Commit | Line | Data |
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410c8acf | 1 | /* -*-c-*- |
2 | * | |
410c8acf | 3 | * Handling of symmetric keysets |
4 | * | |
5 | * (c) 2001 Straylight/Edgeware | |
6 | */ | |
7 | ||
e04c2d50 | 8 | /*----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------* |
410c8acf | 9 | * |
10 | * This file is part of Trivial IP Encryption (TrIPE). | |
11 | * | |
12 | * TrIPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
13 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
14 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
15 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
e04c2d50 | 16 | * |
410c8acf | 17 | * TrIPE is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
18 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
19 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
20 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
e04c2d50 | 21 | * |
410c8acf | 22 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
23 | * along with TrIPE; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, | |
24 | * Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. | |
25 | */ | |
26 | ||
410c8acf | 27 | /*----- Header files ------------------------------------------------------*/ |
28 | ||
29 | #include "tripe.h" | |
30 | ||
410c8acf | 31 | /*----- Handy macros ------------------------------------------------------*/ |
32 | ||
33 | #define KEYOK(ks, now) ((ks)->sz_exp > 0 && (ks)->t_exp > now) | |
34 | ||
426c0bc6 | 35 | /*----- Low-level packet encryption and decryption ------------------------*/ |
410c8acf | 36 | |
59d670e7 | 37 | /* --- Encrypted data format --- * |
38 | * | |
7ed14135 | 39 | * Let %$p_i$% be the %$i$%-th plaintext message, with type %$t$%. We first |
e04c2d50 | 40 | * compute |
59d670e7 | 41 | * |
42 | * %$c_i = \mathcal{E}\textrm{-CBC}_{K_{\text{E}}}(p_i)$% | |
43 | * | |
44 | * as the CBC-ciphertext of %$p_i$%, and then | |
45 | * | |
7ed14135 | 46 | * %$\sigma_i = \mathcal{T}_{K_{\text{M}}}(t, i, c_i)$% |
59d670e7 | 47 | * |
48 | * as a MAC on the %%\emph{ciphertext}%%. The message sent is then the pair | |
49 | * %$(\sigma_i, c_i)$%. This construction is provably secure in the NM-CCA | |
50 | * sense (assuming that the cipher is IND-CPA, and the MAC is SUF-CMA) | |
51 | * [Bellare and Namprempre]. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * This also ensures that, assuming the key is good, we have a secure channel | |
54 | * [Krawczyk]. Actually, [Krawczyk] shows that, if the cipher is either a | |
55 | * simple stream cipher or a block cipher in CBC mode, we can use the MAC- | |
56 | * then-encrypt scheme and still have a secure channel. However, I like the | |
57 | * NM-CCA guarantee from [Bellare and Namprempre]. I'm less worried about | |
58 | * the Horton Principle [Wagner and Schneier]. | |
59 | */ | |
60 | ||
426c0bc6 | 61 | /* --- @doencrypt@ --- * |
410c8acf | 62 | * |
426c0bc6 | 63 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use |
7ed14135 | 64 | * @unsigned ty@ = type of message this is |
426c0bc6 | 65 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
66 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer | |
410c8acf | 67 | * |
a50f9a0e MW |
68 | * Returns: Zero if OK; @KSERR_REGEN@ if it's time to generate new keys. |
69 | * Also returns zero if there was insufficient buffer space, but | |
70 | * the buffer is broken in this case. | |
410c8acf | 71 | * |
426c0bc6 | 72 | * Use: Encrypts a message with the given key. We assume that the |
