17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK 0x000F
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
113 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
131 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
147 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
153 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
155 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
158 * Various remote-bug flags.
160 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
161 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
162 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
163 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
164 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
166 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
167 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
169 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
170 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
171 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
173 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
174 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
175 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
176 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
177 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
178 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
179 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
180 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
181 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
182 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
183 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
184 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
185 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
186 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
187 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
188 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
189 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
190 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
191 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
192 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
193 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
194 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
195 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
196 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
197 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
198 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
199 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
200 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
201 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
202 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
203 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
204 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
205 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
206 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
207 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
208 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
209 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
210 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
211 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
212 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
213 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
216 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
218 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
219 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
220 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
221 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
222 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
223 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
224 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
225 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
226 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
227 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
228 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
229 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
230 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
231 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
232 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
233 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
234 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
235 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
236 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
237 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
238 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
239 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
240 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
241 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
242 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
243 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
244 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
245 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
246 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
247 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
248 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
249 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
250 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
251 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
252 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
253 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
259 #define GET_32BIT(cp) \
260 (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
261 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
262 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
263 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
265 #define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) { \
266 (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24); \
267 (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16); \
268 (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8); \
269 (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value); }
271 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
273 PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
,
274 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
275 * fields to the packet logging code. */
276 PKTT_OTHER
, PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKTT_DATA
280 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
281 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
284 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
286 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
288 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
289 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
290 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
291 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
293 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
295 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
296 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
297 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
299 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
302 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
304 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
305 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
306 #define crReturn(z) \
308 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
312 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
314 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
315 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
316 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
317 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
319 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
322 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
323 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
324 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*, unsigned long value
);
325 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*);
326 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
327 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*, char *data
, int len
);
328 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
329 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
330 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
331 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
332 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
333 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
334 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
335 struct Packet
*pktin
);
336 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
337 struct Packet
*pktin
);
340 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
341 * various different purposes:
343 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
344 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
345 * connection (in SSH1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
346 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
349 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
350 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
351 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
352 * thankfully unlikely in SSH2 since the window mechanism should
353 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
354 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
356 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH2
360 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
361 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
362 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
363 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
365 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
367 static void *nullmac_make_context(void)
371 static void nullmac_free_context(void *handle
)
374 static void nullmac_key(void *handle
, unsigned char *key
)
377 static void nullmac_generate(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
381 static int nullmac_verify(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
386 const static struct ssh_mac ssh_mac_none
= {
387 nullmac_make_context
, nullmac_free_context
, nullmac_key
,
388 nullmac_generate
, nullmac_verify
, "none", 0
390 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
391 &ssh_sha1
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
393 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
394 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
397 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
401 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
404 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
405 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
409 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
413 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
415 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
416 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
417 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
419 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
420 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
421 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
424 enum { /* channel types */
429 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
433 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
436 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
437 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
439 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
442 * In SSH1, this value contains four bits:
444 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
445 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
446 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
447 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
449 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
453 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
456 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
458 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
463 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
464 unsigned char *message
;
465 unsigned char msglen
[4];
466 unsigned lensofar
, totallen
;
468 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
471 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
478 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH 1 and SSH
479 * 2 use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH 2's
480 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
482 * In SSH 1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
483 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
484 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
485 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
486 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
487 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
488 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
489 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
490 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
491 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
492 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
494 * In SSH 2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
495 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
496 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
497 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
498 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
499 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
501 * Hence, in SSH 1 this structure is indexed by destination
502 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH 2 it is indexed by source port.
504 struct ssh_portfwd
; /* forward declaration */
506 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
507 unsigned sport
, dport
;
510 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
;
512 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
513 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
516 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
517 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
518 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
519 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
523 enum { DESTROY
, KEEP
, CREATE
} status
;
525 unsigned sport
, dport
;
528 struct ssh_rportfwd
*remote
;
532 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
533 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
534 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
538 long forcepad
; /* Force padding to at least this length */
540 unsigned long sequence
;
545 long encrypted_len
; /* for SSH2 total-size counting */
548 * State associated with packet logging
552 struct logblank_t
*blanks
;
555 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
556 struct Packet
*pktin
);
557 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
558 struct Packet
*pktin
);
559 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
560 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
561 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
562 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
563 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
564 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
565 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
566 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
567 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
568 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
);
569 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
);
570 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
);
571 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
);
572 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
);
573 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
574 struct Packet
*pktin
);
576 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
577 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
578 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
582 struct Packet
*pktin
;
585 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
586 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
589 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
590 struct Packet
*pktin
;
593 typedef void (*handler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
);
594 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
);
596 struct queued_handler
;
597 struct queued_handler
{
599 chandler_fn_t handler
;
601 struct queued_handler
*next
;
605 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
606 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
608 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
615 unsigned char session_key
[32];
617 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
618 int v1_local_protoflags
;
619 int agentfwd_enabled
;
622 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
625 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
626 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
627 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
628 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
629 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
630 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
631 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
632 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
633 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
639 int echoing
, editing
;
643 int ospeed
, ispeed
; /* temporaries */
644 int term_width
, term_height
;
646 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
647 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
651 tree234
*rportfwds
, *portfwds
;
655 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
661 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
663 struct Packet
**queue
;
664 int queuelen
, queuesize
;
666 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
667 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
670 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
671 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
672 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
678 * Used for username and password input.
680 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
681 int userpass_input_buflen
;
682 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
683 int userpass_input_echo
;
690 int v1_throttle_count
;
693 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
694 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence
;
696 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
697 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
698 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
699 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
700 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
701 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate
;
702 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
703 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
705 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
706 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
707 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
708 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
710 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
711 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
713 /* ssh1 and ssh2 use this for different things, but both use it */
714 int protocol_initial_phase_done
;
716 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
718 struct Packet
*(*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
721 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
722 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
723 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
724 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
729 * Used to transfer data back from async agent callbacks.
731 void *agent_response
;
732 int agent_response_len
;
735 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
738 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch
[256];
741 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
742 * indications from a request.
744 struct queued_handler
*qhead
, *qtail
;
747 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
752 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
755 unsigned long incoming_data_size
, outgoing_data_size
, deferred_data_size
;
756 unsigned long max_data_size
;
758 long next_rekey
, last_rekey
;
759 char *deferred_rekey_reason
; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
762 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
764 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
765 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, const char *fmt
, ...)
771 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
777 #define bombout(msg) \
779 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
780 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
782 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
786 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
788 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
790 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitpass
)
791 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
794 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
796 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
)
797 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
800 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
802 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
805 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
807 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
808 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
809 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
811 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
815 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
817 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
818 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
826 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
828 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
829 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
831 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
832 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
833 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
835 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
840 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
842 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
843 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
845 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
847 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
853 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
854 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
856 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a
, const char *b
)
858 if (a
== NULL
&& b
== NULL
)
867 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
869 struct ssh_portfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) av
;
870 struct ssh_portfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) bv
;
872 if (a
->type
> b
->type
)
874 if (a
->type
< b
->type
)
876 if (a
->addressfamily
> b
->addressfamily
)
878 if (a
->addressfamily
< b
->addressfamily
)
880 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->saddr
, b
->saddr
)) != 0)
881 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
882 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
884 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
886 if (a
->type
!= 'D') {
887 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->daddr
, b
->daddr
)) != 0)
888 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
889 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
891 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
897 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
899 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
900 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
902 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
905 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
906 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
907 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
908 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
909 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
910 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
912 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
916 while (high
- low
> 1) {
917 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
918 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
919 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
920 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
922 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
925 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
926 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
929 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
930 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
932 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
935 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
937 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
939 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
941 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
944 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
947 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
950 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
952 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
953 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
954 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
958 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
960 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
963 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet
*pkt
)
968 static struct Packet
*ssh_new_packet(void)
970 struct Packet
*pkt
= snew(struct Packet
);
974 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
982 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
983 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
984 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
985 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
986 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
988 static struct Packet
*ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
990 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
992 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
994 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
997 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
999 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
1000 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1002 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
1003 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
1006 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
1007 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
1008 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->len
- 5;
1010 if (st
->biglen
< 0) {
1011 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1012 " data stream corruption"));
1013 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1017 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
1018 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1020 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
1021 st
->p
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1022 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
1023 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
1024 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1026 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
1027 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
1028 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
1030 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
1032 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
1035 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
,
1036 st
->biglen
, NULL
)) {
1037 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1038 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1043 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
);
1045 st
->realcrc
= crc32_compute(st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
1046 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
1047 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
1048 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1049 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1053 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1054 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 0;
1056 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1057 unsigned char *decompblk
;
1059 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1060 st
->pktin
->body
- 1, st
->pktin
->length
+ 1,
1061 &decompblk
, &decomplen
)) {
1062 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1063 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1067 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
1068 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
1069 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1070 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1072 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1075 memcpy(st
->pktin
->body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
1077 st
->pktin
->length
= decomplen
- 1;
1080 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->body
[-1];
1083 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1087 struct logblank_t blank
;
1088 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1089 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1090 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1091 if ((st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
) ||
1092 (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
)) {
1093 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 0;
1094 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1095 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1098 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1099 blank
.len
= st
->pktin
->length
;
1100 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1104 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
1105 PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1106 ssh1_pkt_type(st
->pktin
->type
),
1107 st
->pktin
->body
, st
->pktin
->length
,
1111 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1114 static struct Packet
*ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1116 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
1118 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
1120 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1122 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1123 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1125 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
1128 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
1131 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1134 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1135 * contain the length and padding details.
1137 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
1138 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1140 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1145 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1146 st
->pktin
->data
, st
->cipherblk
);
1149 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1151 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
);
1152 st
->pad
= st
->pktin
->data
[4];
1155 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1156 * do us any more damage.
1158 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->pad
< 0 || st
->len
+ st
->pad
< 0) {
1159 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1160 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1165 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1167 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
1169 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
1172 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1174 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
1175 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
1178 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1180 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1181 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1182 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1186 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1188 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1190 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1192 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1195 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1197 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1198 st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
1199 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1201 st
->pktin
->encrypted_len
= st
->packetlen
;
1207 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1208 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1209 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1210 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1214 st
->pktin
->sequence
= st
->incoming_sequence
++;
1217 * Decompress packet payload.
