17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK 0x000F
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
113 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
131 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
147 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
153 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
155 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
158 * Various remote-bug flags.
160 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
161 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
162 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
163 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
164 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
166 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
167 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
170 * Codes for terminal modes.
171 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
172 * This list is derived from draft-ietf-secsh-connect-25 and
175 static const struct {
176 const char* const mode
;
178 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR
, TTY_OP_BOOL
} type
;
180 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
181 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
182 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
183 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
184 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
185 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
186 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
187 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
188 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
189 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
190 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
191 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
192 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
193 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
194 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
195 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
196 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
197 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
198 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
199 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
200 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
201 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
202 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
203 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
204 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
205 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
206 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
207 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
208 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
209 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
210 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
211 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
212 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
213 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
214 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
215 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
216 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
217 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
218 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
219 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
220 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
221 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
222 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
223 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL
}, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
224 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
225 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
226 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
227 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
228 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
229 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
230 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
231 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
232 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
233 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL
}
236 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
237 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
238 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
239 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
240 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
241 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
242 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
244 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
245 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s
)
250 ret
= ctrlparse(s
, &next
);
251 if (!next
) ret
= s
[0];
253 ret
= 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
257 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s
)
259 if (stricmp(s
, "yes") == 0 ||
260 stricmp(s
, "on") == 0 ||
261 stricmp(s
, "true") == 0 ||
262 stricmp(s
, "+") == 0)
264 else if (stricmp(s
, "no") == 0 ||
265 stricmp(s
, "off") == 0 ||
266 stricmp(s
, "false") == 0 ||
267 stricmp(s
, "-") == 0)
268 return 0; /* false */
270 return (atoi(s
) != 0);
273 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
274 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
275 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
277 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
278 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
279 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
280 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
281 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
282 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
283 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
284 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
285 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
286 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
287 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
288 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
289 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
290 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
291 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
292 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
293 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
294 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
295 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
296 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
297 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
298 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
299 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
300 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
301 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
302 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
303 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
304 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
305 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
306 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
307 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
308 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
313 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
316 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
320 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
322 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
323 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
324 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
325 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
326 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
327 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
328 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
329 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
330 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
331 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
332 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
333 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
334 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
335 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
336 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
337 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
338 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
339 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
340 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
341 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
342 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
343 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
344 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
345 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
346 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
347 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
348 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
349 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
350 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
351 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
352 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
353 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
354 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
355 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
356 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
357 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
363 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
365 PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
,
366 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
367 * fields to the packet logging code. */
368 PKTT_OTHER
, PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKTT_DATA
372 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
373 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
376 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
378 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
380 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
381 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
382 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
383 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
385 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
387 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
388 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
389 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
391 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
394 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
396 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
397 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
398 #define crReturn(z) \
400 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
404 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
406 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
407 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
408 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
409 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
411 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
414 static struct Packet
*ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
415 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
416 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*, int length
);
417 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*, void *data
, int len
);
418 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
419 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
420 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*, unsigned long value
);
421 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*);
422 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
423 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*, char *data
, int len
);
424 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
425 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
426 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
427 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
428 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
429 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
430 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
431 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
432 struct Packet
*pktin
);
433 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
434 struct Packet
*pktin
);
437 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
438 * various different purposes:
440 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
441 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
442 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
443 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
446 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
447 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
448 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
449 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
450 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
451 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
453 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
457 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
458 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
459 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
460 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
462 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
464 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
467 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
468 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
471 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
475 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
478 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
479 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
483 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
487 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
489 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
490 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
491 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
493 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
494 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
495 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
498 enum { /* channel types */
503 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
507 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
510 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
511 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
513 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
516 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
518 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
519 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
520 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
521 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
523 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
527 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
530 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
532 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
537 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
538 unsigned char *message
;
539 unsigned char msglen
[4];
540 unsigned lensofar
, totallen
;
542 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
545 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
552 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
553 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
554 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
556 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
557 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
558 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
559 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
560 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
561 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
562 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
563 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
564 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
565 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
566 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
568 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
569 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
570 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
571 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
572 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
573 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
575 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
576 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
578 struct ssh_portfwd
; /* forward declaration */
580 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
581 unsigned sport
, dport
;
584 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
;
586 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
587 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
590 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
591 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
592 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
593 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
597 enum { DESTROY
, KEEP
, CREATE
} status
;
599 unsigned sport
, dport
;
602 struct ssh_rportfwd
*remote
;
606 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
607 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
608 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
611 long length
; /* length of `data' actually used */
612 long forcepad
; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
613 int type
; /* only used for incoming packets */
614 unsigned long sequence
; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
615 unsigned char *data
; /* allocated storage */
616 unsigned char *body
; /* offset of payload within `data' */
617 long savedpos
; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
618 long maxlen
; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
619 long encrypted_len
; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
622 * State associated with packet logging
626 struct logblank_t
*blanks
;
629 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
630 struct Packet
*pktin
);
631 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
632 struct Packet
*pktin
);
633 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
634 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
635 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
636 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
637 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
638 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
639 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
640 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
641 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
642 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
);
643 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
);
644 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
);
645 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
);
646 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
);
647 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
648 struct Packet
*pktin
);
650 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
651 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
652 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
656 struct Packet
*pktin
;
659 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
660 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
663 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
664 struct Packet
*pktin
;
667 typedef void (*handler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
);
668 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
);
670 struct queued_handler
;
671 struct queued_handler
{
673 chandler_fn_t handler
;
675 struct queued_handler
*next
;
679 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
680 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
682 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
689 unsigned char session_key
[32];
691 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
692 int v1_local_protoflags
;
693 int agentfwd_enabled
;
696 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
699 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
700 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
701 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
702 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
703 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
704 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
705 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
706 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
707 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
713 int echoing
, editing
;
717 int ospeed
, ispeed
; /* temporaries */
718 int term_width
, term_height
;
720 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
721 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
726 tree234
*rportfwds
, *portfwds
;
730 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
736 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
738 struct Packet
**queue
;
739 int queuelen
, queuesize
;
741 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
742 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
745 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
746 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
747 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
752 bufchain banner
; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
754 * Used for username and password input.
756 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
757 int userpass_input_buflen
;
758 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
759 int userpass_input_echo
;
766 int v1_throttle_count
;
769 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
770 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence
;
772 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
773 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
774 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
775 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
776 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
777 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate
;
778 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
779 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
781 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
782 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
783 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
784 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
786 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
787 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
789 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
790 int protocol_initial_phase_done
;
792 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
794 struct Packet
*(*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
797 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
798 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
799 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
800 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
805 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
807 void *agent_response
;
808 int agent_response_len
;
812 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
813 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
814 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
815 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
816 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
817 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
821 bufchain queued_incoming_data
;
824 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
827 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch
[256];
830 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
831 * indications from a request.
833 struct queued_handler
*qhead
, *qtail
;
836 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
841 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
844 unsigned long incoming_data_size
, outgoing_data_size
, deferred_data_size
;
845 unsigned long max_data_size
;
847 long next_rekey
, last_rekey
;
848 char *deferred_rekey_reason
; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
851 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
853 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
854 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, const char *fmt
, ...)
860 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
866 #define bombout(msg) \
868 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
869 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
871 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
875 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
877 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
879 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitpass
)
880 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
883 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
885 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
)
886 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
889 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
891 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
894 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
895 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh
, char *modes
,
896 void (*do_mode
)(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
),
900 char *t
= strchr(modes
, '\t');
901 char *m
= snewn(t
-modes
+1, char);
903 strncpy(m
, modes
, t
-modes
);
906 val
= get_ttymode(ssh
->frontend
, m
);
910 do_mode(data
, m
, val
);
913 modes
+= strlen(modes
) + 1;
917 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
919 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
920 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
921 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
923 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
927 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
929 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
930 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
938 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
940 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
941 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
943 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
944 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
945 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
947 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
952 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
954 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
955 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
957 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
959 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
965 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
966 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
968 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a
, const char *b
)
970 if (a
== NULL
&& b
== NULL
)
979 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
981 struct ssh_portfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) av
;
982 struct ssh_portfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) bv
;
984 if (a
->type
> b
->type
)
986 if (a
->type
< b
->type
)
988 if (a
->addressfamily
> b
->addressfamily
)
990 if (a
->addressfamily
< b
->addressfamily
)
992 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->saddr
, b
->saddr
)) != 0)
993 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
994 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
996 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
998 if (a
->type
!= 'D') {
999 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->daddr
, b
->daddr
)) != 0)
1000 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
1001 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
1003 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
1009 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
1011 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
1012 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
1014 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
1017 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1018 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1019 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1020 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1021 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1022 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1024 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
1028 while (high
- low
> 1) {
1029 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
1030 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
1031 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
1032 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
1034 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
1037 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1038 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1041 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
1042 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
1044 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
1047 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
1049 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
1051 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1053 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
1056 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
1059 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
1062 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
1064 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
1065 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
1066 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
1070 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
1072 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
1075 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1080 static struct Packet
*ssh_new_packet(void)
1082 struct Packet
*pkt
= snew(struct Packet
);
1084 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
= NULL
;
1086 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
1094 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1095 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1096 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1097 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1098 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1100 static struct Packet
*ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1102 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
1104 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
1106 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1108 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1109 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1111 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
1112 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1114 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
1115 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
1118 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
1119 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
1120 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->len
- 5;
1122 if (st
->biglen
< 0) {
1123 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1124 " data stream corruption"));
1125 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1129 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
1130 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1132 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
1133 st
->p
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1134 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
1135 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
1136 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1138 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
1139 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
1140 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
1142 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
1144 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
1147 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
,
1148 st
->biglen
, NULL
)) {
1149 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1150 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1155 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
);
1157 st
->realcrc
= crc32_compute(st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
1158 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
1159 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
1160 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1161 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1165 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1166 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 0;
1168 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1169 unsigned char *decompblk
;
1171 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1172 st
->pktin
->body
- 1, st
->pktin
->length
+ 1,
1173 &decompblk
, &decomplen
)) {
1174 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1175 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1179 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
1180 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
1181 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1182 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1184 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1187 memcpy(st
->pktin
->body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
1189 st
->pktin
->length
= decomplen
- 1;
1192 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->body
[-1];
1195 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1199 struct logblank_t blank
;
1200 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1201 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1202 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1203 if ((st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
) ||
1204 (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
)) {
1205 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 0;
1206 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1207 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1210 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1211 blank
.len
= st
->pktin
->length
;
1212 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1216 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
1217 PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1218 ssh1_pkt_type(st
->pktin
->type
),
1219 st
->pktin
->body
, st
->pktin
->length
,
1223 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1226 static struct Packet
*ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1228 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
1230 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
1232 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1234 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1235 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1237 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
1240 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
1243 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1246 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1247 * contain the length and padding details.
1249 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
1250 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1252 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1257 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1258 st
->pktin
->data
, st
->cipherblk
);
1261 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1263 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
);
1264 st
->pad
= st
->pktin
->data
[4];
1267 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1268 * do us any more damage.
