Add an option to disable SSH-2 banners.
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgssc.h"
17 #include "sshgss.h"
18 #endif
19
20 #ifndef FALSE
21 #define FALSE 0
22 #endif
23 #ifndef TRUE
24 #define TRUE 1
25 #endif
26
27 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
28 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
38 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
40 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
41 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
43 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
51 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
53 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
55 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
56 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
59 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
60 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
62 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
63 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
65 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
66 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
67 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
68
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
74 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
75
76 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
77 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
78 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
79
80 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
124 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
125
126 /*
127 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
128 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
129 */
130 typedef enum {
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
134 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
135 } Pkt_KCtx;
136 typedef enum {
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
141 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
142 } Pkt_ACtx;
143
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
158 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
159
160 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
161 NULL,
162 "host not allowed to connect",
163 "protocol error",
164 "key exchange failed",
165 "host authentication failed",
166 "MAC error",
167 "compression error",
168 "service not available",
169 "protocol version not supported",
170 "host key not verifiable",
171 "connection lost",
172 "by application",
173 "too many connections",
174 "auth cancelled by user",
175 "no more auth methods available",
176 "illegal user name",
177 };
178
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
182 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
183
184 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
185
186 /*
187 * Various remote-bug flags.
188 */
189 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
190 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
191 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
192 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
193 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
194 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
195 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
196 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
197 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
198 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
199
200 /*
201 * Codes for terminal modes.
202 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
203 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
204 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
205 */
206 static const struct {
207 const char* const mode;
208 int opcode;
209 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
210 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
211 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
212 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
213 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
229 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
230 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
253 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
255 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
256 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
263 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
264 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
265 };
266
267 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
268 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
269 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
270 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
271 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
272 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
273 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
274
275 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
276 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
277 {
278 unsigned int ret;
279 if (*s) {
280 char *next = NULL;
281 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
282 if (!next) ret = s[0];
283 } else {
284 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
285 }
286 return ret;
287 }
288 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
289 {
290 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
291 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
292 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
293 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
294 return 1; /* true */
295 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
296 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
297 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
298 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
299 return 0; /* false */
300 else
301 return (atoi(s) != 0);
302 }
303
304 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
305 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
306 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
307 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
308 {
309 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
310 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
314 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
320 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
321 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
323 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
324 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
326 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
327 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
328 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
331 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
332 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
333 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
334 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
335 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
336 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
337 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
338 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
339 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
340 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
342 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
343 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
345 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
346 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
348 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
349 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
350 return "unknown";
351 }
352 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
353 {
354 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
360 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
366 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
367 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
368 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
375 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
376 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
377 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
379 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
380 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
381 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
383 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
384 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
385 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
397 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
398 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
399 return "unknown";
400 }
401 #undef translate
402 #undef translatec
403
404 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
405 enum {
406 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
407 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
408 * fields to the packet logging code. */
409 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
410 };
411
412 /*
413 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
414 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
415 * read
416 *
417 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
418 *
419 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
420 *
421 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
422 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
423 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
424 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
425 *
426 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
427 * - click Settings
428 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
429 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
430 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
431 */
432 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
433 #define crState(t) \
434 struct t *s; \
435 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
436 s = ssh->t;
437 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
438 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
439 #define crReturn(z) \
440 do {\
441 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
442 } while (0)
443 #define crReturnV \
444 do {\
445 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
446 } while (0)
447 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
448 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
449 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
450 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
451
452 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
453 struct Packet;
454
455 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
456 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
457 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
458 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
459 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
460 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
461 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
463 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
464 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
465 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
466 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
467 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
468 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
469 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
470 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
471 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
472 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
473 struct Packet *pktin);
474 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
475 struct Packet *pktin);
476
477 /*
478 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
479 * various different purposes:
480 *
481 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
482 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
483 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
484 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
485 * happen very often.
486 *
487 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
488 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
489 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
490 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
491 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
492 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
493 *
494 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
495 * channels.
496 *
497 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
498 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
499 *
500 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
501 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
502 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
503 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
504 * data message.
505 *
506 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
507 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
508 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
509 */
510
511 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
512 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
513 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
514 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
515 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
516 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
517
518 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
519 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
520
521 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
522
523 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
524 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
525 };
526 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
527 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
528 };
529
530 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
531 {
532 return NULL;
533 }
534 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
535 {
536 }
537 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
538 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
539 {
540 return 0;
541 }
542 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
543 {
544 return 0;
545 }
546 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
547 "none",
548 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
549 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
550 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
551 };
552 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
553 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
554 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
555 };
556
557 enum { /* channel types */
558 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
559 CHAN_X11,
560 CHAN_AGENT,
561 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
562 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
563 };
564
565 /*
566 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
567 */
568 struct winadj {
569 struct winadj *next;
570 unsigned size;
571 };
572
573 /*
574 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
575 */
576 struct ssh_channel {
577 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
578 unsigned remoteid, localid;
579 int type;
580 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
581 int halfopen;
582 /*
583 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
584 *
585 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
586 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
587 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
588 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
589 *
590 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
591 */
592 int closes;
593
594 /*
595 * This flag indicates that a close is pending on the outgoing
596 * side of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data
597 * for this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We
598 * can't actually close the channel until we've finished sending
599 * the data, so we set this flag instead to remind us to
600 * initiate the closing process once our buffer is clear.
601 */
602 int pending_close;
603
604 /*
605 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
606 * throttled.
607 */
608 int throttling_conn;
609 union {
610 struct ssh2_data_channel {
611 bufchain outbuffer;
612 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
613 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
614 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
615 /*
616 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
617 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
618 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
619 */
620 int remlocwin;
621 /*
622 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
623 * been acked.
624 */
625 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
626 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
627 } v2;
628 } v;
629 union {
630 struct ssh_agent_channel {
631 unsigned char *message;
632 unsigned char msglen[4];
633 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
634 } a;
635 struct ssh_x11_channel {
636 Socket s;
637 } x11;
638 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
639 Socket s;
640 } pfd;
641 } u;
642 };
643
644 /*
645 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
646 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
647 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
648 *
649 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
650 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
651 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
652 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
653 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
654 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
655 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
656 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
657 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
658 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
659 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
660 *
661 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
662 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
663 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
664 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
665 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
666 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
667 *
668 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
669 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
670 */
671 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
672
673 struct ssh_rportfwd {
674 unsigned sport, dport;
675 char dhost[256];
676 char *sportdesc;
677 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
678 };
679 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
680 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
681
682 /*
683 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
684 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
685 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
686 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
687 * it.
688 */
689 struct ssh_portfwd {
690 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
691 int type;
692 unsigned sport, dport;
693 char *saddr, *daddr;
694 char *sserv, *dserv;
695 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
696 int addressfamily;
697 void *local;
698 };
699 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
700 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
701 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
702
703 struct Packet {
704 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
705 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
706 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
707 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
708 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
709 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
710 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
711 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
712 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
713
714 /*
715 * State associated with packet logging
716 */
717 int logmode;
718 int nblanks;
719 struct logblank_t *blanks;
720 };
721
722 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
723 struct Packet *pktin);
724 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
725 struct Packet *pktin);
726 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
727 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
728 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
729 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
730 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
731 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
732 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
733 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
734 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
735 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
736 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
737 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
738 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
739 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
740 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
741 struct Packet *pktin);
742
743 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
744 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
745 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
746 unsigned char *p;
747 int i;
748 int chunk;
749 struct Packet *pktin;
750 };
751
752 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
753 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
754 int i;
755 int cipherblk;
756 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
757 struct Packet *pktin;
758 };
759
760 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
761 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
762
763 struct queued_handler;
764 struct queued_handler {
765 int msg1, msg2;
766 chandler_fn_t handler;
767 void *ctx;
768 struct queued_handler *next;
769 };
770
771 struct ssh_tag {
772 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
773 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
774
775 char *v_c, *v_s;
776 void *exhash;
777
778 Socket s;
779
780 void *ldisc;
781 void *logctx;
782
783 unsigned char session_key[32];
784 int v1_compressing;
785 int v1_remote_protoflags;
786 int v1_local_protoflags;
787 int agentfwd_enabled;
788 int X11_fwd_enabled;
789 int remote_bugs;
790 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
791 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
792 void *crcda_ctx;
793 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
794 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
795 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
796 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
797 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
798 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
799 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
800 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
801 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
802 int v2_session_id_len;
803 void *kex_ctx;
804
805 char *savedhost;
806 int savedport;
807 int send_ok;
808 int echoing, editing;
809
810 void *frontend;
811
812 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
813 int term_width, term_height;
814
815 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
816 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
817 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
818 int exitcode;
819 int close_expected;
820 int clean_exit;
821
822 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
823
824 enum {
825 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
826 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
827 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
828 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
829 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
830 } state;
831
832 int size_needed, eof_needed;
833
834 struct Packet **queue;
835 int queuelen, queuesize;
836 int queueing;
837 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
838 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
839
840 /*
841 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
842 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
843 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
844 * got.
845 */
846 int fallback_cmd;
847
848 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
849
850 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
851 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
852
853 struct X11Display *x11disp;
854
855 int version;
856 int conn_throttle_count;
857 int overall_bufsize;
858 int throttled_all;
859 int v1_stdout_throttling;
860 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
861
862 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
863 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
864 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
865 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
866 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
867 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
868 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
869 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
870
871 void *do_ssh_init_state;
872 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
873 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
874 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
875
876 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
877 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
878
879 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
880 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
881
882 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
883 struct Packet *pkt);
884 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
885
886 /*
887 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
888 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
889 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
890 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
891 */
892 Config cfg;
893
894 /*
895 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
896 */
897 void *agent_response;
898 int agent_response_len;
899 int user_response;
900
901 /*
902 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
903 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
904 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
905 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
906 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
907 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
908 * store that data.
909 */
910 int frozen;
911 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
912
913 /*
914 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
915 * with at any time.
916 */
917 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
918
919 /*
920 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
921 * indications from a request.
922 */
923 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
924
925 /*
926 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
927 */
928 Pinger pinger;
929
930 /*
931 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
932 * size-based rekeys.
933 */
934 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
935 unsigned long max_data_size;
936 int kex_in_progress;
937 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
938 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
939
940 /*
941 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
942 */
943 char *fullhostname;
944
945 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
946 /*
947 * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
948 */
949 struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
950 #endif
951 };
952
953 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
954
955 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
956 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
957 {
958 va_list ap;
959 char *buf;
960
961 va_start(ap, fmt);
962 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
963 va_end(ap);
964 logevent(buf);
965 sfree(buf);
966 }
967
968 #define bombout(msg) \
969 do { \
970 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
971 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
972 logevent(text); \
973 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
974 sfree(text); \
975 } while (0)
976
977 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
978
979 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
980 {
981 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
982 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
983 }
984
985 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
986 {
987 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
988 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
989 }
990
991 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
992 {
993 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
994 }
995
996 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
997 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
998 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
999 void *data)
1000 {
1001 while (*modes) {
1002 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
1003 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
1004 char *val;
1005 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
1006 m[t-modes] = '\0';
1007 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
1008 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
1009 else
1010 val = dupstr(t+2);
1011 if (val)
1012 do_mode(data, m, val);
1013 sfree(m);
1014 sfree(val);
1015 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
1016 }
1017 }
1018
1019 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1020 {
1021 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1022 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1023 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1024 return -1;
1025 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1026 return +1;
1027 return 0;
1028 }
1029 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1030 {
1031 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1032 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1033 if (*a < b->localid)
1034 return -1;
1035 if (*a > b->localid)
1036 return +1;
1037 return 0;
1038 }
1039
1040 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1041 {
1042 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1043 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1044 int i;
1045 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1046 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1047 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1048 return +1;
1049 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1050 return -1;
1051 return 0;
1052 }
1053
1054 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1055 {
1056 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1057 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1058
1059 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1060 return +1;
1061 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1062 return -1;
1063 return 0;
1064 }
1065
1066 /*
1067 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1068 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1069 */
1070 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1071 {
1072 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1073 return 0;
1074 if (a == NULL)
1075 return -1;
1076 if (b == NULL)
1077 return +1;
1078 return strcmp(a, b);
1079 }
1080
1081 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1082 {
1083 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1084 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1085 int i;
1086 if (a->type > b->type)
1087 return +1;
1088 if (a->type < b->type)
1089 return -1;
1090 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1091 return +1;
1092 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1093 return -1;
1094 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1095 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1096 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1097 return +1;
1098 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1099 return -1;
1100 if (a->type != 'D') {
1101 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1102 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1103 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1104 return +1;
1105 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1106 return -1;
1107 }
1108 return 0;
1109 }
1110
1111 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1112 {
1113 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1114 unsigned low, high, mid;
1115 int tsize;
1116 struct ssh_channel *c;
1117
1118 /*
1119 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1120 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1121 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1122 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1123 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1124 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1125 */
1126 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1127
1128 low = -1;
1129 high = tsize;
1130 while (high - low > 1) {
1131 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1132 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1133 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1134 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1135 else
1136 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1137 }
1138 /*
1139 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1140 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1141 */
1142 {
1143 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1144 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1145 }
1146 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1147 }
1148
1149 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1150 {
1151 int i;
1152 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1153 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1154 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1155 }
1156
1157 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1158 {
1159 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1160 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1161 else
1162 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1163 }
1164
1165 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1166 {
1167 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1168 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1169 else
1170 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1171 }
1172
1173 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1174 {
1175 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1176 }
1177
1178 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1179 {
1180 sfree(pkt->data);
1181 sfree(pkt);
1182 }
1183 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1184 {
1185 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1186
1187 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1188 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1189 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1190 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1191 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1192
1193 return pkt;
1194 }
1195
1196 /*
1197 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1198 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1199 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1200 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1201 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1202 */
1203 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1204 {
1205 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1206
1207 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1208
1209 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1210
1211 st->pktin->type = 0;
1212 st->pktin->length = 0;
1213
1214 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1215 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1216 crReturn(NULL);
1217 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1218 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1219 }
1220
1221 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1222 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1223 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1224
1225 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1226 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1227 " data stream corruption"));
1228 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1229 crStop(NULL);
1230 }
1231
1232 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1233 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1234
1235 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1236 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1237 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1238 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1239 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1240 crReturn(NULL);
1241 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1242 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1243 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1244 *data += st->chunk;
1245 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1246 st->p += st->chunk;
1247 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1248 }
1249
1250 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1251 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1252 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1253 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1254 crStop(NULL);
1255 }
1256
1257 if (ssh->cipher)
1258 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1259
1260 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1261 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1262 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1263 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1264 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1265 crStop(NULL);
1266 }
1267
1268 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1269 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1270
1271 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1272 unsigned char *decompblk;
1273 int decomplen;
1274 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1275 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1276 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1277 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1278 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1279 crStop(NULL);
1280 }
1281
1282 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1283 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1284 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1285 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1286 unsigned char);
1287 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1288 }
1289
1290 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1291 sfree(decompblk);
1292 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1293 }
1294
1295 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1296
1297 /*
1298 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1299 */
1300 if (ssh->logctx) {
1301 int nblanks = 0;
1302 struct logblank_t blank;
1303 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1304 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1305 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1306 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1307 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1308 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1309 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1310 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1311 }
1312 if (do_blank) {
1313 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1314 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1315 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1316 nblanks = 1;
1317 }
1318 }
1319 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1320 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1321 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1322 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1323 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1324 }
1325
1326 crFinish(st->pktin);
1327 }
1328
1329 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1330 {
1331 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1332
1333 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1334
1335 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1336
1337 st->pktin->type = 0;
1338 st->pktin->length = 0;
1339 if (ssh->sccipher)
1340 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1341 else
1342 st->cipherblk = 8;
1343 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1344 st->cipherblk = 8;
1345 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1346
1347 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1348 ssh->scmac) {
1349 /*
1350 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1351 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1352 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1353 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1354 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1355 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1356 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1357 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1358 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1359 * plausible.
1360 */
1361
1362 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1363 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1364 unsigned char);
1365
1366 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1367 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1368 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1369 crReturn(NULL);
1370 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1371 (*datalen)--;
1372 }
1373
1374 st->packetlen = 0;
1375 {
1376 unsigned char seq[4];
1377 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1378 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1379 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1380 }
1381
1382 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1383 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1384 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1385 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1386 crReturn(NULL);
1387 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1388 (*datalen)--;
1389 }
1390 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1391 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1392 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1393 st->cipherblk);
1394 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1395 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1396 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1397 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1398 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1399 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1400 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1401 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1402 break;
1403 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1404 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1405 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1406 crStop(NULL);
1407 }
1408 }
1409 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1410 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1411 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1412 unsigned char);
1413 } else {
1414 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1415
1416 /*
1417 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1418 * contain the length and padding details.
1419 */
1420 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1421 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1422 crReturn(NULL);
1423 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1424 (*datalen)--;
1425 }
1426
1427 if (ssh->sccipher)
1428 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1429 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1430
1431 /*
1432 * Now get the length figure.
1433 */
1434 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1435
1436 /*
1437 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1438 * do us any more damage.
