Don't make scary messages just because one key didn't work on a message:
[tripe] / keyset.c
1 /* -*-c-*-
2 *
3 * $Id: keyset.c,v 1.7 2003/05/17 11:00:47 mdw Exp $
4 *
5 * Handling of symmetric keysets
6 *
7 * (c) 2001 Straylight/Edgeware
8 */
9
10 /*----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------*
11 *
12 * This file is part of Trivial IP Encryption (TrIPE).
13 *
14 * TrIPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
15 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
16 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
17 * (at your option) any later version.
18 *
19 * TrIPE is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
20 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
21 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
22 * GNU General Public License for more details.
23 *
24 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
25 * along with TrIPE; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
26 * Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
27 */
28
29 /*----- Revision history --------------------------------------------------*
30 *
31 * $Log: keyset.c,v $
32 * Revision 1.7 2003/05/17 11:00:47 mdw
33 * Don't make scary messages just because one key didn't work on a message:
34 * only be frightened if they all fail. Set initial keyset refcount
35 * correctly.
36 *
37 * Revision 1.6 2003/04/06 10:26:35 mdw
38 * Report peer name on decrypt errors.
39 *
40 * Revision 1.5 2001/06/19 22:07:43 mdw
41 * Change the encrypted packet format to be non-malleable.
42 *
43 * Revision 1.4 2001/06/16 14:06:40 mdw
44 * Quantify collision probabilities for the stated data volume bounds.
45 *
46 * Revision 1.3 2001/02/16 21:39:55 mdw
47 * Major overhaul. Separate functions for manipulating keysets from
48 * functions for manipulating keyset lists. Introduce a concept of
49 * listening-only keys.
50 *
51 * Revision 1.2 2001/02/05 19:53:23 mdw
52 * Add sequence number protection.
53 *
54 * Revision 1.1 2001/02/03 20:26:37 mdw
55 * Initial checkin.
56 *
57 */
58
59 /*----- Header files ------------------------------------------------------*/
60
61 #include "tripe.h"
62
63 /*----- Tunable parameters ------------------------------------------------*/
64
65 /* --- Note on size limits --- *
66 *
67 * For a 64-bit block cipher (e.g., Blowfish), the probability of a collision
68 * occurring after 32 MB is less than %$2^{-21}$%, and the probability of a
69 * collision occurring after 64 MB is less than %$2^{-19}$%.
70 */
71
72 #define T_EXP MIN(60) /* Expiry time for a key */
73 #define T_REGEN MIN(45) /* Regeneration time for a key */
74 #define SZ_EXP MEG(64) /* Expiry data size for a key */
75 #define SZ_REGEN MEG(32) /* Data size threshold for regen */
76
77 /*----- Handy macros ------------------------------------------------------*/
78
79 #define KEYOK(ks, now) ((ks)->sz_exp > 0 && (ks)->t_exp > now)
80
81 /*----- Low-level packet encryption and decryption ------------------------*/
82
83 /* --- Encrypted data format --- *
84 *
85 * Let %$p_i$% be the %$i$%-th plaintext message. We first compute
86 *
87 * %$c_i = \mathcal{E}\textrm{-CBC}_{K_{\text{E}}}(p_i)$%
88 *
89 * as the CBC-ciphertext of %$p_i$%, and then
90 *
91 * %$\sigma_i = \mathcal{T}_{K_{\text{M}}}(i, c_i)$%
92 *
93 * as a MAC on the %%\emph{ciphertext}%%. The message sent is then the pair
94 * %$(\sigma_i, c_i)$%. This construction is provably secure in the NM-CCA
95 * sense (assuming that the cipher is IND-CPA, and the MAC is SUF-CMA)
96 * [Bellare and Namprempre].