1270 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->len
> 35000 || st
->pad
< 4 ||
1271 st
->len
- st
->pad
< 1 || (st
->len
+ 4) % st
->cipherblk
!= 0) {
1272 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1273 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1278 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1280 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
1282 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
1285 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1287 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
1288 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
1291 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1293 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1294 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1295 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1299 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1301 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1303 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1305 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1308 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1310 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1311 st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
1312 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1314 st
->pktin
->encrypted_len
= st
->packetlen
;
1320 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1321 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1322 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1323 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1327 st
->pktin
->sequence
= st
->incoming_sequence
++;
1330 * Decompress packet payload.
1333 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1336 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1337 st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, st
->pktin
->length
- 5,
1338 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1339 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1340 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1341 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1342 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1345 st
->pktin
->length
= 5 + newlen
;
1346 memcpy(st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1351 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 6;
1352 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1353 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->data
[5];
1356 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1360 struct logblank_t blank
;
1361 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1362 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1363 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1364 if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1365 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1366 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
1367 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 8;
1370 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1371 blank
.len
= (st
->pktin
->length
-6) - blank_prefix
;
1372 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1376 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1377 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, st
->pktin
->type
),
1378 st
->pktin
->data
+6, st
->pktin
->length
-6,
1382 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1385 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int *offset_p
)
1387 int pad
, biglen
, i
, pktoffs
;
1391 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1392 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1393 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1394 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1401 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[12],
1402 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt
->data
[12]),
1403 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
- (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
),
1404 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1405 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1408 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1409 unsigned char *compblk
;
1411 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1412 pkt
->data
+ 12, pkt
->length
- 12,
1413 &compblk
, &complen
);
1414 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ 12, compblk
, complen
);
1416 pkt
->length
= complen
+ 12;
1419 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ 4); /* space for CRC */
1421 len
= pkt
->length
- 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1422 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1424 biglen
= len
+ pad
; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1426 for (i
= pktoffs
; i
< 4+8; i
++)
1427 pkt
->data
[i
] = random_byte();
1428 crc
= crc32_compute(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4, biglen
- 4); /* all ex len */
1429 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4 + biglen
- 4, crc
);
1430 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
, len
);
1433 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
,
1434 pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4, biglen
);
1436 if (offset_p
) *offset_p
= pktoffs
;
1437 return biglen
+ 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1440 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1442 int len
, backlog
, offset
;
1443 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
, &offset
);
1444 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
+ offset
, len
);
1445 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1446 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1447 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1450 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1453 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
, &offset
);
1454 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1455 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1456 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1460 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
,
1461 pkt
->data
+ offset
, len
);
1462 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1463 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1467 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1468 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1469 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1471 static struct Packet
*construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, va_list ap
)
1477 pkt
= ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype
);
1479 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1480 unsigned char *argp
, argchar
;
1481 unsigned long argint
;
1484 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1486 argint
= va_arg(ap
, int);
1487 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, argint
);
1490 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap
, int);
1491 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, argchar
);
1494 argp
= va_arg(ap
, unsigned char *);
1495 arglen
= va_arg(ap
, int);
1496 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, argp
, arglen
);
1499 argp
= va_arg(ap
, unsigned char *);
1500 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt
, argp
);
1503 bn
= va_arg(ap
, Bignum
);
1504 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt
, bn
);
1506 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1508 dont_log_password(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
1511 dont_log_data(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
1514 end_log_omission(ssh
, pkt
);
1522 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1526 va_start(ap
, pkttype
);
1527 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap
);
1532 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1536 va_start(ap
, pkttype
);
1537 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap
);
1539 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh
, pkt
);
1542 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1545 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1547 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1548 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1550 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1555 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1556 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1558 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1563 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1564 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1566 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1568 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1569 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1570 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1571 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1574 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1576 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1577 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1578 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1582 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1584 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1586 if (pkt
->maxlen
< length
) {
1587 unsigned char *body
= pkt
->body
;
1588 int offset
= body ? pkt
->data
- body
: 0;
1589 pkt
->maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1590 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, pkt
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1591 if (body
) pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ offset
;
1594 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*pkt
, void *data
, int len
)
1596 if (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
) {
1598 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
, struct logblank_t
);
1600 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= pkt
->length
-
1601 (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
);
1602 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1603 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1606 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
);
1607 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
- len
, data
, len
);
1609 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char byte
)
1611 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &byte
, 1);
1613 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char value
)
1615 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &value
, 1);
1617 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned long value
)
1620 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1621 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, x
, 4);
1623 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1625 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0);
1626 pkt
->savedpos
= pkt
->length
;
1628 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1630 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, strlen(data
));
1631 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1633 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
, int len
)
1635 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1636 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1638 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1640 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1641 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt
, data
);
1643 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1645 int len
= ssh1_bignum_length(b
);
1646 unsigned char *data
= snewn(len
, char);
1647 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data
, b
);
1648 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1651 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1654 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1655 p
= snewn(n
+ 1, unsigned char);
1657 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1658 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1660 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1662 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1666 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1670 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1671 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1672 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)p
, len
);
1676 static struct Packet
*ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1678 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1679 pkt
->length
= 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1680 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, pkt_type
);
1681 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
;
1685 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1686 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1687 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1688 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1689 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1690 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1691 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1692 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1693 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1695 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1697 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1700 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1701 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
;
1706 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1707 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1708 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1710 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1712 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1715 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[5],
1716 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, pkt
->data
[5]),
1717 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
- (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
),
1718 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1719 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1723 * Compress packet payload.
1726 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1729 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 5,
1731 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1733 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1739 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1740 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1741 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1744 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1745 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1747 if (pkt
->length
+ padding
< pkt
->forcepad
)
1748 padding
= pkt
->forcepad
- pkt
->length
;
1750 (cipherblk
- (pkt
->length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1751 assert(padding
<= 255);
1752 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1753 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1754 pkt
->data
[4] = padding
;
1755 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1756 pkt
->data
[pkt
->length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1757 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
- 4);
1759 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, pkt
->data
,
1760 pkt
->length
+ padding
,
1761 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1762 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1765 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1766 pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
);
1768 pkt
->encrypted_len
= pkt
->length
+ padding
;
1770 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1771 return pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1775 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1776 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1777 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1779 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1780 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1781 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1782 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1783 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1784 * works after packet encryption.
1786 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1787 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1788 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1789 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1790 * then send them once we've finished.
1792 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1793 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1795 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1796 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1797 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1798 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1799 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1800 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1802 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1803 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1804 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1805 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1806 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1807 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1811 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*, int);
1812 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh
);
1815 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1817 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1821 if (ssh
->cscipher
!= NULL
&& (ssh
->cscipher
->flags
& SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC
)) {
1822 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1823 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
, FALSE
);
1824 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1827 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1828 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1829 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1830 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1832 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1833 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1834 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1835 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1836 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1838 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1842 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
1844 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int noignore
)
1847 if (ssh
->cscipher
!= NULL
&& (ssh
->cscipher
->flags
& SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC
) &&
1848 ssh
->deferred_len
== 0 && !noignore
) {
1850 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
1851 * get encrypted with a known IV.
1853 struct Packet
*ipkt
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
1854 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ipkt
, TRUE
);
1856 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1857 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1858 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1859 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1863 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1864 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1865 ssh
->deferred_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1866 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1870 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
1872 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1874 assert(ssh
->queueing
);
1876 if (ssh
->queuelen
>= ssh
->queuesize
) {
1877 ssh
->queuesize
= ssh
->queuelen
+ 32;
1878 ssh
->queue
= sresize(ssh
->queue
, ssh
->queuesize
, struct Packet
*);
1881 ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
++] = pkt
;
1885 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1888 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1891 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1893 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1898 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1901 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1904 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1906 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
, FALSE
);
1911 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1912 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
1914 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1915 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1916 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1917 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1918 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1919 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1920 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1923 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1926 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1928 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1929 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1930 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1931 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1932 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1934 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= ssh
->deferred_data_size
;
1935 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1936 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1937 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1938 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1939 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0;
1943 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
1944 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1945 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1947 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh
)
1951 assert(!ssh
->queueing
);
1953 for (i
= 0; i
< ssh
->queuelen
; i
++)
1954 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ssh
->queue
[i
], FALSE
);
1957 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1961 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1965 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1966 debug(("%s", string
));
1967 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1968 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1974 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1978 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1979 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1984 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1986 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1988 unsigned long value
;
1989 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1990 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1991 value
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1995 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1997 unsigned long value
;
1998 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 1)
1999 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2000 value
= pkt
->body
[pkt
->savedpos
] != 0;
2004 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
)
2009 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
2011 len
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
2016 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< *length
)
2018 *p
= (char *)(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
2019 pkt
->savedpos
+= *length
;
2021 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
2023 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< length
)
2025 pkt
->savedpos
+= length
;
2026 return pkt
->body
+ (pkt
->savedpos
- length
);
2028 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet
*pkt
, struct RSAKey
*key
,
2029 unsigned char **keystr
)
2033 j
= makekey(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
2034 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
,
2041 assert(pkt
->savedpos
< pkt
->length
);
2045 static Bignum
ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
2050 j
= ssh1_read_bignum(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
2051 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
, &b
);
2059 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
2065 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt
, &p
, &length
);
2070 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
2075 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2076 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2077 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2078 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2079 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2081 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
,
2082 void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
2083 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
2085 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
2086 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
2088 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2089 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2092 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2093 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2095 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
2096 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2097 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
2100 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2103 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2104 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
2105 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
2106 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
2107 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
2109 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2112 * Now find the signature integer.
2114 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2115 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
2116 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2118 if (len
!= siglen
) {
2119 unsigned char newlen
[4];
2120 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
2122 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2123 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2124 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
2125 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
2126 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2128 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
2129 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
2130 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2132 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
2133 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2137 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2140 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2141 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
2145 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2146 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2148 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
2150 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
2152 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2154 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2157 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
2159 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
2160 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
2161 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
2162 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
2163 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2164 !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2166 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2167 * to use a different defence against password length
2170 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
2171 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2174 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
2175 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
2176 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2178 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2179 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2182 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
2183 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2186 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
2187 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
2188 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2190 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2191 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2192 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2194 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
2195 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2198 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
2199 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
2200 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2201 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
2202 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
2203 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
2205 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2207 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
2208 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2211 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2212 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
2213 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2214 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
2216 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2217 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2218 * generate the keys).
2220 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
2221 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2224 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
2225 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
2226 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
2227 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
2229 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2231 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
2232 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2235 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
2236 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
2237 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
2239 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2240 * public-key authentication.