1220 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1223 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1224 st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, st
->pktin
->length
- 5,
1225 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1226 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1227 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1228 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1229 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1232 st
->pktin
->length
= 5 + newlen
;
1233 memcpy(st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1238 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 6;
1239 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1240 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->data
[5];
1243 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1247 struct logblank_t blank
;
1248 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1249 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1250 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1251 if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1252 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1253 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
1254 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 8;
1257 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1258 blank
.len
= (st
->pktin
->length
-6) - blank_prefix
;
1259 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1263 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1264 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, st
->pktin
->type
),
1265 st
->pktin
->data
+6, st
->pktin
->length
-6,
1269 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1272 static void ssh1_pktout_size(struct Packet
*pkt
, int len
)
1276 len
+= 5; /* type and CRC */
1277 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1280 pkt
->length
= len
- 5;
1281 if (pkt
->maxlen
< biglen
) {
1282 pkt
->maxlen
= biglen
;
1283 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, biglen
+ 4 + APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1285 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ 4 + pad
+ 1;
1288 static struct Packet
*s_wrpkt_start(int type
, int len
)
1290 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1291 ssh1_pktout_size(pkt
, len
);
1293 /* Initialise log omission state */
1299 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1305 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1306 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1307 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1308 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1314 pkt
->body
[-1] = pkt
->type
;
1317 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->type
,
1318 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt
->type
),
1319 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
,
1320 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1321 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1324 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1325 unsigned char *compblk
;
1327 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1328 pkt
->body
- 1, pkt
->length
+ 1,
1329 &compblk
, &complen
);
1330 ssh1_pktout_size(pkt
, complen
- 1);
1331 memcpy(pkt
->body
- 1, compblk
, complen
);
1335 len
= pkt
->length
+ 5; /* type and CRC */
1336 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1339 for (i
= 0; i
< pad
; i
++)
1340 pkt
->data
[i
+ 4] = random_byte();
1341 crc
= crc32_compute(pkt
->data
+ 4, biglen
- 4);
1342 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ biglen
, crc
);
1343 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, len
);
1346 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 4, biglen
);
1351 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1354 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
);
1355 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1356 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1357 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1360 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1363 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
);
1364 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1365 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1366 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1370 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1371 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1375 * Construct a packet with the specified contents.
1377 static struct Packet
*construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
,
1378 va_list ap1
, va_list ap2
)
1380 unsigned char *p
, *argp
, argchar
;
1381 unsigned long argint
;
1382 int pktlen
, argtype
, arglen
;
1387 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap1
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1390 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1394 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1398 (void) va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1399 arglen
= va_arg(ap1
, int);
1403 argp
= va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1404 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1405 pktlen
+= 4 + arglen
;
1408 bn
= va_arg(ap1
, Bignum
);
1409 pktlen
+= ssh1_bignum_length(bn
);
1414 /* ignore this pass */
1421 pkt
= s_wrpkt_start(pkttype
, pktlen
);
1424 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap2
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1425 int offset
= p
- pkt
->body
, len
= 0;
1427 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1429 argint
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1430 PUT_32BIT(p
, argint
);
1434 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap2
, int);
1439 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1440 arglen
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1441 memcpy(p
, argp
, arglen
);
1445 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1446 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1447 PUT_32BIT(p
, arglen
);
1448 memcpy(p
+ 4, argp
, arglen
);
1452 bn
= va_arg(ap2
, Bignum
);
1453 len
= ssh1_write_bignum(p
, bn
);
1455 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1457 dont_log_password(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
1460 dont_log_data(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
1463 end_log_omission(ssh
, pkt
);
1467 /* Deal with logfile omission, if required. */
1468 if (len
&& (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
)) {
1470 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
,
1472 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= offset
;
1473 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1474 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1481 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1485 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1486 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1487 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1491 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1494 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1498 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1499 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1500 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1503 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh
, pkt
);
1504 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1507 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1510 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1512 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1513 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1515 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1520 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1521 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1523 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1528 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1529 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1532 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1534 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1535 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1536 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1537 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1540 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1542 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1543 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1544 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1548 * SSH2 packet construction functions.
1550 static void ssh2_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1552 if (pkt
->maxlen
< length
) {
1553 pkt
->maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1554 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, pkt
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1557 static void ssh2_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*pkt
, void *data
, int len
)
1559 if (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
) {
1561 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
, struct logblank_t
);
1562 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= pkt
->length
- 6;
1563 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1564 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1567 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
);
1568 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
- len
, data
, len
);
1570 static void ssh2_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char byte
)
1572 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &byte
, 1);
1574 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1576 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1579 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1582 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char value
)
1584 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &value
, 1);
1586 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned long value
)
1589 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1590 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, x
, 4);
1592 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1594 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0);
1595 pkt
->savedpos
= pkt
->length
;
1597 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1599 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, strlen(data
));
1600 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1602 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
, int len
)
1604 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1605 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1607 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1609 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1610 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt
, data
);
1612 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1615 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1616 p
= snewn(n
+ 1, unsigned char);
1618 fatalbox("out of memory");
1620 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1621 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1623 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1625 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1629 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1633 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1634 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1635 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)p
, len
);
1640 * Construct an SSH2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1641 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1642 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1644 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1646 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1649 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[5],
1650 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, pkt
->data
[5]),
1651 pkt
->data
+ 6, pkt
->length
- 6,
1652 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1653 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1657 * Compress packet payload.
1660 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1663 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 5,
1665 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1667 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1673 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1674 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1675 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1678 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1679 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1681 if (pkt
->length
+ padding
< pkt
->forcepad
)
1682 padding
= pkt
->forcepad
- pkt
->length
;
1684 (cipherblk
- (pkt
->length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1685 assert(padding
<= 255);
1686 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1687 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1688 pkt
->data
[4] = padding
;
1689 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1690 pkt
->data
[pkt
->length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1691 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
- 4);
1693 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, pkt
->data
,
1694 pkt
->length
+ padding
,
1695 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1696 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1699 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1700 pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
);
1702 pkt
->encrypted_len
= pkt
->length
+ padding
;
1704 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1705 return pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1709 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1710 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1711 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1713 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1714 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1715 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1716 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1717 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1718 * works after packet encryption.
1720 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1721 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1722 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1723 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1724 * then send them once we've finished.
1726 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1727 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1729 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1730 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1731 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1732 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1733 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1734 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1738 * Send an SSH2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1740 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1744 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1745 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1746 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1747 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1749 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1750 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1751 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1752 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1753 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1755 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1759 * Defer an SSH2 packet.
1761 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1763 int len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1764 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1765 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1766 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1770 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1771 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1772 ssh
->deferred_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1773 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1777 * Queue an SSH2 packet.
1779 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1781 assert(ssh
->queueing
);
1783 if (ssh
->queuelen
>= ssh
->queuesize
) {
1784 ssh
->queuesize
= ssh
->queuelen
+ 32;
1785 ssh
->queue
= sresize(ssh
->queue
, ssh
->queuesize
, struct Packet
*);
1788 ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
++] = pkt
;
1792 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1795 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1798 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1800 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1805 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1808 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1811 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1813 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1818 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1819 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH1's defer_packet().
1821 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1822 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1823 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1824 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1825 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1826 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1827 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1830 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1833 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1835 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1836 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1837 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1838 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1839 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1841 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= ssh
->deferred_data_size
;
1842 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1843 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1844 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1845 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1846 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0;
1850 * Send all queued SSH2 packets. We send them by means of
1851 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1852 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1854 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh
)
1858 assert(!ssh
->queueing
);
1860 for (i
= 0; i
< ssh
->queuelen
; i
++)
1861 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ssh
->queue
[i
]);
1864 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1868 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1872 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1873 debug(("%s", string
));
1874 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1875 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1881 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1885 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1886 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1891 * Packet decode functions for both SSH1 and SSH2.
1893 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1895 unsigned long value
;
1896 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1897 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1898 value
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1902 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1904 unsigned long value
;
1905 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 1)
1906 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1907 value
= pkt
->body
[pkt
->savedpos
] != 0;
1911 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
)
1916 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1918 len
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1923 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< *length
)
1925 *p
= (char *)(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1926 pkt
->savedpos
+= *length
;
1928 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1930 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< length
)
1932 pkt
->savedpos
+= length
;
1933 return pkt
->body
+ (pkt
->savedpos
- length
);
1935 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet
*pkt
, struct RSAKey
*key
,
1936 unsigned char **keystr
)
1940 j
= makekey(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
1941 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
,
1948 assert(pkt
->savedpos
< pkt
->length
);
1952 static Bignum
ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1957 j
= ssh1_read_bignum(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
1958 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
, &b
);
1966 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1972 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt
, &p
, &length
);
1977 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
1982 * Helper function to add an SSH2 signature blob to a packet.
1983 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
1984 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
1985 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
1986 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
1988 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
,
1989 void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
1990 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
1992 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
1993 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
1995 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
1996 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
1999 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2000 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2002 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
2003 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2004 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
2007 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2010 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2011 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
2012 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
2013 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
2014 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
2016 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2019 * Now find the signature integer.
2021 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2022 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
2023 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2025 if (len
!= siglen
) {
2026 unsigned char newlen
[4];
2027 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2028 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
2029 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2030 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2031 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
2032 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
2033 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2035 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
2036 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
2037 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2039 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
2040 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2044 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2047 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2048 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
2052 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2053 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2055 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
2057 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
2059 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2061 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2064 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
2066 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
2067 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
2068 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
2069 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
2070 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2071 !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2073 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2074 * to use a different defence against password length
2077 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
2078 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH1 ignore bug");
2081 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
2082 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
2083 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2085 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2086 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2089 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
2090 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH1 password");
2093 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
2094 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
2095 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2097 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2098 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2099 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2101 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
2102 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle RSA authentication");
2105 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
2106 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
2107 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2108 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
2109 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
2110 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
2112 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2114 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
2115 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 HMAC bug");
2118 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2119 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
2120 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2121 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
2123 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2124 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2125 * generate the keys).
2127 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
2128 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 key-derivation bug");
2131 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
2132 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
2133 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
2134 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
2136 * These versions have the SSH2 RSA padding bug.
2138 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
2139 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 RSA padding bug");
2142 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
2143 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
2144 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
2146 * These versions have the SSH2 session-ID bug in
2147 * public-key authentication.
