Tweak to window handling: Keep the local window in a signed integer, and
[sgt/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15
16 #ifndef FALSE
17 #define FALSE 0
18 #endif
19 #ifndef TRUE
20 #define TRUE 1
21 #endif
22
23 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
24 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
28 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
32 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
36 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
38 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
40 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
42 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
44 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
45 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
47 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
50 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
51 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
52 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
53 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
56 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
59 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
60 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
62 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
63 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
64
65 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
66 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
67
68 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
69 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
70 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
71
72 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
111
112 /*
113 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
114 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
115 */
116 typedef enum {
117 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
118 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
119 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
120 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
121 } Pkt_KCtx;
122 typedef enum {
123 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
124 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
125 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
126 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
127 } Pkt_ACtx;
128
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
130 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
131 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
132 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
133 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
134 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
135 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
136 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
137 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
138 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
139 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
140 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
141 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
142 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
143 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
144
145 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
146 NULL,
147 "host not allowed to connect",
148 "protocol error",
149 "key exchange failed",
150 "host authentication failed",
151 "MAC error",
152 "compression error",
153 "service not available",
154 "protocol version not supported",
155 "host key not verifiable",
156 "connection lost",
157 "by application",
158 "too many connections",
159 "auth cancelled by user",
160 "no more auth methods available",
161 "illegal user name",
162 };
163
164 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
165 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
166 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
167 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
168
169 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
170
171 /*
172 * Various remote-bug flags.
173 */
174 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
175 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
176 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
177 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
178 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
179 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
180 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
181 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
182
183 /*
184 * Codes for terminal modes.
185 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
186 * This list is derived from draft-ietf-secsh-connect-25 and
187 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
188 */
189 static const struct {
190 const char* const mode;
191 int opcode;
192 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
193 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
194 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
195 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
196 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
197 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
198 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
199 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
200 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
201 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
202 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
203 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
204 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
205 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
206 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
207 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
208 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
209 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
210 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
211 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
212 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
213 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
214 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
215 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
216 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
217 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
218 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
219 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
220 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
221 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
222 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
223 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
224 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
225 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
226 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
227 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
228 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
229 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
230 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
238 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
248 };
249
250 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
251 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
252 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
253 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
254 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
255 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
256 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
257
258 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
259 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
260 {
261 unsigned int ret;
262 if (*s) {
263 char *next = NULL;
264 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
265 if (!next) ret = s[0];
266 } else {
267 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
268 }
269 return ret;
270 }
271 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
272 {
273 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
274 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
275 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
276 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
277 return 1; /* true */
278 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
279 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
280 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
281 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
282 return 0; /* false */
283 else
284 return (atoi(s) != 0);
285 }
286
287 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
288 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
289 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
290 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
291 {
292 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
293 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
294 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
295 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
296 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
297 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
298 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
299 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
300 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
301 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
302 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
303 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
304 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
305 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
306 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
307 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
308 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
310 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
311 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
312 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
313 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
314 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
315 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
316 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
318 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
320 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
321 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
322 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
323 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
324 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
325 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
326 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
327 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
328 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
329 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
330 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
331 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
332 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
333 return "unknown";
334 }
335 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
336 {
337 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
338 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
339 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
340 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
341 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
342 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
343 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
344 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
345 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
346 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
347 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
348 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
349 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
350 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
351 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
352 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
353 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
354 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
355 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
356 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
357 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
360 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
361 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
366 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
367 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
368 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
369 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
370 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
371 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
372 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
373 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
374 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
375 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
376 return "unknown";
377 }
378 #undef translate
379 #undef translatec
380
381 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
382 enum {
383 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
384 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
385 * fields to the packet logging code. */
386 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
387 };
388
389 /*
390 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
391 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
392 * read
393 *
394 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
395 *
396 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
397 *
398 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
399 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
400 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
401 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
402 *
403 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
404 * - click Settings
405 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
406 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
407 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
408 */
409 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
410 #define crState(t) \
411 struct t *s; \
412 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
413 s = ssh->t;
414 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
415 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
416 #define crReturn(z) \
417 do {\
418 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
419 } while (0)
420 #define crReturnV \
421 do {\
422 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
423 } while (0)
424 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
425 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
426 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
427 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
428
429 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
430 struct Packet;
431
432 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
433 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
434 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
435 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
436 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
437 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
438 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
439 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
440 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
441 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
442 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
443 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
444 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
445 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
446 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
447 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
448 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
449 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
450 struct Packet *pktin);
451 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
452 struct Packet *pktin);
453
454 /*
455 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
456 * various different purposes:
457 *
458 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
459 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
460 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
461 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
462 * happen very often.
463 *
464 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
465 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
466 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
467 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
468 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
469 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
470 *
471 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
472 * channels.
473 */
474
475 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
476 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
477 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
478 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
479
480 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
481 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
482
483 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
484
485 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
486 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
487 };
488 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
489 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
490 };
491
492 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
493 {
494 return NULL;
495 }
496 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
497 {
498 }
499 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
500 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
501 {
502 return 0;
503 }
504 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
505 {
506 return 0;
507 }
508 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
509 "none",
510 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
511 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
512 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
513 };
514 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
515 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
516 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
517 };
518
519 enum { /* channel types */
520 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
521 CHAN_X11,
522 CHAN_AGENT,
523 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
524 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
525 };
526
527 /*
528 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
529 */
530 struct ssh_channel {
531 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
532 unsigned remoteid, localid;
533 int type;
534 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
535 int halfopen;
536 /*
537 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
538 *
539 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
540 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
541 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
542 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
543 *
544 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
545 */
546 int closes;
547 union {
548 struct ssh1_data_channel {
549 int throttling;
550 } v1;
551 struct ssh2_data_channel {
552 bufchain outbuffer;
553 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
554 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
555 int locwindow;
556 } v2;
557 } v;
558 union {
559 struct ssh_agent_channel {
560 unsigned char *message;
561 unsigned char msglen[4];
562 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
563 } a;
564 struct ssh_x11_channel {
565 Socket s;
566 } x11;
567 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
568 Socket s;
569 } pfd;
570 } u;
571 };
572
573 /*
574 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
575 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
576 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
577 *
578 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
579 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
580 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
581 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
582 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
583 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
584 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
585 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
586 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
587 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
588 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
589 *
590 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
591 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
592 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
593 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
594 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
595 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
596 *
597 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
598 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
599 */
600 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
601
602 struct ssh_rportfwd {
603 unsigned sport, dport;
604 char dhost[256];
605 char *sportdesc;
606 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
607 };
608 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
609 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
610
611 /*
612 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
613 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
614 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
615 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
616 * it.
617 */
618 struct ssh_portfwd {
619 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
620 int type;
621 unsigned sport, dport;
622 char *saddr, *daddr;
623 char *sserv, *dserv;
624 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
625 int addressfamily;
626 void *local;
627 };
628 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
629 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
630 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
631
632 struct Packet {
633 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
634 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
635 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
636 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
637 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
638 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
639 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
640 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
641 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
642
643 /*
644 * State associated with packet logging
645 */
646 int logmode;
647 int nblanks;
648 struct logblank_t *blanks;
649 };
650
651 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
652 struct Packet *pktin);
653 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
654 struct Packet *pktin);
655 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
656 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
657 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
658 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
659 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
660 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
661 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
662 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin);
663 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
664 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
665 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
666 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
667 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
668 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
669 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
670 struct Packet *pktin);
671
672 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
673 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
674 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
675 unsigned char *p;
676 int i;
677 int chunk;
678 struct Packet *pktin;
679 };
680
681 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
682 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
683 int i;
684 int cipherblk;
685 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
686 struct Packet *pktin;
687 };
688
689 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
690 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
691
692 struct queued_handler;
693 struct queued_handler {
694 int msg1, msg2;
695 chandler_fn_t handler;
696 void *ctx;
697 struct queued_handler *next;
698 };
699
700 struct ssh_tag {
701 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
702 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
703
704 char *v_c, *v_s;
705 void *exhash;
706
707 Socket s;
708
709 void *ldisc;
710 void *logctx;
711
712 unsigned char session_key[32];
713 int v1_compressing;
714 int v1_remote_protoflags;
715 int v1_local_protoflags;
716 int agentfwd_enabled;
717 int X11_fwd_enabled;
718 int remote_bugs;
719 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
720 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
721 void *crcda_ctx;
722 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
723 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
724 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
725 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
726 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
727 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
728 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
729 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
730 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
731 int v2_session_id_len;
732 void *kex_ctx;
733
734 char *savedhost;
735 int savedport;
736 int send_ok;
737 int echoing, editing;
738
739 void *frontend;
740
741 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
742 int term_width, term_height;
743
744 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
745 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
746 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
747 int exitcode;
748 int close_expected;
749 int clean_exit;
750
751 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
752
753 enum {
754 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
755 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
756 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
757 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
758 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
759 } state;
760
761 int size_needed, eof_needed;
762
763 struct Packet **queue;
764 int queuelen, queuesize;
765 int queueing;
766 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
767 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
768
769 /*
770 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
771 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
772 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
773 * got.
774 */
775 int fallback_cmd;
776
777 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
778
779 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
780 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
781
782 void *x11auth;
783
784 int version;
785 int v1_throttle_count;
786 int overall_bufsize;
787 int throttled_all;
788 int v1_stdout_throttling;
789 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
790
791 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
792 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
793 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
794 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
795 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
796 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
797 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
798 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
799
800 void *do_ssh_init_state;
801 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
802 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
803 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
804
805 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
806 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
807
808 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
809 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
810
811 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
812 struct Packet *pkt);
813 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
814
815 /*
816 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
817 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
818 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
819 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
820 */
821 Config cfg;
822
823 /*
824 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
825 */
826 void *agent_response;
827 int agent_response_len;
828 int user_response;
829
830 /*
831 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
832 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
833 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
834 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
835 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
836 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
837 * store that data.
838 */
839 int frozen;
840 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
841
842 /*
843 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
844 * with at any time.
845 */
846 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
847
848 /*
849 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
850 * indications from a request.
851 */
852 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
853
854 /*
855 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
856 */
857 Pinger pinger;
858
859 /*
860 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
861 * size-based rekeys.
862 */
863 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
864 unsigned long max_data_size;
865 int kex_in_progress;
866 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
867 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
868 };
869
870 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
871
872 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
873 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
874 {
875 va_list ap;
876 char *buf;
877
878 va_start(ap, fmt);
879 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
880 va_end(ap);
881 logevent(buf);
882 sfree(buf);
883 }
884
885 #define bombout(msg) \
886 do { \
887 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
888 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
889 logevent(text); \
890 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
891 sfree(text); \
892 } while (0)
893
894 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
895
896 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
897 {
898 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
899 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
900 }
901
902 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
903 {
904 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
905 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
906 }
907
908 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
909 {
910 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
911 }
912
913 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
914 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
915 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
916 void *data)
917 {
918 while (*modes) {
919 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
920 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
921 char *val;
922 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
923 m[t-modes] = '\0';
924 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
925 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
926 else
927 val = dupstr(t+2);
928 if (val)
929 do_mode(data, m, val);
930 sfree(m);
931 sfree(val);
932 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
933 }
934 }
935
936 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
937 {
938 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
939 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
940 if (a->localid < b->localid)
941 return -1;
942 if (a->localid > b->localid)
943 return +1;
944 return 0;
945 }
946 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
947 {
948 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
949 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
950 if (*a < b->localid)
951 return -1;
952 if (*a > b->localid)
953 return +1;
954 return 0;
955 }
956
957 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
958 {
959 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
960 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
961 int i;
962 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
963 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
964 if (a->dport > b->dport)
965 return +1;
966 if (a->dport < b->dport)
967 return -1;
968 return 0;
969 }
970
971 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
972 {
973 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
974 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
975
976 if (a->sport > b->sport)
977 return +1;
978 if (a->sport < b->sport)
979 return -1;
980 return 0;
981 }
982
983 /*
984 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
985 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
986 */
987 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
988 {
989 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
990 return 0;
991 if (a == NULL)
992 return -1;
993 if (b == NULL)
994 return +1;
995 return strcmp(a, b);
996 }
997
998 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
999 {
1000 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1001 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1002 int i;
1003 if (a->type > b->type)
1004 return +1;
1005 if (a->type < b->type)
1006 return -1;
1007 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1008 return +1;
1009 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1010 return -1;
1011 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1012 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1013 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1014 return +1;
1015 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1016 return -1;
1017 if (a->type != 'D') {
1018 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1019 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1020 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1021 return +1;
1022 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1023 return -1;
1024 }
1025 return 0;
1026 }
1027
1028 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1029 {
1030 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1031 unsigned low, high, mid;
1032 int tsize;
1033 struct ssh_channel *c;
1034
1035 /*
1036 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1037 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1038 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1039 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1040 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1041 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1042 */
1043 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1044
1045 low = -1;
1046 high = tsize;
1047 while (high - low > 1) {
1048 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1049 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1050 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1051 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1052 else
1053 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1054 }
1055 /*
1056 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1057 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1058 */
1059 {
1060 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1061 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1062 }
1063 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1064 }
1065
1066 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1067 {
1068 int i;
1069 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1070 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1071 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1072 }
1073
1074 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1075 {
1076 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1077 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1078 else
1079 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1080 }
1081
1082 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1083 {
1084 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1085 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1086 else
1087 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1088 }
1089
1090 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1091 {
1092 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1093 }
1094
1095 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1096 {
1097 sfree(pkt->data);
1098 sfree(pkt);
1099 }
1100 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1101 {
1102 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1103
1104 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1105 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1106 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1107 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1108 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1109
1110 return pkt;
1111 }
1112
1113 /*
1114 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1115 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1116 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1117 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1118 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1119 */
1120 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1121 {
1122 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1123
1124 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1125
1126 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1127
1128 st->pktin->type = 0;
1129 st->pktin->length = 0;
1130
1131 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1132 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1133 crReturn(NULL);
1134 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1135 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1136 }
1137
1138 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1139 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1140 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1141
1142 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1143 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1144 " data stream corruption"));
1145 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1146 crStop(NULL);
1147 }
1148
1149 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1150 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1151
1152 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1153 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1154 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1155 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1156 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1157 crReturn(NULL);
1158 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1159 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1160 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1161 *data += st->chunk;
1162 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1163 st->p += st->chunk;
1164 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1165 }
1166
1167 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1168 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1169 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1170 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1171 crStop(NULL);
1172 }
1173
1174 if (ssh->cipher)
1175 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1176
1177 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1178 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1179 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1180 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1181 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1182 crStop(NULL);
1183 }
1184
1185 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1186 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1187
1188 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1189 unsigned char *decompblk;
1190 int decomplen;
1191 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1192 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1193 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1194 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1195 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1196 crStop(NULL);
1197 }
1198
1199 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1200 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1201 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1202 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1203 unsigned char);
1204 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1205 }
1206
1207 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1208 sfree(decompblk);
1209 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1210 }
1211
1212 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1213
1214 /*
1215 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1216 */
1217 if (ssh->logctx) {
1218 int nblanks = 0;
1219 struct logblank_t blank;
1220 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1221 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1222 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1223 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1224 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1225 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 0;
1226 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1227 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1228 }
1229 if (do_blank) {
1230 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1231 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1232 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1233 nblanks = 1;
1234 }
1235 }
1236 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1237 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1238 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1239 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1240 nblanks, &blank);
1241 }
1242
1243 crFinish(st->pktin);
1244 }
1245
1246 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1247 {
1248 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1249
1250 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1251
1252 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1253
1254 st->pktin->type = 0;
1255 st->pktin->length = 0;
1256 if (ssh->sccipher)
1257 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1258 else
1259 st->cipherblk = 8;
1260 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1261 st->cipherblk = 8;
1262
1263 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1267 * contain the length and padding details.
1268 */
1269 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1270 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1271 crReturn(NULL);
1272 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1273 (*datalen)--;
1274 }
1275
1276 if (ssh->sccipher)
1277 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1278 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1279
1280 /*
1281 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1282 */
1283 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1284 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1285
1286 /*
1287 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1288 * do us any more damage.
1289 */
1290 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > 35000 || st->pad < 4 ||
1291 st->len - st->pad < 1 || (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1292 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1293 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1294 crStop(NULL);
1295 }
1296
1297 /*
1298 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1299 */
1300 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1301
1302 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1303
1304 /*
1305 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1306 */
1307 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1308 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1309
1310 /*
1311 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1312 */
1313 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1314 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1315 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1316 unsigned char);
1317
1318 /*
1319 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1320 */
1321 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1322 st->i++) {
1323 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1324 crReturn(NULL);
1325 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1326 (*datalen)--;
1327 }
1328 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1329 if (ssh->sccipher)
1330 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1331 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1332 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1333
1334 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1335
1336 /*
1337 * Check the MAC.