2242 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
2243 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2246 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2247 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== AUTO
&&
2248 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp
) ||
2249 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp
) ||
2250 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp
) ||
2251 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp
) ||
2252 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp
) ||
2253 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-1.2.6", imp
)))) {
2255 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2257 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_REKEY
;
2258 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2263 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2264 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2266 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str
)
2268 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2269 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2270 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2271 assert(*str
== 'H'); str
++;
2272 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2273 while (*str
&& *str
!= '-') str
++;
2274 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2276 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2279 if (*str
== '-' || *str
== ' ')
2285 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
2287 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
2295 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
2297 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
2299 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2301 if (c
!= 'S') goto no
;
2303 if (c
!= 'S') goto no
;
2305 if (c
!= 'H') goto no
;
2307 if (c
!= '-') goto no
;
2316 s
->vstring
= snewn(s
->vstrsize
, char);
2317 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
2321 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2322 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
2324 s
->vstring
= sresize(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
, char);
2326 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
2329 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
2331 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
2332 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
2333 } else if (c
== '\012')
2337 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
2338 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
2340 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
2341 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2342 logeventf(ssh
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
2343 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
2346 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2349 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2350 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
2351 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2352 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
2354 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
2355 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2358 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
2359 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2366 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
2368 * Construct a v2 version string.
2370 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver
);
2374 * Construct a v1 version string.
2376 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2377 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2378 s
->version
: "1.5"),
2383 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring
);
2385 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2387 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2389 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
2390 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
,
2391 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"));
2392 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
,
2393 strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012"));
2396 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2398 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
2399 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2400 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
2403 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2405 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
2406 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2407 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
2409 logeventf(ssh
, "We claim version: %.*s",
2410 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"), verstring
);
2411 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
2413 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2414 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2417 logeventf(ssh
, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh
->version
);
2419 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
2420 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
2421 ssh
->pinger
= pinger_new(&ssh
->cfg
, &ssh_backend
, ssh
);
2428 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
,
2429 unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
2431 struct Packet
*pktin
= ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, data
, datalen
);
2433 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, pktin
);
2434 ssh_free_packet(pktin
);
2438 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
,
2439 unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
2441 bufchain_add(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, *data
, *datalen
);
2446 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
)
2449 unsigned char *data
;
2452 while (!ssh
->frozen
&& bufchain_size(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
)) {
2453 bufchain_prefix(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, &vdata
, &len
);
2457 while (!ssh
->frozen
&& len
> 0)
2458 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &len
);
2461 bufchain_consume(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, origlen
- len
);
2465 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh
, int frozen
)
2468 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, frozen
);
2469 ssh
->frozen
= frozen
;
2472 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
2474 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
2477 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2478 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2479 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2480 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2483 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2485 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
2486 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
2494 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2495 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2496 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2497 * to the proper protocol handler.
2501 while (bufchain_size(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
) > 0 || datalen
> 0) {
2503 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2504 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2505 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2506 * return, so break out. */
2508 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
) > 0) {
2509 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2511 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh
);
2513 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2515 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2517 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2518 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
2521 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2527 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
)
2530 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2532 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2533 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
2538 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2543 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2544 * through this connection.
2546 if (ssh
->channels
) {
2547 while (NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, 0))) {
2550 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
2553 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
2556 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2557 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2558 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
2563 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2564 * listening sockets.
2566 if (ssh
->portfwds
) {
2567 struct ssh_portfwd
*pf
;
2568 while (NULL
!= (pf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, 0))) {
2569 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2571 pfd_terminate(pf
->local
);
2572 del234(ssh
->portfwds
, pf
); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2580 static void ssh_log(Plug plug
, int type
, SockAddr addr
, int port
,
2581 const char *error_msg
, int error_code
)
2583 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2584 char addrbuf
[256], *msg
;
2586 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, lenof(addrbuf
));
2589 msg
= dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2591 msg
= dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf
, error_msg
);
2597 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, const char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2600 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2601 int need_notify
= ssh_do_close(ssh
, FALSE
);
2604 if (!ssh
->close_expected
)
2605 error_msg
= "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2607 error_msg
= "Server closed network connection";
2611 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2614 logevent(error_msg
);
2615 if (!ssh
->close_expected
|| !ssh
->clean_exit
)
2616 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", error_msg
);
2620 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2622 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2623 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2624 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2625 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
2631 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2633 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2635 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2636 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2638 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2639 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2643 * Connect to specified host and port.
2644 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2645 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2646 * freed by the caller.
2648 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2649 char **realhost
, int nodelay
, int keepalive
)
2651 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2662 ssh
->savedhost
= snewn(1 + strlen(host
), char);
2663 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2666 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2667 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2672 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host
,
2673 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
" (IPv4)" :
2674 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
" (IPv6)" : "")));
2675 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
,
2676 ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
);
2677 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
) {
2685 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2686 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2687 0, 1, nodelay
, keepalive
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2688 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2690 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2698 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2700 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2702 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2703 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2704 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2705 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2706 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
2707 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2708 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
2713 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2714 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2716 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2719 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2721 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2723 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2724 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2727 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2729 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2731 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2735 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2738 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2741 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, enable
);
2748 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2749 * reusable in several places - even between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2752 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2753 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2755 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2756 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2757 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2758 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2762 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2763 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2764 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2765 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2767 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2772 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2775 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2776 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2781 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2782 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2783 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2784 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2789 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2790 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2791 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2792 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2801 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2802 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2803 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2805 if ((!ssh
->userpass_input_echo
||
2806 (c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2807 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2808 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2809 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2810 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2811 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2819 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2821 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2823 ssh
->agent_response
= reply
;
2824 ssh
->agent_response_len
= replylen
;
2826 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2827 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2829 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2832 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv
, int ret
)
2834 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2836 ssh
->user_response
= ret
;
2838 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2839 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2841 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2844 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
2847 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh
);
2850 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2852 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)cv
;
2854 void *sentreply
= reply
;
2857 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2858 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
2861 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2862 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
2865 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
2866 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2869 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
2878 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
2879 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
2880 * => log `wire_reason'.
2882 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, char *client_reason
, char *wire_reason
,
2883 int code
, int clean_exit
)
2887 client_reason
= wire_reason
;
2889 error
= dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason
);
2891 error
= dupstr("Disconnected");
2893 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
2894 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
, PKT_STR
, wire_reason
,
2896 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2897 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
2898 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, code
);
2899 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, wire_reason
);
2900 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
2901 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
2904 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
2905 ssh
->clean_exit
= clean_exit
;
2906 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, error
, 0, 0);
2911 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2913 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
2914 struct Packet
*pktin
)
2917 unsigned char cookie
[8], *ptr
;
2918 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2919 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2920 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2922 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2923 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2924 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2925 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2926 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2929 void *publickey_blob
;
2930 int publickey_bloblen
;
2936 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2946 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2948 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2953 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2954 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2958 logevent("Received public keys");
2960 ptr
= ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin
, 8);
2962 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2965 memcpy(cookie
, ptr
, 8);
2967 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
) ||
2968 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
)) {
2969 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
2974 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2978 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2979 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2980 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2981 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2982 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2986 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2987 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2988 s
->supported_auths_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2990 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2991 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2992 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2995 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2996 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2997 MD5Update(&md5c
, cookie
, 8);
2998 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
3000 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
3001 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
3004 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3006 if (hostkey
.bits
> hostkey
.bytes
* 8 ||
3007 servkey
.bits
> servkey
.bytes
* 8) {
3008 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3012 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
3014 s
->rsabuf
= snewn(s
->len
, unsigned char);
3017 * Verify the host key.
3021 * First format the key into a string.
3023 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
3024 char fingerprint
[100];
3025 char *keystr
= snewn(len
, char);
3026 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
3027 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
3029 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
3030 s
->dlgret
= verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
3031 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
,
3032 "rsa", keystr
, fingerprint
,
3033 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
3035 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
3039 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3040 " for user host key response"));
3043 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3044 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
3046 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
3048 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
3049 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at host key verification",
3055 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3056 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
3058 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
3061 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
3062 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
3064 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
3066 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
3068 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
3071 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3075 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3078 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
3079 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
3081 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
3082 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
3083 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
3084 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3086 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
3087 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3088 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3090 switch (next_cipher
) {
3091 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
3092 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
3093 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
3094 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
3095 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
3096 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
3098 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
3102 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
3103 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
3104 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3105 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3107 /* shouldn't happen */
3108 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3112 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3114 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
3115 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "cipher", cipher_string
,
3116 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
3117 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
3121 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3122 " for user response"));
3125 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3126 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
3128 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
3129 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
3130 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
3137 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
3138 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
3139 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3141 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
3142 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3144 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
3145 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3149 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
3150 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
3151 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
3152 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
3153 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
3154 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
3156 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3160 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
3161 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
3163 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
3164 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
3165 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
3167 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
3168 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3170 if (servkey
.modulus
) {
3171 sfree(servkey
.modulus
);
3172 servkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
3174 if (servkey
.exponent
) {
3175 sfree(servkey
.exponent
);
3176 servkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
3178 if (hostkey
.modulus
) {
3179 sfree(hostkey
.modulus
);
3180 hostkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
3182 if (hostkey
.exponent
) {
3183 sfree(hostkey
.exponent
);
3184 hostkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
3188 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3189 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3193 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3197 if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
3198 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
3199 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
3200 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
3202 * get_line failed to get a username.
3205 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "No username provided", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
3209 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3210 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
3213 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
3215 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3216 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3220 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3223 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
3224 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
3227 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
3229 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
3230 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
3232 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
3233 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
3234 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
3235 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
3242 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
3243 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3244 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
3246 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
3248 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
3249 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
3250 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
3251 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
3252 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
))
3253 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3255 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3257 while (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3258 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
3260 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
3262 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3268 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3270 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3271 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
3272 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
3273 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
3274 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3278 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3279 " for agent response"));
3282 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3283 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3284 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3286 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
3287 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
3288 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
3289 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
3290 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3292 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
3293 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
3294 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
3295 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
3296 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
3297 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
3298 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
3299 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3304 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3305 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3306 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3311 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3312 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3317 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) < 4)
3319 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3321 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) <
3324 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
3325 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
3329 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3333 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3334 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3336 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3337 logevent("Key refused");
3340 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3341 if ((s
->challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3342 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3347 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
3350 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3351 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
3352 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
3353 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
3354 len
+= 16; /* session id */
3355 len
+= 4; /* response format */
3356 agentreq
= snewn(4 + len
, char);
3357 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
3359 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
3360 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
3362 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
3363 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
3364 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
3365 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3367 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
3368 if (!agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
,
3369 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3374 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3375 " while waiting for agent"
3379 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3380 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3381 retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3386 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
3387 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3388 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3389 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
3393 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3395 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3396 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
3397 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
3399 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
3401 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
3406 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3409 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3413 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3416 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
3417 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
3418 freebn(s
->challenge
);
3427 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
3428 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
3430 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3431 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
3432 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
3433 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
3434 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3435 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
3437 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
3438 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3439 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
3440 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3441 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
3447 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3449 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3452 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using TIS authentication.\r\n");
3453 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3454 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3455 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3456 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3457 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3458 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3459 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3460 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3461 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3462 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3465 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3466 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
3467 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
3468 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
3469 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3470 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
3472 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
3473 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3474 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3475 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
3481 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3483 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3486 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using CryptoCard authentication.\r\n");
3487 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3488 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3489 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3490 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3491 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3492 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3493 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3494 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3495 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3498 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3499 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3500 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
3502 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3503 char *comment
= NULL
;
3505 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3506 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3507 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3508 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3509 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
3510 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
3511 char *msg
= dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3512 key_type_to_str(type
));
3514 c_write_str(ssh
, msg
);
3515 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3517 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3520 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
3521 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3522 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3525 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
3530 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3531 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3535 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
3536 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
3538 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3539 * because one was supplied on the command line
3540 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3542 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, "Unable to authenticate", 0, FALSE
);
3546 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3547 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3548 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3549 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
3552 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
3554 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3555 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3559 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3563 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3565 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3568 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3571 const char *error
= NULL
;
3572 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
,
3575 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3576 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3577 c_write_str(ssh
, " (");
3578 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
3579 c_write_str(ssh
, ").\r\n");
3580 continue; /* go and try password */
3583 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3584 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
3585 continue; /* try again */
3590 * Send a public key attempt.
