17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
114 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
130 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
132 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
149 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
154 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
157 * Various remote-bug flags.
159 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
160 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
161 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
162 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
163 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
164 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX 64
166 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
168 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
169 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
170 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
172 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
173 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
174 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
175 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
176 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
177 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
178 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
179 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
180 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
181 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
182 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
183 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
184 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
185 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
186 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
187 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
188 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
189 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
190 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
191 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
192 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
193 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
194 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
195 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
196 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
197 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
198 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
199 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
200 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
201 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
202 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
203 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
204 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
205 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
206 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
207 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
208 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
209 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
210 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
211 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
212 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
215 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
217 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
218 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
219 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
220 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
221 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
222 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
223 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
224 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
225 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
);
226 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
);
227 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
228 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
229 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
230 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
231 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
232 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
233 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
234 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
235 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
236 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
237 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
238 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
239 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
240 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
241 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
242 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
243 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
244 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
245 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
246 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
247 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
248 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
249 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
250 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
251 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
252 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
258 #define GET_32BIT(cp) \
259 (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
260 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
261 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
262 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
264 #define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) { \
265 (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24); \
266 (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16); \
267 (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8); \
268 (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value); }
270 enum { PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
};
272 /* Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code */
273 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
276 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = smalloc(sizeof(struct t)); \
278 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
279 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
280 #define crReturn(z) \
282 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
286 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
288 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
289 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
290 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
291 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
293 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
295 static void ssh2_pkt_init(Ssh
, int pkt_type
);
296 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(Ssh
, unsigned char value
);
297 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(Ssh
, unsigned long value
);
298 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(Ssh
);
299 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(Ssh
, char *data
);
300 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(Ssh
, char *data
, int len
);
301 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(Ssh
, char *data
);
302 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
303 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(Ssh
, Bignum b
);
304 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
);
305 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
);
308 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
309 * various different purposes:
311 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
312 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
313 * connection (in SSH1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
314 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
317 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
318 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
319 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
320 * thankfully unlikely in SSH2 since the window mechanism should
321 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
322 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
324 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH2
328 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
329 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
330 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
332 const static struct ssh_kex
*kex_algs
[] = {
333 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
,
337 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
339 static void *nullmac_make_context(void)
343 static void nullmac_free_context(void *handle
)
346 static void nullmac_key(void *handle
, unsigned char *key
)
349 static void nullmac_generate(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
353 static int nullmac_verify(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
358 const static struct ssh_mac ssh_mac_none
= {
359 nullmac_make_context
, nullmac_free_context
, nullmac_key
,
360 nullmac_generate
, nullmac_verify
, "none", 0
362 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
363 &ssh_sha1
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
365 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
366 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
369 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
373 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
376 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
377 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
381 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
385 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
387 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
388 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
389 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
391 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
392 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
393 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
396 enum { /* channel types */
401 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
405 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
408 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
409 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
412 * In SSH1, this value contains four bits:
414 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
415 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
416 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
417 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
419 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
423 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
426 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
428 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
433 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
434 unsigned char *message
;
435 unsigned char msglen
[4];
436 int lensofar
, totallen
;
438 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
441 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
448 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH 1 and SSH
449 * 2 use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH 2's
450 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
452 * In SSH 1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
453 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
454 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
455 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
456 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
457 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
458 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
459 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
460 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
461 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
462 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
464 * In SSH 2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
465 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
466 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
467 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
468 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
469 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
471 * Hence: in SSH 1 this structure stores host:port pairs we intend
472 * to allow connections to, and is indexed by those host:port
473 * pairs. In SSH 2 it stores a mapping from source port to
474 * destination host:port pair, and is indexed by source port.
476 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
477 unsigned sport
, dport
;
490 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
491 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
492 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
493 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
494 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
495 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
496 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
497 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
498 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
500 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
501 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
502 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
508 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
509 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
512 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
516 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
517 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
519 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
526 unsigned char session_key
[32];
528 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
529 int v1_local_protoflags
;
530 int agentfwd_enabled
;
533 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
536 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
537 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
538 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
539 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
540 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
541 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
542 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
543 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
544 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
550 int echoing
, editing
;
554 int term_width
, term_height
;
556 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
557 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
564 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
570 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
573 struct Packet pktout
;
574 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
575 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
578 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
579 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
580 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
586 * Used for username and password input.
588 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
589 int userpass_input_buflen
;
590 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
591 int userpass_input_echo
;
593 char *portfwd_strptr
;
599 int v1_throttle_count
;
602 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
603 int v2_outgoing_sequence
;
605 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
606 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
607 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
608 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
609 int ssh1_protocol_crstate
;
610 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
611 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
612 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
614 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
615 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
616 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
617 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
619 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
620 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
622 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
623 int (*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
626 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
627 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
628 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
629 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
634 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
636 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
637 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, char *fmt
, ...)
643 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
649 #define bombout(msg) ( ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED, \
650 (ssh->s ? sk_close(ssh->s), ssh->s = NULL : 0), \
651 logeventf msg, connection_fatal msg )
653 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
655 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
656 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
657 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
659 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
663 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
665 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
666 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
674 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
676 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
677 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
679 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
680 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
681 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
683 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
688 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
690 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
691 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
693 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
695 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
700 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
702 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
703 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
705 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
708 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
709 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
710 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
711 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
712 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
713 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
715 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
719 while (high
- low
> 1) {
720 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
721 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
722 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
723 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
725 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
728 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
729 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
732 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
733 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
735 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
738 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
740 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
742 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
744 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
747 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
750 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
753 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
755 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
756 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
757 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
761 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
763 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
767 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
768 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
769 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
770 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
771 * Return the additional nr of bytes needed, or 0 when
772 * a complete packet is available.
774 static int ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
776 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
778 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
783 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 0;
785 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
786 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
788 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
789 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
792 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
793 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
794 ssh
->pktin
.length
= st
->len
- 5;
796 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->biglen
) {
797 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
798 ssh
->pktin
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
);
801 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
802 st
->p
= ssh
->pktin
.data
;
803 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
804 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
805 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
806 crReturn(st
->to_read
);
807 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
808 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
809 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
811 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
813 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
816 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
,
818 bombout((ssh
,"Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
823 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
);
825 st
->realcrc
= crc32(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
826 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
827 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
828 bombout((ssh
,"Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
832 ssh
->pktin
.body
= ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
834 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
835 unsigned char *decompblk
;
837 zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
838 ssh
->pktin
.body
- 1, ssh
->pktin
.length
+ 1,
839 &decompblk
, &decomplen
);
841 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
842 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
843 ssh
->pktin
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
844 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
);
845 ssh
->pktin
.body
= ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
848 memcpy(ssh
->pktin
.body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
850 ssh
->pktin
.length
= decomplen
- 1;
853 ssh
->pktin
.type
= ssh
->pktin
.body
[-1];
856 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
857 PKT_INCOMING
, ssh
->pktin
.type
,
858 ssh1_pkt_type(ssh
->pktin
.type
),
859 ssh
->pktin
.body
, ssh
->pktin
.length
);
861 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
||
862 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
||
863 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
||
864 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
||
865 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
866 long stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
867 if (stringlen
+ 4 != ssh
->pktin
.length
) {
868 bombout((ssh
,"Received data packet with bogus string length"));
873 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
) {
874 /* log debug message */
876 int stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
877 strcpy(buf
, "Remote debug message: ");
880 memcpy(buf
+ 8, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, stringlen
);
881 buf
[8 + stringlen
] = '\0';
884 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
) {
889 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
) {
890 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
892 unsigned msglen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
894 strcpy(buf
, "Remote sent disconnect: ");
895 nowlen
= strlen(buf
);
896 if (msglen
> sizeof(buf
) - nowlen
- 1)
897 msglen
= sizeof(buf
) - nowlen
- 1;
898 memcpy(buf
+ nowlen
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, msglen
);
899 buf
[nowlen
+ msglen
] = '\0';
900 /* logevent(buf); (this is now done within the bombout macro) */
901 bombout((ssh
,"Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%s\"", buf
+nowlen
));
908 static int ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
910 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
912 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
916 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 0;
918 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
921 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
924 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->cipherblk
) {
925 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->cipherblk
;
926 ssh
->pktin
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
);
930 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
931 * contain the length and padding details.