2149 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
2150 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2153 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2154 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== AUTO
&&
2155 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp
) ||
2156 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp
) ||
2157 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp
) ||
2158 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp
)))) {
2160 * These versions have the SSH2 rekey bug.
2162 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_REKEY
;
2163 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 rekey bug");
2168 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2169 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2171 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str
)
2173 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2174 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2175 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2176 assert(*str
== 'H'); str
++;
2177 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2178 while (*str
&& *str
!= '-') str
++;
2179 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2181 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2184 if (*str
== '-' || *str
== ' ')
2190 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
2192 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
2200 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
2202 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
2204 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2207 static const int transS
[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
2208 static const int transH
[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
2209 static const int transminus
[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
2211 s
->i
= transS
[s
->i
];
2213 s
->i
= transH
[s
->i
];
2215 s
->i
= transminus
[s
->i
];
2220 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
2224 s
->vstring
= snewn(s
->vstrsize
, char);
2225 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
2229 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2230 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
2232 s
->vstring
= sresize(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
, char);
2234 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
2237 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
2239 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
2240 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
2241 } else if (c
== '\012')
2245 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
2246 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
2248 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
2249 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2250 logeventf(ssh
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
2251 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
2254 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2257 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2258 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
2259 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2260 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
2262 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
2263 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2266 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
2267 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2274 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
2276 * Construct a v2 version string.
2278 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver
);
2282 * Construct a v1 version string.
2284 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2285 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2286 s
->version
: "1.5"),
2291 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring
);
2293 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2295 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2297 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
2298 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
,
2299 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"));
2300 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
,
2301 strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012"));
2304 * Initialise SSHv2 protocol.
2306 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
2307 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2308 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
2311 * Initialise SSHv1 protocol.
2313 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
2314 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2315 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
2317 logeventf(ssh
, "We claim version: %.*s",
2318 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"), verstring
);
2319 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
2323 logeventf(ssh
, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh
->version
);
2325 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
2326 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
2327 ssh
->pinger
= pinger_new(&ssh
->cfg
, &ssh_backend
, ssh
);
2334 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
2336 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
2339 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2340 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2341 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2342 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2345 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2347 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
2348 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
2356 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2357 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2358 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2359 * to the proper protocol handler.
2364 while (datalen
> 0) {
2365 struct Packet
*pktin
= ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2367 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, pktin
);
2368 ssh_free_packet(pktin
);
2370 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
2378 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
)
2381 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2383 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2388 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2393 * Now we must shut down any port and X forwardings going
2394 * through this connection.
2396 if (ssh
->channels
) {
2397 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2400 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
2403 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
2406 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
2407 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2408 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
2416 static void ssh_log(Plug plug
, int type
, SockAddr addr
, int port
,
2417 const char *error_msg
, int error_code
)
2419 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2420 char addrbuf
[256], *msg
;
2422 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, lenof(addrbuf
));
2425 msg
= dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2427 msg
= dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf
, error_msg
);
2433 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, const char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2436 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2437 int need_notify
= ssh_do_close(ssh
, FALSE
);
2439 if (!error_msg
&& !ssh
->close_expected
) {
2440 error_msg
= "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2444 /* A socket error has occurred. */
2445 logevent(error_msg
);
2446 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", error_msg
);
2448 logevent("Server closed network connection");
2451 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2455 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2457 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2458 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2459 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2460 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
2466 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2468 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2470 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2471 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2473 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2474 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2478 * Connect to specified host and port.
2479 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2480 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2481 * freed by the caller.
2483 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2484 char **realhost
, int nodelay
, int keepalive
)
2486 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2497 ssh
->savedhost
= snewn(1 + strlen(host
), char);
2498 if (!ssh
->savedhost
)
2499 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2500 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2503 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2504 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2509 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host
,
2510 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
" (IPv4)" :
2511 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
" (IPv6)" : "")));
2512 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
,
2513 ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
);
2514 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
) {
2522 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2523 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2524 0, 1, nodelay
, keepalive
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2525 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2527 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2535 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2537 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2539 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2540 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2541 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2542 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2543 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
2544 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2545 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
2550 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2551 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2553 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2556 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2558 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2560 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2561 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2564 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2566 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2568 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2572 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2575 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2578 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, enable
);
2585 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2586 * reusable in several places - even between SSH1 and SSH2.
2589 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2590 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2592 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2593 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2594 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2595 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2599 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2600 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2601 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2602 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2604 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2609 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2612 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2613 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2618 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2619 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2620 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2621 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2626 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2627 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2628 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2629 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2638 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2639 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2640 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2642 if ((!ssh
->userpass_input_echo
||
2643 (c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2644 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2645 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2646 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2647 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2648 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2656 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2658 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2660 ssh
->agent_response
= reply
;
2661 ssh
->agent_response_len
= replylen
;
2663 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2664 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2666 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2669 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2671 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)cv
;
2673 void *sentreply
= reply
;
2676 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2677 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
2680 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2681 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
2684 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
2685 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2688 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
2697 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2699 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
2700 struct Packet
*pktin
)
2703 unsigned char cookie
[8], *ptr
;
2704 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2705 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2706 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2708 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2709 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2710 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2711 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2712 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2715 void *publickey_blob
;
2716 int publickey_bloblen
;
2722 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2731 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2733 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2738 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2739 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2743 logevent("Received public keys");
2745 ptr
= ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin
, 8);
2747 bombout(("SSH1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2750 memcpy(cookie
, ptr
, 8);
2752 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
) ||
2753 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
)) {
2754 bombout(("Failed to read SSH1 public keys from public key packet"));
2759 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2763 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2764 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2765 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2766 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2767 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2771 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2772 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2773 s
->supported_auths_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2775 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2776 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2777 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2780 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2781 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2782 MD5Update(&md5c
, cookie
, 8);
2783 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
2785 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
2786 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
2789 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
2791 if (hostkey
.bits
> hostkey
.bytes
* 8 ||
2792 servkey
.bits
> servkey
.bytes
* 8) {
2793 bombout(("SSH1 public keys were badly formatted"));
2797 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
2799 s
->rsabuf
= snewn(s
->len
, unsigned char);
2801 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2804 * Verify the host key.
2808 * First format the key into a string.
2810 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
2811 char fingerprint
[100];
2812 char *keystr
= snewn(len
, char);
2814 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2815 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
2816 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
2817 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
2818 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, "rsa", keystr
,
2823 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2824 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
2826 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
2829 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
2830 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
2832 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
2834 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
2836 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
2839 bombout(("SSH1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
2843 logevent("Encrypted session key");
2846 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
2847 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
2849 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
2850 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
2851 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
2852 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
2854 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
2855 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
2856 logevent("AES not supported in SSH1, skipping");
2858 switch (next_cipher
) {
2859 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
2860 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
2861 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
2862 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
2863 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
2864 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
2866 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
2870 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
2871 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
2872 bombout(("Server violates SSH 1 protocol by not "
2873 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
2875 /* shouldn't happen */
2876 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
2880 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
2882 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
2883 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "cipher", cipher_string
);
2884 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
2888 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
2889 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
2890 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
2892 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
2893 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
2895 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
2896 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
2900 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
2901 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
2902 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
2903 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
2904 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
2905 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
2907 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
2911 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
2912 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
2914 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
2915 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
2916 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
2918 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
2919 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
2921 if (servkey
.modulus
) {
2922 sfree(servkey
.modulus
);
2923 servkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
2925 if (servkey
.exponent
) {
2926 sfree(servkey
.exponent
);
2927 servkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
2929 if (hostkey
.modulus
) {
2930 sfree(hostkey
.modulus
);
2931 hostkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
2933 if (hostkey
.exponent
) {
2934 sfree(hostkey
.exponent
);
2935 hostkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
2939 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2940 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
2944 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
2948 if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
2949 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
2950 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
2951 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
2953 * get_line failed to get a username.
2956 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
2957 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
2958 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
2962 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
2963 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
2966 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
2968 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
2969 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2973 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2976 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
2977 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
2980 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
2982 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
2983 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
2985 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
2986 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
2987 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
2988 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
2995 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
2996 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
2997 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
2999 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
3001 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
3002 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
3003 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
3004 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
3005 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
))
3006 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3008 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3010 while (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3011 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
3013 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
3015 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3021 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3023 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3024 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
3025 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
3026 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
3027 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3031 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3032 " for agent response"));
3035 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3036 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3037 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3039 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
3040 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
3041 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
3042 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
3043 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3045 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
3046 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
3047 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
3048 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
3049 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
3050 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
3051 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
3052 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3057 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3058 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3059 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3064 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3065 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3070 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) < 4)
3072 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3074 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) <
3077 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
3078 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
3082 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3086 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3087 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3089 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3090 logevent("Key refused");
3093 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3094 if ((s
->challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3095 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3100 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
3103 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3104 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
3105 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
3106 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
3107 len
+= 16; /* session id */
3108 len
+= 4; /* response format */
3109 agentreq
= snewn(4 + len
, char);
3110 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
3112 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
3113 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
3115 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
3116 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
3117 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
3118 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3120 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
3121 if (!agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
,
3122 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3127 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3128 " while waiting for agent"
3132 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3133 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3134 retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3139 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
3140 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3141 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3142 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
3146 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3148 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3149 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
3150 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
3152 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
3154 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
3159 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3162 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3166 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3169 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
3170 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
3171 freebn(s
->challenge
);
3180 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
3181 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
3183 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3184 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
3185 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
3186 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
3187 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3188 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
3190 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
3191 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3192 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
3193 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3194 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
3200 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3202 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3205 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3206 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3207 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3208 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3209 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3210 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3211 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3212 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3213 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3214 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3217 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3218 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
3219 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
3220 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
3221 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3222 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
3224 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
3225 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3226 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3227 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
3233 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3235 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3238 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3239 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3240 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3241 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3242 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3243 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3244 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3245 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3246 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3249 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3250 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3251 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
3253 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3254 char *comment
= NULL
;
3256 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3257 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3258 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3259 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3260 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
3261 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
3262 char *msg
= dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3263 key_type_to_str(type
));
3265 c_write_str(ssh
, msg
);
3266 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3268 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3271 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
3272 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3273 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3276 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
3281 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3282 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3286 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
3287 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
3289 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3290 * because one was supplied on the command line
3291 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3293 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
,
3294 PKT_STR
, "No more passwords available to try",
3296 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
3297 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "Unable to authenticate");
3298 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
3299 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
3303 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3304 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3305 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3306 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
3309 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
3311 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3312 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3316 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3320 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3322 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3325 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3328 const char *error
= NULL
;
3329 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
,
3332 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3333 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3334 c_write_str(ssh
, " (");
3335 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
3336 c_write_str(ssh
, ").\r\n");
3337 continue; /* go and try password */
3340 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3341 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
3342 continue; /* try again */
3347 * Send a public key attempt.
