Fix an erroneous "case" fallthrough in ssh1_msg_channel_close, which was
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgssc.h"
17 #include "sshgss.h"
18 #endif
19
20 #ifndef FALSE
21 #define FALSE 0
22 #endif
23 #ifndef TRUE
24 #define TRUE 1
25 #endif
26
27 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
28 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
38 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
40 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
41 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
43 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
51 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
53 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
55 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
56 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
59 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
60 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
62 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
63 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
65 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
66 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
67 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
68
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
74 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
75
76 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
77 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
78 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
79
80 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
124 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
125
126 /*
127 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
128 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
129 */
130 typedef enum {
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
134 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
135 } Pkt_KCtx;
136 typedef enum {
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
141 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
142 } Pkt_ACtx;
143
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
158 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
159
160 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
161 NULL,
162 "host not allowed to connect",
163 "protocol error",
164 "key exchange failed",
165 "host authentication failed",
166 "MAC error",
167 "compression error",
168 "service not available",
169 "protocol version not supported",
170 "host key not verifiable",
171 "connection lost",
172 "by application",
173 "too many connections",
174 "auth cancelled by user",
175 "no more auth methods available",
176 "illegal user name",
177 };
178
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
182 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
183
184 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
185
186 /*
187 * Various remote-bug flags.
188 */
189 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
190 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
191 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
192 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
193 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
194 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
195 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
196 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
197 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
198 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
199 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ 1024
200
201 /*
202 * Codes for terminal modes.
203 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
204 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
205 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
206 */
207 static const struct {
208 const char* const mode;
209 int opcode;
210 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
211 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
212 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
213 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
229 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
230 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
231 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
253 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
255 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
256 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
263 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
264 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
265 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
266 };
267
268 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
269 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
270 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
271 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
272 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
273 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
274 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
275
276 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
277 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
278 {
279 unsigned int ret;
280 if (*s) {
281 char *next = NULL;
282 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
283 if (!next) ret = s[0];
284 } else {
285 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
286 }
287 return ret;
288 }
289 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
290 {
291 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
292 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
293 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
294 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
295 return 1; /* true */
296 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
297 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
298 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
299 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
300 return 0; /* false */
301 else
302 return (atoi(s) != 0);
303 }
304
305 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
306 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
307 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
308 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
309 {
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
311 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
315 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
320 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
321 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
323 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
324 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
326 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
327 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
328 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
331 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
332 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
333 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
334 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
335 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
336 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
337 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
338 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
339 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
340 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
342 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
343 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
345 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
346 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
348 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
349 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
350 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
351 return "unknown";
352 }
353 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
354 {
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
360 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
366 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
367 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
368 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
375 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
376 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
377 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
379 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
380 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
381 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
383 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
384 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
385 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
397 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
398 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
399 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
400 return "unknown";
401 }
402 #undef translate
403 #undef translatec
404
405 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
406 enum {
407 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
408 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
409 * fields to the packet logging code. */
410 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
411 };
412
413 /*
414 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
415 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
416 * read
417 *
418 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
419 *
420 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
421 *
422 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
423 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
424 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
425 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
426 *
427 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
428 * - click Settings
429 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
430 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
431 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
432 */
433 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
434 #define crBeginState crBegin(s->crLine)
435 #define crStateP(t, v) \
436 struct t *s; \
437 if (!(v)) { s = (v) = snew(struct t); s->crLine = 0; } \
438 s = (v);
439 #define crState(t) crStateP(t, ssh->t)
440 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
441 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
442 #define crReturn(z) \
443 do {\
444 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
445 } while (0)
446 #define crReturnV \
447 do {\
448 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
449 } while (0)
450 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
451 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
452 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
453 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
454
455 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
456 struct Packet;
457
458 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
459 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
460 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
461 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
463 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
464 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
465 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
466 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
467 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
468 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
469 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
470 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
471 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
472 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
473 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
474 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
475 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
476 struct Packet *pktin);
477 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
478 struct Packet *pktin);
479 static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
480 static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
481
482 /*
483 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
484 * various different purposes:
485 *
486 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
487 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
488 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
489 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
490 * happen very often.
491 *
492 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
493 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
494 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
495 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
496 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
497 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
498 *
499 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
500 * channels.
501 *
502 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
503 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
504 *
505 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
506 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
507 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
508 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
509 * data message.
510 *
511 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
512 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
513 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
514 */
515
516 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
517 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
518 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
519 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
520 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
521 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
522
523 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
524
525 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
526 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
527 };
528 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
529 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
530 };
531
532 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
533 {
534 return NULL;
535 }
536 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
537 {
538 }
539 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
540 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
541 {
542 return 0;
543 }
544 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
545 {
546 return 0;
547 }
548 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
549 "none", NULL,
550 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
551 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
552 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
553 };
554 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
555 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
556 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
557 };
558
559 enum { /* channel types */
560 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
561 CHAN_X11,
562 CHAN_AGENT,
563 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
564 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT, /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
565 /*
566 * CHAN_ZOMBIE is used to indicate a channel for which we've
567 * already destroyed the local data source: for instance, if a
568 * forwarded port experiences a socket error on the local side, we
569 * immediately destroy its local socket and turn the SSH channel
570 * into CHAN_ZOMBIE.
571 */
572 CHAN_ZOMBIE
573 };
574
575 /*
576 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
577 */
578 struct winadj {
579 struct winadj *next;
580 unsigned size;
581 };
582
583 /*
584 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
585 */
586 struct ssh_channel {
587 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
588 unsigned remoteid, localid;
589 int type;
590 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
591 int halfopen;
592 /*
593 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
594 *
595 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
596 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
597 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
598 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
599 *
600 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
601 *
602 * In SSH-2, the four bits mean:
603 *
604 * 1 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
605 * 2 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
606 * 4 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
607 * 8 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
608 *
609 * A channel is completely finished with when we have both sent
610 * and received CLOSE.
611 *
612 * The symbolic constants below use the SSH-2 terminology, which
613 * is a bit confusing in SSH-1, but we have to use _something_.
614 */
615 #define CLOSES_SENT_EOF 1
616 #define CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE 2
617 #define CLOSES_RCVD_EOF 4
618 #define CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE 8
619 int closes;
620
621 /*
622 * This flag indicates that an EOF is pending on the outgoing side
623 * of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data for
624 * this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We can't
625 * actually send the EOF until we've finished sending the data, so
626 * we set this flag instead to remind us to do so once our buffer
627 * is clear.
628 */
629 int pending_eof;
630
631 /*
632 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
633 * throttled.
634 */
635 int throttling_conn;
636 union {
637 struct ssh2_data_channel {
638 bufchain outbuffer;
639 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
640 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
641 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
642 /*
643 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
644 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
645 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
646 */
647 int remlocwin;
648 /*
649 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
650 * been acked.
651 */
652 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
653 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
654 } v2;
655 } v;
656 union {
657 struct ssh_agent_channel {
658 unsigned char *message;
659 unsigned char msglen[4];
660 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
661 } a;
662 struct ssh_x11_channel {
663 Socket s;
664 } x11;
665 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
666 Socket s;
667 } pfd;
668 } u;
669 };
670
671 /*
672 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
673 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
674 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
675 *
676 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
677 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
678 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
679 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
680 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
681 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
682 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
683 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
684 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
685 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
686 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
687 *
688 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
689 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
690 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
691 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
692 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
693 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
694 *
695 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
696 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
697 */
698 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
699
700 struct ssh_rportfwd {
701 unsigned sport, dport;
702 char dhost[256];
703 char *sportdesc;
704 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
705 };
706 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
707 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
708
709 /*
710 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
711 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
712 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
713 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
714 * it.
715 */
716 struct ssh_portfwd {
717 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
718 int type;
719 unsigned sport, dport;
720 char *saddr, *daddr;
721 char *sserv, *dserv;
722 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
723 int addressfamily;
724 void *local;
725 };
726 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
727 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
728 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
729
730 struct Packet {
731 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
732 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
733 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
734 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
735 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
736 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
737 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
738 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
739 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
740
741 /*
742 * State associated with packet logging
743 */
744 int logmode;
745 int nblanks;
746 struct logblank_t *blanks;
747 };
748
749 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
750 struct Packet *pktin);
751 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
752 struct Packet *pktin);
753 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
754 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
755 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
756 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
757 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
758 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
759 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
760 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
761 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
762 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
763 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
764 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
765 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
766 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
767 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
768 struct Packet *pktin);
769
770 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
771 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
772 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
773 unsigned char *p;
774 int i;
775 int chunk;
776 struct Packet *pktin;
777 };
778
779 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
780 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
781 int i;
782 int cipherblk;
783 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
784 struct Packet *pktin;
785 };
786
787 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
788 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
789
790 struct queued_handler;
791 struct queued_handler {
792 int msg1, msg2;
793 chandler_fn_t handler;
794 void *ctx;
795 struct queued_handler *next;
796 };
797
798 struct ssh_tag {
799 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
800 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
801
802 char *v_c, *v_s;
803 void *exhash;
804
805 Socket s;
806
807 void *ldisc;
808 void *logctx;
809
810 unsigned char session_key[32];
811 int v1_compressing;
812 int v1_remote_protoflags;
813 int v1_local_protoflags;
814 int agentfwd_enabled;
815 int X11_fwd_enabled;
816 int remote_bugs;
817 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
818 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
819 void *crcda_ctx;
820 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
821 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
822 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
823 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
824 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
825 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
826 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
827 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
828 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
829 int v2_session_id_len;
830 void *kex_ctx;
831
832 char *savedhost;
833 int savedport;
834 int send_ok;
835 int echoing, editing;
836
837 void *frontend;
838
839 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
840 int term_width, term_height;
841
842 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
843 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
844 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
845 int exitcode;
846 int close_expected;
847 int clean_exit;
848
849 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
850
851 enum {
852 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
853 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
854 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
855 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
856 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
857 } state;
858
859 int size_needed, eof_needed;
860 int sent_console_eof;
861 int got_pty; /* affects EOF behaviour on main channel */
862
863 struct Packet **queue;
864 int queuelen, queuesize;
865 int queueing;
866 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
867 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
868
869 /*
870 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
871 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
872 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
873 * got.
874 */
875 int fallback_cmd;
876
877 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
878
879 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
880 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
881
882 struct X11Display *x11disp;
883
884 int version;
885 int conn_throttle_count;
886 int overall_bufsize;
887 int throttled_all;
888 int v1_stdout_throttling;
889 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
890
891 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
892 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
893 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
894 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
895
896 void *do_ssh_init_state;
897 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
898 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
899 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
900
901 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
902 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
903
904 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
905 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
906
907 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
908 struct Packet *pkt);
909 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
910
911 /*
912 * We maintain our own copy of a Conf structure here. That way,
913 * when we're passed a new one for reconfiguration, we can check
914 * the differences and potentially reconfigure port forwardings
915 * etc in mid-session.
916 */
917 Conf *conf;
918
919 /*
920 * Values cached out of conf so as to avoid the tree234 lookup
921 * cost every time they're used.
922 */
923 int logomitdata;
924
925 /*
926 * Dynamically allocated username string created during SSH
927 * login. Stored in here rather than in the coroutine state so
928 * that it'll be reliably freed if we shut down the SSH session
929 * at some unexpected moment.
930 */
931 char *username;
932
933 /*
934 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
935 */
936 void *agent_response;
937 int agent_response_len;
938 int user_response;
939
940 /*
941 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
942 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
943 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
944 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
945 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
946 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
947 * store that data.
948 */
949 int frozen;
950 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
951
952 /*
953 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
954 * with at any time.
955 */
956 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
957
958 /*
959 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
960 * indications from a request.
961 */
962 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
963
964 /*
965 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
966 */
967 Pinger pinger;
968
969 /*
970 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
971 * size-based rekeys.
972 */
973 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
974 unsigned long max_data_size;
975 int kex_in_progress;
976 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
977 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
978
979 /*
980 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
981 */
982 char *fullhostname;
983
984 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
985 /*
986 * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
987 */
988 struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
989 #endif
990 };
991
992 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
993
994 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
995 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
996 {
997 va_list ap;
998 char *buf;
999
1000 va_start(ap, fmt);
1001 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
1002 va_end(ap);
1003 logevent(buf);
1004 sfree(buf);
1005 }
1006
1007 #define bombout(msg) \
1008 do { \
1009 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
1010 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
1011 logevent(text); \
1012 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
1013 sfree(text); \
1014 } while (0)
1015
1016 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
1017
1018 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
1019 {
1020 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass))
1021 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
1022 }
1023
1024 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
1025 {
1026 if (ssh->logomitdata)
1027 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
1028 }
1029
1030 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1031 {
1032 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1033 }
1034
1035 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing ttymodes. */
1036 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh,
1037 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
1038 void *data)
1039 {
1040 char *key, *val;
1041
1042 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, NULL, &key);
1043 val != NULL;
1044 val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, key, &key)) {
1045 /*
1046 * val[0] is either 'V', indicating that an explicit value
1047 * follows it, or 'A' indicating that we should pass the
1048 * value through from the local environment via get_ttymode.
1049 */
1050 if (val[0] == 'A')
1051 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, key);
1052 else
1053 val++; /* skip the 'V' */
1054 if (val)
1055 do_mode(data, key, val);
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1060 {
1061 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1062 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1063 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1064 return -1;
1065 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1066 return +1;
1067 return 0;
1068 }
1069 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1070 {
1071 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1072 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1073 if (*a < b->localid)
1074 return -1;
1075 if (*a > b->localid)
1076 return +1;
1077 return 0;
1078 }
1079
1080 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1081 {
1082 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1083 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1084 int i;
1085 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1086 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1087 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1088 return +1;
1089 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1090 return -1;
1091 return 0;
1092 }
1093
1094 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1095 {
1096 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1097 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1098
1099 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1100 return +1;
1101 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1102 return -1;
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105
1106 /*
1107 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1108 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1109 */
1110 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1111 {
1112 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1113 return 0;
1114 if (a == NULL)
1115 return -1;
1116 if (b == NULL)
1117 return +1;
1118 return strcmp(a, b);
1119 }
1120
1121 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1122 {
1123 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1124 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1125 int i;
1126 if (a->type > b->type)
1127 return +1;
1128 if (a->type < b->type)
1129 return -1;
1130 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1131 return +1;
1132 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1133 return -1;
1134 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1135 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1136 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1137 return +1;
1138 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1139 return -1;
1140 if (a->type != 'D') {
1141 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1142 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1143 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1144 return +1;
1145 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1146 return -1;
1147 }
1148 return 0;
1149 }
1150
1151 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1152 {
1153 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1154 unsigned low, high, mid;
1155 int tsize;
1156 struct ssh_channel *c;
1157
1158 /*
1159 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1160 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1161 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1162 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1163 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1164 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1165 */
1166 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1167
1168 low = -1;
1169 high = tsize;
1170 while (high - low > 1) {
1171 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1172 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1173 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1174 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1175 else
1176 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1177 }
1178 /*
1179 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1180 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1181 */
1182 {
1183 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1184 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1185 }
1186 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1187 }
1188
1189 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1190 {
1191 int i;
1192 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1193 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1194 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1195 }
1196
1197 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1198 {
1199 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1200 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1201 else
1202 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1203 }
1204
1205 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1206 {
1207 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1208 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1209 else
1210 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1211 }
1212
1213 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1214 {
1215 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1216 }
1217
1218 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1219 {
1220 sfree(pkt->data);
1221 sfree(pkt);
1222 }
1223 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1224 {
1225 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1226
1227 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1228 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1229 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1230 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1231 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1232
1233 return pkt;
1234 }
1235
1236 /*
1237 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1238 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1239 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1240 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1241 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1242 */
1243 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1244 {
1245 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1246
1247 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1248
1249 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1250
1251 st->pktin->type = 0;
1252 st->pktin->length = 0;
1253
1254 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1255 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1256 crReturn(NULL);
1257 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1258 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1259 }
1260
1261 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1262 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1263 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1264
1265 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1266 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1267 " data stream corruption"));
1268 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1269 crStop(NULL);
1270 }
1271
1272 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1273 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1274
1275 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1276 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1277 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1278 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1279 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1280 crReturn(NULL);
1281 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1282 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1283 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1284 *data += st->chunk;
1285 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1286 st->p += st->chunk;
1287 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1288 }
1289
1290 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1291 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1292 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1293 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1294 crStop(NULL);
1295 }
1296
1297 if (ssh->cipher)
1298 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1299
1300 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1301 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1302 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1303 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1304 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1305 crStop(NULL);
1306 }
1307
1308 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1309 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1310
1311 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1312 unsigned char *decompblk;
1313 int decomplen;
1314 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1315 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1316 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1317 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1318 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1319 crStop(NULL);
1320 }
1321
1322 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1323 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1324 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1325 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1326 unsigned char);
1327 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1328 }
1329
1330 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1331 sfree(decompblk);
1332 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1333 }
1334
1335 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1336
1337 /*
1338 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1339 */
1340 if (ssh->logctx) {
1341 int nblanks = 0;
1342 struct logblank_t blank;
1343 if (ssh->logomitdata) {
1344 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1345 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1346 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1347 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1348 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1349 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1350 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1351 }
1352 if (do_blank) {
1353 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1354 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1355 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1356 nblanks = 1;
1357 }
1358 }
1359 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1360 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1361 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1362 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1363 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1364 }
1365
1366 crFinish(st->pktin);
1367 }
1368
1369 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1370 {
1371 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1372
1373 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1374
1375 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1376
1377 st->pktin->type = 0;
1378 st->pktin->length = 0;
1379 if (ssh->sccipher)
1380 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1381 else
1382 st->cipherblk = 8;
1383 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1384 st->cipherblk = 8;
1385 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1386
1387 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1388 ssh->scmac) {
1389 /*
1390 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1391 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1392 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1393 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1394 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1395 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1396 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1397 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1398 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1399 * plausible.
1400 */
1401
1402 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1403 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1404 unsigned char);
1405
1406 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1407 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1408 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1409 crReturn(NULL);
1410 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1411 (*datalen)--;
1412 }
1413
1414 st->packetlen = 0;
1415 {
1416 unsigned char seq[4];
1417 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1418 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1419 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1420 }
1421
1422 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1423 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1424 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1425 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1426 crReturn(NULL);
1427 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1428 (*datalen)--;
1429 }
1430 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1431 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1432 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1433 st->cipherblk);
1434 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1435 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1436 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1437 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1438 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1439 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1440 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1441 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1442 break;
1443 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1444 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1445 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1446 crStop(NULL);
1447 }
1448 }
1449 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1450 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1451 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1452 unsigned char);
1453 } else {
1454 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1458 * contain the length and padding details.
1459 */
1460 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1461 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1462 crReturn(NULL);
1463 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1464 (*datalen)--;
1465 }
1466
1467 if (ssh->sccipher)
1468 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1469 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1470
1471 /*
1472 * Now get the length figure.