3592 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3593 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3596 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3597 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3598 continue; /* go and try password */
3600 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3601 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3607 unsigned char buffer
[32];
3608 Bignum challenge
, response
;
3610 if ((challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3611 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3614 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
3615 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
3617 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3618 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
3622 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
3623 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3624 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
3626 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3627 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
3634 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3635 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3636 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
3637 " our public key.\r\n");
3638 continue; /* go and try password */
3639 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3640 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3644 break; /* we're through! */
3646 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3648 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3649 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3650 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3651 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3652 * The others are all random data in
3653 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3654 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3655 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3657 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3658 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3659 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3660 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3663 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3664 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3666 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3667 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3668 * packets containing string lengths N through
3669 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3670 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3671 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3673 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3674 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3675 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3676 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3677 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3680 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3681 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3682 * For this server we are left with no defences
3683 * against password length sniffing.
3685 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
3687 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3688 * we can use the primary defence.
3690 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
3693 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
3695 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3698 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
3702 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
3704 randomstr
= snewn(top
+ 1, char);
3706 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
3708 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3709 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
,
3710 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3712 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
3714 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
3715 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
3717 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
3718 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
3719 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
3722 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3723 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
3726 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
3728 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3729 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3730 * can use the secondary defence.
3736 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3737 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3739 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
3740 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
3741 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3742 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
3747 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3748 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3749 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
,
3750 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3753 * The server has _both_
3754 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3755 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3756 * therefore nothing we can do.
3759 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3760 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3761 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3762 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_INT
, len
,
3763 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
,
3764 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3767 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3768 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3771 logevent("Sent password");
3772 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
3774 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3775 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3776 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
3777 logevent("Authentication refused");
3778 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3779 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin
->type
));
3784 logevent("Authentication successful");
3789 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
3793 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3796 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
3798 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3799 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3800 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3801 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3802 * open, we can close it then.
3805 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3806 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3809 struct Packet
*pktout
;
3810 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
3811 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
3812 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
3815 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3816 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
3818 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3819 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
3820 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3822 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3827 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
3831 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3834 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3835 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3836 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3838 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
,
3839 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3841 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3842 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3843 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3844 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3845 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3849 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3850 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3854 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3858 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3861 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3862 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3863 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3864 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3867 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3871 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3873 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
3877 assert(pktin
->type
== qh
->msg1
|| pktin
->type
== qh
->msg2
);
3880 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3881 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = NULL
;
3884 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3885 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = NULL
;
3889 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
3891 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg1
> 0) {
3892 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3893 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3895 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg2
> 0) {
3896 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3897 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3900 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
3901 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
] = NULL
;
3904 qh
->handler(ssh
, pktin
, qh
->ctx
);
3909 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh
, int msg1
, int msg2
,
3910 chandler_fn_t handler
, void *ctx
)
3912 struct queued_handler
*qh
;
3914 qh
= snew(struct queued_handler
);
3917 qh
->handler
= handler
;
3921 if (ssh
->qtail
== NULL
) {
3925 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3926 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3929 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3930 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3933 ssh
->qtail
->next
= qh
;
3938 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
)
3940 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
, *pf
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*)ctx
;
3942 if (pktin
->type
== (ssh
->version
== 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
:
3943 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
)) {
3944 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
3947 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
3950 rpf
= del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
);
3956 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh
, const Config
*cfg
)
3958 const char *portfwd_strptr
= cfg
->portfwd
;
3959 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3962 if (!ssh
->portfwds
) {
3963 ssh
->portfwds
= newtree234(ssh_portcmp
);
3966 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
3967 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
3968 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
3969 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
3972 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3974 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
3975 epf
->status
= DESTROY
;
3978 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
3979 char address_family
, type
;
3980 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3981 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3984 address_family
= 'A';
3986 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'A' ||
3987 *portfwd_strptr
== '4' ||
3988 *portfwd_strptr
== '6')
3989 address_family
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3990 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'L' ||
3991 *portfwd_strptr
== 'R' ||
3992 *portfwd_strptr
== 'D')
3993 type
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3998 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3999 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
4001 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4002 * source port number. This means that
4003 * everything we've seen until now is the
4004 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4005 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4010 if (ssh
->version
== 1 && type
== 'R') {
4011 logeventf(ssh
, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4012 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports
);
4014 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
4017 if (n
< lenof(sports
)-1) sports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4021 if (*portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
4024 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
4025 if (n
< lenof(host
)-1) host
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4028 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':')
4031 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
4032 if (n
< lenof(dports
)-1) dports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4036 dport
= atoi(dports
);
4040 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
4042 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4043 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
4047 while (*portfwd_strptr
) portfwd_strptr
++;
4051 portfwd_strptr
++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4053 sport
= atoi(sports
);
4057 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
4059 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
4060 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
4063 if (sport
&& dport
) {
4064 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4065 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
, *epfrec
;
4067 pfrec
= snew(struct ssh_portfwd
);
4069 pfrec
->saddr
= *saddr ?
dupstr(saddr
) : NULL
;
4070 pfrec
->sserv
= sserv ?
dupstr(sports
) : NULL
;
4071 pfrec
->sport
= sport
;
4072 pfrec
->daddr
= *host ?
dupstr(host
) : NULL
;
4073 pfrec
->dserv
= dserv ?
dupstr(dports
) : NULL
;
4074 pfrec
->dport
= dport
;
4075 pfrec
->local
= NULL
;
4076 pfrec
->remote
= NULL
;
4077 pfrec
->addressfamily
= (address_family
== '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4
:
4078 address_family
== '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6
:
4081 epfrec
= add234(ssh
->portfwds
, pfrec
);
4082 if (epfrec
!= pfrec
) {
4084 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4085 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4086 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4088 epfrec
->status
= KEEP
;
4089 free_portfwd(pfrec
);
4091 pfrec
->status
= CREATE
;
4097 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4100 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
4101 if (epf
->status
== DESTROY
) {
4104 message
= dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4105 epf
->type
== 'L' ?
"local" :
4106 epf
->type
== 'R' ?
"remote" : "dynamic",
4107 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
4108 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
4111 if (epf
->type
!= 'D') {
4112 char *msg2
= dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message
,
4113 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
4118 logeventf(ssh
, "Cancelling %s", message
);
4122 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
= epf
->remote
;
4123 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4126 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4129 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
4131 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4132 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4133 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4134 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4135 * so that any connections the server tries
4136 * to make on it are rejected.
4139 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
4140 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4141 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4143 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
4144 } else if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
) {
4145 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4146 * what was used to open the original connection,
4147 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4148 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
4150 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
4152 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
4153 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4156 del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, rpf
);
4158 } else if (epf
->local
) {
4159 pfd_terminate(epf
->local
);
4162 delpos234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
);
4164 i
--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4168 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4170 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
4171 if (epf
->status
== CREATE
) {
4172 char *sportdesc
, *dportdesc
;
4173 sportdesc
= dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4174 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
4175 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
4176 epf
->sserv ? epf
->sserv
: "",
4177 epf
->sserv ?
"(" : "",
4179 epf
->sserv ?
")" : "");
4180 if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
4183 dportdesc
= dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4185 epf
->dserv ? epf
->dserv
: "",
4186 epf
->dserv ?
"(" : "",
4188 epf
->dserv ?