1439 */
1440 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1441 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1442 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1443 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1444 crStop(NULL);
1445 }
1446
1447 /*
1448 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1449 */
1450 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1451
1452 /*
1453 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1454 */
1455 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1456 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1457 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1458 unsigned char);
1459
1460 /*
1461 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1462 */
1463 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1464 st->i++) {
1465 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1466 crReturn(NULL);
1467 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1468 (*datalen)--;
1469 }
1470 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1471 if (ssh->sccipher)
1472 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1473 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1474 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1475
1476 /*
1477 * Check the MAC.
1478 */
1479 if (ssh->scmac
1480 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1481 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1482 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1483 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1484 crStop(NULL);
1485 }
1486 }
1487 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1488 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1489 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1490 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1491 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1492 crStop(NULL);
1493 }
1494 /*
1495 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1496 */
1497 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1498
1499 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1500 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1501
1502 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1503
1504 /*
1505 * Decompress packet payload.
1506 */
1507 {
1508 unsigned char *newpayload;
1509 int newlen;
1510 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1511 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1512 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1513 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1514 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1515 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1516 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1517 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1518 unsigned char);
1519 }
1520 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1521 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1522 sfree(newpayload);
1523 }
1524 }
1525
1526 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1527 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1528 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1529
1530 /*
1531 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1532 */
1533 if (ssh->logctx) {
1534 int nblanks = 0;
1535 struct logblank_t blank;
1536 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1537 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1538 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1539 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1540 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1541 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1542 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1543 }
1544 if (do_blank) {
1545 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1546 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1547 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1548 nblanks = 1;
1549 }
1550 }
1551 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1552 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1553 st->pktin->type),
1554 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1555 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1556 }
1557
1558 crFinish(st->pktin);
1559 }
1560
1561 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1562 {
1563 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1564 unsigned long crc;
1565 #ifdef __SC__
1566 /*
1567 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1568 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1569 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1570 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1571 */
1572 volatile
1573 #endif
1574 int len;
1575
1576 if (ssh->logctx)
1577 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1578 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1579 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1580 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1581 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1582 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1583
1584 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1585 unsigned char *compblk;
1586 int complen;
1587 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1588 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1589 &compblk, &complen);
1590 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1591 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1592 sfree(compblk);
1593 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1594 }
1595
1596 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1597 pkt->length += 4;
1598 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1599 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1600 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1601 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1602
1603 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1604 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1605 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1606 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1607 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1608
1609 if (ssh->cipher)
1610 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1611 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1612
1613 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1614 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1615 }
1616
1617 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1618 {
1619 if (ssh->logctx)
1620 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1621 0, NULL, NULL);
1622 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1623 }
1624
1625 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1626 {
1627 int len, backlog, offset;
1628 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1629 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1630 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1631 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1632 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1633 }
1634
1635 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1636 {
1637 int len, offset;
1638 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1639 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1640 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1641 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1642 ssh->deferred_size,
1643 unsigned char);
1644 }
1645 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1646 pkt->data + offset, len);
1647 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1648 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1649 }
1650
1651 /*
1652 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1653 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1654 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1655 */
1656 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1657 {
1658 int argtype;
1659 Bignum bn;
1660 struct Packet *pkt;
1661
1662 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1663
1664 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1665 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1666 char *sargp;
1667 unsigned long argint;
1668 int arglen;
1669 switch (argtype) {
1670 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1671 case PKT_INT:
1672 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1673 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1674 break;
1675 case PKT_CHAR:
1676 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1677 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1678 break;
1679 case PKT_DATA:
1680 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1681 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1682 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1683 break;
1684 case PKT_STR:
1685 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1686 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1687 break;
1688 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1689 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1690 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1691 break;
1692 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1693 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1694 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1695 break;
1696 case PKTT_DATA:
1697 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1698 break;
1699 case PKTT_OTHER:
1700 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1701 break;
1702 }
1703 }
1704
1705 return pkt;
1706 }
1707
1708 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1709 {
1710 struct Packet *pkt;
1711 va_list ap;
1712 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1713 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1714 va_end(ap);
1715 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1716 }
1717
1718 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1719 {
1720 struct Packet *pkt;
1721 va_list ap;
1722 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1723 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1724 va_end(ap);
1725 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1726 }
1727
1728 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1729 {
1730 char *ae, *be;
1731 unsigned long av, bv;
1732
1733 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1734 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1735 if (av != bv)
1736 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1737 if (*ae == '.')
1738 ae++;
1739 if (*be == '.')
1740 be++;
1741 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1742 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1743 if (av != bv)
1744 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1745 return 0;
1746 }
1747
1748 /*
1749 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1750 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1751 */
1752 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1753 {
1754 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1755 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1756 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1757 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1758 }
1759
1760 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1761 {
1762 unsigned char intblk[4];
1763 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1764 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1765 }
1766
1767 /*
1768 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1769 */
1770 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1771 {
1772 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1773 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1774 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1775 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1776 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1777 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1778 }
1779 }
1780 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1781 {
1782 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1783 pkt->nblanks++;
1784 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1785 assert(pkt->body);
1786 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1787 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1788 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1789 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1790 }
1791 pkt->length += len;
1792 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1793 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1794 }
1795 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1796 {
1797 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1798 }
1799 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1800 {
1801 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1802 }
1803 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1804 {
1805 unsigned char x[4];
1806 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1807 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1808 }
1809 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1810 {
1811 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1812 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1813 }
1814 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1815 {
1816 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1817 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1818 }
1819 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1820 {
1821 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1822 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1823 }
1824 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1825 {
1826 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1827 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1828 }
1829 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1830 {
1831 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1832 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1833 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1834 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1835 sfree(data);
1836 }
1837 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1838 {
1839 unsigned char *p;
1840 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1841 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1842 p[0] = 0;
1843 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1844 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1845 i = 0;
1846 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1847 i++;
1848 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1849 *len = n + 1 - i;
1850 return p;
1851 }
1852 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1853 {
1854 unsigned char *p;
1855 int len;
1856 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1857 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1858 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1859 sfree(p);
1860 }
1861
1862 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1863 {
1864 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1865 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1866 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1867 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1868 return pkt;
1869 }
1870
1871 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1872 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1873 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1874 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1875 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1876 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1877 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1878 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1879 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1880
1881 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1882 {
1883 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1884 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1885 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1886 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1887 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1888 return pkt;
1889 }
1890
1891 /*
1892 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1893 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1894 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1895 */
1896 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1897 {
1898 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1899
1900 if (ssh->logctx)
1901 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1902 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1903 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1904 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1905 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1906 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1907
1908 /*
1909 * Compress packet payload.
1910 */
1911 {
1912 unsigned char *newpayload;
1913 int newlen;
1914 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1915 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1916 pkt->length - 5,
1917 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1918 pkt->length = 5;
1919 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1920 sfree(newpayload);
1921 }
1922 }
1923
1924 /*
1925 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1926 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1927 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1928 * after padding.
1929 */
1930 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1931 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1932 padding = 4;
1933 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1934 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1935 padding +=
1936 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1937 assert(padding <= 255);
1938 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1939 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1940 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1941 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1942 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1943 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1944 if (ssh->csmac)
1945 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1946 pkt->length + padding,
1947 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1948 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1949
1950 if (ssh->cscipher)
1951 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1952 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1953
1954 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1955
1956 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1957 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1958 }
1959
1960 /*
1961 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1962 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1963 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1964 *
1965 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1966 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1967 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1968 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1969 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1970 * works after packet encryption.
1971 *
1972 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1973 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1974 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1975 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1976 * then send them once we've finished.
1977 *
1978 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1979 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1980 *
1981 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1982 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1983 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1984 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1985 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1986 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1987 *
1988 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1989 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1990 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1991 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1992 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1993 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1994 * CBC.
1995 */
1996
1997 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1998 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1999
2000 /*
2001 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
2002 */
2003 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2004 {
2005 int len;
2006 int backlog;
2007 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
2008 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
2009 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2010 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2011 return;
2012 }
2013 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2014 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
2015 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2016 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2017
2018 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2019 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2020 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2021 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2022 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2023
2024 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2025 }
2026
2027 /*
2028 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2029 */
2030 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2031 {
2032 int len;
2033 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2034 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
2035 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2036 /*
2037 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2038 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2039 */
2040 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2041 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2042 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2043 }
2044 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2045 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2046 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2047 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2048 ssh->deferred_size,
2049 unsigned char);
2050 }
2051 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2052 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2053 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2054 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2055 }
2056
2057 /*
2058 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2059 */
2060 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2061 {
2062 assert(ssh->queueing);
2063
2064 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2065 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2066 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2067 }
2068
2069 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2070 }
2071
2072 /*
2073 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2074 * set.
2075 */
2076 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2077 {
2078 if (ssh->queueing)
2079 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2080 else
2081 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2082 }
2083
2084 /*
2085 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2086 * set.
2087 */
2088 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2089 {
2090 if (ssh->queueing)
2091 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2092 else
2093 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2094 }
2095
2096 /*
2097 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2098 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2099 *
2100 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2101 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2102 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2103 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2104 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2105 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2106 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2107 * ssh->queueing.
2108 */
2109 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2110 {
2111 int backlog;
2112 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2113 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2114 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2115 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2116 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2117 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2118
2119 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2120 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2121 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2122 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2123 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2124 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2125 }
2126
2127 /*
2128 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2129 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2130 */
2131 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2132 int padsize)
2133 {
2134 #if 0
2135 if (0) {
2136 /*
2137 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2138 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2139 *
2140 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2141 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2142 * always Cisco?)
2143 */
2144 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2145 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2146 } else
2147 #endif
2148 {
2149 /*
2150 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2151 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2152 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2153 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2154 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2155 */
2156 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2157
2158 /*
2159 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2160 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2161 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2162 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2163 * gain nothing by it.)
2164 */
2165 if (ssh->cscipher &&
2166 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2167 int stringlen, i;
2168
2169 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2170 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2171 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2172 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2173 /*
2174 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2175 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2176 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2177 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2178 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2179 * by.
2180 */
2181 stringlen -=
2182 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2183 }
2184 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2185 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2186 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2187 char c = (char) random_byte();
2188 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2189 }
2190 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2191 }
2192 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2193 }
2194 }
2195
2196 /*
2197 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2198 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2199 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2200 */
2201 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2202 {
2203 int i;
2204
2205 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2206
2207 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2208 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2209 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2210
2211 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2212 }
2213
2214 #if 0
2215 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2216 {
2217 unsigned char *p;
2218 int i, len;
2219 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2220 debug(("%s", string));
2221 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2222 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2223 debug(("\n"));
2224 sfree(p);
2225 }
2226 #endif
2227
2228 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2229 {
2230 unsigned char *p;
2231 int len;
2232 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2233 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2234 sfree(p);
2235 }
2236
2237 /*
2238 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2239 */
2240 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2241 {
2242 unsigned long value;
2243 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2244 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2245 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2246 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2247 return value;
2248 }
2249 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2250 {
2251 unsigned long value;
2252 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2253 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2254 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2255 pkt->savedpos++;
2256 return value;
2257 }
2258 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2259 {
2260 int len;
2261 *p = NULL;
2262 *length = 0;
2263 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2264 return;
2265 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2266 if (len < 0)
2267 return;
2268 *length = len;
2269 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2270 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2271 return;
2272 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2273 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2274 }
2275 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2276 {
2277 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2278 return NULL;
2279 pkt->savedpos += length;
2280 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2281 }
2282 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2283 unsigned char **keystr)
2284 {
2285 int j;
2286
2287 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2288 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2289 key, keystr, 0);
2290
2291 if (j < 0)
2292 return FALSE;
2293
2294 pkt->savedpos += j;
2295 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2296
2297 return TRUE;
2298 }
2299 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2300 {
2301 int j;
2302 Bignum b;
2303
2304 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2305 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2306
2307 if (j < 0)
2308 return NULL;
2309
2310 pkt->savedpos += j;
2311 return b;
2312 }
2313 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2314 {
2315 char *p;
2316 int length;
2317 Bignum b;
2318
2319 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2320 if (!p)
2321 return NULL;
2322 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2323 return NULL;
2324 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2325 return b;
2326 }
2327
2328 /*
2329 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2330 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2331 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2332 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2333 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2334 */
2335 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2336 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2337 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2338 {
2339 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2340 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2341
2342 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2343 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2344
2345 /*
2346 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2347 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2348 */
2349 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2350 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2351 int pos, len, siglen;
2352
2353 /*
2354 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2355 */
2356
2357 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2358 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2359 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2360 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2361 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2362 len--, pos++;
2363 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2364
2365 /*
2366 * Now find the signature integer.
2367 */
2368 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2369 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2370 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2371
2372 if (len != siglen) {
2373 unsigned char newlen[4];
2374 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2375 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2376 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2377 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2378 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2379 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2380 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2381 newlen[0] = 0;
2382 while (len-- > siglen) {
2383 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2384 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2385 }
2386 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2387 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2388 return;
2389 }
2390
2391 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2392 }
2393
2394 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2395 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2396 }
2397
2398 /*
2399 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2400 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2401 */
2402 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2403 {
2404 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2405 imp = vstring;
2406 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2407 if (*imp) imp++;
2408 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2409 if (*imp) imp++;
2410
2411 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2412
2413 /*
2414 * General notes on server version strings:
2415 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2416 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2417 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2418 * so we can't distinguish them.
2419 */
2420 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2421 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2422 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2423 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2424 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2425 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2426 /*
2427 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2428 * to use a different defence against password length
2429 * sniffing.
2430 */
2431 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2432 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2433 }
2434
2435 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2436 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2437 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2438 /*
2439 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2440 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2441 * the password.
2442 */
2443 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2444 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2445 }
2446
2447 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2448 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2449 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2450 /*
2451 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2452 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2453 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2454 */
2455 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2456 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2457 }
2458
2459 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2460 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2461 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2462 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2463 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2464 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2465 /*
2466 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2467 */
2468 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2469 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2470 }
2471
2472 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2473 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2474 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2475 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2476 /*
2477 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2478 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2479 * generate the keys).
2480 */
2481 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2482 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2483 }
2484
2485 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2486 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2487 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2488 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2489 /*
2490 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2491 */
2492 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2493 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2494 }
2495
2496 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2497 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2498 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2499 /*
2500 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2501 * public-key authentication.
2502 */
2503 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2504 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2505 }
2506
2507 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2508 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2509 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2510 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2511 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2512 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2513 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2514 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2515 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2516 /*
2517 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2518 */
2519 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2520 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2521 }
2522
2523 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
2524 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
2525 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2526 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2527 /*
2528 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2529 */
2530 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2531 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2532 }
2533
2534 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore2 == FORCE_ON) {
2535 /*
2536 * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
2537 * none detected automatically.
2538 */
2539 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
2540 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
2541 }
2542 }
2543
2544 /*
2545 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2546 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2547 */
2548 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2549 {
2550 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2551 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2552 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2553 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2554 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2555 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2556 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2557
2558 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2559 * underscores. */
2560 while (*str) {
2561 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2562 *str = '_';
2563 str++;
2564 }
2565 }
2566
2567 /*
2568 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2569 */
2570 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2571 {
2572 char *verstring;
2573
2574 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2575 /*
2576 * Construct a v2 version string.
2577 */
2578 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2579 } else {
2580 /*
2581 * Construct a v1 version string.
2582 */
2583 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2584 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2585 svers : "1.5"),
2586 sshver);
2587 }
2588
2589 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2590
2591 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2592 size_t len;
2593 /*
2594 * Record our version string.
2595 */
2596 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2597 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2598 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2599 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2600 }
2601
2602 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2603 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2604 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2605 sfree(verstring);
2606 }
2607
2608 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2609 {
2610 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2611 int vslen;
2612 char version[10];
2613 char *vstring;
2614 int vstrsize;
2615 int i;
2616 int proto1, proto2;
2617 };
2618 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2619
2620 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2621
2622 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2623 for (;;) {
2624 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2625 crReturn(1);
2626 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2627 crReturn(1);
2628 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2629 crReturn(1);
2630 if (c != '-') goto no;
2631 break;
2632 no:
2633 while (c != '\012')
2634 crReturn(1);
2635 crReturn(1);
2636 }
2637
2638 s->vstrsize = 16;
2639 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2640 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2641 s->vslen = 4;
2642 s->i = 0;
2643 while (1) {
2644 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2645 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2646 s->vstrsize += 16;
2647 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2648 }
2649 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2650 if (s->i >= 0) {
2651 if (c == '-') {
2652 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2653 s->i = -1;
2654 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2655 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2656 } else if (c == '\012')
2657 break;
2658 }
2659
2660 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2661 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2662
2663 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2664 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2665 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2666 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2667
2668 /*
2669 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2670 */
2671
2672 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2673 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2674 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2675 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2676
2677 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2678 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2679 crStop(0);
2680 }
2681 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2682 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2683 crStop(0);
2684 }
2685
2686 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2687 ssh->version = 2;
2688 else
2689 ssh->version = 1;
2690
2691 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2692
2693 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2694 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
2695 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2696
2697 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2698 size_t len;
2699 /*
2700 * Record their version string.
