Fix cosmetic keyboard-interactive issue: at the end of a normal k-i session,
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgss.h"
17 #endif
18
19 #ifndef FALSE
20 #define FALSE 0
21 #endif
22 #ifndef TRUE
23 #define TRUE 1
24 #endif
25
26 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
27 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
31 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
32 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
38 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
40 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
43 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
44 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
45 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
50 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
52 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
53 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
54 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
55 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
56 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
59 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
60 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
62 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
63 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
65 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
66 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
67
68 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
74
75 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
76 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
77 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
78
79 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
124
125 /*
126 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
127 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
128 */
129 typedef enum {
130 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
134 } Pkt_KCtx;
135 typedef enum {
136 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
141 } Pkt_ACtx;
142
143 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
158
159 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
160 NULL,
161 "host not allowed to connect",
162 "protocol error",
163 "key exchange failed",
164 "host authentication failed",
165 "MAC error",
166 "compression error",
167 "service not available",
168 "protocol version not supported",
169 "host key not verifiable",
170 "connection lost",
171 "by application",
172 "too many connections",
173 "auth cancelled by user",
174 "no more auth methods available",
175 "illegal user name",
176 };
177
178 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
182
183 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
184
185 /*
186 * Various remote-bug flags.
187 */
188 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
189 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
190 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
191 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
192 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
193 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
194 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
195 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
196 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
197
198 /*
199 * Codes for terminal modes.
200 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
201 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
202 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
203 */
204 static const struct {
205 const char* const mode;
206 int opcode;
207 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
208 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
209 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
210 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
211 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
212 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
213 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
229 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
230 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
253 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
255 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
256 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
263 };
264
265 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
266 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
267 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
268 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
269 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
270 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
271 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
272
273 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
274 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
275 {
276 unsigned int ret;
277 if (*s) {
278 char *next = NULL;
279 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
280 if (!next) ret = s[0];
281 } else {
282 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
283 }
284 return ret;
285 }
286 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
287 {
288 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
289 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
290 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
291 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
292 return 1; /* true */
293 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
294 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
295 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
296 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
297 return 0; /* false */
298 else
299 return (atoi(s) != 0);
300 }
301
302 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
303 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
304 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
305 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
306 {
307 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
308 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
310 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
312 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
319 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
320 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
321 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
323 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
324 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
326 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
327 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
328 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
331 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
332 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
333 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
334 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
335 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
336 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
337 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
338 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
339 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
340 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
342 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
343 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
345 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
346 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
348 return "unknown";
349 }
350 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
351 {
352 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
353 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
354 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
359 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
360 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
366 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
367 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
368 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
375 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
376 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
377 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
379 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
380 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
381 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
383 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
384 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
385 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
397 return "unknown";
398 }
399 #undef translate
400 #undef translatec
401
402 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
403 enum {
404 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
405 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
406 * fields to the packet logging code. */
407 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
408 };
409
410 /*
411 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
412 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
413 * read
414 *
415 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
416 *
417 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
418 *
419 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
420 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
421 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
422 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
423 *
424 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
425 * - click Settings
426 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
427 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
428 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
429 */
430 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
431 #define crState(t) \
432 struct t *s; \
433 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
434 s = ssh->t;
435 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
436 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
437 #define crReturn(z) \
438 do {\
439 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
440 } while (0)
441 #define crReturnV \
442 do {\
443 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
444 } while (0)
445 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
446 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
447 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
448 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
449
450 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
451 struct Packet;
452
453 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
454 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
455 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
456 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
457 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
458 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
459 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
460 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
461 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
463 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
464 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
465 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
466 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
467 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
468 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
469 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
470 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
471 struct Packet *pktin);
472 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
473 struct Packet *pktin);
474
475 /*
476 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
477 * various different purposes:
478 *
479 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
480 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
481 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
482 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
483 * happen very often.
484 *
485 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
486 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
487 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
488 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
489 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
490 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
491 *
492 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
493 * channels.
494 *
495 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
496 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
497 *
498 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
499 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
500 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
501 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
502 * data message.