97 *
98 * This also ensures that, assuming the key is good, we have a secure channel
99 * [Krawczyk]. Actually, [Krawczyk] shows that, if the cipher is either a
100 * simple stream cipher or a block cipher in CBC mode, we can use the MAC-
101 * then-encrypt scheme and still have a secure channel. However, I like the
102 * NM-CCA guarantee from [Bellare and Namprempre]. I'm less worried about
103 * the Horton Principle [Wagner and Schneier].
104 */
105
106 /* --- @doencrypt@ --- *
107 *
108 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use
109 * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer
110 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer
111 *
112 * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if a new key is required.
113 *
114 * Use: Encrypts a message with the given key. We assume that the
115 * keyset is OK to use.
116 */
117
118 static int doencrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb)
119 {
120 ghash *h;
121 gcipher *c;
122 const octet *p = BCUR(b);
123 size_t sz = BLEFT(b);
124 octet *qmac, *qseq, *qiv, *qpk;
125 uint32 oseq;
126 size_t osz, nsz;
127 int rc = 0;
128
129 /* --- Allocate the required buffer space --- */
130
131 c = ks->cout;
132 if (buf_ensure(bb, MACSZ + SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz))
133 return (0); /* Caution! */
134 qmac = BCUR(bb); qseq = qmac + MACSZ; qiv = qseq + SEQSZ; qpk = qiv + IVSZ;
135 BSTEP(bb, MACSZ + SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz);
136
137 /* --- Encrypt the packet --- */
138
139 oseq = ks->oseq++; STORE32(qseq, oseq);
140 rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, qiv, IVSZ);
141 c->ops->setiv(c, qiv);
142 c->ops->encrypt(c, p, qpk, sz);
143 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {
144 trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: encrypting packet %lu using keyset %u",
145 (unsigned long)oseq, ks->seq);
146 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: encrypted packet", qpk, sz);
147 })
148
149 /* --- Now compute the MAC --- */
150
151 h = ks->mout->ops->init(ks->mout);
152 h->ops->hash(h, qseq, SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz);
153 memcpy(qmac, h->ops->done(h, 0), MACSZ);
154 h->ops->destroy(h);
155 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {
156 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed MAC", qmac, MACSZ);
157 })
158
159 /* --- Deduct the packet size from the key's data life --- */
160
161 osz = ks->sz_exp;
162 if (osz > sz)
163 nsz = osz - sz;
164 else
165 nsz = 0;
166 if (osz >= SZ_REGEN && nsz < SZ_REGEN) {
167 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: keyset %u data regen limit exceeded -- "
168 "forcing exchange", ks->seq); )
169 rc = -1;
170 }
171 ks->sz_exp = nsz;
172 return (rc);
173 }
174
175 /* --- @dodecrypt@ --- *
176 *
177 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use
178 * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer
179 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer
180 * @uint32 *seq@ = where to store the sequence number
181 *
182 * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if it failed.
183 *
184 * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message with the given key. No other
185 * checking (e.g., sequence number checks) is performed. We
186 * assume that the keyset is OK to use, and that there is
187 * sufficient output buffer space reserved. If the decryption
188 * is successful, the buffer pointer is moved past the decrypted
189 * packet, and the packet's sequence number is stored in @*seq@.