2701 */
2702 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2703 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2704 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2705 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2706
2707 /*
2708 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2709 */
2710 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2711 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2712 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2713 } else {
2714 /*
2715 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2716 */
2717 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2718 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2719 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2720 }
2721 if (ssh->version == 2)
2722 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2723
2724 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2725 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2726 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2727
2728 sfree(s->vstring);
2729
2730 crFinish(0);
2731 }
2732
2733 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2734 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2735 {
2736 struct Packet *pktin;
2737
2738 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2739 if (pktin) {
2740 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2741 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2742 }
2743 }
2744
2745 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2746 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2747 {
2748 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2749 *data += *datalen;
2750 *datalen = 0;
2751 }
2752
2753 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2754 {
2755 void *vdata;
2756 unsigned char *data;
2757 int len, origlen;
2758
2759 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2760 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2761 data = vdata;
2762 origlen = len;
2763
2764 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2765 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2766
2767 if (origlen > len)
2768 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2769 }
2770 }
2771
2772 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2773 {
2774 if (ssh->s)
2775 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2776 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2777 }
2778
2779 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2780 {
2781 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2782 if (ssh->logctx)
2783 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2784 0, NULL, NULL);
2785
2786 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2787
2788 /*
2789 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2790 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2791 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2792 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2793 */
2794 while (1) {
2795 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2796 if (datalen == 0)
2797 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2798 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2799 data++;
2800 datalen--;
2801 if (ret == 0)
2802 break;
2803 }
2804
2805 /*
2806 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2807 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2808 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2809 * to the proper protocol handler.
2810 */
2811
2812 while (1) {
2813 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2814 if (ssh->frozen) {
2815 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2816 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2817 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2818 * return, so break out. */
2819 break;
2820 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2821 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2822 * session. */
2823 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2824 } else {
2825 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2826 * session. */
2827 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2828 }
2829 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2830 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2831 return;
2832 }
2833 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2834 crReturnV;
2835 }
2836 crFinishV;
2837 }
2838
2839 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2840 {
2841 int ret = 0;
2842 struct ssh_channel *c;
2843
2844 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2845 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2846 if (ssh->s) {
2847 sk_close(ssh->s);
2848 ssh->s = NULL;
2849 if (notify_exit)
2850 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2851 else
2852 ret = 1;
2853 }
2854 /*
2855 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2856 * through this connection.
2857 */
2858 if (ssh->channels) {
2859 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2860 switch (c->type) {
2861 case CHAN_X11:
2862 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2863 break;
2864 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2865 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2866 break;
2867 }
2868 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2869 if (ssh->version == 2)
2870 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2871 sfree(c);
2872 }
2873 }
2874 /*
2875 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2876 * listening sockets.
2877 */
2878 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2879 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2880 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2881 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2882 if (pf->local)
2883 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2884 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2885 free_portfwd(pf);
2886 }
2887 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
2888 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
2889 }
2890
2891 return ret;
2892 }
2893
2894 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2895 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2896 {
2897 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2898 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2899
2900 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2901
2902 if (type == 0)
2903 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2904 else
2905 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2906
2907 logevent(msg);
2908 sfree(msg);
2909 }
2910
2911 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2912 int calling_back)
2913 {
2914 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2915 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2916
2917 if (!error_msg) {
2918 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2919 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2920 else
2921 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2922 }
2923
2924 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2925 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2926
2927 if (need_notify)
2928 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2929
2930 if (error_msg)
2931 logevent(error_msg);
2932 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2933 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2934 return 0;
2935 }
2936
2937 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2938 {
2939 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2940 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2941 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2942 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2943 return 0;
2944 }
2945 return 1;
2946 }
2947
2948 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2949 {
2950 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2951 /*
2952 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2953 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2954 */
2955 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2956 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2957 }
2958
2959 /*
2960 * Connect to specified host and port.
2961 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2962 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2963 * freed by the caller.
2964 */
2965 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2966 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2967 {
2968 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2969 ssh_log,
2970 ssh_closing,
2971 ssh_receive,
2972 ssh_sent,
2973 NULL
2974 };
2975
2976 SockAddr addr;
2977 const char *err;
2978
2979 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
2980 char *colon;
2981
2982 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
2983 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
2984
2985 /*
2986 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
2987 * savedport.
2988 *
2989 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
2990 */
2991 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
2992 if (colon) {
2993 *colon++ = '\0';
2994 if (*colon)
2995 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
2996 }
2997 } else {
2998 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
2999 if (port < 0)
3000 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
3001 ssh->savedport = port;
3002 }
3003
3004 /*
3005 * Try to find host.
3006 */
3007 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
3008 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
3009 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
3010 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
3011 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
3012 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
3013 sk_addr_free(addr);
3014 return err;
3015 }
3016 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
3017
3018 /*
3019 * Open socket.
3020 */
3021 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
3022 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
3023 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
3024 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
3025 ssh->s = NULL;
3026 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
3027 return err;
3028 }
3029
3030 /*
3031 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
3032 * send the version string too.
3033 */
3034 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
3035 ssh->version = 1;
3036 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
3037 ssh->version = 2;
3038 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3039 }
3040
3041 /*
3042 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3043 */
3044 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
3045 sfree(*realhost);
3046 *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
3047 }
3048
3049 return NULL;
3050 }
3051
3052 /*
3053 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3054 */
3055 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3056 {
3057 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3058 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3059 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3060 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3061 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3062 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3063 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3064 }
3065 }
3066
3067 /*
3068 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3069 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3070 */
3071 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3072 {
3073 int i;
3074 struct ssh_channel *c;
3075
3076 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3077 return;
3078 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3079 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3080 if (!ssh->channels)
3081 return;
3082 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3083 switch (c->type) {
3084 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3085 /*
3086 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3087 */
3088 break;
3089 case CHAN_X11:
3090 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3091 break;
3092 case CHAN_AGENT:
3093 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3094 break;
3095 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3096 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3097 break;
3098 }
3099 }
3100 }
3101
3102 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3103 {
3104 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3105
3106 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3107 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3108
3109 if (ssh->version == 1)
3110 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3111 else
3112 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3113 }
3114
3115 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3116 {
3117 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3118
3119 ssh->user_response = ret;
3120
3121 if (ssh->version == 1)
3122 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3123 else
3124 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3125
3126 /*
3127 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3128 * queued-data run.
3129 */
3130 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3131 }
3132
3133 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3134 {
3135 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3136 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3137 void *sentreply = reply;
3138
3139 if (!sentreply) {
3140 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3141 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3142 replylen = 5;
3143 }
3144 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3145 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3146 ssh2_try_send(c);
3147 } else {
3148 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3149 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3150 PKT_INT, replylen,
3151 PKTT_DATA,
3152 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3153 PKTT_OTHER,
3154 PKT_END);
3155 }
3156 if (reply)
3157 sfree(reply);
3158 }
3159
3160 /*
3161 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3162 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3163 * => log `wire_reason'.
3164 */
3165 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3166 int code, int clean_exit)
3167 {
3168 char *error;
3169 if (!client_reason)
3170 client_reason = wire_reason;
3171 if (client_reason)
3172 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3173 else
3174 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3175 if (wire_reason) {
3176 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3177 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3178 PKT_END);
3179 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3180 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3181 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3182 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3183 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3184 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3185 }
3186 }
3187 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3188 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3189 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3190 sfree(error);
3191 }
3192
3193 /*
3194 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3195 */
3196 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3197 struct Packet *pktin)
3198 {
3199 int i, j, ret;
3200 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3201 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3202 struct MD5Context md5c;
3203 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3204 int len;
3205 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3206 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3207 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3208 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3209 unsigned char session_id[16];
3210 int cipher_type;
3211 char username[100];
3212 void *publickey_blob;
3213 int publickey_bloblen;
3214 char *publickey_comment;
3215 int publickey_encrypted;
3216 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3217 char c;
3218 int pwpkt_type;
3219 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3220 int responselen;
3221 int keyi, nkeys;
3222 int authed;
3223 struct RSAKey key;
3224 Bignum challenge;
3225 char *commentp;
3226 int commentlen;
3227 int dlgret;
3228 };
3229 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3230
3231 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
3232
3233 if (!pktin)
3234 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3235
3236 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3237 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3238 crStop(0);
3239 }
3240
3241 logevent("Received public keys");
3242
3243 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3244 if (!ptr) {
3245 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3246 crStop(0);
3247 }
3248 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3249
3250 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3251 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3252 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3253 crStop(0);
3254 }
3255
3256 /*
3257 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3258 */
3259 {
3260 char logmsg[80];
3261 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3262 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3263 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3264 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3265 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3266 logevent(logmsg);
3267 }
3268
3269 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3270 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3271 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3272 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3273 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3274
3275 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3276 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3277 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3278
3279 MD5Init(&md5c);
3280 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3281 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3282 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3283 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3284
3285 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3286 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3287
3288 /*
3289 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3290 */
3291 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3292 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3293 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3294 crStop(0);
3295 }
3296
3297 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3298
3299 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3300
3301 /*
3302 * Verify the host key.
3303 */
3304 {
3305 /*
3306 * First format the key into a string.
3307 */
3308 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3309 char fingerprint[100];
3310 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3311 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3312 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3313
3314 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3315 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3316 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3317 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3318 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3319 sfree(keystr);
3320 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3321 do {
3322 crReturn(0);
3323 if (pktin) {
3324 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3325 " for user host key response"));
3326 crStop(0);
3327 }
3328 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3329 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3330 }
3331 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3332
3333 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3334 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3335 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3336 crStop(0);
3337 }
3338 }
3339
3340 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3341 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3342 if (i < 16)
3343 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3344 }
3345
3346 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3347 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3348 if (ret)
3349 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3350 } else {
3351 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3352 if (ret)
3353 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3354 }
3355 if (!ret) {
3356 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3357 crStop(0);
3358 }
3359
3360 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3361
3362 {
3363 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3364 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3365 int i;
3366 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3367 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3368 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3369 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3370 warn = 1;
3371 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3372 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3373 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3374 } else {
3375 switch (next_cipher) {
3376 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3377 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3378 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3379 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3380 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3381 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3382 }
3383 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3384 cipher_chosen = 1;
3385 }
3386 }
3387 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3388 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3389 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3390 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3391 else
3392 /* shouldn't happen */
3393 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3394 crStop(0);
3395 }
3396
3397 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3398 if (warn) {
3399 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3400 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3401 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3402 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3403 do {
3404 crReturn(0);
3405 if (pktin) {
3406 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3407 " for user response"));
3408 crStop(0);
3409 }
3410 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3411 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3412 }
3413 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3414 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3415 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3416 0, TRUE);
3417 crStop(0);
3418 }
3419 }
3420 }
3421
3422 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3423 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3424 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3425 break;
3426 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3427 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3428 break;
3429 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3430 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3431 break;
3432 }
3433
3434 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3435 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3436 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3437 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3438 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3439 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3440
3441 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3442
3443 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3444
3445 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3446 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3447 &ssh_3des);
3448 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3449 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3450 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3451
3452 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3453 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3454
3455 if (servkey.modulus) {
3456 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3457 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3458 }
3459 if (servkey.exponent) {
3460 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3461 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3462 }
3463 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3464 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3465 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3466 }
3467 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3468 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3469 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3470 }
3471 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3472
3473 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3474 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3475 crStop(0);
3476 }
3477
3478 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3479
3480 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3481 {
3482 if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
3483 sizeof(s->username))) {
3484 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3485 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3486 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3487 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3488 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
3489 lenof(s->username));
3490 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3491 while (ret < 0) {
3492 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3493 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3494 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3495 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3496 }
3497 if (!ret) {
3498 /*
3499 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3500 */
3501 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3502 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3503 crStop(0);
3504 }
3505 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3506 lenof(s->username));
3507 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3508 }
3509
3510 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3511 {
3512 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3513 logevent(userlog);
3514 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3515 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3516 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3517 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3518 }
3519 sfree(userlog);
3520 }
3521 }
3522
3523 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3524
3525 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3526 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3527 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3528 } else {
3529 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3530 }
3531 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3532 /*
3533 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3534 */
3535 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3536 int keytype;
3537 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3538 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3539 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3540 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3541 const char *error;
3542 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3543 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3544 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3545 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3546 NULL);
3547 } else {
3548 char *msgbuf;
3549 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3550 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3551 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3552 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3553 error);
3554 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3555 sfree(msgbuf);
3556 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3557 }
3558 } else {
3559 char *msgbuf;
3560 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3561 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3562 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3563 " (%s)\r\n",
3564 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3565 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3566 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3567 sfree(msgbuf);
3568 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3569 }
3570 } else
3571 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3572
3573 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3574 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3575
3576 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3577 /*
3578 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3579 */
3580 void *r;
3581
3582 s->authed = FALSE;
3583 s->tried_agent = 1;
3584 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3585
3586 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3587 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3588 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3589 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3590 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3591 do {
3592 crReturn(0);
3593 if (pktin) {
3594 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3595 " for agent response"));
3596 crStop(0);
3597 }
3598 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3599 r = ssh->agent_response;
3600 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3601 }
3602 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3603 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3604 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3605 s->p = s->response + 5;
3606 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3607 s->p += 4;
3608 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3609 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3610 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3611 s->p += 4;
3612 {
3613 int n, ok = FALSE;
3614 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3615 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3616 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3617 &s->key.exponent);
3618 if (n < 0)
3619 break;
3620 s->p += n;
3621 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3622 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3623 &s->key.modulus);
3624 if (n < 0)
3625 break;
3626 s->p += n;
3627 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3628 break;
3629 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3630 s->p += 4;
3631 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3632 s->commentlen)
3633 break;
3634 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3635 s->p += s->commentlen;
3636 ok = TRUE;
3637 } while (0);
3638 if (!ok) {
3639 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3640 break;
3641 }
3642 }
3643 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3644 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3645 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3646 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3647 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3648 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3649 } else
3650 /* Skip non-configured key */
3651 continue;
3652 }
3653 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3654 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3655 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3656 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3657 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3658 logevent("Key refused");
3659 continue;
3660 }
3661 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3662 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3663 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3664 crStop(0);
3665 }
3666
3667 {
3668 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3669 void *vret;
3670 int len, retlen;
3671 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3672 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3673 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3674 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3675 len += 16; /* session id */
3676 len += 4; /* response format */
3677 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3678 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3679 q = agentreq + 4;
3680 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3681 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3682 q += 4;
3683 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3684 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3685 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3686 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3687 q += 16;
3688 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3689 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3690 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3691 sfree(agentreq);
3692 do {
3693 crReturn(0);
3694 if (pktin) {
3695 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3696 " while waiting for agent"
3697 " response"));
3698 crStop(0);
3699 }
3700 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3701 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3702 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3703 } else
3704 sfree(agentreq);
3705 ret = vret;
3706 if (ret) {
3707 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3708 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3709 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3710 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3711 PKT_END);
3712 sfree(ret);
3713 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3714 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3715 logevent
3716 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3717 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3718 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3719 " RSA key \"");
3720 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3721 s->commentlen);
3722 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3723 }
3724 s->authed = TRUE;
3725 } else
3726 logevent
3727 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3728 } else {
3729 logevent
3730 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3731 sfree(ret);
3732 }
3733 } else {
3734 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3735 }
3736 }
3737 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3738 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3739 freebn(s->challenge);
3740 if (s->authed)
3741 break;
3742 }
3743 sfree(s->response);
3744 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3745 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3746 }
3747 if (s->authed)
3748 break;
3749 }
3750 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3751 /*
3752 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3753 * key file.
3754 */
3755 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3756 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3757 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3758 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3759 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3760 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3761 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3762 while (!got_passphrase) {
3763 /*
3764 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3765 */
3766 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3767 const char *error;
3768 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3769 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3770 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3771 passphrase = NULL;
3772 } else {
3773 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3774 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3775 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3776 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3777 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3778 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3779 s->publickey_comment),
3780 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3781 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3782 while (ret < 0) {
3783 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3784 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3785 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3786 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3787 }
3788 if (!ret) {
3789 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3790 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3791 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3792 0, TRUE);
3793 crStop(0);
3794 }
3795 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3796 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3797 }
3798 /*
3799 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3800 */
3801 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3802 &error);
3803 if (passphrase) {
3804 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
3805 sfree(passphrase);
3806 }
3807 if (ret == 1) {
3808 /* Correct passphrase. */
3809 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3810 } else if (ret == 0) {
3811 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3812 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3813 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3814 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3815 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3816 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3817 break; /* go and try something else */
3818 } else if (ret == -1) {
3819 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3820 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3821 /* and try again */
3822 } else {
3823 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3824 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3825 }
3826 }
3827
3828 if (got_passphrase) {
3829
3830 /*
3831 * Send a public key attempt.