503 *
504 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
505 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
506 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
507 */
508
509 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
510 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
511 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
512 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
513 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
514 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
515
516 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
517 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
518
519 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
520
521 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
522 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
523 };
524 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
525 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
526 };
527
528 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
529 {
530 return NULL;
531 }
532 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
533 {
534 }
535 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
536 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
537 {
538 return 0;
539 }
540 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
541 {
542 return 0;
543 }
544 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
545 "none",
546 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
547 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
548 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
549 };
550 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
551 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
552 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
553 };
554
555 enum { /* channel types */
556 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
557 CHAN_X11,
558 CHAN_AGENT,
559 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
560 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
561 };
562
563 /*
564 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
565 */
566 struct winadj {
567 struct winadj *next;
568 unsigned size;
569 };
570
571 /*
572 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
573 */
574 struct ssh_channel {
575 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
576 unsigned remoteid, localid;
577 int type;
578 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
579 int halfopen;
580 /*
581 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
582 *
583 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
584 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
585 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
586 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
587 *
588 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
589 */
590 int closes;
591 /*
592 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
593 * throttled.
594 */
595 int throttling_conn;
596 union {
597 struct ssh2_data_channel {
598 bufchain outbuffer;
599 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
600 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
601 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
602 /*
603 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
604 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
605 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
606 */
607 int remlocwin;
608 /*
609 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
610 * been acked.
611 */
612 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
613 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
614 } v2;
615 } v;
616 union {
617 struct ssh_agent_channel {
618 unsigned char *message;
619 unsigned char msglen[4];
620 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
621 } a;
622 struct ssh_x11_channel {
623 Socket s;
624 } x11;
625 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
626 Socket s;
627 } pfd;
628 } u;
629 };
630
631 /*
632 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
633 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
634 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
635 *
636 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
637 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
638 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
639 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
640 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
641 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
642 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
643 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
644 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
645 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
646 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
647 *
648 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
649 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
650 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
651 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
652 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
653 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
654 *
655 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
656 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
657 */
658 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
659
660 struct ssh_rportfwd {
661 unsigned sport, dport;
662 char dhost[256];
663 char *sportdesc;
664 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
665 };
666 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
667 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
668
669 /*
670 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
671 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
672 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
673 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
674 * it.
675 */
676 struct ssh_portfwd {
677 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
678 int type;
679 unsigned sport, dport;
680 char *saddr, *daddr;
681 char *sserv, *dserv;
682 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
683 int addressfamily;
684 void *local;
685 };
686 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
687 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
688 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
689
690 struct Packet {
691 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
692 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
693 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
694 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
695 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
696 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
697 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
698 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
699 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
700
701 /*
702 * State associated with packet logging
703 */
704 int logmode;
705 int nblanks;
706 struct logblank_t *blanks;
707 };
708
709 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
710 struct Packet *pktin);
711 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
712 struct Packet *pktin);
713 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
714 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
715 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
716 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
717 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
718 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
719 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
720 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
721 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
722 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
723 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
724 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
725 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
726 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
727 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
728 struct Packet *pktin);
729
730 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
731 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
732 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
733 unsigned char *p;
734 int i;
735 int chunk;
736 struct Packet *pktin;
737 };
738
739 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
740 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
741 int i;
742 int cipherblk;
743 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
744 struct Packet *pktin;
745 };
746
747 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
748 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
749
750 struct queued_handler;
751 struct queued_handler {
752 int msg1, msg2;
753 chandler_fn_t handler;
754 void *ctx;
755 struct queued_handler *next;
756 };
757
758 struct ssh_tag {
759 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
760 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
761
762 char *v_c, *v_s;
763 void *exhash;
764
765 Socket s;
766
767 void *ldisc;
768 void *logctx;
769
770 unsigned char session_key[32];
771 int v1_compressing;
772 int v1_remote_protoflags;
773 int v1_local_protoflags;
774 int agentfwd_enabled;
775 int X11_fwd_enabled;
776 int remote_bugs;
777 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
778 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
779 void *crcda_ctx;
780 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
781 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
782 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
783 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
784 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
785 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
786 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
787 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
788 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
789 int v2_session_id_len;
790 void *kex_ctx;
791
792 char *savedhost;
793 int savedport;
794 int send_ok;
795 int echoing, editing;
796
797 void *frontend;
798
799 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
800 int term_width, term_height;
801
802 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
803 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
804 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
805 int exitcode;
806 int close_expected;
807 int clean_exit;
808
809 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
810
811 enum {
812 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
813 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
814 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
815 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
816 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
817 } state;
818
819 int size_needed, eof_needed;
820
821 struct Packet **queue;
822 int queuelen, queuesize;
823 int queueing;
824 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
825 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
826
827 /*
828 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
829 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
830 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
831 * got.