190 */
191
192 static int dodecrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
193 {
194 const octet *pmac, *piv, *pseq, *ppk;
195 size_t psz = BLEFT(b);
196 size_t sz;
197 octet *q = BCUR(bb);
198 ghash *h;
199 gcipher *c = ks->cin;
200 size_t ivsz = c->ops->c->blksz;
201 octet *mac;
202 int eq;
203
204 /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */
205
206 if (psz < ivsz + 4) {
207 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset %u", ks->seq); )
208 return (-1);
209 }
210 sz = psz - IVSZ - SEQSZ - MACSZ;
211 pmac = BCUR(b); pseq = pmac + MACSZ; piv = pseq + SEQSZ; ppk = piv + IVSZ;
212
213 /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */
214
215 h = ks->min->ops->init(ks->min);
216 h->ops->hash(h, pseq, SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz);
217 mac = h->ops->done(h, 0);
218 eq = !memcmp(mac, pmac, MACSZ);
219 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {
220 trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decrypting using keyset %u", ks->seq);
221 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed MAC", mac, MACSZ);
222 })
223 h->ops->destroy(h);
224 if (!eq) {
225 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {
226 trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: incorrect MAC: decryption failed");
227 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: expected MAC", pmac, MACSZ);
228 })
229 return (-1);
230 }
231
232 /* --- Decrypt the packet --- */
233
234 c->ops->setiv(c, piv);
235 c->ops->decrypt(c, ppk, q, sz);
236 if (seq)
237 *seq = LOAD32(pseq);
238 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {
239 trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decrypted OK (sequence = %lu)",
240 (unsigned long)LOAD32(pseq));
241 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: decrypted packet", q, sz);
242 })
243 BSTEP(bb, sz);
244 return (0);
245 }
246
247 /* --- @dosequence@ --- *
248 *
249 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
250 * @uint32 seq@ = a sequence number from a packet
251 *
252 * Returns: Zero if the sequence number is OK, nonzero if it's not.
253 *
254 * Use: Checks a sequence number. The data in the keyset which keeps
255 * track of valid sequence numbers is updated if the sequence
256 * number given is good. It's assumed that the sequence number
257 * has already been checked for authenticity.
258 */
259
260 static int dosequence(keyset *ks, uint32 seq)
261 {
262 uint32 seqbit;
263 uint32 n;
264
265 if (seq < ks->iseq) {
266 a_warn("received packet has old sequence number (possible replay)");
267 return (-1);
268 }
269 if (seq >= ks->iseq + KS_SEQWINSZ) {
270 n = seq - (ks->iseq + KS_SEQWINSZ - 1);
271 if (n < KS_SEQWINSZ)
272 ks->iwin >>= n;
273 else
274 ks->iwin = 0;
275 ks->iseq += n;
276 }
277 seqbit = 1 << (seq - ks->iseq);
278 if (ks->iwin & seqbit) {
279 a_warn("received packet repeats old sequence number");
280 return (-1);
281 }
282 ks->iwin |= seqbit;
283 return (0);
284 }
285
286 /*----- Operations on a single keyset -------------------------------------*/
287
288 /* --- @ks_drop@ --- *
289 *
290 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
291 *
292 * Returns: ---
293 *
294 * Use: Decrements a keyset's reference counter. If the counter hits
295 * zero, the keyset is freed.
296 */
297
298 void ks_drop(keyset *ks)
299 {
300 if (--ks->ref)
301 return;
302 ks->cin->ops->destroy(ks->cin);
303 ks->cout->ops->destroy(ks->cout);
304 ks->min->ops->destroy(ks->min);
305 ks->mout->ops->destroy(ks->mout);
306 DESTROY(ks);
307 }
308
309 /* --- @ks_gen@ --- *
310 *
311 * Arguments: @const void *k@ = pointer to key material
312 * @size_t x, y, z@ = offsets into key material (see below)
313 * @peer *p@ = pointer to peer information
314 *
315 * Returns: A pointer to the new keyset.
316 *
317 * Use: Derives a new keyset from the given key material. The
318 * offsets @x@, @y@ and @z@ separate the key material into three
319 * parts. Between the @k@ and @k + x@ is `my' contribution to
320 * the key material; between @k + x@ and @k + y@ is `your'
321 * contribution; and between @k + y@ and @k + z@ is a shared
322 * value we made together. These are used to construct two
323 * pairs of symmetric keys. Each pair consists of an encryption
324 * key and a message authentication key. One pair is used for
325 * outgoing messages, the other for incoming messages.
326 *
327 * The new key is marked so that it won't be selected for output
328 * by @ksl_encrypt@. You can still encrypt data with it by
329 * calling @ks_encrypt@ directly.