1338 */
1339 if (ssh->scmac
1340 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->len + 4,
1341 st->incoming_sequence)) {
1342 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1343 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1344 crStop(NULL);
1345 }
1346
1347 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1348
1349 /*
1350 * Decompress packet payload.
1351 */
1352 {
1353 unsigned char *newpayload;
1354 int newlen;
1355 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1356 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1357 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1358 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1359 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1360 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1361 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1362 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1363 unsigned char);
1364 }
1365 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1366 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1367 sfree(newpayload);
1368 }
1369 }
1370
1371 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1372 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1373 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1374
1375 /*
1376 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1377 */
1378 if (ssh->logctx) {
1379 int nblanks = 0;
1380 struct logblank_t blank;
1381 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1382 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1383 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1384 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1385 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1386 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1387 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1388 }
1389 if (do_blank) {
1390 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1391 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1392 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1393 nblanks = 1;
1394 }
1395 }
1396 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1397 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1398 st->pktin->type),
1399 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1400 nblanks, &blank);
1401 }
1402
1403 crFinish(st->pktin);
1404 }
1405
1406 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1407 {
1408 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1409 unsigned long crc;
1410 #ifdef __SC__
1411 /*
1412 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1413 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1414 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1415 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1416 */
1417 volatile
1418 #endif
1419 int len;
1420
1421 if (ssh->logctx)
1422 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1423 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1424 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1425 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1426 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1427 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1428
1429 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1430 unsigned char *compblk;
1431 int complen;
1432 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1433 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1434 &compblk, &complen);
1435 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1436 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1437 sfree(compblk);
1438 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1439 }
1440
1441 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1442 pkt->length += 4;
1443 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1444 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1445 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1446 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1447
1448 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1449 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1450 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1451 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1452 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1453
1454 if (ssh->cipher)
1455 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1456 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1457
1458 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1459 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1460 }
1461
1462 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1463 {
1464 if (ssh->logctx)
1465 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len, 0, NULL);
1466 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1467 }
1468
1469 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1470 {
1471 int len, backlog, offset;
1472 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1473 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1474 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1475 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1476 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1477 }
1478
1479 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1480 {
1481 int len, offset;
1482 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1483 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1484 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1485 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1486 ssh->deferred_size,
1487 unsigned char);
1488 }
1489 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1490 pkt->data + offset, len);
1491 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1492 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1493 }
1494
1495 /*
1496 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1497 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1498 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1499 */
1500 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1501 {
1502 int argtype;
1503 Bignum bn;
1504 struct Packet *pkt;
1505
1506 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1507
1508 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1509 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1510 char *sargp;
1511 unsigned long argint;
1512 int arglen;
1513 switch (argtype) {
1514 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1515 case PKT_INT:
1516 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1517 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1518 break;
1519 case PKT_CHAR:
1520 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1521 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1522 break;
1523 case PKT_DATA:
1524 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1525 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1526 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1527 break;
1528 case PKT_STR:
1529 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1530 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1531 break;
1532 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1533 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1534 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1535 break;
1536 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1537 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1538 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1539 break;
1540 case PKTT_DATA:
1541 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1542 break;
1543 case PKTT_OTHER:
1544 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1545 break;
1546 }
1547 }
1548
1549 return pkt;
1550 }
1551
1552 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1553 {
1554 struct Packet *pkt;
1555 va_list ap;
1556 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1557 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1558 va_end(ap);
1559 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1560 }
1561
1562 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1563 {
1564 struct Packet *pkt;
1565 va_list ap;
1566 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1567 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1568 va_end(ap);
1569 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1570 }
1571
1572 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1573 {
1574 char *ae, *be;
1575 unsigned long av, bv;
1576
1577 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1578 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1579 if (av != bv)
1580 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1581 if (*ae == '.')
1582 ae++;
1583 if (*be == '.')
1584 be++;
1585 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1586 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1587 if (av != bv)
1588 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1589 return 0;
1590 }
1591
1592 /*
1593 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1594 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1595 */
1596 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1597 {
1598 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1599 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1600 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1601 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1602 }
1603
1604 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1605 {
1606 unsigned char intblk[4];
1607 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1608 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1609 }
1610
1611 /*
1612 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1613 */
1614 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1615 {
1616 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1617 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1618 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1619 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1620 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1621 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1622 }
1623 }
1624 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1625 {
1626 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1627 pkt->nblanks++;
1628 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1629 assert(pkt->body);
1630 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1631 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1632 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1633 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1634 }
1635 pkt->length += len;
1636 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1637 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1638 }
1639 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1640 {
1641 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1642 }
1643 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1644 {
1645 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1646 }
1647 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1648 {
1649 unsigned char x[4];
1650 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1651 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1652 }
1653 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1654 {
1655 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1656 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1657 }
1658 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1659 {
1660 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1661 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1662 }
1663 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1664 {
1665 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1666 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1667 }
1668 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1669 {
1670 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1671 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1672 }
1673 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1674 {
1675 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1676 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1677 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1678 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1679 sfree(data);
1680 }
1681 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1682 {
1683 unsigned char *p;
1684 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1685 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1686 p[0] = 0;
1687 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1688 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1689 i = 0;
1690 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1691 i++;
1692 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1693 *len = n + 1 - i;
1694 return p;
1695 }
1696 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1697 {
1698 unsigned char *p;
1699 int len;
1700 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1701 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1702 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1703 sfree(p);
1704 }
1705
1706 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1707 {
1708 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1709 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1710 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1711 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1712 return pkt;
1713 }
1714
1715 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1716 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1717 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1718 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1719 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1720 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1721 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1722 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1723 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1724
1725 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1726 {
1727 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1728 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1729 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1730 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1731 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1732 return pkt;
1733 }
1734
1735 /*
1736 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1737 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1738 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1739 */
1740 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1741 {
1742 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1743
1744 if (ssh->logctx)
1745 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1746 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1747 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1748 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1749 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1750 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1751
1752 /*
1753 * Compress packet payload.
1754 */
1755 {
1756 unsigned char *newpayload;
1757 int newlen;
1758 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1759 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1760 pkt->length - 5,
1761 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1762 pkt->length = 5;
1763 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1764 sfree(newpayload);
1765 }
1766 }
1767
1768 /*
1769 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1770 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1771 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1772 * after padding.
1773 */
1774 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1775 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1776 padding = 4;
1777 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1778 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1779 padding +=
1780 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1781 assert(padding <= 255);
1782 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1783 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1784 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1785 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1786 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1787 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1788 if (ssh->csmac)
1789 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1790 pkt->length + padding,
1791 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1792 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1793
1794 if (ssh->cscipher)
1795 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1796 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1797
1798 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1799
1800 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1801 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1802 }
1803
1804 /*
1805 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1806 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1807 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1808 *
1809 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1810 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1811 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1812 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1813 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1814 * works after packet encryption.
1815 *
1816 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1817 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1818 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1819 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1820 * then send them once we've finished.
1821 *
1822 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1823 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1824 *
1825 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1826 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1827 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1828 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1829 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1830 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1831 *
1832 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1833 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1834 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1835 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1836 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1837 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1838 * CBC.
1839 */
1840
1841 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1842 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1843
1844 /*
1845 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1846 */
1847 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1848 {
1849 int len;
1850 int backlog;
1851 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
1852 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1853 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1854 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1855 return;
1856 }
1857 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1858 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
1859 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1860 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1861
1862 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1863 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1864 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1865 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1866 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1867
1868 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1869 }
1870
1871 /*
1872 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
1873 */
1874 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
1875 {
1876 int len;
1877 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1878 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
1879 /*
1880 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
1881 * get encrypted with a known IV.
1882 */
1883 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1884 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
1885 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
1886 }
1887 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1888 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1889 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1890 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1891 ssh->deferred_size,
1892 unsigned char);
1893 }
1894 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
1895 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1896 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1897 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1898 }
1899
1900 /*
1901 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
1902 */
1903 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1904 {
1905 assert(ssh->queueing);
1906
1907 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
1908 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
1909 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
1910 }
1911
1912 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
1913 }
1914
1915 /*
1916 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1917 * set.
1918 */
1919 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1920 {
1921 if (ssh->queueing)
1922 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1923 else
1924 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
1925 }
1926
1927 /*
1928 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1929 * set.
1930 */
1931 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1932 {
1933 if (ssh->queueing)
1934 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1935 else
1936 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1937 }
1938
1939 /*
1940 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1941 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
1942 *
1943 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1944 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1945 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1946 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1947 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1948 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1949 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1950 * ssh->queueing.
1951 */
1952 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
1953 {
1954 int backlog;
1955 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
1956 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
1957 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
1958 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
1959 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1960 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1961
1962 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
1963 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1964 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1965 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1966 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1967 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
1968 }
1969
1970 /*
1971 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
1972 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
1973 */
1974 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
1975 int padsize)
1976 {
1977 #if 0
1978 if (0) {
1979 /*
1980 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
1981 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
1982 *
1983 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
1984 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
1985 * always Cisco?)
1986 */
1987 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
1988 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
1989 } else
1990 #endif
1991 {
1992 /*
1993 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
1994 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
1995 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
1996 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
1997 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
1998 */
1999 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2000
2001 /*
2002 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2003 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2004 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2005 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2006 * gain nothing by it.)
2007 */
2008 if (ssh->cscipher) {
2009 int stringlen, i;
2010
2011 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2012 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2013 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2014 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2015 /*
2016 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2017 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2018 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2019 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2020 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2021 * by.
2022 */
2023 stringlen -=
2024 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2025 }
2026 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2027 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2028 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2029 char c = (char) random_byte();
2030 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2031 }
2032 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2033 }
2034 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2035 }
2036 }
2037
2038 /*
2039 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2040 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2041 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2042 */
2043 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2044 {
2045 int i;
2046
2047 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2048
2049 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2050 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2051 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2052
2053 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2054 }
2055
2056 #if 0
2057 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2058 {
2059 unsigned char *p;
2060 int i, len;
2061 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2062 debug(("%s", string));
2063 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2064 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2065 debug(("\n"));
2066 sfree(p);
2067 }
2068 #endif
2069
2070 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2071 {
2072 unsigned char *p;
2073 int len;
2074 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2075 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2076 sfree(p);
2077 }
2078
2079 /*
2080 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2081 */
2082 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2083 {
2084 unsigned long value;
2085 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2086 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2087 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2088 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2089 return value;
2090 }
2091 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2092 {
2093 unsigned long value;
2094 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2095 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2096 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2097 pkt->savedpos++;
2098 return value;
2099 }
2100 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2101 {
2102 int len;
2103 *p = NULL;
2104 *length = 0;
2105 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2106 return;
2107 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2108 if (len < 0)
2109 return;
2110 *length = len;
2111 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2112 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2113 return;
2114 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2115 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2116 }
2117 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2118 {
2119 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2120 return NULL;
2121 pkt->savedpos += length;
2122 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2123 }
2124 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2125 unsigned char **keystr)
2126 {
2127 int j;
2128
2129 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2130 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2131 key, keystr, 0);
2132
2133 if (j < 0)
2134 return FALSE;
2135
2136 pkt->savedpos += j;
2137 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2138
2139 return TRUE;
2140 }
2141 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2142 {
2143 int j;
2144 Bignum b;
2145
2146 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2147 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2148
2149 if (j < 0)
2150 return NULL;
2151
2152 pkt->savedpos += j;
2153 return b;
2154 }
2155 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2156 {
2157 char *p;
2158 int length;
2159 Bignum b;
2160
2161 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2162 if (!p)
2163 return NULL;
2164 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2165 return NULL;
2166 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2167 return b;
2168 }
2169
2170 /*
2171 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2172 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2173 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2174 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2175 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2176 */
2177 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2178 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2179 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2180 {
2181 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2182 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2183
2184 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2185 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2186
2187 /*
2188 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2189 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2190 */
2191 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2192 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2193 int pos, len, siglen;
2194
2195 /*
2196 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2197 */
2198
2199 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2200 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2201 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2202 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2203 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2204 len--, pos++;
2205 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2206
2207 /*
2208 * Now find the signature integer.
2209 */
2210 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2211 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2212 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2213
2214 if (len != siglen) {
2215 unsigned char newlen[4];
2216 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2217 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2218 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2219 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2220 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2221 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2222 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2223 newlen[0] = 0;
2224 while (len-- > siglen) {
2225 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2226 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2227 }
2228 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2229 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2230 return;
2231 }
2232
2233 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2234 }
2235
2236 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2237 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2238 }
2239
2240 /*
2241 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2242 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2243 */
2244 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2245 {
2246 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2247 imp = vstring;
2248 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2249 if (*imp) imp++;
2250 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2251 if (*imp) imp++;
2252
2253 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2254
2255 /*
2256 * General notes on server version strings:
2257 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2258 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2259 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2260 * so we can't distinguish them.
2261 */
2262 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2263 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2264 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2265 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2266 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2267 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2268 /*
2269 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2270 * to use a different defence against password length
2271 * sniffing.
2272 */
2273 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2274 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2275 }
2276
2277 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2278 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2279 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2280 /*
2281 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2282 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2283 * the password.
2284 */
2285 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2286 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2287 }
2288
2289 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2290 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2291 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2292 /*
2293 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2294 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2295 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2296 */
2297 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2298 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2299 }
2300
2301 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2302 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2303 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2304 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2305 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2306 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2307 /*
2308 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2309 */
2310 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2311 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2312 }
2313
2314 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2315 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2316 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2317 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2318 /*
2319 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2320 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2321 * generate the keys).
2322 */
2323 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2324 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2325 }
2326
2327 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2328 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2329 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2330 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2331 /*
2332 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2333 */
2334 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2335 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2336 }
2337
2338 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2339 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2340 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2341 /*
2342 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2343 * public-key authentication.
2344 */
2345 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2346 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2347 }
2348
2349 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2350 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2351 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2352 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2353 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2354 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2355 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2356 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2357 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2358 /*
2359 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2360 */
2361 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2362 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2363 }
2364 }
2365
2366 /*
2367 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2368 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2369 */
2370 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2371 {
2372 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2373 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2374 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2375 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2376 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2377 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2378 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2379
2380 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2381 * underscores. */
2382 while (*str) {
2383 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2384 *str = '_';
2385 str++;
2386 }
2387 }
2388
2389 /*
2390 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2391 */
2392 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2393 {
2394 char *verstring;
2395
2396 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2397 /*
2398 * Construct a v2 version string.
2399 */
2400 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2401 } else {
2402 /*
2403 * Construct a v1 version string.
2404 */
2405 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2406 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2407 svers : "1.5"),
2408 sshver);
2409 }
2410
2411 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2412
2413 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2414 size_t len;
2415 /*
2416 * Record our version string.
2417 */
2418 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2419 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2420 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2421 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2422 }
2423
2424 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2425 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2426 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2427 sfree(verstring);
2428 }
2429
2430 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2431 {
2432 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2433 int vslen;
2434 char version[10];
2435 char *vstring;
2436 int vstrsize;
2437 int i;
2438 int proto1, proto2;
2439 };
2440 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2441
2442 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2443
2444 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2445 for (;;) {
2446 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2447 crReturn(1);
2448 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2449 crReturn(1);
2450 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2451 crReturn(1);
2452 if (c != '-') goto no;
2453 break;
2454 no:
2455 while (c != '\012')
2456 crReturn(1);
2457 crReturn(1);
2458 }
2459
2460 s->vstrsize = 16;
2461 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2462 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2463 s->vslen = 4;
2464 s->i = 0;
2465 while (1) {
2466 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2467 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2468 s->vstrsize += 16;
2469 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2470 }
2471 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2472 if (s->i >= 0) {
2473 if (c == '-') {
2474 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2475 s->i = -1;
2476 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2477 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2478 } else if (c == '\012')
2479 break;
2480 }
2481
2482 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2483 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2484
2485 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2486 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2487 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2488 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2489
2490 /*
2491 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2492 */
2493
2494 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2495 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2496 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2497 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2498
2499 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2500 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2501 crStop(0);
2502 }
2503 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2504 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2505 crStop(0);
2506 }
2507
2508 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2509 ssh->version = 2;
2510 else
2511 ssh->version = 1;
2512
2513 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2514
2515 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2516 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
2517 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2518
2519 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2520 size_t len;
2521 /*
2522 * Record their version string.