832 */
833 int fallback_cmd;
834
835 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
836
837 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
838 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
839
840 struct X11Display *x11disp;
841
842 int version;
843 int conn_throttle_count;
844 int overall_bufsize;
845 int throttled_all;
846 int v1_stdout_throttling;
847 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
848
849 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
850 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
851 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
852 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
853 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
854 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
855 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
856 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
857
858 void *do_ssh_init_state;
859 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
860 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
861 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
862
863 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
864 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
865
866 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
867 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
868
869 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
870 struct Packet *pkt);
871 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
872
873 /*
874 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
875 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
876 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
877 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
878 */
879 Config cfg;
880
881 /*
882 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
883 */
884 void *agent_response;
885 int agent_response_len;
886 int user_response;
887
888 /*
889 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
890 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
891 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
892 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
893 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
894 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
895 * store that data.
896 */
897 int frozen;
898 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
899
900 /*
901 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
902 * with at any time.
903 */
904 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
905
906 /*
907 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
908 * indications from a request.
909 */
910 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
911
912 /*
913 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
914 */
915 Pinger pinger;
916
917 /*
918 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
919 * size-based rekeys.
920 */
921 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
922 unsigned long max_data_size;
923 int kex_in_progress;
924 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
925 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
926
927 /*
928 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
929 */
930 char *fullhostname;
931 };
932
933 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
934
935 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
936 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
937 {
938 va_list ap;
939 char *buf;
940
941 va_start(ap, fmt);
942 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
943 va_end(ap);
944 logevent(buf);
945 sfree(buf);
946 }
947
948 #define bombout(msg) \
949 do { \
950 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
951 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
952 logevent(text); \
953 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
954 sfree(text); \
955 } while (0)
956
957 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
958
959 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
960 {
961 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
962 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
963 }
964
965 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
966 {
967 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
968 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
969 }
970
971 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
972 {
973 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
974 }
975
976 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
977 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
978 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
979 void *data)
980 {
981 while (*modes) {
982 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
983 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
984 char *val;
985 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
986 m[t-modes] = '\0';
987 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
988 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
989 else
990 val = dupstr(t+2);
991 if (val)
992 do_mode(data, m, val);
993 sfree(m);
994 sfree(val);
995 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
996 }
997 }
998
999 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1000 {
1001 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1002 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1003 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1004 return -1;
1005 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1006 return +1;
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1010 {
1011 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1012 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1013 if (*a < b->localid)
1014 return -1;
1015 if (*a > b->localid)
1016 return +1;
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019
1020 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1021 {
1022 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1023 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1024 int i;
1025 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1026 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1027 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1028 return +1;
1029 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1030 return -1;
1031 return 0;
1032 }
1033
1034 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1035 {
1036 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1037 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1038
1039 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1040 return +1;
1041 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1042 return -1;
1043 return 0;
1044 }
1045
1046 /*
1047 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1048 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1049 */
1050 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1051 {
1052 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1053 return 0;
1054 if (a == NULL)
1055 return -1;
1056 if (b == NULL)
1057 return +1;
1058 return strcmp(a, b);
1059 }
1060
1061 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1062 {
1063 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1064 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1065 int i;
1066 if (a->type > b->type)
1067 return +1;
1068 if (a->type < b->type)
1069 return -1;
1070 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1071 return +1;
1072 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1073 return -1;
1074 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1075 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1076 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1077 return +1;
1078 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1079 return -1;
1080 if (a->type != 'D') {
1081 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1082 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1083 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1084 return +1;
1085 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1086 return -1;
1087 }
1088 return 0;
1089 }
1090
1091 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1092 {
1093 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1094 unsigned low, high, mid;
1095 int tsize;
1096 struct ssh_channel *c;
1097
1098 /*
1099 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1100 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1101 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1102 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1103 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1104 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1105 */
1106 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1107
1108 low = -1;
1109 high = tsize;
1110 while (high - low > 1) {
1111 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1112 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1113 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1114 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1115 else
1116 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1117 }
1118 /*
1119 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1120 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1121 */
1122 {
1123 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1124 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1125 }
1126 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1127 }
1128
1129 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1130 {
1131 int i;
1132 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1133 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1134 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1135 }
1136
1137 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1138 {
1139 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1140 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1141 else
1142 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1143 }
1144
1145 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1146 {
1147 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1148 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1149 else
1150 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1151 }
1152
1153 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1154 {
1155 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1156 }
1157
1158 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1159 {
1160 sfree(pkt->data);
1161 sfree(pkt);
1162 }
1163 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1164 {
1165 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1166