3832 */
3833 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3834 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3835
3836 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3837 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3838 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3839 continue; /* go and try something else */
3840 }
3841 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3842 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3843 crStop(0);
3844 }
3845
3846 {
3847 int i;
3848 unsigned char buffer[32];
3849 Bignum challenge, response;
3850
3851 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3852 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3853 crStop(0);
3854 }
3855 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3856 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3857
3858 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3859 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3860 }
3861
3862 MD5Init(&md5c);
3863 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3864 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3865 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3866
3867 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3868 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3869
3870 freebn(challenge);
3871 freebn(response);
3872 }
3873
3874 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3875 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3876 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3877 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3878 " our public key.\r\n");
3879 continue; /* go and try something else */
3880 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3881 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3882 crStop(0);
3883 }
3884
3885 break; /* we're through! */
3886 }
3887
3888 }
3889
3890 /*
3891 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3892 */
3893 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3894
3895 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3896 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3897 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3898 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3899 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3900 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3901 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3902 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3903 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3904 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3905 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3906 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3907 continue;
3908 } else {
3909 char *challenge;
3910 int challengelen;
3911 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3912
3913 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3914 if (!challenge) {
3915 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3916 crStop(0);
3917 }
3918 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3919 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3920 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3921 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3922 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3923 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3924 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3925 } else {
3926 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3927 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3928 }
3929 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3930 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3931 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3932 instr_suf);
3933 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3934 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3935 sfree(instr_suf);
3936 }
3937 }
3938 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3939 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3940 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3941 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3942 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3943 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3944 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3945 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3946 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3947 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3948 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3949 continue;
3950 } else {
3951 char *challenge;
3952 int challengelen;
3953 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3954
3955 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3956 if (!challenge) {
3957 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3958 crStop(0);
3959 }
3960 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3961 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3962 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
3963 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
3964 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3965 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3966 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3967 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3968 } else {
3969 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3970 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3971 }
3972 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3973 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
3974 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3975 instr_suf);
3976 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3977 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3978 sfree(instr_suf);
3979 }
3980 }
3981 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3982 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
3983 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
3984 crStop(0);
3985 }
3986 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3987 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
3988 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3989 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
3990 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3991 }
3992
3993 /*
3994 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3995 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3996 * authentication.
3997 */
3998 {
3999 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
4000 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
4001 while (ret < 0) {
4002 ssh->send_ok = 1;
4003 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
4004 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
4005 ssh->send_ok = 0;
4006 }
4007 if (!ret) {
4008 /*
4009 * Failed to get a password (for example
4010 * because one was supplied on the command line
4011 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
4012 */
4013 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4014 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
4015 crStop(0);
4016 }
4017 }
4018
4019 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4020 /*
4021 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
4022 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
4023 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
4024 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
4025 * The others are all random data in
4026 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
4027 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
4028 * hence can't deduce the password length.
4029 *
4030 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
4031 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
4032 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4033 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4034 * do is:
4035 *
4036 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4037 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4038 *
4039 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4040 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4041 * packets containing string lengths N through
4042 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4043 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4044 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4045 *
4046 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4047 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4048 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4049 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4050 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4051 *
4052 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4053 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4054 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4055 * against password length sniffing.
4056 */
4057 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4058 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4059 /*
4060 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4061 * we can use the primary defence.
4062 */
4063 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4064 char *randomstr;
4065
4066 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4067 if (pwlen < 16) {
4068 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4069 top = 15;
4070 } else {
4071 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4072 top = bottom + 7;
4073 }
4074
4075 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4076
4077 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4078
4079 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4080 if (i == pwlen) {
4081 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4082 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4083 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4084 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4085 } else {
4086 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4087 do {
4088 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4089 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4090 }
4091 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4092 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4093 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4094 }
4095 }
4096 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4097 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4098 sfree(randomstr);
4099 }
4100 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4101 /*
4102 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4103 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4104 * can use the secondary defence.
4105 */
4106 char string[64];
4107 char *ss;
4108 int len;
4109
4110 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4111 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4112 ss = string;
4113 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4114 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4115 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4116 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4117 }
4118 } else {
4119 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4120 }
4121 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4122 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4123 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4124 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4125 } else {
4126 /*
4127 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4128 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4129 */
4130 int len;
4131 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4132 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4133 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4134 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4135 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4136 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4137 }
4138 } else {
4139 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4140 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4141 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4142 }
4143 logevent("Sent password");
4144 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4145 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4146 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4147 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4148 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4149 logevent("Authentication refused");
4150 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4151 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4152 crStop(0);
4153 }
4154 }
4155
4156 /* Clear up */
4157 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4158 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4159 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4160 }
4161
4162 logevent("Authentication successful");
4163
4164 crFinish(1);
4165 }
4166
4167 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4168 {
4169 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4170
4171 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4172 return;
4173
4174 if (!c->closes) {
4175 /*
4176 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
4177 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
4178 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
4179 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
4180 * open, we can close it then.
4181 */
4182 if (!c->halfopen) {
4183 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4184 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4185 PKT_END);
4186 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4187 } else {
4188 int bytes_to_send = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
4189 if (bytes_to_send > 0) {
4190 /*
4191 * If we still have unsent data in our outgoing
4192 * buffer for this channel, we can't actually
4193 * initiate a close operation yet or that data
4194 * will be lost. Instead, set the pending_close
4195 * flag so that when we do clear the buffer
4196 * we'll start closing the channel.
4197 */
4198 char logmsg[160] = {'\0'};
4199 sprintf(
4200 logmsg,
4201 "Forwarded port pending to be closed : "
4202 "%d bytes remaining",
4203 bytes_to_send);
4204 logevent(logmsg);
4205
4206 c->pending_close = TRUE;
4207 } else {
4208 /*
4209 * No locally buffered data, so we can send the
4210 * close message immediately.
4211 */
4212 struct Packet *pktout;
4213 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4214 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4215 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4216 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4217 logevent("Nothing left to send, closing channel");
4218 }
4219 }
4220 }
4221
4222 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
4223 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4224 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4225 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
4226 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4227 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4228 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4229 }
4230 }
4231 }
4232
4233 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4234 {
4235 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4236
4237 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4238 return 0;
4239
4240 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4241 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4242 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4243 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4244 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4245 /*
4246 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4247 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4248 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4249 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4250 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4251 */
4252 return 0;
4253 } else {
4254 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4255 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4256 }
4257 }
4258
4259 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4260 {
4261 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4262 int buflimit;
4263
4264 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4265 return;
4266
4267 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4268 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4269 } else {
4270 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4271 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4272 }
4273 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4274 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4275 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4276 }
4277 }
4278
4279 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4280 {
4281 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4282
4283 assert(qh != NULL);
4284
4285 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4286
4287 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4288 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4289 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4290 }
4291 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4292 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4293 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4294 }
4295
4296 if (qh->next) {
4297 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4298
4299 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4300 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4301 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4302 }
4303 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4304 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4305 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4306 }
4307 } else {
4308 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4309 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4310 }
4311
4312 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4313
4314 sfree(qh);
4315 }
4316
4317 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4318 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4319 {
4320 struct queued_handler *qh;
4321
4322 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4323 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4324 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4325 qh->handler = handler;
4326 qh->ctx = ctx;
4327 qh->next = NULL;
4328
4329 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4330 ssh->qhead = qh;
4331
4332 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4333 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4334 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4335 }
4336 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4337 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4338 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4339 }
4340 } else {
4341 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4342 }
4343 ssh->qtail = qh;
4344 }
4345
4346 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4347 {
4348 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4349
4350 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4351 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4352 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4353 pf->sportdesc);
4354 } else {
4355 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4356 pf->sportdesc);
4357
4358 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4359 assert(rpf == pf);
4360 pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
4361 free_rportfwd(pf);
4362 }
4363 }
4364
4365 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
4366 {
4367 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
4368 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4369 int i;
4370
4371 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4372 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4373 } else {
4374 /*
4375 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4376 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4377 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4378 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4379 * they were before.
4380 */
4381 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4382 int i;
4383 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4384 epf->status = DESTROY;
4385 }
4386
4387 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4388 char address_family, type;
4389 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4390 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
4391 int n;
4392
4393 address_family = 'A';
4394 type = 'L';
4395 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
4396 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
4397 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
4398 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
4399 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
4400 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
4401 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
4402 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4403
4404 saddr[0] = '\0';
4405
4406 n = 0;
4407 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4408 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4409 /*
4410 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4411 * source port number. This means that
4412 * everything we've seen until now is the
4413 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4414 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4415 * again.
4416 */
4417 portfwd_strptr++;
4418 sports[n] = '\0';
4419 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4420 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4421 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4422 } else
4423 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4424 n = 0;
4425 }
4426 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4427 }
4428 sports[n] = 0;
4429 if (type != 'D') {
4430 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4431 portfwd_strptr++;
4432 n = 0;
4433 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4434 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4435 }
4436 host[n] = 0;
4437 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4438 portfwd_strptr++;
4439 n = 0;
4440 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4441 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4442 }
4443 dports[n] = 0;
4444 portfwd_strptr++;
4445 dport = atoi(dports);
4446 dserv = 0;
4447 if (dport == 0) {
4448 dserv = 1;
4449 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4450 if (!dport) {
4451 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4452 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4453 }
4454 }
4455 } else {
4456 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4457 host[0] = 0;
4458 dports[0] = 0;
4459 dport = dserv = -1;
4460 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4461 }
4462 sport = atoi(sports);
4463 sserv = 0;
4464 if (sport == 0) {
4465 sserv = 1;
4466 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4467 if (!sport) {
4468 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4469 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4470 }
4471 }
4472 if (sport && dport) {
4473 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4474 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4475
4476 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4477 pfrec->type = type;
4478 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4479 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4480 pfrec->sport = sport;
4481 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4482 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4483 pfrec->dport = dport;
4484 pfrec->local = NULL;
4485 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4486 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4487 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4488 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4489
4490 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4491 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4492 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
4493 /*
4494 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
4495 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
4496 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
4497 * as KEEP.
4498 */
4499 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4500 }
4501 /*
4502 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
4503 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
4504 */
4505 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4506 } else {
4507 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4508 }
4509 }
4510 }
4511
4512 /*
4513 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4514 * not re-enabled.
4515 */
4516 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4517 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4518 char *message;
4519
4520 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4521 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4522 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4523 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4524 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4525 epf->sport);
4526
4527 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4528 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4529 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4530 sfree(message);
4531 message = msg2;
4532 }
4533
4534 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4535 sfree(message);
4536
4537 /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
4538 * forwarding failed. */
4539 if (epf->remote) {
4540 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4541 struct Packet *pktout;
4542
4543 /*
4544 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4545 * end.
4546 */
4547 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4548 /*
4549 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4550 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4551 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4552 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4553 * so that any connections the server tries
4554 * to make on it are rejected.
4555 */
4556 } else {
4557 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4558 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4559 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4560 if (epf->saddr) {
4561 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4562 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4563 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4564 * what was used to open the original connection,
4565 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4566 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4567 } else {
4568 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4569 }
4570 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4571 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4572 }
4573
4574 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4575 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4576 } else if (epf->local) {
4577 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4578 }
4579
4580 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4581 free_portfwd(epf);
4582 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4583 }
4584
4585 /*
4586 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4587 */
4588 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4589 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4590 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4591 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4592 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4593 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4594 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4595 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4596 epf->sport,
4597 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4598 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4599 dportdesc = NULL;
4600 } else {
4601 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4602 epf->daddr,
4603 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4604 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4605 epf->dport,
4606 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4607 }
4608
4609 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4610 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4611 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4612 ssh, cfg,
4613 &epf->local,
4614 epf->addressfamily);
4615
4616 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4617 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4618 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4619 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4620 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4621 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4622 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4623 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4624 ssh, cfg,
4625 &epf->local,
4626 epf->addressfamily);
4627
4628 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4629 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4630 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4631 sportdesc,
4632 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4633 } else {
4634 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4635
4636 /*
4637 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4638 */
4639 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4640 if (ssh->version == 1)
4641 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4642 else
4643 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4644 }
4645
4646 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4647 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4648 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4649 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4650 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4651 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4652 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4653 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4654 sfree(pf);
4655 } else {
4656 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4657 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4658
4659 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4660 sportdesc = NULL;
4661 epf->remote = pf;
4662 pf->pfrec = epf;
4663
4664 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4665 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4666 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4667 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4668 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4669 PKT_END);
4670 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4671 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4672 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4673 } else {
4674 struct Packet *pktout;
4675 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4676 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4677 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4678 if (epf->saddr) {
4679 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4680 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4681 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4682 } else {
4683 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4684 }
4685 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4686 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4687
4688 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4689 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4690 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4691 }
4692 }
4693 }
4694 sfree(sportdesc);
4695 sfree(dportdesc);
4696 }
4697 }
4698
4699 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4700 {
4701 char *string;
4702 int stringlen, bufsize;
4703
4704 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4705 if (string == NULL) {
4706 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4707 return;
4708 }
4709
4710 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4711 string, stringlen);
4712 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4713 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4714 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4715 }
4716 }
4717
4718 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4719 {
4720 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4721 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4722 struct ssh_channel *c;
4723 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4724
4725 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4726 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4727 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4728 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4729 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4730 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4731 } else {
4732 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4733 c->ssh = ssh;
4734
4735 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4736 NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4737 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4738 sfree(c);
4739 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4740 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4741 } else {
4742 logevent
4743 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4744 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4745 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4746 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4747 c->closes = 0;
4748 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4749 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4750 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4751 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4752 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4753 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4754 c->localid, PKT_END);
4755 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4756 }
4757 }
4758 }
4759
4760 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4761 {
4762 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4763 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4764 struct ssh_channel *c;
4765 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4766
4767 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4768 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4769 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4770 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4771 } else {
4772 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4773 c->ssh = ssh;
4774 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4775 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4776 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4777 c->closes = 0;
4778 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4779 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4780 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4781 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4782 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4783 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4784 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4785 PKT_END);
4786 }
4787 }
4788
4789 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4790 {
4791 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4792 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4793 struct ssh_channel *c;
4794 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4795 int remoteid;
4796 int hostsize, port;
4797 char *host;
4798 const char *e;
4799 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4800 c->ssh = ssh;
4801
4802 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4803 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4804 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4805
4806 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4807 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4808 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4809 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4810 pf.dport = port;
4811 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4812
4813 if (pfp == NULL) {
4814 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4815 pf.dhost, port);
4816 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4817 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4818 } else {
4819 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4820 pf.dhost, port);
4821 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4822 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4823 if (e != NULL) {
4824 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4825 sfree(c);
4826 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4827 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4828 } else {
4829 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4830 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4831 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4832 c->closes = 0;
4833 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4834 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4835 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4836 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4837 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4838 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4839 c->localid, PKT_END);
4840 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4841 }
4842 }
4843 }
4844
4845 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4846 {
4847 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4848 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4849 struct ssh_channel *c;
4850
4851 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4852 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4853 c->remoteid = localid;
4854 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4855 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4856 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4857 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4858 }
4859
4860 if (c && c->closes) {
4861 /*
4862 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4863 * which we decided on before the server acked
4864 * the channel open. So now we know the
4865 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4866 */
4867 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4868 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4869 }
4870 }
4871
4872 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4873 {
4874 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4875 struct ssh_channel *c;
4876
4877 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4878 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4879 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4880 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4881 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4882 sfree(c);
4883 }
4884 }
4885
4886 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4887 {
4888 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4889 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4890 struct ssh_channel *c;
4891 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4892 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4893 int closetype;
4894 closetype =
4895 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4896
4897 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4898 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4899 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4900 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4901 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4902 }
4903 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4904 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4905 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4906 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4907 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4908 }
4909
4910 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4911 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4912 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4913 PKT_END);
4914 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4915 }
4916
4917 if (c->closes == 15) {
4918 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4919 sfree(c);
4920 }
4921 } else {
4922 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4923 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4924 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4925 i));
4926 }
4927 }
4928
4929 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4930 {
4931 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4932 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4933 char *p;
4934 int len;
4935 struct ssh_channel *c;
4936
4937 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4938
4939 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4940 if (c) {
4941 int bufsize = 0;
4942 switch (c->type) {
4943 case CHAN_X11:
4944 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4945 break;
4946 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4947 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4948 break;
4949 case CHAN_AGENT:
4950 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4951 while (len > 0) {
4952 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4953 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
4954 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4955 l);
4956 p += l;
4957 len -= l;
4958 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4959 }
4960 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4961 c->u.a.totallen =
4962 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4963 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4964 unsigned char);
4965 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4966 }
4967 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4968 unsigned int l =
4969 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4970 (unsigned)len);
4971 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4972 l);
4973 p += l;
4974 len -= l;
4975 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4976 }
4977 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4978 void *reply;
4979 int replylen;
4980 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4981 c->u.a.totallen,
4982 &reply, &replylen,
4983 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4984 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4985 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4986 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4987 }
4988 }
4989 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4990 break;
4991 }
4992 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4993 c->throttling_conn = 1;
4994 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4995 }
4996 }
4997 }
4998
4999 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5000 {
5001 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5002 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
5003 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
5004 /*
5005 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
5006 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
5007 * session which we might mistake for another
5008 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
5009 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
5010 */
5011 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
5012 }
5013
5014 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
5015 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
5016 {
5017 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
5018 int i = 0;
5019 unsigned int arg = 0;
5020 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
5021 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
5022 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
5023 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
5024 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
5025 break;
5026 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
5027 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
5028 break;
5029 }
5030 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
5031 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
5032 }
5033
5034
5035 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
5036 struct Packet *pktin)
5037 {
5038 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
5039
5040 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
5041 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
5042 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
5043
5044 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
5045 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
5046 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
5047 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
5048 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
5049 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
5050 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
5051 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
5052 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
5053
5054 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
5055 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
5056 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
5057 do {
5058 crReturnV;
5059 } while (!pktin);
5060 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5061 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5062 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5063 crStopV;
5064 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5065 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5066 } else {
5067 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5068 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
5069 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
5070 }
5071 }
5072
5073 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
5074 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
5075 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
5076 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5077 /*
5078 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5079 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5080 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5081 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5082 * cookie into the log.