73 | * keyset is OK to use. | |
410c8acf | 74 | */ |
75 | ||
7ed14135 | 76 | static int doencrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb) |
410c8acf | 77 | { |
a93aacce | 78 | int rc; |
426c0bc6 | 79 | size_t sz = BLEFT(b); |
426c0bc6 | 80 | size_t osz, nsz; |
426c0bc6 | 81 | |
a93aacce | 82 | /* --- Initial tracing --- */ |
426c0bc6 | 83 | |
426c0bc6 | 84 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
a93aacce MW |
85 | trace(T_KEYSET, |
86 | "keyset: encrypting packet %lu (type %u) using keyset %u", | |
87 | (unsigned long)ks->oseq, ty, ks->seq); | |
88 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: plaintext packet", BCUR(b), sz); | |
426c0bc6 | 89 | }) |
59d670e7 | 90 | |
a93aacce | 91 | /* --- Apply the bulk-crypto transformation --- */ |
426c0bc6 | 92 | |
a93aacce MW |
93 | rc = ks->bulk->encrypt(ks, ty, b, bb); |
94 | if (rc || !BOK(bb)) return (rc); | |
b5c45da1 | 95 | |
a93aacce | 96 | /* --- Do the necessary accounting for data volume --- */ |
426c0bc6 | 97 | |
98 | osz = ks->sz_exp; | |
a93aacce | 99 | nsz = osz > sz ? osz - sz : 0; |
383a9d71 | 100 | if (osz >= ks->sz_regen && ks->sz_regen > nsz) { |
426c0bc6 | 101 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: keyset %u data regen limit exceeded -- " |
102 | "forcing exchange", ks->seq); ) | |
a50f9a0e | 103 | rc = KSERR_REGEN; |
426c0bc6 | 104 | } |
105 | ks->sz_exp = nsz; | |
a93aacce MW |
106 | |
107 | /* --- We're done --- */ | |
108 | ||
e04c2d50 | 109 | return (rc); |
410c8acf | 110 | } |
111 | ||
426c0bc6 | 112 | /* --- @dodecrypt@ --- * |
410c8acf | 113 | * |
426c0bc6 | 114 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use |
7ed14135 | 115 | * @unsigned ty@ = expected type code |
426c0bc6 | 116 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
117 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer | |
118 | * @uint32 *seq@ = where to store the sequence number | |
410c8acf | 119 | * |
a50f9a0e | 120 | * Returns: Zero on success; @KSERR_DECRYPT@ on failure. |
410c8acf | 121 | * |
426c0bc6 | 122 | * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message with the given key. No other |
123 | * checking (e.g., sequence number checks) is performed. We | |
124 | * assume that the keyset is OK to use, and that there is | |
125 | * sufficient output buffer space reserved. If the decryption | |
126 | * is successful, the buffer pointer is moved past the decrypted | |
127 | * packet, and the packet's sequence number is stored in @*seq@. | |
410c8acf | 128 | */ |
129 | ||
7ed14135 | 130 | static int dodecrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq) |
410c8acf | 131 | { |
a93aacce MW |
132 | const octet *q = BCUR(bb); |
133 | int rc; | |
426c0bc6 | 134 | |
426c0bc6 | 135 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
a93aacce MW |
136 | trace(T_KEYSET, |
137 | "keyset: try decrypting packet (type %u) using keyset %u", | |
138 | ty, ks->seq); | |
139 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: ciphertext packet", BCUR(b), BLEFT(b)); | |
426c0bc6 | 140 | }) |
b5c45da1 | 141 | |
a93aacce MW |
142 | rc = ks->bulk->decrypt(ks, ty, b, bb, seq); |
143 | if (rc) return (rc); | |
59d670e7 | 144 | |
426c0bc6 | 145 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
146 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decrypted OK (sequence = %lu)", | |
a93aacce MW |
147 | (unsigned long)*seq); |
148 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: decrypted packet", q, BCUR(bb) - q); | |
426c0bc6 | 149 | }) |
426c0bc6 | 150 | return (0); |