3349 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3350 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3353 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3354 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3355 continue; /* go and try password */
3357 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3358 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3364 unsigned char buffer
[32];
3365 Bignum challenge
, response
;
3367 if ((challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3368 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3371 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
3372 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
3374 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3375 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
3379 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
3380 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3381 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
3383 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3384 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
3391 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3392 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3393 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
3394 " our public key.\r\n");
3395 continue; /* go and try password */
3396 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3397 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3401 break; /* we're through! */
3403 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3405 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3406 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3407 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3408 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3409 * The others are all random data in
3410 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3411 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3412 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3414 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3415 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3416 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3417 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3420 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3421 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3423 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3424 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3425 * packets containing string lengths N through
3426 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3427 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3428 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3430 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3431 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3432 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3433 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3434 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3437 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3438 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3439 * For this server we are left with no defences
3440 * against password length sniffing.
3442 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
3444 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3445 * we can use the primary defence.
3447 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
3450 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
3452 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3455 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
3459 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
3461 randomstr
= snewn(top
+ 1, char);
3463 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
3465 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3466 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
,
3467 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3469 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
3471 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
3472 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
3474 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
3475 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
3476 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
3479 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3480 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
3483 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
3485 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3486 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3487 * can use the secondary defence.
3493 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3494 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3496 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
3497 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
3498 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3499 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
3504 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3505 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3506 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
,
3507 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3510 * The server has _both_
3511 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3512 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3513 * therefore nothing we can do.
3516 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3517 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3518 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3519 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_INT
, len
,
3520 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
,
3521 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3524 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3525 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3528 logevent("Sent password");
3529 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
3531 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3532 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3533 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
3534 logevent("Authentication refused");
3535 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3536 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin
->type
));
3541 logevent("Authentication successful");
3546 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
3550 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3551 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3555 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
3557 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3558 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3559 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3560 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3561 * open, we can close it then.
3564 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3565 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3568 struct Packet
*pktout
;
3569 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
3570 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
3571 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
3574 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3575 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
3577 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3578 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
3579 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3581 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3586 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
3590 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3591 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3595 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3596 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3597 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3599 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
,
3600 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3602 * In SSH1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3603 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3604 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3605 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3606 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3610 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3611 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3615 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3619 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3620 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3624 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3625 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3626 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3627 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3630 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3634 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3636 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
3640 assert(pktin
->type
== qh
->msg1
|| pktin
->type
== qh
->msg2
);
3643 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3644 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = NULL
;
3647 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3648 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = NULL
;
3652 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
3654 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg1
> 0) {
3655 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3656 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3658 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg2
> 0) {
3659 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3660 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3663 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
3664 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
] = NULL
;
3667 qh
->handler(ssh
, pktin
, qh
->ctx
);
3672 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh
, int msg1
, int msg2
,
3673 chandler_fn_t handler
, void *ctx
)
3675 struct queued_handler
*qh
;
3677 qh
= snew(struct queued_handler
);
3680 qh
->handler
= handler
;
3684 if (ssh
->qtail
== NULL
) {
3688 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3689 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3692 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3693 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3696 ssh
->qtail
->next
= qh
;
3701 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
)
3703 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
, *pf
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*)ctx
;
3705 if (pktin
->type
== (ssh
->version
== 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
:
3706 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
)) {
3707 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
3710 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
3713 rpf
= del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
);
3719 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh
, const Config
*cfg
)
3721 const char *portfwd_strptr
= cfg
->portfwd
;
3722 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3725 if (!ssh
->portfwds
) {
3726 ssh
->portfwds
= newtree234(ssh_portcmp
);
3729 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
3730 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
3731 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
3732 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
3735 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3737 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
3738 epf
->status
= DESTROY
;
3741 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
3742 char address_family
, type
;
3743 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3744 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3747 address_family
= 'A';
3749 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'A' ||
3750 *portfwd_strptr
== '4' ||
3751 *portfwd_strptr
== '6')
3752 address_family
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3753 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'L' ||
3754 *portfwd_strptr
== 'R' ||
3755 *portfwd_strptr
== 'D')
3756 type
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3761 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3762 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
3764 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3765 * source port number. This means that
3766 * everything we've seen until now is the
3767 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
3768 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
3773 if (ssh
->version
== 1 && type
== 'R') {
3774 logeventf(ssh
, "SSH1 cannot handle remote source address "
3775 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports
);
3777 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
3780 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
3784 if (*portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
3787 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
3788 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
3791 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':')
3794 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
3795 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
3799 dport
= atoi(dports
);
3803 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
3805 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
3806 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
3810 while (*portfwd_strptr
) portfwd_strptr
++;
3812 portfwd_strptr
++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
3814 sport
= atoi(sports
);
3818 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
3820 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
3821 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
3824 if (sport
&& dport
) {
3825 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
3826 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
, *epfrec
;
3828 pfrec
= snew(struct ssh_portfwd
);
3830 pfrec
->saddr
= *saddr ?
dupstr(saddr
) : NULL
;
3831 pfrec
->sserv
= sserv ?
dupstr(sports
) : NULL
;
3832 pfrec
->sport
= sport
;
3833 pfrec
->daddr
= *host ?
dupstr(host
) : NULL
;
3834 pfrec
->dserv
= dserv ?
dupstr(dports
) : NULL
;
3835 pfrec
->dport
= dport
;
3836 pfrec
->local
= NULL
;
3837 pfrec
->remote
= NULL
;
3838 pfrec
->addressfamily
= (address_family
== '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4
:
3839 address_family
== '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6
:
3842 epfrec
= add234(ssh
->portfwds
, pfrec
);
3843 if (epfrec
!= pfrec
) {
3845 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
3846 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
3847 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
3849 epfrec
->status
= KEEP
;
3850 free_portfwd(pfrec
);
3852 pfrec
->status
= CREATE
;
3858 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
3861 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
3862 if (epf
->status
== DESTROY
) {
3865 message
= dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
3866 epf
->type
== 'L' ?
"local" :
3867 epf
->type
== 'R' ?
"remote" : "dynamic",
3868 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
3869 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
3872 if (epf
->type
!= 'D') {
3873 char *msg2
= dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message
,
3874 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
3879 logeventf(ssh
, "Cancelling %s", message
);
3883 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
= epf
->remote
;
3884 struct Packet
*pktout
;
3887 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
3890 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3892 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
3893 * server side in SSH1! There's no message
3894 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
3895 * the rportfwd record from the local end
3896 * so that any connections the server tries
3897 * to make on it are rejected.
3900 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
3901 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
3902 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
3904 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
3905 } else if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
) {
3906 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
3907 * what was used to open the original connection,
3908 * since it's reconfigurable. */
3909 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
3911 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
3913 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
3914 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
3917 del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, rpf
);
3919 } else if (epf
->local
) {
3920 pfd_terminate(epf
->local
);
3923 delpos234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
);
3925 i
--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
3929 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
3931 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
3932 if (epf
->status
== CREATE
) {
3933 char *sportdesc
, *dportdesc
;
3934 sportdesc
= dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
3935 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
3936 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
3937 epf
->sserv ? epf
->sserv
: "",
3938 epf
->sserv ?
"(" : "",
3940 epf
->sserv ?
")" : "");
3941 if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
3944 dportdesc
= dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
3946 epf
->dserv ? epf
->dserv
: "",
3947 epf
->dserv ?
"(" : "",
3949 epf
->dserv ?