5083 */
5084 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5085 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5086 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5087 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5088 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5089 PKTT_OTHER,
5090 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5091 PKT_END);
5092 } else {
5093 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5094 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5095 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5096 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5097 PKTT_OTHER,
5098 PKT_END);
5099 }
5100 do {
5101 crReturnV;
5102 } while (!pktin);
5103 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5104 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5105 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5106 crStopV;
5107 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5108 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5109 } else {
5110 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5111 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5112 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5113 }
5114 }
5115
5116 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
5117 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5118
5119 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
5120 struct Packet *pkt;
5121 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5122 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5123 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5124 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5125 /* Send the pty request. */
5126 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5127 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
5128 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5129 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5130 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5131 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5132 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
5133 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5134 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5135 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5136 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5137 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5138 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5139 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5140 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5141 do {
5142 crReturnV;
5143 } while (!pktin);
5144 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5145 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5146 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5147 crStopV;
5148 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5149 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5150 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5151 }
5152 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5153 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5154 } else {
5155 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5156 }
5157
5158 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
5159 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5160 do {
5161 crReturnV;
5162 } while (!pktin);
5163 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5164 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5165 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5166 crStopV;
5167 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5168 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5169 }
5170 logevent("Started compression");
5171 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5172 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5173 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5174 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5175 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5176 }
5177
5178 /*
5179 * Start the shell or command.
5180 *
5181 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5182 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5183 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5184 */
5185 {
5186 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
5187
5188 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
5189
5190 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
5191 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
5192 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5193 }
5194 if (*cmd)
5195 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5196 else
5197 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5198 logevent("Started session");
5199 }
5200
5201 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5202 if (ssh->size_needed)
5203 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5204 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5205 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5206
5207 if (ssh->ldisc)
5208 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5209 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5210 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5211 while (1) {
5212
5213 /*
5214 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5215 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5216 * attention to the unusual ones.
5217 */
5218
5219 crReturnV;
5220 if (pktin) {
5221 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5222 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5223 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5224 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5225 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5226 } else {
5227 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5228 crStopV;
5229 }
5230 } else {
5231 while (inlen > 0) {
5232 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5233 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5234 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5235 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5236 in += len;
5237 inlen -= len;
5238 }
5239 }
5240 }
5241
5242 crFinishV;
5243 }
5244
5245 /*
5246 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5247 */
5248 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5249 {
5250 char *msg;
5251 int msglen;
5252
5253 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5254 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5255 }
5256
5257 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5258 {
5259 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5260 char *msg;
5261 int msglen;
5262
5263 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5264 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5265 }
5266
5267 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5268 {
5269 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5270 }
5271
5272 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5273 {
5274 int i;
5275
5276 /*
5277 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5278 */
5279 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5280 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5281
5282 /*
5283 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5284 */
5285 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5286 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5287 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5288 }
5289
5290 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5291 struct Packet *pktin)
5292 {
5293 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5294 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5295 return;
5296
5297 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5298 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5299 return;
5300 }
5301
5302 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5303 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5304 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5305 else
5306 return;
5307 }
5308
5309 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5310 }
5311
5312 /*
5313 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5314 */
5315 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5316 {
5317 int needlen;
5318 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5319 return 0;
5320 needlen = strlen(needle);
5321 while (1) {
5322 /*
5323 * Is it at the start of the string?
5324 */
5325 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5326 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5327 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5328 /* either , or EOS follows */
5329 )
5330 return 1;
5331 /*
5332 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5333 * If no comma found, terminate.
5334 */
5335 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5336 haylen--, haystack++;
5337 if (haylen == 0)
5338 return 0;
5339 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5340 }
5341 }
5342
5343 /*
5344 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5345 */
5346 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5347 {
5348 int needlen;
5349 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5350 return 0;
5351 needlen = strlen(needle);
5352 /*
5353 * Is it at the start of the string?
5354 */
5355 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5356 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5357 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5358 /* either , or EOS follows */
5359 )
5360 return 1;
5361 return 0;
5362 }
5363
5364
5365 /*
5366 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5367 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5368 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5369 */
5370 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5371 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5372 unsigned char *keyspace)
5373 {
5374 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5375 void *s;
5376 /* First hlen bytes. */
5377 s = h->init();
5378 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5379 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5380 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5381 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5382 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5383 h->final(s, keyspace);
5384 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5385 s = h->init();
5386 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5387 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5388 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5389 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5390 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5391 }
5392
5393 /*
5394 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5395 */
5396 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5397 struct Packet *pktin)
5398 {
5399 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5400 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5401 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5402 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5403 void *our_kexinit;
5404 int our_kexinitlen;
5405 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5406 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5407 int nmacs;
5408 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5409 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5410 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5411 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5412 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5413 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5414 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5415 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5416 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5417 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5418 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5419 int n_preferred_kex;
5420 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5421 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5422 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5423 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5424 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5425 struct Packet *pktout;
5426 int dlgret;
5427 int guessok;
5428 int ignorepkt;
5429 };
5430 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5431
5432 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5433
5434 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5435 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5436 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5437
5438 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5439
5440 /*
5441 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5442 */
5443 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5444 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5445 else
5446 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5447
5448 begin_key_exchange:
5449 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5450 {
5451 int i, j, commalist_started;
5452
5453 /*
5454 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5455 */
5456 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5457 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5458 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5459 case KEX_DHGEX:
5460 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5461 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5462 break;
5463 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5464 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5465 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5466 break;
5467 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5468 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5469 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5470 break;
5471 case KEX_RSA:
5472 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5473 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5474 break;
5475 case KEX_WARN:
5476 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5477 * the list. */
5478 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5479 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5480 }
5481 break;
5482 }
5483 }
5484
5485 /*
5486 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5487 */
5488 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5489 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5490 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5491 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5492 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5493 break;
5494 case CIPHER_DES:
5495 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5496 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5497 }
5498 break;
5499 case CIPHER_3DES:
5500 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5501 break;
5502 case CIPHER_AES:
5503 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5504 break;
5505 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5506 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5507 break;
5508 case CIPHER_WARN:
5509 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5510 * the list. */
5511 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5512 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5513 }
5514 break;
5515 }
5516 }
5517
5518 /*
5519 * Set up preferred compression.
5520 */
5521 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5522 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5523 else
5524 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5525
5526 /*
5527 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5528 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5529 */
5530 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5531
5532 /*
5533 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5534 */
5535 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5536
5537 /*
5538 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5539 */
5540 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5541 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5542 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5543 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5544 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5545 commalist_started = 0;
5546 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5547 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5548 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5549 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5550 if (commalist_started)
5551 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5552 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5553 commalist_started = 1;
5554 }
5555 }
5556 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5557 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5558 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5559 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5560 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5561 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5562 }
5563 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5564 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5565 commalist_started = 0;
5566 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5567 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5568 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5569 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5570 if (commalist_started)
5571 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5572 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5573 commalist_started = 1;
5574 }
5575 }
5576 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5577 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5578 commalist_started = 0;
5579 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5580 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5581 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5582 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5583 if (commalist_started)
5584 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5585 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5586 commalist_started = 1;
5587 }
5588 }
5589 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5590 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5591 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5592 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5593 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5594 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5595 }
5596 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5597 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5598 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5599 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5600 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5601 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5602 }
5603 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5604 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5605 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5606 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5607 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5608 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5609 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5610 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5611 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5612 }
5613 }
5614 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5615 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5616 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5617 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5618 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5619 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5620 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5621 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5622 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5623 }
5624 }
5625 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5626 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5627 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5628 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5629 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5630 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5631 /* Reserved. */
5632 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5633 }
5634
5635 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5636 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5637 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5638
5639 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5640
5641 if (!pktin)
5642 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5643
5644 /*
5645 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5646 * to.
5647 */
5648 {
5649 char *str, *preferred;
5650 int i, j, len;
5651
5652 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5653 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5654 crStop(0);
5655 }
5656 ssh->kex = NULL;
5657 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5658 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5659 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5660 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5661 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5662 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5663 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5664 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5665
5666 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5667 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5668
5669 preferred = NULL;
5670 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5671 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5672 if (!k) {
5673 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5674 } else {
5675 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5676 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5677 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5678 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5679 break;
5680 }
5681 }
5682 }
5683 if (ssh->kex)
5684 break;
5685 }
5686 if (!ssh->kex) {
5687 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5688 str ? str : "(null)"));
5689 crStop(0);
5690 }
5691 /*
5692 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5693 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5694 * we end up using.
5695 */
5696 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5697 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5698 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5699 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5700 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5701 break;
5702 }
5703 }
5704 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5705 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5706 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5707 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5708 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5709 if (!c) {
5710 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5711 } else {
5712 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5713 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5714 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5715 break;
5716 }
5717 }
5718 }
5719 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5720 break;
5721 }
5722 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5723 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5724 str ? str : "(null)"));
5725 crStop(0);
5726 }
5727
5728 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5729 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5730 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5731 if (!c) {
5732 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5733 } else {
5734 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5735 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5736 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5737 break;
5738 }
5739 }
5740 }
5741 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5742 break;
5743 }
5744 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5745 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5746 str ? str : "(null)"));
5747 crStop(0);
5748 }
5749
5750 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5751 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5752 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5753 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5754 break;
5755 }
5756 }
5757 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5758 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5759 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5760 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5761 break;
5762 }
5763 }
5764 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5765 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5766 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5767 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5768 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5769 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5770 break;
5771 }
5772 }
5773 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5774 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5775 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5776 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5777 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5778 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5779 break;
5780 }
5781 }
5782 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5783 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5784 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5785
5786 if (s->warn_kex) {
5787 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5788 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5789 ssh->kex->name,
5790 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5791 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5792 do {
5793 crReturn(0);
5794 if (pktin) {
5795 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5796 " waiting for user response"));
5797 crStop(0);
5798 }
5799 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5800 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5801 }
5802 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5803 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5804 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5805 0, TRUE);
5806 crStop(0);
5807 }
5808 }
5809
5810 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5811 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5812 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5813 "client-to-server cipher",
5814 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5815 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5816 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5817 do {
5818 crReturn(0);
5819 if (pktin) {
5820 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5821 " waiting for user response"));
5822 crStop(0);
5823 }
5824 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5825 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5826 }
5827 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5828 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5829 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5830 0, TRUE);
5831 crStop(0);
5832 }
5833 }
5834
5835 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5836 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5837 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5838 "server-to-client cipher",
5839 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5840 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5841 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5842 do {
5843 crReturn(0);
5844 if (pktin) {
5845 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5846 " waiting for user response"));
5847 crStop(0);
5848 }
5849 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5850 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5851 }
5852 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5853 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5854 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5855 0, TRUE);
5856 crStop(0);
5857 }
5858 }
5859
5860 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5861 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5862 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5863 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5864 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5865 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5866 if (pktin->length > 5)
5867 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5868 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5869
5870 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5871 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5872 }
5873
5874 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5875 /*
5876 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5877 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5878 * either cipher...
5879 */
5880 {
5881 int csbits, scbits;
5882
5883 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5884 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5885 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5886 }
5887 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
5888 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
5889 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
5890 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
5891
5892 /*
5893 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5894 * requesting a group.
5895 */
5896 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5897 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5898 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5899 /*
5900 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5901 * much data.
5902 */
5903 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5904 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5905 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5906 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5907
5908 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5909 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5910 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5911 crStop(0);
5912 }
5913 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5914 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5915 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5916 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5917 crStop(0);
5918 }
5919 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5920 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5921 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5922 } else {
5923 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5924 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5925 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5926 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5927 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5928 ssh->kex->groupname);
5929 }
5930
5931 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
5932 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5933 /*
5934 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5935 */
5936 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5937 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5938 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5939 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5940 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5941
5942 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5943 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5944 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5945 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5946 crStop(0);
5947 }
5948 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5949 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5950 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5951 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5952 if (!s->f) {
5953 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5954 crStop(0);
5955 }
5956 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5957
5958 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5959
5960 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5961 * involve user interaction. */
5962 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5963
5964 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5965 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5966 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5967 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
5968 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
5969 }
5970 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
5971 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
5972
5973 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5974 freebn(s->f);
5975 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5976 freebn(s->g);
5977 freebn(s->p);
5978 }
5979 } else {
5980 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
5981 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5982 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
5983 /*
5984 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
5985 * from the server.
5986 */
5987 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5988 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
5989 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
5990 crStop(0);
5991 }
5992
5993 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5994 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5995 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5996 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5997
5998 {
5999 char *keydata;
6000 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
6001 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
6002 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
6003 }
6004
6005 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6006 if (!s->rsakey) {
6007 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6008 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
6009 crStop(0);
6010 }
6011
6012 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6013
6014 /*
6015 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
6016 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
6017 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
6018 * we're using.
6019 */
6020 {
6021 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
6022 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
6023 int i, byte = 0;
6024 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
6025 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
6026
6027 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
6028
6029 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
6030 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
6031 byte = random_byte();
6032 }
6033 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
6034 }
6035
6036 /*
6037 * Encode this as an mpint.
6038 */
6039 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
6040 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
6041 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
6042 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
6043
6044 /*
6045 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
6046 */
6047 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
6048 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
6049 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
6050 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
6051
6052 /*
6053 * And send it off in a return packet.
6054 */
6055 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
6056 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6057 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
6058 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6059
6060 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
6061
6062 sfree(kstr2);
6063 sfree(kstr1);
6064 sfree(outstr);
6065 }
6066
6067 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
6068
6069 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6070 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
6071 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6072 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
6073 crStop(0);
6074 }
6075
6076 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6077
6078 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6079 }
6080
6081 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6082 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6083 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6084
6085 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6086
6087 #if 0
6088 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6089 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6090 #endif
6091
6092 if (!s->hkey ||
6093 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6094 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6095 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6096 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6097 crStop(0);
6098 }
6099
6100 /*
6101 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6102 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6103 */
6104 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6105 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6106 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6107 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6108 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6109 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6110 s->fingerprint,
6111 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6112 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6113 do {
6114 crReturn(0);
6115 if (pktin) {
6116 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6117 " for user host key response"));
6118 crStop(0);
6119 }
6120 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6121 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6122 }
6123 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6124 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6125 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6126 0, TRUE);
6127 crStop(0);
6128 }
6129 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6130 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6131 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6132 }
6133 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6134 sfree(s->keystr);
6135 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6136
6137 /*
6138 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6139 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6140 * authentication.
6141 */
6142 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6143 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6144 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6145 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6146 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6147 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6148 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6149 }
6150
6151 /*
6152 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6153 */
6154 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6155 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6156 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6157
6158 /*
6159 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6160 * client-to-server session keys.
6161 */
6162 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6163 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6164 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6165 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6166
6167 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6168 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6169 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6170 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6171
6172 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6173 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6174 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6175 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6176
6177 /*
6178 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6179 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6180 */
6181 {
6182 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6183 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6184 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6185 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6186 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6187 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6188 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6189 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6190 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6191 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6192 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6193 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6194 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6195 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6196 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6197 }
6198
6199 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6200 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6201 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6202 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6203 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6204 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6205 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6206
6207 /*
6208 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6209 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6210 */
6211 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6212 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6213
6214 /*
6215 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6216 */
6217 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6218 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6219 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6220 crStop(0);
6221 }
6222 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6223
6224 /*
6225 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6226 * server-to-client session keys.
6227 */
6228 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6229 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6230 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6231 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6232
6233 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6234 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6235 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6236 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6237
6238 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6239 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6240 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6241 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6242
6243 /*
6244 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6245 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6246 */
6247 {
6248 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6249 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6250 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6251 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6252 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6253 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6254 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6255 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6256 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6257 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6258 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6259 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6260 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6261 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6262 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6263 }
6264 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6265 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6266 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6267 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6268 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6269 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6270 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6271
6272 /*
6273 * Free shared secret.
6274 */
6275 freebn(s->K);
6276
6277 /*
6278 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6279 * deferred rekey reason.
6280 */
6281 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6282 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6283 pktin = NULL;
6284 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6285 goto begin_key_exchange;
6286 }
6287
6288 /*
6289 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6290 */
6291 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6292 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6293 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
6294 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6295 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6296
6297 /*
6298 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6299 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6300 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6301 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6302 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6303 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6304 */
6305 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6306 crReturn(0);
6307 }
6308 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6309
6310 /*
6311 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6312 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6313 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6314 * start.
6315 *
6316 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6317 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
6318 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6319 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6320 */
6321 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6322 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
6323 wait_for_rekey:
6324 crReturn(1);
6325 }
6326 if (pktin) {
6327 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6328 } else {
6329 /*
6330 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6331 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6332 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6333 * we process it anyway!)