")" : "");
4191 if (epf
->type
== 'L') {
4192 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
,
4193 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
4196 epf
->addressfamily
);
4198 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4199 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
4200 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
4201 sportdesc
, dportdesc
,
4202 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
4203 } else if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
4204 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1,
4205 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
4208 epf
->addressfamily
);
4210 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4211 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
4212 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
4214 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
4216 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
4219 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4221 if (!ssh
->rportfwds
) {
4222 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
4223 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
4225 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
4228 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
4229 strncpy(pf
->dhost
, epf
->daddr
, lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1);
4230 pf
->dhost
[lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1] = '\0';
4231 pf
->dport
= epf
->dport
;
4232 pf
->sport
= epf
->sport
;
4233 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
4234 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4235 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
4238 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %s"
4239 " forward to %s", sportdesc
, dportdesc
);
4241 pf
->sportdesc
= sportdesc
;
4246 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
4247 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
4248 PKT_INT
, epf
->sport
,
4249 PKT_STR
, epf
->daddr
,
4250 PKT_INT
, epf
->dport
,
4252 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
,
4254 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4256 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4257 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
4258 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "tcpip-forward");
4259 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 1);/* want reply */
4261 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
4262 } else if (cfg
->rport_acceptall
) {
4263 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
4265 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
4267 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
4268 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4270 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
,
4271 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
,
4272 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4281 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4284 int stringlen
, bufsize
;
4286 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &string
, &stringlen
);
4287 if (string
== NULL
) {
4288 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4292 bufsize
= from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
4294 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4295 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
4296 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4300 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4302 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4303 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4304 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4305 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4307 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4308 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4309 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
4310 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4311 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4312 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4314 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4317 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
4318 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
4319 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4321 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4322 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4325 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4326 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4327 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4328 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4330 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4331 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
4332 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4333 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4334 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4335 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4336 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4341 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4343 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4344 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4345 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4346 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4348 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4349 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
4350 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4351 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4353 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4355 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4356 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4357 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4359 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4360 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
4361 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4362 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4363 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4364 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
4369 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4371 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4372 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4373 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4374 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *pfp
;
4379 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4382 remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4383 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &host
, &hostsize
);
4384 port
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4386 if (hostsize
>= lenof(pf
.dhost
))
4387 hostsize
= lenof(pf
.dhost
)-1;
4388 memcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
, hostsize
);
4389 pf
.dhost
[hostsize
] = '\0';
4391 pfp
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
4394 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4396 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4397 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4399 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4401 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, pf
.dhost
, port
,
4402 c
, &ssh
->cfg
, pfp
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
4404 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
4406 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4407 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4409 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4410 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4411 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4413 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4414 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
4415 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4416 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4417 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4418 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4419 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4424 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4426 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4427 unsigned int localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4428 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4430 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4431 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4432 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
4433 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4434 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
4435 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4436 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4439 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
4441 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4442 * which we decided on before the server acked
4443 * the channel open. So now we know the
4444 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4446 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
4447 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4451 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4453 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4454 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4456 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4457 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4458 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4459 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4460 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4465 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4467 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4468 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4469 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4470 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4471 if (c
&& !c
->halfopen
) {
4474 (pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
4476 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
4477 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4478 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
4479 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
4482 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
4483 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4484 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
4485 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4489 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
4490 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
4491 send_packet(ssh
, pktin
->type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
4493 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
4496 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
4497 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4501 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4502 pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
4503 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
4508 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4510 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4511 int i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4514 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4516 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &p
, &len
);
4518 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4523 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, p
, len
);
4526 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, p
, len
);
4529 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4531 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
4532 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
4533 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4537 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4539 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
4541 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
4542 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
4544 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
4546 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
4548 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
4550 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4554 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4556 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
4559 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
4562 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
4563 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
4564 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
4565 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4568 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4571 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4572 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
4573 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4578 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4580 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4581 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh
->exitcode
);
4582 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
4584 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4585 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4586 * session which we might mistake for another
4587 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4588 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4590 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
4593 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4594 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
)
4596 struct Packet
*pktout
= (struct Packet
*)data
;
4598 unsigned int arg
= 0;
4599 while (strcmp(mode
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].mode
) != 0) i
++;
4600 if (i
== lenof(ssh_ttymodes
)) return;
4601 switch (ssh_ttymodes
[i
].type
) {
4603 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val
);
4606 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val
);
4609 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].opcode
);
4610 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, arg
);
4614 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
4615 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4617 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
);
4619 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
] =
4620 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
] =
4621 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data
;
4623 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
4624 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
4625 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
4626 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure
;
4627 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] =
4628 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
] =
4629 ssh1_msg_channel_close
;
4630 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = ssh1_msg_channel_data
;
4631 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status
;
4633 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
4634 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4635 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
4639 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4640 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4641 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4643 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4644 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4646 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4647 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4648 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open
;
4652 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
4653 char proto
[20], data
[64];
4654 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4655 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
4656 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
4657 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
4659 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
4660 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
4661 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
4662 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
4663 * cookie into the log.
4665 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
4666 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4668 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKTT_OTHER
,
4669 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
4672 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4674 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4679 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4680 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4681 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4683 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4684 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4686 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4687 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4688 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open
;
4692 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
4693 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
] = ssh1_msg_port_open
;
4695 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
4697 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4698 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4699 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4700 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
4701 /* Send the pty request. */
4702 pkt
= ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
4703 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
4704 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->term_height
);
4705 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->term_width
);
4706 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0); /* width in pixels */
4707 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0); /* height in pixels */
4708 parse_ttymodes(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.ttymodes
,
4709 ssh1_send_ttymode
, (void *)pkt
);
4710 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED
);
4711 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4712 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED
);
4713 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->ospeed
);
4714 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH_TTY_OP_END
);
4716 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
4720 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4721 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4722 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4724 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4725 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4726 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4728 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4729 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4731 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4734 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
4735 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
4739 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4740 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4741 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4743 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4744 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4746 logevent("Started compression");
4747 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
4748 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
4749 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4750 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
4751 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4755 * Start the shell or command.
4757 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
4758 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4759 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4762 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
4764 if (!cmd
) cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd
;
4766 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
4767 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
4768 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
4771 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
4773 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
4774 logevent("Started session");
4777 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
4778 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
4779 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
4780 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
4781 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
4784 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4786 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
4790 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4791 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4792 * attention to the unusual ones.
4797 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
4798 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4799 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4800 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4801 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4803 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
4808 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
4809 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
, PKTT_DATA
,
4810 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
,
4811 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4822 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
4824 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4829 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4830 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
4833 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4835 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4839 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4840 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen
, msg
));
4843 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4845 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4848 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
4853 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4855 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
4856 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = NULL
;
4859 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4861 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh1_msg_disconnect
;
4862 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
;
4863 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh1_msg_debug
;
4866 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4867 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4869 unsigned char *in
=(unsigned char*)vin
;
4870 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
4873 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
4874 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
4878 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
4879 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
))
4880 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
4885 do_ssh1_connection(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
4889 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4891 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4894 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4896 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4899 * Is it at the start of the string?
4901 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4902 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4903 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4904 /* either , or EOS follows */
4908 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4909 * If no comma found, terminate.
4911 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
4912 haylen
--, haystack
++;
4915 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
4920 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
4922 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4925 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4927 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4929 * Is it at the start of the string?
4931 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4932 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4933 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4934 /* either , or EOS follows */
4942 * SSH-2 key creation method.
4944 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
4945 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
4946 unsigned char *keyspace
)
4949 /* First 20 bytes. */
4951 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4953 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4954 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
4955 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
4956 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
4957 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4959 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4961 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4962 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
4963 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
4967 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
4969 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4970 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4972 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
4973 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
4974 int nbits
, pbits
, warn_kex
, warn_cscipher
, warn_sccipher
;
4975 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
4976 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
4977 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
4979 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
4980 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
4981 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
4982 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
4983 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
4984 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
4985 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
4986 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
4987 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
4988 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
4989 int n_preferred_kex
;
4990 const struct ssh_kex
*preferred_kex
[KEX_MAX
];
4991 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
4992 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
4993 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
4994 int got_session_id
, activated_authconn
;
4995 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5000 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
5002 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
5004 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
5005 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5006 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5008 s
->got_session_id
= s
->activated_authconn
= FALSE
;
5011 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5013 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
5014 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
5016 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
5019 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK
;
5021 int i
, j
, commalist_started
;
5024 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5026 s
->n_preferred_kex
= 0;
5027 for (i
= 0; i
< KEX_MAX
; i
++) {
5028 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_kexlist
[i
]) {
5030 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5031 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
;
5034 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5035 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14
;
5038 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5039 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1
;
5042 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5044 if (i
< KEX_MAX
- 1) {
5045 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] = NULL
;
5052 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5054 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
5055 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
5056 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
5057 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
5058 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
5061 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
5062 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
5066 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
5069 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
5071 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR
:
5072 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_arcfour
;
5075 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5077 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
5078 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
5085 * Set up preferred compression.
5087 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
5088 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
5090 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
5093 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5094 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5096 ssh
->queueing
= TRUE
;
5099 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5101 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= TRUE
;
5104 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5106 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
5107 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
5108 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5109 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5110 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5111 commalist_started
= 0;
5112 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
5113 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
5114 if (!k
) continue; /* warning flag */
5115 if (commalist_started
)
5116 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5117 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_kex
[i
]->name
);
5118 commalist_started
= 1;
5120 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5122 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
5123 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
5124 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
5125 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5127 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5128 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5129 commalist_started
= 0;
5130 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5131 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5132 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
5133 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5134 if (commalist_started
)
5135 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5136 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
5137 commalist_started
= 1;
5140 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5141 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5142 commalist_started
= 0;
5143 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5144 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5145 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
5146 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5147 if (commalist_started
)
5148 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5149 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
5150 commalist_started
= 1;
5153 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5154 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5155 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5156 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
5157 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
5158 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5160 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5161 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5162 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5163 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
5164 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
5165 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5167 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5168 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5169 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
5170 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
5171 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
5172 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
5173 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
5174 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5175 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
5178 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5179 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5180 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
5181 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
5182 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
5183 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
5184 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
5185 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5186 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
5189 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5190 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5191 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5192 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5193 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5194 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
5196 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0);
5199 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
5200 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5, s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
5202 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5206 if (pktin
->length
> 5)
5207 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, pktin
->data
+ 5, pktin
->length
- 5);
5210 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5214 char *str
, *preferred
;
5217 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
5218 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5222 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
5223 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
5224 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
5225 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5226 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5227 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5228 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5229 s
->warn_kex
= s
->warn_cscipher
= s
->warn_sccipher
= FALSE
;
5231 pktin
->savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5232 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
5235 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
5236 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
5240 if (!preferred
) preferred
= k
->name
;
5241 if (in_commasep_string(k
->name
, str
, len
))
5248 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5249 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5253 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5254 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5257 s
->guessok
= first_in_commasep_string(preferred
, str
, len
);
5258 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
5259 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
5260 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5261 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
5265 s
->guessok
= s
->guessok
&&
5266 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[0]->name
, str
, len
);
5267 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
5268 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5269 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5271 s
->warn_cscipher
= TRUE
;
5273 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5274 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5275 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5280 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
)
5283 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
5284 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5285 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5289 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
5290 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5291 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5293 s
->warn_sccipher
= TRUE
;
5295 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5296 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5297 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5302 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
)
5305 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
5306 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5307 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5311 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
5312 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5313 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5314 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5318 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
5319 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5320 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5321 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5325 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
5326 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5327 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5328 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5329 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5334 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
5335 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5336 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5337 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5338 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5343 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server language */
5344 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client language */
5345 s
->ignorepkt
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
) && !s
->guessok
;
5348 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5349 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "key-exchange algorithm",
5351 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5352 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5356 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5357 " waiting for user response"));
5360 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5361 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5363 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5364 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5365 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL
,
5371 if (s
->warn_cscipher
) {
5372 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5373 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
,
5374 "client-to-server cipher",
5375 s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
,
5376 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5377 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5381 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5382 " waiting for user response"));
5385 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5386 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5388 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5389 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5390 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
5396 if (s
->warn_sccipher
) {
5397 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5398 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
,
5399 "server-to-client cipher",
5400 s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
,
5401 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5402 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5406 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5407 " waiting for user response"));
5410 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5411 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5413 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5414 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5415 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
5421 if (s
->ignorepkt
) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5422 crWaitUntil(pktin
); /* Ignore packet */
5426 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
5427 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
5433 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5434 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5435 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
5437 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
5438 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
5443 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5444 * requesting a group.