2523 */
2524 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2525 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2526 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2527 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2528
2529 /*
2530 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2531 */
2532 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2533 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2534 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2535 } else {
2536 /*
2537 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2538 */
2539 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2540 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2541 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2542 }
2543 if (ssh->version == 2)
2544 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2545
2546 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2547 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2548 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2549
2550 sfree(s->vstring);
2551
2552 crFinish(0);
2553 }
2554
2555 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2556 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2557 {
2558 struct Packet *pktin;
2559
2560 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2561 if (pktin) {
2562 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2563 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2564 }
2565 }
2566
2567 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2568 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2569 {
2570 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2571 *data += *datalen;
2572 *datalen = 0;
2573 }
2574
2575 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2576 {
2577 void *vdata;
2578 unsigned char *data;
2579 int len, origlen;
2580
2581 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2582 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2583 data = vdata;
2584 origlen = len;
2585
2586 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2587 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2588
2589 if (origlen > len)
2590 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2591 }
2592 }
2593
2594 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2595 {
2596 if (ssh->s)
2597 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2598 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2599 }
2600
2601 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2602 {
2603 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2604 if (ssh->logctx)
2605 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2606 0, NULL);
2607
2608 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2609
2610 /*
2611 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2612 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2613 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2614 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2615 */
2616 while (1) {
2617 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2618 if (datalen == 0)
2619 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2620 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2621 data++;
2622 datalen--;
2623 if (ret == 0)
2624 break;
2625 }
2626
2627 /*
2628 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2629 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2630 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2631 * to the proper protocol handler.
2632 */
2633
2634 while (1) {
2635 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2636 if (ssh->frozen) {
2637 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2638 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2639 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2640 * return, so break out. */
2641 break;
2642 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2643 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2644 * session. */
2645 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2646 } else {
2647 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2648 * session. */
2649 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2650 }
2651 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2652 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2653 return;
2654 }
2655 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2656 crReturnV;
2657 }
2658 crFinishV;
2659 }
2660
2661 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2662 {
2663 int ret = 0;
2664 struct ssh_channel *c;
2665
2666 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2667 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2668 if (ssh->s) {
2669 sk_close(ssh->s);
2670 ssh->s = NULL;
2671 if (notify_exit)
2672 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2673 else
2674 ret = 1;
2675 }
2676 /*
2677 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2678 * through this connection.
2679 */
2680 if (ssh->channels) {
2681 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2682 switch (c->type) {
2683 case CHAN_X11:
2684 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2685 break;
2686 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2687 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2688 break;
2689 }
2690 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2691 if (ssh->version == 2)
2692 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2693 sfree(c);
2694 }
2695 }
2696 /*
2697 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2698 * listening sockets.
2699 */
2700 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2701 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2702 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2703 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2704 if (pf->local)
2705 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2706 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2707 free_portfwd(pf);
2708 }
2709 }
2710
2711 return ret;
2712 }
2713
2714 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2715 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2716 {
2717 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2718 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2719
2720 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2721
2722 if (type == 0)
2723 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2724 else
2725 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2726
2727 logevent(msg);
2728 sfree(msg);
2729 }
2730
2731 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2732 int calling_back)
2733 {
2734 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2735 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2736
2737 if (!error_msg) {
2738 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2739 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2740 else
2741 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2742 }
2743
2744 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2745 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2746
2747 if (need_notify)
2748 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2749
2750 if (error_msg)
2751 logevent(error_msg);
2752 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2753 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2754 return 0;
2755 }
2756
2757 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2758 {
2759 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2760 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2761 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2762 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2763 return 0;
2764 }
2765 return 1;
2766 }
2767
2768 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2769 {
2770 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2771 /*
2772 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2773 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2774 */
2775 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2776 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2777 }
2778
2779 /*
2780 * Connect to specified host and port.
2781 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2782 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2783 * freed by the caller.
2784 */
2785 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2786 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2787 {
2788 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2789 ssh_log,
2790 ssh_closing,
2791 ssh_receive,
2792 ssh_sent,
2793 NULL
2794 };
2795
2796 SockAddr addr;
2797 const char *err;
2798
2799 ssh->savedhost = snewn(1 + strlen(host), char);
2800 strcpy(ssh->savedhost, host);
2801
2802 if (port < 0)
2803 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
2804 ssh->savedport = port;
2805
2806 /*
2807 * Try to find host.
2808 */
2809 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
2810 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
2811 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
2812 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
2813 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
2814 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
2815 sk_addr_free(addr);
2816 return err;
2817 }
2818
2819 /*
2820 * Open socket.
2821 */
2822 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
2823 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
2824 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
2825 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
2826 ssh->s = NULL;
2827 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2828 return err;
2829 }
2830
2831 /*
2832 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
2833 * send the version string too.
2834 */
2835 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
2836 ssh->version = 1;
2837 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
2838 ssh->version = 2;
2839 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
2840 }
2841
2842 return NULL;
2843 }
2844
2845 /*
2846 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2847 */
2848 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
2849 {
2850 int old_count = ssh->v1_throttle_count;
2851 ssh->v1_throttle_count += adjust;
2852 assert(ssh->v1_throttle_count >= 0);
2853 if (ssh->v1_throttle_count && !old_count) {
2854 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
2855 } else if (!ssh->v1_throttle_count && old_count) {
2856 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
2857 }
2858 }
2859
2860 /*
2861 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2862 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2863 */
2864 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
2865 {
2866 int i;
2867 struct ssh_channel *c;
2868
2869 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
2870 return;
2871 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
2872 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
2873 if (!ssh->channels)
2874 return;
2875 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
2876 switch (c->type) {
2877 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
2878 /*
2879 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2880 */
2881 break;
2882 case CHAN_X11:
2883 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
2884 break;
2885 case CHAN_AGENT:
2886 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2887 break;
2888 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2889 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
2890 break;
2891 }
2892 }
2893 }
2894
2895 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
2896 {
2897 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2898
2899 ssh->agent_response = reply;
2900 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
2901
2902 if (ssh->version == 1)
2903 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2904 else
2905 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2906 }
2907
2908 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
2909 {
2910 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2911
2912 ssh->user_response = ret;
2913
2914 if (ssh->version == 1)
2915 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2916 else
2917 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2918
2919 /*
2920 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
2921 * queued-data run.
2922 */
2923 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2924 }
2925
2926 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
2927 {
2928 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
2929 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
2930 void *sentreply = reply;
2931
2932 if (!sentreply) {
2933 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2934 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
2935 replylen = 5;
2936 }
2937 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2938 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
2939 ssh2_try_send(c);
2940 } else {
2941 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
2942 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
2943 PKTT_DATA,
2944 PKT_INT, replylen,
2945 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
2946 PKTT_OTHER,
2947 PKT_END);
2948 }
2949 if (reply)
2950 sfree(reply);
2951 }
2952
2953 /*
2954 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
2955 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
2956 * => log `wire_reason'.
2957 */
2958 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
2959 int code, int clean_exit)
2960 {
2961 char *error;
2962 if (!client_reason)
2963 client_reason = wire_reason;
2964 if (client_reason)
2965 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
2966 else
2967 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
2968 if (wire_reason) {
2969 if (ssh->version == 1) {
2970 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
2971 PKT_END);
2972 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
2973 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
2974 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
2975 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
2976 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
2977 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
2978 }
2979 }
2980 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
2981 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
2982 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
2983 sfree(error);
2984 }
2985
2986 /*
2987 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2988 */
2989 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
2990 struct Packet *pktin)
2991 {
2992 int i, j, ret;
2993 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
2994 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
2995 struct MD5Context md5c;
2996 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
2997 int len;
2998 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
2999 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3000 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3001 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3002 unsigned char session_id[16];
3003 int cipher_type;
3004 char username[100];
3005 void *publickey_blob;
3006 int publickey_bloblen;
3007 char *publickey_comment;
3008 int publickey_encrypted;
3009 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3010 char c;
3011 int pwpkt_type;
3012 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3013 int responselen;
3014 int keyi, nkeys;
3015 int authed;
3016 struct RSAKey key;
3017 Bignum challenge;
3018 char *commentp;
3019 int commentlen;
3020 int dlgret;
3021 };
3022 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3023
3024 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
3025
3026 if (!pktin)
3027 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3028
3029 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3030 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3031 crStop(0);
3032 }
3033
3034 logevent("Received public keys");
3035
3036 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3037 if (!ptr) {
3038 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3039 crStop(0);
3040 }
3041 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3042
3043 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3044 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3045 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3046 crStop(0);
3047 }
3048
3049 /*
3050 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3051 */
3052 {
3053 char logmsg[80];
3054 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3055 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3056 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3057 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3058 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3059 logevent(logmsg);
3060 }
3061
3062 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3063 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3064 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3065
3066 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3067 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3068 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3069
3070 MD5Init(&md5c);
3071 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3072 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3073 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3074 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3075
3076 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3077 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3078
3079 /*
3080 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3081 */
3082 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3083 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3084 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3085 crStop(0);
3086 }
3087
3088 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3089
3090 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3091
3092 /*
3093 * Verify the host key.
3094 */
3095 {
3096 /*
3097 * First format the key into a string.
3098 */
3099 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3100 char fingerprint[100];
3101 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3102 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3103 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3104
3105 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3106 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3107 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3108 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3109 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3110 sfree(keystr);
3111 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3112 do {
3113 crReturn(0);
3114 if (pktin) {
3115 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3116 " for user host key response"));
3117 crStop(0);
3118 }
3119 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3120 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3121 }
3122 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3123
3124 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3125 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3126 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3127 crStop(0);
3128 }
3129 }
3130
3131 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3132 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3133 if (i < 16)
3134 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3135 }
3136
3137 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3138 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3139 if (ret)
3140 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3141 } else {
3142 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3143 if (ret)
3144 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3145 }
3146 if (!ret) {
3147 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3148 crStop(0);
3149 }
3150
3151 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3152
3153 {
3154 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3155 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3156 int i;
3157 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3158 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3159 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3160 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3161 warn = 1;
3162 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3163 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3164 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3165 } else {
3166 switch (next_cipher) {
3167 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3168 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3169 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3170 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3171 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3172 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3173 }
3174 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3175 cipher_chosen = 1;
3176 }
3177 }
3178 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3179 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3180 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3181 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3182 else
3183 /* shouldn't happen */
3184 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3185 crStop(0);
3186 }
3187
3188 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3189 if (warn) {
3190 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3191 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3192 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3193 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3194 do {
3195 crReturn(0);
3196 if (pktin) {
3197 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3198 " for user response"));
3199 crStop(0);
3200 }
3201 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3202 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3203 }
3204 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3205 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3206 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3207 0, TRUE);
3208 crStop(0);
3209 }
3210 }
3211 }
3212
3213 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3214 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3215 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3216 break;
3217 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3218 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3219 break;
3220 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3221 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3222 break;
3223 }
3224
3225 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3226 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3227 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3228 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3229 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3230 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3231
3232 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3233
3234 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3235
3236 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3237 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3238 &ssh_3des);
3239 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3240 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3241 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3242
3243 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3244 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3245
3246 if (servkey.modulus) {
3247 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3248 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3249 }
3250 if (servkey.exponent) {
3251 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3252 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3253 }
3254 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3255 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3256 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3257 }
3258 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3259 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3260 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3261 }
3262 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3263
3264 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3265 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3266 crStop(0);
3267 }
3268
3269 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3270
3271 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3272 {
3273 if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
3274 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3275 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3276 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3277 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3278 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
3279 lenof(s->username));
3280 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3281 while (ret < 0) {
3282 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3283 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3284 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3285 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3286 }
3287 if (!ret) {
3288 /*
3289 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3290 */
3291 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3292 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3293 crStop(0);
3294 }
3295 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3296 lenof(s->username));
3297 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3298 } else {
3299 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
3300 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
3301 }
3302
3303 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3304 {
3305 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3306 logevent(userlog);
3307 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3308 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3309 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3310 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3311 }
3312 sfree(userlog);
3313 }
3314 }
3315
3316 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3317
3318 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA)) {
3319 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3320 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3321 } else {
3322 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3323 }
3324 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3325 /*
3326 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3327 */
3328 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3329 int keytype;
3330 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3331 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3332 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3333 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3334 const char *error;
3335 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3336 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3337 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3338 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3339 NULL);
3340 } else {
3341 char *msgbuf;
3342 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3343 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3344 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3345 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3346 error);
3347 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3348 sfree(msgbuf);
3349 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3350 }
3351 } else {
3352 char *msgbuf;
3353 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3354 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3355 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3356 " (%s)\r\n",
3357 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3358 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3359 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3360 sfree(msgbuf);
3361 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3362 }
3363 } else
3364 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3365
3366 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3367 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3368
3369 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3370 /*
3371 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3372 */
3373 void *r;
3374
3375 s->authed = FALSE;
3376 s->tried_agent = 1;
3377 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3378
3379 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3380 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3381 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3382 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3383 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3384 do {
3385 crReturn(0);
3386 if (pktin) {
3387 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3388 " for agent response"));
3389 crStop(0);
3390 }
3391 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3392 r = ssh->agent_response;
3393 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3394 }
3395 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3396 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3397 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3398 s->p = s->response + 5;
3399 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3400 s->p += 4;
3401 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3402 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3403 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3404 s->p += 4;
3405 {
3406 int n, ok = FALSE;
3407 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3408 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3409 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3410 &s->key.exponent);
3411 if (n < 0)
3412 break;
3413 s->p += n;
3414 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3415 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3416 &s->key.modulus);
3417 if (n < 0)
3418 break;
3419 s->p += n;
3420 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3421 break;
3422 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3423 s->p += 4;
3424 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3425 s->commentlen)
3426 break;
3427 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3428 s->p += s->commentlen;
3429 ok = TRUE;
3430 } while (0);
3431 if (!ok) {
3432 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3433 break;
3434 }
3435 }
3436 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3437 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3438 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3439 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3440 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3441 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3442 } else
3443 /* Skip non-configured key */
3444 continue;
3445 }
3446 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3447 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3448 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3449 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3450 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3451 logevent("Key refused");
3452 continue;
3453 }
3454 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3455 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3456 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3457 crStop(0);
3458 }
3459
3460 {
3461 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3462 void *vret;
3463 int len, retlen;
3464 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3465 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3466 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3467 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3468 len += 16; /* session id */
3469 len += 4; /* response format */
3470 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3471 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3472 q = agentreq + 4;
3473 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3474 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3475 q += 4;
3476 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3477 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3478 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3479 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3480 q += 16;
3481 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3482 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3483 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3484 sfree(agentreq);
3485 do {
3486 crReturn(0);
3487 if (pktin) {
3488 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3489 " while waiting for agent"
3490 " response"));
3491 crStop(0);
3492 }
3493 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3494 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3495 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3496 } else
3497 sfree(agentreq);
3498 ret = vret;
3499 if (ret) {
3500 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3501 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3502 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3503 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3504 PKT_END);
3505 sfree(ret);
3506 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3507 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3508 logevent
3509 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3510 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3511 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3512 " RSA key \"");
3513 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3514 s->commentlen);
3515 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3516 }
3517 s->authed = TRUE;
3518 } else
3519 logevent
3520 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3521 } else {
3522 logevent
3523 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3524 sfree(ret);
3525 }
3526 } else {
3527 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3528 }
3529 }
3530 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3531 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3532 freebn(s->challenge);
3533 if (s->authed)
3534 break;
3535 }
3536 sfree(s->response);
3537 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3538 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3539 }
3540 if (s->authed)
3541 break;
3542 }
3543 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3544 /*
3545 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3546 * key file.
3547 */
3548 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3549 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3550 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3551 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3552 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3553 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3554 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3555 while (!got_passphrase) {
3556 /*
3557 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3558 */
3559 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3560 const char *error;
3561 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3562 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3563 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3564 passphrase = NULL;
3565 } else {
3566 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3567 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3568 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3569 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3570 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3571 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3572 s->publickey_comment),
3573 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3574 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3575 while (ret < 0) {
3576 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3577 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3578 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3579 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3580 }
3581 if (!ret) {
3582 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3583 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3584 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3585 0, TRUE);
3586 crStop(0);
3587 }
3588 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3589 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3590 }
3591 /*
3592 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3593 */
3594 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3595 &error);
3596 if (passphrase) {
3597 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
3598 sfree(passphrase);
3599 }
3600 if (ret == 1) {
3601 /* Correct passphrase. */
3602 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3603 } else if (ret == 0) {
3604 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3605 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3606 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3607 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3608 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3609 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3610 break; /* go and try something else */
3611 } else if (ret == -1) {
3612 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3613 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3614 /* and try again */
3615 } else {
3616 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3617 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3618 }
3619 }
3620
3621 if (got_passphrase) {
3622
3623 /*
3624 * Send a public key attempt.