933 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
934 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
935 crReturn(st
->cipherblk
- st
->i
);
936 ssh
->pktin
.data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
941 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
942 ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->cipherblk
);
945 * Now get the length and padding figures.
947 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
);
948 st
->pad
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[4];
951 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
952 * do us any more damage.
954 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->pad
< 0 || st
->len
+ st
->pad
< 0) {
955 bombout((ssh
,"Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
960 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
962 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
964 ssh
->pktin
.length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
967 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
969 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
970 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
973 * Adjust memory allocation if packet is too big.
975 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
) {
976 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
977 ssh
->pktin
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
978 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
);
982 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
984 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
986 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
987 crReturn(st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
- st
->i
);
988 ssh
->pktin
.data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
991 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
993 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
994 ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
995 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1001 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1002 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1003 bombout((ssh
,"Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1006 st
->incoming_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1009 * Decompress packet payload.
1012 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1015 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1016 ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktin
.length
- 5,
1017 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1018 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1019 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1020 ssh
->pktin
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
1021 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
);
1023 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 5 + newlen
;
1024 memcpy(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1029 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
= 6;
1030 ssh
->pktin
.type
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[5];
1033 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, ssh
->pktin
.type
,
1034 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.type
),
1035 ssh
->pktin
.data
+6, ssh
->pktin
.length
-6);
1037 switch (ssh
->pktin
.type
) {
1039 * These packets we must handle instantly.
1041 case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
:
1043 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
1046 int reason
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 6);
1047 unsigned msglen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 10);
1049 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
1050 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
1051 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
1053 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
1054 " type %d)", reason
);
1058 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
1059 &nowlen
, msglen
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 14);
1061 bombout((ssh
,"Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
1063 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
1064 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
1070 case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
:
1072 case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
:
1074 /* log the debug message */
1076 /* int display = ssh->pktin.body[6]; */
1077 int stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+7);
1079 strcpy(buf
, "Remote debug message: ");
1080 prefix
= strlen(buf
);
1081 if (stringlen
> (int)(sizeof(buf
)-prefix
-1))
1082 stringlen
= sizeof(buf
)-prefix
-1;
1083 memcpy(buf
+ prefix
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 11, stringlen
);
1084 buf
[prefix
+ stringlen
] = '\0';
1087 goto next_packet
; /* FIXME: print the debug message */
1090 * These packets we need do nothing about here.
1092 case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
:
1093 case SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
:
1094 case SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
:
1095 case SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
:
1096 case SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
:
1097 case SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
:
1098 case SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
:
1099 /* case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST: duplicate case value */
1100 /* case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP: duplicate case value */
1101 case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
:
1102 case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
:
1103 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
:
1104 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
:
1105 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
:
1106 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
:
1107 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
:
1108 /* case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ: duplicate case value */
1109 /* case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST: duplicate case value */
1110 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
:
1111 case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
:
1112 case SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
:
1113 case SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
:
1114 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
:
1115 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
:
1116 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
:
1117 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
:
1118 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
:
1119 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
:
1120 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
:
1121 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
:
1122 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
:
1123 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
:
1124 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
:
1128 * For anything else we send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
1131 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
1132 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, st
->incoming_sequence
- 1);
1140 static void ssh1_pktout_size(Ssh ssh
, int len
)
1144 len
+= 5; /* type and CRC */
1145 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1148 ssh
->pktout
.length
= len
- 5;
1149 if (ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
< biglen
) {
1150 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
= biglen
;
1152 /* Allocate enough buffer space for extra block
1153 * for MS CryptEncrypt() */
1154 ssh
->pktout
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktout
.data
, biglen
+ 12);
1156 ssh
->pktout
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktout
.data
, biglen
+ 4);
1159 ssh
->pktout
.body
= ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4 + pad
+ 1;
1162 static void s_wrpkt_start(Ssh ssh
, int type
, int len
)
1164 ssh1_pktout_size(ssh
, len
);
1165 ssh
->pktout
.type
= type
;
1168 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
)
1174 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1175 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1176 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1177 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1183 ssh
->pktout
.body
[-1] = ssh
->pktout
.type
;
1186 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, ssh
->pktout
.type
,
1187 ssh1_pkt_type(ssh
->pktout
.type
),
1188 ssh
->pktout
.body
, ssh
->pktout
.length
);
1190 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1191 unsigned char *compblk
;
1193 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1194 ssh
->pktout
.body
- 1, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ 1,
1195 &compblk
, &complen
);
1196 ssh1_pktout_size(ssh
, complen
- 1);
1197 memcpy(ssh
->pktout
.body
- 1, compblk
, complen
);
1201 len
= ssh
->pktout
.length
+ 5; /* type and CRC */
1202 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1205 for (i
= 0; i
< pad
; i
++)
1206 ssh
->pktout
.data
[i
+ 4] = random_byte();
1207 crc
= crc32(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4, biglen
- 4);
1208 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ biglen
, crc
);
1209 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1212 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4, biglen
);
1217 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
)
1220 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
);
1221 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1222 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1223 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1226 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
)
1229 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
);
1230 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1231 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1232 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= srealloc(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1233 ssh
->deferred_size
);
1235 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1236 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1240 * Construct a packet with the specified contents.
1242 static void construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, va_list ap1
, va_list ap2
)
1244 unsigned char *p
, *argp
, argchar
;
1245 unsigned long argint
;
1246 int pktlen
, argtype
, arglen
;
1250 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap1
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1253 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1257 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1261 (void) va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1262 arglen
= va_arg(ap1
, int);
1266 argp
= va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1267 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1268 pktlen
+= 4 + arglen
;
1271 bn
= va_arg(ap1
, Bignum
);
1272 pktlen
+= ssh1_bignum_length(bn
);
1279 s_wrpkt_start(ssh
, pkttype
, pktlen
);
1280 p
= ssh
->pktout
.body
;
1282 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap2
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1285 argint
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1286 PUT_32BIT(p
, argint
);
1290 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap2
, int);
1295 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1296 arglen
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1297 memcpy(p
, argp
, arglen
);
1301 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1302 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1303 PUT_32BIT(p
, arglen
);
1304 memcpy(p
+ 4, argp
, arglen
);
1308 bn
= va_arg(ap2
, Bignum
);
1309 p
+= ssh1_write_bignum(p
, bn
);
1315 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1318 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1319 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1320 construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1324 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1327 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1328 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1329 construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1333 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1336 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1338 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1339 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1341 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1346 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1347 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1349 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1354 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1355 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1358 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1360 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1361 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1362 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1363 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1366 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1368 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1369 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1370 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1374 * SSH2 packet construction functions.
1376 static void ssh2_pkt_ensure(Ssh ssh
, int length
)
1378 if (ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
< length
) {
1379 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1380 ssh
->pktout
.data
= srealloc(ssh
->pktout
.data
,
1381 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
);
1382 if (!ssh
->pktout
.data
)
1383 fatalbox("Out of memory");
1386 static void ssh2_pkt_adddata(Ssh ssh
, void *data
, int len
)
1388 ssh
->pktout
.length
+= len
;
1389 ssh2_pkt_ensure(ssh
, ssh
->pktout
.length
);
1390 memcpy(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.length
- len
, data
, len
);
1392 static void ssh2_pkt_addbyte(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char byte
)
1394 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, &byte
, 1);
1396 static void ssh2_pkt_init(Ssh ssh
, int pkt_type
)
1398 ssh
->pktout
.length
= 5;
1399 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(ssh
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1401 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char value
)
1403 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, &value
, 1);
1405 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(Ssh ssh
, unsigned long value
)
1408 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1409 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, x
, 4);
1411 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(Ssh ssh
)
1413 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
1414 ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
= ssh
->pktout
.length
;
1416 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(Ssh ssh
, char *data
)
1418 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, data
, strlen(data
));
1419 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
- 4,
1420 ssh
->pktout
.length
- ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
);
1422 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(Ssh ssh
, char *data
, int len
)
1424 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, data
, len
);
1425 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
- 4,
1426 ssh
->pktout
.length
- ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
);
1428 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(Ssh ssh
, char *data
)
1430 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1431 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, data
);
1433 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1436 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1439 fatalbox("out of memory");
1441 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1442 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1444 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1446 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1450 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(Ssh ssh
, Bignum b
)
1454 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1455 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1456 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)p
, len
);
1461 * Construct an SSH2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1462 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1463 * ssh->pktout.data. Total length is returned.