")" : "");
3952 if (epf
->type
== 'L') {
3953 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
,
3954 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
3957 epf
->addressfamily
);
3959 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
3960 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
3961 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
3962 sportdesc
, dportdesc
,
3963 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
3964 } else if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
3965 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1,
3966 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
3969 epf
->addressfamily
);
3971 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
3972 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
3973 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
3975 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
3977 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
3980 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
3982 if (!ssh
->rportfwds
) {
3983 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
3984 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
3986 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
3989 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
3990 strncpy(pf
->dhost
, epf
->daddr
, lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1);
3991 pf
->dhost
[lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1] = '\0';
3992 pf
->dport
= epf
->dport
;
3993 pf
->sport
= epf
->sport
;
3994 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
3995 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
3996 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
3999 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %s"
4000 " forward to %s", sportdesc
, dportdesc
);
4002 pf
->sportdesc
= sportdesc
;
4007 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
4008 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
4009 PKT_INT
, epf
->sport
,
4010 PKT_STR
, epf
->daddr
,
4011 PKT_INT
, epf
->dport
,
4013 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
,
4015 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4017 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4018 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
4019 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "tcpip-forward");
4020 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 1);/* want reply */
4022 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
4023 } else if (cfg
->rport_acceptall
) {
4024 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
4026 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
4028 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
4029 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4031 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
,
4032 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
,
4033 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4042 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4045 int stringlen
, bufsize
;
4047 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &string
, &stringlen
);
4048 if (string
== NULL
) {
4049 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4053 bufsize
= from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
4055 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4056 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
4057 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4061 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4063 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4064 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4065 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4066 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4068 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4069 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4070 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
4071 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4072 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4073 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4075 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4078 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
4079 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
4080 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4082 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4083 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4086 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4087 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4088 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4089 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4091 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4092 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
4093 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4094 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4095 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4096 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4097 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4102 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4104 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4105 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4106 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4107 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4109 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4110 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
4111 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4112 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4114 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4116 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4117 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4118 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4120 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4121 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
4122 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4123 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4124 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4125 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
4130 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4132 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4133 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4134 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4135 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *pfp
;
4140 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4143 remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4144 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &host
, &hostsize
);
4145 port
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4147 if (hostsize
>= lenof(pf
.dhost
))
4148 hostsize
= lenof(pf
.dhost
)-1;
4149 memcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
, hostsize
);
4150 pf
.dhost
[hostsize
] = '\0';
4152 pfp
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
4155 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4157 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4158 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4160 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4162 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, pf
.dhost
, port
,
4163 c
, &ssh
->cfg
, pfp
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
4165 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
4167 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4168 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4170 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4171 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4172 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4174 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4175 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
4176 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4177 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4178 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4179 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4180 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4185 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4187 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4188 unsigned int localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4189 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4191 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4192 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4193 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
4194 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4195 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
4196 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4197 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4200 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
4202 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4203 * which we decided on before the server acked
4204 * the channel open. So now we know the
4205 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4207 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
4208 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4212 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4214 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4215 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4217 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4218 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4219 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4220 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4221 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4226 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4228 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4229 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4230 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4231 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4232 if (c
&& !c
->halfopen
) {
4235 (pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
4237 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
4238 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4239 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
4240 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
4243 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
4244 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4245 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
4246 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4250 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
4251 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
4252 send_packet(ssh
, pktin
->type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
4254 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
4257 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
4258 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4262 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4263 pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
4264 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
4269 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4271 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4272 int i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4275 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4277 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &p
, &len
);
4279 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4284 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, p
, len
);
4287 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, p
, len
);
4290 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4292 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
4293 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
4294 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4298 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4300 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
4302 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
4303 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
4305 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
4307 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
4309 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
4311 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4315 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4317 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
4320 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
4323 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
4324 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
4325 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
4326 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4329 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4332 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4333 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
4334 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4339 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4341 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4342 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh
->exitcode
);
4343 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
4345 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4346 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4347 * session which we might mistake for another
4348 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4349 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4351 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
4352 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
4355 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
4356 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4358 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
);
4360 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
] =
4361 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
] =
4362 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data
;
4364 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
4365 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
4366 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
4367 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure
;
4368 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] =
4369 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
] =
4370 ssh1_msg_channel_close
;
4371 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = ssh1_msg_channel_data
;
4372 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status
;
4374 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
4375 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4376 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
4380 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4381 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4382 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4384 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4385 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4387 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4388 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4389 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open
;
4393 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
4394 char proto
[20], data
[64];
4395 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4396 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
4397 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
4398 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
4399 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
4400 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4401 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
,
4402 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
4405 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4406 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKT_END
);
4411 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4412 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4413 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4415 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4416 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4418 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4419 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4420 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open
;
4424 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
4425 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
] = ssh1_msg_port_open
;
4427 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
4428 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4429 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4430 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4431 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
4432 /* Send the pty request. */
4433 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
,
4434 PKT_STR
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
,
4435 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
4436 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
4437 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, /* width,height in pixels */
4438 PKT_CHAR
, 192, PKT_INT
, ssh
->ispeed
, /* TTY_OP_ISPEED */
4439 PKT_CHAR
, 193, PKT_INT
, ssh
->ospeed
, /* TTY_OP_OSPEED */
4440 PKT_CHAR
, 0, PKT_END
);
4441 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
4445 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4446 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4447 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4449 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4450 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4451 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4453 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4454 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4456 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4459 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
4460 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
4464 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4465 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4466 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4468 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4469 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4471 logevent("Started compression");
4472 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
4473 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
4474 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4475 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
4476 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4480 * Start the shell or command.
4482 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH2
4483 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4484 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4487 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
4489 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
4490 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
4491 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
4494 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
4496 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
4497 logevent("Started session");
4500 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
4501 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
4502 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
4503 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
4504 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
4507 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4509 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
4513 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4514 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4515 * attention to the unusual ones.
4520 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
4521 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4522 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4523 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4524 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4526 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
4531 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
4532 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
, PKTT_DATA
,
4533 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
,
4534 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4545 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
4547 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4552 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4553 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
4556 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4558 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4562 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4563 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen
, msg
));
4566 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4568 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4571 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
4576 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4578 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
4579 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = NULL
;
4582 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4584 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh1_msg_disconnect
;
4585 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
;
4586 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh1_msg_debug
;
4589 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4590 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4592 unsigned char *in
=(unsigned char*)vin
;
4593 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
4596 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
4597 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
4601 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
4602 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
))
4603 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
4608 do_ssh1_connection(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
4612 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4614 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4617 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4619 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4622 * Is it at the start of the string?
4624 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4625 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4626 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4627 /* either , or EOS follows */
4631 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4632 * If no comma found, terminate.
4634 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
4635 haylen
--, haystack
++;
4638 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
4643 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
4645 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4648 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4650 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4652 * Is it at the start of the string?
4654 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4655 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4656 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4657 /* either , or EOS follows */
4665 * SSH2 key creation method.
4667 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
4668 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
4669 unsigned char *keyspace
)
4672 /* First 20 bytes. */
4674 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4676 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4677 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
4678 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
4679 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
4680 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4682 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4684 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4685 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
4686 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
4690 * Handle the SSH2 transport layer.
4692 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4693 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4695 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
4696 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
4697 int nbits
, pbits
, warn
;
4698 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
4699 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
4700 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
4702 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
4703 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
4704 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
4705 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
4706 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
4707 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
4708 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
4709 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
4710 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
4711 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
4712 int n_preferred_kex
;
4713 const struct ssh_kex
*preferred_kex
[KEX_MAX
];
4714 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
4715 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
4716 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
4717 int got_session_id
, activated_authconn
;
4718 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4720 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
4722 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
4724 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4725 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4726 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4728 s
->got_session_id
= s
->activated_authconn
= FALSE
;
4731 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
4733 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
4734 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
4736 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
4739 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK
;
4741 int i
, j
, commalist_started
;
4744 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
4746 s
->n_preferred_kex
= 0;
4747 for (i
= 0; i
< KEX_MAX
; i
++) {
4748 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_kexlist
[i
]) {
4750 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4751 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
;
4754 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4755 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14
;
4758 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4759 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1
;
4762 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
4764 if (i
< KEX_MAX
- 1) {
4765 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] = NULL
;
4772 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
4774 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
4775 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
4776 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
4777 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
4778 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
4781 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
4782 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
4786 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
4789 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
4792 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
4794 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
4795 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
4802 * Set up preferred compression.
4804 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
4805 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
4807 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
4810 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
4811 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
4813 ssh
->queueing
= TRUE
;
4816 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
4818 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= TRUE
;
4821 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
4823 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
4824 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
4825 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
4826 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
4827 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4828 commalist_started
= 0;
4829 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
4830 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
4831 if (!k
) continue; /* warning flag */
4832 if (commalist_started
)
4833 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4834 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_kex
[i
]->name
);
4835 commalist_started
= 1;
4837 /* List server host key algorithms. */
4838 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4839 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
4840 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
4841 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
4842 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4844 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
4845 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4846 commalist_started
= 0;
4847 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4848 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4849 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
4850 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4851 if (commalist_started
)
4852 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4853 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
4854 commalist_started
= 1;
4857 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
4858 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4859 commalist_started
= 0;
4860 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4861 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4862 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
4863 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4864 if (commalist_started
)
4865 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4866 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
4867 commalist_started
= 1;
4870 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
4871 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4872 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4873 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
4874 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
4875 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4877 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
4878 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4879 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4880 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
4881 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
4882 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4884 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
4885 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4886 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
4887 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
4888 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
4889 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
4890 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
4891 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4892 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
4895 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
4896 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4897 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
4898 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
4899 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
4900 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
4901 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
4902 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4903 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
4906 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
4907 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4908 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
4909 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4910 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
4911 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
4913 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0);
4916 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
4917 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5, s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
4919 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
4923 if (pktin
->length
> 5)
4924 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, pktin
->data
+ 5, pktin
->length
- 5);
4927 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
4932 int i
, j
, len
, guessok
;
4934 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
4935 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
4939 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
4940 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4941 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4942 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4943 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4944 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4945 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4946 pktin
->savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
4947 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
4949 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
4950 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
4953 } else if (in_commasep_string(k
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4958 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
4959 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "key-exchange algorithm",
4961 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
4967 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
4968 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4972 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
4973 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
4977 first_in_commasep_string(s
->preferred_kex
[0]->name
, str
, len
);
4978 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
4979 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
4980 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4981 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
4985 guessok
= guessok
&&
4986 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[0]->name
, str
, len
);
4987 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
4989 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4990 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4994 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4995 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4996 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5001 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
5003 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
5004 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "client-to-server cipher",
5005 s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
);
5006 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
5011 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
5012 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5013 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5017 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
5019 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5020 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5024 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5025 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5026 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5031 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
5033 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
5034 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "server-to-client cipher",
5035 s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
);
5036 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
5041 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
5042 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5043 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5047 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
5048 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5049 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5050 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5054 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
5055 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5056 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5057 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5061 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
5062 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5063 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5064 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5065 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5070 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
5071 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5072 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5073 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5074 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5079 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server language */
5080 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client language */
5081 if (ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
) && !guessok
) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5082 crWaitUntil(pktin
); /* Ignore packet */
5086 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
5087 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
5093 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5094 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5095 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
5097 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
5098 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
5103 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5104 * requesting a group.
5106 if (!ssh
->kex
->pdata
) {
5107 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5108 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
5110 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5113 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
5114 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
5115 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->pbits
);
5116 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5119 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
5120 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5123 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5124 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5125 if (!s
->p
|| !s
->g
) {
5126 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5129 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_gex(s
->p
, s
->g
);
5130 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
5131 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
5133 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
;
5134 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(ssh
->kex
);
5135 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
5136 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
5137 logeventf(ssh
, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5138 ssh
->kex
->groupname
);
5141 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
5143 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5145 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
5146 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(s
->kex_init_value
);
5147 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s
->pktout
, s
->e
);
5148 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5151 if (pktin
->type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
5152 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5155 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
5156 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5158 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5161 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
5163 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
5165 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5166 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5167 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
5168 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
5169 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
5171 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
5172 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
5173 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
5174 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
5176 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
5177 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
5180 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5181 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
5184 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5186 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
5187 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
5188 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5193 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5194 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5196 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
5197 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
5198 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
5199 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
5200 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
,
5201 s
->keystr
, s
->fingerprint
);
5202 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
5203 if (!s
->got_session_id
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5204 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5205 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
5207 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
5209 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
5212 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5213 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5216 if (!s
->got_session_id
) {
5217 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
5218 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
5219 s
->got_session_id
= TRUE
;
5223 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5225 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
5226 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5227 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5230 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5231 * client-to-server session keys.