3625 */
3626 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3627 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3628
3629 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3630 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3631 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3632 continue; /* go and try something else */
3633 }
3634 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3635 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3636 crStop(0);
3637 }
3638
3639 {
3640 int i;
3641 unsigned char buffer[32];
3642 Bignum challenge, response;
3643
3644 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3645 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3646 crStop(0);
3647 }
3648 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3649 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3650
3651 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3652 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3653 }
3654
3655 MD5Init(&md5c);
3656 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3657 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3658 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3659
3660 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3661 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3662
3663 freebn(challenge);
3664 freebn(response);
3665 }
3666
3667 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3668 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3669 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3670 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3671 " our public key.\r\n");
3672 continue; /* go and try something else */
3673 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3674 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3675 crStop(0);
3676 }
3677
3678 break; /* we're through! */
3679 }
3680
3681 }
3682
3683 /*
3684 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3685 */
3686 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3687
3688 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3689 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3690 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3691 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3692 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3693 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3694 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3695 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3696 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3697 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3698 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3699 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3700 continue;
3701 } else {
3702 char *challenge;
3703 int challengelen;
3704 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3705
3706 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3707 if (!challenge) {
3708 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3709 crStop(0);
3710 }
3711 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3712 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3713 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3714 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3715 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3716 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3717 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3718 } else {
3719 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3720 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3721 }
3722 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3723 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3724 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3725 instr_suf);
3726 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3727 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3728 sfree(instr_suf);
3729 }
3730 }
3731 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3732 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3733 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3734 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3735 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3736 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3737 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3738 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3739 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3740 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3741 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3742 continue;
3743 } else {
3744 char *challenge;
3745 int challengelen;
3746 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3747
3748 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3749 if (!challenge) {
3750 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3751 crStop(0);
3752 }
3753 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3754 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3755 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
3756 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
3757 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3758 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3759 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3760 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3761 } else {
3762 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3763 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3764 }
3765 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3766 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
3767 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3768 instr_suf);
3769 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3770 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3771 sfree(instr_suf);
3772 }
3773 }
3774 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3775 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3776 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
3777 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3778 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
3779 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3780 }
3781
3782 /*
3783 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3784 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3785 * authentication.
3786 */
3787 {
3788 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3789 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3790 while (ret < 0) {
3791 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3792 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3793 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3794 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3795 }
3796 if (!ret) {
3797 /*
3798 * Failed to get a password (for example
3799 * because one was supplied on the command line
3800 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3801 */
3802 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3803 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
3804 crStop(0);
3805 }
3806 }
3807
3808 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3809 /*
3810 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3811 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3812 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3813 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3814 * The others are all random data in
3815 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3816 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3817 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3818 *
3819 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3820 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3821 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3822 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3823 * do is:
3824 *
3825 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3826 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3827 *
3828 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3829 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3830 * packets containing string lengths N through
3831 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3832 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3833 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3834 *
3835 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
3836 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
3837 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
3838 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
3839 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
3840 *
3841 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3842 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
3843 * For these servers we are left with no defences
3844 * against password length sniffing.
3845 */
3846 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
3847 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
3848 /*
3849 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3850 * we can use the primary defence.
3851 */
3852 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
3853 char *randomstr;
3854
3855 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3856 if (pwlen < 16) {
3857 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3858 top = 15;
3859 } else {
3860 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
3861 top = bottom + 7;
3862 }
3863
3864 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
3865
3866 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
3867
3868 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
3869 if (i == pwlen) {
3870 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3871 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
3872 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3873 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3874 } else {
3875 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
3876 do {
3877 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
3878 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
3879 }
3880 randomstr[i] = '\0';
3881 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
3882 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
3883 }
3884 }
3885 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3886 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
3887 sfree(randomstr);
3888 }
3889 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
3890 /*
3891 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3892 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3893 * can use the secondary defence.
3894 */
3895 char string[64];
3896 char *ss;
3897 int len;
3898
3899 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3900 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
3901 ss = string;
3902 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3903 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
3904 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
3905 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
3906 }
3907 } else {
3908 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
3909 }
3910 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3911 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3912 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
3913 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3914 } else {
3915 /*
3916 * The server is believed unable to cope with
3917 * any of our password camouflage methods.
3918 */
3919 int len;
3920 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3921 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3922 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3923 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
3924 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
3925 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3926 }
3927 } else {
3928 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3929 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3930 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3931 }
3932 logevent("Sent password");
3933 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3934 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3935 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3936 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3937 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
3938 logevent("Authentication refused");
3939 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3940 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
3941 crStop(0);
3942 }
3943 }
3944
3945 /* Clear up */
3946 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3947 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
3948 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
3949 }
3950
3951 logevent("Authentication successful");
3952
3953 crFinish(1);
3954 }
3955
3956 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
3957 {
3958 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3959
3960 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3961 return;
3962
3963 if (c && !c->closes) {
3964 /*
3965 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3966 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3967 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3968 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3969 * open, we can close it then.
3970 */
3971 if (!c->halfopen) {
3972 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3973 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3974 PKT_END);
3975 } else {
3976 struct Packet *pktout;
3977 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
3978 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
3979 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
3980 }
3981 }
3982 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3983 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
3984 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
3985 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3986 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
3987 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
3988 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
3989 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3990 }
3991 }
3992 }
3993
3994 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
3995 {
3996 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3997
3998 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3999 return 0;
4000
4001 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4002 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4003 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4004 PKTT_DATA,
4005 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4006 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4007 /*
4008 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4009 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4010 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4011 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4012 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4013 */
4014 return 0;
4015 } else {
4016 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4017 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4018 }
4019 }
4020
4021 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4022 {
4023 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4024
4025 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4026 return;
4027
4028 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4029 if (c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4030 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4031 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
4032 }
4033 } else {
4034 ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
4035 }
4036 }
4037
4038 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4039 {
4040 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4041
4042 assert(qh != NULL);
4043
4044 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4045
4046 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4047 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4048 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4049 }
4050 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4051 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4052 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4053 }
4054
4055 if (qh->next) {
4056 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4057
4058 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4059 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4060 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4061 }
4062 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4063 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4064 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4065 }
4066 } else {
4067 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4068 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4069 }
4070
4071 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4072
4073 sfree(qh);
4074 }
4075
4076 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4077 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4078 {
4079 struct queued_handler *qh;
4080
4081 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4082 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4083 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4084 qh->handler = handler;
4085 qh->ctx = ctx;
4086 qh->next = NULL;
4087
4088 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4089 ssh->qhead = qh;
4090
4091 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4092 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4093 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4094 }
4095 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4096 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4097 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4098 }
4099 } else {
4100 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4101 }
4102 ssh->qtail = qh;
4103 }
4104
4105 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4106 {
4107 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4108
4109 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4110 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4111 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4112 pf->sportdesc);
4113 } else {
4114 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4115 pf->sportdesc);
4116
4117 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4118 assert(rpf == pf);
4119 free_rportfwd(pf);
4120 }
4121 }
4122
4123 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
4124 {
4125 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
4126 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4127 int i;
4128
4129 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4130 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4131 } else {
4132 /*
4133 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4134 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4135 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4136 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4137 * they were before.
4138 */
4139 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4140 int i;
4141 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4142 epf->status = DESTROY;
4143 }
4144
4145 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4146 char address_family, type;
4147 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4148 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
4149 int n;
4150
4151 address_family = 'A';
4152 type = 'L';
4153 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
4154 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
4155 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
4156 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
4157 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
4158 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
4159 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
4160 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4161
4162 saddr[0] = '\0';
4163
4164 n = 0;
4165 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4166 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4167 /*
4168 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4169 * source port number. This means that
4170 * everything we've seen until now is the
4171 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4172 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4173 * again.
4174 */
4175 portfwd_strptr++;
4176 sports[n] = '\0';
4177 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4178 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4179 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4180 } else
4181 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4182 n = 0;
4183 }
4184 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4185 }
4186 sports[n] = 0;
4187 if (type != 'D') {
4188 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4189 portfwd_strptr++;
4190 n = 0;
4191 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4192 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4193 }
4194 host[n] = 0;
4195 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4196 portfwd_strptr++;
4197 n = 0;
4198 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4199 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4200 }
4201 dports[n] = 0;
4202 portfwd_strptr++;
4203 dport = atoi(dports);
4204 dserv = 0;
4205 if (dport == 0) {
4206 dserv = 1;
4207 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4208 if (!dport) {
4209 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4210 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4211 }
4212 }
4213 } else {
4214 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4215 host[0] = 0;
4216 dports[0] = 0;
4217 dport = dserv = -1;
4218 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4219 }
4220 sport = atoi(sports);
4221 sserv = 0;
4222 if (sport == 0) {
4223 sserv = 1;
4224 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4225 if (!sport) {
4226 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4227 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4228 }
4229 }
4230 if (sport && dport) {
4231 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4232 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4233
4234 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4235 pfrec->type = type;
4236 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4237 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4238 pfrec->sport = sport;
4239 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4240 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4241 pfrec->dport = dport;
4242 pfrec->local = NULL;
4243 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4244 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4245 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4246 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4247
4248 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4249 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4250 /*
4251 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4252 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4253 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4254 */
4255 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4256 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4257 } else {
4258 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4259 }
4260 }
4261 }
4262
4263 /*
4264 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4265 * not re-enabled.
4266 */
4267 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4268 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4269 char *message;
4270
4271 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4272 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4273 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4274 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4275 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4276 epf->sport);
4277
4278 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4279 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4280 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4281 sfree(message);
4282 message = msg2;
4283 }
4284
4285 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4286 sfree(message);
4287
4288 if (epf->remote) {
4289 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4290 struct Packet *pktout;
4291
4292 /*
4293 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4294 * end.
4295 */
4296 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4297 /*
4298 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4299 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4300 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4301 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4302 * so that any connections the server tries
4303 * to make on it are rejected.
4304 */
4305 } else {
4306 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4307 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4308 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4309 if (epf->saddr) {
4310 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4311 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4312 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4313 * what was used to open the original connection,
4314 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4315 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4316 } else {
4317 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4318 }
4319 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4320 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4321 }
4322
4323 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4324 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4325 } else if (epf->local) {
4326 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4327 }
4328
4329 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4330 free_portfwd(epf);
4331 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4332 }
4333
4334 /*
4335 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4336 */
4337 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4338 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4339 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4340 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4341 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4342 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4343 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4344 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4345 epf->sport,
4346 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4347 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4348 dportdesc = NULL;
4349 } else {
4350 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4351 epf->daddr,
4352 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4353 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4354 epf->dport,
4355 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4356 }
4357
4358 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4359 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4360 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4361 ssh, cfg,
4362 &epf->local,
4363 epf->addressfamily);
4364
4365 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4366 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4367 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4368 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4369 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4370 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4371 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4372 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4373 ssh, cfg,
4374 &epf->local,
4375 epf->addressfamily);
4376
4377 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4378 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4379 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4380 sportdesc,
4381 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4382 } else {
4383 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4384
4385 /*
4386 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4387 */
4388 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4389 if (ssh->version == 1)
4390 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4391 else
4392 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4393 }
4394
4395 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4396 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4397 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4398 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4399 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4400 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4401 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4402 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4403 sfree(pf);
4404 } else {
4405 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4406 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4407
4408 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4409 sportdesc = NULL;
4410 epf->remote = pf;
4411 pf->pfrec = epf;
4412
4413 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4414 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4415 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4416 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4417 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4418 PKT_END);
4419 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4420 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4421 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4422 } else {
4423 struct Packet *pktout;
4424 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4425 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4426 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4427 if (epf->saddr) {
4428 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4429 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4430 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4431 } else {
4432 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4433 }
4434 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4435 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4436
4437 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4438 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4439 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4440 }
4441 }
4442 }
4443 sfree(sportdesc);
4444 sfree(dportdesc);
4445 }
4446 }
4447
4448 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4449 {
4450 char *string;
4451 int stringlen, bufsize;
4452
4453 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4454 if (string == NULL) {
4455 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4456 return;
4457 }
4458
4459 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4460 string, stringlen);
4461 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4462 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4463 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4464 }
4465 }
4466
4467 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4468 {
4469 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4470 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4471 struct ssh_channel *c;
4472 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4473
4474 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4475 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4476 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4477 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4478 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4479 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4480 } else {
4481 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4482 c->ssh = ssh;
4483
4484 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
4485 ssh->x11auth, NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4486 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4487 sfree(c);
4488 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4489 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4490 } else {
4491 logevent
4492 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4493 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4494 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4495 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4496 c->closes = 0;
4497 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4498 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4499 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4500 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4501 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4502 c->localid, PKT_END);
4503 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4504 }
4505 }
4506 }
4507
4508 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4509 {
4510 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4511 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4512 struct ssh_channel *c;
4513 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4514
4515 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4516 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4517 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4518 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4519 } else {
4520 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4521 c->ssh = ssh;
4522 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4523 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4524 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4525 c->closes = 0;
4526 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4527 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4528 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4529 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4530 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4531 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4532 PKT_END);
4533 }
4534 }
4535
4536 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4537 {
4538 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4539 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4540 struct ssh_channel *c;
4541 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4542 int remoteid;
4543 int hostsize, port;
4544 char *host;
4545 const char *e;
4546 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4547 c->ssh = ssh;
4548
4549 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4550 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4551 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4552
4553 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4554 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4555 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4556 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4557 pf.dport = port;
4558 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4559
4560 if (pfp == NULL) {
4561 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4562 pf.dhost, port);
4563 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4564 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4565 } else {
4566 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4567 pf.dhost, port);
4568 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4569 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4570 if (e != NULL) {
4571 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4572 sfree(c);
4573 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4574 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4575 } else {
4576 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4577 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4578 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4579 c->closes = 0;
4580 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4581 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4582 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4583 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4584 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4585 c->localid, PKT_END);
4586 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4587 }
4588 }
4589 }
4590
4591 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4592 {
4593 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4594 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4595 struct ssh_channel *c;
4596
4597 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4598 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4599 c->remoteid = localid;
4600 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4601 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4602 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4603 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4604 }
4605
4606 if (c && c->closes) {
4607 /*
4608 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4609 * which we decided on before the server acked
4610 * the channel open. So now we know the
4611 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4612 */
4613 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4614 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4615 }
4616 }
4617
4618 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4619 {
4620 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4621 struct ssh_channel *c;
4622
4623 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4624 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4625 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4626 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4627 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4628 sfree(c);
4629 }
4630 }
4631
4632 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4633 {
4634 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4635 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4636 struct ssh_channel *c;
4637 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4638 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4639 int closetype;
4640 closetype =
4641 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4642
4643 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4644 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4645 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4646 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4647 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4648 }
4649 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4650 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4651 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4652 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4653 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4654 }
4655
4656 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4657 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4658 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4659 PKT_END);
4660 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4661 }
4662
4663 if (c->closes == 15) {
4664 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4665 sfree(c);
4666 }
4667 } else {
4668 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4669 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4670 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4671 i));
4672 }
4673 }
4674
4675 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4676 {
4677 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4678 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4679 char *p;
4680 int len;
4681 struct ssh_channel *c;
4682
4683 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4684
4685 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4686 if (c) {
4687 int bufsize = 0;
4688 switch (c->type) {
4689 case CHAN_X11:
4690 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4691 break;
4692 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4693 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4694 break;
4695 case CHAN_AGENT:
4696 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4697 while (len > 0) {
4698 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4699 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
4700 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4701 l);
4702 p += l;
4703 len -= l;
4704 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4705 }
4706 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4707 c->u.a.totallen =
4708 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4709 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4710 unsigned char);
4711 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4712 }
4713 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4714 unsigned int l =
4715 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4716 (unsigned)len);
4717 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4718 l);
4719 p += l;
4720 len -= l;
4721 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4722 }
4723 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4724 void *reply;
4725 int replylen;
4726 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4727 c->u.a.totallen,
4728 &reply, &replylen,
4729 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4730 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4731 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4732 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4733 }
4734 }
4735 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4736 break;
4737 }
4738 if (!c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4739 c->v.v1.throttling = 1;
4740 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4741 }
4742 }
4743 }
4744
4745 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4746 {
4747 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4748 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
4749 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
4750 /*
4751 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4752 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4753 * session which we might mistake for another
4754 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4755 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4756 */
4757 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
4758 }
4759
4760 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4761 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
4762 {
4763 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
4764 int i = 0;
4765 unsigned int arg = 0;
4766 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
4767 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
4768 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
4769 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
4770 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
4771 break;
4772 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
4773 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
4774 break;
4775 }
4776 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
4777 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
4778 }
4779
4780
4781 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
4782 struct Packet *pktin)
4783 {
4784 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
4785
4786 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
4787 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
4788 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
4789
4790 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
4791 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
4792 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
4793 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
4794 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
4795 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
4796 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
4797 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
4798 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
4799
4800 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
4801 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4802 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
4803 do {
4804 crReturnV;
4805 } while (!pktin);
4806 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4807 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4808 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4809 crStopV;
4810 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4811 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4812 } else {
4813 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4814 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
4815 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
4816 }
4817 }
4818
4819 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
4820 char proto[20], data[64];
4821 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4822 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
4823 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
4824 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
4825 /*
4826 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
4827 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
4828 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
4829 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
4830 * cookie into the log.