1465 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
)
1467 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1470 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, ssh
->pktout
.data
[5],
1471 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
[5]),
1472 ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 6, ssh
->pktout
.length
- 6);
1475 * Compress packet payload.
1478 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1481 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
1482 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5,
1483 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1484 ssh
->pktout
.length
= 5;
1485 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1491 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1492 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1494 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1495 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1498 (cipherblk
- (ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1499 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1500 ssh2_pkt_ensure(ssh
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1501 ssh
->pktout
.data
[4] = padding
;
1502 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1503 ssh
->pktout
.data
[ssh
->pktout
.length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1504 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
- 4);
1506 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
,
1507 ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
,
1508 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1509 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1512 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1513 ssh
->pktout
.data
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
);
1515 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at ssh->pktout.data. We return length. */
1516 return ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1520 * Construct and send an SSH2 packet immediately.
1522 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
)
1526 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
);
1527 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1528 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1529 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1533 * Construct an SSH2 packet and add it to a deferred data block.
1534 * Useful for sending multiple packets in a single sk_write() call,
1535 * to prevent a traffic-analysing listener from being able to work
1536 * out the length of any particular packet (such as the password
1539 * Note that because SSH2 sequence-numbers its packets, this can
1540 * NOT be used as an m4-style `defer' allowing packets to be
1541 * constructed in one order and sent in another.
1543 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
)
1545 int len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
);
1546 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1547 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1548 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= srealloc(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1549 ssh
->deferred_size
);
1551 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1552 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1556 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1557 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH1's defer_packet().
1559 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1562 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1564 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1565 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1566 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1567 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1568 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1572 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1576 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1577 debug(("%s", string
));
1578 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1579 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1585 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1589 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1590 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1595 * SSH2 packet decode functions.
1597 static unsigned long ssh2_pkt_getuint32(Ssh ssh
)
1599 unsigned long value
;
1600 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 4)
1601 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1602 value
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1603 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 4;
1606 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(Ssh ssh
)
1608 unsigned long value
;
1609 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 1)
1610 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1611 value
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
] != 0;
1612 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
++;
1615 static void ssh2_pkt_getstring(Ssh ssh
, char **p
, int *length
)
1620 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 4)
1622 len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1626 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 4;
1627 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< *length
)
1629 *p
= (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1630 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= *length
;
1632 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(Ssh ssh
)
1638 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &p
, &length
);
1642 bombout((ssh
,"internal error: Can't handle negative mpints"));
1645 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
1650 * Helper function to add an SSH2 signature blob to a packet.
1651 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
1652 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
1653 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
1654 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
1656 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
1657 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
1659 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
1660 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
1662 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
1663 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
1666 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
1667 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
1669 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
1670 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
1671 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
1674 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
1677 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1678 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
1679 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
1680 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
1681 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
1683 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
1686 * Now find the signature integer.
1688 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1689 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
1690 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
1692 if (len
!= siglen
) {
1693 unsigned char newlen
[4];
1694 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1695 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
1696 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
1697 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
1698 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
1699 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
1700 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
1702 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
1703 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
1704 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
1706 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
1707 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
1711 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
1714 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1715 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
1719 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
1720 * a list of known buggy implementations.
1722 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
1724 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
1726 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1728 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1731 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
1733 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
1734 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
1735 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
1736 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
1737 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1739 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
1740 * to use a different defence against password length
1743 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
1744 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH1 ignore bug");
1747 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
1748 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
1749 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1751 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
1752 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
1755 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
1756 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH1 password");
1759 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
1760 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
1761 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1763 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
1764 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
1765 * an AUTH_RSA message.
1767 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
1768 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle RSA authentication");
1771 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
1772 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
1773 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
1774 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
1775 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
1777 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
1779 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
1780 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 HMAC bug");
1783 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
1784 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
1785 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
1787 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
1788 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
1789 * generate the keys).
1791 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
1792 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 key-derivation bug");
1795 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
1796 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
1797 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
1798 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
1800 * These versions have the SSH2 RSA padding bug.
1802 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
1803 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 RSA padding bug");
1806 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
1807 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
1808 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
1810 * These versions have the SSH2 session-ID bug in
1811 * public-key authentication.
1813 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
1814 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 public-key-session-ID bug");
1817 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_dhgex2
== FORCE_ON
) {
1819 * User specified the SSH2 DH GEX bug.
1821 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
;
1822 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 DH group exchange bug");
1826 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
1828 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
1836 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
1838 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
1840 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
1843 static const int transS
[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
1844 static const int transH
[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
1845 static const int transminus
[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
1847 s
->i
= transS
[s
->i
];
1849 s
->i
= transH
[s
->i
];
1851 s
->i
= transminus
[s
->i
];
1856 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
1860 s
->vstring
= smalloc(s
->vstrsize
);
1861 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
1865 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
1866 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
1868 s
->vstring
= srealloc(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
);
1870 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
1873 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
1875 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
1876 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
1877 } else if (c
== '\012')
1881 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
1882 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
1884 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
1885 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\r\n")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
1888 vlog
= smalloc(20 + s
->vslen
);
1889 sprintf(vlog
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
1893 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
1896 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
1899 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
1900 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
1901 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
1902 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
1904 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
1905 bombout((ssh
,"SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
1908 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
1909 bombout((ssh
,"SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
1913 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
1917 char verstring
[80], vlog
[100];
1918 sprintf(verstring
, "SSH-2.0-%s", sshver
);
1919 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
1921 * Hash our version string and their version string.
1923 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1924 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
, strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\r\n"));
1925 sprintf(vlog
, "We claim version: %s", verstring
);
1927 strcat(verstring
, "\012");
1928 logevent("Using SSH protocol version 2");
1929 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1930 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
1932 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
1937 char verstring
[80], vlog
[100];
1938 sprintf(verstring
, "SSH-%s-%s",
1939 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ? s
->version
: "1.5"),
1941 sprintf(vlog
, "We claim version: %s", verstring
);
1943 strcat(verstring
, "\012");
1945 logevent("Using SSH protocol version 1");
1946 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1947 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
1949 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
1951 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
1958 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
1960 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
1963 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
1964 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
1965 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
1966 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
1969 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
1971 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
1972 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
1980 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
1981 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
1982 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
1983 * to the proper protocol handler.
1988 while (datalen
> 0) {
1989 if (ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
) == 0) {
1990 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
1993 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, 1);
1994 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2004 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2007 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2008 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2014 /* A socket error has occurred. */
2015 logevent(error_msg
);
2016 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, error_msg
);
2018 /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
2023 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2025 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2026 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2027 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2037 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2039 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2041 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2042 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2044 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2045 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2049 * Connect to specified host and port.
2050 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2051 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2052 * freed by the caller.
2054 static char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2055 char **realhost
, int nodelay
)
2057 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2067 ssh
->savedhost
= smalloc(1 + strlen(host
));
2068 if (!ssh
->savedhost
)
2069 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2070 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2073 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2074 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2079 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"", host
);
2080 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2081 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
)
2089 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, 100);
2090 logeventf(ssh
, "Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2092 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2093 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2094 0, 1, nodelay
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2095 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2104 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2106 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2108 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2109 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2110 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2111 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2112 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
2113 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2114 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
2119 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2120 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2122 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2125 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2127 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2129 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2130 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2133 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2135 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2137 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2141 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2144 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2147 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2154 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2155 * reusable in several places - even between SSH1 and SSH2.
2158 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2159 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2161 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2162 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2163 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2164 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2168 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2169 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2170 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2171 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2173 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2178 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2181 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2182 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2187 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2188 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2189 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2190 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2195 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2196 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2197 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2198 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2206 if (((c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2207 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2208 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2209 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2210 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2211 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2220 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2222 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
2225 unsigned char cookie
[8];
2226 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2227 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2228 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2230 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2231 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2232 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2233 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2234 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2237 void *publickey_blob
;
2238 int publickey_bloblen
;
2244 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2253 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2255 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2260 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2261 bombout((ssh
,"Public key packet not received"));
2265 logevent("Received public keys");
2267 memcpy(cookie
, ssh
->pktin
.body
, 8);
2269 i
= makekey(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
, 0);
2270 j
= makekey(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8 + i
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
, 0);
2273 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2277 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2278 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2279 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2280 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2281 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2285 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8 + i
+ j
);
2286 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 12 + i
+ j
);
2287 s
->supported_auths_mask
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 16 + i
+ j
);
2289 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2290 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2291 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2294 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2295 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2296 MD5Update(&md5c
, ssh
->pktin
.body
, 8);
2297 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
2299 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
2300 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
2302 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
2304 s
->rsabuf
= smalloc(s
->len
);
2306 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2309 * Verify the host key.