410c8acf | 151 | } |
152 | ||
426c0bc6 | 153 | /*----- Operations on a single keyset -------------------------------------*/ |
154 | ||
155 | /* --- @ks_drop@ --- * | |
156 | * | |
157 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset | |
158 | * | |
159 | * Returns: --- | |
160 | * | |
161 | * Use: Decrements a keyset's reference counter. If the counter hits | |
162 | * zero, the keyset is freed. | |
163 | */ | |
164 | ||
165 | void ks_drop(keyset *ks) | |
166 | { | |
167 | if (--ks->ref) | |
168 | return; | |
a93aacce MW |
169 | |
170 | #define DROP(dir, a, drop) do { if (ks->dir.a) drop(ks->dir.a); } while (0) | |
171 | #define DROP_DIR(dir) do { \ | |
172 | DROP(dir, c, GC_DESTROY); \ | |
173 | DROP(dir, m, GM_DESTROY); \ | |
174 | } while (0) | |
175 | ||
176 | DROP_DIR(in); | |
177 | DROP_DIR(out); | |
178 | ||
179 | #undef DROP | |
180 | #undef DROP_DIR | |
181 | ||
426c0bc6 | 182 | DESTROY(ks); |
410c8acf | 183 | } |
184 | ||
185 | /* --- @ks_gen@ --- * | |
186 | * | |
426c0bc6 | 187 | * Arguments: @const void *k@ = pointer to key material |
188 | * @size_t x, y, z@ = offsets into key material (see below) | |
e04c2d50 | 189 | * @peer *p@ = pointer to peer information |
410c8acf | 190 | * |
426c0bc6 | 191 | * Returns: A pointer to the new keyset. |
410c8acf | 192 | * |
426c0bc6 | 193 | * Use: Derives a new keyset from the given key material. The |
194 | * offsets @x@, @y@ and @z@ separate the key material into three | |
195 | * parts. Between the @k@ and @k + x@ is `my' contribution to | |
196 | * the key material; between @k + x@ and @k + y@ is `your' | |
197 | * contribution; and between @k + y@ and @k + z@ is a shared | |
198 | * value we made together. These are used to construct two | |
199 | * pairs of symmetric keys. Each pair consists of an encryption | |
200 | * key and a message authentication key. One pair is used for | |
201 | * outgoing messages, the other for incoming messages. | |
202 | * | |
203 | * The new key is marked so that it won't be selected for output | |
204 | * by @ksl_encrypt@. You can still encrypt data with it by | |
205 | * calling @ks_encrypt@ directly. | |
410c8acf | 206 | */ |
207 | ||
a93aacce MW |
208 | static void gen_dir(const algswitch *algs, struct ksdir *ksd, |
209 | const char *whichdir, | |
210 | const octet *from, size_t fromsz, | |
211 | const octet *to, size_t tosz, | |
212 | const octet *both, size_t bothsz) | |
213 | { | |
214 | #define SETKEY(what, a, init) do { \ | |
215 | ghash *_h; \ | |
216 | octet *_hh; \ | |
217 | \ | |
218 | if (!algs->a) \ | |
219 | ksd->a = 0; \ | |
220 | else { \ | |
221 | _h = GH_INIT(algs->h); \ | |
222 | HASH_STRING(_h, "tripe-" what); \ | |
223 | GH_HASH(_h, from, fromsz); \ | |
224 | GH_HASH(_h, to, tosz); \ | |
225 | GH_HASH(_h, both, bothsz); \ | |
226 | _hh = GH_DONE(_h, 0); \ | |
227 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { \ | |
228 | char _buf[32]; \ | |
229 | sprintf(_buf, "crypto: %s key " what, whichdir); \ | |
230 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, _buf, _hh, algs->a##ksz); \ | |
231 | }) }) \ | |
232 | ksd->a = init(algs->a, _hh, algs->a##ksz); \ | |
233 | GH_DESTROY(_h); \ | |
234 | } \ | |
235 | } while (0) | |
236 | ||
237 | SETKEY("encryption", c, GC_INIT); | |
238 | SETKEY("integrity", m, GM_KEY); | |
239 | ||
240 | #undef SETKEY | |
241 | } | |
242 | ||
9466fafa | 243 | keyset *ks_gen(const void *k, size_t x, size_t y, size_t z, peer *p) |
410c8acf | 244 | { |
410c8acf | 245 | keyset *ks = CREATE(keyset); |
246 | time_t now = time(0); | |