4831 */
4832 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
4833 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4834 PKT_STR, proto,
4835 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER,
4836 PKT_INT, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display),
4837 PKT_END);
4838 } else {
4839 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4840 PKT_STR, proto,
4841 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4842 }
4843 do {
4844 crReturnV;
4845 } while (!pktin);
4846 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4847 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4848 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4849 crStopV;
4850 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4851 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4852 } else {
4853 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4854 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
4855 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
4856 }
4857 }
4858
4859 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
4860 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
4861
4862 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
4863 struct Packet *pkt;
4864 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4865 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4866 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4867 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
4868 /* Send the pty request. */
4869 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
4870 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
4871 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
4872 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
4873 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
4874 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
4875 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
4876 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
4877 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
4878 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
4879 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
4880 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
4881 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
4882 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
4883 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
4884 do {
4885 crReturnV;
4886 } while (!pktin);
4887 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4888 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4889 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4890 crStopV;
4891 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4892 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4893 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4894 }
4895 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4896 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
4897 } else {
4898 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4899 }
4900
4901 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
4902 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
4903 do {
4904 crReturnV;
4905 } while (!pktin);
4906 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4907 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4908 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4909 crStopV;
4910 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4911 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4912 }
4913 logevent("Started compression");
4914 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
4915 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
4916 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4917 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
4918 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4919 }
4920
4921 /*
4922 * Start the shell or command.
4923 *
4924 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
4925 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4926 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4927 */
4928 {
4929 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
4930
4931 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
4932
4933 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
4934 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
4935 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
4936 }
4937 if (*cmd)
4938 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
4939 else
4940 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
4941 logevent("Started session");
4942 }
4943
4944 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
4945 if (ssh->size_needed)
4946 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
4947 if (ssh->eof_needed)
4948 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
4949
4950 if (ssh->ldisc)
4951 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4952 ssh->send_ok = 1;
4953 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
4954 while (1) {
4955
4956 /*
4957 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4958 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4959 * attention to the unusual ones.
4960 */
4961
4962 crReturnV;
4963 if (pktin) {
4964 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4965 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4966 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4967 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4968 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4969 } else {
4970 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
4971 crStopV;
4972 }
4973 } else {
4974 while (inlen > 0) {
4975 int len = min(inlen, 512);
4976 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, PKTT_DATA,
4977 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
4978 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4979 in += len;
4980 inlen -= len;
4981 }
4982 }
4983 }
4984
4985 crFinishV;
4986 }
4987
4988 /*
4989 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
4990 */
4991 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4992 {
4993 char *msg;
4994 int msglen;
4995
4996 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
4997 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
4998 }
4999
5000 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5001 {
5002 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5003 char *msg;
5004 int msglen;
5005
5006 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5007 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5008 }
5009
5010 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5011 {
5012 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5013 }
5014
5015 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5016 {
5017 int i;
5018
5019 /*
5020 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5021 */
5022 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5023 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5024
5025 /*
5026 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5027 */
5028 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5029 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5030 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5031 }
5032
5033 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5034 struct Packet *pktin)
5035 {
5036 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5037 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5038 return;
5039
5040 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5041 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5042 return;
5043 }
5044
5045 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5046 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5047 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5048 else
5049 return;
5050 }
5051
5052 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5053 }
5054
5055 /*
5056 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5057 */
5058 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5059 {
5060 int needlen;
5061 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5062 return 0;
5063 needlen = strlen(needle);
5064 while (1) {
5065 /*
5066 * Is it at the start of the string?
5067 */
5068 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5069 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5070 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5071 /* either , or EOS follows */
5072 )
5073 return 1;
5074 /*
5075 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5076 * If no comma found, terminate.
5077 */
5078 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5079 haylen--, haystack++;
5080 if (haylen == 0)
5081 return 0;
5082 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5083 }
5084 }
5085
5086 /*
5087 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5088 */
5089 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5090 {
5091 int needlen;
5092 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5093 return 0;
5094 needlen = strlen(needle);
5095 /*
5096 * Is it at the start of the string?
5097 */
5098 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5099 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5100 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5101 /* either , or EOS follows */
5102 )
5103 return 1;
5104 return 0;
5105 }
5106
5107
5108 /*
5109 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5110 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5111 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5112 */
5113 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5114 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5115 unsigned char *keyspace)
5116 {
5117 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5118 void *s;
5119 /* First hlen bytes. */
5120 s = h->init();
5121 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5122 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5123 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5124 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5125 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5126 h->final(s, keyspace);
5127 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5128 s = h->init();
5129 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5130 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5131 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5132 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5133 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5134 }
5135
5136 /*
5137 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5138 */
5139 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5140 struct Packet *pktin)
5141 {
5142 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5143 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5144 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5145 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5146 void *our_kexinit;
5147 int our_kexinitlen;
5148 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5149 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5150 int nmacs;
5151 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5152 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5153 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5154 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5155 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5156 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5157 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5158 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5159 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5160 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5161 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5162 int n_preferred_kex;
5163 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5164 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5165 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5166 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5167 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5168 struct Packet *pktout;
5169 int dlgret;
5170 int guessok;
5171 int ignorepkt;
5172 };
5173 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5174
5175 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5176
5177 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5178 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5179 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5180
5181 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5182
5183 /*
5184 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5185 */
5186 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5187 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5188 else
5189 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5190
5191 begin_key_exchange:
5192 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5193 {
5194 int i, j, commalist_started;
5195
5196 /*
5197 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5198 */
5199 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5200 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5201 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5202 case KEX_DHGEX:
5203 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5204 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5205 break;
5206 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5207 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5208 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5209 break;
5210 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5211 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5212 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5213 break;
5214 case KEX_RSA:
5215 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5216 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5217 break;
5218 case KEX_WARN:
5219 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5220 * the list. */
5221 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5222 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5223 }
5224 break;
5225 }
5226 }
5227
5228 /*
5229 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5230 */
5231 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5232 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5233 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5234 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5235 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5236 break;
5237 case CIPHER_DES:
5238 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5239 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5240 }
5241 break;
5242 case CIPHER_3DES:
5243 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5244 break;
5245 case CIPHER_AES:
5246 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5247 break;
5248 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5249 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5250 break;
5251 case CIPHER_WARN:
5252 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5253 * the list. */
5254 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5255 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5256 }
5257 break;
5258 }
5259 }
5260
5261 /*
5262 * Set up preferred compression.
5263 */
5264 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5265 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5266 else
5267 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5268
5269 /*
5270 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5271 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5272 */
5273 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5274
5275 /*
5276 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5277 */
5278 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5279
5280 /*
5281 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5282 */
5283 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5284 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5285 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5286 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5287 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5288 commalist_started = 0;
5289 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5290 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5291 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5292 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5293 if (commalist_started)
5294 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5295 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5296 commalist_started = 1;
5297 }
5298 }
5299 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5300 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5301 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5302 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5303 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5304 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5305 }
5306 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5307 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5308 commalist_started = 0;
5309 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5310 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5311 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5312 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5313 if (commalist_started)
5314 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5315 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5316 commalist_started = 1;
5317 }
5318 }
5319 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5320 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5321 commalist_started = 0;
5322 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5323 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5324 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5325 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5326 if (commalist_started)
5327 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5328 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5329 commalist_started = 1;
5330 }
5331 }
5332 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5333 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5334 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5335 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5336 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5337 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5338 }
5339 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5340 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5341 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5342 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5343 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5344 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5345 }
5346 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5347 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5348 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5349 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5350 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5351 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5352 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5353 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5354 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5355 }
5356 }
5357 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5358 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5359 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5360 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5361 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5362 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5363 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5364 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5365 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5366 }
5367 }
5368 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5369 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5370 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5371 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5372 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5373 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5374 /* Reserved. */
5375 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5376 }
5377
5378 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5379 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5380 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5381
5382 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5383
5384 if (!pktin)
5385 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5386
5387 /*
5388 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5389 * to.
5390 */
5391 {
5392 char *str, *preferred;
5393 int i, j, len;
5394
5395 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5396 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5397 crStop(0);
5398 }
5399 ssh->kex = NULL;
5400 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5401 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5402 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5403 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5404 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5405 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5406 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5407 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5408
5409 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5410 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5411
5412 preferred = NULL;
5413 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5414 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5415 if (!k) {
5416 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5417 } else {
5418 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5419 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5420 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5421 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5422 break;
5423 }
5424 }
5425 }
5426 if (ssh->kex)
5427 break;
5428 }
5429 if (!ssh->kex) {
5430 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5431 str ? str : "(null)"));
5432 crStop(0);
5433 }
5434 /*
5435 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5436 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5437 * we end up using.
5438 */
5439 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5440 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5441 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5442 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5443 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5444 break;
5445 }
5446 }
5447 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5448 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5449 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5450 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5451 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5452 if (!c) {
5453 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5454 } else {
5455 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5456 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5457 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5458 break;
5459 }
5460 }
5461 }
5462 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5463 break;
5464 }
5465 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5466 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5467 str ? str : "(null)"));
5468 crStop(0);
5469 }
5470
5471 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5472 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5473 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5474 if (!c) {
5475 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5476 } else {
5477 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5478 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5479 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5480 break;
5481 }
5482 }
5483 }
5484 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5485 break;
5486 }
5487 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5488 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5489 str ? str : "(null)"));
5490 crStop(0);
5491 }
5492
5493 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5494 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5495 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5496 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5497 break;
5498 }
5499 }
5500 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5501 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5502 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5503 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5504 break;
5505 }
5506 }
5507 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5508 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5509 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5510 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5511 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5512 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5513 break;
5514 }
5515 }
5516 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5517 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5518 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5519 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5520 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5521 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5522 break;
5523 }
5524 }
5525 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5526 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5527 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5528
5529 if (s->warn_kex) {
5530 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5531 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5532 ssh->kex->name,
5533 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5534 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5535 do {
5536 crReturn(0);
5537 if (pktin) {
5538 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5539 " waiting for user response"));
5540 crStop(0);
5541 }
5542 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5543 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5544 }
5545 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5546 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5547 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5548 0, TRUE);
5549 crStop(0);
5550 }
5551 }
5552
5553 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5554 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5555 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5556 "client-to-server cipher",
5557 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5558 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5559 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5560 do {
5561 crReturn(0);
5562 if (pktin) {
5563 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5564 " waiting for user response"));
5565 crStop(0);
5566 }
5567 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5568 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5569 }
5570 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5571 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5572 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5573 0, TRUE);
5574 crStop(0);
5575 }
5576 }
5577
5578 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5579 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5580 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5581 "server-to-client cipher",
5582 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5583 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5584 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5585 do {
5586 crReturn(0);
5587 if (pktin) {
5588 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5589 " waiting for user response"));
5590 crStop(0);
5591 }
5592 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5593 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5594 }
5595 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5596 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5597 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5598 0, TRUE);
5599 crStop(0);
5600 }
5601 }
5602
5603 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5604 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5605 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5606 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5607 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5608 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5609 if (pktin->length > 5)
5610 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5611 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5612
5613 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5614 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5615 }
5616
5617 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5618 /*
5619 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5620 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5621 * either cipher...
5622 */
5623 {
5624 int csbits, scbits;
5625
5626 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5627 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5628 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5629 }
5630 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
5631 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
5632 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
5633 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
5634
5635 /*
5636 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5637 * requesting a group.
5638 */
5639 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5640 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5641 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5642 /*
5643 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5644 * much data.
5645 */
5646 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5647 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5648 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5649 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5650
5651 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5652 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5653 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5654 crStop(0);
5655 }
5656 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5657 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5658 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5659 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5660 crStop(0);
5661 }
5662 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5663 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5664 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5665 } else {
5666 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5667 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5668 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5669 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5670 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5671 ssh->kex->groupname);
5672 }
5673
5674 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
5675 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5676 /*
5677 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5678 */
5679 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5680 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5681 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5682 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5683 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5684
5685 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5686 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5687 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5688 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5689 crStop(0);
5690 }
5691 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5692 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5693 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5694 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5695 if (!s->f) {
5696 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5697 crStop(0);
5698 }
5699 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5700
5701 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5702
5703 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5704 * involve user interaction. */
5705 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5706
5707 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5708 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5709 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5710 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
5711 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
5712 }
5713 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
5714 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
5715
5716 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5717 freebn(s->f);
5718 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5719 freebn(s->g);
5720 freebn(s->p);
5721 }
5722 } else {
5723 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
5724 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5725 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
5726 /*
5727 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
5728 * from the server.
5729 */
5730 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5731 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
5732 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
5733 crStop(0);
5734 }
5735
5736 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5737 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5738 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5739 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5740
5741 {
5742 char *keydata;
5743 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
5744 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
5745 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
5746 }
5747
5748 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5749 if (!s->rsakey) {
5750 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5751 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
5752 crStop(0);
5753 }
5754
5755 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5756
5757 /*
5758 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
5759 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
5760 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
5761 * we're using.
5762 */
5763 {
5764 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
5765 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
5766 int i, byte = 0;
5767 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
5768 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
5769
5770 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
5771
5772 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
5773 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
5774 byte = random_byte();
5775 }
5776 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
5777 }
5778
5779 /*
5780 * Encode this as an mpint.
5781 */
5782 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
5783 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
5784 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
5785 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
5786
5787 /*
5788 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
5789 */
5790 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
5791 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
5792 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
5793 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
5794
5795 /*
5796 * And send it off in a return packet.
5797 */
5798 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
5799 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5800 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
5801 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5802
5803 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
5804
5805 sfree(kstr2);
5806 sfree(kstr1);
5807 sfree(outstr);
5808 }
5809
5810 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
5811
5812 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5813 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
5814 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5815 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
5816 crStop(0);
5817 }
5818
5819 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5820
5821 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5822 }
5823
5824 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
5825 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
5826 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
5827
5828 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
5829
5830 #if 0
5831 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5832 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
5833 #endif
5834
5835 if (!s->hkey ||
5836 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
5837 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
5838 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
5839 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5840 crStop(0);
5841 }
5842
5843 /*
5844 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5845 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5846 */
5847 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
5848 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
5849 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5850 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
5851 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
5852 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
5853 s->fingerprint,
5854 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5855 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5856 do {
5857 crReturn(0);
5858 if (pktin) {
5859 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
5860 " for user host key response"));
5861 crStop(0);
5862 }
5863 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5864 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5865 }
5866 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5867 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5868 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
5869 0, TRUE);
5870 crStop(0);
5871 }
5872 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5873 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5874 logevent(s->fingerprint);
5875 }
5876 sfree(s->fingerprint);
5877 sfree(s->keystr);
5878 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
5879
5880 /*
5881 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5882 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5883 * authentication.
5884 */
5885 if (!s->got_session_id) {
5886 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
5887 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
5888 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
5889 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
5890 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
5891 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
5892 }
5893
5894 /*
5895 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5896 */
5897 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
5898 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5899 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5900
5901 /*
5902 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5903 * client-to-server session keys.
5904 */
5905 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
5906 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
5907 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
5908 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
5909
5910 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
5911 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
5912 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
5913 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
5914
5915 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
5916 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
5917 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
5918 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
5919
5920 /*
5921 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5922 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5923 */
5924 {
5925 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
5926 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5927 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
5928 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
5929 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5930 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5931 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
5932 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
5933 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5934 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5935 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
5936 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
5937 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5938 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
5939 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
5940 }
5941
5942 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5943 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
5944 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5945 ssh->csmac->text_name);
5946 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
5947 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
5948 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
5949
5950 /*
5951 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5952 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5953 */
5954 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
5955 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
5956
5957 /*
5958 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5959 */
5960 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5961 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
5962 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5963 crStop(0);
5964 }
5965 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5966
5967 /*
5968 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5969 * server-to-client session keys.