1473 */
1474 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1475
1476 /*
1477 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1478 * do us any more damage.
1479 */
1480 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1481 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1482 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1483 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1484 crStop(NULL);
1485 }
1486
1487 /*
1488 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1489 */
1490 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1491
1492 /*
1493 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1494 */
1495 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1496 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1497 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1498 unsigned char);
1499
1500 /*
1501 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1502 */
1503 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1504 st->i++) {
1505 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1506 crReturn(NULL);
1507 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1508 (*datalen)--;
1509 }
1510 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1511 if (ssh->sccipher)
1512 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1513 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1514 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1515
1516 /*
1517 * Check the MAC.
1518 */
1519 if (ssh->scmac
1520 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1521 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1522 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1523 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1524 crStop(NULL);
1525 }
1526 }
1527 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1528 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1529 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1530 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1531 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1532 crStop(NULL);
1533 }
1534 /*
1535 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1536 */
1537 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1538
1539 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1540 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1541
1542 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1543
1544 /*
1545 * Decompress packet payload.
1546 */
1547 {
1548 unsigned char *newpayload;
1549 int newlen;
1550 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1551 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1552 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1553 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1554 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1555 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1556 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1557 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1558 unsigned char);
1559 }
1560 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1561 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1562 sfree(newpayload);
1563 }
1564 }
1565
1566 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1567 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1568 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1569
1570 /*
1571 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1572 */
1573 if (ssh->logctx) {
1574 int nblanks = 0;
1575 struct logblank_t blank;
1576 if (ssh->logomitdata) {
1577 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1578 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1579 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1580 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1581 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1582 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1583 }
1584 if (do_blank) {
1585 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1586 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1587 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1588 nblanks = 1;
1589 }
1590 }
1591 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1592 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1593 st->pktin->type),
1594 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1595 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1596 }
1597
1598 crFinish(st->pktin);
1599 }
1600
1601 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1602 {
1603 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1604 unsigned long crc;
1605 #ifdef __SC__
1606 /*
1607 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1608 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1609 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1610 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1611 */
1612 volatile
1613 #endif
1614 int len;
1615
1616 if (ssh->logctx)
1617 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1618 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1619 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1620 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1621 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1622 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1623
1624 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1625 unsigned char *compblk;
1626 int complen;
1627 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1628 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1629 &compblk, &complen);
1630 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1631 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1632 sfree(compblk);
1633 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1634 }
1635
1636 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1637 pkt->length += 4;
1638 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1639 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1640 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1641 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1642
1643 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1644 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1645 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1646 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1647 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1648
1649 if (ssh->cipher)
1650 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1651 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1652
1653 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1654 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1655 }
1656
1657 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1658 {
1659 if (ssh->logctx)
1660 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1661 0, NULL, NULL);
1662 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1663 }
1664
1665 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1666 {
1667 int len, backlog, offset;
1668 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1669 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1670 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1671 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1672 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1673 }
1674
1675 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1676 {
1677 int len, offset;
1678 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1679 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1680 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1681 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1682 ssh->deferred_size,
1683 unsigned char);
1684 }
1685 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1686 pkt->data + offset, len);
1687 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1688 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1689 }
1690
1691 /*
1692 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1693 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1694 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1695 */
1696 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1697 {
1698 int argtype;
1699 Bignum bn;
1700 struct Packet *pkt;
1701
1702 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1703
1704 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1705 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1706 char *sargp;
1707 unsigned long argint;
1708 int arglen;
1709 switch (argtype) {
1710 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1711 case PKT_INT:
1712 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1713 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1714 break;
1715 case PKT_CHAR:
1716 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1717 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1718 break;
1719 case PKT_DATA:
1720 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1721 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1722 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1723 break;
1724 case PKT_STR:
1725 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1726 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1727 break;
1728 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1729 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1730 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1731 break;
1732 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1733 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1734 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1735 break;
1736 case PKTT_DATA:
1737 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1738 break;
1739 case PKTT_OTHER:
1740 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1741 break;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 return pkt;
1746 }
1747
1748 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1749 {
1750 struct Packet *pkt;
1751 va_list ap;
1752 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1753 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1754 va_end(ap);
1755 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1756 }
1757
1758 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1759 {
1760 struct Packet *pkt;
1761 va_list ap;
1762 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1763 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1764 va_end(ap);
1765 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1766 }
1767
1768 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1769 {
1770 char *ae, *be;
1771 unsigned long av, bv;
1772
1773 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1774 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1775 if (av != bv)
1776 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1777 if (*ae == '.')
1778 ae++;
1779 if (*be == '.')
1780 be++;
1781 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1782 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1783 if (av != bv)
1784 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1785 return 0;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1790 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1791 */
1792 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1793 {
1794 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1795 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1796 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1797 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1798 }
1799
1800 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1801 {
1802 unsigned char intblk[4];
1803 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1804 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1805 }
1806
1807 /*
1808 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1809 */
1810 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1811 {
1812 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1813 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1814 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1815 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1816 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1817 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1818 }
1819 }
1820 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1821 {
1822 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1823 pkt->nblanks++;
1824 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1825 assert(pkt->body);
1826 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1827 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1828 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1829 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1830 }
1831 pkt->length += len;
1832 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1833 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1834 }
1835 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1836 {
1837 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1838 }
1839 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1840 {
1841 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1842 }
1843 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1844 {
1845 unsigned char x[4];
1846 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1847 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1848 }
1849 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1850 {
1851 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1852 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1853 }
1854 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1855 {
1856 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1857 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1858 }
1859 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1860 {
1861 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1862 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1863 }
1864 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1865 {
1866 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1867 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1868 }
1869 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1870 {
1871 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1872 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1873 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1874 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1875 sfree(data);
1876 }
1877 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1878 {
1879 unsigned char *p;
1880 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1881 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1882 p[0] = 0;
1883 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1884 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1885 i = 0;
1886 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1887 i++;
1888 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1889 *len = n + 1 - i;
1890 return p;
1891 }
1892 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1893 {
1894 unsigned char *p;
1895 int len;
1896 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1897 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1898 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1899 sfree(p);
1900 }
1901
1902 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1903 {
1904 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1905 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1906 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1907 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1908 return pkt;
1909 }
1910
1911 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1912 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1913 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1914 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1915 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1916 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1917 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1918 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1919 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1920
1921 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1922 {
1923 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1924 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1925 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1926 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1927 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1928 return pkt;
1929 }
1930
1931 /*
1932 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1933 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1934 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1935 */
1936 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1937 {
1938 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1939
1940 if (ssh->logctx)
1941 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1942 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1943 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1944 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1945 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1946 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1947
1948 /*
1949 * Compress packet payload.
1950 */
1951 {
1952 unsigned char *newpayload;
1953 int newlen;
1954 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1955 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1956 pkt->length - 5,
1957 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1958 pkt->length = 5;
1959 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1960 sfree(newpayload);
1961 }
1962 }
1963
1964 /*
1965 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1966 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1967 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1968 * after padding.
1969 */
1970 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1971 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1972 padding = 4;
1973 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1974 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1975 padding +=
1976 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1977 assert(padding <= 255);
1978 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1979 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1980 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1981 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1982 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1983 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1984 if (ssh->csmac)
1985 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1986 pkt->length + padding,
1987 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1988 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1989
1990 if (ssh->cscipher)
1991 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1992 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1993
1994 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1995
1996 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1997 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1998 }
1999
2000 /*
2001 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
2002 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
2003 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
2004 *
2005 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
2006 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
2007 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
2008 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
2009 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
2010 * works after packet encryption.
2011 *
2012 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
2013 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
2014 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
2015 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
2016 * then send them once we've finished.
2017 *
2018 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
2019 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
2020 *
2021 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
2022 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
2023 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
2024 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
2025 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
2026 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
2027 *
2028 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
2029 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
2030 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
2031 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
2032 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
2033 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
2034 * CBC.
2035 */
2036
2037 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
2038 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
2039
2040 /*
2041 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
2042 */
2043 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2044 {
2045 int len;
2046 int backlog;
2047 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
2048 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
2049 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2050 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2051 return;
2052 }
2053 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2054 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
2055 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2056 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2057
2058 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2059 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2060 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2061 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2062 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2063
2064 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2065 }
2066
2067 /*
2068 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2069 */
2070 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2071 {
2072 int len;
2073 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2074 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
2075 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2076 /*
2077 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2078 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2079 */
2080 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2081 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2082 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2083 }
2084 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2085 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2086 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2087 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2088 ssh->deferred_size,
2089 unsigned char);
2090 }
2091 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2092 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2093 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2094 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2095 }
2096
2097 /*
2098 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2099 */
2100 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2101 {
2102 assert(ssh->queueing);
2103
2104 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2105 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2106 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2107 }
2108
2109 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2110 }
2111
2112 /*
2113 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2114 * set.
2115 */
2116 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2117 {
2118 if (ssh->queueing)
2119 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2120 else
2121 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2122 }
2123
2124 /*
2125 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2126 * set.
2127 */
2128 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2129 {
2130 if (ssh->queueing)
2131 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2132 else
2133 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2134 }
2135
2136 /*
2137 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2138 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2139 *
2140 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2141 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2142 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2143 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2144 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2145 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2146 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2147 * ssh->queueing.
2148 */
2149 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2150 {
2151 int backlog;
2152 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2153 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2154 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2155 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2156 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2157 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2158
2159 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2160 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2161 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2162 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2163 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2164 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2165 }
2166
2167 /*
2168 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2169 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2170 */
2171 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2172 int padsize)
2173 {
2174 #if 0
2175 if (0) {
2176 /*
2177 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2178 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2179 *
2180 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2181 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2182 * always Cisco?)
2183 */
2184 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2185 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2186 } else
2187 #endif
2188 {
2189 /*
2190 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2191 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2192 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2193 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2194 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2195 */
2196 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2197
2198 /*
2199 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2200 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2201 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2202 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2203 * gain nothing by it.)
2204 */
2205 if (ssh->cscipher &&
2206 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2207 int stringlen, i;
2208
2209 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2210 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2211 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2212 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2213 /*
2214 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2215 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2216 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2217 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2218 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2219 * by.
2220 */
2221 stringlen -=
2222 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2223 }
2224 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2225 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2226 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2227 char c = (char) random_byte();
2228 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2229 }
2230 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2231 }
2232 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2233 }
2234 }
2235
2236 /*
2237 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2238 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2239 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2240 */
2241 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2242 {
2243 int i;
2244
2245 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2246
2247 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2248 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2249 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2250
2251 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2252 }
2253
2254 #if 0
2255 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2256 {
2257 unsigned char *p;
2258 int i, len;
2259 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2260 debug(("%s", string));
2261 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2262 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2263 debug(("\n"));
2264 sfree(p);
2265 }
2266 #endif
2267
2268 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2269 {
2270 unsigned char *p;
2271 int len;
2272 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2273 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2274 sfree(p);
2275 }
2276
2277 /*
2278 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2279 */
2280 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2281 {
2282 unsigned long value;
2283 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2284 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2285 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2286 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2287 return value;
2288 }
2289 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2290 {
2291 unsigned long value;
2292 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2293 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2294 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2295 pkt->savedpos++;
2296 return value;
2297 }
2298 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2299 {
2300 int len;
2301 *p = NULL;
2302 *length = 0;
2303 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2304 return;
2305 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2306 if (len < 0)
2307 return;
2308 *length = len;
2309 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2310 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2311 return;
2312 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2313 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2314 }
2315 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2316 {
2317 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2318 return NULL;
2319 pkt->savedpos += length;
2320 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2321 }
2322 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2323 unsigned char **keystr)
2324 {
2325 int j;
2326
2327 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2328 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2329 key, keystr, 0);
2330
2331 if (j < 0)
2332 return FALSE;
2333
2334 pkt->savedpos += j;
2335 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2336
2337 return TRUE;
2338 }
2339 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2340 {
2341 int j;
2342 Bignum b;
2343
2344 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2345 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2346
2347 if (j < 0)
2348 return NULL;
2349
2350 pkt->savedpos += j;
2351 return b;
2352 }
2353 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2354 {
2355 char *p;
2356 int length;
2357 Bignum b;
2358
2359 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2360 if (!p)
2361 return NULL;
2362 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2363 return NULL;
2364 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2365 return b;
2366 }
2367
2368 /*
2369 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2370 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2371 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2372 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2373 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2374 */
2375 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2376 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2377 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2378 {
2379 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2380 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2381
2382 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2383 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2384
2385 /*
2386 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2387 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2388 */
2389 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2390 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2391 int pos, len, siglen;
2392
2393 /*
2394 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2395 */
2396
2397 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2398 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2399 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2400 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2401 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2402 len--, pos++;
2403 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2404
2405 /*
2406 * Now find the signature integer.
2407 */
2408 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2409 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2410 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2411
2412 if (len != siglen) {
2413 unsigned char newlen[4];
2414 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2415 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2416 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2417 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2418 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2419 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2420 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2421 newlen[0] = 0;
2422 while (len-- > siglen) {
2423 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2424 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2425 }
2426 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2427 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2428 return;
2429 }
2430
2431 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2432 }
2433
2434 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2435 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2436 }
2437
2438 /*
2439 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2440 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2441 */
2442 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2443 {
2444 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2445 imp = vstring;
2446 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2447 if (*imp) imp++;
2448 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2449 if (*imp) imp++;
2450
2451 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2452
2453 /*
2454 * General notes on server version strings:
2455 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2456 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2457 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2458 * so we can't distinguish them.
2459 */
2460 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == FORCE_ON ||
2461 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == AUTO &&
2462 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2463 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2464 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2465 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2466 /*
2467 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2468 * to use a different defence against password length
2469 * sniffing.
2470 */
2471 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2472 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2473 }
2474
2475 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == FORCE_ON ||
2476 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == AUTO &&
2477 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2478 /*
2479 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2480 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2481 * the password.
2482 */
2483 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2484 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2485 }
2486
2487 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == FORCE_ON ||
2488 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == AUTO &&
2489 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2490 /*
2491 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2492 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2493 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2494 */
2495 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2496 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2497 }
2498
2499 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == FORCE_ON ||
2500 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == AUTO &&
2501 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2502 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2503 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2504 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2505 /*
2506 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2507 */
2508 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2509 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2510 }
2511
2512 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
2513 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == AUTO &&
2514 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2515 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2516 /*
2517 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2518 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2519 * generate the keys).
2520 */
2521 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2522 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2523 }
2524
2525 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == FORCE_ON ||
2526 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == AUTO &&
2527 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2528 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2529 /*
2530 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2531 */
2532 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2533 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2534 }
2535
2536 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == FORCE_ON ||
2537 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == AUTO &&
2538 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2539 /*
2540 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2541 * public-key authentication.
2542 */
2543 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2544 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2545 }
2546
2547 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
2548 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == AUTO &&
2549 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2550 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2551 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2552 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2553 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2554 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2555 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2556 /*
2557 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2558 */
2559 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2560 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2561 }
2562
2563 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == FORCE_ON ||
2564 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == AUTO &&
2565 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2566 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2567 /*
2568 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2569 */
2570 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2571 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2572 }
2573
2574 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore2) == FORCE_ON) {
2575 /*
2576 * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
2577 * none detected automatically.
2578 */
2579 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
2580 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
2581 }
2582
2583 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_winadj) == FORCE_ON) {
2584 /*
2585 * Servers that don't support our winadj request for one
2586 * reason or another. Currently, none detected automatically.
2587 */
2588 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ;
2589 logevent("We believe remote version has winadj bug");
2590 }
2591 }
2592
2593 /*
2594 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2595 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2596 */
2597 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2598 {
2599 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2600 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2601 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2602 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2603 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2604 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2605 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2606
2607 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2608 * underscores. */
2609 while (*str) {
2610 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2611 *str = '_';
2612 str++;
2613 }
2614 }
2615
2616 /*
2617 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2618 */
2619 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2620 {
2621 char *verstring;
2622
2623 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2624 /*
2625 * Construct a v2 version string.
2626 */
2627 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2628 } else {
2629 /*
2630 * Construct a v1 version string.
2631 */
2632 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2633 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2634 svers : "1.5"),
2635 sshver);
2636 }
2637
2638 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2639
2640 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2641 size_t len;
2642 /*
2643 * Record our version string.
2644 */
2645 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2646 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2647 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2648 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2652 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2653 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2654 sfree(verstring);
2655 }
2656
2657 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2658 {
2659 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2660 int crLine;
2661 int vslen;
2662 char version[10];
2663 char *vstring;
2664 int vstrsize;
2665 int i;
2666 int proto1, proto2;
2667 };
2668 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2669
2670 crBeginState;
2671
2672 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2673 for (;;) {
2674 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2675 crReturn(1);
2676 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2677 crReturn(1);
2678 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2679 crReturn(1);
2680 if (c != '-') goto no;
2681 break;
2682 no:
2683 while (c != '\012')
2684 crReturn(1);
2685 crReturn(1);
2686 }
2687
2688 s->vstrsize = 16;
2689 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2690 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2691 s->vslen = 4;
2692 s->i = 0;
2693 while (1) {
2694 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2695 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2696 s->vstrsize += 16;
2697 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2698 }
2699 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2700 if (s->i >= 0) {
2701 if (c == '-') {
2702 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2703 s->i = -1;
2704 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2705 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2706 } else if (c == '\012')
2707 break;
2708 }
2709
2710 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2711 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2712
2713 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2714 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2715 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2716 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2717
2718 /*
2719 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2720 */
2721
2722 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2723 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2724 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2725 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2726
2727 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2728 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2729 crStop(0);
2730 }
2731 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2732 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2733 crStop(0);
2734 }
2735
2736 if (s->proto2 && (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2737 ssh->version = 2;
2738 else
2739 ssh->version = 1;
2740
2741 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2742
2743 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2744 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) != 3)
2745 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2746
2747 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2748 size_t len;
2749 /*
2750 * Record their version string.
2751 */
2752 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2753 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2754 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2755 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2756
2757 /*
2758 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2759 */
2760 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2761 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2762 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2763 } else {
2764 /*
2765 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2766 */
2767 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2768 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2769 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2770 }
2771 if (ssh->version == 2)
2772 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2773
2774 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2775 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2776 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2777
2778 sfree(s->vstring);
2779
2780 crFinish(0);
2781 }
2782
2783 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2784 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2785 {
2786 struct Packet *pktin;
2787
2788 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2789 if (pktin) {
2790 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2791 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2792 }
2793 }
2794
2795 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2796 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2797 {
2798 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2799 *data += *datalen;
2800 *datalen = 0;
2801 }
2802
2803 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2804 {
2805 void *vdata;
2806 unsigned char *data;
2807 int len, origlen;
2808
2809 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2810 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2811 data = vdata;
2812 origlen = len;
2813
2814 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2815 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2816
2817 if (origlen > len)
2818 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2819 }
2820 }
2821
2822 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2823 {
2824 if (ssh->s)
2825 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2826 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2827 }
2828
2829 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2830 {
2831 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2832 if (ssh->logctx)
2833 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2834 0, NULL, NULL);
2835
2836 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2837
2838 /*
2839 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2840 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2841 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2842 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2843 */
2844 while (1) {
2845 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2846 if (datalen == 0)
2847 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2848 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2849 data++;
2850 datalen--;
2851 if (ret == 0)
2852 break;
2853 }
2854
2855 /*
2856 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2857 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2858 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2859 * to the proper protocol handler.