1167 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1168 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1169 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1170 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1171 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1172
1173 return pkt;
1174 }
1175
1176 /*
1177 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1178 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1179 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1180 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1181 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1182 */
1183 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1184 {
1185 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1186
1187 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1188
1189 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1190
1191 st->pktin->type = 0;
1192 st->pktin->length = 0;
1193
1194 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1195 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1196 crReturn(NULL);
1197 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1198 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1199 }
1200
1201 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1202 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1203 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1204
1205 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1206 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1207 " data stream corruption"));
1208 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1209 crStop(NULL);
1210 }
1211
1212 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1213 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1214
1215 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1216 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1217 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1218 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1219 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1220 crReturn(NULL);
1221 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1222 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1223 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1224 *data += st->chunk;
1225 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1226 st->p += st->chunk;
1227 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1228 }
1229
1230 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1231 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1232 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1233 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1234 crStop(NULL);
1235 }
1236
1237 if (ssh->cipher)
1238 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1239
1240 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1241 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1242 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1243 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1244 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1245 crStop(NULL);
1246 }
1247
1248 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1249 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1250
1251 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1252 unsigned char *decompblk;
1253 int decomplen;
1254 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1255 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1256 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1257 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1258 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1259 crStop(NULL);
1260 }
1261
1262 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1263 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1264 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1265 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1266 unsigned char);
1267 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1268 }
1269
1270 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1271 sfree(decompblk);
1272 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1273 }
1274
1275 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1276
1277 /*
1278 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1279 */
1280 if (ssh->logctx) {
1281 int nblanks = 0;
1282 struct logblank_t blank;
1283 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1284 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1285 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1286 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1287 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1288 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1289 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1290 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1291 }
1292 if (do_blank) {
1293 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1294 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1295 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1296 nblanks = 1;
1297 }
1298 }
1299 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1300 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1301 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1302 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1303 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1304 }
1305
1306 crFinish(st->pktin);
1307 }
1308
1309 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1310 {
1311 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1312
1313 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1314
1315 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1316
1317 st->pktin->type = 0;
1318 st->pktin->length = 0;
1319 if (ssh->sccipher)
1320 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1321 else
1322 st->cipherblk = 8;
1323 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1324 st->cipherblk = 8;
1325 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1326
1327 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1328 ssh->scmac) {
1329 /*
1330 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1331 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1332 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1333 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1334 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1335 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1336 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1337 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1338 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1339 * plausible.
1340 */
1341
1342 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1343 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1344 unsigned char);
1345
1346 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1347 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1348 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1349 crReturn(NULL);
1350 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1351 (*datalen)--;
1352 }
1353
1354 st->packetlen = 0;
1355 {
1356 unsigned char seq[4];
1357 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1358 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1359 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1360 }
1361
1362 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1363 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1364 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1365 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1366 crReturn(NULL);
1367 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1368 (*datalen)--;
1369 }
1370 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1371 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1372 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1373 st->cipherblk);
1374 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1375 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1376 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1377 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1378 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1379 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1380 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1381 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1382 break;
1383 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1384 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1385 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1386 crStop(NULL);
1387 }
1388 }
1389 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1390 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1391 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1392 unsigned char);
1393 } else {
1394 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1395
1396 /*
1397 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1398 * contain the length and padding details.
1399 */
1400 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1401 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1402 crReturn(NULL);
1403 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1404 (*datalen)--;
1405 }
1406
1407 if (ssh->sccipher)
1408 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1409 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1410
1411 /*
1412 * Now get the length figure.
1413 */
1414 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1415
1416 /*
1417 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1418 * do us any more damage.
1419 */
1420 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1421 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1422 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1423 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1424 crStop(NULL);
1425 }
1426
1427 /*
1428 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1429 */
1430 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1431
1432 /*
1433 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1434 */
1435 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1436 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1437 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1438 unsigned char);
1439
1440 /*
1441 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1442 */
1443 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1444 st->i++) {
1445 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1446 crReturn(NULL);
1447 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1448 (*datalen)--;
1449 }
1450 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1451 if (ssh->sccipher)
1452 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1453 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1454 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Check the MAC.