5970 */
5971 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
5972 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
5973 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
5974 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
5975
5976 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
5977 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
5978 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
5979 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
5980
5981 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
5982 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
5983 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
5984 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
5985
5986 /*
5987 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5988 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5989 */
5990 {
5991 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
5992 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5993 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
5994 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
5995 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
5996 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5997 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
5998 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
5999 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6000 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6001 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6002 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6003 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6004 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6005 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6006 }
6007 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6008 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6009 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6010 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6011 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6012 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6013 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6014
6015 /*
6016 * Free shared secret.
6017 */
6018 freebn(s->K);
6019
6020 /*
6021 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6022 * deferred rekey reason.
6023 */
6024 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6025 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6026 pktin = NULL;
6027 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6028 goto begin_key_exchange;
6029 }
6030
6031 /*
6032 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6033 */
6034 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6035 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6036 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
6037 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6038 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6039
6040 /*
6041 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6042 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6043 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6044 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6045 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6046 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6047 */
6048 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6049 crReturn(0);
6050 }
6051 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6052
6053 /*
6054 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6055 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6056 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6057 * start.
6058 *
6059 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6060 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
6061 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6062 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6063 */
6064 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6065 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
6066 wait_for_rekey:
6067 crReturn(1);
6068 }
6069 if (pktin) {
6070 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6071 } else {
6072 /*
6073 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6074 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6075 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6076 * we process it anyway!)
6077 */
6078 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6079 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6080 (char *)in);
6081 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6082 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6083 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6084 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6085 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
6086 ssh->next_rekey =
6087 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6088 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6089 }
6090 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6091 } else {
6092 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6093 }
6094 }
6095 goto begin_key_exchange;
6096
6097 crFinish(1);
6098 }
6099
6100 /*
6101 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6102 */
6103 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6104 int len)
6105 {
6106 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6107 }
6108
6109 /*
6110 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6111 */
6112 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6113 {
6114 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6115 struct Packet *pktout;
6116
6117 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6118 int len;
6119 void *data;
6120 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6121 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6122 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6123 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6124 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6125 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6126 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6127 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6128 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6129 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6130 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6131 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6132 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6133 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6134 }
6135
6136 /*
6137 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6138 * still buffered.
6139 */
6140 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6141 }
6142
6143 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
6144 {
6145 int bufsize;
6146 if (c->closes)
6147 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
6148 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6149 if (bufsize == 0) {
6150 switch (c->type) {
6151 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6152 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6153 * notification since it will be polled */
6154 break;
6155 case CHAN_X11:
6156 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6157 break;
6158 case CHAN_AGENT:
6159 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6160 * buffer management */
6161 break;
6162 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6163 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6164 break;
6165 }
6166 }
6167 }
6168
6169 /*
6170 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6171 */
6172 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin)
6173 {
6174 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6175
6176 /*
6177 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
6178 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
6179 * be sending any more data anyway.
6180 */
6181 if (c->closes != 0)
6182 return;
6183
6184 /*
6185 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6186 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6187 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6188 *
6189 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6190 */
6191 if (newwin > c->v.v2.locwindow * 2) {
6192 struct Packet *pktout;
6193
6194 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6195 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6196 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6197 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6198 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6199 }
6200 }
6201
6202 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6203 {
6204 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6205 struct ssh_channel *c;
6206 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6207 if (c && !c->closes) {
6208 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6209 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
6210 }
6211 }
6212
6213 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6214 {
6215 char *data;
6216 int length;
6217 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6218 struct ssh_channel *c;
6219 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6220 if (!c)
6221 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6222 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6223 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6224 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6225 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6226 if (data) {
6227 int bufsize = 0;
6228 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6229 switch (c->type) {
6230 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6231 bufsize =
6232 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6233 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6234 data, length);
6235 break;
6236 case CHAN_X11:
6237 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6238 break;
6239 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6240 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6241 break;
6242 case CHAN_AGENT:
6243 while (length > 0) {
6244 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6245 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6246 (unsigned)length);
6247 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6248 data, l);
6249 data += l;
6250 length -= l;
6251 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6252 }
6253 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6254 c->u.a.totallen =
6255 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6256 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6257 unsigned char);
6258 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6259 }
6260 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6261 unsigned int l =
6262 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6263 (unsigned)length);
6264 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6265 data, l);
6266 data += l;
6267 length -= l;
6268 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6269 }
6270 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6271 void *reply;
6272 int replylen;
6273 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6274 c->u.a.totallen,
6275 &reply, &replylen,
6276 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6277 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6278 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6279 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6280 }
6281 }
6282 bufsize = 0;
6283 break;
6284 }
6285 /*
6286 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6287 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6288 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6289 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6290 * sent excess data.
6291 */
6292 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < OUR_V2_WINSIZE ?
6293 OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize : 0);
6294 }
6295 }
6296
6297 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6298 {
6299 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6300 struct ssh_channel *c;
6301
6302 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6303 if (!c)
6304 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6305
6306 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6307 /*
6308 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
6309 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
6310 */
6311 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6312 sshfwd_close(c);
6313 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6314 sshfwd_close(c);
6315 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6316 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6317 sshfwd_close(c);
6318 }
6319 }
6320
6321 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6322 {
6323 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6324 struct ssh_channel *c;
6325 struct Packet *pktout;
6326
6327 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6328 if (!c || c->halfopen) {
6329 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
6330 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", i));
6331 return;
6332 }
6333 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6334 switch (c->type) {
6335 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6336 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6337 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6338 break;
6339 case CHAN_X11:
6340 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6341 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6342 sshfwd_close(c);
6343 break;
6344 case CHAN_AGENT:
6345 sshfwd_close(c);
6346 break;
6347 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6348 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6349 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6350 sshfwd_close(c);
6351 break;
6352 }
6353 if (c->closes == 0) {
6354 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6355 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6356 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6357 }
6358 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6359 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6360 sfree(c);
6361
6362 /*
6363 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6364 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6365 * not running in -N mode.)
6366 */
6367 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6368 /*
6369 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6370 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6371 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6372 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6373 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6374 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6375 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6376 * this is more polite than sending a
6377 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6378 */
6379 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6380 }
6381 }
6382
6383 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6384 {
6385 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6386 struct ssh_channel *c;
6387 struct Packet *pktout;
6388
6389 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6390 if (!c)
6391 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6392 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6393 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6394 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6395 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6396 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6397 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6398 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6399 if (c->u.pfd.s)
6400 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6401 if (c->closes) {
6402 /*
6403 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6404 * which we decided on before the server acked
6405 * the channel open. So now we know the
6406 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6407 */
6408 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6409 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6410 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6411 }
6412 }
6413
6414 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6415 {
6416 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6417 "<unknown reason code>",
6418 "Administratively prohibited",
6419 "Connect failed",
6420 "Unknown channel type",
6421 "Resource shortage",
6422 };
6423 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6424 unsigned reason_code;
6425 char *reason_string;
6426 int reason_length;
6427 struct ssh_channel *c;
6428 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6429 if (!c)
6430 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6431 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6432 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6433
6434 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6435 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6436 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6437 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6438 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6439 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6440
6441 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6442
6443 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6444 sfree(c);
6445 }
6446
6447 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6448 {
6449 unsigned localid;
6450 char *type;
6451 int typelen, want_reply;
6452 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6453 struct ssh_channel *c;
6454 struct Packet *pktout;
6455
6456 localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6457 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6458 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6459
6460 /*
6461 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
6462 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
6463 */
6464 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6465 if (!c) {
6466 char *buf = dupprintf("Received channel request for nonexistent"
6467 " channel %d", localid);
6468 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6469 sfree(buf);
6470 return;
6471 }
6472
6473 /*
6474 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6475 * the request type string to see if it's something
6476 * we recognise.
6477 */
6478 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6479 /*
6480 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6481 * the primary channel.
6482 */
6483 if (typelen == 11 &&
6484 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6485
6486 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6487 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6488 ssh->exitcode);
6489 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6490
6491 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6492 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6493
6494 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6495 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6496 char *msg;
6497 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6498 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6499 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6500 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
6501 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6502 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6503 {
6504 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6505 pktin->savedpos;
6506 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6507 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6508 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6509 if (num == 0) {
6510 is_int = FALSE;
6511 } else {
6512 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6513 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6514 do { \
6515 long q = offset; \
6516 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6517 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6518 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6519 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6520 result = TRUE; \
6521 } \
6522 } while(0)
6523 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6524 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6525 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6526 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6527 is_int = TRUE;
6528 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6529 is_int = FALSE;
6530 else
6531 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6532 is_plausible = FALSE;
6533 }
6534 }
6535 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
6536 if (is_plausible) {
6537 if (is_int) {
6538 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6539 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6540 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6541 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
6542 } else {
6543 /* As per the drafts. */
6544 char *sig;
6545 int siglen;
6546 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6547 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6548 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6549 if (siglen) {
6550 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6551 siglen, sig);
6552 }
6553
6554 /*
6555 * Really hideous method of translating the
6556 * signal description back into a locally
6557 * meaningful number.
6558 */
6559
6560 if (0)
6561 ;
6562 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
6563 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
6564 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
6565 #ifdef SIGABRT
6566 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
6567 #endif
6568 #ifdef SIGALRM
6569 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
6570 #endif
6571 #ifdef SIGFPE
6572 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
6573 #endif
6574 #ifdef SIGHUP
6575 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
6576 #endif
6577 #ifdef SIGILL
6578 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
6579 #endif
6580 #ifdef SIGINT
6581 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
6582 #endif
6583 #ifdef SIGKILL
6584 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
6585 #endif
6586 #ifdef SIGPIPE
6587 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
6588 #endif
6589 #ifdef SIGQUIT
6590 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
6591 #endif
6592 #ifdef SIGSEGV
6593 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
6594 #endif
6595 #ifdef SIGTERM
6596 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
6597 #endif
6598 #ifdef SIGUSR1
6599 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
6600 #endif
6601 #ifdef SIGUSR2
6602 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
6603 #endif
6604 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
6605 else
6606 ssh->exitcode = 128;
6607 }
6608 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6609 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
6610 if (msglen) {
6611 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
6612 }
6613 /* ignore lang tag */
6614 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6615 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6616 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
6617 fmt_msg);
6618 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
6619 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
6620 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6621
6622 }
6623 } else {
6624 /*
6625 * This is a channel request we don't know
6626 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6627 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6628 * on want_reply.
6629 */
6630 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
6631 }
6632 if (want_reply) {
6633 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
6634 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6635 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6636 }
6637 }
6638
6639 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6640 {
6641 char *type;
6642 int typelen, want_reply;
6643 struct Packet *pktout;
6644
6645 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6646 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6647
6648 /*
6649 * We currently don't support any global requests
6650 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6651 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6652 * want_reply.
6653 */
6654 if (want_reply) {
6655 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
6656 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6657 }
6658 }
6659
6660 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6661 {
6662 char *type;
6663 int typelen;
6664 char *peeraddr;
6665 int peeraddrlen;
6666 int peerport;
6667 char *error = NULL;
6668 struct ssh_channel *c;
6669 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
6670 struct Packet *pktout;
6671
6672 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6673 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
6674 c->ssh = ssh;
6675
6676 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6677 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6678 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6679
6680 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
6681 char *addrstr;
6682
6683 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6684 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
6685 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
6686 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
6687 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6688
6689 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
6690 addrstr, peerport);
6691
6692 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
6693 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
6694 else if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
6695 ssh->x11auth, addrstr, peerport,
6696 &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
6697 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
6698 } else {
6699 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
6700 c->type = CHAN_X11;
6701 }
6702
6703 sfree(addrstr);
6704 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
6705 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
6706 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
6707 char *dummy;
6708 int dummylen;
6709 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
6710 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6711 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6712 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6713 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
6714 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
6715 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
6716 if (realpf == NULL) {
6717 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
6718 } else {
6719 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
6720 realpf->dhost,
6721 realpf->dport, c,
6722 &ssh->cfg,
6723 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
6724 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
6725 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
6726 if (e != NULL) {
6727 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
6728 error = "Port open failed";
6729 } else {
6730 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
6731 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6732 }
6733 }
6734 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
6735 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
6736 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
6737 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
6738 else {
6739 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
6740 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6741 }
6742 } else {
6743 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
6744 }
6745
6746 c->remoteid = remid;
6747 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6748 if (error) {
6749 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
6750 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6751 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
6752 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
6753 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
6754 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6755 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
6756 sfree(c);
6757 } else {
6758 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6759 c->closes = 0;
6760 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6761 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
6762 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
6763 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6764 add234(ssh->channels, c);
6765 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
6766 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6767 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
6768 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
6769 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
6770 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6771 }
6772 }
6773
6774 /*
6775 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
6776 */
6777 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6778 {
6779 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
6780 if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
6781 char *banner = NULL;
6782 int size = 0;
6783 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
6784 if (banner)
6785 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
6786 }
6787 }
6788
6789 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
6790 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
6791 {
6792 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
6793 int i = 0;
6794 unsigned int arg = 0;
6795 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
6796 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
6797 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
6798 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
6799 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
6800 break;
6801 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
6802 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
6803 break;
6804 }
6805 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
6806 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
6807 }
6808
6809 /*
6810 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
6811 */
6812 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
6813 struct Packet *pktin)
6814 {
6815 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
6816 enum {
6817 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
6818 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
6819 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
6820 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
6821 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
6822 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
6823 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6824 } type;
6825 int done_service_req;
6826 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
6827 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
6828 int kbd_inter_refused;
6829 int we_are_in;
6830 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
6831 int num_prompts;
6832 char username[100];
6833 char *password;
6834 int got_username;
6835 void *publickey_blob;
6836 int publickey_bloblen;
6837 int publickey_encrypted;
6838 char *publickey_algorithm;
6839 char *publickey_comment;
6840 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
6841 int agent_responselen;
6842 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
6843 int keyi, nkeys;
6844 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
6845 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
6846 int siglen, retlen, len;
6847 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
6848 int try_send;
6849 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
6850 struct Packet *pktout;
6851 };
6852 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
6853
6854 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
6855
6856 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
6857 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6858 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
6859 /*
6860 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6861 */
6862 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6863 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
6864 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6865 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6866 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
6867 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
6868 }
6869 if (!s->done_service_req) {
6870 /*
6871 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
6872 */
6873 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6874 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
6875 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6876 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6877 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
6878 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
6879 } else {
6880 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
6881 crStopV;
6882 }
6883 }
6884
6885 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
6886 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
6887 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
6888 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
6889 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
6890
6891 /*
6892 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
6893 */
6894 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6895 if (!s->we_are_in) {
6896
6897 /*
6898 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
6899 * for later use.
6900 */
6901 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
6902 int keytype;
6903 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6904 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
6905 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
6906 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
6907 const char *error;
6908 s->publickey_blob =
6909 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
6910 &s->publickey_algorithm,
6911 &s->publickey_bloblen,
6912 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
6913 if (s->publickey_blob) {
6914 s->publickey_encrypted =
6915 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
6916 } else {
6917 char *msgbuf;
6918 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
6919 error);
6920 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
6921 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
6922 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
6923 error);
6924 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
6925 sfree(msgbuf);
6926 }
6927 } else {
6928 char *msgbuf;
6929 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6930 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6931 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6932 " (%s)\r\n",
6933 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
6934 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6935 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
6936 sfree(msgbuf);
6937 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6938 }
6939 }
6940
6941 /*
6942 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
6943 * public key configured, filter out all others).
6944 */
6945 s->nkeys = 0;
6946 s->agent_response = NULL;
6947 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
6948 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
6949
6950 void *r;
6951
6952 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6953
6954 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6955 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
6956 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
6957 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
6958 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
6959 do {
6960 crReturnV;
6961 if (pktin) {
6962 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6963 " waiting for agent response"));
6964 crStopV;
6965 }
6966 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6967 r = ssh->agent_response;
6968 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
6969 }
6970 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
6971 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
6972 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
6973 int keyi;
6974 unsigned char *p;
6975 p = s->agent_response + 5;
6976 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
6977 p += 4;
6978 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
6979 if (s->publickey_blob) {
6980 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
6981 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
6982 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
6983 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
6984 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
6985 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
6986 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
6987 "configured key file", keyi);
6988 s->keyi = keyi;
6989 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
6990 break;
6991 }
6992 p += 4 + s->pklen;
6993 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
6994 }
6995 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
6996 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
6997 s->nkeys = 0;
6998 }
6999 }
7000 }
7001 }
7002
7003 }
7004
7005 /*
7006 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7007 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7008 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7009 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7010 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7011 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7012 *
7013 * I think this best serves the needs of
7014 *
7015 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7016 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7017 * type both correctly
7018 *
7019 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7020 * need to fall back to passwords
7021 *
7022 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7023 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7024 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7025 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7026 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7027 * retype it!