2860 */
2861
2862 while (1) {
2863 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2864 if (ssh->frozen) {
2865 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2866 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2867 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2868 * return, so break out. */
2869 break;
2870 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2871 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2872 * session. */
2873 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2874 } else {
2875 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2876 * session. */
2877 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2878 }
2879 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2880 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2881 return;
2882 }
2883 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2884 crReturnV;
2885 }
2886 crFinishV;
2887 }
2888
2889 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2890 {
2891 int ret = 0;
2892 struct ssh_channel *c;
2893
2894 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2895 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2896 if (ssh->s) {
2897 sk_close(ssh->s);
2898 ssh->s = NULL;
2899 if (notify_exit)
2900 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2901 else
2902 ret = 1;
2903 }
2904 /*
2905 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2906 * through this connection.
2907 */
2908 if (ssh->channels) {
2909 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2910 switch (c->type) {
2911 case CHAN_X11:
2912 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2913 break;
2914 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2915 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
2916 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2917 break;
2918 }
2919 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2920 if (ssh->version == 2)
2921 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2922 sfree(c);
2923 }
2924 }
2925 /*
2926 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2927 * listening sockets.
2928 */
2929 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2930 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2931 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2932 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2933 if (pf->local)
2934 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2935 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2936 free_portfwd(pf);
2937 }
2938 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
2939 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
2940 }
2941
2942 return ret;
2943 }
2944
2945 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2946 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2947 {
2948 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2949 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2950
2951 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2952
2953 if (type == 0)
2954 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2955 else
2956 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2957
2958 logevent(msg);
2959 sfree(msg);
2960 }
2961
2962 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2963 int calling_back)
2964 {
2965 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2966 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2967
2968 if (!error_msg) {
2969 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2970 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2971 else
2972 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2973 }
2974
2975 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2976 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2977
2978 if (need_notify)
2979 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2980
2981 if (error_msg)
2982 logevent(error_msg);
2983 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2984 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2985 return 0;
2986 }
2987
2988 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2989 {
2990 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2991 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2992 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2993 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2994 return 0;
2995 }
2996 return 1;
2997 }
2998
2999 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
3000 {
3001 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
3002 /*
3003 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
3004 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
3005 */
3006 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
3007 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
3008 }
3009
3010 /*
3011 * Connect to specified host and port.
3012 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
3013 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
3014 * freed by the caller.
3015 */
3016 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
3017 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
3018 {
3019 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
3020 ssh_log,
3021 ssh_closing,
3022 ssh_receive,
3023 ssh_sent,
3024 NULL
3025 };
3026
3027 SockAddr addr;
3028 const char *err;
3029 char *loghost;
3030 int addressfamily, sshprot;
3031
3032 loghost = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_loghost);
3033 if (*loghost) {
3034 char *colon;
3035
3036 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(loghost);
3037 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
3038
3039 /*
3040 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
3041 * savedport.
3042 *
3043 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
3044 */
3045 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
3046 if (colon) {
3047 *colon++ = '\0';
3048 if (*colon)
3049 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
3050 }
3051 } else {
3052 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
3053 if (port < 0)
3054 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
3055 ssh->savedport = port;
3056 }
3057
3058 /*
3059 * Try to find host.
3060 */
3061 addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
3062 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
3063 (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
3064 (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
3065 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
3066 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
3067 sk_addr_free(addr);
3068 return err;
3069 }
3070 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
3071
3072 /*
3073 * Open socket.
3074 */
3075 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
3076 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
3077 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
3078 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
3079 ssh->s = NULL;
3080 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
3081 return err;
3082 }
3083
3084 /*
3085 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
3086 * send the version string too.
3087 */
3088 sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
3089 if (sshprot == 0)
3090 ssh->version = 1;
3091 if (sshprot == 3) {
3092 ssh->version = 2;
3093 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3094 }
3095
3096 /*
3097 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3098 */
3099 if (*loghost) {
3100 sfree(*realhost);
3101 *realhost = dupstr(loghost);
3102 }
3103
3104 return NULL;
3105 }
3106
3107 /*
3108 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3109 */
3110 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3111 {
3112 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3113 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3114 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3115 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3116 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3117 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3118 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3119 }
3120 }
3121
3122 /*
3123 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3124 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3125 */
3126 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3127 {
3128 int i;
3129 struct ssh_channel *c;
3130
3131 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3132 return;
3133 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3134 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3135 if (!ssh->channels)
3136 return;
3137 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3138 switch (c->type) {
3139 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3140 /*
3141 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3142 */
3143 break;
3144 case CHAN_X11:
3145 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3146 break;
3147 case CHAN_AGENT:
3148 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3149 break;
3150 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3151 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3152 break;
3153 }
3154 }
3155 }
3156
3157 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3158 {
3159 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3160
3161 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3162 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3163
3164 if (ssh->version == 1)
3165 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3166 else
3167 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3168 }
3169
3170 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3171 {
3172 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3173
3174 ssh->user_response = ret;
3175
3176 if (ssh->version == 1)
3177 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3178 else
3179 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3180
3181 /*
3182 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3183 * queued-data run.
3184 */
3185 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3186 }
3187
3188 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3189 {
3190 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3191 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3192 void *sentreply = reply;
3193
3194 if (!sentreply) {
3195 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3196 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3197 replylen = 5;
3198 }
3199 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3200 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3201 ssh2_try_send(c);
3202 } else {
3203 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3204 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3205 PKT_INT, replylen,
3206 PKTT_DATA,
3207 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3208 PKTT_OTHER,
3209 PKT_END);
3210 }
3211 if (reply)
3212 sfree(reply);
3213 }
3214
3215 /*
3216 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3217 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3218 * => log `wire_reason'.
3219 */
3220 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3221 int code, int clean_exit)
3222 {
3223 char *error;
3224 if (!client_reason)
3225 client_reason = wire_reason;
3226 if (client_reason)
3227 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3228 else
3229 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3230 if (wire_reason) {
3231 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3232 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3233 PKT_END);
3234 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3235 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3236 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3237 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3238 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3239 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3240 }
3241 }
3242 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3243 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3244 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3245 sfree(error);
3246 }
3247
3248 /*
3249 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3250 */
3251 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3252 struct Packet *pktin)
3253 {
3254 int i, j, ret;
3255 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3256 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3257 struct MD5Context md5c;
3258 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3259 int crLine;
3260 int len;
3261 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3262 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3263 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3264 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3265 unsigned char session_id[16];
3266 int cipher_type;
3267 void *publickey_blob;
3268 int publickey_bloblen;
3269 char *publickey_comment;
3270 int publickey_encrypted;
3271 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3272 char c;
3273 int pwpkt_type;
3274 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3275 int responselen;
3276 int keyi, nkeys;
3277 int authed;
3278 struct RSAKey key;
3279 Bignum challenge;
3280 char *commentp;
3281 int commentlen;
3282 int dlgret;
3283 Filename *keyfile;
3284 };
3285 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3286
3287 crBeginState;
3288
3289 if (!pktin)
3290 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3291
3292 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3293 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3294 crStop(0);
3295 }
3296
3297 logevent("Received public keys");
3298
3299 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3300 if (!ptr) {
3301 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3302 crStop(0);
3303 }
3304 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3305
3306 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3307 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3308 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3309 crStop(0);
3310 }
3311
3312 /*
3313 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3314 */
3315 {
3316 char logmsg[80];
3317 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3318 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3319 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3320 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3321 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3322 logevent(logmsg);
3323 }
3324
3325 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3326 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3327 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3328 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3329 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3330
3331 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3332 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3333 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3334
3335 MD5Init(&md5c);
3336 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3337 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3338 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3339 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3340
3341 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3342 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3343
3344 /*
3345 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3346 */
3347 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3348 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3349 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3350 crStop(0);
3351 }
3352
3353 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3354
3355 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3356
3357 /*
3358 * Verify the host key.
3359 */
3360 {
3361 /*
3362 * First format the key into a string.
3363 */
3364 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3365 char fingerprint[100];
3366 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3367 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3368 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3369
3370 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3371 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3372 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3373 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3374 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3375 sfree(keystr);
3376 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3377 do {
3378 crReturn(0);
3379 if (pktin) {
3380 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3381 " for user host key response"));
3382 crStop(0);
3383 }
3384 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3385 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3386 }
3387 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3388
3389 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3390 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3391 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3392 crStop(0);
3393 }
3394 }
3395
3396 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3397 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3398 if (i < 16)
3399 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3400 }
3401
3402 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3403 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3404 if (ret)
3405 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3406 } else {
3407 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3408 if (ret)
3409 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3410 }
3411 if (!ret) {
3412 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3413 crStop(0);
3414 }
3415
3416 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3417
3418 {
3419 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3420 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3421 int i;
3422 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3423 int next_cipher = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
3424 CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i);
3425 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3426 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3427 warn = 1;
3428 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3429 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3430 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3431 } else {
3432 switch (next_cipher) {
3433 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3434 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3435 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3436 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3437 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3438 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3439 }
3440 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3441 cipher_chosen = 1;
3442 }
3443 }
3444 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3445 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3446 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3447 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3448 else
3449 /* shouldn't happen */
3450 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3451 crStop(0);
3452 }
3453
3454 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3455 if (warn) {
3456 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3457 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3458 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3459 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3460 do {
3461 crReturn(0);
3462 if (pktin) {
3463 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3464 " for user response"));
3465 crStop(0);
3466 }
3467 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3468 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3469 }
3470 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3471 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3472 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3473 0, TRUE);
3474 crStop(0);
3475 }
3476 }
3477 }
3478
3479 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3480 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3481 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3482 break;
3483 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3484 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3485 break;
3486 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3487 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3488 break;
3489 }
3490
3491 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3492 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3493 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3494 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3495 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3496 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3497
3498 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3499
3500 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3501
3502 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3503 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3504 &ssh_3des);
3505 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3506 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3507 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3508
3509 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3510 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3511
3512 if (servkey.modulus) {
3513 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3514 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3515 }
3516 if (servkey.exponent) {
3517 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3518 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3519 }
3520 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3521 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3522 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3523 }
3524 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3525 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3526 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3527 }
3528 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3529
3530 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3531 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3532 crStop(0);
3533 }
3534
3535 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3536
3537 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3538 {
3539 if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
3540 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3541 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3542 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3543 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3544 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
3545 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3546 while (ret < 0) {
3547 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3548 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3549 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3550 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3551 }
3552 if (!ret) {
3553 /*
3554 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3555 */
3556 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3557 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3558 crStop(0);
3559 }
3560 ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3561 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3562 }
3563
3564 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, ssh->username, PKT_END);
3565 {
3566 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", ssh->username);
3567 logevent(userlog);
3568 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3569 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3570 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3571 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3572 }
3573 sfree(userlog);
3574 }
3575 }
3576
3577 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3578
3579 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3580 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3581 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3582 } else {
3583 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3584 }
3585 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3586 /*
3587 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3588 */
3589 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3590 if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
3591 int keytype;
3592 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3593 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3594 keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
3595 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3596 const char *error;
3597 if (rsakey_pubblob(s->keyfile,
3598 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3599 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3600 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
3601 NULL);
3602 } else {
3603 char *msgbuf;
3604 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3605 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3606 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3607 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
3608 error);
3609 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3610 sfree(msgbuf);
3611 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3612 }
3613 } else {
3614 char *msgbuf;
3615 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3616 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3617 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3618 " (%s)\r\n",
3619 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
3620 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3621 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3622 sfree(msgbuf);
3623 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3624 }
3625 } else
3626 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3627
3628 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3629 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3630
3631 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3632 /*
3633 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3634 */
3635 void *r;
3636
3637 s->authed = FALSE;
3638 s->tried_agent = 1;
3639 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3640
3641 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3642 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3643 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3644 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3645 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3646 do {
3647 crReturn(0);
3648 if (pktin) {
3649 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3650 " for agent response"));
3651 crStop(0);
3652 }
3653 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3654 r = ssh->agent_response;
3655 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3656 }
3657 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3658 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3659 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3660 s->p = s->response + 5;
3661 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3662 s->p += 4;
3663 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3664 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3665 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3666 s->p += 4;
3667 {
3668 int n, ok = FALSE;
3669 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3670 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3671 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3672 &s->key.exponent);
3673 if (n < 0)
3674 break;
3675 s->p += n;
3676 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3677 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3678 &s->key.modulus);
3679 if (n < 0)
3680 break;
3681 s->p += n;
3682 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3683 break;
3684 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3685 s->p += 4;
3686 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3687 s->commentlen)
3688 break;
3689 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3690 s->p += s->commentlen;
3691 ok = TRUE;
3692 } while (0);
3693 if (!ok) {
3694 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3695 break;
3696 }
3697 }
3698 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3699 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3700 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3701 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3702 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3703 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3704 } else
3705 /* Skip non-configured key */
3706 continue;
3707 }
3708 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3709 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3710 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3711 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3712 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3713 logevent("Key refused");
3714 continue;
3715 }
3716 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3717 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3718 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3719 crStop(0);
3720 }
3721
3722 {
3723 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3724 void *vret;
3725 int len, retlen;
3726 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3727 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3728 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3729 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3730 len += 16; /* session id */
3731 len += 4; /* response format */
3732 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3733 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3734 q = agentreq + 4;
3735 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3736 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3737 q += 4;
3738 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3739 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3740 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3741 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3742 q += 16;
3743 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3744 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3745 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3746 sfree(agentreq);
3747 do {
3748 crReturn(0);
3749 if (pktin) {
3750 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3751 " while waiting for agent"
3752 " response"));
3753 crStop(0);
3754 }
3755 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3756 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3757 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3758 } else
3759 sfree(agentreq);
3760 ret = vret;
3761 if (ret) {
3762 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3763 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3764 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3765 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3766 PKT_END);
3767 sfree(ret);
3768 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3769 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3770 logevent
3771 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3772 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3773 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3774 " RSA key \"");
3775 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3776 s->commentlen);
3777 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3778 }
3779 s->authed = TRUE;
3780 } else
3781 logevent
3782 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3783 } else {
3784 logevent
3785 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3786 sfree(ret);
3787 }
3788 } else {
3789 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3790 }
3791 }
3792 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3793 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3794 freebn(s->challenge);
3795 if (s->authed)
3796 break;
3797 }
3798 sfree(s->response);
3799 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3800 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3801 } else {
3802 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
3803 }
3804 if (s->authed)
3805 break;
3806 }
3807 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3808 /*
3809 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3810 * key file.
3811 */
3812 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3813 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3814 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3815 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3816 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3817 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3818 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3819 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3820 while (!got_passphrase) {
3821 /*
3822 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3823 */
3824 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3825 const char *error;
3826 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3827 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3828 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3829 passphrase = NULL;
3830 } else {
3831 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3832 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3833 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3834 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3835 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3836 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3837 s->publickey_comment), FALSE);
3838 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3839 while (ret < 0) {
3840 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3841 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3842 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3843 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3844 }
3845 if (!ret) {
3846 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3847 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3848 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3849 0, TRUE);
3850 crStop(0);
3851 }
3852 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3853 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3854 }
3855 /*
3856 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3857 */
3858 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3859 ret = loadrsakey(s->keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3860 &error);
3861 if (passphrase) {
3862 smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
3863 sfree(passphrase);
3864 }
3865 if (ret == 1) {
3866 /* Correct passphrase. */
3867 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3868 } else if (ret == 0) {
3869 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3870 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3871 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3872 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3873 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3874 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3875 break; /* go and try something else */
3876 } else if (ret == -1) {
3877 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3878 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3879 /* and try again */
3880 } else {
3881 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3882 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3883 }
3884 }
3885
3886 if (got_passphrase) {
3887
3888 /*
3889 * Send a public key attempt.
3890 */
3891 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3892 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3893
3894 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3895 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3896 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3897 continue; /* go and try something else */
3898 }
3899 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3900 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3901 crStop(0);
3902 }
3903
3904 {
3905 int i;
3906 unsigned char buffer[32];
3907 Bignum challenge, response;
3908
3909 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3910 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3911 crStop(0);
3912 }
3913 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3914 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3915
3916 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3917 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3918 }
3919
3920 MD5Init(&md5c);
3921 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3922 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3923 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3924
3925 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3926 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3927
3928 freebn(challenge);
3929 freebn(response);
3930 }
3931
3932 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3933 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3934 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3935 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3936 " our public key.\r\n");
3937 continue; /* go and try something else */
3938 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3939 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3940 crStop(0);
3941 }
3942
3943 break; /* we're through! */
3944 }
3945
3946 }
3947
3948 /*
3949 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3950 */
3951 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3952
3953 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
3954 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3955 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3956 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3957 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3958 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3959 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3960 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3961 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3962 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3963 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3964 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3965 continue;
3966 } else {
3967 char *challenge;
3968 int challengelen;
3969 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3970
3971 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3972 if (!challenge) {
3973 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3974 crStop(0);
3975 }
3976 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3977 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3978 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3979 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3980 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3981 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3982 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3983 } else {
3984 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3985 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3986 }
3987 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3988 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3989 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3990 instr_suf);
3991 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3992 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
3993 sfree(instr_suf);
3994 }
3995 }
3996 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
3997 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3998 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3999 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
4000 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
4001 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
4002 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4003 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
4004 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
4005 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
4006 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
4007 continue;
4008 } else {
4009 char *challenge;
4010 int challengelen;
4011 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
4012
4013 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
4014 if (!challenge) {
4015 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
4016 crStop(0);
4017 }
4018 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
4019 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
4020 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
4021 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
4022 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
4023 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
4024 instr_suf = dupstr("");
4025 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
4026 } else {
4027 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
4028 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
4029 }
4030 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
4031 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
4032 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
4033 instr_suf);
4034 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
4035 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
4036 sfree(instr_suf);
4037 }
4038 }
4039 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4040 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
4041 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
4042 crStop(0);
4043 }
4044 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
4045 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
4046 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
4047 ssh->username, ssh->savedhost),
4048 FALSE);
4049 }
4050
4051 /*
4052 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
4053 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
4054 * authentication.
4055 */
4056 {
4057 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
4058 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
4059 while (ret < 0) {
4060 ssh->send_ok = 1;
4061 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
4062 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
4063 ssh->send_ok = 0;
4064 }
4065 if (!ret) {
4066 /*
4067 * Failed to get a password (for example
4068 * because one was supplied on the command line
4069 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
4070 */
4071 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4072 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
4073 crStop(0);
4074 }
4075 }
4076
4077 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4078 /*
4079 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
4080 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
4081 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
4082 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
4083 * The others are all random data in
4084 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
4085 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
4086 * hence can't deduce the password length.