9466fafa | 247 | const octet *pp = k; |
35c8b547 | 248 | const algswitch *algs = &p->kx.kpriv->algs; |
410c8acf | 249 | T( static unsigned seq = 0; ) |
250 | ||
251 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: adding new keyset %u", seq); ) | |
252 | ||
a93aacce MW |
253 | gen_dir(algs, &ks->in, "incoming", pp, x, pp + x, y - x, pp + y, z - y); |
254 | gen_dir(algs, &ks->out, "outgoing", pp + x, y - x, pp, x, pp + y, z - y); | |
410c8acf | 255 | |
256 | T( ks->seq = seq++; ) | |
a93aacce | 257 | ks->bulk = algs->bulk; |
e945d6e4 | 258 | ks->ref = 1; |
426c0bc6 | 259 | ks->t_exp = now + T_EXP; |
35c8b547 MW |
260 | ks->sz_exp = algs->expsz; |
261 | ks->sz_regen = algs->expsz/2; | |
37941236 | 262 | ks->oseq = 0; |
263 | seq_reset(&ks->iseq); | |
426c0bc6 | 264 | ks->next = 0; |
9466fafa | 265 | ks->p = p; |
426c0bc6 | 266 | ks->f = KSF_LISTEN; |
35c8b547 | 267 | ks->tagsz = algs->tagsz; |
426c0bc6 | 268 | return (ks); |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
426c0bc6 | 271 | /* --- @ks_activate@ --- * |
272 | * | |
273 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset | |
274 | * | |
275 | * Returns: --- | |
276 | * | |
277 | * Use: Activates a keyset, so that it can be used for encrypting | |
278 | * outgoing messages. | |
279 | */ | |
280 | ||
281 | void ks_activate(keyset *ks) | |
282 | { | |
283 | if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) { | |
284 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: activating keyset %u", ks->seq); ) | |
285 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN; | |
286 | } | |
410c8acf | 287 | } |
288 | ||
289 | /* --- @ks_encrypt@ --- * | |
290 | * | |
426c0bc6 | 291 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
7ed14135 | 292 | * @unsigned ty@ = message type |
426c0bc6 | 293 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
294 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer | |
295 | * | |
a50f9a0e MW |
296 | * Returns: Zero if successful; @KSERR_REGEN@ if we should negotiate a |
297 | * new key; @KSERR_NOKEYS@ if the key is not usable. Also | |
298 | * returns zero if there was insufficient buffer (but the output | |
299 | * buffer is broken in this case). | |
426c0bc6 | 300 | * |
301 | * Use: Encrypts a block of data using the key. Note that the `key | |
302 | * ought to be replaced' notification is only ever given once | |
303 | * for each key. Also note that this call forces a keyset to be | |
304 | * used even if it's marked as not for data output. | |
a93aacce MW |
305 | * |
306 | * The encryption transform is permitted to corrupt @buf_u@ for | |
307 | * its own purposes. Neither the source nor destination should | |
308 | * be within @buf_u@; and callers mustn't expect anything stored | |
309 | * in @buf_u@ to still | |
426c0bc6 | 310 | */ |
311 | ||
7ed14135 | 312 | int ks_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb) |
426c0bc6 | 313 | { |
314 | time_t now = time(0); | |
315 | ||
316 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) { | |
317 | buf_break(bb); | |
a50f9a0e | 318 | return (KSERR_NOKEYS); |
426c0bc6 | 319 | } |
7ed14135 | 320 | return (doencrypt(ks, ty, b, bb)); |
426c0bc6 | 321 | } |
322 | ||
323 | /* --- @ks_decrypt@ --- * | |
324 | * | |
325 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset | |
7ed14135 | 326 | * @unsigned ty@ = expected type code |
426c0bc6 | 327 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
328 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer | |
329 | * | |