7028 */
7029 s->username[0] = '\0';
7030 s->got_username = FALSE;
7031 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7032 /*
7033 * Get a username.
7034 */
7035 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7036 /*
7037 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7038 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7039 * it again.
7040 */
7041 } else if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
7042 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7043 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7044 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7045 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7046 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
7047 lenof(s->username));
7048 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7049 while (ret < 0) {
7050 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7051 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7052 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7053 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7054 }
7055 if (!ret) {
7056 /*
7057 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7058 * Terminate.
7059 */
7060 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7061 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7062 crStopV;
7063 }
7064 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
7065 lenof(s->username));
7066 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7067 } else {
7068 char *stuff;
7069 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
7070 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
7071 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7072 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
7073 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7074 sfree(stuff);
7075 }
7076 }
7077 s->got_username = TRUE;
7078
7079 /*
7080 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7081 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7082 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7083 */
7084 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7085
7086 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7087 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7088 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7089 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7090 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7091 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7092 s->gotit = FALSE;
7093 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7094
7095 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7096 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7097
7098 /* Reset agent request state. */
7099 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7100 if (s->agent_response) {
7101 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7102 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7103 } else {
7104 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7105 s->keyi = 0;
7106 }
7107 }
7108
7109 while (1) {
7110 /*
7111 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7112 */
7113 if (!s->gotit)
7114 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7115 /*
7116 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7117 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7118 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7119 * with.)
7120 */
7121 {
7122 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7123 /*
7124 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7125 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7126 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7127 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7128 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7129 * output of (say) plink.)
7130 */
7131 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7132 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7133 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7134 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7135 sfree(banner);
7136 }
7137 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7138 }
7139 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7140 logevent("Access granted");
7141 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
7142 break;
7143 }
7144
7145 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7146 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7147 "type %d", pktin->type));
7148 crStopV;
7149 }
7150
7151 s->gotit = FALSE;
7152
7153 /*
7154 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7155 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7156 * helpfully try next.
7157 */
7158 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7159 char *methods;
7160 int methlen;
7161 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7162 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7163 /*
7164 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7165 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7166 * messages:
7167 *
7168 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
7169 * it's not worth printing anything at all
7170 *
7171 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
7172 * the message should be "Server refused our
7173 * key" (or no message at all if the key
7174 * came from Pageant)
7175 *
7176 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
7177 * message really should be "Access denied".
7178 *
7179 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7180 * authentication, we should break out of this
7181 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7182 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7183 * username change attempts).
7184 */
7185 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7186 /* do nothing */
7187 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7188 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7189 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7190 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7191 logevent("Server refused public key");
7192 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7193 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
7194 } else {
7195 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7196 logevent("Access denied");
7197 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
7198 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7199 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7200 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7201 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7202 break;
7203 }
7204 }
7205 } else {
7206 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7207 logevent("Further authentication required");
7208 }
7209
7210 s->can_pubkey =
7211 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7212 s->can_passwd =
7213 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7214 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
7215 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7216 }
7217
7218 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7219
7220 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7221
7222 /*
7223 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7224 */
7225
7226 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7227
7228 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7229
7230 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7231 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7232 s->agentp += 4;
7233 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7234 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7235 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7236 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7237 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7238 s->agentp += 4;
7239 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7240 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7241 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7242
7243 /* See if server will accept it */
7244 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7245 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7246 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7247 /* service requested */
7248 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7249 /* method */
7250 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7251 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7252 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7253 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7254 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7255 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7256 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7257
7258 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7259 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7260
7261 /* Offer of key refused. */
7262 s->gotit = TRUE;
7263
7264 } else {
7265
7266 void *vret;
7267
7268 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7269 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7270 "public key \"");
7271 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7272 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7273 }
7274
7275 /*
7276 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7277 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7278 */
7279 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7280 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7281 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7282 /* service requested */
7283 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7284 /* method */
7285 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7286 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7287 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7288 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7289 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7290
7291 /* Ask agent for signature. */
7292 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7293 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7294 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7295 s->siglen -= 4;
7296 s->len = 1; /* message type */
7297 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
7298 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
7299 s->len += 4; /* flags */
7300 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
7301 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
7302 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
7303 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
7304 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
7305 s->q += 4;
7306 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7307 s->q += s->pklen;
7308 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
7309 s->q += 4;
7310 /* Now the data to be signed... */
7311 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7312 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7313 s->q += 4;
7314 }
7315 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
7316 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7317 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7318 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
7319 s->pktout->length - 5);
7320 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
7321 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
7322 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
7323 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
7324 &vret, &s->retlen,
7325 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7326 do {
7327 crReturnV;
7328 if (pktin) {
7329 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
7330 " while waiting for agent"
7331 " response"));
7332 crStopV;
7333 }
7334 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7335 vret = ssh->agent_response;
7336 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7337 }
7338 s->ret = vret;
7339 sfree(s->agentreq);
7340 if (s->ret) {
7341 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
7342 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
7343 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
7344 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
7345 s->ret + 9,
7346 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
7347 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7348 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7349 } else {
7350 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
7351 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
7352 crStopV;
7353 }
7354 }
7355 }
7356
7357 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
7358 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7359 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7360 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7361 } else {
7362 s->keyi++;
7363 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
7364 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7365 }
7366
7367 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
7368 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
7369
7370 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
7371 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
7372
7373 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7374
7375 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7376
7377 /*
7378 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
7379 *
7380 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
7381 * willing to accept it.
7382 */
7383 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7384 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7385 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7386 /* service requested */
7387 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7388 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7389 /* no signature included */
7390 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
7391 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7392 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
7393 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
7394 s->publickey_bloblen);
7395 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7396 logevent("Offered public key");
7397
7398 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7399 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7400 /* Key refused. Give up. */
7401 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
7402 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
7403 continue; /* process this new message */
7404 }
7405 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
7406
7407 /*
7408 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
7409 * the key.
7410 */
7411 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7412 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
7413 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
7414 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
7415 }
7416 key = NULL;
7417 while (!key) {
7418 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
7419 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
7420 /*
7421 * Get a passphrase from the user.
7422 */
7423 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7424 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7425 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
7426 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
7427 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7428 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
7429 s->publickey_comment),
7430 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7431 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7432 while (ret < 0) {
7433 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7434 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7435 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
7436 in, inlen);
7437 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7438 }
7439 if (!ret) {
7440 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
7441 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7442 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7443 "Unable to authenticate",
7444 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7445 TRUE);
7446 crStopV;
7447 }
7448 passphrase =
7449 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7450 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7451 } else {
7452 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
7453 }
7454
7455 /*
7456 * Try decrypting the key.
7457 */
7458 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
7459 &error);
7460 if (passphrase) {
7461 /* burn the evidence */
7462 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
7463 sfree(passphrase);
7464 }
7465 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7466 if (passphrase &&
7467 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
7468 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7469 key = NULL;
7470 /* and loop again */
7471 } else {
7472 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7473 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7474 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7475 key = NULL;
7476 break; /* try something else */
7477 }
7478 }
7479 }
7480
7481 if (key) {
7482 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7483 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7484 int p;
7485
7486 /*
7487 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7488 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7489 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7490 */
7491 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7492 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7493 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7494 /* service requested */
7495 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7496 /* method */
7497 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7498 /* signature follows */
7499 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7500 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
7501 &pkblob_len);
7502 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7503 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
7504 pkblob_len);
7505
7506 /*
7507 * The data to be signed is:
7508 *
7509 * string session-id
7510 *
7511 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7512 * outgoing packet.
7513 */
7514 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7515 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7516 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7517 sigdata_len -= 4;
7518 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7519 p = 0;
7520 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7521 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7522 p += 4;
7523 }
7524 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
7525 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7526 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7527 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7528 s->pktout->length - 5);
7529 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7530 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7531 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7532 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7533 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7534 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7535 sfree(pkblob);
7536 sfree(sigblob);
7537 sfree(sigdata);
7538
7539 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7540 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7541 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7542 }
7543
7544 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
7545
7546 /*
7547 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
7548 */
7549
7550 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7551
7552 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
7553
7554 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7555 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7556 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7557 /* service requested */
7558 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
7559 /* method */
7560 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
7561 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
7562 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7563
7564 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7565 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
7566 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
7567 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
7568 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
7569 * Give up on it entirely. */
7570 s->gotit = TRUE;
7571 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
7572 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
7573 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
7574 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
7575 continue;
7576 }
7577
7578 /*
7579 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
7580 */
7581 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
7582
7583 char *name, *inst, *lang;
7584 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
7585 int i;
7586
7587 /*
7588 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
7589 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
7590 */
7591 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
7592 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
7593 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
7594 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7595 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7596 if (name_len) {
7597 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
7598 * local prompts? */
7599 s->cur_prompt->name =
7600 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
7601 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
7602 } else {
7603 s->cur_prompt->name =
7604 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
7605 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
7606 }
7607 /* FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
7608 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
7609 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
7610 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
7611 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
7612 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
7613
7614 /*
7615 * Get the prompts from the packet.
7616 */
7617 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7618 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
7619 char *prompt;
7620 int prompt_len;
7621 int echo;
7622 static char noprompt[] =
7623 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
7624
7625 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
7626 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7627 if (!prompt_len) {
7628 prompt = noprompt;
7629 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
7630 }
7631 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7632 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
7633 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7634 }
7635
7636 /*
7637 * Get the user's responses.
7638 */
7639 if (s->num_prompts) {
7640 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
7641 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7642 while (ret < 0) {
7643 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7644 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7645 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7646 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7647 }
7648 if (!ret) {
7649 /*
7650 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
7651 */
7652 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7653 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
7654 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7655 TRUE);
7656 crStopV;
7657 }
7658 }
7659
7660 /*
7661 * Send the responses to the server.
7662 */
7663 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
7664 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
7665 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
7666 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7667 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
7668 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
7669 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7670 }
7671 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
7672
7673 /*
7674 * Get the next packet in case it's another
7675 * INFO_REQUEST.
7676 */
7677 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7678
7679 }
7680
7681 /*
7682 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
7683 */
7684 s->gotit = TRUE;
7685
7686 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
7687
7688 /*
7689 * Plain old password authentication.
7690 */
7691 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
7692 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
7693
7694 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
7695
7696 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7697 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7698 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
7699 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
7700 s->username,
7701 ssh->savedhost),
7702 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7703
7704 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7705 while (ret < 0) {
7706 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7707 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7708 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7709 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7710 }
7711 if (!ret) {
7712 /*
7713 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
7714 */
7715 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7716 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
7717 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7718 TRUE);
7719 crStopV;
7720 }
7721 /*
7722 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
7723 * asked to change it.)
7724 */
7725 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7726 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7727
7728 /*
7729 * Send the password packet.
7730 *
7731 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
7732 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
7733 * user's password.
7734 *
7735 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
7736 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
7737 * people who find out how long their password is!
7738 */
7739 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7740 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7741 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7742 /* service requested */
7743 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
7744 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7745 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7746 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7747 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7748 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
7749 logevent("Sent password");
7750 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
7751
7752 /*
7753 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
7754 * request.
7755 */
7756 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7757 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
7758
7759 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
7760
7761 /*
7762 * We're being asked for a new password
7763 * (perhaps not for the first time).
7764 * Loop until the server accepts it.
7765 */
7766
7767 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
7768 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
7769 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
7770
7771 {
7772 char *msg;
7773 if (changereq_first_time)
7774 msg = "Server requested password change";
7775 else
7776 msg = "Server rejected new password";
7777 logevent(msg);
7778 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
7779 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7780 }
7781
7782 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
7783
7784 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7785 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7786 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
7787 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
7788 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
7789 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
7790 /*
7791 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
7792 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
7793 * password-change messages to be the same, and
7794 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
7795 * by the user entering a blank password originally
7796 * and the real password subsequently, so,
7797 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
7798 *
7799 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
7800 * to check this field.)
7801 */
7802 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7803 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
7804 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7805 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
7806 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7807 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
7808 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7809
7810 /*
7811 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
7812 * password twice.
7813 */
7814 while (!got_new) {
7815
7816 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7817 while (ret < 0) {
7818 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7819 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7820 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7821 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7822 }
7823 if (!ret) {
7824 /*
7825 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
7826 */
7827 /* burn the evidence */
7828 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7829 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
7830 sfree(s->password);
7831 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
7832 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7833 TRUE);
7834 crStopV;
7835 }
7836
7837 /*
7838 * If the user specified a new original password
7839 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
7840 * one.
7841 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
7842 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
7843 */
7844 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
7845 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
7846 /* burn the evidence */
7847 sfree(s->password);
7848 s->password =
7849 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7850 }
7851
7852 /*
7853 * Check the two new passwords match.
7854 */
7855 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
7856 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
7857 == 0);
7858 if (!got_new)
7859 /* They don't. Silly user. */
7860 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
7861
7862 }
7863
7864 /*
7865 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
7866 * (see above for padding rationale)
7867 */
7868 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7869 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7870 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7871 /* service requested */
7872 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
7873 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7874 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7875 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7876 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
7877 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
7878 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7879 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7880 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
7881 logevent("Sent new password");
7882
7883 /*
7884 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
7885 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
7886 * new password.)
7887 */
7888 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7889 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
7890
7891 }
7892
7893 /*
7894 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
7895 * of the loop. Either:
7896 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
7897 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
7898 * usual meaning
7899 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
7900 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
7901 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
7902 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
7903 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
7904 * the loop and start again.
7905 */
7906 s->gotit = TRUE;
7907
7908 /*
7909 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
7910 * case. Burn the evidence.
7911 */
7912 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
7913 sfree(s->password);
7914
7915 } else {
7916
7917 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7918 "No supported authentication methods available",
7919 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
7920 FALSE);
7921 crStopV;
7922
7923 }
7924
7925 }
7926 }
7927 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
7928
7929 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
7930 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7931 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
7932 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
7933 }
7934 if (s->agent_response)
7935 sfree(s->agent_response);
7936
7937 /*
7938 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
7939 */
7940
7941 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
7942
7943 /*
7944 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
7945 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
7946 */
7947 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
7948 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
7949 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
7950 ssh2_msg_global_request;
7951
7952 /*
7953 * Create the main session channel.
7954 */
7955 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
7956 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
7957 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
7958 /*
7959 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
7960 * channel.
7961 */
7962 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7963 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
7964 ssh->mainchan->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
7965 logeventf(ssh,
7966 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
7967 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
7968 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
7969 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
7970 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
7971 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
7972 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
7973 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7974 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
7975 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
7976 /*
7977 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
7978 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
7979 * information.
7980 */
7981 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
7982 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
7983 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7984
7985 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7986 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
7987 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
7988 crStopV;
7989 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
7990 }
7991 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
7992 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
7993 crStopV;
7994 }
7995 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7996 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
7997 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
7998 ssh->mainchan->closes = 0;
7999 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8000 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8001 bufchain_init(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer);
8002 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8003 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8004 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8005 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8006 } else {
8007 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8008 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8009 ssh->mainchan->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
8010 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8011 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8012 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8013 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
8014 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8015 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8016 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8017 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8018 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8019 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8020 crStopV;
8021 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8022 }
8023 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8024 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8025 crStopV;
8026 }
8027 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8028 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8029 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8030 ssh->mainchan->closes = 0;
8031 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8032 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8033 bufchain_init(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer);
8034 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8035 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8036 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8037 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8038 }
8039
8040 /*
8041 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8042 * general channel-based messages.
8043 */
8044 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8045 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8046 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8047 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8048 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8049 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8050 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8051 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8052 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8053 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8054 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8055 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8056 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8057
8058 /*
8059 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
8060 */
8061 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
8062 char proto[20], data[64];
8063 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
8064 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
8065 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
8066 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
8067 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8068 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8069 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
8070 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8071 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
8072 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, proto);
8073 /*
8074 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
8075 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
8076 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
8077 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
8078 * cookie into the log.
8079 */
8080 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8081 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, data);
8082 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8083 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display));
8084 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8085
8086 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8087
8088 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8089 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8090 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
8091 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8092 crStopV;
8093 }
8094 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
8095 } else {
8096 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
8097 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
8098 }
8099 }
8100
8101 /*
8102 * Enable port forwardings.