4087 *
4088 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
4089 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
4090 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4091 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4092 * do is:
4093 *
4094 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4095 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4096 *
4097 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4098 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4099 * packets containing string lengths N through
4100 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4101 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4102 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4103 *
4104 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4105 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4106 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4107 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4108 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4109 *
4110 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4111 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4112 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4113 * against password length sniffing.
4114 */
4115 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4116 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4117 /*
4118 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4119 * we can use the primary defence.
4120 */
4121 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4122 char *randomstr;
4123
4124 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4125 if (pwlen < 16) {
4126 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4127 top = 15;
4128 } else {
4129 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4130 top = bottom + 7;
4131 }
4132
4133 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4134
4135 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4136
4137 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4138 if (i == pwlen) {
4139 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4140 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4141 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4142 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4143 } else {
4144 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4145 do {
4146 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4147 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4148 }
4149 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4150 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4151 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4152 }
4153 }
4154 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4155 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4156 sfree(randomstr);
4157 }
4158 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4159 /*
4160 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4161 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4162 * can use the secondary defence.
4163 */
4164 char string[64];
4165 char *ss;
4166 int len;
4167
4168 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4169 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4170 ss = string;
4171 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4172 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4173 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4174 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4175 }
4176 } else {
4177 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4178 }
4179 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4180 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4181 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4182 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4183 } else {
4184 /*
4185 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4186 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4187 */
4188 int len;
4189 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4190 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4191 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4192 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4193 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4194 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4195 }
4196 } else {
4197 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4198 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4199 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4200 }
4201 logevent("Sent password");
4202 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4203 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4204 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4205 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4206 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4207 logevent("Authentication refused");
4208 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4209 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4210 crStop(0);
4211 }
4212 }
4213
4214 /* Clear up */
4215 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4216 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4217 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4218 }
4219
4220 logevent("Authentication successful");
4221
4222 crFinish(1);
4223 }
4224
4225 static void ssh_channel_try_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
4226 {
4227 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4228 assert(c->pending_eof); /* precondition for calling us */
4229 if (c->halfopen)
4230 return; /* can't close: not even opened yet */
4231 if (ssh->version == 2 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0)
4232 return; /* can't send EOF: pending outgoing data */
4233
4234 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4235 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4236 PKT_END);
4237 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4238 } else {
4239 struct Packet *pktout;
4240 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
4241 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4242 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4243 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4244 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes)) {
4245 /*
4246 * Also send MSG_CLOSE.
4247 */
4248 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4249 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4250 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4251 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4252 }
4253 }
4254 c->pending_eof = FALSE; /* we've sent it now */
4255 }
4256
4257 void sshfwd_write_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
4258 {
4259 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4260
4261 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4262 return;
4263
4264 if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
4265 return;
4266
4267 c->pending_eof = TRUE;
4268 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
4269 }
4270
4271 void sshfwd_unclean_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4272 {
4273 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4274 struct Packet *pktout;
4275
4276 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4277 return;
4278
4279 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
4280 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4281 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4282 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4283 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4284 }
4285
4286 switch (c->type) {
4287 case CHAN_X11:
4288 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4289 break;
4290 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4291 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
4292 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4293 break;
4294 }
4295 c->type = CHAN_ZOMBIE;
4296
4297 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
4298 }
4299
4300 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4301 {
4302 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4303
4304 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4305 return 0;
4306
4307 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4308 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4309 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4310 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4311 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4312 /*
4313 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4314 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4315 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4316 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4317 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4318 */
4319 return 0;
4320 } else {
4321 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4322 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4323 }
4324 }
4325
4326 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4327 {
4328 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4329 int buflimit;
4330
4331 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4332 return;
4333
4334 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4335 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4336 } else {
4337 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4338 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4339 }
4340 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4341 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4342 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4343 }
4344 }
4345
4346 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4347 {
4348 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4349
4350 assert(qh != NULL);
4351
4352 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4353
4354 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4355 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4356 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4357 }
4358 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4359 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4360 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4361 }
4362
4363 if (qh->next) {
4364 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4365
4366 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4367 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4368 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4369 }
4370 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4371 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4372 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4373 }
4374 } else {
4375 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4376 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4377 }
4378
4379 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4380
4381 sfree(qh);
4382 }
4383
4384 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4385 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4386 {
4387 struct queued_handler *qh;
4388
4389 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4390 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4391 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4392 qh->handler = handler;
4393 qh->ctx = ctx;
4394 qh->next = NULL;
4395
4396 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4397 ssh->qhead = qh;
4398
4399 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4400 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4401 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4402 }
4403 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4404 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4405 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4406 }
4407 } else {
4408 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4409 }
4410 ssh->qtail = qh;
4411 }
4412
4413 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4414 {
4415 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4416
4417 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4418 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4419 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4420 pf->sportdesc);
4421 } else {
4422 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4423 pf->sportdesc);
4424
4425 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4426 assert(rpf == pf);
4427 pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
4428 free_rportfwd(pf);
4429 }
4430 }
4431
4432 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, Conf *conf)
4433 {
4434 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4435 int i;
4436 char *key, *val;
4437
4438 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4439 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4440 } else {
4441 /*
4442 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4443 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4444 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4445 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4446 * they were before.
4447 */
4448 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4449 int i;
4450 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4451 epf->status = DESTROY;
4452 }
4453
4454 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, NULL, &key);
4455 val != NULL;
4456 val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, key, &key)) {
4457 char *kp, *kp2, *vp, *vp2;
4458 char address_family, type;
4459 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4460 char *sports, *dports, *saddr, *host;
4461
4462 kp = key;
4463
4464 address_family = 'A';
4465 type = 'L';
4466 if (*kp == 'A' || *kp == '4' || *kp == '6')
4467 address_family = *kp++;
4468 if (*kp == 'L' || *kp == 'R')
4469 type = *kp++;
4470
4471 if ((kp2 = strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
4472 /*
4473 * There's a colon in the middle of the source port
4474 * string, which means that the part before it is
4475 * actually a source address.
4476 */
4477 saddr = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
4478 sports = kp2+1;
4479 } else {
4480 saddr = NULL;
4481 sports = kp;
4482 }
4483 sport = atoi(sports);
4484 sserv = 0;
4485 if (sport == 0) {
4486 sserv = 1;
4487 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4488 if (!sport) {
4489 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4490 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4491 }
4492 }
4493
4494 if (type == 'L' && !strcmp(val, "D")) {
4495 /* dynamic forwarding */
4496 host = NULL;
4497 dports = NULL;
4498 dport = -1;
4499 dserv = 0;
4500 type = 'D';
4501 } else {
4502 /* ordinary forwarding */
4503 vp = val;
4504 vp2 = vp + strcspn(vp, ":");
4505 host = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(vp2 - vp), vp);
4506 if (vp2)
4507 vp2++;
4508 dports = vp2;
4509 dport = atoi(dports);
4510 dserv = 0;
4511 if (dport == 0) {
4512 dserv = 1;
4513 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4514 if (!dport) {
4515 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4516 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4517 }
4518 }
4519 }
4520
4521 if (sport && dport) {
4522 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4523 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4524
4525 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4526 pfrec->type = type;
4527 pfrec->saddr = saddr;
4528 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4529 pfrec->sport = sport;
4530 pfrec->daddr = host;
4531 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4532 pfrec->dport = dport;
4533 pfrec->local = NULL;
4534 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4535 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4536 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4537 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4538
4539 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4540 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4541 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
4542 /*
4543 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
4544 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
4545 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
4546 * as KEEP.
4547 */
4548 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4549 }
4550 /*
4551 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
4552 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
4553 */
4554 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4555 } else {
4556 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4557 }
4558 } else {
4559 sfree(saddr);
4560 sfree(host);
4561 }
4562 }
4563
4564 /*
4565 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4566 * not re-enabled.
4567 */
4568 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4569 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4570 char *message;
4571
4572 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4573 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4574 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4575 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4576 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4577 epf->sport);
4578
4579 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4580 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4581 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4582 sfree(message);
4583 message = msg2;
4584 }
4585
4586 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4587 sfree(message);
4588
4589 /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
4590 * forwarding failed. */
4591 if (epf->remote) {
4592 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4593 struct Packet *pktout;
4594
4595 /*
4596 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4597 * end.
4598 */
4599 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4600 /*
4601 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4602 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4603 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4604 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4605 * so that any connections the server tries
4606 * to make on it are rejected.
4607 */
4608 } else {
4609 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4610 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4611 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4612 if (epf->saddr) {
4613 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4614 } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
4615 /* XXX: rport_acceptall may not represent
4616 * what was used to open the original connection,
4617 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4618 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4619 } else {
4620 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4621 }
4622 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4623 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4624 }
4625
4626 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4627 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4628 } else if (epf->local) {
4629 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4630 }
4631
4632 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4633 free_portfwd(epf);
4634 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4635 }
4636
4637 /*
4638 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4639 */
4640 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4641 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4642 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4643 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4644 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4645 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4646 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4647 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4648 epf->sport,
4649 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4650 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4651 dportdesc = NULL;
4652 } else {
4653 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4654 epf->daddr,
4655 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4656 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4657 epf->dport,
4658 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4659 }
4660
4661 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4662 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4663 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4664 ssh, conf,
4665 &epf->local,
4666 epf->addressfamily);
4667
4668 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4669 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4670 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4671 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4672 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4673 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4674 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4675 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4676 ssh, conf,
4677 &epf->local,
4678 epf->addressfamily);
4679
4680 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4681 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4682 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4683 sportdesc,
4684 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4685 } else {
4686 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4687
4688 /*
4689 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4690 */
4691 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4692 if (ssh->version == 1)
4693 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4694 else
4695 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4696 }
4697
4698 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4699 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4700 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4701 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4702 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4703 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4704 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4705 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4706 sfree(pf);
4707 } else {
4708 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4709 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4710
4711 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4712 sportdesc = NULL;
4713 epf->remote = pf;
4714 pf->pfrec = epf;
4715
4716 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4717 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4718 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4719 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4720 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4721 PKT_END);
4722 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4723 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4724 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4725 } else {
4726 struct Packet *pktout;
4727 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4728 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4729 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4730 if (epf->saddr) {
4731 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4732 } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
4733 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4734 } else {
4735 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4736 }
4737 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4738 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4739
4740 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4741 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4742 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4743 }
4744 }
4745 }
4746 sfree(sportdesc);
4747 sfree(dportdesc);
4748 }
4749 }
4750
4751 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4752 {
4753 char *string;
4754 int stringlen, bufsize;
4755
4756 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4757 if (string == NULL) {
4758 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4759 return;
4760 }
4761
4762 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4763 string, stringlen);
4764 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4765 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4766 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4767 }
4768 }
4769
4770 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4771 {
4772 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4773 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4774 struct ssh_channel *c;
4775 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4776
4777 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4778 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4779 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4780 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4781 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4782 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4783 } else {
4784 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4785 c->ssh = ssh;
4786
4787 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4788 NULL, -1, ssh->conf) != NULL) {
4789 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4790 sfree(c);
4791 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4792 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4793 } else {
4794 logevent
4795 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4796 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4797 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4798 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4799 c->closes = 0;
4800 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4801 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4802 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4803 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4804 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4805 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4806 c->localid, PKT_END);
4807 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4808 }
4809 }
4810 }
4811
4812 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4813 {
4814 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4815 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4816 struct ssh_channel *c;
4817 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4818
4819 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4820 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4821 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4822 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4823 } else {
4824 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4825 c->ssh = ssh;
4826 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4827 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4828 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4829 c->closes = 0;
4830 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4831 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4832 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4833 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4834 c->u.a.message = NULL;
4835 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4836 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4837 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4838 PKT_END);
4839 }
4840 }
4841
4842 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4843 {
4844 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4845 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4846 struct ssh_channel *c;
4847 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4848 int remoteid;
4849 int hostsize, port;
4850 char *host;
4851 const char *e;
4852 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4853 c->ssh = ssh;
4854
4855 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4856 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4857 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4858
4859 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4860 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4861 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4862 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4863 pf.dport = port;
4864 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4865
4866 if (pfp == NULL) {
4867 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4868 pf.dhost, port);
4869 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4870 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4871 } else {
4872 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4873 pf.dhost, port);
4874 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4875 c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4876 if (e != NULL) {
4877 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4878 sfree(c);
4879 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4880 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4881 } else {
4882 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4883 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4884 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4885 c->closes = 0;
4886 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4887 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4888 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4889 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4890 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4891 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4892 c->localid, PKT_END);
4893 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4894 }
4895 }
4896 }
4897
4898 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4899 {
4900 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4901 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4902 struct ssh_channel *c;
4903
4904 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4905 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4906 c->remoteid = localid;
4907 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4908 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4909 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4910 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4911 }
4912
4913 if (c && c->pending_eof) {
4914 /*
4915 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4916 * which we decided on before the server acked
4917 * the channel open. So now we know the
4918 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4919 */
4920 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
4921 }
4922 }
4923
4924 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4925 {
4926 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4927 struct ssh_channel *c;
4928
4929 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4930 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4931 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4932 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4933 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4934 sfree(c);
4935 }
4936 }
4937
4938 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4939 {
4940 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4941 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4942 struct ssh_channel *c;
4943 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4944 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4945
4946 if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE &&
4947 !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)) {
4948 /*
4949 * Received CHANNEL_CLOSE, which we translate into
4950 * outgoing EOF.
4951 */
4952 int send_close = FALSE;
4953
4954 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
4955
4956 switch (c->type) {
4957 case CHAN_X11:
4958 if (c->u.x11.s)
4959 x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
4960 else
4961 send_close = TRUE;
4962 break;
4963 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4964 if (c->u.pfd.s)
4965 pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
4966 else
4967 send_close = TRUE;
4968 break;
4969 case CHAN_AGENT:
4970 send_close = TRUE;
4971 break;
4972 }
4973
4974 if (send_close && !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
4975 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4976 PKT_END);
4977 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4978 }
4979 }
4980
4981 if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION &&
4982 !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
4983
4984 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
4985 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION for channel %d"
4986 " for which we never sent CHANNEL_CLOSE\n", i));
4987 }
4988
4989 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
4990 }
4991
4992 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes) &&
4993 !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
4994 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION,
4995 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4996 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4997 }
4998
4999 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes))
5000 ssh_channel_destroy(c);
5001 } else {
5002 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
5003 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
5004 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
5005 i));
5006 }
5007 }
5008
5009 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5010 {
5011 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
5012 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5013 char *p;
5014 int len;
5015 struct ssh_channel *c;
5016
5017 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
5018
5019 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5020 if (c) {
5021 int bufsize = 0;
5022 switch (c->type) {
5023 case CHAN_X11:
5024 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
5025 break;
5026 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
5027 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
5028 break;
5029 case CHAN_AGENT:
5030 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
5031 while (len > 0) {
5032 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
5033 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
5034 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
5035 l);
5036 p += l;
5037 len -= l;
5038 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5039 }
5040 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
5041 c->u.a.totallen =
5042 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
5043 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
5044 unsigned char);
5045 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
5046 }
5047 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
5048 unsigned int l =
5049 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
5050 (unsigned)len);
5051 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
5052 l);
5053 p += l;
5054 len -= l;
5055 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5056 }
5057 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
5058 void *reply;
5059 int replylen;
5060 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
5061 c->u.a.totallen,
5062 &reply, &replylen,
5063 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
5064 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
5065 sfree(c->u.a.message);
5066 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
5067 }
5068 }
5069 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
5070 break;
5071 }
5072 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
5073 c->throttling_conn = 1;
5074 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
5075 }
5076 }
5077 }
5078
5079 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5080 {
5081 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5082 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
5083 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
5084 /*
5085 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
5086 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
5087 * session which we might mistake for another
5088 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
5089 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
5090 */
5091 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
5092 }
5093
5094 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
5095 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
5096 {
5097 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
5098 int i = 0;
5099 unsigned int arg = 0;
5100 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
5101 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
5102 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
5103 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
5104 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
5105 break;
5106 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
5107 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
5108 break;
5109 }
5110 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
5111 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
5112 }
5113
5114
5115 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
5116 struct Packet *pktin)
5117 {
5118 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
5119
5120 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
5121 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
5122 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
5123
5124 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
5125 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
5126 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
5127 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
5128 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
5129 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
5130 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
5131 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
5132 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
5133
5134 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
5135 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
5136 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
5137 do {
5138 crReturnV;
5139 } while (!pktin);
5140 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5141 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5142 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5143 crStopV;
5144 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5145 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5146 } else {
5147 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5148 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
5149 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
5150 }
5151 }
5152
5153 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
5154 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
5155 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
5156 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5157 /*
5158 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5159 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5160 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5161 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5162 * cookie into the log.
5163 */
5164 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5165 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5166 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5167 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5168 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5169 PKTT_OTHER,
5170 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5171 PKT_END);
5172 } else {
5173 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5174 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5175 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5176 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5177 PKTT_OTHER,
5178 PKT_END);
5179 }
5180 do {
5181 crReturnV;
5182 } while (!pktin);
5183 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5184 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5185 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5186 crStopV;
5187 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5188 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5189 } else {
5190 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5191 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5192 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5193 }
5194 }
5195
5196 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
5197 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5198
5199 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
5200 struct Packet *pkt;
5201 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5202 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5203 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5204 sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5205 /* Send the pty request. */
5206 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5207 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
5208 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5209 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5210 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5211 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5212 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5213 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5214 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5215 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5216 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5217 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5218 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5219 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5220 do {
5221 crReturnV;
5222 } while (!pktin);
5223 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5224 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5225 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5226 crStopV;
5227 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5228 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5229 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5230 } else {
5231 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5232 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5233 ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
5234 }
5235 } else {
5236 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5237 }
5238
5239 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression)) {
5240 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5241 do {
5242 crReturnV;
5243 } while (!pktin);
5244 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5245 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5246 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5247 crStopV;
5248 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5249 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5250 }
5251 logevent("Started compression");
5252 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5253 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5254 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5255 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5256 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5257 }
5258
5259 /*
5260 * Start the shell or command.
5261 *
5262 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5263 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5264 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5265 */
5266 {
5267 char *cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
5268
5269 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys) &&
5270 conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
5271 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
5272 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5273 }
5274 if (*cmd)
5275 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5276 else
5277 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5278 logevent("Started session");
5279 }
5280
5281 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5282 if (ssh->size_needed)
5283 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5284 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5285 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5286
5287 if (ssh->ldisc)
5288 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5289 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5290 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5291 while (1) {
5292
5293 /*
5294 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5295 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5296 * attention to the unusual ones.