330 */
331
332 keyset *ks_gen(const void *k, size_t x, size_t y, size_t z, peer *p)
333 {
334 HASH_CTX h;
335 octet buf[HASHSZ];
336 keyset *ks = CREATE(keyset);
337 time_t now = time(0);
338 const octet *pp = k;
339 T( static unsigned seq = 0; )
340
341 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: adding new keyset %u", seq); )
342
343 /* --- Construct the various keys --- *
344 *
345 * This is done with macros, because it's quite tedious.
346 */
347
348 #define MINE HASH(&h, pp, x)
349 #define YOURS HASH(&h, pp + x, y - x)
350 #define OURS HASH(&h, pp + y, z - y)
351
352 #define IN MINE; YOURS; OURS
353 #define OUT YOURS; MINE; OURS
354 #define STR_IN "incoming"
355 #define STR_OUT "outgoing"
356
357 #define GETHASH(str, dir) do { \
358 HASH_INIT(&h); \
359 HASH_STRING(&h, "tripe-" str); \
360 dir; \
361 HASH_DONE(&h, buf); \
362 IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \
363 trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: " STR_##dir " key " str, \
364 buf, sizeof(buf)); \
365 }) \
366 } while (0)
367
368 GETHASH("encryption", IN); ks->cin = CIPHER->init(buf, sizeof(buf));
369 GETHASH("integrity", IN); ks->min = MAC->key(buf, sizeof(buf));
370 GETHASH("encryption", OUT); ks->cout = CIPHER->init(buf, sizeof(buf));
371 GETHASH("integrity", OUT); ks->mout = MAC->key(buf, sizeof(buf));
372
373 #undef MINE
374 #undef YOURS
375 #undef OURS
376 #undef IN
377 #undef OUT
378 #undef STR_IN
379 #undef STR_OUT
380 #undef GETHASH
381
382 T( ks->seq = seq++; )
383 ks->ref = 1;
384 ks->t_exp = now + T_EXP;
385 ks->sz_exp = SZ_EXP;
386 ks->oseq = ks->iseq = 0;
387 ks->iwin = 0;
388 ks->next = 0;
389 ks->p = p;
390 ks->f = KSF_LISTEN;
391 BURN(buf);
392 return (ks);
393 }
394
395 /* --- @ks_tregen@ --- *
396 *
397 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
398 *
399 * Returns: The time at which moves ought to be made to replace this key.
400 */
401
402 time_t ks_tregen(keyset *ks) { return (ks->t_exp - T_EXP + T_REGEN); }
403
404 /* --- @ks_activate@ --- *
405 *
406 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
407 *
408 * Returns: ---
409 *
410 * Use: Activates a keyset, so that it can be used for encrypting
411 * outgoing messages.
412 */
413
414 void ks_activate(keyset *ks)
415 {
416 if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) {
417 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: activating keyset %u", ks->seq); )
418 ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN;
419 }
420 }
421
422 /* --- @ks_encrypt@ --- *
423 *
424 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
425 * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer
426 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer
427 *
428 * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the key needs replacing. If the
429 * encryption failed, the output buffer is broken and zero is
430 * returned.
431 *
432 * Use: Encrypts a block of data using the key. Note that the `key
433 * ought to be replaced' notification is only ever given once
434 * for each key. Also note that this call forces a keyset to be
435 * used even if it's marked as not for data output.
436 */
437
438 int ks_encrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb)
439 {
440 time_t now = time(0);
441
442 if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) {
443 buf_break(bb);
444 return (0);
445 }
446 return (doencrypt(ks, b, bb));
447 }
448
449 /* --- @ks_decrypt@ --- *
450 *
451 * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
452 * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer
453 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer
454 *
455 * Returns: Zero on success, or nonzero if there was some problem.
456 *
457 * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message using a given key. Note that
458 * requesting decryption with a key directly won't clear a
459 * marking that it's not for encryption.
