- added-by = "sti",
- url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067",
- number = "2000/067",
- month = oct,
- abstract = "We propose a new paradigm for defining security of
- cryptographic protocols, called {\sf universally composable
- security.} The salient property of universally composable
- definitions of security is that they guarantee security
- even when a secure protocol is composed with an arbitrary
- set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is
- used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an
- essential property for maintaining security of
- cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable
- environments such as the Internet. In particular,
- universally composable definitions guarantee security even
- when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed
- concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they
- guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary
- protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally
- composable definitions of security for practically any
- cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
- practically any such definition can be realized using known
- general techniques, as long as only a minority of the
- participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate
- universally composable definitions of a wide array of
- cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure
- communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption,
- signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero-knowledge,
- and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the
- realizability of the proposed definitions in other natural
- settings.",
- keywords = "foundations / cryptographic protocols, security analysis of
- protocols, concurrent composition",
- type = "Report",
- annote = "Revised version of \cite{Canetti:2000:SCM}.",
- year = 2001,
- institution = "Cryptology {ePrint} Archive",
- added-at = "Wed Oct 17 16:02:37 2001",
- note = "Extended Abstract appeared in proceedings of the 42nd
- Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001"
-}
-
-@PhdThesis{Daemen:1995:CHF,
- author = "Joan Daemen",
- title = "Cipher and hash function design strategies based on linear
+ institution = "Cryptology {ePrint} Archive",
+ year = 2001,
+ type = "Report",
+ number = "2000/067",
+ month = oct,
+ note = "Extended Abstract appeared in proceedings of the 42nd
+ Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001",
+ annote = "Revised version of \cite{Canetti:2000:SCM}.",
+ added-by = "sti",
+ url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067",
+ abstract = "We propose a new paradigm for defining security of
+ cryptographic protocols, called {\sf universally
+ composable security.} The salient property of universally
+ composable definitions of security is that they guarantee
+ security even when a secure protocol is composed with an
+ arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the
+ protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary
+ system. This is an essential property for maintaining
+ security of cryptographic protocols in complex and
+ unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In
+ particular, universally composable definitions guarantee
+ security even when an unbounded number of protocol
+ instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially
+ controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with
+ respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to
+ formulate universally composable definitions of security
+ for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we
+ demonstrate that practically any such definition can be
+ realized using known general techniques, as long as only a
+ minority of the participants are corrupted. We then
+ proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of
+ a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including
+ authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange,
+ public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious
+ transfer, zero-knowledge, and more. We also make initial
+ steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed
+ definitions in other natural settings.",
+ keywords = "foundations / cryptographic protocols, security analysis
+ of protocols, concurrent composition",
+ added-at = "Wed Oct 17 16:02:37 2001"
+}
+
+@Misc{certicom-2000:sec1,
+ author = "{Certicom Research}",
+ title = "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, {SEC} 1: {E}lliptic
+ curve cryptography, Version 1.0",
+ year = 2000,
+ url = "http://www.secg.org/download/aid-385/sec1_final.pdf"
+}
+
+@PhdThesis{daemen-1995:cipher-hash-design,
+ author = "Joan Daemen",
+ title = "Cipher and hash function design strategies based on linear