5446 if (!ssh
->kex
->pdata
) {
5447 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5448 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
5450 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5453 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
5454 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
5455 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->pbits
);
5456 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5459 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
5460 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5463 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5464 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5465 if (!s
->p
|| !s
->g
) {
5466 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5469 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_gex(s
->p
, s
->g
);
5470 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
5471 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
5473 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
;
5474 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(ssh
->kex
);
5475 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
5476 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
5477 logeventf(ssh
, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5478 ssh
->kex
->groupname
);
5481 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
5483 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5485 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_CPU
); /* this can take a while */
5486 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
5487 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(s
->kex_init_value
);
5488 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s
->pktout
, s
->e
);
5489 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5491 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_WAITING
); /* wait for server */
5493 if (pktin
->type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
5494 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5497 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_CPU
); /* cogitate */
5498 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
5499 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5501 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5504 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
5506 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
5508 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5509 * involve user interaction. */
5510 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_NOT
);
5512 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5513 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5514 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
5515 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
5516 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
5518 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
5519 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
5520 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
5521 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
5523 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
5524 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
5527 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5528 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
5531 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5533 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
5534 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
5535 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5540 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5541 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5543 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
5544 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
5545 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5546 s
->dlgret
= verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
5547 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
,
5548 ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
, s
->keystr
,
5550 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5551 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5555 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
5556 " for user host key response"));
5559 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5560 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5562 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5563 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5564 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL
,
5568 if (!s
->got_session_id
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5569 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5570 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
5572 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
5574 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
5577 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5578 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5581 if (!s
->got_session_id
) {
5582 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
5583 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
5584 s
->got_session_id
= TRUE
;
5588 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5590 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
5591 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5592 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5595 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5596 * client-to-server session keys.
5598 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
5599 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
5600 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
5601 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
5603 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
5604 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
5605 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
5606 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
5608 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
5609 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
5610 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
5611 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
5614 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5615 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5618 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5619 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
5620 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5621 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
5622 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5623 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
5624 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5627 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5628 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
5629 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5630 ssh
->csmac
->text_name
);
5631 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
5632 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
5633 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
5636 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5637 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5639 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
5640 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh
);
5643 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5646 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
5647 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5650 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5653 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5654 * server-to-client session keys.
5656 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
5657 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
5658 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
5659 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
5661 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
5662 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
5663 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
5664 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
5666 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
5667 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
5668 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
5669 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
5672 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5673 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5676 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5677 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
5678 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5679 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
5680 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5681 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
5682 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5684 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
5685 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
5686 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
5687 ssh
->scmac
->text_name
);
5688 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
5689 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
5690 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
5693 * Free key exchange data.
5697 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5703 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
5704 * deferred rekey reason.
5706 if (ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
) {
5707 logevent(ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
);
5709 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
5710 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5714 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
5716 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
5717 ssh
->last_rekey
= GETTICKCOUNT();
5718 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0)
5719 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5723 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
5724 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
5725 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
5726 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
5727 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
5728 * it would only confuse the layer above.
5730 if (s
->activated_authconn
) {
5733 s
->activated_authconn
= TRUE
;
5736 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
5737 * function so that other things can run on top of the
5738 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
5741 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
5742 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
5743 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
5744 * giving the reason for the rekey.
5746 while (!((pktin
&& pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) ||
5747 (!pktin
&& inlen
== -1))) {
5752 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
5755 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
5756 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
5757 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
5758 * we process it anyway!)
5760 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_REKEY
)) {
5761 logeventf(ssh
, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
5763 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
5764 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
5765 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0;
5766 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0;
5767 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
5769 schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5772 goto wait_for_rekey
; /* this is utterly horrid */
5774 logeventf(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in
);
5777 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5783 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
5785 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
5788 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
5792 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
5794 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
5797 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5799 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
5802 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
5803 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
5804 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
5805 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
5806 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
5807 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
5808 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5809 dont_log_data(ssh
, pktout
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
5810 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
5811 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout
, data
, len
);
5812 end_log_omission(ssh
, pktout
);
5813 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5814 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
5815 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
5819 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
5822 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5825 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
5829 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
5830 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
5833 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5834 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5835 * notification since it will be polled */
5838 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5841 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
5842 * buffer management */
5845 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5852 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
5854 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
5859 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5860 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5861 * be sending any more data anyway.
5867 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
5868 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
5869 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
5871 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
5873 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
* 2) {
5874 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5876 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5877 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5878 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5879 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5880 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
5884 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5886 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5887 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5888 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5889 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
5890 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5891 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c
);
5895 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5899 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5900 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5901 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5903 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5904 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5905 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5906 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5907 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &data
, &length
);
5910 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5912 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5914 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
==
5915 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5919 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5922 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5925 while (length
> 0) {
5926 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5927 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5928 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5932 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5934 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5936 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5937 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
5939 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5941 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5943 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5945 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5949 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5951 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5954 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5957 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
5958 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
5959 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5960 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5967 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5968 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5970 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5971 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5975 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5977 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5978 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5980 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5982 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5984 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5986 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5987 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5989 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5991 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5993 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5994 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5999 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6001 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6002 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6003 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6005 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6006 if (!c
|| c
->halfopen
) {
6007 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
6008 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
6011 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6013 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
6014 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
6015 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
6018 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
6019 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6026 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
6027 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6031 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
6032 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
6033 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6034 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6036 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6037 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6041 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6042 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6043 * not running in -N mode.)
6045 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
&& count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
6047 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6048 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6049 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6050 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6051 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6052 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6053 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6054 * this is more polite than sending a
6055 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6057 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "All channels closed", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
6061 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6063 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6064 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6065 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6067 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6069 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6070 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
6071 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6072 c
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6073 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
6074 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
6075 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6076 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6078 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6081 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6082 * which we decided on before the server acked
6083 * the channel open. So now we know the
6084 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6086 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
6087 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6088 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6092 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6094 static const char *const reasons
[] = {
6095 "<unknown reason code>",
6096 "Administratively prohibited",
6098 "Unknown channel type",
6099 "Resource shortage",
6101 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6102 unsigned reason_code
;
6103 char *reason_string
;
6105 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6106 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6108 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6109 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
6110 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6112 reason_code
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6113 if (reason_code
>= lenof(reasons
))
6114 reason_code
= 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6115 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &reason_string
, &reason_length
);
6116 logeventf(ssh
, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6117 reasons
[reason_code
], reason_length
, reason_string
);
6119 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6121 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6125 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6129 int typelen
, want_reply
;
6130 int reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
; /* default */
6131 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6132 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6134 localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6135 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6136 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6139 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
6140 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
6142 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
6144 char *buf
= dupprintf("Received channel request for nonexistent"
6145 " channel %d", localid
);
6146 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, buf
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR
, FALSE
);
6152 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6153 * the request type string to see if it's something
6156 if (c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
6158 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6159 * the primary channel.
6161 if (typelen
== 11 &&
6162 !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11)) {
6164 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6165 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6167 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
6169 } else if (typelen
== 11 &&
6170 !memcmp(type
, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6172 int is_plausible
= TRUE
, is_int
= FALSE
;
6173 char *fmt_sig
= "", *fmt_msg
= "";
6175 int msglen
= 0, core
= FALSE
;
6176 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6177 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6178 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
6179 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6180 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6182 unsigned char *p
= pktin
->body
+
6184 long len
= pktin
->length
- pktin
->savedpos
;
6185 unsigned long num
= GET_32BIT(p
); /* what is it? */
6186 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6190 int maybe_int
= FALSE
, maybe_str
= FALSE
;
6191 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6194 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6195 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6196 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6197 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6201 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int
);
6202 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num
+1, maybe_str
);
6203 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6204 if (maybe_int
&& !maybe_str
)
6206 else if (!maybe_int
&& maybe_str
)
6209 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6210 is_plausible
= FALSE
;
6215 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6216 int signum
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6217 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" %d", signum
);
6219 /* As per the drafts. */
6222 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &sig
, &siglen
);
6223 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6224 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6226 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6230 core
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6231 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
6233 fmt_msg
= dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen
, msg
);
6235 /* ignore lang tag */
6236 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6237 logeventf(ssh
, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6238 fmt_sig
, core ?
" (core dumped)" : "",
6240 if (*fmt_sig
) sfree(fmt_sig
);
6241 if (*fmt_msg
) sfree(fmt_msg
);
6242 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
6247 * This is a channel request we don't know
6248 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6249 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6252 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
;
6255 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(reply
);
6256 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6257 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6261 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6264 int typelen
, want_reply
;
6265 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6267 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6268 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6271 * We currently don't support any global requests
6272 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6273 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6277 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
6278 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6282 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6290 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6291 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
6292 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6294 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6295 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
6298 remid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6299 winsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6300 pktsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6302 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
6305 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
6306 addrstr
= snewn(peeraddrlen
+1, char);
6307 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
6308 addrstr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
6309 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6311 logeventf(ssh
, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
6314 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
6315 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
6316 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
6317 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, peerport
,
6318 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
6319 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
6321 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
6326 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
6327 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
6328 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
6331 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
6332 pf
.sport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6333 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
6334 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6335 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
6336 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port %d open request "
6337 "from %s:%d", pf
.sport
, peeraddr
, peerport
);
6338 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
6339 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
6341 const char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
,
6345 realpf
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
6346 logeventf(ssh
, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
6347 "%s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
6349 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
6350 error
= "Port open failed";
6352 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
6353 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
6356 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
6357 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
6358 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
6359 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
6361 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
6362 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
6365 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
6368 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
6369 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
6371 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
6372 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6373 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
6374 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, error
);
6375 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6376 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6377 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected channel open: %s", error
);
6380 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6382 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6383 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
6384 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
6385 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6386 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6387 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
6388 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6389 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
6390 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
6391 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
6392 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6397 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
6399 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6401 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
6402 if (bufchain_size(&ssh
->banner
) <= 131072) {
6403 char *banner
= NULL
;
6405 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &banner
, &size
);
6407 bufchain_add(&ssh
->banner
, banner
, size
);
6411 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
6412 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
)
6414 struct Packet
*pktout
= (struct Packet
*)data
;
6416 unsigned int arg
= 0;
6417 while (strcmp(mode
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].mode
) != 0) i
++;
6418 if (i
== lenof(ssh_ttymodes
)) return;
6419 switch (ssh_ttymodes
[i
].type
) {
6421 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val
);
6424 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val
);
6427 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].opcode
);
6428 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, arg
);
6432 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
6434 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
6435 struct Packet
*pktin
)
6437 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
6439 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
6441 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
6445 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
6446 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
6447 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
6449 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
6450 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6452 int done_service_req
;
6453 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
6454 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
;
6455 int kbd_inter_running
, kbd_inter_refused
;
6457 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
6462 void *publickey_blob
;
6463 int publickey_bloblen
;
6464 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
6468 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
6469 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
6470 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
6471 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
6473 int num_env
, env_left
, env_ok
;
6474 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6476 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
6478 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
6480 s
->done_service_req
= FALSE
;
6481 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6482 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_userauth
) {
6484 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6486 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
6487 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-userauth");
6488 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6489 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6490 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
)
6491 s
->done_service_req
= TRUE
;
6493 if (!s
->done_service_req
) {
6495 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
6497 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
6498 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");
6499 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6500 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6501 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
6502 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
; /* no auth required */
6504 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
6510 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
6511 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
6512 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
6513 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
6514 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
6515 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
6517 * I think this best serves the needs of
6519 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
6520 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
6521 * type both correctly
6523 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
6524 * need to fall back to passwords
6526 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
6527 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
6528 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
6529 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
6530 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
6533 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
6534 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
6535 bufchain_init(&ssh
->banner
);
6536 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] =
6537 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner
;
6538 while (!s
->we_are_in
) {
6542 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6544 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
6545 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
6548 } else if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
6549 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
6550 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
6551 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
6553 * get_line failed to get a username.