5297 */
5298
5299 crReturnV;
5300 if (pktin) {
5301 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5302 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5303 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5304 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5305 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5306 } else {
5307 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5308 crStopV;
5309 }
5310 } else {
5311 while (inlen > 0) {
5312 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5313 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5314 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5315 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5316 in += len;
5317 inlen -= len;
5318 }
5319 }
5320 }
5321
5322 crFinishV;
5323 }
5324
5325 /*
5326 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5327 */
5328 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5329 {
5330 char *msg;
5331 int msglen;
5332
5333 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5334 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5335 }
5336
5337 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5338 {
5339 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5340 char *msg;
5341 int msglen;
5342
5343 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5344 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5345 }
5346
5347 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5348 {
5349 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5350 }
5351
5352 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5353 {
5354 int i;
5355
5356 /*
5357 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5358 */
5359 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5360 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5361
5362 /*
5363 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5364 */
5365 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5366 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5367 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5368 }
5369
5370 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5371 struct Packet *pktin)
5372 {
5373 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5374 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5375 return;
5376
5377 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5378 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5379 return;
5380 }
5381
5382 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5383 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5384 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5385 else
5386 return;
5387 }
5388
5389 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5390 }
5391
5392 /*
5393 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5394 */
5395 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5396 {
5397 int needlen;
5398 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5399 return 0;
5400 needlen = strlen(needle);
5401 while (1) {
5402 /*
5403 * Is it at the start of the string?
5404 */
5405 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5406 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5407 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5408 /* either , or EOS follows */
5409 )
5410 return 1;
5411 /*
5412 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5413 * If no comma found, terminate.
5414 */
5415 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5416 haylen--, haystack++;
5417 if (haylen == 0)
5418 return 0;
5419 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5420 }
5421 }
5422
5423 /*
5424 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5425 */
5426 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5427 {
5428 int needlen;
5429 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5430 return 0;
5431 needlen = strlen(needle);
5432 /*
5433 * Is it at the start of the string?
5434 */
5435 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5436 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5437 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5438 /* either , or EOS follows */
5439 )
5440 return 1;
5441 return 0;
5442 }
5443
5444
5445 /*
5446 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5447 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5448 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5449 */
5450 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5451 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5452 unsigned char *keyspace)
5453 {
5454 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5455 void *s;
5456 /* First hlen bytes. */
5457 s = h->init();
5458 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5459 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5460 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5461 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5462 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5463 h->final(s, keyspace);
5464 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5465 s = h->init();
5466 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5467 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5468 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5469 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5470 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5471 }
5472
5473 /*
5474 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5475 */
5476 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5477 struct Packet *pktin)
5478 {
5479 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5480 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5481 int crLine;
5482 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5483 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5484 void *our_kexinit;
5485 int our_kexinitlen;
5486 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5487 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5488 int nmacs;
5489 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5490 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5491 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5492 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5493 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5494 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5495 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5496 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5497 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5498 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5499 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5500 int n_preferred_kex;
5501 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5502 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5503 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5504 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5505 int userauth_succeeded; /* for delayed compression */
5506 int pending_compression;
5507 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5508 struct Packet *pktout;
5509 int dlgret;
5510 int guessok;
5511 int ignorepkt;
5512 };
5513 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5514
5515 crBeginState;
5516
5517 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5518 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5519 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5520
5521 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5522 s->userauth_succeeded = FALSE;
5523 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
5524
5525 /*
5526 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5527 */
5528 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5529 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5530 else
5531 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5532
5533 begin_key_exchange:
5534 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5535 {
5536 int i, j, commalist_started;
5537
5538 /*
5539 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5540 */
5541 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5542 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5543 switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_kexlist, i)) {
5544 case KEX_DHGEX:
5545 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5546 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5547 break;
5548 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5549 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5550 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5551 break;
5552 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5553 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5554 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5555 break;
5556 case KEX_RSA:
5557 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5558 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5559 break;
5560 case KEX_WARN:
5561 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5562 * the list. */
5563 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5564 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5565 }
5566 break;
5567 }
5568 }
5569
5570 /*
5571 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5572 */
5573 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5574 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5575 switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
5576 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5577 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5578 break;
5579 case CIPHER_DES:
5580 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
5581 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5582 }
5583 break;
5584 case CIPHER_3DES:
5585 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5586 break;
5587 case CIPHER_AES:
5588 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5589 break;
5590 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5591 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5592 break;
5593 case CIPHER_WARN:
5594 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5595 * the list. */
5596 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5597 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5598 }
5599 break;
5600 }
5601 }
5602
5603 /*
5604 * Set up preferred compression.
5605 */
5606 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression))
5607 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5608 else
5609 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5610
5611 /*
5612 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5613 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5614 */
5615 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5616
5617 /*
5618 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5619 */
5620 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5621
5622 /*
5623 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5624 */
5625 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5626 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5627 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5628 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5629 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5630 commalist_started = 0;
5631 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5632 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5633 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5634 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5635 if (commalist_started)
5636 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5637 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5638 commalist_started = 1;
5639 }
5640 }
5641 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5642 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5643 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5644 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5645 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5646 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5647 }
5648 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5649 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5650 commalist_started = 0;
5651 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5652 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5653 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5654 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5655 if (commalist_started)
5656 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5657 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5658 commalist_started = 1;
5659 }
5660 }
5661 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5662 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5663 commalist_started = 0;
5664 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5665 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5666 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5667 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5668 if (commalist_started)
5669 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5670 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5671 commalist_started = 1;
5672 }
5673 }
5674 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5675 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5676 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5677 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5678 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5679 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5680 }
5681 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5682 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5683 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5684 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5685 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5686 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5687 }
5688 /* List client->server compression algorithms,
5689 * then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
5690 * same set twice.) */
5691 for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
5692 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5693 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5694 /* Prefer non-delayed versions */
5695 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5696 /* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
5697 * they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
5698 * this function. */
5699 if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
5700 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5701 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
5702 s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
5703 }
5704 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5705 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5706 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5707 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5708 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5709 if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
5710 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5711 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
5712 }
5713 }
5714 }
5715 }
5716 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5717 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5718 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5719 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5720 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5721 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5722 /* Reserved. */
5723 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5724 }
5725
5726 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5727 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5728 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5729
5730 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5731
5732 if (!pktin)
5733 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5734
5735 /*
5736 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5737 * to.
5738 */
5739 {
5740 char *str, *preferred;
5741 int i, j, len;
5742
5743 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5744 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5745 crStop(0);
5746 }
5747 ssh->kex = NULL;
5748 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5749 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5750 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5751 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5752 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5753 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5754 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5755 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5756
5757 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5758 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5759
5760 preferred = NULL;
5761 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5762 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5763 if (!k) {
5764 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5765 } else {
5766 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5767 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5768 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5769 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5770 break;
5771 }
5772 }
5773 }
5774 if (ssh->kex)
5775 break;
5776 }
5777 if (!ssh->kex) {
5778 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5779 str ? str : "(null)"));
5780 crStop(0);
5781 }
5782 /*
5783 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5784 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5785 * we end up using.
5786 */
5787 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5788 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5789 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5790 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5791 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5792 break;
5793 }
5794 }
5795 if (!ssh->hostkey) {
5796 bombout(("Couldn't agree a host key algorithm (available: %s)",
5797 str ? str : "(null)"));
5798 crStop(0);
5799 }
5800
5801 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5802 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5803 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5804 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5805 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5806 if (!c) {
5807 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5808 } else {
5809 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5810 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5811 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5812 break;
5813 }
5814 }
5815 }
5816 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5817 break;
5818 }
5819 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5820 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5821 str ? str : "(null)"));
5822 crStop(0);
5823 }
5824
5825 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5826 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5827 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5828 if (!c) {
5829 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5830 } else {
5831 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5832 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5833 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5834 break;
5835 }
5836 }
5837 }
5838 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5839 break;
5840 }
5841 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5842 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5843 str ? str : "(null)"));
5844 crStop(0);
5845 }
5846
5847 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5848 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5849 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5850 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5851 break;
5852 }
5853 }
5854 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5855 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5856 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5857 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5858 break;
5859 }
5860 }
5861 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5862 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5863 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5864 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5865 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5866 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5867 break;
5868 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
5869 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
5870 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5871 break;
5872 } else {
5873 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
5874 }
5875 }
5876 }
5877 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5878 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5879 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5880 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5881 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5882 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5883 break;
5884 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
5885 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
5886 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5887 break;
5888 } else {
5889 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
5890 }
5891 }
5892 }
5893 if (s->pending_compression) {
5894 logevent("Server supports delayed compression; "
5895 "will try this later");
5896 }
5897 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5898 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5899 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5900
5901 if (s->warn_kex) {
5902 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5903 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5904 ssh->kex->name,
5905 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5906 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5907 do {
5908 crReturn(0);
5909 if (pktin) {
5910 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5911 " waiting for user response"));
5912 crStop(0);
5913 }
5914 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5915 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5916 }
5917 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5918 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5919 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5920 0, TRUE);
5921 crStop(0);
5922 }
5923 }
5924
5925 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5926 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5927 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5928 "client-to-server cipher",
5929 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5930 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5931 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5932 do {
5933 crReturn(0);
5934 if (pktin) {
5935 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5936 " waiting for user response"));
5937 crStop(0);
5938 }
5939 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5940 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5941 }
5942 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5943 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5944 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5945 0, TRUE);
5946 crStop(0);
5947 }
5948 }
5949
5950 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5951 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5952 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5953 "server-to-client cipher",
5954 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5955 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5956 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5957 do {
5958 crReturn(0);
5959 if (pktin) {
5960 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5961 " waiting for user response"));
5962 crStop(0);
5963 }
5964 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5965 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5966 }
5967 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5968 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5969 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5970 0, TRUE);
5971 crStop(0);
5972 }
5973 }
5974
5975 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5976 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5977 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5978 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5979 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5980 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5981 if (pktin->length > 5)
5982 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5983 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5984
5985 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5986 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5987 }
5988
5989 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5990 /*
5991 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5992 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5993 * either cipher...
5994 */
5995 {
5996 int csbits, scbits;
5997
5998 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5999 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
6000 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
6001 }
6002 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
6003 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
6004 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
6005 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
6006
6007 /*
6008 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
6009 * requesting a group.
6010 */
6011 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6012 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
6013 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
6014 /*
6015 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
6016 * much data.
6017 */
6018 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
6019 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
6020 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
6021 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6022
6023 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6024 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
6025 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
6026 crStop(0);
6027 }
6028 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6029 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6030 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
6031 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
6032 crStop(0);
6033 }
6034 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
6035 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
6036 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
6037 } else {
6038 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
6039 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
6040 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
6041 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
6042 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
6043 ssh->kex->groupname);
6044 }
6045
6046 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
6047 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
6048 /*
6049 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
6050 */
6051 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
6052 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
6053 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
6054 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
6055 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6056
6057 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
6058 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6059 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
6060 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
6061 crStop(0);
6062 }
6063 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
6064 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
6065 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6066 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6067 if (!s->f) {
6068 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
6069 crStop(0);
6070 }
6071 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6072
6073 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
6074
6075 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
6076 * involve user interaction. */
6077 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
6078
6079 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6080 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6081 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
6082 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
6083 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
6084 }
6085 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
6086 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
6087
6088 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
6089 freebn(s->f);
6090 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6091 freebn(s->g);
6092 freebn(s->p);
6093 }
6094 } else {
6095 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
6096 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
6097 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
6098 /*
6099 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
6100 * from the server.
6101 */
6102 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6103 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
6104 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
6105 crStop(0);
6106 }
6107
6108 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
6109 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
6110 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6111 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6112
6113 {
6114 char *keydata;
6115 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
6116 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
6117 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
6118 }
6119
6120 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6121 if (!s->rsakey) {
6122 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6123 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
6124 crStop(0);
6125 }
6126
6127 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6128
6129 /*
6130 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
6131 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
6132 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
6133 * we're using.
6134 */
6135 {
6136 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
6137 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
6138 int i, byte = 0;
6139 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
6140 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
6141
6142 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
6143
6144 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
6145 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
6146 byte = random_byte();
6147 }
6148 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
6149 }
6150
6151 /*
6152 * Encode this as an mpint.
6153 */
6154 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
6155 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
6156 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
6157 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
6158
6159 /*
6160 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
6161 */
6162 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
6163 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
6164 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
6165 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
6166
6167 /*
6168 * And send it off in a return packet.
6169 */
6170 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
6171 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6172 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
6173 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6174
6175 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
6176
6177 sfree(kstr2);
6178 sfree(kstr1);
6179 sfree(outstr);
6180 }
6181
6182 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
6183
6184 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6185 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
6186 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6187 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
6188 crStop(0);
6189 }
6190
6191 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6192
6193 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6194 }
6195
6196 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6197 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6198 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6199
6200 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6201
6202 #if 0
6203 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6204 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6205 #endif
6206
6207 if (!s->hkey ||
6208 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6209 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6210 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6211 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6212 crStop(0);
6213 }
6214
6215 /*
6216 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6217 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6218 */
6219 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6220 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6221 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6222 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6223 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6224 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6225 s->fingerprint,
6226 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6227 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6228 do {
6229 crReturn(0);
6230 if (pktin) {
6231 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6232 " for user host key response"));
6233 crStop(0);
6234 }
6235 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6236 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6237 }
6238 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6239 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6240 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6241 0, TRUE);
6242 crStop(0);
6243 }
6244 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6245 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6246 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6247 }
6248 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6249 sfree(s->keystr);
6250 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6251
6252 /*
6253 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6254 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6255 * authentication.
6256 */
6257 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6258 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6259 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6260 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6261 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6262 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6263 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6264 }
6265
6266 /*
6267 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6268 */
6269 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6270 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6271 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6272
6273 /*
6274 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6275 * client-to-server session keys.
6276 */
6277 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6278 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6279 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6280 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6281
6282 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6283 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6284 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6285 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6286
6287 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6288 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6289 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6290 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6291
6292 /*
6293 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6294 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6295 */
6296 {
6297 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6298 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6299 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6300 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6301 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6302 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6303 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6304 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6305 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6306 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6307 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6308 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6309 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6310 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6311 smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
6312 }
6313
6314 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6315 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6316 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6317 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6318 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6319 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6320 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6321
6322 /*
6323 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6324 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6325 */
6326 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6327 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6328
6329 /*
6330 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6331 */
6332 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6333 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6334 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6335 crStop(0);
6336 }
6337 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6338
6339 /*
6340 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6341 * server-to-client session keys.
6342 */
6343 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6344 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6345 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6346 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6347
6348 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6349 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6350 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6351 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6352
6353 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6354 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6355 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6356 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6357
6358 /*
6359 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6360 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6361 */
6362 {
6363 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6364 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6365 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6366 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6367 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6368 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6369 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6370 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6371 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6372 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6373 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6374 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6375 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6376 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6377 smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
6378 }
6379 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6380 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6381 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6382 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6383 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6384 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6385 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6386
6387 /*
6388 * Free shared secret.
6389 */
6390 freebn(s->K);
6391
6392 /*
6393 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6394 * deferred rekey reason.
6395 */
6396 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6397 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6398 pktin = NULL;
6399 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6400 goto begin_key_exchange;
6401 }
6402
6403 /*
6404 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6405 */
6406 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6407 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6408 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0)
6409 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6410 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6411
6412 /*
6413 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6414 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6415 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6416 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6417 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6418 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6419 */
6420 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6421 crReturn(0);
6422 }
6423 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6424
6425 /*
6426 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6427 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6428 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6429 * start.
6430 *
6431 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6432 * inlen negative, because this is a special signal meaning
6433 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6434 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6435 *
6436 * inlen==-1 means always initiate a rekey;
6437 * inlen==-2 means that userauth has completed successfully and
6438 * we should consider rekeying (for delayed compression).
6439 */
6440 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6441 (!pktin && inlen < 0))) {
6442 wait_for_rekey:
6443 crReturn(1);
6444 }
6445 if (pktin) {
6446 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6447 } else {
6448 if (inlen == -2) {
6449 /*
6450 * authconn has seen a USERAUTH_SUCCEEDED. Time to enable
6451 * delayed compression, if it's available.
6452 *
6453 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00 says that you
6454 * negotiate delayed compression in the first key exchange, and
6455 * both sides start compressing when the server has sent
6456 * USERAUTH_SUCCESS. This has a race condition -- the server
6457 * can't know when the client has seen it, and thus which incoming
6458 * packets it should treat as compressed.
6459 *
6460 * Instead, we do the initial key exchange without offering the
6461 * delayed methods, but note if the server offers them; when we
6462 * get here, if a delayed method was available that was higher
6463 * on our list than what we got, we initiate a rekey in which we
6464 * _do_ list the delayed methods (and hopefully get it as a
6465 * result). Subsequent rekeys will do the same.
6466 */
6467 assert(!s->userauth_succeeded); /* should only happen once */
6468 s->userauth_succeeded = TRUE;
6469 if (!s->pending_compression)
6470 /* Can't see any point rekeying. */
6471 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6472 /* else fall through to rekey... */
6473 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
6474 }
6475 /*
6476 * Now we've decided to rekey.
6477 *
6478 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6479 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6480 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6481 * we process it anyway!)
6482 */
6483 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6484 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6485 (char *)in);
6486 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6487 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6488 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6489 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6490 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0) {
6491 ssh->next_rekey =
6492 schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6493 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6494 }
6495 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is still utterly horrid */
6496 } else {
6497 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6498 }
6499 }
6500 goto begin_key_exchange;
6501
6502 crFinish(1);
6503 }
6504
6505 /*
6506 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6507 */
6508 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6509 int len)
6510 {
6511 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6512 }
6513
6514 /*
6515 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6516 */
6517 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6518 {
6519 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6520 struct Packet *pktout;
6521 int ret;
6522
6523 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6524 int len;
6525 void *data;
6526 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6527 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6528 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6529 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6530 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6531 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6532 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6533 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6534 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6535 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6536 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6537 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6538 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6539 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6540 }
6541
6542 /*
6543 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6544 * still buffered.
6545 */
6546 ret = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6547
6548 /*
6549 * And if there's no data pending but we need to send an EOF, send
6550 * it.
6551 */
6552 if (!ret && c->pending_eof)
6553 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
6554
6555 return ret;
6556 }
6557
6558 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
6559 {
6560 int bufsize;
6561 if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
6562 return; /* don't send on channels we've EOFed */
6563 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6564 if (bufsize == 0) {
6565 switch (c->type) {
6566 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6567 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6568 * notification since it will be polled */
6569 break;
6570 case CHAN_X11:
6571 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6572 break;
6573 case CHAN_AGENT:
6574 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6575 * buffer management */
6576 break;
6577 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6578 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6579 break;
6580 }
6581 }
6582 }
6583
6584 /*
6585 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6586 */
6587 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6588 {
6589 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6590 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6591 c->closes = 0;
6592 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
6593 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6594 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6595 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6596 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6597 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6598 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6599 }
6600
6601 /*
6602 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6603 */
6604 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6605 {
6606 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6607
6608 /*
6609 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side has
6610 * already sent EOF on; there's no point, since it won't be
6611 * sending any more data anyway. Ditto if _we've_ already sent
6612 * CLOSE.