12a26b8b | 330 | * Returns: Zero on success; @KSERR_...@ on failure. Also returns |
a50f9a0e MW |
331 | * zero if there was insufficient buffer (but the output buffer |
332 | * is broken in this case). | |
426c0bc6 | 333 | * |
334 | * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message using a given key. Note that | |
335 | * requesting decryption with a key directly won't clear a | |
336 | * marking that it's not for encryption. | |
a93aacce MW |
337 | * |
338 | * The decryption transform is permitted to corrupt @buf_u@ for | |
339 | * its own purposes. Neither the source nor destination should | |
340 | * be within @buf_u@; and callers mustn't expect anything stored | |
341 | * in @buf_u@ to still | |
426c0bc6 | 342 | */ |
343 | ||
7ed14135 | 344 | int ks_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb) |
426c0bc6 | 345 | { |
346 | time_t now = time(0); | |
347 | uint32 seq; | |
12a26b8b | 348 | int err; |
426c0bc6 | 349 | |
12a26b8b MW |
350 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) return (KSERR_DECRYPT); |
351 | if (buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b))) return (0); | |
352 | if ((err = dodecrypt(ks, ty, b, bb, &seq)) != 0) return (err); | |
353 | if (seq_check(&ks->iseq, seq, "SYMM")) return (KSERR_SEQ); | |
426c0bc6 | 354 | return (0); |
355 | } | |
356 | ||
357 | /*----- Keyset list handling ----------------------------------------------*/ | |
358 | ||
359 | /* --- @ksl_free@ --- * | |
360 | * | |
361 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head | |
362 | * | |
363 | * Returns: --- | |
364 | * | |
365 | * Use: Frees (releases references to) all of the keys in a keyset. | |
366 | */ | |
367 | ||
368 | void ksl_free(keyset **ksroot) | |
369 | { | |
370 | keyset *ks, *ksn; | |
371 | for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ksn) { | |
372 | ksn = ks->next; | |
373 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK; | |
374 | ks_drop(ks); | |
375 | } | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | /* --- @ksl_link@ --- * | |
379 | * | |
380 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head | |
381 | * @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset | |
382 | * | |
383 | * Returns: --- | |
384 | * | |
385 | * Use: Links a keyset into a list. A keyset can only be on one list | |
386 | * at a time. Bad things happen otherwise. | |
387 | */ | |
388 | ||
389 | void ksl_link(keyset **ksroot, keyset *ks) | |
390 | { | |
391 | assert(!(ks->f & KSF_LINK)); | |
392 | ks->next = *ksroot; | |
393 | *ksroot = ks; | |
394 | ks->f |= KSF_LINK; | |
395 | ks->ref++; | |
396 | } | |
397 | ||
398 | /* --- @ksl_prune@ --- * | |
399 | * | |
400 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head | |
401 | * | |
402 | * Returns: --- | |
403 | * | |
404 | * Use: Prunes the keyset list by removing keys which mustn't be used | |
405 | * any more. | |
406 | */ | |
407 | ||
408 | void ksl_prune(keyset **ksroot) | |
409 | { | |
410 | time_t now = time(0); | |
411 | ||
412 | while (*ksroot) { | |
413 | keyset *ks = *ksroot; | |
414 | ||
415 | if (ks->t_exp <= now) { | |
416 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (time limit reached)", | |
417 | ks->seq); ) | |
418 | goto kill; | |
419 | } else if (ks->sz_exp == 0) { | |
420 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (data limit reached)", | |
421 | ks->seq); ) | |
422 | goto kill; | |
423 | } else { | |
424 | ksroot = &ks->next; | |
425 | continue; | |
426 | } | |
427 | ||
428 | kill: | |
429 | *ksroot = ks->next; | |
430 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK; | |