6334 */
6335 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6336 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6337 (char *)in);
6338 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6339 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6340 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6341 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6342 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
6343 ssh->next_rekey =
6344 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6345 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6346 }
6347 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6348 } else {
6349 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6350 }
6351 }
6352 goto begin_key_exchange;
6353
6354 crFinish(1);
6355 }
6356
6357 /*
6358 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6359 */
6360 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6361 int len)
6362 {
6363 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6364 }
6365
6366 /*
6367 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6368 */
6369 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6370 {
6371 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6372 struct Packet *pktout;
6373
6374 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6375 int len;
6376 void *data;
6377 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6378 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6379 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6380 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6381 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6382 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6383 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6384 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6385 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6386 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6387 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6388 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6389 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6390 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6391 }
6392
6393 /*
6394 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6395 * still buffered.
6396 */
6397 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6398 }
6399
6400 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
6401 {
6402 int bufsize;
6403 if (c->closes)
6404 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
6405 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6406 if (bufsize == 0) {
6407 switch (c->type) {
6408 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6409 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6410 * notification since it will be polled */
6411 break;
6412 case CHAN_X11:
6413 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6414 break;
6415 case CHAN_AGENT:
6416 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6417 * buffer management */
6418 break;
6419 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6420 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6421 break;
6422 }
6423 }
6424
6425 /*
6426 * If we've emptied the channel's output buffer and there's a
6427 * pending close event, start the channel-closing procedure.
6428 */
6429 if (c->pending_close && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) == 0) {
6430 struct Packet *pktout;
6431 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6432 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6433 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6434 c->closes = 1;
6435 c->pending_close = FALSE;
6436 }
6437 }
6438
6439 /*
6440 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6441 */
6442 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6443 {
6444 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6445 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6446 c->closes = 0;
6447 c->pending_close = FALSE;
6448 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6449 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6450 ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6451 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6452 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6453 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6454 }
6455
6456 /*
6457 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6458 */
6459 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6460 {
6461 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6462
6463 /*
6464 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
6465 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
6466 * be sending any more data anyway.
6467 */
6468 if (c->closes != 0)
6469 return;
6470
6471 /*
6472 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6473 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6474 * window as well).
6475 */
6476 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6477 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6478
6479
6480 /*
6481 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6482 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6483 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6484 *
6485 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6486 */
6487 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6488 struct Packet *pktout;
6489 struct winadj *wa;
6490
6491 /*
6492 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6493 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6494 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6495 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6496 *
6497 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6498 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6499 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6500 *
6501 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6502 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6503 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6504 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6505 */
6506 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6507 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
6508 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6509 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6510 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6511 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6512 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6513
6514 /*
6515 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6516 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6517 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6518 */
6519 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6520 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6521 wa->next = NULL;
6522 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6523 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6524 else
6525 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6526 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6527 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6528 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6529 } else {
6530 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6531 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6532 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6533 }
6534 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6535 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6536 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6537 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6538 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6539 }
6540 }
6541
6542 /*
6543 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6544 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6545 */
6546 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6547 {
6548 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6549 struct ssh_channel *c;
6550
6551 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6552 if (!c ||
6553 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6554 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6555 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6556 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6557 pktin->type),
6558 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6559 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6560 sfree(buf);
6561 return NULL;
6562 }
6563 return c;
6564 }
6565
6566 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6567 {
6568 /*
6569 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6570 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6571 * installed.
6572 */
6573 struct ssh_channel *c;
6574 struct winadj *wa;
6575
6576 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6577 if (!c)
6578 return;
6579 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6580 if (wa)
6581 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS for "
6582 "\"winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org\"",
6583 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6584 else
6585 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6586 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6587 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6588 }
6589
6590 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6591 {
6592 /*
6593 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6594 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6595 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6596 * installed.
6597 */
6598 struct ssh_channel *c;
6599 struct winadj *wa;
6600
6601 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6602 if (!c)
6603 return;
6604 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6605 if (!wa) {
6606 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6607 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6608 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6609 return;
6610 }
6611 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6612 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6613 sfree(wa);
6614 /*
6615 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6616 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6617 * complete.
6618 */
6619 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6620 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6621 }
6622
6623 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6624 {
6625 struct ssh_channel *c;
6626 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6627 if (!c)
6628 return;
6629 if (!c->closes) {
6630 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6631 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
6632 }
6633 }
6634
6635 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6636 {
6637 char *data;
6638 int length;
6639 struct ssh_channel *c;
6640 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6641 if (!c)
6642 return;
6643 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6644 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6645 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6646 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6647 if (data) {
6648 int bufsize = 0;
6649 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6650 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6651 switch (c->type) {
6652 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6653 bufsize =
6654 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6655 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6656 data, length);
6657 break;
6658 case CHAN_X11:
6659 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6660 break;
6661 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6662 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6663 break;
6664 case CHAN_AGENT:
6665 while (length > 0) {
6666 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6667 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6668 (unsigned)length);
6669 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6670 data, l);
6671 data += l;
6672 length -= l;
6673 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6674 }
6675 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6676 c->u.a.totallen =
6677 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6678 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6679 unsigned char);
6680 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6681 }
6682 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6683 unsigned int l =
6684 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6685 (unsigned)length);
6686 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6687 data, l);
6688 data += l;
6689 length -= l;
6690 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6691 }
6692 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6693 void *reply;
6694 int replylen;
6695 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6696 c->u.a.totallen,
6697 &reply, &replylen,
6698 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6699 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6700 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6701 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6702 }
6703 }
6704 bufsize = 0;
6705 break;
6706 }
6707 /*
6708 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6709 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6710 * larger window.
6711 */
6712 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6713 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6714 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6715 /*
6716 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6717 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6718 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6719 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6720 * sent excess data.
6721 */
6722 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6723 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6724 /*
6725 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6726 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6727 * throttle the whole channel.
6728 */
6729 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6730 (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
6731 !c->throttling_conn) {
6732 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6733 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6734 }
6735 }
6736 }
6737
6738 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6739 {
6740 struct ssh_channel *c;
6741
6742 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6743 if (!c)
6744 return;
6745
6746 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6747 /*
6748 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
6749 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
6750 */
6751 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6752 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
6753 sshfwd_close(c);
6754 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6755 sshfwd_close(c);
6756 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6757 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6758 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
6759 sshfwd_close(c);
6760 }
6761 }
6762
6763 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6764 {
6765 struct ssh_channel *c;
6766 struct Packet *pktout;
6767
6768 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6769 if (!c)
6770 return;
6771 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6772 switch (c->type) {
6773 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6774 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6775 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6776 break;
6777 case CHAN_X11:
6778 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6779 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6780 sshfwd_close(c);
6781 break;
6782 case CHAN_AGENT:
6783 sshfwd_close(c);
6784 break;
6785 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6786 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6787 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6788 sshfwd_close(c);
6789 break;
6790 }
6791 if (c->closes == 0) {
6792 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6793 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6794 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6795 }
6796 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6797 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6798 sfree(c);
6799
6800 /*
6801 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6802 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6803 * not running in -N mode.)
6804 */
6805 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6806 /*
6807 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6808 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6809 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6810 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6811 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6812 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6813 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6814 * this is more polite than sending a
6815 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6816 */
6817 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6818 }
6819 }
6820
6821 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6822 {
6823 struct ssh_channel *c;
6824 struct Packet *pktout;
6825
6826 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6827 if (!c)
6828 return;
6829 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6830 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6831 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6832 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6833 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6834 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6835 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6836 if (c->u.pfd.s)
6837 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6838 if (c->closes) {
6839 /*
6840 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6841 * which we decided on before the server acked
6842 * the channel open. So now we know the
6843 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6844 */
6845 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6846 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6847 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6848 }
6849 }
6850
6851 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6852 {
6853 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6854 "<unknown reason code>",
6855 "Administratively prohibited",
6856 "Connect failed",
6857 "Unknown channel type",
6858 "Resource shortage",
6859 };
6860 unsigned reason_code;
6861 char *reason_string;
6862 int reason_length;
6863 struct ssh_channel *c;
6864 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6865 if (!c)
6866 return;
6867 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6868 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6869
6870 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6871 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6872 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6873 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6874 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6875 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6876
6877 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6878
6879 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6880 sfree(c);
6881 }
6882
6883 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6884 {
6885 char *type;
6886 int typelen, want_reply;
6887 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6888 struct ssh_channel *c;
6889 struct Packet *pktout;
6890
6891 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6892 if (!c)
6893 return;
6894 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6895 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6896
6897 /*
6898 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6899 * the request type string to see if it's something
6900 * we recognise.
6901 */
6902 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6903 /*
6904 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6905 * the primary channel.
6906 */
6907 if (typelen == 11 &&
6908 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6909
6910 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6911 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6912 ssh->exitcode);
6913 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6914
6915 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6916 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6917
6918 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6919 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6920 char *msg;
6921 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6922 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6923 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6924 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
6925 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6926 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6927 {
6928 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6929 pktin->savedpos;
6930 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6931 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6932 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6933 if (num == 0) {
6934 is_int = FALSE;
6935 } else {
6936 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6937 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6938 do { \
6939 long q = offset; \
6940 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6941 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6942 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6943 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6944 result = TRUE; \
6945 } \
6946 } while(0)
6947 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6948 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6949 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6950 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6951 is_int = TRUE;
6952 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6953 is_int = FALSE;
6954 else
6955 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6956 is_plausible = FALSE;
6957 }
6958 }
6959 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
6960 if (is_plausible) {
6961 if (is_int) {
6962 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6963 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6964 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6965 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
6966 } else {
6967 /* As per RFC 4254. */
6968 char *sig;
6969 int siglen;
6970 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6971 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6972 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6973 if (siglen) {
6974 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6975 siglen, sig);
6976 }
6977
6978 /*
6979 * Really hideous method of translating the
6980 * signal description back into a locally
6981 * meaningful number.
6982 */
6983
6984 if (0)
6985 ;
6986 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
6987 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
6988 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
6989 #ifdef SIGABRT
6990 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
6991 #endif
6992 #ifdef SIGALRM
6993 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
6994 #endif
6995 #ifdef SIGFPE
6996 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
6997 #endif
6998 #ifdef SIGHUP
6999 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
7000 #endif
7001 #ifdef SIGILL
7002 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
7003 #endif
7004 #ifdef SIGINT
7005 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
7006 #endif
7007 #ifdef SIGKILL
7008 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
7009 #endif
7010 #ifdef SIGPIPE
7011 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
7012 #endif
7013 #ifdef SIGQUIT
7014 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
7015 #endif
7016 #ifdef SIGSEGV
7017 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
7018 #endif
7019 #ifdef SIGTERM
7020 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
7021 #endif
7022 #ifdef SIGUSR1
7023 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
7024 #endif
7025 #ifdef SIGUSR2
7026 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
7027 #endif
7028 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
7029 else
7030 ssh->exitcode = 128;
7031 }
7032 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7033 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7034 if (msglen) {
7035 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
7036 }
7037 /* ignore lang tag */
7038 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
7039 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
7040 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
7041 fmt_msg);
7042 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
7043 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
7044 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7045
7046 }
7047 } else {
7048 /*
7049 * This is a channel request we don't know
7050 * about, so we now either ignore the request
7051 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
7052 * on want_reply.
7053 */
7054 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
7055 }
7056 if (want_reply) {
7057 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
7058 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7059 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7060 }
7061 }
7062
7063 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7064 {
7065 char *type;
7066 int typelen, want_reply;
7067 struct Packet *pktout;
7068
7069 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7070 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7071
7072 /*
7073 * We currently don't support any global requests
7074 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
7075 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
7076 * want_reply.
7077 */
7078 if (want_reply) {
7079 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
7080 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7081 }
7082 }
7083
7084 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7085 {
7086 char *type;
7087 int typelen;
7088 char *peeraddr;
7089 int peeraddrlen;
7090 int peerport;
7091 char *error = NULL;
7092 struct ssh_channel *c;
7093 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7094 struct Packet *pktout;
7095
7096 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7097 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7098 c->ssh = ssh;
7099
7100 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7101 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7102 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7103
7104 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7105 char *addrstr;
7106 const char *x11err;
7107
7108 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7109 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7110 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7111 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7112 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7113
7114 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7115 addrstr, peerport);
7116
7117 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7118 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7119 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7120 addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
7121 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7122 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7123 } else {
7124 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7125 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7126 }
7127
7128 sfree(addrstr);
7129 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7130 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7131 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7132 char *dummy;
7133 int dummylen;
7134 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7135 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7136 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7137 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7138 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7139 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7140 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7141 if (realpf == NULL) {
7142 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7143 } else {
7144 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7145 realpf->dhost,
7146 realpf->dport, c,
7147 &ssh->cfg,
7148 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7149 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7150 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7151 if (e != NULL) {
7152 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7153 error = "Port open failed";
7154 } else {
7155 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7156 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7157 }
7158 }
7159 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7160 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7161 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7162 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7163 else {
7164 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7165 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7166 }
7167 } else {
7168 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7169 }
7170
7171 c->remoteid = remid;
7172 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7173 if (error) {
7174 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7175 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7176 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7177 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7178 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7179 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7180 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7181 sfree(c);
7182 } else {
7183 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7184 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7185 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7186 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7187 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7188 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7189 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7190 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7191 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7192 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7193 }
7194 }
7195
7196 /*
7197 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
7198 * if we're going to display them.
7199 */
7200 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7201 {
7202 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7203 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_show_banner &&
7204 bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7205 char *banner = NULL;
7206 int size = 0;
7207 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7208 if (banner)
7209 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7210 }
7211 }
7212
7213 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7214 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7215 {
7216 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7217 int i = 0;
7218 unsigned int arg = 0;
7219 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7220 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7221 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7222 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7223 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7224 break;
7225 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7226 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7227 break;
7228 }
7229 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7230 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7231 }
7232
7233 /*
7234 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7235 */
7236 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7237 struct Packet *pktin)
7238 {
7239 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7240 enum {
7241 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7242 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7243 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7244 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7245 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7246 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI,
7247 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7248 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7249 } type;
7250 int done_service_req;
7251 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7252 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7253 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7254 int can_gssapi;
7255 int tried_gssapi;
7256 #endif
7257 int kbd_inter_refused;
7258 int we_are_in;
7259 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7260 int num_prompts;
7261 char username[100];
7262 char *password;
7263 int got_username;
7264 void *publickey_blob;
7265 int publickey_bloblen;
7266 int publickey_encrypted;
7267 char *publickey_algorithm;
7268 char *publickey_comment;
7269 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7270 int agent_responselen;
7271 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7272 int keyi, nkeys;
7273 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7274 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7275 int siglen, retlen, len;
7276 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7277 int try_send;
7278 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7279 struct Packet *pktout;
7280 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7281 struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
7282 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7283 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7284 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7285 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7286 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7287 #endif
7288 };
7289 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7290
7291 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
7292
7293 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7294 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7295 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7296 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7297 #endif
7298
7299 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
7300 /*
7301 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7302 */
7303 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7304 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7305 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7306 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7307 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7308 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7309 }
7310 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7311 /*
7312 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7313 */
7314 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7315 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7316 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7317 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7318 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7319 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7320 } else {
7321 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7322 crStopV;
7323 }
7324 }
7325
7326 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7327 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7328 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7329 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7330 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7331
7332 /*
7333 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7334 */
7335 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7336 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7337
7338 /*
7339 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7340 * for later use.
7341 */
7342 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
7343 int keytype;
7344 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7345 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
7346 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
7347 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7348 const char *error;
7349 s->publickey_blob =
7350 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
7351 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7352 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7353 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7354 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7355 s->publickey_encrypted =
7356 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
7357 } else {
7358 char *msgbuf;
7359 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7360 error);
7361 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7362 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7363 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7364 error);
7365 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7366 sfree(msgbuf);
7367 }
7368 } else {
7369 char *msgbuf;
7370 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7371 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7372 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7373 " (%s)\r\n",
7374 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7375 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7376 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7377 sfree(msgbuf);
7378 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7379 }
7380 }
7381
7382 /*
7383 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7384 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7385 */
7386 s->nkeys = 0;
7387 s->agent_response = NULL;
7388 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7389 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
7390
7391 void *r;
7392
7393 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7394
7395 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7396 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7397 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7398 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7399 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7400 do {
7401 crReturnV;
7402 if (pktin) {
7403 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7404 " waiting for agent response"));
7405 crStopV;
7406 }
7407 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7408 r = ssh->agent_response;
7409 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7410 }
7411 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7412 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7413 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7414 int keyi;
7415 unsigned char *p;
7416 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7417 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7418 p += 4;
7419 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7420 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7421 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7422 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7423 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7424 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7425 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7426 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7427 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7428 "configured key file", keyi);
7429 s->keyi = keyi;
7430 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7431 break;
7432 }
7433 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7434 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7435 }
7436 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7437 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7438 s->nkeys = 0;
7439 }
7440 }
7441 }
7442 }
7443
7444 }
7445
7446 /*
7447 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7448 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7449 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7450 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7451 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7452 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7453 *
7454 * I think this best serves the needs of
7455 *
7456 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7457 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7458 * type both correctly
7459 *
7460 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7461 * need to fall back to passwords
7462 *
7463 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7464 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7465 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7466 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7467 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7468 * retype it!