2313 * First format the key into a string.
2315 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
2316 char fingerprint
[100];
2317 char *keystr
= smalloc(len
);
2319 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2320 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
2321 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
2322 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
2323 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, "rsa", keystr
,
2328 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2329 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
2331 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
2334 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
2335 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
2336 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
2338 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
2339 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
2342 logevent("Encrypted session key");
2345 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
2346 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
2348 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
2349 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
2350 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
2351 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
2353 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
2354 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
2355 logevent("AES not supported in SSH1, skipping");
2357 switch (next_cipher
) {
2358 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
2359 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
2360 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
2361 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
2362 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
2363 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
2365 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
2369 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
2370 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
2371 bombout((ssh
,"Server violates SSH 1 protocol by not "
2372 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
2374 /* shouldn't happen */
2375 bombout((ssh
,"No supported ciphers found"));
2379 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
2381 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, cipher_string
, 0);
2384 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
2385 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
2386 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
2388 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
2389 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
2391 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
2392 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
2396 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
2397 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
2398 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
2399 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
2400 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
2401 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
2403 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
2407 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
2408 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
2410 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
2411 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
2412 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
2414 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
2415 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
2419 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2420 bombout((ssh
,"Encryption not successfully enabled"));
2424 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
2428 if ((flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
) && !*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
2429 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
2430 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
2431 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
2433 * get_line failed to get a username.
2436 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
2437 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2441 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
2442 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
2445 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
2447 crWaitUntil(!ispkt
);
2448 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2452 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2455 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
2456 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
2459 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
2461 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
2462 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
2464 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
2465 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
2466 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
2467 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
2474 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
2475 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
2476 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
2478 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
2480 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
2481 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
2482 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
2483 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
2484 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
))
2485 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2487 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2489 while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2490 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
2492 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
2494 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
2500 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
2502 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
2503 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
2504 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
2505 agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
);
2506 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
2507 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
2508 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
2509 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
2510 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2514 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
2517 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
2520 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
2523 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
2524 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
2525 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
2526 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
2527 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2530 s
->p
+= ssh1_read_bignum(s
->p
, &s
->key
.exponent
);
2531 s
->p
+= ssh1_read_bignum(s
->p
, &s
->key
.modulus
);
2532 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2534 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
2535 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
2536 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
2537 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
2539 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
2540 logevent("Key refused");
2543 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
2544 ssh1_read_bignum(ssh
->pktin
.body
, &s
->challenge
);
2546 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
2549 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
2550 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
2551 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
2552 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
2553 len
+= 16; /* session id */
2554 len
+= 4; /* response format */
2555 agentreq
= smalloc(4 + len
);
2556 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
2558 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
2559 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
2561 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
2562 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
2563 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
2564 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
2566 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
2567 agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
);
2571 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
2572 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
2573 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
2574 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
2578 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2580 ("Pageant's response accepted");
2581 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
2582 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
2584 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
2586 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
2591 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
2594 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
2598 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
2601 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
2602 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
2603 freebn(s
->challenge
);
2611 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
2612 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
2614 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
2615 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
2616 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
2617 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
2618 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
2619 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
2621 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
2622 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
2623 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
2624 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
2625 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
2628 int challengelen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
2629 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
2630 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
2631 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
2632 memcpy(s
->prompt
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, challengelen
);
2633 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
2634 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
2635 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
2636 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
2637 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
2638 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
2641 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
2642 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
2643 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
2644 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
2645 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
2646 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
2648 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
2649 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
2650 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
2651 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
2654 int challengelen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
2655 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
2656 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
2657 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
2658 memcpy(s
->prompt
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, challengelen
);
2659 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
2660 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
2661 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
2662 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
2663 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
2666 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
2667 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
2668 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
2670 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
2671 char *comment
= NULL
;
2674 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2675 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
2676 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
2677 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
2678 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
2679 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
2680 sprintf(msgbuf
, "Key is of wrong type (%s)",
2681 key_type_to_str(type
));
2683 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
2684 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2685 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2688 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
2689 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2690 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
2693 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
2698 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
2699 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
2703 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
2704 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
2706 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
2707 * because one was supplied on the command line
2708 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
2710 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
,
2711 PKT_STR
, "No more passwords available to try",
2713 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
2714 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "Unable to authenticate");
2715 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2719 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
2720 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
2721 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
2722 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
2725 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
2727 crWaitUntil(!ispkt
);
2728 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2732 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2736 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
2738 * Try public key authentication with the specified
2741 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2744 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
);
2746 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
2747 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
2748 c_write_str(ssh
, ".\r\n");
2749 continue; /* go and try password */
2752 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
2753 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
2754 continue; /* try again */
2759 * Send a public key attempt.
2761 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
2762 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
2765 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2766 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
2767 continue; /* go and try password */
2769 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
2770 bombout((ssh
,"Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
2776 unsigned char buffer
[32];
2777 Bignum challenge
, response
;
2779 ssh1_read_bignum(ssh
->pktin
.body
, &challenge
);
2780 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
2781 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
2783 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2784 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
2788 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
2789 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
2790 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
2792 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
2793 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
2800 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2801 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2802 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
2803 " our public key.\r\n");
2804 continue; /* go and try password */
2805 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2806 bombout((ssh
,"Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
2810 break; /* we're through! */
2812 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
2814 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
2815 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
2816 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
2817 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
2818 * The others are all random data in
2819 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
2820 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
2821 * hence can't deduce the password length.
2823 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
2824 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
2825 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
2826 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
2829 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
2830 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
2832 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
2833 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
2834 * packets containing string lengths N through
2835 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
2836 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
2837 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
2839 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
2840 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
2841 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
2842 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
2843 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
2846 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
2847 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
2848 * For this server we are left with no defences
2849 * against password length sniffing.
2851 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
2853 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
2854 * we can use the primary defence.
2856 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
2859 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
2861 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
2864 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
2868 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
2870 randomstr
= smalloc(top
+ 1);
2872 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
2874 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
2875 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKT_END
);
2877 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
2879 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
2880 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
2882 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
2883 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
2884 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
2887 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
2888 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
2890 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
2892 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
2893 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
2894 * can use the secondary defence.
2900 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
2901 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
2903 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
2904 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
2905 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
2906 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
2911 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
2912 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_INT
, len
,
2913 PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
, PKT_END
);
2916 * The server has _both_
2917 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
2918 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
2919 * therefore nothing we can do.
2922 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
2923 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
2924 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_INT
, len
,
2925 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
, PKT_END
);
2928 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKT_END
);
2931 logevent("Sent password");
2932 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
2934 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2935 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2936 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
2937 logevent("Authentication refused");
2938 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2939 bombout((ssh
,"Strange packet received, type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
2944 logevent("Authentication successful");
2949 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
2953 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
2955 * If the channel's remoteid is -1, we have sent
2956 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
2957 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
2958 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
2959 * open, we can close it then.
