SSH back end should now be tolerant of garbage appearing in the data

stream after the actual SSH connection is finished. Some firewalls
add this for no good reason.

git-svn-id: svn://svn.tartarus.org/sgt/putty@1271 cda61777-01e9-0310-a592-d414129be87e

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 27b7216..4a6db9f 100644 (file)
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -607,12 +607,6 @@ static int ssh1_rdpkt(unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
        (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
     }
 
-#ifdef FWHACK
-    if (st->len == 0x52656d6f) {       /* "Remo"te server has closed ... */
-       st->len = 0x300;               /* big enough to carry to end */
-    }
-#endif
-
     st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
     st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
     pktin.length = st->len - 5;
@@ -770,11 +764,7 @@ static int ssh2_rdpkt(unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
        pktin.data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
        (*datalen)--;
     }
-#ifdef FWHACK
-    if (!memcmp(pktin.data, "Remo", 4)) {      /* "Remo"te server has closed ... */
-       /* FIXME */
-    }
-#endif
+
     if (sccipher)
        sccipher->decrypt(pktin.data, st->cipherblk);
 
@@ -3005,6 +2995,15 @@ static void ssh1_protocol(unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
                 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
            } else if (pktin.type == SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS) {
                send_packet(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
+                /*
+                 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
+                 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
+                 * session which we might mistake for another
+                 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
+                 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
+                 */
+                ssh_state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
+                crReturnV;
            } else {
                bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin.type));
                crReturnV;