460 */
461
462 int ks_decrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb)
463 {
464 time_t now = time(0);
465 uint32 seq;
466
467 if (!KEYOK(ks, now) ||
468 buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b)) ||
469 dodecrypt(ks, b, bb, &seq) ||
470 dosequence(ks, seq))
471 return (-1);
472 return (0);
473 }
474
475 /*----- Keyset list handling ----------------------------------------------*/
476
477 /* --- @ksl_free@ --- *
478 *
479 * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head
480 *
481 * Returns: ---
482 *
483 * Use: Frees (releases references to) all of the keys in a keyset.
484 */
485
486 void ksl_free(keyset **ksroot)
487 {
488 keyset *ks, *ksn;
489 for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ksn) {
490 ksn = ks->next;
491 ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK;
492 ks_drop(ks);
493 }
494 }
495
496 /* --- @ksl_link@ --- *
497 *
498 * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head
499 * @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset
500 *
501 * Returns: ---
502 *
503 * Use: Links a keyset into a list. A keyset can only be on one list
504 * at a time. Bad things happen otherwise.
505 */
506
507 void ksl_link(keyset **ksroot, keyset *ks)
508 {
509 assert(!(ks->f & KSF_LINK));
510 ks->next = *ksroot;
511 *ksroot = ks;
512 ks->f |= KSF_LINK;
513 ks->ref++;
514 }
515
516 /* --- @ksl_prune@ --- *
517 *
518 * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head
519 *
520 * Returns: ---
521 *
522 * Use: Prunes the keyset list by removing keys which mustn't be used
523 * any more.
524 */
525
526 void ksl_prune(keyset **ksroot)
527 {
528 time_t now = time(0);
529
530 while (*ksroot) {
531 keyset *ks = *ksroot;
532
533 if (ks->t_exp <= now) {
534 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (time limit reached)",
535 ks->seq); )
536 goto kill;
537 } else if (ks->sz_exp == 0) {
538 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (data limit reached)",
539 ks->seq); )
540 goto kill;
541 } else {
542 ksroot = &ks->next;
543 continue;
544 }
545
546 kill:
547 *ksroot = ks->next;
548 ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK;
549 ks_drop(ks);
550 }
551 }
552
553 /* --- @ksl_encrypt@ --- *
554 *
555 * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head
556 * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer
557 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer
558 *
559 * Returns: Nonzero if a new key is needed.
560 *
561 * Use: Encrypts a packet.
562 */
563
564 int ksl_encrypt(keyset **ksroot, buf *b, buf *bb)
565 {
566 time_t now = time(0);
567 keyset *ks = *ksroot;
568
569 for (;;) {
570 if (!ks) {
571 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no suitable keysets found"); )
572 buf_break(bb);
573 return (-1);
574 }
575 if (KEYOK(ks, now) && !(ks->f & KSF_LISTEN))
576 break;
577 ks = ks->next;
578 }
579
580 return (doencrypt(ks, b, bb));
581 }
582
583 /* --- @ksl_decrypt@ --- *
584 *
585 * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head
586 * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer
587 * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer
588 *
589 * Returns: Nonzero if the packet couldn't be decrypted.
590 *
591 * Use: Decrypts a packet.
592 */
593
594 int ksl_decrypt(keyset **ksroot, buf *b, buf *bb)
595 {
596 time_t now = time(0);
597 keyset *ks;
598 uint32 seq;
599
600 if (buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b)))
601 return (-1);
602
603 for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ks->next) {
604 if (!KEYOK(ks, now))
605 continue;
606 if (!dodecrypt(ks, b, bb, &seq)) {
607 if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) {
608 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: implicitly activating keyset %u",
609 ks->seq); )
610 ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN;
611 }
612 return (dosequence(ks, seq));
613 }
614 }
615 T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no matching keys, or incorrect MAC"); )
616 return (-1);
617 }
618
619 /*----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------*/