6613 */
6614 if (c->closes & (CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
6615 return;
6616
6617 /*
6618 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6619 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6620 * window as well).
6621 */
6622 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6623 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6624
6625 /*
6626 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6627 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6628 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6629 *
6630 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6631 */
6632 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6633 struct Packet *pktout;
6634 struct winadj *wa;
6635
6636 /*
6637 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6638 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6639 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6640 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6641 *
6642 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6643 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6644 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6645 *
6646 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6647 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6648 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6649 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6650 */
6651 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6652 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] &&
6653 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ)) {
6654 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6655 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6656 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6657 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6658 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6659
6660 /*
6661 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6662 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6663 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6664 */
6665 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6666 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6667 wa->next = NULL;
6668 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6669 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6670 else
6671 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6672 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6673 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6674 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6675 } else {
6676 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6677 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6678 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6679 }
6680 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6681 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6682 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6683 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6684 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6685 }
6686 }
6687
6688 /*
6689 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6690 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6691 */
6692 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6693 {
6694 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6695 struct ssh_channel *c;
6696
6697 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6698 if (!c ||
6699 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6700 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6701 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6702 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6703 pktin->type),
6704 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6705 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6706 sfree(buf);
6707 return NULL;
6708 }
6709 return c;
6710 }
6711
6712 static int ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *c)
6713 {
6714 struct winadj *wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6715 if (!wa)
6716 return FALSE;
6717 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6718 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6719 sfree(wa);
6720 /*
6721 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6722 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6723 * complete.
6724 */
6725 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6726 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6727 /*
6728 * We may now initiate channel-closing procedures, if that winadj
6729 * was the last thing outstanding before we send CHANNEL_CLOSE.
6730 */
6731 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
6732 return TRUE;
6733 }
6734
6735 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6736 {
6737 /*
6738 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6739 * sent with want_reply false, are sent before this handler gets
6740 * installed, or are "winadj@putty" requests, which servers should
6741 * never respond to with success.
6742 *
6743 * However, at least one server ("boks_sshd") is known to return
6744 * SUCCESS for channel requests it's never heard of, such as
6745 * "winadj@putty". Raised with foxt.com as bug 090916-090424, but
6746 * for the sake of a quiet life, we handle it just the same as the
6747 * expected FAILURE.
6748 */
6749 struct ssh_channel *c;
6750
6751 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6752 if (!c)
6753 return;
6754 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
6755 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6756 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6757 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6758 }
6759
6760 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6761 {
6762 /*
6763 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6764 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6765 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6766 * installed.
6767 */
6768 struct ssh_channel *c;
6769
6770 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6771 if (!c)
6772 return;
6773 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
6774 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6775 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6776 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6777 }
6778
6779 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6780 {
6781 struct ssh_channel *c;
6782 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6783 if (!c)
6784 return;
6785 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
6786 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6787 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
6788 }
6789 }
6790
6791 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6792 {
6793 char *data;
6794 int length;
6795 struct ssh_channel *c;
6796 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6797 if (!c)
6798 return;
6799 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6800 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6801 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6802 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6803 if (data) {
6804 int bufsize = 0;
6805 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6806 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6807 switch (c->type) {
6808 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6809 bufsize =
6810 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6811 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6812 data, length);
6813 break;
6814 case CHAN_X11:
6815 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6816 break;
6817 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6818 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6819 break;
6820 case CHAN_AGENT:
6821 while (length > 0) {
6822 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6823 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6824 (unsigned)length);
6825 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6826 data, l);
6827 data += l;
6828 length -= l;
6829 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6830 }
6831 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6832 c->u.a.totallen =
6833 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6834 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6835 unsigned char);
6836 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6837 }
6838 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6839 unsigned int l =
6840 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6841 (unsigned)length);
6842 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6843 data, l);
6844 data += l;
6845 length -= l;
6846 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6847 }
6848 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6849 void *reply;
6850 int replylen;
6851 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6852 c->u.a.totallen,
6853 &reply, &replylen,
6854 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6855 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6856 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6857 c->u.a.message = NULL;
6858 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6859 }
6860 }
6861 bufsize = 0;
6862 break;
6863 }
6864 /*
6865 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6866 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6867 * larger window.
6868 */
6869 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6870 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6871 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6872 /*
6873 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6874 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6875 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6876 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6877 * sent excess data.
6878 */
6879 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6880 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6881 /*
6882 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6883 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6884 * throttle the whole channel.
6885 */
6886 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6887 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) && bufsize > 0)) &&
6888 !c->throttling_conn) {
6889 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6890 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6891 }
6892 }
6893 }
6894
6895 static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c)
6896 {
6897 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6898
6899 switch (c->type) {
6900 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6901 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6902 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6903 break;
6904 case CHAN_X11:
6905 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6906 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6907 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
6908 break;
6909 case CHAN_AGENT:
6910 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6911 break;
6912 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6913 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6914 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6915 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
6916 break;
6917 }
6918
6919 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6920 if (ssh->version == 2)
6921 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6922 sfree(c);
6923
6924 /*
6925 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6926 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6927 * not running in -N mode.)
6928 */
6929 if (ssh->version == 2 &&
6930 !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
6931 count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6932 /*
6933 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6934 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6935 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6936 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6937 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6938 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6939 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6940 * this is more polite than sending a
6941 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6942 */
6943 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6944 }
6945 }
6946
6947 static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
6948 {
6949 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6950 struct Packet *pktout;
6951
6952 if ((c->closes & (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
6953 == (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) && !c->v.v2.winadj_head) {
6954 /*
6955 * We have both sent and received EOF, and we have no
6956 * outstanding winadj channel requests, which means the
6957 * channel is in final wind-up. But we haven't sent CLOSE, so
6958 * let's do so now.
6959 */
6960 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6961 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6962 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6963 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
6964 }
6965
6966 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes)) {
6967 /*
6968 * We have both sent and received CLOSE, which means we're
6969 * completely done with the channel.
6970 */
6971 ssh_channel_destroy(c);
6972 }
6973 }
6974
6975 static void ssh2_channel_got_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
6976 {
6977 if (c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)
6978 return; /* already seen EOF */
6979 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
6980
6981 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6982 x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
6983 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6984 /* Manufacture an outgoing EOF in response to the incoming one. */
6985 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
6986 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6987 pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
6988 } else if (c->type == CHAN_MAINSESSION) {
6989 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6990
6991 if (!ssh->sent_console_eof &&
6992 (from_backend_eof(ssh->frontend) || ssh->got_pty)) {
6993 /*
6994 * Either from_backend_eof told us that the front end
6995 * wants us to close the outgoing side of the connection
6996 * as soon as we see EOF from the far end, or else we've
6997 * unilaterally decided to do that because we've allocated
6998 * a remote pty and hence EOF isn't a particularly
6999 * meaningful concept.
7000 */
7001 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
7002 }
7003 ssh->sent_console_eof = TRUE;
7004 }
7005
7006 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
7007 }
7008
7009 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7010 {
7011 struct ssh_channel *c;
7012
7013 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7014 if (!c)
7015 return;
7016 ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
7017 }
7018
7019 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7020 {
7021 struct ssh_channel *c;
7022
7023 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7024 if (!c)
7025 return;
7026
7027 /*
7028 * When we receive CLOSE on a channel, we assume it comes with an
7029 * implied EOF if we haven't seen EOF yet.
7030 */
7031 ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
7032
7033 /*
7034 * And we also send an outgoing EOF, if we haven't already, on the
7035 * assumption that CLOSE is a pretty forceful announcement that
7036 * the remote side is doing away with the entire channel. (If it
7037 * had wanted to send us EOF and continue receiving data from us,
7038 * it would have just sent CHANNEL_EOF.)
7039 */
7040 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
7041 /*
7042 * Make sure we don't read any more from whatever our local
7043 * data source is for this channel.
7044 */
7045 switch (c->type) {
7046 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
7047 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* stop trying to read from stdin */
7048 break;
7049 case CHAN_X11:
7050 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, 1);
7051 break;
7052 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
7053 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, 1);
7054 break;
7055 }
7056
7057 /*
7058 * Send outgoing EOF.
7059 */
7060 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
7061 }
7062
7063 /*
7064 * Now process the actual close.
7065 */
7066 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
7067 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
7068 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
7069 }
7070 }
7071
7072 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7073 {
7074 struct ssh_channel *c;
7075
7076 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7077 if (!c)
7078 return;
7079 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
7080 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
7081 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7082 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7083 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7084 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7085 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7086 if (c->u.pfd.s)
7087 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
7088 if (c->pending_eof)
7089 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
7090 }
7091
7092 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7093 {
7094 static const char *const reasons[] = {
7095 "<unknown reason code>",
7096 "Administratively prohibited",
7097 "Connect failed",
7098 "Unknown channel type",
7099 "Resource shortage",
7100 };
7101 unsigned reason_code;
7102 char *reason_string;
7103 int reason_length;
7104 struct ssh_channel *c;
7105 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7106 if (!c)
7107 return;
7108 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
7109 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
7110
7111 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7112 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
7113 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
7114 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
7115 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
7116 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
7117
7118 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
7119
7120 del234(ssh->channels, c);
7121 sfree(c);
7122 }
7123
7124 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7125 {
7126 char *type;
7127 int typelen, want_reply;
7128 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
7129 struct ssh_channel *c;
7130 struct Packet *pktout;
7131
7132 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7133 if (!c)
7134 return;
7135 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7136 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7137
7138 /*
7139 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
7140 * the request type string to see if it's something
7141 * we recognise.
7142 */
7143 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
7144 /*
7145 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
7146 * the primary channel.
7147 */
7148 if (typelen == 11 &&
7149 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
7150
7151 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7152 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
7153 ssh->exitcode);
7154 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7155
7156 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
7157 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
7158
7159 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
7160 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
7161 char *msg;
7162 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
7163 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
7164 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
7165 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
7166 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
7167 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
7168 {
7169 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
7170 pktin->savedpos;
7171 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
7172 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
7173 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
7174 if (num == 0) {
7175 is_int = FALSE;
7176 } else {
7177 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
7178 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
7179 do { \
7180 long q = offset; \
7181 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
7182 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
7183 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
7184 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
7185 result = TRUE; \
7186 } \
7187 } while(0)
7188 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
7189 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
7190 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
7191 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
7192 is_int = TRUE;
7193 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
7194 is_int = FALSE;
7195 else
7196 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
7197 is_plausible = FALSE;
7198 }
7199 }
7200 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
7201 if (is_plausible) {
7202 if (is_int) {
7203 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
7204 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7205 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
7206 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
7207 } else {
7208 /* As per RFC 4254. */
7209 char *sig;
7210 int siglen;
7211 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
7212 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
7213 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
7214 if (siglen) {
7215 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
7216 siglen, sig);
7217 }
7218
7219 /*
7220 * Really hideous method of translating the
7221 * signal description back into a locally
7222 * meaningful number.
7223 */
7224
7225 if (0)
7226 ;
7227 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
7228 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
7229 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
7230 #ifdef SIGABRT
7231 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
7232 #endif
7233 #ifdef SIGALRM
7234 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
7235 #endif
7236 #ifdef SIGFPE
7237 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
7238 #endif
7239 #ifdef SIGHUP
7240 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
7241 #endif
7242 #ifdef SIGILL
7243 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
7244 #endif
7245 #ifdef SIGINT
7246 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
7247 #endif
7248 #ifdef SIGKILL
7249 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
7250 #endif
7251 #ifdef SIGPIPE
7252 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
7253 #endif
7254 #ifdef SIGQUIT
7255 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
7256 #endif
7257 #ifdef SIGSEGV
7258 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
7259 #endif
7260 #ifdef SIGTERM
7261 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
7262 #endif
7263 #ifdef SIGUSR1
7264 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
7265 #endif
7266 #ifdef SIGUSR2
7267 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
7268 #endif
7269 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
7270 else
7271 ssh->exitcode = 128;
7272 }
7273 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7274 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7275 if (msglen) {
7276 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
7277 }
7278 /* ignore lang tag */
7279 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
7280 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
7281 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
7282 fmt_msg);
7283 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
7284 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
7285 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7286
7287 }
7288 } else {
7289 /*
7290 * This is a channel request we don't know
7291 * about, so we now either ignore the request
7292 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
7293 * on want_reply.
7294 */
7295 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
7296 }
7297 if (want_reply) {
7298 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
7299 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7300 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7301 }
7302 }
7303
7304 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7305 {
7306 char *type;
7307 int typelen, want_reply;
7308 struct Packet *pktout;
7309
7310 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7311 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7312
7313 /*
7314 * We currently don't support any global requests
7315 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
7316 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
7317 * want_reply.
7318 */
7319 if (want_reply) {
7320 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
7321 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7322 }
7323 }
7324
7325 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7326 {
7327 char *type;
7328 int typelen;
7329 char *peeraddr;
7330 int peeraddrlen;
7331 int peerport;
7332 char *error = NULL;
7333 struct ssh_channel *c;
7334 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7335 struct Packet *pktout;
7336
7337 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7338 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7339 c->ssh = ssh;
7340
7341 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7342 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7343 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7344
7345 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7346 char *addrstr;
7347 const char *x11err;
7348
7349 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7350 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7351 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7352 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7353 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7354
7355 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7356 addrstr, peerport);
7357
7358 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7359 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7360 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7361 addrstr, peerport, ssh->conf)) != NULL) {
7362 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7363 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7364 } else {
7365 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7366 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7367 }
7368
7369 sfree(addrstr);
7370 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7371 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7372 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7373 char *dummy;
7374 int dummylen;
7375 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7376 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7377 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7378 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7379 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7380 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7381 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7382 if (realpf == NULL) {
7383 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7384 } else {
7385 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7386 realpf->dhost,
7387 realpf->dport, c,
7388 ssh->conf,
7389 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7390 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7391 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7392 if (e != NULL) {
7393 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7394 error = "Port open failed";
7395 } else {
7396 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7397 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7398 }
7399 }
7400 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7401 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7402 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7403 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7404 else {
7405 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7406 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7407 }
7408 } else {
7409 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7410 }
7411
7412 c->remoteid = remid;
7413 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7414 if (error) {
7415 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7416 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7417 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7418 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7419 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7420 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7421 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7422 sfree(c);
7423 } else {
7424 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7425 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7426 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7427 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7428 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7429 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7430 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7431 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7432 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7433 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7434 }
7435 }
7436
7437 /*
7438 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
7439 * if we're going to display them.
7440 */
7441 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7442 {
7443 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7444 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner) &&
7445 bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7446 char *banner = NULL;
7447 int size = 0;
7448 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7449 if (banner)
7450 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7451 }
7452 }
7453
7454 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7455 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7456 {
7457 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7458 int i = 0;
7459 unsigned int arg = 0;
7460 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7461 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7462 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7463 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7464 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7465 break;
7466 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7467 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7468 break;
7469 }
7470 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7471 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7472 }
7473
7474 /*
7475 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7476 */
7477 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7478 struct Packet *pktin)
7479 {
7480 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7481 int crLine;
7482 enum {
7483 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7484 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7485 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7486 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7487 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7488 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
7489 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7490 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7491 } type;
7492 int done_service_req;
7493 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7494 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7495 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7496 int can_gssapi;
7497 int tried_gssapi;
7498 #endif
7499 int kbd_inter_refused;
7500 int we_are_in, userauth_success;
7501 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7502 int num_prompts;
7503 char *username;
7504 char *password;
7505 int got_username;
7506 void *publickey_blob;
7507 int publickey_bloblen;
7508 int publickey_encrypted;
7509 char *publickey_algorithm;
7510 char *publickey_comment;
7511 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7512 int agent_responselen;
7513 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7514 int keyi, nkeys;
7515 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7516 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7517 int siglen, retlen, len;
7518 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7519 int try_send;
7520 int requested_x11;
7521 int requested_agent;
7522 int requested_tty;
7523 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7524 struct Packet *pktout;
7525 Filename *keyfile;
7526 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7527 struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
7528 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7529 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7530 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7531 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7532 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7533 #endif
7534 };
7535 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7536
7537 crBeginState;
7538
7539 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7540 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
7541 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7542 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7543 #endif
7544
7545 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
7546 /*
7547 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7548 */
7549 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7550 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7551 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7552 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7553 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7554 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7555 }
7556 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7557 /*
7558 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7559 */
7560 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7561 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7562 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7563 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7564 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7565 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7566 } else {
7567 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7568 crStopV;
7569 }
7570 }
7571
7572 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7573 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7574 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7575 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7576 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7577
7578 /*
7579 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7580 */
7581 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7582 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7583
7584 /*
7585 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7586 * for later use.
7587 */
7588 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
7589 if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
7590 int keytype;
7591 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7592 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
7593 keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
7594 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7595 const char *error;
7596 s->publickey_blob =
7597 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(s->keyfile,
7598 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7599 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7600 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7601 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7602 s->publickey_encrypted =
7603 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(s->keyfile, NULL);
7604 } else {
7605 char *msgbuf;
7606 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7607 error);
7608 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7609 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7610 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
7611 error);
7612 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7613 sfree(msgbuf);
7614 }
7615 } else {
7616 char *msgbuf;
7617 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7618 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7619 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7620 " (%s)\r\n",
7621 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
7622 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7623 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7624 sfree(msgbuf);
7625 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7626 }
7627 }
7628
7629 /*
7630 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7631 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7632 */
7633 s->nkeys = 0;
7634 s->agent_response = NULL;
7635 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7636 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists()) {
7637
7638 void *r;
7639
7640 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7641
7642 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7643 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7644 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7645 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7646 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7647 do {
7648 crReturnV;
7649 if (pktin) {
7650 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7651 " waiting for agent response"));
7652 crStopV;
7653 }
7654 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7655 r = ssh->agent_response;
7656 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7657 }
7658 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7659 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7660 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7661 int keyi;
7662 unsigned char *p;
7663 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7664 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7665 p += 4;
7666 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7667 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7668 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7669 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7670 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7671 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7672 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7673 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7674 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7675 "configured key file", keyi);
7676 s->keyi = keyi;
7677 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7678 break;
7679 }
7680 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7681 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7682 }
7683 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7684 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7685 s->nkeys = 0;
7686 }
7687 }
7688 } else {
7689 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
7690 }
7691 }
7692
7693 }
7694
7695 /*
7696 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7697 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7698 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7699 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7700 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7701 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7702 *
7703 * I think this best serves the needs of
7704 *
7705 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7706 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7707 * type both correctly
7708 *
7709 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7710 * need to fall back to passwords
7711 *
7712 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7713 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7714 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7715 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7716 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7717 * retype it!