1458 */
1459 if (ssh->scmac
1460 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1461 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1462 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1463 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1464 crStop(NULL);
1465 }
1466 }
1467 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1468 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1469 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1470 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1471 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1472 crStop(NULL);
1473 }
1474 /*
1475 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1476 */
1477 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1478
1479 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1480 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1481
1482 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1483
1484 /*
1485 * Decompress packet payload.
1486 */
1487 {
1488 unsigned char *newpayload;
1489 int newlen;
1490 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1491 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1492 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1493 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1494 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1495 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1496 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1497 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1498 unsigned char);
1499 }
1500 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1501 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1502 sfree(newpayload);
1503 }
1504 }
1505
1506 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1507 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1508 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1509
1510 /*
1511 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1512 */
1513 if (ssh->logctx) {
1514 int nblanks = 0;
1515 struct logblank_t blank;
1516 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1517 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1518 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1519 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1520 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1521 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1522 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1523 }
1524 if (do_blank) {
1525 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1526 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1527 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1528 nblanks = 1;
1529 }
1530 }
1531 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1532 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1533 st->pktin->type),
1534 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1535 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1536 }
1537
1538 crFinish(st->pktin);
1539 }
1540
1541 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1542 {
1543 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1544 unsigned long crc;
1545 #ifdef __SC__
1546 /*
1547 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1548 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1549 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1550 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1551 */
1552 volatile
1553 #endif
1554 int len;
1555
1556 if (ssh->logctx)
1557 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1558 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1559 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1560 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1561 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1562 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1563
1564 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1565 unsigned char *compblk;
1566 int complen;
1567 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1568 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1569 &compblk, &complen);
1570 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1571 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1572 sfree(compblk);
1573 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1574 }
1575
1576 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1577 pkt->length += 4;
1578 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1579 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1580 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1581 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1582
1583 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1584 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1585 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1586 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1587 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1588
1589 if (ssh->cipher)
1590 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1591 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1592
1593 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1594 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1595 }
1596
1597 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1598 {
1599 if (ssh->logctx)
1600 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1601 0, NULL, NULL);
1602 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1603 }
1604
1605 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1606 {
1607 int len, backlog, offset;
1608 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1609 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1610 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1611 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1612 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1613 }
1614
1615 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1616 {
1617 int len, offset;
1618 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1619 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1620 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1621 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1622 ssh->deferred_size,
1623 unsigned char);
1624 }
1625 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1626 pkt->data + offset, len);
1627 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1628 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1629 }
1630
1631 /*
1632 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1633 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1634 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1635 */
1636 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1637 {
1638 int argtype;
1639 Bignum bn;
1640 struct Packet *pkt;
1641
1642 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1643
1644 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1645 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1646 char *sargp;
1647 unsigned long argint;
1648 int arglen;
1649 switch (argtype) {
1650 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1651 case PKT_INT:
1652 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1653 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1654 break;
1655 case PKT_CHAR:
1656 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1657 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1658 break;
1659 case PKT_DATA:
1660 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1661 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1662 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1663 break;
1664 case PKT_STR:
1665 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1666 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1667 break;
1668 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1669 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1670 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1671 break;
1672 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1673 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1674 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1675 break;
1676 case PKTT_DATA:
1677 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1678 break;
1679 case PKTT_OTHER:
1680 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1681 break;
1682 }
1683 }
1684
1685 return pkt;
1686 }
1687
1688 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1689 {
1690 struct Packet *pkt;
1691 va_list ap;
1692 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1693 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1694 va_end(ap);
1695 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1696 }
1697
1698 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1699 {
1700 struct Packet *pkt;
1701 va_list ap;
1702 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1703 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1704 va_end(ap);
1705 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1706 }
1707
1708 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1709 {
1710 char *ae, *be;
1711 unsigned long av, bv;
1712
1713 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1714 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1715 if (av != bv)
1716 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1717 if (*ae == '.')
1718 ae++;
1719 if (*be == '.')