5233 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
5234 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
5235 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
5236 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
5238 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
5239 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
5240 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
5241 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
5243 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
5244 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
5245 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
5246 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
5249 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5250 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5253 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5254 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
5255 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5256 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
5257 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5258 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
5259 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5262 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5263 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
5264 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5265 ssh
->csmac
->text_name
);
5266 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
5267 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
5268 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
5271 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5272 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5274 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
5275 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh
);
5278 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5281 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
5282 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5285 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5288 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5289 * server-to-client session keys.
5291 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
5292 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
5293 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
5294 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
5296 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
5297 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
5298 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
5299 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
5301 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
5302 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
5303 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
5304 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
5307 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5308 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5311 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5312 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
5313 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5314 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
5315 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5316 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
5317 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5319 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
5320 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
5321 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
5322 ssh
->scmac
->text_name
);
5323 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
5324 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
5325 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
5328 * Free key exchange data.
5332 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5338 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
5339 * deferred rekey reason.
5341 if (ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
) {
5342 logevent(ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
);
5344 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
5345 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5349 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
5351 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
5352 ssh
->last_rekey
= GETTICKCOUNT();
5353 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0)
5354 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5358 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
5359 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
5360 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
5361 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
5362 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
5363 * it would only confuse the layer above.
5365 if (s
->activated_authconn
) {
5368 s
->activated_authconn
= TRUE
;
5371 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
5372 * function so that other things can run on top of the
5373 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
5376 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
5377 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
5378 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
5379 * giving the reason for the rekey.
5381 while (!((pktin
&& pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) ||
5382 (!pktin
&& inlen
== -1))) {
5387 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
5390 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
5391 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
5392 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
5393 * we process it anyway!)
5395 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_REKEY
)) {
5396 logeventf(ssh
, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
5398 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
5399 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
5400 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0;
5401 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0;
5402 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
5404 schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5407 goto wait_for_rekey
; /* this is utterly horrid */
5409 logeventf(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in
);
5412 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5418 * Add data to an SSH2 channel output buffer.
5420 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
5423 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
5427 * Attempt to send data on an SSH2 channel.
5429 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
5432 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5434 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
5437 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
5438 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
5439 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
5440 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
5441 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
5442 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
5443 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5444 dont_log_data(ssh
, pktout
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
5445 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
5446 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout
, data
, len
);
5447 end_log_omission(ssh
, pktout
);
5448 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5449 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
5450 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
5454 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
5457 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5461 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH2 channel.
5463 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
5468 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5469 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5470 * be sending any more data anyway.
5476 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
5477 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
5478 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
5480 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
5482 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
* 2) {
5483 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5485 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5486 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5487 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5488 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5489 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
5493 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5495 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5496 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5497 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5498 if (c
&& !c
->closes
)
5499 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5502 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5506 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5507 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5508 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5510 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5511 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5512 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5513 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5514 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &data
, &length
);
5517 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5519 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5521 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
==
5522 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5526 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5529 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5532 while (length
> 0) {
5533 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5534 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5535 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5539 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5541 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5543 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5544 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
5546 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5548 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5550 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5552 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5556 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5558 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5561 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5564 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
5565 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
5566 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5567 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5574 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5575 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5577 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5578 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5582 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5584 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5585 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5587 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5589 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5591 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5593 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5594 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5596 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5598 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5600 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5601 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5606 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5608 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5609 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5610 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5612 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5613 if (!c
|| c
->halfopen
) {
5614 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
5615 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
5618 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
5620 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5621 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
5622 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
5625 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
5626 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5633 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
5634 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5638 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
5639 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5640 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5641 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5643 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5644 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5648 * See if that was the last channel left open.
5649 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
5650 * not running in -N mode.)
5652 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
&& count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
5653 logevent("All channels closed. Disconnecting");
5656 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
5657 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
5658 * SSH2 connection had to end with a disconnect
5659 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
5660 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
5661 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
5662 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
5663 * this is more polite than sending a
5664 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
5666 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5667 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5668 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "All open channels closed");
5669 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
5670 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5672 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
5673 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5677 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5679 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5680 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5681 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5683 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5685 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5686 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5687 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
5688 c
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5689 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
5690 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5691 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5692 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5694 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5697 * We have a pending close on this channel,
5698 * which we decided on before the server acked
5699 * the channel open. So now we know the
5700 * remoteid, we can close it again.
5702 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5703 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5704 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5708 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5710 static const char *const reasons
[] = {
5711 "<unknown reason code>",
5712 "Administratively prohibited",
5714 "Unknown channel type",
5715 "Resource shortage",
5717 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5718 unsigned reason_code
;
5719 char *reason_string
;
5721 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5722 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5724 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5725 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5726 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
5728 reason_code
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5729 if (reason_code
>= lenof(reasons
))
5730 reason_code
= 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
5731 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &reason_string
, &reason_length
);
5732 logeventf(ssh
, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
5733 reasons
[reason_code
], reason_length
, reason_string
);
5735 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5737 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5741 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5745 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5746 int reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
; /* default */
5747 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5748 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5750 localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5751 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5752 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5755 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
5756 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
5758 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
5761 sprintf(buf
, "Received channel request for nonexistent"
5762 " channel %d", localid
);
5764 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5765 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5766 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, buf
);
5767 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
5768 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
5769 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", buf
);
5770 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
5771 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5776 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
5777 * the request type string to see if it's something
5780 if (c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
5782 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
5783 * the primary channel.
5785 if (typelen
== 11 &&
5786 !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11)) {
5788 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5789 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
5791 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
5793 } else if (typelen
== 11 &&
5794 !memcmp(type
, "exit-signal", 11)) {
5796 int is_plausible
= TRUE
, is_int
= FALSE
;
5797 char *fmt_sig
= "", *fmt_msg
= "";
5799 int msglen
= 0, core
= FALSE
;
5800 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
5801 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
5802 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
5803 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
5804 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
5806 unsigned char *p
= pktin
->body
+
5808 long len
= pktin
->length
- pktin
->savedpos
;
5809 unsigned long num
= GET_32BIT(p
); /* what is it? */
5810 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
5814 int maybe_int
= FALSE
, maybe_str
= FALSE
;
5815 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
5818 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
5819 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
5820 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
5821 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
5825 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int
);
5826 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num
+1, maybe_str
);
5827 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
5828 if (maybe_int
&& !maybe_str
)
5830 else if (!maybe_int
&& maybe_str
)
5833 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
5834 is_plausible
= FALSE
;
5839 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
5840 int signum
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5841 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" %d", signum
);
5843 /* As per the drafts. */
5846 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &sig
, &siglen
);
5847 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
5848 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
5850 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
5854 core
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5855 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
5857 fmt_msg
= dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen
, msg
);
5859 /* ignore lang tag */
5860 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
5861 logeventf(ssh
, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
5862 fmt_sig
, core ?
" (core dumped)" : "",
5864 if (*fmt_sig
) sfree(fmt_sig
);
5865 if (*fmt_msg
) sfree(fmt_msg
);
5866 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
5871 * This is a channel request we don't know
5872 * about, so we now either ignore the request
5873 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
5876 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
;
5879 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(reply
);
5880 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5881 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5885 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5888 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5889 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5891 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5892 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5895 * We currently don't support any global requests
5896 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
5897 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
5901 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
5902 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5906 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5914 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5915 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
5916 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5918 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5919 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
5922 remid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5923 winsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5924 pktsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5926 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
5929 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5930 addrstr
= snewn(peeraddrlen
+1, char);
5931 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
5932 addrstr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
5933 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5935 logeventf(ssh
, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
5938 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
5939 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
5940 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
5941 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, peerport
,
5942 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
5943 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
5945 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
5950 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
5951 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
5952 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
5955 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
5956 pf
.sport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5957 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5958 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5959 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
5960 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port %d open request "
5961 "from %s:%d", pf
.sport
, peeraddr
, peerport
);
5962 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
5963 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
5965 const char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
,
5969 realpf
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
5970 logeventf(ssh
, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
5971 "%s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
5973 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
5974 error
= "Port open failed";
5976 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
5977 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5980 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
5981 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 3)) {
5982 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
5983 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
5985 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
5986 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5989 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
5992 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
5993 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
5995 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
5996 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5997 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
5998 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, error
);
5999 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6000 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6001 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected channel open: %s", error
);
6004 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6006 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6007 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
6008 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
6009 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6010 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6011 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
6012 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6013 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
6014 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
6015 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
6016 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6021 * Handle the SSH2 userauth and connection layers.
6023 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
6024 struct Packet
*pktin
)
6026 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
6028 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
6030 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
6034 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
6035 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
6036 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
6038 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
6039 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6041 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
6042 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
;
6043 int kbd_inter_running
, kbd_inter_refused
;
6045 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
6050 void *publickey_blob
;
6051 int publickey_bloblen
;
6052 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
6056 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
6057 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
6058 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
6059 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
6061 int num_env
, env_left
, env_ok
;
6062 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6064 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
6066 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
6069 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6071 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
6072 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-userauth");
6073 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6074 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6075 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
6076 bombout(("Server refused user authentication protocol"));
6081 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
6082 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
6083 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
6084 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
6085 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
6086 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
6088 * I think this best serves the needs of
6090 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
6091 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
6092 * type both correctly
6094 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
6095 * need to fall back to passwords
6097 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
6098 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
6099 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
6100 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
6101 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
6104 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
6105 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
6110 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6112 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
6113 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
6116 } else if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
6117 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
6118 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
6119 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
6121 * get_line failed to get a username.
6124 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
6125 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
6126 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
6130 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6131 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
6133 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
6135 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
6136 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
6140 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6142 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
6145 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
6146 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
6147 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
6148 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
6149 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
6153 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
6156 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
6157 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
6158 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
6160 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6162 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6163 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6164 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
6165 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
6166 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6167 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
6169 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6171 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
6172 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
6173 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6174 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= FALSE
;
6175 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
6176 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
6178 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6179 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
6180 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
6181 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
6183 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
6184 &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
);
6187 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6188 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6189 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6191 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
6192 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6193 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
6195 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6198 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6202 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
6205 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6206 while (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
) {
6210 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
6211 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
6212 * a script, which means nobody will read the
6213 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
6214 * the banner will screw up processing on the
6215 * output of (say) plink.)