7718 */
7719 s->got_username = FALSE;
7720 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7721 /*
7722 * Get a username.
7723 */
7724 if (s->got_username && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
7725 /*
7726 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7727 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7728 * it again.
7729 */
7730 } else if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
7731 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7732 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7733 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7734 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7735 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
7736 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7737 while (ret < 0) {
7738 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7739 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7740 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7741 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7742 }
7743 if (!ret) {
7744 /*
7745 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7746 * Terminate.
7747 */
7748 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7749 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7750 crStopV;
7751 }
7752 ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7753 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7754 } else {
7755 char *stuff;
7756 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7757 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", ssh->username);
7758 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7759 sfree(stuff);
7760 }
7761 }
7762 s->got_username = TRUE;
7763
7764 /*
7765 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7766 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7767 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7768 */
7769 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7770
7771 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7772 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7773 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7774 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7775 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7776 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7777 s->gotit = FALSE;
7778 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7779
7780 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7781 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7782
7783 /* Reset agent request state. */
7784 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7785 if (s->agent_response) {
7786 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7787 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7788 } else {
7789 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7790 s->keyi = 0;
7791 }
7792 }
7793
7794 while (1) {
7795 char *methods = NULL;
7796 int methlen = 0;
7797
7798 /*
7799 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7800 */
7801 if (!s->gotit)
7802 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7803 /*
7804 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7805 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7806 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7807 * with.)
7808 */
7809 {
7810 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7811 /*
7812 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7813 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7814 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7815 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7816 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7817 * output of (say) plink.)
7818 */
7819 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7820 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7821 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7822 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7823 sfree(banner);
7824 }
7825 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7826 }
7827 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7828 logevent("Access granted");
7829 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = TRUE;
7830 break;
7831 }
7832
7833 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7834 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7835 "type %d", pktin->type));
7836 crStopV;
7837 }
7838
7839 s->gotit = FALSE;
7840
7841 /*
7842 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7843 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7844 * helpfully try next.
7845 */
7846 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7847 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7848 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7849 /*
7850 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7851 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7852 * messages, or no message at all.
7853 *
7854 * For forms of authentication which are attempted
7855 * implicitly, by which I mean without printing
7856 * anything in the window indicating that we're
7857 * trying them, we should never print 'Access
7858 * denied'.
7859 *
7860 * If we do print a message saying that we're
7861 * attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
7862 * to print a followup message saying it failed -
7863 * but the message may sometimes be more specific
7864 * than simply 'Access denied'.
7865 *
7866 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7867 * authentication, we should break out of this
7868 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7869 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7870 * username change attempts).
7871 */
7872 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7873 /* do nothing */
7874 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7875 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7876 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7877 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7878 logevent("Server refused our key");
7879 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
7880 /* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
7881 * protocol bug causing client and server to
7882 * disagree on what is a correct signature. */
7883 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused public-key signature"
7884 " despite accepting key!\r\n");
7885 logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
7886 " despite accepting key!");
7887 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7888 /* quiet, so no c_write */
7889 logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive authentication");
7890 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7891 /* always quiet, so no c_write */
7892 /* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
7893 * already logged this in the Event Log */
7894 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
7895 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication failed");
7896 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7897 } else {
7898 assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
7899 logevent("Password authentication failed");
7900 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7901
7902 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
7903 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7904 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7905 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7906 break;
7907 }
7908 }
7909 } else {
7910 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7911 logevent("Further authentication required");
7912 }
7913
7914 s->can_pubkey =
7915 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7916 s->can_passwd =
7917 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7918 s->can_keyb_inter = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_ki_auth) &&
7919 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7920 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7921 if (!ssh->gsslibs)
7922 ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(ssh->conf);
7923 s->can_gssapi = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_gssapi_auth) &&
7924 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7925 ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
7926 #endif
7927 }
7928
7929 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7930
7931 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7932
7933 /*
7934 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7935 */
7936
7937 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7938
7939 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7940
7941 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7942 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7943 s->agentp += 4;
7944 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7945 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7946 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7947 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7948 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7949 s->agentp += 4;
7950 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7951 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7952 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7953
7954 /* See if server will accept it */
7955 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7956 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7957 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7958 /* service requested */
7959 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7960 /* method */
7961 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7962 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7963 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7964 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7965 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7966 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7967 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7968
7969 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7970 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7971
7972 /* Offer of key refused. */
7973 s->gotit = TRUE;
7974
7975 } else {
7976
7977 void *vret;
7978
7979 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7980 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7981 "public key \"");
7982 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7983 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7984 }
7985
7986 /*
7987 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7988 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7989 */
7990 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7991 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7992 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7993 /* service requested */
7994 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7995 /* method */
7996 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7997 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7998 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7999 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8000 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
8001
8002 /* Ask agent for signature. */
8003 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
8004 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8005 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
8006 s->siglen -= 4;
8007 s->len = 1; /* message type */
8008 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
8009 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
8010 s->len += 4; /* flags */
8011 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
8012 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
8013 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
8014 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
8015 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
8016 s->q += 4;
8017 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
8018 s->q += s->pklen;
8019 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
8020 s->q += 4;
8021 /* Now the data to be signed... */
8022 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
8023 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8024 s->q += 4;
8025 }
8026 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
8027 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8028 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8029 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
8030 s->pktout->length - 5);
8031 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
8032 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
8033 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
8034 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
8035 &vret, &s->retlen,
8036 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
8037 do {
8038 crReturnV;
8039 if (pktin) {
8040 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
8041 " while waiting for agent"
8042 " response"));
8043 crStopV;
8044 }
8045 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
8046 vret = ssh->agent_response;
8047 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
8048 }
8049 s->ret = vret;
8050 sfree(s->agentreq);
8051 if (s->ret) {
8052 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
8053 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
8054 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
8055 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
8056 s->ret + 9,
8057 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
8058 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8059 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
8060 } else {
8061 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
8062 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
8063 crStopV;
8064 }
8065 }
8066 }
8067
8068 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
8069 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
8070 s->done_agent = TRUE;
8071 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
8072 } else {
8073 s->keyi++;
8074 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
8075 s->done_agent = TRUE;
8076 }
8077
8078 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
8079 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
8080
8081 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
8082 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
8083
8084 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
8085
8086 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
8087
8088 /*
8089 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
8090 *
8091 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
8092 * willing to accept it.
8093 */
8094 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8095 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8096 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8097 /* service requested */
8098 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
8099 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8100 /* no signature included */
8101 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
8102 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8103 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
8104 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
8105 s->publickey_bloblen);
8106 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8107 logevent("Offered public key");
8108
8109 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8110 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
8111 /* Key refused. Give up. */
8112 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
8113 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
8114 continue; /* process this new message */
8115 }
8116 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
8117
8118 /*
8119 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
8120 * the key.
8121 */
8122 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
8123 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
8124 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
8125 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
8126 }
8127 key = NULL;
8128 while (!key) {
8129 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
8130 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
8131 /*
8132 * Get a passphrase from the user.
8133 */
8134 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
8135 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8136 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
8137 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
8138 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8139 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
8140 s->publickey_comment),
8141 FALSE);
8142 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8143 while (ret < 0) {
8144 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8145 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8146 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
8147 in, inlen);
8148 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8149 }
8150 if (!ret) {
8151 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
8152 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8153 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
8154 "Unable to authenticate",
8155 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8156 TRUE);
8157 crStopV;
8158 }
8159 passphrase =
8160 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8161 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8162 } else {
8163 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
8164 }
8165
8166 /*
8167 * Try decrypting the key.
8168 */
8169 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
8170 key = ssh2_load_userkey(s->keyfile, passphrase, &error);
8171 if (passphrase) {
8172 /* burn the evidence */
8173 smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
8174 sfree(passphrase);
8175 }
8176 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
8177 if (passphrase &&
8178 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
8179 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
8180 key = NULL;
8181 /* and loop again */
8182 } else {
8183 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
8184 c_write_str(ssh, error);
8185 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
8186 key = NULL;
8187 break; /* try something else */
8188 }
8189 }
8190 }
8191
8192 if (key) {
8193 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
8194 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
8195 int p;
8196
8197 /*
8198 * We have loaded the private key and the server
8199 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
8200 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
8201 */
8202 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8203 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8204 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8205 /* service requested */
8206 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
8207 /* method */
8208 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8209 /* signature follows */
8210 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
8211 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
8212 &pkblob_len);
8213 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8214 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
8215 pkblob_len);
8216
8217 /*
8218 * The data to be signed is:
8219 *
8220 * string session-id
8221 *
8222 * followed by everything so far placed in the
8223 * outgoing packet.
8224 */
8225 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
8226 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8227 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
8228 sigdata_len -= 4;
8229 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
8230 p = 0;
8231 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
8232 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8233 p += 4;
8234 }
8235 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
8236 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8237 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8238 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
8239 s->pktout->length - 5);
8240 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
8241 assert(p == sigdata_len);
8242 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
8243 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
8244 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
8245 sigblob, sigblob_len);
8246 sfree(pkblob);
8247 sfree(sigblob);
8248 sfree(sigdata);
8249
8250 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8251 logevent("Sent public key signature");
8252 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
8253 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
8254 }
8255
8256 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
8257 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
8258
8259 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
8260
8261 int micoffset, len;
8262 char *data;
8263 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
8264 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
8265 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
8266 s->gotit = TRUE;
8267 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
8268
8269 /*
8270 * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
8271 * list.
8272 */
8273 {
8274 int i, j;
8275 s->gsslib = NULL;
8276 for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
8277 int want_id = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
8278 CONF_ssh_gsslist, i);
8279 for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
8280 if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
8281 s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
8282 goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
8283 }
8284 }
8285 got_gsslib:
8286 /*
8287 * We always expect to have found something in
8288 * the above loop: we only came here if there
8289 * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
8290 * preference list should always mention
8291 * everything and only change the order.
8292 */
8293 assert(s->gsslib);
8294 }
8295
8296 if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
8297 logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
8298
8299 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
8300 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8301 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8302 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8303 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8304 logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
8305
8306 /* add mechanism info */
8307 s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
8308
8309 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
8310 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
8311
8312 /* length of OID + 2 */
8313 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
8314 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
8315
8316 /* length of OID */
8317 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
8318
8319 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
8320 s->gss_buf.length);
8321 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8322 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8323 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
8324 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
8325 continue;
8326 }
8327
8328 /* check returned packet ... */
8329
8330 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8331 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8332 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8333 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
8334 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
8335 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
8336 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
8337 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
8338 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
8339 continue;
8340 }
8341
8342 /* now start running */
8343 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
8344 ssh->fullhostname,
8345 &s->gss_srv_name);
8346 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8347 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
8348 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
8349 else
8350 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
8351 continue;
8352 }
8353
8354 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
8355 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8356
8357 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8358 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
8359 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8360 continue;
8361 }
8362
8363 /* initial tokens are empty */
8364 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
8365 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
8366
8367 /* now enter the loop */
8368 do {
8369 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
8370 (s->gsslib,
8371 &s->gss_ctx,
8372 s->gss_srv_name,
8373 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_gssapifwd),
8374 &s->gss_rcvtok,
8375 &s->gss_sndtok);
8376
8377 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
8378 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8379 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
8380
8381 if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
8382 &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
8383 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
8384 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
8385 }
8386
8387 break;
8388 }
8389 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
8390
8391 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
8392 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
8393
8394 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8395 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8396 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8397 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8398 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8399 s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
8400 }
8401
8402 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8403 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8404 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8405 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8406 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8407 break;
8408 }
8409 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8410 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8411 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8412 }
8413 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8414
8415 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8416 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8417 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8418 continue;
8419 }
8420 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8421
8422 /* Now send the MIC */
8423
8424 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8425 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8426 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8427 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8428 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8429 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8430 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8431 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8432
8433 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8434 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8435
8436 s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8437 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8438 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8439 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8440 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8441 s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
8442
8443 s->gotit = FALSE;
8444
8445 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8446 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8447 continue;
8448 #endif
8449 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8450
8451 /*
8452 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8453 */
8454
8455 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8456
8457 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8458
8459 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8460 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8461 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8462 /* service requested */
8463 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8464 /* method */
8465 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8466 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8467 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8468
8469 logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
8470
8471 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8472 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8473 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8474 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8475 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8476 * Give up on it entirely. */
8477 s->gotit = TRUE;
8478 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8479 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8480 continue;
8481 }
8482
8483 /*
8484 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8485 */
8486 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8487
8488 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8489 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8490 int i;
8491
8492 /*
8493 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8494 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8495 */
8496 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8497 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8498 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8499 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8500 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8501
8502 /*
8503 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8504 */
8505 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8506 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8507 char *prompt;
8508 int prompt_len;
8509 int echo;
8510 static char noprompt[] =
8511 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8512
8513 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8514 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8515 if (!prompt_len) {
8516 prompt = noprompt;
8517 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8518 }
8519 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8520 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8521 echo);
8522 }
8523
8524 if (name_len) {
8525 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8526 * local prompts? */
8527 s->cur_prompt->name =
8528 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8529 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8530 } else {
8531 s->cur_prompt->name =
8532 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8533 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8534 }
8535 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8536 * has come from the server.
8537 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8538 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8539 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8540 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8541 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8542 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8543 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8544 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8545 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8546 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8547 } else {
8548 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8549 }
8550
8551 /*
8552 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8553 * response(s).
8554 */
8555 {
8556 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8557 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8558 while (ret < 0) {
8559 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8560 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8561 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8562 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8563 }
8564 if (!ret) {
8565 /*
8566 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8567 */
8568 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8569 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8570 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8571 TRUE);
8572 crStopV;
8573 }
8574 }
8575
8576 /*
8577 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8578 */
8579 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8580 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8581 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8582 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8583 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8584 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8585 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8586 }
8587 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8588
8589 /*
8590 * Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
8591 * If there's another, a new one will be allocated
8592 * when we return to the top of this while loop.
8593 */
8594 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8595
8596 /*
8597 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8598 * INFO_REQUEST.
8599 */
8600 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8601
8602 }
8603
8604 /*
8605 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8606 */
8607 s->gotit = TRUE;
8608
8609 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8610
8611 /*
8612 * Plain old password authentication.
8613 */
8614 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8615 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8616
8617 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8618
8619 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8620 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8621 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8622 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
8623 ssh->username,
8624 ssh->savedhost),
8625 FALSE);
8626
8627 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8628 while (ret < 0) {
8629 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8630 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8631 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8632 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8633 }
8634 if (!ret) {
8635 /*
8636 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8637 */
8638 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8639 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8640 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8641 TRUE);
8642 crStopV;
8643 }
8644 /*
8645 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8646 * asked to change it.)
8647 */
8648 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8649 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8650
8651 /*
8652 * Send the password packet.
8653 *
8654 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8655 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8656 * user's password.
8657 *
8658 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8659 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8660 * people who find out how long their password is!
8661 */
8662 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8663 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8664 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8665 /* service requested */
8666 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8667 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8668 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8669 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8670 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8671 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8672 logevent("Sent password");
8673 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8674
8675 /*
8676 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8677 * request.
8678 */
8679 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8680 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8681
8682 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8683
8684 /*
8685 * We're being asked for a new password
8686 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8687 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8688 */
8689
8690 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8691 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8692 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8693
8694 {
8695 char *msg;
8696 if (changereq_first_time)
8697 msg = "Server requested password change";
8698 else
8699 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8700 logevent(msg);
8701 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8702 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8703 }
8704
8705 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8706
8707 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8708 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8709 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8710 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8711 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8712 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8713 /*
8714 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8715 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8716 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8717 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8718 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8719 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8720 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8721 *
8722 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8723 * to check this field.)
8724 */
8725 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8726 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8727 FALSE);
8728 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8729 FALSE);
8730 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8731 FALSE);
8732
8733 /*
8734 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8735 * password twice.
8736 */
8737 while (!got_new) {
8738
8739 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8740 while (ret < 0) {
8741 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8742 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8743 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8744 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8745 }
8746 if (!ret) {
8747 /*
8748 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8749 */
8750 /* burn the evidence */
8751 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8752 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8753 sfree(s->password);
8754 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8755 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8756 TRUE);
8757 crStopV;
8758 }
8759
8760 /*
8761 * If the user specified a new original password
8762 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8763 * one.
8764 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8765 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8766 */
8767 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8768 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8769 /* burn the evidence */
8770 sfree(s->password);
8771 s->password =
8772 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8773 }
8774
8775 /*
8776 * Check the two new passwords match.
8777 */
8778 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8779 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8780 == 0);
8781 if (!got_new)
8782 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8783 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8784
8785 }
8786
8787 /*
8788 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8789 * (see above for padding rationale)
8790 */
8791 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8792 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8793 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8794 /* service requested */
8795 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8796 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8797 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8798 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8799 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8800 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8801 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8802 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8803 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8804 logevent("Sent new password");
8805
8806 /*
8807 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8808 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8809 * new password.)
8810 */
8811 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8812 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8813
8814 }
8815
8816 /*
8817 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8818 * of the loop. Either:
8819 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8820 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8821 * usual meaning
8822 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8823 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8824 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8825 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8826 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8827 * the loop and start again.
8828 */
8829 s->gotit = TRUE;
8830
8831 /*
8832 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8833 * case. Burn the evidence.
8834 */
8835 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8836 sfree(s->password);
8837
8838 } else {
8839 char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
8840 " (server sent: %.*s)",
8841 methlen, methods);
8842
8843 ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
8844 "No supported authentication methods available",
8845 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8846 FALSE);
8847 sfree(str);
8848
8849 crStopV;
8850
8851 }
8852
8853 }
8854 }
8855 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8856
8857 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8858 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8859 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8860 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8861 }
8862 if (s->agent_response)
8863 sfree(s->agent_response);
8864
8865 if (s->userauth_success) {
8866 /*
8867 * We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
8868 * packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
8869 * delayed compression.
8870 *
8871 * (Relying on we_are_in is not sufficient, as
8872 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed is quite clear that it
8873 * triggers on USERAUTH_SUCCESS specifically, and we_are_in can
8874 * become set for other reasons.)
8875 */
8876 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
8877 }
8878
8879 /*
8880 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8881 */
8882
8883 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8884
8885 /*
8886 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8887 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8888 */
8889 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8890 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8891 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8892 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8893
8894 /*
8895 * Create the main session channel.
8896 */
8897 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell)) {
8898 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8899 } else if (*conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host)) {
8900 /*
8901 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8902 * channel.
8903 */
8904 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8905 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8906 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8907 logeventf(ssh,
8908 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8909 conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host),
8910 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
8911 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8912 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8913 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8914 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8915 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8916 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host));
8917 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
8918 /*
8919 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8920 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8921 * information.