1720 be++;
1721 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1722 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1723 if (av != bv)
1724 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1725 return 0;
1726 }
1727
1728 /*
1729 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1730 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1731 */
1732 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1733 {
1734 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1735 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1736 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1737 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1738 }
1739
1740 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1741 {
1742 unsigned char intblk[4];
1743 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1744 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1745 }
1746
1747 /*
1748 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1749 */
1750 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1751 {
1752 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1753 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1754 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1755 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1756 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1757 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1758 }
1759 }
1760 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1761 {
1762 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1763 pkt->nblanks++;
1764 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1765 assert(pkt->body);
1766 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1767 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1768 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1769 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1770 }
1771 pkt->length += len;
1772 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1773 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1774 }
1775 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1776 {
1777 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1778 }
1779 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1780 {
1781 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1782 }
1783 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1784 {
1785 unsigned char x[4];
1786 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1787 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1788 }
1789 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1790 {
1791 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1792 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1793 }
1794 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1795 {
1796 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1797 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1798 }
1799 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1800 {
1801 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1802 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1803 }
1804 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1805 {
1806 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1807 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1808 }
1809 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1810 {
1811 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1812 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1813 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1814 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1815 sfree(data);
1816 }
1817 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1818 {
1819 unsigned char *p;
1820 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1821 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1822 p[0] = 0;
1823 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1824 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1825 i = 0;
1826 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1827 i++;
1828 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1829 *len = n + 1 - i;
1830 return p;
1831 }
1832 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1833 {
1834 unsigned char *p;
1835 int len;
1836 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1837 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1838 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1839 sfree(p);
1840 }
1841
1842 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1843 {
1844 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1845 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1846 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1847 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1848 return pkt;
1849 }
1850
1851 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1852 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1853 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1854 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1855 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1856 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1857 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1858 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1859 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1860
1861 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1862 {
1863 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1864 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1865 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1866 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1867 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1868 return pkt;
1869 }
1870
1871 /*
1872 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1873 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1874 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1875 */
1876 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1877 {
1878 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1879
1880 if (ssh->logctx)
1881 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1882 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1883 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1884 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1885 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1886 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1887
1888 /*
1889 * Compress packet payload.
1890 */
1891 {
1892 unsigned char *newpayload;
1893 int newlen;
1894 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1895 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1896 pkt->length - 5,
1897 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1898 pkt->length = 5;
1899 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1900 sfree(newpayload);
1901 }
1902 }
1903
1904 /*
1905 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1906 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1907 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1908 * after padding.
1909 */
1910 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1911 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1912 padding = 4;
1913 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1914 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1915 padding +=
1916 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1917 assert(padding <= 255);
1918 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1919 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1920 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1921 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1922 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1923 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1924 if (ssh->csmac)
1925 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1926 pkt->length + padding,
1927 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1928 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1929
1930 if (ssh->cscipher)
1931 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1932 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1933
1934 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1935
1936 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1937 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1938 }
1939
1940 /*
1941 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1942 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1943 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1944 *
1945 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1946 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1947 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1948 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1949 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1950 * works after packet encryption.
1951 *
1952 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1953 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1954 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1955 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1956 * then send them once we've finished.
1957 *
1958 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1959 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1960 *
1961 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1962 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1963 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1964 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1965 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1966 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1967 *
1968 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1969 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1970 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1971 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1972 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1973 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1974 * CBC.
1975 */
1976
1977 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1978 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1979
1980 /*
1981 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1982 */
1983 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1984 {
1985 int len;
1986 int backlog;
1987 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
1988 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1989 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1990 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1991 return;
1992 }
1993 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1994 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
1995 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1996 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1997
1998 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1999 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2000 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2001 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2002 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2003
2004 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2005 }
2006
2007 /*
2008 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2009 */
2010 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2011 {
2012 int len;
2013 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2014 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
2015 /*
2016 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2017 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2018 */
2019 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2020 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2021 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2022 }
2023 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2024 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2025 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2026 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2027 ssh->deferred_size,
2028 unsigned char);
2029 }
2030 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2031 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2032 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2033 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2034 }
2035
2036 /*
2037 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2038 */
2039 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2040 {
2041 assert(ssh->queueing);
2042
2043 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2044 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2045 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2046 }
2047
2048 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2049 }
2050
2051 /*
2052 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2053 * set.
2054 */
2055 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2056 {
2057 if (ssh->queueing)
2058 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2059 else
2060 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2061 }
2062
2063 /*
2064 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2065 * set.