6217 if (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
6218 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &banner
, &size
);
6220 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
6222 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6224 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
6225 logevent("Access granted");
6226 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
6230 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
6231 pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
6233 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
6234 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
6235 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
6236 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
6237 * curr_prompt variable.
6241 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
) {
6242 /* FIXME: perhaps we should support this? */
6243 bombout(("PASSWD_CHANGEREQ not yet supported"));
6245 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6246 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
6254 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
6255 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
6256 * helpfully try next.
6258 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6261 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &methods
, &methlen
);
6262 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6263 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
)) {
6265 * We have received an unequivocal Access
6266 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
6269 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
6270 * it's not worth printing anything at all
6272 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
6273 * the message should be "Server refused our
6274 * key" (or no message at all if the key
6275 * came from Pageant)
6277 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
6278 * message really should be "Access denied".
6280 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
6281 * authentication, we should break out of this
6282 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
6283 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
6284 * username change attempts).
6286 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
6288 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
6289 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
6290 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
6291 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
6292 logevent("Server refused public key");
6293 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
6294 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
6296 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
6297 logevent("Access denied");
6298 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
&&
6299 ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6300 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
6301 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
6302 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6307 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
6308 logevent("Further authentication required");
6312 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
6314 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
6315 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
6316 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
6320 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6324 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
6325 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
6326 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
6327 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
6331 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
6332 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
6334 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
6339 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6340 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6342 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
6344 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6346 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6347 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
6348 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
6349 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
6350 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6354 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6355 " waiting for agent response"));
6358 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6359 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6360 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6362 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
6363 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
6364 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
6365 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
6366 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6368 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
6369 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
6372 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
6373 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6375 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
6376 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
6377 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
6378 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
6379 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
6380 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
6382 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
6384 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
6385 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
6386 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6388 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
6389 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
6390 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6391 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6392 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6393 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6394 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6395 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6396 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6397 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6398 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6399 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6401 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6402 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6403 logevent("Key refused");
6407 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6408 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
6410 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
6411 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
6415 * Server is willing to accept the key.
6416 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
6418 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6419 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6420 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6421 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6422 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
6423 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6424 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6425 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6426 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6428 s
->siglen
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
6429 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
6431 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
6432 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
6433 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
6434 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
6435 s
->agentreq
= snewn(4 + s
->len
, char);
6436 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
6437 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
6438 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
6439 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
6441 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6443 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
6445 /* Now the data to be signed... */
6446 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
6447 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
6450 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
6452 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
6453 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
6454 s
->q
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
6455 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
6457 if (!agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4,
6459 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6463 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6464 " while waiting for agent"
6468 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6469 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6470 s
->retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6475 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
6476 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6477 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
,
6478 s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
6480 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
6481 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6486 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6497 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
6498 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
6499 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
6500 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
6503 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6505 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6506 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6509 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6511 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6512 * willing to accept it.
6515 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
6520 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6521 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6522 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6523 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6524 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6525 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, algorithm
);
6526 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6527 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pub_blob
,
6529 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6530 logevent("Offered public key");
6532 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6533 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6535 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
6536 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6539 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6541 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6544 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
6545 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
6546 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6552 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6553 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6554 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
6555 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
6557 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
6561 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->kbd_inter_refused
&&
6562 !s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
6563 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6564 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6566 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6567 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
6569 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6570 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6571 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6572 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
6573 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ""); /* lang */
6574 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "");
6575 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6577 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6578 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
6579 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
6581 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
6582 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
6583 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= TRUE
; /* don't try it again */
6587 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
6591 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
6592 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6593 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6595 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6596 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
6598 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
6600 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
6601 * Display header data, and start going through
6604 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
6605 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
6607 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &name
, &name_len
);
6608 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
6609 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
6611 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
6612 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6615 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
6616 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6618 s
->num_prompts
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6622 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
6623 * display one and get a response.
6625 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
6629 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
6630 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
6631 static const char trunc
[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
6632 static const int prlen
= sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) -
6634 if (prompt_len
> prlen
) {
6635 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prlen
);
6636 strcpy(s
->pwprompt
+ prlen
, trunc
);
6638 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prompt_len
);
6639 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
] = '\0';
6643 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
6645 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6651 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
6652 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
6653 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6654 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
6655 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
6662 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
6663 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
6665 * get_line failed to get a password (for
6666 * example because one was supplied on the
6667 * command line which has already failed to
6670 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
6671 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
,SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
6672 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "No more passwords available"
6674 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6675 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6676 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
6677 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
,
6678 "Unable to authenticate");
6679 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
6680 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
6684 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6685 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
6688 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
6689 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
6691 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
6692 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
6696 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6700 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
6702 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
6704 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
6705 const char *error
= NULL
;
6707 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
,
6709 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
6710 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
6711 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
6712 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
6714 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key (");
6715 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
6716 c_write_str(ssh
, ")\r\n");
6717 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6719 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
6720 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6721 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6722 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6723 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
6724 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6725 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
6727 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
6728 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
6732 * We have loaded the private key and the server
6733 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
6734 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
6736 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6737 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6738 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6739 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6740 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
6741 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, key
->alg
->name
);
6742 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
6743 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6744 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
6747 * The data to be signed is:
6751 * followed by everything so far placed in the
6754 sigdata_len
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
6755 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
6757 sigdata
= snewn(sigdata_len
, unsigned char);
6759 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
6760 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
6763 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
6764 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
6765 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
6766 p
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
6767 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
6768 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
6769 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
6770 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
6771 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
6776 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6777 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
6778 key
->alg
->freekey(key
->data
);
6780 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
6782 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
6783 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
6786 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
6787 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
6788 * people who find out how long their password is!
6790 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6791 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
6792 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6793 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6794 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "password");
6795 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
6796 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
6797 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
6798 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
6799 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6800 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6801 logevent("Sent password");
6802 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
6803 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
6804 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
6805 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
6806 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
6807 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->num_prompts
);
6809 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
6810 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
6811 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
6812 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
6813 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6816 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
6817 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6820 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
6821 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
6822 * another packet. Then we go back round the
6823 * loop and will end up retrieving another
6824 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
6829 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6831 c_write_str(ssh
, "No supported authentication methods"
6832 " left to try!\r\n");
6833 logevent("No supported authentications offered."
6835 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
6836 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
6837 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "No supported authentication"
6838 " methods available");
6839 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6840 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6841 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
6842 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
6846 } while (!s
->we_are_in
);
6849 * Now we're authenticated for the connection protocol. The
6850 * connection protocol will automatically have started at this
6851 * point; there's no need to send SERVICE_REQUEST.
6854 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
6857 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
6858 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
6860 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] =
6861 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust
;
6862 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] =
6863 ssh2_msg_global_request
;
6866 * Create the main session channel.
6868 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
) {
6869 ssh
->mainchan
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
6870 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
6871 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6872 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
6873 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "session");
6874 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
6875 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6876 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
6877 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
6878 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6879 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6880 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
6881 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
6883 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
6885 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
6886 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
6889 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6890 ssh
->mainchan
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
6891 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
6892 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
6893 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6894 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6895 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6896 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
6897 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
6898 logevent("Opened channel for session");
6900 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
6903 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
6904 * general channel-based messages.
6906 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] =
6907 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] =
6908 ssh2_msg_channel_data
;
6909 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof
;
6910 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = ssh2_msg_channel_close
;
6911 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
6912 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
6913 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
6914 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure
;
6915 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] =
6916 ssh2_msg_channel_request
;
6917 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] =
6918 ssh2_msg_channel_open
;
6921 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
6923 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
6924 char proto
[20], data
[64];
6925 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
6926 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
6927 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
6928 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
6929 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6930 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6931 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "x11-req");
6932 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6933 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 0); /* many connections */
6934 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, proto
);
6935 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, data
);
6936 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
6937 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6939 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6941 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6942 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6943 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
6944 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6947 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
6949 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
6950 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
6955 * Enable port forwardings.
6957 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
6960 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
6962 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
6963 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
6964 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6965 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6966 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
6967 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6968 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6970 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6972 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6973 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6974 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
6975 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6978 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
6980 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
6981 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
6986 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
6988 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& !ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
6989 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
6990 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
6991 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
6992 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
6993 /* Build the pty request. */
6994 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6995 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
6996 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "pty-req");
6997 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6998 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
6999 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
7000 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
7001 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel width */
7002 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel height */
7003 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7004 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, 128); /* TTY_OP_ISPEED */
7005 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7006 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, 129); /* TTY_OP_OSPEED */
7007 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ospeed
);
7008 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
7009 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7010 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
7012 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7014 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7015 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7016 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
7017 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7020 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
7021 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7023 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
7024 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7027 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7031 * Send environment variables.
7033 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
7034 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
7036 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& *ssh
->cfg
.environmt
) {
7037 char *e
= ssh
->cfg
.environmt
;
7038 char *var
, *varend
, *val
;
7044 while (*e
&& *e
!= '\t') e
++;
7046 if (*e
== '\t') e
++;
7051 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7052 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7053 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "env");
7054 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7055 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7056 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, var
, varend
-var
);
7057 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, val
);
7058 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7063 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent %d environment variables", s
->num_env
);
7066 s
->env_left
= s
->num_env
;
7068 while (s
->env_left
> 0) {
7069 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7071 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7072 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7073 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
7074 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7084 if (s
->env_ok
== s
->num_env
) {
7085 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
7086 } else if (s
->env_ok
== 0) {
7087 logevent("All environment variables refused");
7088 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
7090 logeventf(ssh
, "%d environment variables refused",
7091 s
->num_env
- s
->env_ok
);
7092 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
7097 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
7098 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
7101 if (ssh
->mainchan
) while (1) {
7105 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
7106 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
7107 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
7109 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
7110 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
7113 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7114 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
7116 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "subsystem");
7117 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7118 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7120 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "exec");
7121 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7122 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7124 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "shell");
7125 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7127 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7129 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7131 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7132 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7133 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
7134 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7138 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
7139 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
7140 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
7141 * back to it before complaining.