8922 */
8923 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8924 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8925 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8926
8927 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8928 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8929 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8930 crStopV;
8931 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8932 }
8933 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8934 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8935 crStopV;
8936 }
8937 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8938 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8939 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8940 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8941 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8942 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8943 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8944 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8945 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8946 } else {
8947 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8948 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8949 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8950 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8951 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8952 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8953 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8954 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8955 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8956 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8957 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8958 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8959 crStopV;
8960 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8961 }
8962 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8963 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8964 crStopV;
8965 }
8966 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8967 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8968 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8969 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8970 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8971 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8972 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8973 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8974 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8975 }
8976
8977 /*
8978 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8979 * general channel-based messages.
8980 */
8981 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8982 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8983 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8984 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8985 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8986 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8987 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8988 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8989 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8990 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8991 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8992 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8993 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8994
8995 if (ssh->mainchan && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple)) {
8996 /*
8997 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8998 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8999 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
9000 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
9001 */
9002 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9003 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9004 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
9005 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
9006 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9007 }
9008
9009 /*
9010 * Enable port forwardings.
9011 */
9012 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
9013
9014 /*
9015 * Send the CHANNEL_REQUESTS for the main channel. We send them all
9016 * and then start looking for responses, so it's important that the
9017 * sending and receiving code below it is kept in sync.
9018 */
9019
9020 /*
9021 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
9022 */
9023 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
9024 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
9025 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
9026 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
9027 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9028 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9029 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
9030 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9031 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
9032 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
9033 /*
9034 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
9035 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
9036 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
9037 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
9038 * cookie into the log.
9039 */
9040 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
9041 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
9042 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
9043 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
9044 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9045 s->requested_x11 = TRUE;
9046 } else
9047 s->requested_x11 = FALSE;
9048
9049 /*
9050 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
9051 */
9052 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
9053 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
9054 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9055 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9056 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
9057 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9058 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9059 s->requested_agent = TRUE;
9060 } else
9061 s->requested_agent = FALSE;
9062
9063 /*
9064 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
9065 */
9066 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
9067 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
9068 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
9069 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
9070 sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
9071 /* Build the pty request. */
9072 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9073 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
9074 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
9075 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9076 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
9077 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
9078 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
9079 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
9080 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
9081 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
9082 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
9083 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
9084 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
9085 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
9086 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
9087 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
9088 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9089 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
9090 s->requested_tty = TRUE;
9091 } else
9092 s->requested_tty = FALSE;
9093
9094 /*
9095 * Send environment variables.
9096 *
9097 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
9098 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
9099 */
9100 s->num_env = 0;
9101 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) {
9102 char *key, *val;
9103
9104 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, NULL, &key);
9105 val != NULL;
9106 val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, key, &key)) {
9107 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9108 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9109 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
9110 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9111 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key);
9112 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
9113 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9114
9115 s->num_env++;
9116 }
9117 if (s->num_env)
9118 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
9119 }
9120
9121 /*
9122 * All CHANNEL_REQUESTs sent. Now collect up the replies. These
9123 * must be in precisely the same order as the requests.
9124 */
9125
9126 if (s->requested_x11) {
9127 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9128
9129 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9130 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9131 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
9132 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9133 crStopV;
9134 }
9135 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
9136 } else {
9137 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
9138 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
9139 }
9140 }
9141
9142 if (s->requested_agent) {
9143 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9144
9145 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9146 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9147 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
9148 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9149 crStopV;
9150 }
9151 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
9152 } else {
9153 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
9154 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
9155 }
9156 }
9157
9158 if (s->requested_tty) {
9159 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9160
9161 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9162 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9163 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
9164 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9165 crStopV;
9166 }
9167 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
9168 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
9169 } else {
9170 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
9171 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
9172 ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
9173 }
9174 } else {
9175 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
9176 }
9177
9178 if (s->num_env) {
9179 s->env_ok = 0;
9180 s->env_left = s->num_env;
9181
9182 while (s->env_left > 0) {
9183 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9184
9185 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9186 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9187 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
9188 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9189 crStopV;
9190 }
9191 } else {
9192 s->env_ok++;
9193 }
9194
9195 s->env_left--;
9196 }
9197
9198 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
9199 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
9200 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
9201 logevent("All environment variables refused");
9202 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
9203 } else {
9204 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
9205 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
9206 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
9207 }
9208 }
9209
9210 /*
9211 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
9212 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
9213 * of command.
9214 */
9215 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
9216 int subsys;
9217 char *cmd;
9218
9219 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
9220 subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys2);
9221 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
9222 } else {
9223 subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys);
9224 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
9225 }
9226
9227 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9228 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
9229 if (subsys) {
9230 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
9231 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9232 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
9233 } else if (*cmd) {
9234 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
9235 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9236 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
9237 } else {
9238 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
9239 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9240 }
9241 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9242
9243 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9244
9245 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9246 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9247 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
9248 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9249 crStopV;
9250 }
9251 /*
9252 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
9253 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
9254 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
9255 * back to it before complaining.
9256 */
9257 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd &&
9258 *conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
9259 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
9260 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
9261 continue;
9262 }
9263 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
9264 crStopV;
9265 } else {
9266 logevent("Started a shell/command");
9267 }
9268 break;
9269 }
9270
9271 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
9272 if (ssh->size_needed)
9273 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
9274 if (ssh->eof_needed)
9275 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
9276
9277 /*
9278 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
9279 * failure handler.
9280 */
9281 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
9282 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
9283
9284 /*
9285 * Transfer data!
9286 */
9287 if (ssh->ldisc)
9288 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
9289 if (ssh->mainchan)
9290 ssh->send_ok = 1;
9291 while (1) {
9292 crReturnV;
9293 s->try_send = FALSE;
9294 if (pktin) {
9295
9296 /*
9297 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
9298 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
9299 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
9300 */
9301
9302 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
9303 crStopV;
9304 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9305 /*
9306 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
9307 */
9308 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
9309 s->try_send = TRUE;
9310 }
9311 if (s->try_send) {
9312 int i;
9313 struct ssh_channel *c;
9314 /*
9315 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
9316 */
9317 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
9318 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
9319 }
9320 }
9321
9322 crFinishV;
9323 }
9324
9325 /*
9326 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
9327 */
9328 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9329 {
9330 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
9331 char *buf, *msg;
9332 int reason, msglen;
9333
9334 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
9335 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9336
9337 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
9338 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
9339 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
9340 } else {
9341 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
9342 " type %d)", reason);
9343 }
9344 logevent(buf);
9345 sfree(buf);
9346 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
9347 msglen, msg);
9348 logevent(buf);
9349 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
9350 reason,
9351 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
9352 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
9353 msglen, msg));
9354 sfree(buf);
9355 }
9356
9357 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9358 {
9359 /* log the debug message */
9360 char *msg;
9361 int msglen;
9362
9363 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of the return value */
9364 ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
9365 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9366
9367 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
9368 }
9369
9370 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9371 {
9372 struct Packet *pktout;
9373 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
9374 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
9375 /*
9376 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
9377 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
9378 */
9379 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9380 }
9381
9382 /*
9383 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
9384 */
9385 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
9386 {
9387 int i;
9388
9389 /*
9390 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
9391 */
9392 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
9393 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
9394
9395 /*
9396 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
9397 * the coroutines will get it.
9398 */
9399 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
9400 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
9401 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
9402 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
9403 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
9404 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
9405 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
9406 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9407 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9408 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
9409 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
9410 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
9411 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
9412 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9413 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
9414 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
9415 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9416 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9417 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
9418 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9419 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9420 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
9421 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
9422 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
9423 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
9424 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
9425 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
9426 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
9427 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
9428 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
9429 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9430 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9431 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
9432
9433 /*
9434 * These special message types we install handlers for.
9435 */
9436 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9437 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9438 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9439 }
9440
9441 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9442 {
9443 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9444
9445 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9446 return;
9447
9448 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
9449 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9450 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9451 }
9452 }
9453
9454 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9455 struct Packet *pktin)
9456 {
9457 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9458 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9459 return;
9460
9461 if (pktin) {
9462 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9463 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9464 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9465 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9466 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9467 }
9468
9469 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9470 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9471 return;
9472 }
9473
9474 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9475 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9476 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9477 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9478 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9479 /*
9480 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9481 */
9482 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9483 }
9484 } else {
9485 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9486 }
9487 }
9488
9489 static void ssh_cache_conf_values(Ssh ssh)
9490 {
9491 ssh->logomitdata = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitdata);
9492 }
9493
9494 /*
9495 * Called to set up the connection.
9496 *
9497 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9498 */
9499 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9500 Conf *conf, char *host, int port, char **realhost,
9501 int nodelay, int keepalive)
9502 {
9503 const char *p;
9504 Ssh ssh;
9505
9506 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9507 ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
9508 ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
9509 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9510 ssh->s = NULL;
9511 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9512 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9513 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9514 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9515 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9516 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9517 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9518 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9519 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9520 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9521 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9522 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9523 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9524 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9525 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9526 ssh->kex = NULL;
9527 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9528 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9529 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9530 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9531 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9532 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9533 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9534 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9535 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9536 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9537 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9538 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9539 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9540 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9541 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9542 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9543 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9544 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9545 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9546 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9547 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9548 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9549 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9550 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9551 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9552 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9553 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9554 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9555 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9556 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9557 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9558 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9559 ssh->queue = NULL;
9560 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9561 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9562 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9563 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9564 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9565 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9566 ssh->username = NULL;
9567 ssh->sent_console_eof = FALSE;
9568 ssh->got_pty = FALSE;
9569
9570 *backend_handle = ssh;
9571
9572 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9573 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9574 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9575 #endif
9576
9577 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9578 ssh->term_width = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_width);
9579 ssh->term_height = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_height);
9580
9581 ssh->channels = NULL;
9582 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9583 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9584
9585 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9586 ssh->editing = 0;
9587 ssh->echoing = 0;
9588 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9589 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9590 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9591
9592 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9593
9594 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9595
9596 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9597
9598 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9599 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9600 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
9601 CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
9602 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9603
9604 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9605 ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
9606 #endif
9607
9608 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9609 if (p != NULL)
9610 return p;
9611
9612 random_ref();
9613
9614 return NULL;
9615 }
9616
9617 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9618 {
9619 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9620 struct ssh_channel *c;
9621 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9622
9623 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9624 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9625 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9626 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9627 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9628 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9629 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9630 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9631 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9632 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9633 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9634 if (ssh->cscomp)
9635 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9636 else
9637 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9638 }
9639 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9640 if (ssh->sccomp)
9641 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9642 else
9643 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9644 }
9645 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9646 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9647 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9648
9649 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9650 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9651 sfree(ssh->queue);
9652
9653 while (ssh->qhead) {
9654 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9655 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9656 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9657 }
9658 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9659
9660 if (ssh->channels) {
9661 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9662 switch (c->type) {
9663 case CHAN_X11:
9664 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9665 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9666 break;
9667 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9668 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
9669 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9670 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9671 break;
9672 }
9673 sfree(c);
9674 }
9675 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9676 ssh->channels = NULL;
9677 }
9678
9679 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9680 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9681 free_rportfwd(pf);
9682 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9683 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9684 }
9685 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9686 if (ssh->x11disp)
9687 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9688 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9689 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9690 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9691 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9692 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9693 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9694 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9695 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9696 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9697 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9698 }
9699 if (ssh->s)
9700 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9701 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9702 if (ssh->pinger)
9703 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9704 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9705 sfree(ssh->username);
9706 conf_free(ssh->conf);
9707 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9708 if (ssh->gsslibs)
9709 ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
9710 #endif
9711 sfree(ssh);
9712
9713 random_unref();
9714 }
9715
9716 /*
9717 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9718 */
9719 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Conf *conf)
9720 {
9721 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9722 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9723 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9724 int i, rekey_time;
9725
9726 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, ssh->conf, conf);
9727 if (ssh->portfwds)
9728 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, conf);
9729
9730 rekey_time = conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time);
9731 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != rekey_time &&
9732 rekey_time != 0) {
9733 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9734 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9735
9736 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9737 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9738 } else {
9739 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9740 }
9741 }
9742
9743 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9744 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
9745 CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
9746 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9747 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9748 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9749 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9750 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9751 }
9752
9753 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression) !=
9754 conf_get_int(conf, CONF_compression)) {
9755 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9756 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9757 }
9758
9759 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++)
9760 if (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i) !=
9761 conf_get_int_int(conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
9762 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9763 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9764 }
9765 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc) !=
9766 conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
9767 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9768 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9769 }
9770
9771 conf_free(ssh->conf);
9772 ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
9773 ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
9774
9775 if (rekeying) {
9776 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9777 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9778 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9779 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9780 }
9781 }
9782 }
9783
9784 /*
9785 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9786 */
9787 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9788 {
9789 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9790
9791 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9792 return 0;
9793
9794 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9795
9796 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9797 }
9798
9799 /*
9800 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9801 */
9802 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9803 {
9804 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9805 int override_value;
9806
9807 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9808 return 0;
9809
9810 /*
9811 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9812 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9813 */
9814 override_value = 0;
9815 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9816 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9817
9818 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9819 return override_value;
9820 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9821 if (!ssh->mainchan)
9822 return override_value;
9823 else
9824 return (override_value +
9825 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9826 }
9827
9828 return 0;
9829 }
9830
9831 /*
9832 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9833 */
9834 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9835 {
9836 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9837 struct Packet *pktout;
9838
9839 ssh->term_width = width;
9840 ssh->term_height = height;
9841
9842 switch (ssh->state) {
9843 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9844 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9845 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9846 break; /* do nothing */
9847 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9848 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9849 break;
9850 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9851 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
9852 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9853 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9854 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9855 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9856 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9857 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9858 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9859 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9860 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9861 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9862 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9863 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9864 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9865 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9866 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9867 }
9868 }
9869 break;
9870 }
9871 }
9872
9873 /*
9874 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9875 * protocol.
9876 */
9877 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9878 {
9879 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9880 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9881 };
9882 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
9883 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9884 };
9885 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
9886 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9887 };
9888 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9889 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9890 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9891 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9892 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9893 * required signals. */
9894 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9895 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9896 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9897 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9898 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9899 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9900 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9901 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9902 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9903 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9904 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9905 };
9906 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9907 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9908 };
9909 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9910 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
9911 lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
9912 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9913 lenof(specials_end)];
9914 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9915 int i = 0;
9916 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9917 do { \
9918 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9919 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9920 i += lenof(name); \
9921 } while(0)
9922
9923 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9924 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9925 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9926 * asked anyway. */
9927 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9928 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9929 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9930 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
9931 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
9932 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
9933 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
9934 if (ssh->mainchan)
9935 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9936 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9937
9938 if (i) {
9939 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9940 return ssh_specials;
9941 } else {
9942 return NULL;
9943 }
9944 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9945 }
9946
9947 /*
9948 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9949 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9950 * hostname sort').
9951 */
9952 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9953 {
9954 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9955 struct Packet *pktout;
9956
9957 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9958 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9959 /*
9960 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9961 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9962 */
9963 if (code == TS_EOF)
9964 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9965 return;
9966 }
9967 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9968 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9969 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9970 sshfwd_write_eof(ssh->mainchan);
9971 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9972 }
9973 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9974 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9975 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9976 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9977 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9978 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9979 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9980 } else {
9981 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
9982 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9983 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9984 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9985 }
9986 }
9987 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9988 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9989 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9990 }
9991 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9992 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9993 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9994 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9995 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9996 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9997 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9998 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9999 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
10000 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
10001 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
10002 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10003 }
10004 } else {
10005 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
10006 char *signame = NULL;
10007 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
10008 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
10009 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
10010 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
10011 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
10012 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
10013 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
10014 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
10015 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
10016 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
10017 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
10018 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
10019 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
10020 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
10021 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
10022 if (signame) {
10023 /* It's a signal. */
10024 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
10025 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
10026 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
10027 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
10028 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
10029 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
10030 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10031 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
10032 }
10033 } else {
10034 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
10035 }
10036 }
10037 }
10038
10039 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
10040 {
10041 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10042 struct ssh_channel *c;
10043 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
10044
10045 c->ssh = ssh;
10046 ssh2_channel_init(c);
10047 c->halfopen = TRUE;
10048 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
10049 c->u.pfd.s = s;
10050 add234(ssh->channels, c);
10051 return c;
10052 }
10053
10054 /*
10055 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
10056 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
10057 */
10058 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
10059 {
10060 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10061 int buflimit;
10062
10063 if (ssh->version == 1) {
10064 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
10065 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
10066 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
10067 }
10068 } else {
10069 if (ssh->mainchan) {
10070 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
10071 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
10072 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
10073 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple))
10074 buflimit = 0;
10075 else
10076 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
10077 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
10078 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
10079 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
10080 }
10081 }
10082 }
10083
10084 /*
10085 * Now process any SSH connection data that was stashed in our
10086 * queue while we were frozen.
10087 */
10088 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
10089 }
10090
10091 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
10092 {
10093 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
10094 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
10095 struct Packet *pktout;
10096
10097 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
10098
10099 if (ssh->version == 1) {
10100 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
10101 PKT_INT, c->localid,
10102 PKT_STR, hostname,
10103 PKT_INT, port,
10104 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
10105 PKT_END);
10106 } else {
10107 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
10108 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
10109 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
10110 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
10111 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
10112 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
10113 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
10114 /*
10115 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
10116 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
10117 * convinced the server should be told details like that
10118 * about my local network configuration.
10119 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
10120 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
10121 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
10122 */
10123 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
10124 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
10125 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10126 }
10127 }
10128
10129 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
10130 {
10131 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10132 return ssh->s != NULL;
10133 }
10134
10135 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
10136 {
10137 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10138 return ssh->send_ok;
10139 }
10140
10141 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
10142 {
10143 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10144 if (option == LD_ECHO)
10145 return ssh->echoing;
10146 if (option == LD_EDIT)
10147 return ssh->editing;
10148 return FALSE;
10149 }
10150
10151 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
10152 {
10153 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10154 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
10155 }
10156
10157 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
10158 {
10159 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10160 ssh->logctx = logctx;
10161 }
10162
10163 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
10164 {
10165 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10166 if (ssh->s != NULL)
10167 return -1;
10168 else
10169 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
10170 }
10171
10172 /*
10173 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
10174 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
10175 */
10176 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
10177 {
10178 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10179 return ssh->version;
10180 }
10181
10182 /*
10183 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
10184 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
10185 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
10186 */
10187 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
10188 {
10189 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10190 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
10191 }
10192
10193 Backend ssh_backend = {
10194 ssh_init,
10195 ssh_free,
10196 ssh_reconfig,
10197 ssh_send,
10198 ssh_sendbuffer,
10199 ssh_size,
10200 ssh_special,
10201 ssh_get_specials,
10202 ssh_connected,
10203 ssh_return_exitcode,
10204 ssh_sendok,
10205 ssh_ldisc,
10206 ssh_provide_ldisc,
10207 ssh_provide_logctx,
10208 ssh_unthrottle,
10209 ssh_cfg_info,
10210 "ssh",
10211 PROT_SSH,
10212 22
10213 };