2961 if (((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
2962 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
2963 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2966 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
2967 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
2971 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
2972 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
2974 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
2975 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
2976 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
2978 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
2983 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
2987 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
2988 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
2989 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2990 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
, PKT_END
);
2992 * In SSH1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
2993 * connections are never individually throttled - because
2994 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
2995 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
2996 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3000 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3001 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3005 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3009 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3010 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3011 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3012 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3015 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3019 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
3021 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_protocol_crstate
);
3025 while (!do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
)) {
3028 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3031 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
3032 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
3033 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
3037 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3038 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3039 bombout((ssh
,"Protocol confusion"));
3041 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3042 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
3044 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
3045 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3049 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
3050 char proto
[20], data
[64];
3051 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
3052 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
3053 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
3054 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
3055 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
3056 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3057 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
,
3058 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
3061 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3062 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKT_END
);
3067 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3068 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3069 bombout((ssh
,"Protocol confusion"));
3071 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3072 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
3074 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
3075 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3082 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3083 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3085 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
3086 /* Add port forwardings. */
3087 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
3088 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3089 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3092 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3093 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
3095 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3096 * source port number. This means that
3097 * everything we've seen until now is the
3098 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
3099 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
3102 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3104 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
3107 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3110 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
3111 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3113 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
3114 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3117 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
3118 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3120 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3121 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3124 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3125 dport
= atoi(dports
);
3129 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
3131 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for"
3132 " destination port \"%s\"", dports
);
3135 sport
= atoi(sports
);
3139 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
3141 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
3142 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
3145 if (sport
&& dport
) {
3147 pfd_addforward(host
, dport
, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
3148 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3149 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
3150 " forwarding to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3151 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
3152 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
3153 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3154 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
3156 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
3157 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
3159 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
3160 pf
= smalloc(sizeof(*pf
));
3161 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
3165 "SSH1 cannot handle source address spec \"%s:%d\"; ignoring",
3168 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
3170 "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
3174 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
3175 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3176 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3177 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
3179 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
3180 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
3181 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
3189 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3190 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3191 bombout((ssh
,"Protocol confusion"));
3193 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3194 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused port"
3197 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
3204 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
3205 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
,
3206 PKT_STR
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
,
3207 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
3208 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
3209 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_CHAR
, 0, PKT_END
);
3210 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
3214 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3215 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3216 bombout((ssh
,"Protocol confusion"));
3218 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3219 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
3220 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
3222 logevent("Allocated pty");
3224 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
3227 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
3228 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
3232 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3233 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3234 bombout((ssh
,"Protocol confusion"));
3236 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3237 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
3239 logevent("Started compression");
3240 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
3241 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
3242 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
3243 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
3244 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
3248 * Start the shell or command.
3250 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH2
3251 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
3252 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
3255 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
3257 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
3258 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
3259 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
3262 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
3264 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
3265 logevent("Started session");
3268 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
3269 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
3270 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
3271 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
3272 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
3275 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
3277 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
3281 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
||
3282 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
) {
3283 long len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3285 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
,
3286 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
3287 (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.body
) + 4, len
);
3288 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3289 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
3290 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3292 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
) {
3293 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
3294 logevent("Received disconnect request");
3296 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
) {
3297 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3298 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
3299 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3301 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
3302 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
3303 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
3304 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3305 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3306 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
3308 c
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
3311 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
3312 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
3313 logevent("opening X11 forward connection failed");
3315 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3316 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
),
3320 ("opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
3321 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3322 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3324 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3325 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
3326 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3327 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3328 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3329 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3330 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
3333 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
) {
3334 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3335 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
3336 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3338 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
3339 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
3340 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3341 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3343 c
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
3345 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3346 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3348 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3349 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
3350 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3351 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3352 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3353 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
3356 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
) {
3357 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
3358 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
3359 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3360 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
;
3362 char host
[256], buf
[1024];
3364 c
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
3367 hostsize
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+4);
3368 for (h
= host
, p
= (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.body
+8);
3369 hostsize
!= 0; hostsize
--) {
3370 if (h
+1 < host
+sizeof(host
))
3375 port
= GET_32BIT(p
);
3377 strcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
);
3380 if (find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
3381 sprintf(buf
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
3384 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3385 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3387 sprintf(buf
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
3390 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, host
, port
, c
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3393 sprintf(buf
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
3396 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3397 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
),
3400 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3401 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3403 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3404 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
3405 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3406 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3407 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3408 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3409 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
3413 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
3414 unsigned int remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3415 unsigned int localid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+4);
3416 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3418 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3419 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3420 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
3421 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
3422 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3423 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3426 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
3428 * We have a pending close on this channel,
3429 * which we decided on before the server acked
3430 * the channel open. So now we know the
3431 * remoteid, we can close it again.
3433 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
3434 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3437 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
) {
3438 unsigned int remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3439 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3441 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3442 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3443 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
3444 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3445 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3449 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
||
3450 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
) {
3451 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
3452 unsigned i
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3453 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3454 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3455 if (c
&& ((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
3458 (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
3460 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
3461 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3462 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
3463 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
3466 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
3467 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3468 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
3469 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3473 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
3474 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
3475 send_packet(ssh
, ssh
->pktin
.type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3477 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
3480 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
3481 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3485 bombout((ssh
,"Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
3486 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
3487 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
3490 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
3491 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
3492 int i
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3493 int len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4);
3494 unsigned char *p
= ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8;
3495 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3496 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3501 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, (char *)p
, len
);
3504 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, (char *)p
, len
);
3507 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
3509 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
3510 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
3511 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3515 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3517 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
3519 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
3520 c
->u
.a
.message
= smalloc(c
->u
.a
.totallen
);
3521 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
3523 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
3525 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
3527 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3531 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3533 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
3534 void *reply
, *sentreply
;
3536 agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
3537 c
->u
.a
.totallen
, &reply
,
3542 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3543 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
3546 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3547 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3549 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
3553 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
3554 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3557 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
3560 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3561 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
3562 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3565 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3566 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
3567 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3568 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
3569 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
3570 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
) {
3572 ssh
->exitcode
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3573 sprintf(buf
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
3576 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
3578 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
3579 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
3580 * session which we might mistake for another
3581 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
3582 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
3584 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
3587 bombout((ssh
,"Strange packet received: type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
3592 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
3593 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
,
3594 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
, PKT_END
);
3605 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
3607 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
3610 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
3612 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
3615 * Is it at the start of the string?
3617 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
3618 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
3619 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
3620 /* either , or EOS follows */
3624 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
3625 * If no comma found, terminate.
3627 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
3628 haylen
--, haystack
++;
3631 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
3636 * SSH2 key creation method.
3638 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
3639 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
3640 unsigned char *keyspace
)
3643 /* First 20 bytes. */
3645 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
3647 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
3648 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
3649 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
3650 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
3651 /* Next 20 bytes. */
3653 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
3655 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
3656 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
3657 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
3661 * Handle the SSH2 transport layer.
3663 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
3665 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
3666 int nbits
, pbits
, warn
;
3667 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
3668 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
3669 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
3671 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
3672 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
3673 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
3674 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
3675 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
3676 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
3677 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
3678 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
3679 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
3680 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
3681 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
3682 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
3683 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
3686 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
3688 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
3690 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3691 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3692 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3700 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
3702 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
3703 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
3704 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
3705 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
3706 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
3709 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
3710 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
3714 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
3717 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
3720 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
3722 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
3723 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
3731 * Set up preferred compression.
3733 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
3734 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
3736 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
3739 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
3741 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
3742 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
3744 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
3748 int i
, j
, cipherstr_started
;
3751 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
3753 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
3754 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
3755 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(ssh
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
3756 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
3757 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3758 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(kex_algs
); i
++) {
3759 if (kex_algs
[i
] == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
&&
3760 (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
))
3762 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, kex_algs
[i
]->name
);
3763 if (i
< lenof(kex_algs
) - 1)
3764 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3766 /* List server host key algorithms. */
3767 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3768 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
3769 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
3770 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
3771 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3773 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
3774 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3775 cipherstr_started
= 0;
3776 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3777 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3778 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
3779 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3780 if (cipherstr_started
)
3781 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3782 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
3783 cipherstr_started
= 1;
3786 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
3787 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3788 cipherstr_started
= 0;
3789 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3790 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3791 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
3792 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3793 if (cipherstr_started
)
3794 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3795 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
3796 cipherstr_started
= 1;
3799 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
3800 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3801 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3802 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
3803 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
3804 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3806 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
3807 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3808 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3809 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
3810 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
3811 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3813 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
3814 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3815 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3816 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3817 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3818 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->name
);
3819 if (i
< lenof(compressions
))
3820 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3822 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
3823 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3824 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3825 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3826 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3827 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->name
);
3828 if (i
< lenof(compressions
))
3829 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3831 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
3832 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3833 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
3834 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3835 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
3836 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
);
3838 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
3841 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
3842 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
3848 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
> 5)
3849 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktin
.length
- 5);
3852 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
3859 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
3860 bombout((ssh
,"expected key exchange packet from server"));
3864 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
3865 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3866 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3867 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3868 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3869 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3870 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3871 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
3872 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
3873 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(kex_algs
); i
++) {
3874 if (kex_algs
[i
] == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
&&
3875 (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
))
3877 if (in_commasep_string(kex_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3878 ssh
->kex
= kex_algs
[i
];
3882 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
3883 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
3884 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3885 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
3889 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
3891 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3892 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3896 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3897 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3898 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
3903 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
3905 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
, 1);
3909 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
3910 bombout((ssh
,"Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
3911 str ? str
: "(null)"));
3915 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
3917 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3918 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3922 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3923 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3924 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
3929 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
3931 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
, 2);
3935 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
3936 bombout((ssh
,"Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
3937 str ? str
: "(null)"));
3941 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
3942 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3943 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3944 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
3948 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
3949 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3950 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3951 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
3955 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
3956 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3957 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3958 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3959 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
3964 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
3965 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3966 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3967 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3968 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
3976 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
3977 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
3983 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
3984 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
3985 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
3987 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
3988 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
3993 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
3994 * requesting a group.