6556 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "No username provided", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
6560 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6561 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
6563 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
6565 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
6566 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
6570 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6572 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
6575 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
6576 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
6577 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
6578 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
6579 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
6583 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
6586 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
6587 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
6588 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
6590 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6592 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6593 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6594 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
6595 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
6596 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6597 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
6599 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6601 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
6602 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
6603 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6604 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= FALSE
;
6605 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
6606 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
6608 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6609 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
6610 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
6611 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
6613 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
6614 &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
);
6617 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6618 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6619 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6621 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
6622 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6623 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
6625 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6628 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6632 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
6635 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6637 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
6638 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
6639 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
6643 int size
= bufchain_size(&ssh
->banner
);
6645 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
6646 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
6647 * a script, which means nobody will read the
6648 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
6649 * the banner will screw up processing on the
6650 * output of (say) plink.)
6652 if (size
&& (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
))) {
6653 char *banner
= snewn(size
, char);
6654 bufchain_fetch(&ssh
->banner
, banner
, size
);
6655 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
6658 bufchain_clear(&ssh
->banner
);
6660 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
6661 logevent("Access granted");
6662 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
6666 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
6667 pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
6669 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
6670 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
6671 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
6672 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
6673 * curr_prompt variable.
6677 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
) {
6678 /* FIXME: perhaps we should support this? */
6679 bombout(("PASSWD_CHANGEREQ not yet supported"));
6681 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6682 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
6690 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
6691 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
6692 * helpfully try next.
6694 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6697 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &methods
, &methlen
);
6698 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6699 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
)) {
6701 * We have received an unequivocal Access
6702 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
6705 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
6706 * it's not worth printing anything at all
6708 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
6709 * the message should be "Server refused our
6710 * key" (or no message at all if the key
6711 * came from Pageant)
6713 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
6714 * message really should be "Access denied".
6716 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
6717 * authentication, we should break out of this
6718 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
6719 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
6720 * username change attempts).
6722 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
6724 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
6725 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
6726 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
6727 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
6728 logevent("Server refused public key");
6729 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
6730 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
6732 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
6733 logevent("Access denied");
6734 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
&&
6735 ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6736 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
6737 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
6738 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6743 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
6744 logevent("Further authentication required");
6748 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
6750 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
6751 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
6752 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
6756 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6760 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
6761 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
6762 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
6763 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
6767 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
6768 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
6770 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
6775 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6776 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6778 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
6780 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6782 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6783 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
6784 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
6785 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
6786 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6790 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6791 " waiting for agent response"));
6794 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6795 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6796 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6798 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
6799 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
6800 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
6801 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
6802 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6804 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
6805 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
6808 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
6809 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6811 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
6812 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
6813 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
6814 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
6815 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
6816 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
6818 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
6820 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
6821 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
6822 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6824 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
6825 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
6826 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6827 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6828 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6829 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6830 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6831 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6832 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6833 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6834 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6835 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6837 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6838 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6839 logevent("Key refused");
6843 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6844 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
6846 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
6847 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
6851 * Server is willing to accept the key.
6852 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
6854 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6855 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6856 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6857 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6858 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
6859 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6860 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6861 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6862 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6864 s
->siglen
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
6865 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
6867 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
6868 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
6869 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
6870 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
6871 s
->agentreq
= snewn(4 + s
->len
, char);
6872 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
6873 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
6874 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
6875 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
6877 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6879 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
6881 /* Now the data to be signed... */
6882 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
6883 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
6886 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
6888 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
6889 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
6890 s
->q
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
6891 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
6893 if (!agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4,
6895 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6899 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6900 " while waiting for agent"
6904 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6905 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6906 s
->retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6911 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
6912 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6913 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
,
6914 s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
6916 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
6917 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6922 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6933 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
6934 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
6935 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
6936 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
6939 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6941 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6942 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6945 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6947 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6948 * willing to accept it.
6951 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
6956 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6957 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6958 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6959 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6960 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6961 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, algorithm
);
6962 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6963 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pub_blob
,
6965 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6966 logevent("Offered public key");
6968 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6969 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6971 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
6972 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6975 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6977 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6980 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
6981 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
6982 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6988 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6989 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6990 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
6991 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
6993 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
6997 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->kbd_inter_refused
&&
6998 !s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
6999 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7000 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7002 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
7003 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
7005 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7006 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7007 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7008 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
7009 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ""); /* lang */
7010 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "");
7011 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7013 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7014 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
7015 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
7017 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
7018 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
7019 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= TRUE
; /* don't try it again */
7023 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using keyboard-interactive authentication.\r\n");
7024 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
7028 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
7029 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7030 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7032 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
7033 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
7035 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
7037 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
7038 * Display header data, and start going through
7041 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
7042 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
7044 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &name
, &name_len
);
7045 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
7046 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
7048 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
7049 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7052 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
7053 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7055 s
->num_prompts
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7059 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
7060 * display one and get a response.
7062 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
7066 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
7067 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
7068 static const char trunc
[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
7069 static const int prlen
= sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) -
7071 if (prompt_len
> prlen
) {
7072 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prlen
);
7073 strcpy(s
->pwprompt
+ prlen
, trunc
);
7075 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prompt_len
);
7076 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
] = '\0';
7080 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
7082 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
7088 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
7089 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
7090 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
7091 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
7092 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
7099 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
7100 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
7102 * get_line failed to get a password (for
7103 * example because one was supplied on the
7104 * command line which has already failed to
7107 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, "Unable to authenticate",
7108 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER
,
7113 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
7114 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
7117 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
7118 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
7120 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
7121 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
7125 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7129 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
7131 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
7133 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
7134 const char *error
= NULL
;
7136 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
,
7138 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
7139 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
7140 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7141 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
7143 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key (");
7144 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
7145 c_write_str(ssh
, ")\r\n");
7146 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
7148 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
7149 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7150 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7151 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7152 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
7153 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7154 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
7156 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
7157 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
7161 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7162 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7163 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7165 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7166 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7167 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7168 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
7169 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
7170 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, key
->alg
->name
);
7171 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
7172 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7173 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
7176 * The data to be signed is:
7180 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7183 sigdata_len
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
7184 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
7186 sigdata
= snewn(sigdata_len
, unsigned char);
7188 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
7189 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
7192 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
7193 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
7194 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
7195 p
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
7196 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
7197 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
7198 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
7199 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
7200 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
7205 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7206 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
7207 key
->alg
->freekey(key
->data
);
7209 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
7211 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
7212 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
7215 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
7216 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
7217 * people who find out how long their password is!
7219 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7220 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
7221 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7222 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7223 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "password");
7224 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
7225 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7226 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
7227 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
7228 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7229 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7230 logevent("Sent password");
7231 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
7232 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
7233 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
7234 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
7235 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
7236 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->num_prompts
);
7238 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
7239 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7240 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
7241 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
7242 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7245 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
7246 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7249 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
7250 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
7251 * another packet. Then we go back round the
7252 * loop and will end up retrieving another
7253 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
7258 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7260 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
,
7261 "No supported authentication methods available",
7262 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE
,
7268 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7271 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
7274 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
7277 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
7278 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
7280 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] =
7281 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust
;
7282 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] =
7283 ssh2_msg_global_request
;
7286 * Create the main session channel.
7288 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
) {
7289 ssh
->mainchan
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
7290 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
7291 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
7292 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
7293 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "session");
7294 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
7295 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
7296 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
7297 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
7298 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7299 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7300 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
7301 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
7303 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
7305 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
7306 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
7309 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7310 ssh
->mainchan
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
7311 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
7312 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
7313 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7314 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7315 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
7316 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
7317 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
7318 logevent("Opened channel for session");
7320 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7323 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
7324 * general channel-based messages.
7326 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] =
7327 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] =
7328 ssh2_msg_channel_data
;
7329 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof
;
7330 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = ssh2_msg_channel_close
;
7331 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
7332 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
7333 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
7334 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure
;
7335 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] =
7336 ssh2_msg_channel_request
;
7337 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] =
7338 ssh2_msg_channel_open
;
7341 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
7343 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
7344 char proto
[20], data
[64];
7345 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
7346 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
7347 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
7348 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
7349 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7350 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7351 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "x11-req");
7352 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7353 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 0); /* many connections */
7354 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, proto
);
7356 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
7357 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
7358 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
7359 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
7360 * cookie into the log.
7362 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7363 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, data
);
7364 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7365 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
7366 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7368 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7370 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7371 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7372 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
7373 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7376 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
7378 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
7379 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
7384 * Enable port forwardings.
7386 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
7389 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
7391 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
7392 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
7393 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7394 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7395 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
7396 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7397 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7399 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7401 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7402 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7403 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
7404 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7407 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
7409 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
7410 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
7415 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
7417 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& !ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
7418 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
7419 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
7420 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
7421 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
7422 /* Build the pty request. */
7423 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7424 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
7425 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "pty-req");
7426 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7427 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
7428 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
7429 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
7430 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel width */
7431 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel height */
7432 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7433 parse_ttymodes(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.ttymodes
,
7434 ssh2_send_ttymode
, (void *)s
->pktout
);
7435 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED
);
7436 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7437 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED
);
7438 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ospeed
);
7439 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
7440 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7441 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
7443 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7445 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7446 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7447 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
7448 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7451 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
7452 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7454 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
7455 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7458 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7462 * Send environment variables.
7464 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
7465 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
7467 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& *ssh
->cfg
.environmt
) {
7468 char *e
= ssh
->cfg
.environmt
;
7469 char *var
, *varend
, *val
;
7475 while (*e
&& *e
!= '\t') e
++;
7477 if (*e
== '\t') e
++;
7482 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7483 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7484 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "env");
7485 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7486 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7487 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, var
, varend
-var
);
7488 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, val
);
7489 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7494 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent %d environment variables", s
->num_env
);
7497 s
->env_left
= s
->num_env
;
7499 while (s
->env_left
> 0) {
7500 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7502 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7503 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7504 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
7505 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7515 if (s
->env_ok
== s
->num_env
) {
7516 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
7517 } else if (s
->env_ok
== 0) {
7518 logevent("All environment variables refused");
7519 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
7521 logeventf(ssh
, "%d environment variables refused",
7522 s
->num_env
- s
->env_ok
);
7523 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
7528 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
7529 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
7532 if (ssh
->mainchan
) while (1) {
7536 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
7537 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
7538 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
7540 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
7541 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
7542 if (!cmd
) cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd
;
7545 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7546 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
7548 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "subsystem");
7549 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7550 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7552 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "exec");
7553 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7554 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7556 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "shell");
7557 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7559 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7561 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7563 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7564 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7565 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
7566 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7570 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
7571 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
7572 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
7573 * back to it before complaining.