2066 */
2067 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2068 {
2069 if (ssh->queueing)
2070 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2071 else
2072 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2073 }
2074
2075 /*
2076 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2077 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2078 *
2079 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2080 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2081 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2082 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2083 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2084 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2085 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2086 * ssh->queueing.
2087 */
2088 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2089 {
2090 int backlog;
2091 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2092 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2093 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2094 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2095 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2096 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2097
2098 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2099 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2100 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2101 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2102 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2103 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2104 }
2105
2106 /*
2107 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2108 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2109 */
2110 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2111 int padsize)
2112 {
2113 #if 0
2114 if (0) {
2115 /*
2116 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2117 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2118 *
2119 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2120 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2121 * always Cisco?)
2122 */
2123 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2124 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2125 } else
2126 #endif
2127 {
2128 /*
2129 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2130 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2131 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2132 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2133 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2134 */
2135 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2136
2137 /*
2138 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2139 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2140 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2141 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2142 * gain nothing by it.)
2143 */
2144 if (ssh->cscipher) {
2145 int stringlen, i;
2146
2147 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2148 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2149 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2150 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2151 /*
2152 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2153 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2154 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2155 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2156 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2157 * by.
2158 */
2159 stringlen -=
2160 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2161 }
2162 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2163 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2164 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2165 char c = (char) random_byte();
2166 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2167 }
2168 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2169 }
2170 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2171 }
2172 }
2173
2174 /*
2175 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2176 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2177 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2178 */
2179 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2180 {
2181 int i;
2182
2183 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2184
2185 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2186 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2187 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2188
2189 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2190 }
2191
2192 #if 0
2193 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2194 {
2195 unsigned char *p;
2196 int i, len;
2197 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2198 debug(("%s", string));
2199 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2200 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2201 debug(("\n"));
2202 sfree(p);
2203 }
2204 #endif
2205
2206 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2207 {
2208 unsigned char *p;
2209 int len;
2210 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2211 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2212 sfree(p);
2213 }
2214
2215 /*
2216 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2217 */
2218 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2219 {
2220 unsigned long value;
2221 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2222 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2223 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2224 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2225 return value;
2226 }
2227 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2228 {
2229 unsigned long value;
2230 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2231 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2232 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2233 pkt->savedpos++;
2234 return value;
2235 }
2236 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2237 {
2238 int len;
2239 *p = NULL;
2240 *length = 0;
2241 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2242 return;
2243 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2244 if (len < 0)
2245 return;
2246 *length = len;
2247 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2248 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2249 return;
2250 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2251 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2252 }
2253 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2254 {
2255 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2256 return NULL;
2257 pkt->savedpos += length;
2258 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2259 }
2260 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2261 unsigned char **keystr)
2262 {
2263 int j;
2264
2265 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2266 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2267 key, keystr, 0);
2268
2269 if (j < 0)
2270 return FALSE;
2271
2272 pkt->savedpos += j;
2273 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2274
2275 return TRUE;
2276 }
2277 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2278 {
2279 int j;
2280 Bignum b;
2281
2282 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2283 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2284
2285 if (j < 0)
2286 return NULL;
2287
2288 pkt->savedpos += j;
2289 return b;
2290 }
2291 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2292 {
2293 char *p;
2294 int length;
2295 Bignum b;
2296
2297 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2298 if (!p)
2299 return NULL;
2300 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2301 return NULL;
2302 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2303 return b;
2304 }
2305
2306 /*
2307 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2308 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2309 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2310 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2311 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2312 */
2313 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2314 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2315 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2316 {
2317 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2318 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2319
2320 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2321 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2322
2323 /*
2324 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2325 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2326 */
2327 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2328 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2329 int pos, len, siglen;
2330
2331 /*
2332 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2333 */
2334
2335 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2336 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2337 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2338 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2339 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2340 len--, pos++;
2341 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2342
2343 /*
2344 * Now find the signature integer.
2345 */
2346 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2347 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2348 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2349
2350 if (len != siglen) {
2351 unsigned char newlen[4];
2352 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2353 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2354 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2355 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2356 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2357 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2358 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2359 newlen[0] = 0;
2360 while (len-- > siglen) {
2361 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2362 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2363 }
2364 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2365 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2366 return;
2367 }
2368
2369 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2370 }
2371
2372 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2373 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2374 }
2375
2376 /*
2377 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2378 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2379 */
2380 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2381 {
2382 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2383 imp = vstring;
2384 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2385 if (*imp) imp++;
2386 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2387 if (*imp) imp++;
2388
2389 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2390
2391 /*
2392 * General notes on server version strings:
2393 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2394 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2395 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2396 * so we can't distinguish them.