3996 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
3997 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
3998 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
4000 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
4003 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
4004 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
4005 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, s
->pbits
);
4009 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
4010 bombout((ssh
,"expected key exchange group packet from server"));
4013 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4014 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4015 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(s
->p
, s
->g
);
4016 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
4017 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
4019 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
;
4020 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group1();
4021 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
4022 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
4025 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
4027 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
4029 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
4030 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, s
->kex_init_value
);
4031 ssh2_pkt_addmp(ssh
, s
->e
);
4035 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
4036 bombout((ssh
,"expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
4039 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
4040 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4041 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
4043 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
4045 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4046 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
4047 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
4048 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
4049 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
4051 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
4052 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
4053 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
4054 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
4056 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
4057 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
4060 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
4061 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
4064 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4066 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
4067 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
4068 bombout((ssh
,"Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
4073 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
4074 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
4076 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
4077 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
4078 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
4079 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
,
4080 s
->keystr
, s
->fingerprint
);
4081 if (s
->first_kex
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
4082 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
4083 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
4085 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
4087 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
4090 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
4092 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
4096 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
4099 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
4100 bombout((ssh
,"expected new-keys packet from server"));
4105 * Create and initialise session keys.
4107 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
4108 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
4109 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
4110 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
4112 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
4113 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
4114 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
4115 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
4117 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
4118 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
4119 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
4120 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
4122 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
4123 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
4124 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
4125 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
4127 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
4128 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
4129 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
4130 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
4132 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
4133 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
4134 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
4135 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
4138 * Set IVs after keys. Here we use the exchange hash from the
4139 * _first_ key exchange.
4142 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
4144 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
4145 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
4146 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
4147 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4148 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
4149 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4150 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
4151 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4152 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
4153 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4154 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
4155 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4156 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
4157 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4159 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
4160 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
4161 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
4162 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
4163 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
4164 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
4165 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
4166 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
4167 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
4168 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
4171 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
4172 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
4173 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
4174 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
4175 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
4176 * it would only confuse the layer above.
4178 if (!s
->first_kex
) {
4184 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
4185 * function so that other things can run on top of the
4186 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
4189 while (!(ispkt
&& ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
)) {
4192 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
4193 goto begin_key_exchange
;
4199 * Add data to an SSH2 channel output buffer.
4201 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
4204 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
4208 * Attempt to send data on an SSH2 channel.
4210 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
4214 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
4217 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
4218 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
4219 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
4220 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
4221 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
4222 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
4223 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
4224 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4225 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, data
, len
);
4227 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
4228 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
4232 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
4235 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
4239 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH2 channel.
4241 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
4246 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
4247 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
4248 * be sending any more data anyway.
4253 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
) {
4254 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
4255 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
4256 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
4258 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
4263 * Handle the SSH2 userauth and connection layers.
4265 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
4267 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
4269 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
4271 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
4275 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
4276 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
4277 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
4279 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
4280 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
4282 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
4283 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
, tried_keyb_inter
;
4284 int kbd_inter_running
;
4286 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
4291 void *publickey_blob
;
4292 int publickey_bloblen
;
4293 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
4297 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
4298 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
4299 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
4300 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
4303 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
4305 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
4308 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
4310 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
4311 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-userauth");
4313 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4314 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
4315 bombout((ssh
,"Server refused user authentication protocol"));
4320 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
4321 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
4322 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
4323 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
4324 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
4325 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
4327 * I think this best serves the needs of
4329 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
4330 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
4331 * type both correctly
4333 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
4334 * need to fall back to passwords
4336 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
4337 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
4338 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
4339 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
4340 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
4343 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
4344 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
4349 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
4351 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
4352 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
4355 } else if ((flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
) && !*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
4356 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
4357 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
4358 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
4360 * get_line failed to get a username.
4363 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
4364 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
4368 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
4369 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
4371 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
4373 crWaitUntilV(!ispkt
);
4374 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
4378 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4380 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
4383 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
4384 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
4385 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
4386 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
4387 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
4391 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
4394 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
4395 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
4396 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
4398 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4400 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4401 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4402 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
4403 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "none"); /* method */
4405 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
4407 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
4409 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
4410 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
4411 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= FALSE
;
4412 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
4413 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
4414 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
4416 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
4417 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
4418 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
4419 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
4421 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
4422 &s
->publickey_bloblen
);
4425 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
4426 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
4427 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
4429 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
4430 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
4431 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
4433 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
4436 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
4440 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
4443 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4444 while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
) {
4448 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
4449 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
4450 * a script, which means nobody will read the
4451 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
4452 * the banner will screw up processing on the
4453 * output of (say) plink.)
4455 if (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
4456 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &banner
, &size
);
4458 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
4460 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4462 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
4463 logevent("Access granted");
4464 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
4468 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
4469 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
4471 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
4472 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
4473 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
4474 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
4475 * curr_prompt variable.
4479 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
4480 bombout((ssh
,"Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
4488 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
4489 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
4490 * helpfully try next.
4492 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
4495 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &methods
, &methlen
);
4496 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
4497 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
)) {
4499 * We have received an unequivocal Access
4500 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
4503 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
4504 * it's not worth printing anything at all
4506 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
4507 * the message should be "Server refused our
4508 * key" (or no message at all if the key
4509 * came from Pageant)
4511 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
4512 * message really should be "Access denied".
4514 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
4515 * authentication, we should break out of this
4516 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
4519 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
4521 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
4522 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
4523 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
4524 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
4525 logevent("Server refused public key");
4526 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
4527 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
4529 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
4530 logevent("Access denied");
4531 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
) {
4532 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
4537 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
4538 logevent("Further authentication required");
4542 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
4544 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
4545 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
4546 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
4550 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4553 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
4554 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
4555 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
4556 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
4560 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
4561 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
4563 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
4568 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4569 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
4571 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
4573 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
4575 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
4576 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
4577 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
4578 agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
);
4579 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
4580 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
4581 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
4582 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
4583 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4587 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
4590 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
4595 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
4598 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4600 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
4601 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
4602 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
4603 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
4604 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
4605 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
4607 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
4609 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
4610 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
4611 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4613 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
4614 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
4615 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4616 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4617 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4618 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4619 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
4620 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4621 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
4622 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4623 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4626 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4627 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
4628 logevent("Key refused");
4632 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
4633 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
4635 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
4636 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
4640 * Server is willing to accept the key.
4641 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
4643 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4644 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4645 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4646 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4647 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, TRUE
);
4648 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4649 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
4650 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4651 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4653 s
->siglen
= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
4654 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
4656 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
4657 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
4658 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
4659 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
4660 s
->agentreq
= smalloc(4 + s
->len
);
4661 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
4662 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
4663 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
4664 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
4666 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4668 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
4670 /* Now the data to be signed... */
4671 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
4672 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
4675 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
4677 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
4678 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
4679 s
->q
+= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5;
4680 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
4682 agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4, &vret
, &s
->retlen
);
4686 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
4687 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
4688 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
4690 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
4696 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
4706 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
4707 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
4708 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
4709 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
4712 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
4714 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4715 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
4718 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
4720 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
4721 * willing to accept it.