8103 */
8104 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
8105
8106 /*
8107 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
8108 */
8109 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
8110 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
8111 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8112 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8113 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
8114 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8115 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8116
8117 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8118
8119 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8120 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8121 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
8122 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8123 crStopV;
8124 }
8125 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
8126 } else {
8127 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
8128 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
8129 }
8130 }
8131
8132 /*
8133 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
8134 */
8135 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8136 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
8137 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
8138 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
8139 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
8140 /* Build the pty request. */
8141 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8142 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8143 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
8144 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8145 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
8146 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
8147 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
8148 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
8149 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
8150 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8151 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
8152 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
8153 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
8154 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
8155 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
8156 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
8157 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
8158 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8159 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
8160
8161 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8162
8163 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8164 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8165 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
8166 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8167 crStopV;
8168 }
8169 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
8170 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8171 } else {
8172 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
8173 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
8174 }
8175 } else {
8176 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8177 }
8178
8179 /*
8180 * Send environment variables.
8181 *
8182 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
8183 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
8184 */
8185 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
8186 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
8187 char *var, *varend, *val;
8188
8189 s->num_env = 0;
8190
8191 while (*e) {
8192 var = e;
8193 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
8194 varend = e;
8195 if (*e == '\t') e++;
8196 val = e;
8197 while (*e) e++;
8198 e++;
8199
8200 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8201 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8202 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
8203 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8204 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8205 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
8206 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
8207 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8208
8209 s->num_env++;
8210 }
8211
8212 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
8213
8214 s->env_ok = 0;
8215 s->env_left = s->num_env;
8216
8217 while (s->env_left > 0) {
8218 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8219
8220 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8221 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8222 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
8223 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8224 crStopV;
8225 }
8226 } else {
8227 s->env_ok++;
8228 }
8229
8230 s->env_left--;
8231 }
8232
8233 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
8234 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
8235 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
8236 logevent("All environment variables refused");
8237 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
8238 } else {
8239 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
8240 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
8241 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
8242 }
8243 }
8244
8245 /*
8246 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
8247 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
8248 * of command.
8249 */
8250 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
8251 int subsys;
8252 char *cmd;
8253
8254 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
8255 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
8256 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
8257 } else {
8258 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
8259 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
8260 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
8261 }
8262
8263 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8264 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8265 if (subsys) {
8266 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
8267 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8268 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8269 } else if (*cmd) {
8270 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
8271 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8272 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8273 } else {
8274 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
8275 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8276 }
8277 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8278
8279 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8280
8281 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8282 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8283 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
8284 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8285 crStopV;
8286 }
8287 /*
8288 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
8289 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
8290 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
8291 * back to it before complaining.
8292 */
8293 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
8294 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
8295 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
8296 continue;
8297 }
8298 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
8299 crStopV;
8300 } else {
8301 logevent("Started a shell/command");
8302 }
8303 break;
8304 }
8305
8306 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
8307 if (ssh->size_needed)
8308 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
8309 if (ssh->eof_needed)
8310 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
8311
8312 /*
8313 * Transfer data!
8314 */
8315 if (ssh->ldisc)
8316 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
8317 if (ssh->mainchan)
8318 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8319 while (1) {
8320 crReturnV;
8321 s->try_send = FALSE;
8322 if (pktin) {
8323
8324 /*
8325 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
8326 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
8327 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
8328 */
8329
8330 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
8331 crStopV;
8332 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8333 /*
8334 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
8335 */
8336 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
8337 s->try_send = TRUE;
8338 }
8339 if (s->try_send) {
8340 int i;
8341 struct ssh_channel *c;
8342 /*
8343 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
8344 */
8345 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
8346 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
8347 }
8348 }
8349
8350 crFinishV;
8351 }
8352
8353 /*
8354 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
8355 */
8356 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8357 {
8358 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
8359 char *buf, *msg;
8360 int nowlen, reason, msglen;
8361
8362 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8363 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8364
8365 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
8366 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
8367 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
8368 } else {
8369 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
8370 " type %d)", reason);
8371 }
8372 logevent(buf);
8373 sfree(buf);
8374 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
8375 &nowlen, msglen, msg);
8376 logevent(buf);
8377 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
8378 reason,
8379 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
8380 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
8381 buf+nowlen));
8382 sfree(buf);
8383 }
8384
8385 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8386 {
8387 /* log the debug message */
8388 char *msg;
8389 int msglen;
8390 int always_display;
8391
8392 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
8393 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8394 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8395
8396 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
8397 }
8398
8399 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8400 {
8401 struct Packet *pktout;
8402 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
8403 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
8404 /*
8405 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
8406 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
8407 */
8408 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8409 }
8410
8411 /*
8412 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
8413 */
8414 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
8415 {
8416 int i;
8417
8418 /*
8419 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
8420 */
8421 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
8422 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
8423
8424 /*
8425 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
8426 * the coroutines will get it.
8427 */
8428 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
8429 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
8430 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
8431 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
8432 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
8433 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
8434 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
8435 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8436 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8437 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
8438 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
8439 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
8440 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
8441 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8442 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8443 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
8444 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8445 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8446 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
8447 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
8448 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8449 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
8450 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
8451 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
8452 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
8453 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
8454 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
8455 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
8456 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
8457 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
8458 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
8459 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8460 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
8461
8462 /*
8463 * These special message types we install handlers for.
8464 */
8465 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
8466 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
8467 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
8468 }
8469
8470 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
8471 {
8472 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
8473
8474 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
8475 return;
8476
8477 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
8478 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
8479 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
8480 }
8481 }
8482
8483 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
8484 struct Packet *pktin)
8485 {
8486 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
8487 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
8488 return;
8489
8490 if (pktin) {
8491 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
8492 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
8493 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
8494 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
8495 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
8496 }
8497
8498 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
8499 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
8500 return;
8501 }
8502
8503 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
8504 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
8505 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
8506 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
8507 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
8508 /*
8509 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
8510 */
8511 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
8512 }
8513 } else {
8514 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
8515 }
8516 }
8517
8518 /*
8519 * Called to set up the connection.
8520 *
8521 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
8522 */
8523 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
8524 Config *cfg,
8525 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
8526 int keepalive)
8527 {
8528 const char *p;
8529 Ssh ssh;
8530
8531 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
8532 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8533 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
8534 ssh->s = NULL;
8535 ssh->cipher = NULL;
8536 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
8537 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
8538 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
8539 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
8540 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
8541 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
8542 ssh->csmac = NULL;
8543 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
8544 ssh->scmac = NULL;
8545 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
8546 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
8547 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
8548 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
8549 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
8550 ssh->kex = NULL;
8551 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
8552 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
8553 ssh->exitcode = -1;
8554 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
8555 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
8556 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
8557 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
8558 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
8559 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
8560 ssh->logctx = NULL;
8561 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
8562 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
8563 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
8564 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
8565 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
8566 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
8567 ssh->x11auth = NULL;
8568 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
8569 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
8570 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
8571 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
8572 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
8573 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
8574 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
8575 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
8576 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
8577 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
8578 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
8579 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
8580 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
8581 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
8582 ssh->v_c = NULL;
8583 ssh->v_s = NULL;
8584 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8585 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
8586 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
8587 ssh->queue = NULL;
8588 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
8589 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
8590 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
8591 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
8592 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
8593 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
8594
8595 *backend_handle = ssh;
8596
8597 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
8598 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
8599 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
8600 #endif
8601
8602 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
8603 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
8604 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
8605
8606 ssh->channels = NULL;
8607 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
8608 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
8609
8610 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8611 ssh->editing = 0;
8612 ssh->echoing = 0;
8613 ssh->v1_throttle_count = 0;
8614 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
8615 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
8616
8617 ssh->protocol = NULL;
8618
8619 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
8620
8621 ssh->pinger = NULL;
8622
8623 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
8624 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
8625 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
8626 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
8627
8628 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
8629 if (p != NULL)
8630 return p;
8631
8632 random_ref();
8633
8634 return NULL;
8635 }
8636
8637 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
8638 {
8639 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8640 struct ssh_channel *c;
8641 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
8642
8643 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
8644 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
8645 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
8646 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
8647 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
8648 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
8649 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
8650 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
8651 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
8652 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
8653 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
8654 if (ssh->cscomp)
8655 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
8656 else
8657 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
8658 }
8659 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
8660 if (ssh->sccomp)
8661 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
8662 else
8663 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
8664 }
8665 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
8666 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
8667 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
8668
8669 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
8670 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
8671 sfree(ssh->queue);
8672
8673 while (ssh->qhead) {
8674 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
8675 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
8676 sfree(ssh->qhead);
8677 }
8678 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
8679
8680 if (ssh->channels) {
8681 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
8682 switch (c->type) {
8683 case CHAN_X11:
8684 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
8685 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
8686 break;
8687 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
8688 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
8689 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
8690 break;
8691 }
8692 sfree(c);
8693 }
8694 freetree234(ssh->channels);
8695 ssh->channels = NULL;
8696 }
8697
8698 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
8699 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
8700 sfree(pf);
8701 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
8702 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
8703 }
8704 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
8705 if (ssh->x11auth)
8706 x11_free_auth(ssh->x11auth);
8707 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
8708 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
8709 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
8710 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
8711 sfree(ssh->v_c);
8712 sfree(ssh->v_s);
8713 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
8714 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
8715 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
8716 }
8717 if (ssh->s)
8718 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
8719 expire_timer_context(ssh);
8720 if (ssh->pinger)
8721 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
8722 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
8723 sfree(ssh);
8724
8725 random_unref();
8726 }
8727
8728 /*
8729 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
8730 */
8731 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
8732 {
8733 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8734 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
8735 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
8736
8737 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
8738 if (ssh->portfwds)
8739 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
8740
8741 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
8742 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
8743 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
8744 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
8745
8746 if (new_next - now < 0) {
8747 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
8748 } else {
8749 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
8750 }
8751 }
8752
8753 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
8754 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
8755 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
8756 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
8757 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
8758 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
8759 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
8760 }
8761
8762 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
8763 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
8764 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8765 }
8766
8767 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
8768 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
8769 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
8770 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
8771 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8772 }
8773
8774 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8775
8776 if (rekeying) {
8777 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
8778 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
8779 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
8780 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
8781 }
8782 }
8783 }
8784
8785 /*
8786 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
8787 */
8788 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
8789 {
8790 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8791
8792 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8793 return 0;
8794
8795 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
8796
8797 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
8798 }
8799
8800 /*
8801 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
8802 */
8803 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
8804 {
8805 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8806 int override_value;
8807
8808 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8809 return 0;
8810
8811 /*
8812 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
8813 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
8814 */
8815 override_value = 0;
8816 if (ssh->throttled_all)
8817 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
8818
8819 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8820 return override_value;
8821 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8822 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
8823 return override_value;
8824 else
8825 return (override_value +
8826 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
8827 }
8828
8829 return 0;
8830 }
8831
8832 /*
8833 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
8834 */
8835 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
8836 {
8837 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8838 struct Packet *pktout;
8839
8840 ssh->term_width = width;
8841 ssh->term_height = height;
8842
8843 switch (ssh->state) {
8844 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
8845 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
8846 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
8847 break; /* do nothing */
8848 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
8849 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
8850 break;
8851 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
8852 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8853 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8854 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
8855 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
8856 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
8857 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
8858 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8859 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8860 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8861 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
8862 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8863 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
8864 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
8865 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8866 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8867 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8868 }
8869 }
8870 break;
8871 }
8872 }
8873
8874 /*
8875 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
8876 * protocol.
8877 */
8878 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
8879 {
8880 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
8881 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
8882 };
8883 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
8884 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
8885 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
8886 };
8887 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
8888 {NULL, TS_SEP},
8889 {"Break", TS_BRK},
8890 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
8891 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
8892 * required signals. */
8893 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
8894 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
8895 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
8896 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
8897 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
8898 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
8899 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
8900 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
8901 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
8902 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
8903 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
8904 };
8905 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
8906 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
8907 };
8908 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
8909 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
8910 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
8911 lenof(specials_end)];
8912 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8913 int i = 0;
8914 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
8915 do { \
8916 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
8917 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
8918 i += lenof(name); \
8919 } while(0)
8920
8921 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8922 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
8923 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
8924 * asked anyway. */
8925 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8926 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
8927 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8928 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
8929 if (ssh->mainchan)
8930 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
8931 } /* else we're not ready yet */
8932
8933 if (i) {
8934 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
8935 return ssh_specials;
8936 } else {
8937 return NULL;
8938 }
8939 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
8940 }
8941
8942 /*
8943 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
8944 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
8945 * hostname sort').
8946 */
8947 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
8948 {
8949 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8950 struct Packet *pktout;
8951
8952 if (code == TS_EOF) {
8953 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
8954 /*
8955 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
8956 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
8957 */
8958 if (code == TS_EOF)
8959 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
8960 return;
8961 }
8962 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8963 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
8964 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8965 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
8966 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8967 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8968 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
8969 }
8970 logevent("Sent EOF message");
8971 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
8972 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8973 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8974 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8975 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8976 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
8977 } else {
8978 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
8979 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
8980 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8981 }
8982 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
8983 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
8984 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
8985 }
8986 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
8987 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8988 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8989 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8990 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
8991 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8992 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8993 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8994 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
8995 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8996 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
8997 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8998 }
8999 } else {
9000 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
9001 char *signame = NULL;
9002 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
9003 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
9004 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
9005 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
9006 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
9007 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
9008 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
9009 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
9010 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
9011 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
9012 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
9013 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
9014 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
9015 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
9016 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
9017 if (signame) {
9018 /* It's a signal. */
9019 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
9020 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9021 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9022 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
9023 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9024 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
9025 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9026 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
9027 }
9028 } else {
9029 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
9030 }
9031 }
9032 }
9033
9034 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
9035 {
9036 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9037 struct ssh_channel *c;
9038 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
9039 c->ssh = ssh;
9040
9041 if (c) {
9042 c->halfopen = TRUE;
9043 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
9044 c->closes = 0;
9045 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
9046 c->u.pfd.s = s;
9047 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
9048 add234(ssh->channels, c);
9049 }
9050 return c;
9051 }
9052
9053 /*
9054 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
9055 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
9056 */
9057 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
9058 {
9059 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9060 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9061 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
9062 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9063 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
9064 }
9065 } else {
9066 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
9067 }
9068 }
9069
9070 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
9071 {
9072 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
9073 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
9074 struct Packet *pktout;
9075
9076 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
9077
9078 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9079 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
9080 PKT_INT, c->localid,
9081 PKT_STR, hostname,
9082 PKT_INT, port,
9083 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
9084 PKT_END);
9085 } else {
9086 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
9087 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
9088 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
9089 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
9090 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
9091 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
9092 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
9093 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
9094 /*
9095 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
9096 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
9097 * convinced the server should be told details like that
9098 * about my local network configuration.
9099 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
9100 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
9101 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
9102 */
9103 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
9104 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9105 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9106 }
9107 }
9108
9109 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
9110 {
9111 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9112 return ssh->s != NULL;
9113 }
9114
9115 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
9116 {
9117 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9118 return ssh->send_ok;
9119 }
9120
9121 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
9122 {
9123 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9124 if (option == LD_ECHO)
9125 return ssh->echoing;
9126 if (option == LD_EDIT)
9127 return ssh->editing;
9128 return FALSE;
9129 }
9130
9131 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
9132 {
9133 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9134 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
9135 }
9136
9137 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
9138 {
9139 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9140 ssh->logctx = logctx;
9141 }
9142
9143 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
9144 {
9145 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9146 if (ssh->s != NULL)
9147 return -1;
9148 else
9149 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
9150 }
9151
9152 /*
9153 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
9154 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
9155 */
9156 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
9157 {
9158 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9159 return ssh->version;
9160 }
9161
9162 /*
9163 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
9164 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
9165 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
9166 */
9167 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
9168 {
9169 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9170 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
9171 }
9172
9173 Backend ssh_backend = {
9174 ssh_init,
9175 ssh_free,
9176 ssh_reconfig,
9177 ssh_send,
9178 ssh_sendbuffer,
9179 ssh_size,
9180 ssh_special,
9181 ssh_get_specials,
9182 ssh_connected,
9183 ssh_return_exitcode,
9184 ssh_sendok,
9185 ssh_ldisc,
9186 ssh_provide_ldisc,
9187 ssh_provide_logctx,
9188 ssh_unthrottle,
9189 ssh_cfg_info,
9190 "ssh",
9191 PROT_SSH,
9192 22
9193 };