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[catacomb] / symm / rijndael-x86ish-aesni.S

/// -*- mode: asm; asm-comment-char: ?/ -*-
///
/// AESNI-based implementation of Rijndael
///
/// (c) 2015 Straylight/Edgeware
///

///----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
///
/// This file is part of Catacomb.
///
/// Catacomb is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
/// it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public License as
/// published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
/// License, or (at your option) any later version.
///
/// Catacomb is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
/// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
/// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
/// GNU Library General Public License for more details.
///
/// You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
/// License along with Catacomb; if not, write to the Free
/// Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston,
/// MA 02111-1307, USA.

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// External definitions.

#include "config.h"
#include "asm-common.h"

        .globl  F(abort)
        .globl  F(rijndael_rcon)

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Local utilities.

// Magic constants for shuffling.
#define ROTL 0x93
#define ROT2 0x4e
#define ROTR 0x39

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Main code.

        .arch   .aes
        .text

/// The AESNI instructions implement a little-endian version of AES, but
/// Catacomb's internal interface presents as big-endian so as to work better
/// with things like GCM.  We therefore maintain the round keys in
/// little-endian form, and have to end-swap blocks in and out.
///
/// For added amusement, the AESNI instructions don't implement the
/// larger-block versions of Rijndael, so we have to end-swap the keys if
/// we're preparing for one of those.

        // Useful constants.
        .equ    maxrounds, 16           // maximum number of rounds
        .equ    maxblksz, 32            // maximum block size, in bytes
        .equ    kbufsz, maxblksz*(maxrounds + 1) // size of a key-schedule buffer

        // Context structure.
        .equ    nr, 0                   // number of rounds
        .equ    w, nr + 4               // encryption key words
        .equ    wi, w + kbufsz          // decryption key words

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Key setup.

FUNC(rijndael_setup_x86ish_aesni)

#if CPUFAM_X86
        // Arguments are on the stack.  We'll need to stack the caller's
        // register veriables, but we'll manage.

#  define CTX ebp                       // context pointer
#  define BLKSZ [esp + 24]              // block size

#  define SI esi                        // source pointer
#  define DI edi                        // destination pointer

#  define KSZ ebx                       // key size
#  define KSZo ebx                      // ... as address offset
#  define NKW edx                       // total number of key words
#  define NKW_NEEDS_REFRESH 1           // ... needs recalculating
#  define RCON ecx                      // round constants table
#  define LIM edx                       // limit pointer
#  define LIMn edx                      // ... as integer offset from base

#  define NR ecx                        // number of rounds
#  define LRK eax                       // distance to last key
#  define LRKo eax                      // ... as address offset
#  define BLKOFF edx                    // block size in bytes
#  define BLKOFFo edx                   // ... as address offset

        // Stack the caller's registers.
        push    ebp
        push    ebx
        push    esi
        push    edi

        // Set up our own variables.
        mov     CTX, [esp + 20]         // context base pointer
        mov     SI, [esp + 28]          // key material
        mov     KSZ, [esp + 32]         // key size, in words
#endif

#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_SYSV
        // Arguments are in registers.  We have plenty, but, to be honest,
        // the initial register allocation is a bit annoying.

#  define CTX r8                        // context pointer
#  define BLKSZ r9d                     // block size

#  define SI rsi                        // source pointer
#  define DI rdi                        // destination pointer

#  define KSZ edx                       // key size
#  define KSZo rdx                      // ... as address offset
#  define NKW r10d                      // total number of key words
#  define RCON rdi                      // round constants table
#  define LIMn ecx                      // limit pointer
#  define LIM rcx                       // ... as integer offset from base

#  define NR ecx                        // number of rounds
#  define LRK eax                       // distance to last key
#  define LRKo rax                      // ... as address offset
#  define BLKOFF r9d                    // block size in bytes
#  define BLKOFFo r9                    // ... as address offset

        // Move arguments to more useful places.
        mov     CTX, rdi                // context base pointer
        mov     BLKSZ, esi              // block size in words
        mov     SI, rdx                 // key material
        mov     KSZ, ecx                // key size, in words
#endif

#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_WIN
        // Arguments are in different registers, and they're a little tight.

#  define CTX r8                        // context pointer
#  define BLKSZ edx                     // block size

#  define SI rsi                        // source pointer
#  define DI rdi                        // destination pointer

#  define KSZ r9d                       // key size
#  define KSZo r9                       // ... as address offset
#  define NKW r10d                      // total number of key words
#  define RCON rdi                      // round constants table
#  define LIMn ecx                      // limit pointer
#  define LIM rcx                       // ... as integer offset from base

#  define NR ecx                        // number of rounds
#  define LRK eax                       // distance to last key
#  define LRKo rax                      // ... as address offset
#  define BLKOFF edx                    // block size in bytes
#  define BLKOFFo rdx                   // ... as address offset

        // We'll need the index registers, which belong to the caller in this
        // ABI.
        push    rsi
        push    rdi

        // Move arguments to more useful places.
        mov     SI, r8                  // key material
        mov     CTX, rcx                // context base pointer
#endif