7575 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
7576 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
7577 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
7580 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
7583 logevent("Started a shell/command");
7588 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
7589 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
7590 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
7591 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
7592 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
7598 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
7603 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
7607 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
7608 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
7609 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
7612 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
7614 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7616 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
7618 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
7623 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7625 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
7627 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++)
7628 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c
);
7636 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
7638 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7640 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
7642 int nowlen
, reason
, msglen
;
7644 reason
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7645 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7647 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
7648 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
7649 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
7651 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
7652 " type %d)", reason
);
7656 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
7657 &nowlen
, msglen
, msg
);
7659 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
7661 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
7662 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
7667 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7669 /* log the debug message */
7674 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
7675 always_display
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
7676 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7678 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
7681 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7683 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7684 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
7685 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, pktin
->sequence
);
7687 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7688 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7690 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7694 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
7696 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
7701 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7703 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
7704 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented
;
7707 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7708 * the coroutines will get it.
7710 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
] = NULL
;
7711 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7712 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
] = NULL
;
7713 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
] = NULL
;
7714 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
] = NULL
;
7715 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
] = NULL
;
7716 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7717 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7718 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7719 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
] = NULL
;
7720 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7721 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7722 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7723 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7724 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7725 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
] = NULL
;
7726 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7727 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7728 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
] = NULL
;
7729 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7730 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7731 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7732 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] = NULL
;
7733 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] = NULL
;
7734 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7735 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] = NULL
;
7736 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = NULL
;
7737 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] = NULL
;
7738 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = NULL
;
7739 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = NULL
;
7740 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7741 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7742 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7745 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7747 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh2_msg_disconnect
;
7748 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
; /* shared with SSH-1 */
7749 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh2_msg_debug
;
7752 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
)
7756 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7759 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0 &&
7760 now
- ssh
->next_rekey
>= 0) {
7761 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "timeout", -1, NULL
);
7765 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
7766 struct Packet
*pktin
)
7768 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
7769 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7773 ssh
->incoming_data_size
+= pktin
->encrypted_len
;
7774 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
7775 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
7776 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
7777 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data received", -1, NULL
);
7780 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
7781 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
7785 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
||
7786 (pktin
&& pktin
->type
>= 20 && pktin
->type
< 50)) {
7787 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
) &&
7788 !ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
7789 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
7791 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7793 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, 0, NULL
);
7796 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
7801 * Called to set up the connection.
7803 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7805 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
7807 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
,
7813 ssh
= snew(struct ssh_tag
);
7814 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7815 ssh
->version
= 0; /* when not ready yet */
7818 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7819 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7820 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
7821 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7822 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
7823 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7825 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7827 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7829 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7831 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7833 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
7834 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
7836 ssh
->close_expected
= FALSE
;
7837 ssh
->clean_exit
= FALSE
;
7838 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
7839 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
7840 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
7843 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
7844 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
7845 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
7846 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7848 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
7849 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
7850 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
7851 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7852 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7853 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
7854 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
7855 ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
= 0;
7856 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
7857 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
7858 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
7859 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
7860 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
7861 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
7862 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
7863 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7864 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
7865 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7867 ssh
->queuelen
= ssh
->queuesize
= 0;
7868 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
7869 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7870 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
7871 bufchain_init(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
);
7872 ssh
->frozen
= FALSE
;
7874 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
7877 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7878 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7881 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
7882 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
7883 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
7885 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7886 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7887 ssh
->portfwds
= NULL
;
7892 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
7893 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
7894 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7896 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
7898 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= FALSE
;
7902 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= ssh
->outgoing_data_size
=
7903 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0L;
7904 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_data
);
7905 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
7907 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
, keepalive
);
7916 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
7918 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7919 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7920 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
7922 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
7923 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
7924 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
7925 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
7926 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
7927 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
7928 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
7929 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
7930 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
7931 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
7932 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
) {
7934 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7936 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7938 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
) {
7940 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7942 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7945 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
7946 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
7948 while (ssh
->queuelen
-- > 0)
7949 ssh_free_packet(ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
]);
7952 while (ssh
->qhead
) {
7953 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
7954 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
7957 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7959 if (ssh
->channels
) {
7960 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
7963 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
7964 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
7967 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
7968 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
7973 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
7974 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7977 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
7978 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
7980 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
7981 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7983 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
7985 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
7986 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
7987 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
7988 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
7989 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
7990 if (ssh
->crcda_ctx
) {
7991 crcda_free_context(ssh
->crcda_ctx
);
7992 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7995 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
7996 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
7998 pinger_free(ssh
->pinger
);
7999 bufchain_clear(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
);
8006 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
8008 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
8010 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8011 char *rekeying
= NULL
, rekey_mandatory
= FALSE
;
8012 unsigned long old_max_data_size
;
8014 pinger_reconfig(ssh
->pinger
, &ssh
->cfg
, cfg
);
8016 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, cfg
);
8018 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
&&
8019 cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
8020 long new_next
= ssh
->last_rekey
+ cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
;
8021 long now
= GETTICKCOUNT();
8023 if (new_next
- now
< 0) {
8024 rekeying
= "timeout shortened";
8026 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(new_next
- now
, ssh2_timer
, ssh
);
8030 old_max_data_size
= ssh
->max_data_size
;
8031 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(cfg
->ssh_rekey_data
);
8032 if (old_max_data_size
!= ssh
->max_data_size
&&
8033 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0) {
8034 if (ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
||
8035 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
8036 rekeying
= "data limit lowered";
8039 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
!= cfg
->compression
) {
8040 rekeying
= "compression setting changed";
8041 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
8044 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
!= cfg
->ssh2_des_cbc
||
8045 memcmp(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
, cfg
->ssh_cipherlist
,
8046 sizeof(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
))) {
8047 rekeying
= "cipher settings changed";
8048 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
8051 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8054 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
) {
8055 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, rekeying
, -1, NULL
);
8056 } else if (rekey_mandatory
) {
8057 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= rekeying
;
8063 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
8065 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
8067 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8069 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
8072 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
8074 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
8078 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
8080 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
8082 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8085 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
8089 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
8090 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
8093 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
8094 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
8096 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8097 return override_value
;
8098 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
8099 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
8100 return override_value
;
8102 return (override_value
+
8103 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
8110 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
8112 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
8114 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8115 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8117 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
8118 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
8120 switch (ssh
->state
) {
8121 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
8122 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
8123 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
8124 break; /* do nothing */
8125 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
8126 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
8128 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
8129 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
8130 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8131 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
8132 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
8133 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
8134 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
8135 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8136 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8137 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8138 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "window-change");
8139 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8140 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
8141 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
8142 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8143 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8144 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8152 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
8155 static const struct telnet_special
*ssh_get_specials(void *handle
)
8157 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special
[] = {
8158 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
}
8160 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials
[] = {
8161 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
8162 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY
},
8164 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials
[] = {
8167 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
8168 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
8169 * required signals. */
8170 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT
},
8171 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM
},
8172 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL
},
8173 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT
},
8174 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP
},
8175 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU
},
8176 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT
}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM
},
8177 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE
}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL
},
8178 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE
}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV
},
8179 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1
}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2
},
8182 static const struct telnet_special specials_end
[] = {
8185 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
8186 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials
[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials
) +
8187 lenof(ssh2_session_specials
) +
8188 lenof(specials_end
)];
8189 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8191 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
8193 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
8194 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
8198 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8199 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
8200 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
8202 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
8203 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special
);
8204 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
8205 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials
);
8207 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials
);
8208 } /* else we're not ready yet */
8211 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end
);
8212 return ssh_specials
;
8220 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
8221 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
8224 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
8226 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8227 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8229 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
8230 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
8232 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
8233 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
8236 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
8239 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8240 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
8241 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8242 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
8243 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8244 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8245 ssh
->send_ok
= 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
8247 logevent("Sent EOF message");
8248 } else if (code
== TS_PING
|| code
== TS_NOP
) {
8249 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8250 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
8251 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8252 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
8253 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
8255 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
8256 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
8257 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
8259 } else if (code
== TS_REKEY
) {
8260 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->version
== 2) {
8261 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "at user request", -1, NULL
);
8263 } else if (code
== TS_BRK
) {
8264 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8265 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
8266 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8267 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
8268 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8269 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8270 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8271 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "break");
8272 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8273 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0); /* default break length */
8274 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8277 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
8278 char *signame
= NULL
;
8279 if (code
== TS_SIGABRT
) signame
= "ABRT";
8280 if (code
== TS_SIGALRM
) signame
= "ALRM";
8281 if (code
== TS_SIGFPE
) signame
= "FPE";
8282 if (code
== TS_SIGHUP
) signame
= "HUP";
8283 if (code
== TS_SIGILL
) signame
= "ILL";
8284 if (code
== TS_SIGINT
) signame
= "INT";
8285 if (code
== TS_SIGKILL
) signame
= "KILL";
8286 if (code
== TS_SIGPIPE
) signame
= "PIPE";
8287 if (code
== TS_SIGQUIT
) signame
= "QUIT";
8288 if (code
== TS_SIGSEGV
) signame
= "SEGV";
8289 if (code
== TS_SIGTERM
) signame
= "TERM";
8290 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR1
) signame
= "USR1";
8291 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR2
) signame
= "USR2";
8292 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
8293 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
8295 /* It's a signal. */
8296 if (ssh
->version
== 2 && ssh
->mainchan
) {
8297 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8298 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8299 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "signal");
8300 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8301 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, signame
);
8302 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8303 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame
);
8306 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
8311 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
8313 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8314 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
8315 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
8320 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
8322 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
8324 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
8325 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
8331 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
8332 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
8334 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
8336 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8337 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8338 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
8339 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
8340 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
8343 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
8344 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
8348 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
8350 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
8352 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8354 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
8356 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8357 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
8358 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
8361 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
8364 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
8365 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "direct-tcpip");
8366 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
8367 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
8368 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
8369 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
8370 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, hostname
);
8371 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, port
);
8373 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
8374 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
8375 * convinced the server should be told details like that
8376 * about my local network configuration.
8378 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "client-side-connection");
8379 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8380 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8384 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
8386 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8390 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
8392 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8393 return ssh
->send_ok
;
8396 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
8398 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8399 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
8400 return ssh
->echoing
;
8401 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
8402 return ssh
->editing
;
8406 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
8408 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8412 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
8414 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8415 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
8418 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
8420 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8424 return (ssh
->exitcode
>= 0 ? ssh
->exitcode
: 0);
8428 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
8429 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
8431 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle
)
8433 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8434 return ssh
->version
;
8438 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
8439 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
8440 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
8442 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
8444 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8445 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
8448 Backend ssh_backend
= {
8458 ssh_return_exitcode
,