4724 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
4728 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4729 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4730 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4731 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4732 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
4733 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, algorithm
);
4734 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4735 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)pub_blob
,
4738 logevent("Offered public key"); /* FIXME */
4740 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4741 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
4743 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
4744 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
4747 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
4749 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
4752 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
4753 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
4754 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
4760 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
4761 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
4762 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
4763 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
4767 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->tried_keyb_inter
) {
4768 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4769 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4770 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
4772 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4773 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
4775 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4776 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4777 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4778 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
4779 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, ""); /* lang */
4780 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "");
4783 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4784 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
4785 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
4787 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
4788 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
4792 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
4796 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
4797 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4798 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4799 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
4801 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4802 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
4804 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
4806 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
4807 * Display header data, and start going through
4810 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
4811 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
4813 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &name
, &name_len
);
4814 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
4815 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
4817 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
4818 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4821 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
4822 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4824 s
->num_prompts
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
4828 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
4829 * display one and get a response.
4831 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
4835 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
4836 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
4837 strncpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, sizeof(s
->pwprompt
));
4838 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
< sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) ?
4839 prompt_len
: sizeof(s
->pwprompt
)-1] = '\0';
4842 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
4844 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
4850 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
4851 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
4852 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4853 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
4854 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
4861 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
4862 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
4864 * get_line failed to get a password (for
4865 * example because one was supplied on the
4866 * command line which has already failed to
4869 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
4870 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
,SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
4871 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "No more passwords available"
4873 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
4875 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
4876 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
,
4877 "Unable to authenticate");
4878 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
4882 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
4883 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
4886 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
4887 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
4889 crWaitUntilV(!ispkt
);
4890 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
4894 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4898 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
4900 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
4902 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
4904 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
);
4905 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
4906 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
4907 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
4908 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
4910 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key\r\n");
4911 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
4913 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
4914 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4915 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4916 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4917 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "none"); /* method */
4919 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
4921 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
4922 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
4926 * We have loaded the private key and the server
4927 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
4928 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
4930 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4931 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4932 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4933 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4934 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, TRUE
);
4935 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, key
->alg
->name
);
4936 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
4937 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4938 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
4941 * The data to be signed is:
4945 * followed by everything so far placed in the
4948 sigdata_len
= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
4949 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
4951 sigdata
= smalloc(sigdata_len
);
4953 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
4954 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
4957 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
4958 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
4959 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
4960 p
+= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5;
4961 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
4962 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
4963 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
4964 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
4965 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
4971 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
4973 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
4975 * We send the password packet lumped tightly together with
4976 * an SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet. The IGNORE packet contains a
4977 * string long enough to make the total length of the two
4978 * packets constant. This should ensure that a passive
4979 * listener doing traffic analyis can't work out the length
4982 * For this to work, we need an assumption about the
4983 * maximum length of the password packet. I think 256 is
4984 * pretty conservative. Anyone using a password longer than
4985 * that probably doesn't have much to worry about from
4986 * people who find out how long their password is!
4988 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4989 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4990 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4991 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "password");
4992 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
);
4993 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->password
);
4994 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
4995 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
);
4997 * We'll include a string that's an exact multiple of the
4998 * cipher block size. If the cipher is NULL for some
4999 * reason, we don't do this trick at all because we gain
5002 if (ssh
->cscipher
) {
5005 stringlen
= (256 - ssh
->deferred_len
);
5006 stringlen
+= ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
- 1;
5007 stringlen
-= (stringlen
% ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
);
5010 * Temporarily disable actual compression,
5011 * so we can guarantee to get this string
5012 * exactly the length we want it. The
5013 * compression-disabling routine should
5014 * return an integer indicating how many
5015 * bytes we should adjust our string length
5019 ssh
->cscomp
->disable_compression(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
5021 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
5022 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
5023 for (i
= 0; i
< stringlen
; i
++) {
5024 char c
= (char) random_byte();
5025 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, &c
, 1);
5027 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
);
5029 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
5030 logevent("Sent password");
5031 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
5032 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
5033 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
5034 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
5035 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, s
->num_prompts
);
5037 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
5038 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->password
);
5039 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
5042 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
5046 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
5047 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
5048 * another packet. Then we go back round the
5049 * loop and will end up retrieving another
5050 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
5055 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
5057 c_write_str(ssh
, "No supported authentication methods"
5058 " left to try!\r\n");
5059 logevent("No supported authentications offered."
5061 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5062 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5063 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "No supported authentication"
5064 " methods available");
5065 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5067 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
5071 } while (!s
->we_are_in
);
5074 * Now we're authenticated for the connection protocol. The
5075 * connection protocol will automatically have started at this
5076 * point; there's no need to send SERVICE_REQUEST.
5080 * So now create a channel with a session in it.
5082 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
5083 ssh
->mainchan
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
5084 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
5085 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
5086 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
5087 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "session");
5088 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
5089 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
5090 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
5091 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
5093 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5094 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
5095 bombout((ssh
,"Server refused to open a session"));
5097 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
5099 if (ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
5100 bombout((ssh
,"Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
5103 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5104 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
5105 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
5106 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5107 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5108 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5109 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
5110 logevent("Opened channel for session");
5113 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
5115 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
5116 char proto
[20], data
[64];
5117 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5118 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
5119 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
5120 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
5121 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5122 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
5123 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "x11-req");
5124 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5125 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 0); /* many connections */
5126 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, proto
);
5127 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, data
);
5128 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
5132 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5133 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5134 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5135 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5136 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5138 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5139 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5141 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5143 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5144 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5145 bombout((ssh
,"Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
5146 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5149 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5151 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5152 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
5157 * Enable port forwardings.
5162 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
5163 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
5165 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
5166 /* Add port forwardings. */
5167 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
5168 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
5169 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5172 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
5173 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
5175 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
5176 * source port number. This means that
5177 * everything we've seen until now is the
5178 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
5179 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
5182 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5184 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
5187 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5190 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
5191 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5193 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
5194 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5197 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
5198 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5200 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
5201 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5204 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5205 dport
= atoi(dports
);
5209 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
5211 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
5212 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
5215 sport
= atoi(sports
);
5219 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
5221 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
5222 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
5225 if (sport
&& dport
) {
5227 pfd_addforward(host
, dport
, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
5228 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
5229 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
5230 " forwarding to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
5231 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
5232 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
5233 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
5234 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
5236 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
5237 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
5239 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
5240 pf
= smalloc(sizeof(*pf
));
5241 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
5244 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
5245 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding"
5246 " to %s:%d", host
, dport
);
5249 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port "
5250 "%.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
5251 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
5252 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0),
5254 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
5255 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
5256 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
5258 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
5259 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
5260 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
5261 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "tcpip-forward");
5262 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1);/* want reply */
5264 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, saddr
);
5265 if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
)
5266 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "0.0.0.0");
5268 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "127.0.0.1");
5269 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, sport
);
5273 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5274 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5275 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5276 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5277 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5279 continue;/* nonexistent channel */
5280 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5282 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5284 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
) {
5285 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
) {
5286 bombout((ssh
,"Unexpected response to port "
5287 "forwarding request: packet type %d",
5291 logevent("Server refused this port forwarding");
5293 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
5302 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
5304 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
5305 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
5306 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5307 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
5308 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
5309 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5313 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5314 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5315 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5316 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5317 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5319 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5320 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5322 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5324 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5325 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5326 bombout((ssh
,"Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
5327 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5330 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5332 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5333 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
5338 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
5340 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
5341 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5342 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
5343 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "pty-req");
5344 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5345 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
5346 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
);
5347 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_height
);
5348 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0); /* pixel width */
5349 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0); /* pixel height */
5350 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
5351 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END, no special options */
5353 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
5356 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5357 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5358 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5359 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5360 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5362 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5363 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5365 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5367 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5368 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5369 bombout((ssh
,"Unexpected response to pty request:"
5370 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5373 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5374 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
5376 logevent("Allocated pty");
5379 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
5383 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
5384 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
5391 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
5392 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
5393 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
5395 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
5396 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
5399 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5400 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
5402 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "subsystem");
5403 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5404 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, cmd
);
5406 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "exec");
5407 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5408 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, cmd
);
5410 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "shell");
5411 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5415 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5416 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5417 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5418 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5419 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5421 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5422 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5424 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5425 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5426 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5427 bombout((ssh
,"Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
5428 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5432 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
5433 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
5434 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
5435 * back to it before complaining.