7143 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
7144 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
7145 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
7148 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
7151 logevent("Started a shell/command");
7156 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
7157 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
7158 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
7159 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
7160 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
7166 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
7171 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
7175 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
7176 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
7177 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
7180 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
7182 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7184 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
7186 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
7191 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7193 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
7195 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
7198 continue; /* don't send on closing channels */
7199 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
7202 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
7203 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
7204 * notification since it will be polled */
7207 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
7210 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
7211 * buffer management */
7214 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
7226 * Handlers for SSH2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
7228 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7230 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
7232 int nowlen
, reason
, msglen
;
7234 reason
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7235 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7237 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
7238 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
7239 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
7241 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
7242 " type %d)", reason
);
7246 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
7247 &nowlen
, msglen
, msg
);
7249 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
7251 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
7252 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
7257 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7259 /* log the debug message */
7264 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
7265 always_display
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
7266 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7268 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
7271 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7273 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7274 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
7275 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, pktin
->sequence
);
7277 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7278 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7280 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7284 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
7286 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
7291 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7293 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
7294 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented
;
7297 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7298 * the coroutines will get it.
7300 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
] = NULL
;
7301 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7302 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
] = NULL
;
7303 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
] = NULL
;
7304 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
] = NULL
;
7305 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
] = NULL
;
7306 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7307 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7308 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7309 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
] = NULL
;
7310 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7311 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7312 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7313 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7314 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7315 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
] = NULL
;
7316 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7317 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7318 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
] = NULL
;
7319 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7320 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7321 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7322 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] = NULL
;
7323 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] = NULL
;
7324 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7325 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] = NULL
;
7326 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = NULL
;
7327 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] = NULL
;
7328 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = NULL
;
7329 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = NULL
;
7330 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7331 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7332 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7335 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7337 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh2_msg_disconnect
;
7338 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
; /* shared with ssh1 */
7339 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh2_msg_debug
;
7342 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
)
7346 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0 &&
7347 now
- ssh
->next_rekey
>= 0) {
7348 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "timeout", -1, NULL
);
7352 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
7353 struct Packet
*pktin
)
7355 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
7356 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7360 ssh
->incoming_data_size
+= pktin
->encrypted_len
;
7361 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
7362 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
7363 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
7364 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data received", -1, NULL
);
7367 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
7368 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
7372 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
||
7373 (pktin
&& pktin
->type
>= 20 && pktin
->type
< 50)) {
7374 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
) &&
7375 !ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
7376 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
7378 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7380 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, 0, NULL
);
7383 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
7388 * Called to set up the connection.
7390 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7392 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
7394 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
,
7400 ssh
= snew(struct ssh_tag
);
7401 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7402 ssh
->version
= 0; /* when not ready yet */
7405 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7406 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7407 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
7408 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7409 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
7410 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7412 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7414 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7416 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7418 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7420 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
7421 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
7423 ssh
->close_expected
= FALSE
;
7424 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
7425 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
7426 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
7429 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
7430 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
7431 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
7432 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7434 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
7435 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
7436 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
7437 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7438 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7439 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
7440 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
7441 ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
= 0;
7442 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
7443 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
7444 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
7445 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
7446 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
7447 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
7448 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
7449 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7450 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
7451 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7453 ssh
->queuelen
= ssh
->queuesize
= 0;
7454 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
7455 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7456 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
7458 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
7461 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7462 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7465 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
7466 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
7467 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
7469 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7470 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7471 ssh
->portfwds
= NULL
;
7476 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
7477 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
7478 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7480 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
7482 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= FALSE
;
7486 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= ssh
->outgoing_data_size
=
7487 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0L;
7488 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_data
);
7489 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
7491 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
, keepalive
);
7500 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
7502 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7503 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7504 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
7506 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
7507 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
7508 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
7509 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
7510 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
7511 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
7512 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
7513 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
7514 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
7515 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
7516 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
) {
7518 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7520 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7522 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
) {
7524 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7526 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7529 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
7530 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
7532 while (ssh
->queuelen
-- > 0)
7533 ssh_free_packet(ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
]);
7536 while (ssh
->qhead
) {
7537 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
7538 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
7541 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7543 if (ssh
->channels
) {
7544 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
7547 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
7548 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
7551 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
7552 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
7557 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
7558 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7561 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
7562 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
7564 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
7565 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7567 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
7569 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
7570 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
7571 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
7572 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
7573 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
7574 if (ssh
->crcda_ctx
) {
7575 crcda_free_context(ssh
->crcda_ctx
);
7576 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7579 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
7580 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
7582 pinger_free(ssh
->pinger
);
7589 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
7591 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
7593 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7594 char *rekeying
= NULL
, rekey_mandatory
= FALSE
;
7595 unsigned long old_max_data_size
;
7597 pinger_reconfig(ssh
->pinger
, &ssh
->cfg
, cfg
);
7598 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, cfg
);
7600 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
&&
7601 cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
7602 long new_next
= ssh
->last_rekey
+ cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
;
7603 long now
= GETTICKCOUNT();
7605 if (new_next
- now
< 0) {
7606 rekeying
= "timeout shortened";
7608 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(new_next
- now
, ssh2_timer
, ssh
);
7612 old_max_data_size
= ssh
->max_data_size
;
7613 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(cfg
->ssh_rekey_data
);
7614 if (old_max_data_size
!= ssh
->max_data_size
&&
7615 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0) {
7616 if (ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
||
7617 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
7618 rekeying
= "data limit lowered";
7621 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
!= cfg
->compression
) {
7622 rekeying
= "compression setting changed";
7623 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
7626 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
!= cfg
->ssh2_des_cbc
||
7627 memcmp(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
, cfg
->ssh_cipherlist
,
7628 sizeof(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
))) {
7629 rekeying
= "cipher settings changed";
7630 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
7633 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7636 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
) {
7637 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, rekeying
, -1, NULL
);
7638 } else if (rekey_mandatory
) {
7639 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= rekeying
;
7645 * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
7647 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
7649 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7651 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
7654 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
7656 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
7660 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
7662 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
7664 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7667 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
7671 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
7672 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
7675 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
7676 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
7678 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7679 return override_value
;
7680 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
7681 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
7682 return override_value
;
7684 return (override_value
+
7685 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
7692 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
7694 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
7696 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7697 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7699 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
7700 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
7702 switch (ssh
->state
) {
7703 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
7704 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
7705 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
7706 break; /* do nothing */
7707 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
7708 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
7710 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
7711 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
7712 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7713 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
7714 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
7715 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
7716 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
7717 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7718 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7719 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7720 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "window-change");
7721 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7722 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
7723 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
7724 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7725 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7726 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7734 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
7737 static const struct telnet_special
*ssh_get_specials(void *handle
)
7739 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special
[] = {
7740 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
}
7742 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials
[] = {
7743 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
7744 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY
},
7746 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials
[] = {
7749 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
7750 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
7751 * required signals. */
7752 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT
},
7753 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM
},
7754 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL
},
7755 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT
},
7756 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP
},
7757 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU
},
7758 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT
}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM
},
7759 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE
}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL
},
7760 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE
}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV
},
7761 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1
}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2
},
7764 static const struct telnet_special specials_end
[] = {
7767 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
7768 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials
[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials
) +
7769 lenof(ssh2_session_specials
) +
7770 lenof(specials_end
)];
7771 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7773 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
7775 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
7776 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
7780 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7781 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
7782 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
7784 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
7785 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special
);
7786 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
7787 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials
);
7789 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials
);
7790 } /* else we're not ready yet */
7793 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end
);
7794 return ssh_specials
;
7802 * Send Telnet special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
7803 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
7806 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
7808 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7809 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7811 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
7812 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
7814 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
7815 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
7818 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
7821 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7822 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
7823 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7824 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
7825 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7826 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7828 logevent("Sent EOF message");
7829 } else if (code
== TS_PING
|| code
== TS_NOP
) {
7830 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
7831 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
7832 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7833 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
7834 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
7836 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
7837 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
7838 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7840 } else if (code
== TS_REKEY
) {
7841 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->version
== 2) {
7842 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "at user request", -1, NULL
);
7844 } else if (code
== TS_BRK
) {
7845 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
7846 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
7847 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7848 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH1");
7849 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7850 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7851 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7852 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "break");
7853 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7854 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0); /* default break length */
7855 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7858 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
7859 char *signame
= NULL
;
7860 if (code
== TS_SIGABRT
) signame
= "ABRT";
7861 if (code
== TS_SIGALRM
) signame
= "ALRM";
7862 if (code
== TS_SIGFPE
) signame
= "FPE";
7863 if (code
== TS_SIGHUP
) signame
= "HUP";
7864 if (code
== TS_SIGILL
) signame
= "ILL";
7865 if (code
== TS_SIGINT
) signame
= "INT";
7866 if (code
== TS_SIGKILL
) signame
= "KILL";
7867 if (code
== TS_SIGPIPE
) signame
= "PIPE";
7868 if (code
== TS_SIGQUIT
) signame
= "QUIT";
7869 if (code
== TS_SIGSEGV
) signame
= "SEGV";
7870 if (code
== TS_SIGTERM
) signame
= "TERM";
7871 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR1
) signame
= "USR1";
7872 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR2
) signame
= "USR2";
7873 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
7874 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
7876 /* It's a signal. */
7877 if (ssh
->version
== 2 && ssh
->mainchan
) {
7878 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7879 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7880 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "signal");
7881 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7882 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, signame
);
7883 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7884 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame
);
7887 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
7892 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
7894 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7895 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7896 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
7901 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
7903 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
7905 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
7906 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
7912 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
7913 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
7915 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
7917 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7918 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7919 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
7920 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7921 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
7924 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
7925 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
7929 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
7931 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
7933 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7935 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
7937 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7938 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
7939 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
7942 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
7945 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
7946 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "direct-tcpip");
7947 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
7948 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
7949 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
7950 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
7951 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, hostname
);
7952 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, port
);
7954 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
7955 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
7956 * convinced the server should be told details like that
7957 * about my local network configuration.
7959 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "client-side-connection");
7960 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7961 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7965 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
7967 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7971 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
7973 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7974 return ssh
->send_ok
;
7977 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
7979 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7980 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
7981 return ssh
->echoing
;
7982 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
7983 return ssh
->editing
;
7987 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
7989 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7993 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
7995 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7996 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
7999 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
8001 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8005 return (ssh
->exitcode
>= 0 ? ssh
->exitcode
: 0);
8009 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
8010 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
8012 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle
)
8014 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8015 return ssh
->version
;
8019 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
8020 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
8021 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
8023 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
8025 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8026 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
8029 Backend ssh_backend
= {
8039 ssh_return_exitcode
,