        // The initial round key material is taken directly from the input
        // key, so copy it over.
#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_SYSV
        // We've been lucky.  We already have a copy of the context pointer
        // in rdi, and the key size in ecx.
        add     DI, w
#else
        lea     DI, [CTX + w]
        mov     ecx, KSZ
#endif
        rep     movsd

        // Find out other useful things.
        mov     NKW, [CTX + nr]         // number of rounds
        add     NKW, 1
        imul    NKW, BLKSZ              // total key size in words
#if !NKW_NEEDS_REFRESH
        // If we can't keep NKW for later, then we use the same register for
        // it and LIM, so this move is unnecessary.
        mov     LIMn, NKW
#endif
        sub     LIMn, KSZ               // offset by the key size

        // Find the round constants.
        ldgot   ecx
        leaext  RCON, F(rijndael_rcon), ecx

        // Prepare for the main loop.
        lea     SI, [CTX + w]
        mov     eax, [SI + 4*KSZo - 4]  // most recent key word
        lea     LIM, [SI + 4*LIM]       // limit, offset by one key expansion

        // Main key expansion loop.  The first word of each key-length chunk
        // needs special treatment.
        //
        // This is rather tedious because the Intel `AESKEYGENASSIST'
        // instruction is very strangely shaped.  Firstly, it wants to
        // operate on vast SSE registers, even though we're data-blocked from
        // doing more than operation at a time unless we're doing two key
        // schedules simultaneously -- and even then we can't do more than
        // two, because the instruction ignores two of its input words
        // entirely, and produces two different outputs for each of the other
        // two.  And secondly it insists on taking the magic round constant
        // as an immediate, so it's kind of annoying if you're not
        // open-coding the whole thing.  It's much easier to leave that as
        // zero and XOR in the round constant by hand.
9:      movd    xmm0, eax
        pshufd  xmm0, xmm0, ROTR
        aeskeygenassist xmm1, xmm0, 0
        pshufd  xmm1, xmm1, ROTL
        movd    eax, xmm1
        xor     eax, [SI]
        xor     al, [RCON]
        inc     RCON
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // The next three words are simple...
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // (Word 2...)
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // (Word 3...)
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // Word 4.  If the key is /more/ than 6 words long, then we must
        // apply a substitution here.
        cmp     KSZ, 5
        jb      9b
        cmp     KSZ, 7
        jb      0f
        movd    xmm0, eax
        pshufd  xmm0, xmm0, ROTL
        aeskeygenassist xmm1, xmm0, 0
        movd    eax, xmm1
0:      xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // (Word 5...)
        cmp     KSZ, 6
        jb      9b
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // (Word 6...)
        cmp     KSZ, 7
        jb      9b
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // (Word 7...)
        cmp     KSZ, 8
        jb      9b
        xor     eax, [SI]
        mov     [SI + 4*KSZo], eax
        add     SI, 4
        cmp     SI, LIM
        jae     8f

        // Must be done by now.
        jmp     9b

        // Next job is to construct the decryption keys.  The keys for the
        // first and last rounds don't need to be mangled, but the remaining
        // ones do -- and they all need to be reordered too.
        //
        // The plan of action, then, is to copy the final encryption round's
        // keys into place first, then to do each of the intermediate rounds
        // in reverse order, and finally do the first round.
        //
        // Do all of the heavy lifting with SSE registers.  The order we're
        // doing this in means that it's OK if we read or write too much, and
        // there's easily enough buffer space for the over-enthusiastic reads
        // and writes because the context has space for 32-byte blocks, which
        // is our maximum and an exact fit for two SSE registers.
8:      mov     NR, [CTX + nr]          // number of rounds
#if NKW_NEEDS_REFRESH
        mov     BLKOFF, BLKSZ
        mov     LRK, NR
        imul    LRK, BLKOFF
#else
        // If we retain NKW, then BLKSZ and BLKOFF are the same register
        // because we won't need the former again.
        mov     LRK, NKW
        sub     LRK, BLKSZ
#endif
        lea     DI, [CTX + wi]
        lea     SI, [CTX + w + 4*LRKo]  // last round's keys
        shl     BLKOFF, 2               // block size (in bytes now)

        // Copy the last encryption round's keys.
        movdqu  xmm0, [SI]
        movdqu  [DI], xmm0
        cmp     BLKOFF, 16
        jbe     9f
        movdqu  xmm0, [SI + 16]
        movdqu  [DI + 16], xmm0

        // Update the loop variables and stop if we've finished.
9:      add     DI, BLKOFFo
        sub     SI, BLKOFFo
        sub     NR, 1
        jbe     0f

        // Do another middle round's keys...
        movdqu  xmm0, [SI]
        aesimc  xmm0, xmm0
        movdqu  [DI], xmm0
        cmp     BLKOFF, 16
        jbe     9b
        movdqu  xmm0, [SI + 16]
        aesimc  xmm0, xmm0
        movdqu  [DI + 16], xmm0
        jmp     9b