7469 */
7470 s->username[0] = '\0';
7471 s->got_username = FALSE;
7472 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7473 /*
7474 * Get a username.
7475 */
7476 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7477 /*
7478 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7479 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7480 * it again.
7481 */
7482 } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
7483 sizeof(s->username))) {
7484 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7485 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7486 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7487 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7488 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
7489 lenof(s->username));
7490 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7491 while (ret < 0) {
7492 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7493 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7494 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7495 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7496 }
7497 if (!ret) {
7498 /*
7499 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7500 * Terminate.
7501 */
7502 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7503 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7504 crStopV;
7505 }
7506 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
7507 lenof(s->username));
7508 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7509 } else {
7510 char *stuff;
7511 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7512 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
7513 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7514 sfree(stuff);
7515 }
7516 }
7517 s->got_username = TRUE;
7518
7519 /*
7520 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7521 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7522 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7523 */
7524 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7525
7526 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7527 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7528 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7529 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7530 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7531 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7532 s->gotit = FALSE;
7533 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7534
7535 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7536 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7537
7538 /* Reset agent request state. */
7539 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7540 if (s->agent_response) {
7541 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7542 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7543 } else {
7544 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7545 s->keyi = 0;
7546 }
7547 }
7548
7549 while (1) {
7550 char *methods = NULL;
7551 int methlen = 0;
7552
7553 /*
7554 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7555 */
7556 if (!s->gotit)
7557 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7558 /*
7559 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7560 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7561 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7562 * with.)
7563 */
7564 {
7565 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7566 /*
7567 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7568 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7569 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7570 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7571 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7572 * output of (say) plink.)
7573 */
7574 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7575 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7576 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7577 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7578 sfree(banner);
7579 }
7580 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7581 }
7582 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7583 logevent("Access granted");
7584 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
7585 break;
7586 }
7587
7588 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7589 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7590 "type %d", pktin->type));
7591 crStopV;
7592 }
7593
7594 s->gotit = FALSE;
7595
7596 /*
7597 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7598 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7599 * helpfully try next.
7600 */
7601 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7602 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7603 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7604 /*
7605 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7606 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7607 * messages:
7608 *
7609 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
7610 * it's not worth printing anything at all
7611 *
7612 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
7613 * the message should be "Server refused our
7614 * key" (or no message at all if the key
7615 * came from Pageant)
7616 *
7617 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
7618 * message really should be "Access denied".
7619 *
7620 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7621 * authentication, we should break out of this
7622 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7623 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7624 * username change attempts).
7625 */
7626 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7627 /* do nothing */
7628 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7629 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7630 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7631 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7632 logevent("Server refused public key");
7633 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7634 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
7635 } else {
7636 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7637 logevent("Access denied");
7638 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
7639 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7640 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7641 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7642 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7643 break;
7644 }
7645 }
7646 } else {
7647 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7648 logevent("Further authentication required");
7649 }
7650
7651 s->can_pubkey =
7652 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7653 s->can_passwd =
7654 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7655 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
7656 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7657 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7658 if (!ssh->gsslibs)
7659 ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(&ssh->cfg);
7660 s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
7661 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7662 ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
7663 #endif
7664 }
7665
7666 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7667
7668 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7669
7670 /*
7671 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7672 */
7673
7674 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7675
7676 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7677
7678 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7679 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7680 s->agentp += 4;
7681 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7682 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7683 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7684 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7685 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7686 s->agentp += 4;
7687 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7688 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7689 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7690
7691 /* See if server will accept it */
7692 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7693 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7694 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7695 /* service requested */
7696 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7697 /* method */
7698 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7699 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7700 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7701 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7702 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7703 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7704 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7705
7706 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7707 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7708
7709 /* Offer of key refused. */
7710 s->gotit = TRUE;
7711
7712 } else {
7713
7714 void *vret;
7715
7716 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7717 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7718 "public key \"");
7719 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7720 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7721 }
7722
7723 /*
7724 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7725 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7726 */
7727 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7728 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7729 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7730 /* service requested */
7731 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7732 /* method */
7733 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7734 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7735 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7736 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7737 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7738
7739 /* Ask agent for signature. */
7740 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7741 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7742 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7743 s->siglen -= 4;
7744 s->len = 1; /* message type */
7745 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
7746 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
7747 s->len += 4; /* flags */
7748 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
7749 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
7750 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
7751 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
7752 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
7753 s->q += 4;
7754 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7755 s->q += s->pklen;
7756 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
7757 s->q += 4;
7758 /* Now the data to be signed... */
7759 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7760 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7761 s->q += 4;
7762 }
7763 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
7764 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7765 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7766 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
7767 s->pktout->length - 5);
7768 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
7769 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
7770 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
7771 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
7772 &vret, &s->retlen,
7773 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7774 do {
7775 crReturnV;
7776 if (pktin) {
7777 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
7778 " while waiting for agent"
7779 " response"));
7780 crStopV;
7781 }
7782 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7783 vret = ssh->agent_response;
7784 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7785 }
7786 s->ret = vret;
7787 sfree(s->agentreq);
7788 if (s->ret) {
7789 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
7790 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
7791 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
7792 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
7793 s->ret + 9,
7794 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
7795 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7796 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7797 } else {
7798 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
7799 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
7800 crStopV;
7801 }
7802 }
7803 }
7804
7805 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
7806 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7807 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7808 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7809 } else {
7810 s->keyi++;
7811 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
7812 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7813 }
7814
7815 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
7816 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
7817
7818 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
7819 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
7820
7821 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7822
7823 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7824
7825 /*
7826 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
7827 *
7828 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
7829 * willing to accept it.
7830 */
7831 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7832 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7833 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7834 /* service requested */
7835 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7836 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7837 /* no signature included */
7838 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
7839 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7840 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
7841 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
7842 s->publickey_bloblen);
7843 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7844 logevent("Offered public key");
7845
7846 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7847 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7848 /* Key refused. Give up. */
7849 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
7850 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
7851 continue; /* process this new message */
7852 }
7853 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
7854
7855 /*
7856 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
7857 * the key.
7858 */
7859 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7860 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
7861 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
7862 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
7863 }
7864 key = NULL;
7865 while (!key) {
7866 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
7867 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
7868 /*
7869 * Get a passphrase from the user.
7870 */
7871 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7872 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7873 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
7874 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
7875 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7876 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
7877 s->publickey_comment),
7878 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7879 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7880 while (ret < 0) {
7881 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7882 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7883 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
7884 in, inlen);
7885 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7886 }
7887 if (!ret) {
7888 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
7889 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7890 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7891 "Unable to authenticate",
7892 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7893 TRUE);
7894 crStopV;
7895 }
7896 passphrase =
7897 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7898 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7899 } else {
7900 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
7901 }
7902
7903 /*
7904 * Try decrypting the key.
7905 */
7906 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
7907 &error);
7908 if (passphrase) {
7909 /* burn the evidence */
7910 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
7911 sfree(passphrase);
7912 }
7913 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7914 if (passphrase &&
7915 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
7916 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7917 key = NULL;
7918 /* and loop again */
7919 } else {
7920 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7921 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7922 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7923 key = NULL;
7924 break; /* try something else */
7925 }
7926 }
7927 }
7928
7929 if (key) {
7930 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7931 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7932 int p;
7933
7934 /*
7935 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7936 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7937 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7938 */
7939 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7940 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7941 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7942 /* service requested */
7943 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7944 /* method */
7945 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7946 /* signature follows */
7947 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7948 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
7949 &pkblob_len);
7950 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7951 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
7952 pkblob_len);
7953
7954 /*
7955 * The data to be signed is:
7956 *
7957 * string session-id
7958 *
7959 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7960 * outgoing packet.
7961 */
7962 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7963 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7964 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7965 sigdata_len -= 4;
7966 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7967 p = 0;
7968 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7969 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7970 p += 4;
7971 }
7972 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
7973 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7974 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7975 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7976 s->pktout->length - 5);
7977 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7978 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7979 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7980 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7981 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7982 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7983 sfree(pkblob);
7984 sfree(sigblob);
7985 sfree(sigdata);
7986
7987 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7988 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7989 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7990 }
7991
7992 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7993 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
7994
7995 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
7996
7997 int micoffset, len;
7998 char *data;
7999 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
8000 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
8001 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
8002 s->gotit = TRUE;
8003 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
8004
8005 /*
8006 * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
8007 * list.
8008 */
8009 {
8010 int i, j;
8011 s->gsslib = NULL;
8012 for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
8013 int want_id = ssh->cfg.ssh_gsslist[i];
8014 for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
8015 if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
8016 s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
8017 goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
8018 }
8019 }
8020 got_gsslib:
8021 /*
8022 * We always expect to have found something in
8023 * the above loop: we only came here if there
8024 * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
8025 * preference list should always mention
8026 * everything and only change the order.
8027 */
8028 assert(s->gsslib);
8029 }
8030
8031 if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
8032 logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
8033
8034 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
8035 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8036 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8037 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8038 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8039
8040 /* add mechanism info */
8041 s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
8042
8043 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
8044 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
8045
8046 /* length of OID + 2 */
8047 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
8048 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
8049
8050 /* length of OID */
8051 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
8052
8053 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
8054 s->gss_buf.length);
8055 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8056 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8057 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
8058 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
8059 continue;
8060 }
8061
8062 /* check returned packet ... */
8063
8064 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8065 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8066 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8067 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
8068 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
8069 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
8070 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
8071 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
8072 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
8073 continue;
8074 }
8075
8076 /* now start running */
8077 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
8078 ssh->fullhostname,
8079 &s->gss_srv_name);
8080 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8081 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
8082 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
8083 else
8084 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
8085 continue;
8086 }
8087
8088 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
8089 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8090
8091 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8092 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
8093 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8094 continue;
8095 }
8096
8097 /* initial tokens are empty */
8098 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
8099 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
8100
8101 /* now enter the loop */
8102 do {
8103 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
8104 (s->gsslib,
8105 &s->gss_ctx,
8106 s->gss_srv_name,
8107 ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
8108 &s->gss_rcvtok,
8109 &s->gss_sndtok);
8110
8111 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
8112 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8113 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
8114
8115 if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
8116 &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
8117 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
8118 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
8119 }
8120
8121 break;
8122 }
8123 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
8124
8125 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
8126 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
8127
8128 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8129 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8130 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8131 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8132 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8133 s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
8134 }
8135
8136 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8137 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8138 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8139 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8140 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8141 break;
8142 }
8143 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8144 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8145 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8146 }
8147 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8148
8149 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8150 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8151 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8152 continue;
8153 }
8154 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8155
8156 /* Now send the MIC */
8157
8158 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8159 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8160 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8161 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8162 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8163 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8164 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8165 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8166
8167 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8168 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8169
8170 s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8171 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8172 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8173 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8174 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8175 s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
8176
8177 s->gotit = FALSE;
8178
8179 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8180 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8181 continue;
8182 #endif
8183 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8184
8185 /*
8186 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8187 */
8188
8189 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8190
8191 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8192
8193 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8194 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8195 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8196 /* service requested */
8197 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8198 /* method */
8199 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8200 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8201 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8202
8203 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8204 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8205 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8206 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8207 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8208 * Give up on it entirely. */
8209 s->gotit = TRUE;
8210 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
8211 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
8212 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8213 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8214 continue;
8215 }
8216
8217 /*
8218 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8219 */
8220 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8221
8222 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8223 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8224 int i;
8225
8226 /*
8227 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8228 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8229 */
8230 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8231 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8232 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8233 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8234 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8235
8236 /*
8237 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8238 */
8239 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8240 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8241 char *prompt;
8242 int prompt_len;
8243 int echo;
8244 static char noprompt[] =
8245 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8246
8247 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8248 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8249 if (!prompt_len) {
8250 prompt = noprompt;
8251 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8252 }
8253 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8254 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8255 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8256 }
8257
8258 if (name_len) {
8259 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8260 * local prompts? */
8261 s->cur_prompt->name =
8262 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8263 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8264 } else {
8265 s->cur_prompt->name =
8266 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8267 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8268 }
8269 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8270 * has come from the server.
8271 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8272 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8273 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8274 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8275 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8276 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8277 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8278 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8279 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8280 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8281 } else {
8282 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8283 }
8284
8285 /*
8286 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8287 * response(s).
8288 */
8289 {
8290 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8291 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8292 while (ret < 0) {
8293 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8294 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8295 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8296 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8297 }
8298 if (!ret) {
8299 /*
8300 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8301 */
8302 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8303 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8304 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8305 TRUE);
8306 crStopV;
8307 }
8308 }
8309
8310 /*
8311 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8312 */
8313 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8314 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8315 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8316 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8317 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8318 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8319 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8320 }
8321 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8322
8323 /*
8324 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8325 * INFO_REQUEST.
8326 */
8327 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8328
8329 }
8330
8331 /*
8332 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8333 */
8334 s->gotit = TRUE;
8335
8336 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8337
8338 /*
8339 * Plain old password authentication.
8340 */
8341 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8342 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8343
8344 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8345
8346 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8347 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8348 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8349 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
8350 s->username,
8351 ssh->savedhost),
8352 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8353
8354 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8355 while (ret < 0) {
8356 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8357 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8358 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8359 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8360 }
8361 if (!ret) {
8362 /*
8363 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8364 */
8365 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8366 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8367 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8368 TRUE);
8369 crStopV;
8370 }
8371 /*
8372 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8373 * asked to change it.)
8374 */
8375 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8376 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8377
8378 /*
8379 * Send the password packet.
8380 *
8381 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8382 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8383 * user's password.
8384 *
8385 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8386 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8387 * people who find out how long their password is!
8388 */
8389 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8390 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8391 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8392 /* service requested */
8393 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8394 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8395 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8396 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8397 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8398 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8399 logevent("Sent password");
8400 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8401
8402 /*
8403 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8404 * request.
8405 */
8406 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8407 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8408
8409 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8410
8411 /*
8412 * We're being asked for a new password
8413 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8414 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8415 */
8416
8417 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8418 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8419 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8420
8421 {
8422 char *msg;
8423 if (changereq_first_time)
8424 msg = "Server requested password change";
8425 else
8426 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8427 logevent(msg);
8428 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8429 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8430 }
8431
8432 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8433
8434 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8435 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8436 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8437 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8438 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8439 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8440 /*
8441 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8442 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8443 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8444 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8445 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8446 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8447 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8448 *
8449 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8450 * to check this field.)
8451 */
8452 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8453 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8454 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8455 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8456 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8457 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8458 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8459
8460 /*
8461 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8462 * password twice.
8463 */
8464 while (!got_new) {
8465
8466 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8467 while (ret < 0) {
8468 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8469 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8470 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8471 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8472 }
8473 if (!ret) {
8474 /*
8475 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8476 */
8477 /* burn the evidence */
8478 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8479 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8480 sfree(s->password);
8481 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8482 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8483 TRUE);
8484 crStopV;
8485 }
8486
8487 /*
8488 * If the user specified a new original password
8489 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8490 * one.
8491 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8492 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8493 */
8494 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8495 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8496 /* burn the evidence */
8497 sfree(s->password);
8498 s->password =
8499 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8500 }
8501
8502 /*
8503 * Check the two new passwords match.
8504 */
8505 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8506 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8507 == 0);
8508 if (!got_new)
8509 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8510 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8511
8512 }
8513
8514 /*
8515 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8516 * (see above for padding rationale)
8517 */
8518 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8519 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8520 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8521 /* service requested */
8522 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8523 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8524 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8525 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8526 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8527 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8528 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8529 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8530 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8531 logevent("Sent new password");
8532
8533 /*
8534 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8535 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8536 * new password.)
8537 */
8538 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8539 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8540
8541 }
8542
8543 /*
8544 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8545 * of the loop. Either:
8546 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8547 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8548 * usual meaning
8549 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8550 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8551 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8552 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8553 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8554 * the loop and start again.
8555 */
8556 s->gotit = TRUE;
8557
8558 /*
8559 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8560 * case. Burn the evidence.
8561 */
8562 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8563 sfree(s->password);
8564
8565 } else {
8566 char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
8567 " (server sent: %.*s)",
8568 methlen, methods);
8569
8570 ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
8571 "No supported authentication methods available",
8572 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8573 FALSE);
8574 sfree(str);
8575
8576 crStopV;
8577
8578 }
8579
8580 }
8581 }
8582 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8583
8584 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8585 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8586 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8587 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8588 }
8589 if (s->agent_response)
8590 sfree(s->agent_response);
8591
8592 /*
8593 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8594 */
8595
8596 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8597
8598 /*
8599 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8600 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8601 */
8602 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8603 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8604 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8605 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8606
8607 /*
8608 * Create the main session channel.
8609 */
8610 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
8611 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8612 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
8613 /*
8614 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8615 * channel.
8616 */
8617 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8618 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8619 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8620 logeventf(ssh,
8621 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8622 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8623 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8624 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8625 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8626 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8627 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8628 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
8629 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8630 /*
8631 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8632 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8633 * information.