5437 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
5438 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
5439 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
5442 bombout((ssh
,"Server refused to start a shell/command"));
5445 logevent("Started a shell/command");
5450 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
5451 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
5452 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
5453 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
5454 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
5460 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5464 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
5466 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
||
5467 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
5470 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5471 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5472 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5474 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5475 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5476 ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5477 continue; /* extended but not stderr */
5478 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &data
, &length
);
5481 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5483 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5485 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, ssh
->pktin
.type
==
5486 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5490 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5493 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5496 while (length
> 0) {
5497 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5498 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5499 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5503 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5505 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5507 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5508 c
->u
.a
.message
= smalloc(c
->u
.a
.totallen
);
5509 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5511 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5513 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5515 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5519 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5521 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5522 void *reply
, *sentreply
;
5524 agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5525 c
->u
.a
.totallen
, &reply
,
5530 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
5531 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
5534 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
5538 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5539 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5546 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5547 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5549 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5550 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5552 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
) {
5553 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5554 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5556 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5558 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5560 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5562 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5563 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5565 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5567 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5569 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5570 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5573 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
) {
5574 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5575 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5577 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5578 if (!c
|| ((int)c
->remoteid
) == -1) {
5579 bombout((ssh
,"Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
5580 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
5582 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
5584 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5585 break; /* nothing to see here, move along */
5587 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
5588 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5595 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
5596 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5600 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
5601 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5602 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5605 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5606 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5610 * See if that was the last channel left open.
5612 if (count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
5615 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
5616 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
5617 * SSH2 connection had to end with a disconnect
5618 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
5619 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
5620 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
5621 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
5622 * this is more polite than sending a
5623 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
5625 logevent("All channels closed. Disconnecting");
5626 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5627 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5628 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "All open channels closed");
5629 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5632 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
5635 continue; /* remote sends close; ignore (FIXME) */
5636 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5637 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5638 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5639 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5640 if (!c
|| c
->closes
)
5641 continue; /* nonexistent or closing channel */
5642 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5644 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
5645 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5646 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5647 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5649 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5650 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5651 continue; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
5652 c
->remoteid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5653 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5654 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5655 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5657 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5660 * We have a pending close on this channel,
5661 * which we decided on before the server acked
5662 * the channel open. So now we know the
5663 * remoteid, we can close it again.
5665 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5666 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5669 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
) {
5670 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5671 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5672 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5674 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5675 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5676 continue; /* dunno why they're failing this */
5678 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
5680 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5682 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5684 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
) {
5687 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5688 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5690 localid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5691 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5692 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
5695 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
5696 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
5698 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
5701 sprintf(buf
, "Received channel request for nonexistent"
5702 " channel %d", localid
);
5704 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5705 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5706 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, buf
);
5707 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5709 connection_fatal("%s", buf
);
5710 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
5715 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
5716 * the request type string to see if it's something
5719 if (typelen
== 11 && !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11) &&
5720 c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
5721 /* We recognise "exit-status" on the primary channel. */
5723 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5724 sprintf(buf
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
5728 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
5729 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5734 * This is a channel request we don't know
5735 * about, so we now either ignore the request
5736 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
5740 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
5741 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5745 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
) {
5747 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5749 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5750 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
5753 * We currently don't support any global requests
5754 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
5755 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
5759 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
5762 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
) {
5769 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5770 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
5771 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5772 c
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
5775 remid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5776 winsize
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5777 pktsize
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5778 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5779 port
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5781 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
5782 char *addrstr
= smalloc(peeraddrlen
+1);
5783 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
5784 peeraddr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
5786 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
5787 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
5788 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
5789 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, port
,
5790 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
5791 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
5797 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
5798 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
5799 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
5802 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
5803 pf
.sport
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5804 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
5805 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
5806 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
5808 char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, realpf
->dhost
,
5809 realpf
->dport
, c
, &ssh
->cfg
);
5810 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port open request"
5811 " for %s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
5813 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
5814 error
= "Port open failed";
5816 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
5817 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5820 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
5821 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 3)) {
5822 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
5823 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
5825 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
5826 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5829 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
5832 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
5834 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
5835 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5836 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
5837 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, error
);
5838 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5842 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
5844 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
5845 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
5846 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
5847 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5848 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5849 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
5850 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5851 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->localid
);
5852 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5853 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
5857 bombout((ssh
,"Strange packet received: type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5862 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
5864 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
5869 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5871 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
5873 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
5876 continue; /* don't send on closing channels */
5877 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
5880 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5881 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5882 * notification since it will be polled */
5885 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5888 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
5889 * buffer management */
5892 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5904 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
5906 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
5908 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
) == 0)
5910 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
);
5914 * Called to set up the connection.
5916 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
5918 static char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
5920 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
)
5925 ssh
= smalloc(sizeof(*ssh
));
5926 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
5929 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
5930 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
5931 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
5932 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
5933 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
5934 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
5936 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
5938 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
5940 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
5942 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
5944 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
5945 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
5947 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
5948 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
5949 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
5953 static const struct Packet empty
= { 0, 0, NULL
, NULL
, 0 };
5954 ssh
->pktin
= ssh
->pktout
= empty
;
5956 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
5957 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
5958 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
5959 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
5961 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
5962 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
5963 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
5964 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
5965 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
5966 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
5967 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
5968 ssh
->ssh1_protocol_crstate
= 0;
5969 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
5970 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
5971 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
5972 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
5973 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
5974 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
5975 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
5976 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
5977 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
5978 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
5980 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
5983 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
5984 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
5987 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
5988 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
5989 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
5991 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
5992 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
5997 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
5998 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
5999 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
6001 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
6003 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
);
6010 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
6012 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6013 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6014 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
6016 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
6017 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
6018 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
6019 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
6020 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
6021 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
6022 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
6023 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
6024 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
6025 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
6026 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
6027 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
6028 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
6029 ssh
->sccomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
6031 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
6032 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
6034 if (ssh
->channels
) {
6035 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
6038 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
6039 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6042 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
6043 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6048 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
6051 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
6052 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
6054 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
6056 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
6058 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
6059 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
6060 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
6061 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
6062 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
6070 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
6072 * Currently, this function does nothing very useful. In future,
6073 * however, we could do some handy things with it. For example, we
6074 * could make the port forwarding configurer active in the Change
6075 * Settings box, and this routine could close down existing
6076 * forwardings and open up new ones in response to changes.
6078 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
6080 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6081 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
6085 * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
6087 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
6089 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6091 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
6094 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
6096 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
6100 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
6102 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
6104 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6107 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
6111 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
6112 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
6115 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
6116 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
6118 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6119 return override_value
;
6120 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
6121 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
6122 return override_value
;
6124 return (override_value
+
6125 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
6132 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
6134 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
6136 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6138 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
6139 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
6141 switch (ssh
->state
) {
6142 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
6143 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
6144 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
6145 break; /* do nothing */
6146 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
6147 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
6149 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
6150 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
6151 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6152 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
6153 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
6154 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
6155 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
6157 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6158 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6159 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "window-change");
6160 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 0);
6161 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
);
6162 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_height
);
6163 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6164 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6173 * Send Telnet special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
6174 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
6177 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
6179 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6181 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
6182 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
6184 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
6185 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
6188 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
6191 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6192 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
6194 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
6195 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6198 logevent("Sent EOF message");
6199 } else if (code
== TS_PING
) {
6200 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
6201 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
6202 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6203 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
6204 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
6206 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
6207 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
6215 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
6217 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6218 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6219 c
= smalloc(sizeof(struct ssh_channel
));
6223 c
->remoteid
= -1; /* to be set when open confirmed */
6224 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6226 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
6228 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6229 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6235 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
6236 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
6238 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
6240 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6241 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6242 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
6243 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
6244 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
6247 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
6248 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
6252 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
6254 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
6257 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
6259 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6260 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
6261 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
6264 //PKT_STR, <org:orgport>,
6267 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
6268 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "direct-tcpip");
6269 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->localid
);
6270 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6271 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
6272 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
6273 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, hostname
);
6274 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, port
);
6276 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
6277 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
6278 * convinced the server should be told details like that
6279 * about my local network configuration.
6281 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "client-side-connection");
6282 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6288 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
6290 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6294 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
6296 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6297 return ssh
->send_ok
;
6300 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
6302 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6303 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
6304 return ssh
->echoing
;
6305 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
6306 return ssh
->editing
;
6310 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
6312 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6316 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
6318 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6319 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
6322 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
6324 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6325 return ssh
->exitcode
;
6329 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
6330 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
6331 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
6333 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
6335 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6336 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
6339 Backend ssh_backend
= {
6348 ssh_return_exitcode
,