431 | ks_drop(ks); | |
432 | } | |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
435 | /* --- @ksl_encrypt@ --- * | |
436 | * | |
410c8acf | 437 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
7ed14135 | 438 | * @unsigned ty@ = message type |
410c8acf | 439 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
440 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer | |
441 | * | |
a50f9a0e MW |
442 | * Returns: Zero if successful; @KSERR_REGEN@ if it's time to negotiate a |
443 | * new key; @KSERR_NOKEYS@ if there are no suitable keys | |
444 | * available. Also returns zero if there was insufficient | |
445 | * buffer space (but the output buffer is broken in this case). | |
410c8acf | 446 | * |
447 | * Use: Encrypts a packet. | |
448 | */ | |
449 | ||
7ed14135 | 450 | int ksl_encrypt(keyset **ksroot, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb) |
410c8acf | 451 | { |
452 | time_t now = time(0); | |
426c0bc6 | 453 | keyset *ks = *ksroot; |
410c8acf | 454 | |
410c8acf | 455 | for (;;) { |
456 | if (!ks) { | |
426c0bc6 | 457 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no suitable keysets found"); ) |
410c8acf | 458 | buf_break(bb); |
a50f9a0e | 459 | return (KSERR_NOKEYS); |
410c8acf | 460 | } |
426c0bc6 | 461 | if (KEYOK(ks, now) && !(ks->f & KSF_LISTEN)) |
410c8acf | 462 | break; |
463 | ks = ks->next; | |
464 | } | |
465 | ||
7ed14135 | 466 | return (doencrypt(ks, ty, b, bb)); |
410c8acf | 467 | } |
468 | ||
426c0bc6 | 469 | /* --- @ksl_decrypt@ --- * |
410c8acf | 470 | * |
471 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head | |
7ed14135 | 472 | * @unsigned ty@ = expected type code |
410c8acf | 473 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
474 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer | |
475 | * | |
a50f9a0e MW |
476 | * Returns: Zero on success; @KSERR_DECRYPT@ on failure. Also returns |
477 | * zero if there was insufficient buffer (but the output buffer | |
478 | * is broken in this case). | |
410c8acf | 479 | * |
480 | * Use: Decrypts a packet. | |
481 | */ | |
482 | ||
7ed14135 | 483 | int ksl_decrypt(keyset **ksroot, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb) |
410c8acf | 484 | { |
485 | time_t now = time(0); | |
410c8acf | 486 | keyset *ks; |
426c0bc6 | 487 | uint32 seq; |
12a26b8b | 488 | int err; |
410c8acf | 489 | |
426c0bc6 | 490 | if (buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b))) |
12a26b8b | 491 | return (0); |
09585a65 | 492 | |
410c8acf | 493 | for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ks->next) { |
410c8acf | 494 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) |
495 | continue; | |
12a26b8b | 496 | if ((err = dodecrypt(ks, ty, b, bb, &seq)) == 0) { |
426c0bc6 | 497 | if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) { |
498 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: implicitly activating keyset %u", | |
499 | ks->seq); ) | |
500 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN; | |
501 | } | |
a50f9a0e | 502 | if (seq_check(&ks->iseq, seq, "SYMM")) |
12a26b8b | 503 | return (KSERR_SEQ); |
a50f9a0e MW |
504 | else |
505 | return (0); | |
410c8acf | 506 | } |
12a26b8b | 507 | if (err != KSERR_DECRYPT) return (err); |
410c8acf | 508 | } |
e945d6e4 | 509 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no matching keys, or incorrect MAC"); ) |
a50f9a0e | 510 | return (KSERR_DECRYPT); |
410c8acf | 511 | } |
512 | ||
513 | /*----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------*/ |