8634 */
8635 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8636 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8637 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8638
8639 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8640 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8641 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8642 crStopV;
8643 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8644 }
8645 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8646 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8647 crStopV;
8648 }
8649 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8650 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8651 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8652 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8653 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8654 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8655 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8656 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8657 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8658 } else {
8659 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8660 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8661 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8662 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8663 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8664 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8665 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8666 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8667 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8668 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8669 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8670 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8671 crStopV;
8672 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8673 }
8674 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8675 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8676 crStopV;
8677 }
8678 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8679 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8680 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8681 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8682 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8683 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8684 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8685 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8686 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8687 }
8688
8689 /*
8690 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8691 * general channel-based messages.
8692 */
8693 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8694 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8695 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8696 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8697 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8698 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8699 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8700 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8701 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8702 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8703 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8704 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8705 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8706
8707 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
8708 /*
8709 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8710 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8711 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
8712 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
8713 */
8714 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8715 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8716 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
8717 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
8718 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8719 }
8720
8721 /*
8722 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
8723 */
8724 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
8725 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
8726 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
8727 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
8728 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8729 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8730 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
8731 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8732 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
8733 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
8734 /*
8735 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
8736 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
8737 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
8738 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
8739 * cookie into the log.
8740 */
8741 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8742 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
8743 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8744 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
8745 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8746
8747 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8748
8749 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8750 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8751 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
8752 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8753 crStopV;
8754 }
8755 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
8756 } else {
8757 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
8758 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
8759 }
8760 }
8761
8762 /*
8763 * Enable port forwardings.
8764 */
8765 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
8766
8767 /*
8768 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
8769 */
8770 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
8771 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
8772 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8773 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8774 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
8775 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8776 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8777
8778 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8779
8780 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8781 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8782 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
8783 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8784 crStopV;
8785 }
8786 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
8787 } else {
8788 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
8789 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
8790 }
8791 }
8792
8793 /*
8794 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
8795 */
8796 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8797 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
8798 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
8799 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
8800 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
8801 /* Build the pty request. */
8802 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8803 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8804 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
8805 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8806 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
8807 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
8808 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
8809 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
8810 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
8811 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8812 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
8813 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
8814 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
8815 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
8816 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
8817 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
8818 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
8819 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8820 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
8821
8822 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8823
8824 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8825 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8826 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
8827 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8828 crStopV;
8829 }
8830 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
8831 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8832 } else {
8833 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
8834 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
8835 }
8836 } else {
8837 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8838 }
8839
8840 /*
8841 * Send environment variables.
8842 *
8843 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
8844 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
8845 */
8846 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
8847 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
8848 char *var, *varend, *val;
8849
8850 s->num_env = 0;
8851
8852 while (*e) {
8853 var = e;
8854 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
8855 varend = e;
8856 if (*e == '\t') e++;
8857 val = e;
8858 while (*e) e++;
8859 e++;
8860
8861 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8862 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8863 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
8864 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8865 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8866 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
8867 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
8868 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8869
8870 s->num_env++;
8871 }
8872
8873 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
8874
8875 s->env_ok = 0;
8876 s->env_left = s->num_env;
8877
8878 while (s->env_left > 0) {
8879 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8880
8881 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8882 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8883 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
8884 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8885 crStopV;
8886 }
8887 } else {
8888 s->env_ok++;
8889 }
8890
8891 s->env_left--;
8892 }
8893
8894 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
8895 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
8896 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
8897 logevent("All environment variables refused");
8898 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
8899 } else {
8900 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
8901 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
8902 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
8903 }
8904 }
8905
8906 /*
8907 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
8908 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
8909 * of command.
8910 */
8911 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
8912 int subsys;
8913 char *cmd;
8914
8915 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
8916 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
8917 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
8918 } else {
8919 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
8920 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
8921 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
8922 }
8923
8924 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8925 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8926 if (subsys) {
8927 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
8928 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8929 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8930 } else if (*cmd) {
8931 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
8932 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8933 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8934 } else {
8935 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
8936 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8937 }
8938 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8939
8940 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8941
8942 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8943 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8944 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
8945 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8946 crStopV;
8947 }
8948 /*
8949 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
8950 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
8951 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
8952 * back to it before complaining.
8953 */
8954 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
8955 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
8956 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
8957 continue;
8958 }
8959 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
8960 crStopV;
8961 } else {
8962 logevent("Started a shell/command");
8963 }
8964 break;
8965 }
8966
8967 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
8968 if (ssh->size_needed)
8969 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
8970 if (ssh->eof_needed)
8971 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
8972
8973 /*
8974 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
8975 * failure handler.
8976 */
8977 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
8978 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
8979
8980 /*
8981 * Transfer data!
8982 */
8983 if (ssh->ldisc)
8984 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
8985 if (ssh->mainchan)
8986 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8987 while (1) {
8988 crReturnV;
8989 s->try_send = FALSE;
8990 if (pktin) {
8991
8992 /*
8993 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
8994 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
8995 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
8996 */
8997
8998 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
8999 crStopV;
9000 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9001 /*
9002 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
9003 */
9004 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
9005 s->try_send = TRUE;
9006 }
9007 if (s->try_send) {
9008 int i;
9009 struct ssh_channel *c;
9010 /*
9011 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
9012 */
9013 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
9014 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
9015 }
9016 }
9017
9018 crFinishV;
9019 }
9020
9021 /*
9022 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
9023 */
9024 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9025 {
9026 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
9027 char *buf, *msg;
9028 int reason, msglen;
9029
9030 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
9031 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9032
9033 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
9034 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
9035 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
9036 } else {
9037 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
9038 " type %d)", reason);
9039 }
9040 logevent(buf);
9041 sfree(buf);
9042 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
9043 msglen, msg);
9044 logevent(buf);
9045 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
9046 reason,
9047 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
9048 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
9049 msglen, msg));
9050 sfree(buf);
9051 }
9052
9053 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9054 {
9055 /* log the debug message */
9056 char *msg;
9057 int msglen;
9058 int always_display;
9059
9060 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
9061 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
9062 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9063
9064 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
9065 }
9066
9067 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9068 {
9069 struct Packet *pktout;
9070 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
9071 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
9072 /*
9073 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
9074 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
9075 */
9076 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9077 }
9078
9079 /*
9080 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
9081 */
9082 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
9083 {
9084 int i;
9085
9086 /*
9087 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
9088 */
9089 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
9090 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
9091
9092 /*
9093 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
9094 * the coroutines will get it.
9095 */
9096 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
9097 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
9098 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
9099 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
9100 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
9101 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
9102 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
9103 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9104 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9105 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
9106 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
9107 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
9108 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
9109 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9110 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
9111 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
9112 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9113 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9114 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
9115 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9116 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9117 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
9118 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
9119 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
9120 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
9121 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
9122 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
9123 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
9124 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
9125 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
9126 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9127 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9128 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
9129
9130 /*
9131 * These special message types we install handlers for.
9132 */
9133 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9134 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9135 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9136 }
9137
9138 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9139 {
9140 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9141
9142 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9143 return;
9144
9145 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
9146 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9147 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9148 }
9149 }
9150
9151 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9152 struct Packet *pktin)
9153 {
9154 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9155 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9156 return;
9157
9158 if (pktin) {
9159 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9160 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9161 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9162 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9163 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9164 }
9165
9166 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9167 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9168 return;
9169 }
9170
9171 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9172 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9173 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9174 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9175 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9176 /*
9177 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9178 */
9179 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9180 }
9181 } else {
9182 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9183 }
9184 }
9185
9186 /*
9187 * Called to set up the connection.
9188 *
9189 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9190 */
9191 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9192 Config *cfg,
9193 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
9194 int keepalive)
9195 {
9196 const char *p;
9197 Ssh ssh;
9198
9199 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9200 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9201 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9202 ssh->s = NULL;
9203 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9204 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9205 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9206 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9207 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9208 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9209 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9210 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9211 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9212 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9213 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9214 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9215 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9216 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9217 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9218 ssh->kex = NULL;
9219 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9220 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9221 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9222 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9223 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9224 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9225 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9226 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9227 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9228 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9229 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9230 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9231 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9232 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9233 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9234 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9235 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9236 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9237 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9238 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9239 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9240 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
9241 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9242 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9243 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
9244 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
9245 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
9246 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9247 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9248 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9249 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9250 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9251 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9252 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9253 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9254 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9255 ssh->queue = NULL;
9256 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9257 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9258 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9259 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9260 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9261 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9262
9263 *backend_handle = ssh;
9264
9265 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9266 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9267 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9268 #endif
9269
9270 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9271 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
9272 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
9273
9274 ssh->channels = NULL;
9275 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9276 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9277
9278 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9279 ssh->editing = 0;
9280 ssh->echoing = 0;
9281 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9282 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9283 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9284
9285 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9286
9287 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9288
9289 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9290
9291 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9292 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9293 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
9294 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9295
9296 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9297 ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
9298 #endif
9299
9300 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9301 if (p != NULL)
9302 return p;
9303
9304 random_ref();
9305
9306 return NULL;
9307 }
9308
9309 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9310 {
9311 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9312 struct ssh_channel *c;
9313 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9314
9315 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9316 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9317 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9318 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9319 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9320 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9321 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9322 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9323 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9324 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9325 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9326 if (ssh->cscomp)
9327 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9328 else
9329 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9330 }
9331 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9332 if (ssh->sccomp)
9333 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9334 else
9335 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9336 }
9337 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9338 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9339 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9340
9341 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9342 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9343 sfree(ssh->queue);
9344
9345 while (ssh->qhead) {
9346 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9347 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9348 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9349 }
9350 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9351
9352 if (ssh->channels) {
9353 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9354 switch (c->type) {
9355 case CHAN_X11:
9356 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9357 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9358 break;
9359 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9360 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9361 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9362 break;
9363 }
9364 sfree(c);
9365 }
9366 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9367 ssh->channels = NULL;
9368 }
9369
9370 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9371 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9372 free_rportfwd(pf);
9373 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9374 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9375 }
9376 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9377 if (ssh->x11disp)
9378 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9379 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9380 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9381 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9382 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9383 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9384 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9385 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9386 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9387 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9388 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9389 }
9390 if (ssh->s)
9391 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9392 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9393 if (ssh->pinger)
9394 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9395 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9396 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9397 if (ssh->gsslibs)
9398 ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
9399 #endif
9400 sfree(ssh);
9401
9402 random_unref();
9403 }
9404
9405 /*
9406 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9407 */
9408 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
9409 {
9410 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9411 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9412 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9413
9414 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
9415 if (ssh->portfwds)
9416 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
9417
9418 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
9419 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
9420 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9421 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9422
9423 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9424 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9425 } else {
9426 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9427 }
9428 }
9429
9430 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9431 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
9432 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9433 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9434 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9435 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9436 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9437 }
9438
9439 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
9440 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9441 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9442 }
9443
9444 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
9445 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
9446 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
9447 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9448 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9449 }
9450
9451 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9452
9453 if (rekeying) {
9454 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9455 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9456 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9457 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9458 }
9459 }
9460 }
9461
9462 /*
9463 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9464 */
9465 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9466 {
9467 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9468
9469 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9470 return 0;
9471
9472 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9473
9474 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9475 }
9476
9477 /*
9478 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9479 */
9480 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9481 {
9482 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9483 int override_value;
9484
9485 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9486 return 0;
9487
9488 /*
9489 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9490 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9491 */
9492 override_value = 0;
9493 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9494 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9495
9496 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9497 return override_value;
9498 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9499 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
9500 return override_value;
9501 else
9502 return (override_value +
9503 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9504 }
9505
9506 return 0;
9507 }
9508
9509 /*
9510 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9511 */
9512 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9513 {
9514 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9515 struct Packet *pktout;
9516
9517 ssh->term_width = width;
9518 ssh->term_height = height;
9519
9520 switch (ssh->state) {
9521 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9522 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9523 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9524 break; /* do nothing */
9525 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9526 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9527 break;
9528 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9529 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
9530 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9531 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9532 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9533 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9534 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9535 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9536 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9537 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9538 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9539 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9540 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9541 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9542 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9543 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9544 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9545 }
9546 }
9547 break;
9548 }
9549 }
9550
9551 /*
9552 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9553 * protocol.
9554 */
9555 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9556 {
9557 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9558 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9559 };
9560 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
9561 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9562 };
9563 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
9564 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9565 };
9566 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9567 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9568 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9569 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9570 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9571 * required signals. */
9572 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9573 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9574 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9575 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9576 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9577 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9578 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9579 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9580 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9581 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9582 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9583 };
9584 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9585 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9586 };
9587 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9588 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
9589 lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
9590 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9591 lenof(specials_end)];
9592 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9593 int i = 0;
9594 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9595 do { \
9596 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9597 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9598 i += lenof(name); \
9599 } while(0)
9600
9601 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9602 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9603 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9604 * asked anyway. */
9605 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9606 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9607 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9608 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
9609 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
9610 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
9611 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
9612 if (ssh->mainchan)
9613 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9614 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9615
9616 if (i) {
9617 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9618 return ssh_specials;
9619 } else {
9620 return NULL;
9621 }
9622 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9623 }
9624
9625 /*
9626 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9627 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9628 * hostname sort').
9629 */
9630 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9631 {
9632 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9633 struct Packet *pktout;
9634
9635 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9636 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9637 /*
9638 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9639 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9640 */
9641 if (code == TS_EOF)
9642 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9643 return;
9644 }
9645 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9646 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9647 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9648 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
9649 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9650 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9651 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9652 }
9653 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9654 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9655 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9656 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9657 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9658 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9659 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9660 } else {
9661 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
9662 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9663 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9664 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9665 }
9666 }
9667 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9668 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9669 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9670 }
9671 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9672 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9673 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9674 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9675 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9676 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9677 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9678 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9679 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
9680 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9681 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
9682 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9683 }
9684 } else {
9685 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
9686 char *signame = NULL;
9687 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
9688 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
9689 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
9690 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
9691 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
9692 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
9693 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
9694 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
9695 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
9696 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
9697 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
9698 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
9699 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
9700 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
9701 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
9702 if (signame) {
9703 /* It's a signal. */
9704 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
9705 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9706 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9707 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
9708 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9709 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
9710 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9711 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
9712 }
9713 } else {
9714 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
9715 }
9716 }
9717 }
9718
9719 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
9720 {
9721 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9722 struct ssh_channel *c;
9723 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
9724
9725 c->ssh = ssh;
9726 ssh2_channel_init(c);
9727 c->halfopen = TRUE;
9728 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
9729 c->u.pfd.s = s;
9730 add234(ssh->channels, c);
9731 return c;
9732 }
9733
9734 /*
9735 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
9736 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
9737 */
9738 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
9739 {
9740 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9741 int buflimit;
9742
9743 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9744 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
9745 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9746 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9747 }
9748 } else {
9749 if (ssh->mainchan) {
9750 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
9751 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
9752 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
9753 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
9754 buflimit = 0;
9755 else
9756 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
9757 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
9758 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
9759 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9760 }
9761 }
9762 }
9763 }
9764
9765 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
9766 {
9767 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
9768 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
9769 struct Packet *pktout;
9770
9771 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
9772
9773 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9774 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
9775 PKT_INT, c->localid,
9776 PKT_STR, hostname,
9777 PKT_INT, port,
9778 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
9779 PKT_END);
9780 } else {
9781 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
9782 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
9783 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
9784 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
9785 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
9786 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
9787 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
9788 /*
9789 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
9790 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
9791 * convinced the server should be told details like that
9792 * about my local network configuration.
9793 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
9794 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
9795 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
9796 */
9797 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
9798 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9799 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9800 }
9801 }
9802
9803 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
9804 {
9805 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9806 return ssh->s != NULL;
9807 }
9808
9809 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
9810 {
9811 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9812 return ssh->send_ok;
9813 }
9814
9815 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
9816 {
9817 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9818 if (option == LD_ECHO)
9819 return ssh->echoing;
9820 if (option == LD_EDIT)
9821 return ssh->editing;
9822 return FALSE;
9823 }
9824
9825 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
9826 {
9827 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9828 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
9829 }
9830
9831 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
9832 {
9833 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9834 ssh->logctx = logctx;
9835 }
9836
9837 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
9838 {
9839 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9840 if (ssh->s != NULL)
9841 return -1;
9842 else
9843 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
9844 }
9845
9846 /*
9847 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
9848 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
9849 */
9850 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
9851 {
9852 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9853 return ssh->version;
9854 }
9855
9856 /*
9857 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
9858 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
9859 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
9860 */
9861 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
9862 {
9863 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9864 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
9865 }
9866
9867 Backend ssh_backend = {
9868 ssh_init,
9869 ssh_free,
9870 ssh_reconfig,
9871 ssh_send,
9872 ssh_sendbuffer,
9873 ssh_size,
9874 ssh_special,
9875 ssh_get_specials,
9876 ssh_connected,
9877 ssh_return_exitcode,
9878 ssh_sendok,
9879 ssh_ldisc,
9880 ssh_provide_ldisc,
9881 ssh_provide_logctx,
9882 ssh_unthrottle,
9883 ssh_cfg_info,
9884 "ssh",
9885 PROT_SSH,
9886 22
9887 };