3 ### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
5 ### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
8 ###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
10 ### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
11 ### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
12 ### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
13 ### (at your option) any later version.
15 ### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
16 ### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
17 ### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
18 ### GNU General Public License for more details.
20 ### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 ### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
22 ### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
24 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
28 admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
29 trusted_groups = CONF_trusted_groups
30 prod_requires_admin = false
32 SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
33 log_file_path = : syslog
38 syslog_duplication = false
39 syslog_timestamp = false
41 SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
42 local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
43 extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::0
45 SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
46 deliver_queue_load_max = 8
49 smtp_accept_queue = 32
50 smtp_accept_reserve = 4
51 smtp_load_reserve = 10
52 smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted
54 SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
57 SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
59 gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)
61 SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
62 received_header_text = Received: \
63 ${if def:sender_rcvhost \
64 {from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
65 {${if def:sender_ident \
66 {from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
67 by $primary_hostname \
68 (Exim $version_number)\
69 ${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
70 ${if def:received_protocol \
71 {with $received_protocol \
72 ${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
73 ${if def:sender_address \
74 {(envelope-from $sender_address\
75 ${if def:authenticated_id \
76 {; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
78 ${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}
80 SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
81 smtp_return_error_details = true
82 accept_8bitmime = true
84 SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
85 extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
86 headers_charset = utf-8
87 qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain
89 SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
90 delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d
92 SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
93 tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.certlist
94 tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
95 tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
96 tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
97 tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
98 {match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
100 {CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
101 tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
102 tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}
105 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
106 ### Access control lists.
108 SECTION(global, acl-after)
109 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
111 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
113 ## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
114 ## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
115 ## it's too blunt a tool. Rather than reject, add a warning header.
116 ## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
117 ## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
118 ## and we should only care about the most recent one.
119 warn set acl_c_helo_warning = false
121 ${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
122 {<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
123 {match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
124 {localhost : +thishost}}}}
126 ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
127 {${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
129 {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
131 {$sender_host_address} \
134 set acl_c_helo_warning = true
138 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
139 acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
140 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
142 ## Record the user's name.
143 warn set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
148 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
150 SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
153 ## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
155 warn condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
156 add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
158 Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
159 helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
160 address=$sender_host_address
162 ## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
165 ## Ensure that the sender looks valid.
166 require acl = mail_check_sender
168 ## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
169 warn condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
172 ## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
173 deny message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
174 !condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
178 ## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
179 require acl = mail_check_auth
181 SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
185 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
188 ## See whether there's a special exception for this sender domain.
189 accept senders = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
190 {KV(senders, {$value}{})},
193 ## Ensure that the sender is routable. This is important to prevent
194 ## undeliverable bounces.
195 require message = Invalid sender; \
196 ($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
202 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
203 acl_smtp_connect = connect
204 SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
206 SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
207 ## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
208 warn acl = check_submission
214 ## See whether this message needs hacking on.
215 accept !hosts = +thishost
216 !condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
217 set acl_c_mode = relay
219 ## Remember to apply submission controls.
220 warn set acl_c_mode = submission
225 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
227 SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
230 ## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
231 ## isn't in one of our known domains.
232 require message = Relaying not permitted
235 ## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
236 require message = Invalid recipient \
237 ($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
240 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
242 ## Accept either if the client is allowed to relay through us, or if
243 ## we're the correct place to send this mail.
245 ## Known clients and authenticated users are OK.
246 accept hosts = CONF_relay_clients
247 accept authenticated = *
249 ## Known domains are OK.
250 accept domains = +public
252 ## Finally, domains in our table are OK, unless they say they aren't.
254 ${if exists{CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf} \
255 {partial0-lsearch; CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf}}
256 condition = DOMKV(service, {$value}{true})
258 ## Nope, that's not allowed.
261 SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
262 ## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
265 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
267 SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
270 SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
273 SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
274 acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
275 acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
276 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
278 accept hosts = +trusted
279 deny message = Suck it and see
282 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
283 ### Verification of sender address.
285 SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
288 ## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
289 accept condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
291 ## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
292 ## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
293 ## answer. So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
294 warn set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
297 condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
298 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
300 ## User must be authenticated by now.
301 deny message = Sender not authenticated
302 condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}
308 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
309 ### Common options for forwarding routers.
311 ## We're pretty permissive here.
312 m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
320 forbid_blackhole = false
321 check_ancestor = true:>)
323 ## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
324 m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
326 user = CONF_filter_user
327 forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
328 forbid_filter_logwrite = true
329 forbid_filter_perl = true
330 forbid_filter_readsocket = true
331 forbid_filter_run = true
332 file_transport = dummy
333 directory_transport = dummy
334 pipe_transport = dummy
335 reply_transport = dummy:>)
337 ## Transports for redirection filters.
338 m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
339 <:file_transport = mailbox
340 directory_transport = maildir
341 pipe_transport = pipe
342 reply_transport = reply:>)
344 m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
351 FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)
354 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
357 SECTION(routers, alias)m4_dnl
358 ## Look up the local part in the address map.
363 user = CONF_filter_user
365 local_parts = nwildlsearch; CONF_alias_file
366 data = ${expand:$local_part_data}
367 SECTION(routers, alias-opts)m4_dnl
370 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
371 ### Some standard transports.
373 m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
374 <:delivery_date_add = true
375 envelope_to_add = true
376 return_path_add = true:>)
378 SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
379 ## A standard transport for remote delivery. By default, try to do TLS, and
380 ## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
381 ## in plaintext anyway. But all of this can be overridden from the
382 ## `domains.conf' file. Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
383 ## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way. Instead, encode
384 ## it into the transport name. This is very unpleasant, of course.
387 tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
388 tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
389 tls_tempfail_tryclear = true
391 m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
394 hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
395 hosts_require_auth = \
396 ${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
397 tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
398 tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
399 tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
400 tls_require_ciphers = \
402 {${extract {${expand:$value}} \
403 { good = CONF_good_ciphers \
404 any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
406 {${expand:$value}}}} \
407 {CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
409 tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
411 SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
413 SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)
415 ## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
419 hosts_require_tls = *
420 tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.certlist
421 tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
422 tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
423 tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
424 tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
425 tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
426 authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
427 {$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
430 ## A standard transport for local delivery.
433 file = /var/mail/$local_part
436 mode_fail_narrower = false
439 ## Transports for user filters.
447 maildir_format = true
453 path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
454 /usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
455 /usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
458 return_fail_output = true
461 ## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
467 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
468 ### Retry configuration.
470 SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
473 F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h
476 ###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------