        // Finally do the first encryption round.
0:      movdqu  xmm0, [SI]
        movdqu  [DI], xmm0
        cmp     BLKOFF, 16
        jbe     0f
        movdqu  xmm0, [SI + 16]
        movdqu  [DI + 16], xmm0

        // If the block size is not exactly four words then we must end-swap
        // everything.  We can use fancy SSE toys for this.
0:      cmp     BLKOFF, 16
        je      0f

        // Find the byte-reordering table.
        ldgot   ecx
        movdqa  xmm5, [INTADDR(endswap_tab, ecx)]

#if NKW_NEEDS_REFRESH
        // Calculate the number of subkey words again.  (It's a good job
        // we've got a fast multiplier.)
        mov     NKW, [CTX + nr]
        add     NKW, 1
        imul    NKW, BLKSZ
#endif

        // End-swap the encryption keys.
        mov     ecx, NKW
        lea     SI, [CTX + w]
        call    endswap_block

        // And the decryption keys.
        mov     ecx, NKW
        lea     SI, [CTX + wi]
        call    endswap_block

0:      // All done.
#if CPUFAM_X86
        pop     edi
        pop     esi
        pop     ebx
        pop     ebp
#endif
#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_WIN
        pop     rdi
        pop     rsi
#endif
        ret

        .align  16
endswap_block:
        // End-swap ECX words starting at SI.  The end-swapping table is
        // already loaded into XMM5; and it's OK to work in 16-byte chunks.
        movdqu  xmm1, [SI]
        pshufb  xmm1, xmm5
        movdqu  [SI], xmm1
        add     SI, 16
        sub     ecx, 4
        ja      endswap_block
        ret

#undef CTX
#undef BLKSZ
#undef SI
#undef DI
#undef KSZ
#undef KSZo
#undef RCON
#undef LIMn
#undef LIM
#undef NR
#undef LRK
#undef LRKo
#undef BLKOFF
#undef BLKOFFo

ENDFUNC

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Encrypting and decrypting blocks.

.macro  encdec  op, aes, koff
  FUNC(rijndael_\op\()_x86ish_aesni)

        // Find the magic endianness-swapping table.
        ldgot   ecx
        movdqa  xmm5, [INTADDR(endswap_tab, ecx)]

#if CPUFAM_X86
        // Arguments come in on the stack, and need to be collected.  We
        // don't have a shortage of registers.

#  define K ecx
#  define SRC edx
#  define DST edx
#  define NR eax

        mov     K, [esp + 4]
        mov     SRC, [esp + 8]
#endif

#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_SYSV
        // Arguments come in registers.  All is good.

#  define K rdi
#  define SRC rsi
#  define DST rdx
#  define NR eax
#endif

#if CPUFAM_AMD64 && ABI_WIN
        // Arguments come in different registers.

#  define K rcx
#  define SRC rdx
#  define DST r8
#  define NR eax
#endif

        // Initial setup.
        movdqu  xmm0, [SRC]
        pshufb  xmm0, xmm5
        mov     NR, [K + nr]
        add     K, \koff

        // Initial whitening.
        movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        add     K, 16
        pxor    xmm0, xmm1

        // Dispatch to the correct code.
        cmp     NR, 10
        je      10f
        jb      bogus
        cmp     NR, 14
        je      14f
        ja      bogus
        cmp     NR, 12
        je      12f
        jb      11f
        jmp     13f

        .align  2

        // 14 rounds...
14:     movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        add     K, 16
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 13 rounds...
13:     movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        add     K, 16
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 12 rounds...
12:     movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        add     K, 16
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 11 rounds...
11:     movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        add     K, 16
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 10 rounds...
10:     movdqu  xmm1, [K]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 9 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 16]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 8 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 32]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 7 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 48]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 6 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 64]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 5 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 80]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 4 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 96]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 3 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 112]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // 2 rounds...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 128]
        \aes    xmm0, xmm1

        // Final round...
        movdqu  xmm1, [K + 144]
        \aes\()last xmm0, xmm1

        // Unpermute the ciphertext block and store it.
        pshufb  xmm0, xmm5
#if CPUFAM_X86
        mov     DST, [esp + 12]
#endif
        movdqu  [DST], xmm0

        // And we're done.
        ret

#undef K
#undef SRC
#undef DST
#undef NR

  ENDFUNC
.endm

        encdec  eblk, aesenc, w
        encdec  dblk, aesdec, wi

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Random utilities.

        .align  16
        // Abort the process because of a programming error.  Indirecting
        // through this point serves several purposes: (a) by CALLing, rather
        // than branching to, `abort', we can save the return address, which
        // might at least provide a hint as to what went wrong; (b) we don't
        // have conditional CALLs (and they'd be big anyway); and (c) we can
        // write a HLT here as a backstop against `abort' being mad.
bogus:  callext F(abort)
0:      hlt
        jmp     0b

        gotaux  ecx

///--------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Data tables.

        .align  16
endswap_tab:
        .byte    3,  2,  1,  0
        .byte    7,  6,  5,  4
        .byte   11, 10,  9,  8
        .byte   15, 14, 13, 12

///----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------