2397 */
2398 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2399 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2400 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2401 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2402 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2403 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2404 /*
2405 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2406 * to use a different defence against password length
2407 * sniffing.
2408 */
2409 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2410 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2411 }
2412
2413 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2414 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2415 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2416 /*
2417 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2418 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2419 * the password.
2420 */
2421 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2422 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2423 }
2424
2425 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2426 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2427 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2428 /*
2429 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2430 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2431 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2432 */
2433 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2434 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2435 }
2436
2437 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2438 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2439 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2440 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2441 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2442 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2443 /*
2444 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2445 */
2446 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2447 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2448 }
2449
2450 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2451 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2452 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2453 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2454 /*
2455 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2456 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2457 * generate the keys).
2458 */
2459 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2460 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2461 }
2462
2463 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2464 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2465 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2466 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2467 /*
2468 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2469 */
2470 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2471 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2472 }
2473
2474 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2475 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2476 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2477 /*
2478 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2479 * public-key authentication.
2480 */
2481 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2482 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2483 }
2484
2485 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2486 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2487 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2488 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2489 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2490 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2491 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2492 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2493 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2494 /*
2495 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2496 */
2497 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2498 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2499 }
2500
2501 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
2502 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
2503 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2504 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2505 /*
2506 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2507 */
2508 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2509 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2510 }
2511 }
2512
2513 /*
2514 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2515 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2516 */
2517 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2518 {
2519 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2520 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2521 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2522 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2523 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2524 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2525 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2526
2527 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2528 * underscores. */
2529 while (*str) {
2530 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2531 *str = '_';
2532 str++;
2533 }
2534 }
2535
2536 /*
2537 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2538 */
2539 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2540 {
2541 char *verstring;
2542
2543 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2544 /*
2545 * Construct a v2 version string.
2546 */
2547 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2548 } else {
2549 /*
2550 * Construct a v1 version string.
2551 */
2552 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2553 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2554 svers : "1.5"),
2555 sshver);
2556 }
2557
2558 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2559
2560 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2561 size_t len;
2562 /*
2563 * Record our version string.
2564 */
2565 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2566 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2567 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2568 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2572 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2573 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2574 sfree(verstring);
2575 }
2576
2577 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2578 {
2579 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2580 int vslen;
2581 char version[10];
2582 char *vstring;
2583 int vstrsize;
2584 int i;
2585 int proto1, proto2;
2586 };
2587 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2588
2589 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2590
2591 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2592 for (;;) {
2593 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2594 crReturn(1);
2595 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2596 crReturn(1);
2597 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2598 crReturn(1);
2599 if (c != '-') goto no;
2600 break;
2601 no:
2602 while (c != '\012')
2603 crReturn(1);
2604 crReturn(1);
2605 }
2606
2607 s->vstrsize = 16;
2608 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2609 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2610 s->vslen = 4;
2611 s->i = 0;
2612 while (1) {
2613 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2614 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2615 s->vstrsize += 16;
2616 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2617 }
2618 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2619 if (s->i >= 0) {
2620 if (c == '-') {
2621 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2622 s->i = -1;
2623 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2624 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2625 } else if (c == '\012')
2626 break;
2627 }
2628
2629 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2630 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2631
2632 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2633 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2634 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2635 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2636
2637 /*
2638 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2639 */
2640
2641 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2642 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2643 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2644 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2645
2646 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2647 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2648 crStop(0);
2649 }
2650 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2651 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2652 crStop(0);
2653 }
2654
2655 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2656 ssh->version = 2;
2657 else
2658 ssh->version = 1;
2659
2660 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2661
2662 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2663 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
2664 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2665
2666 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2667 size_t len;
2668 /*
2669 * Record their version string.
2670 */
2671 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2672 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2673 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2674 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2675
2676 /*
2677 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2678 */
2679 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2680 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2681 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2682 } else {
2683 /*
2684 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2685 */
2686 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2687 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2688 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2689 }
2690 if (ssh->version == 2)
2691 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2692
2693 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2694 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2695 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2696
2697 sfree(s->vstring);
2698
2699 crFinish(0);
2700 }
2701
2702 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2703 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2704 {
2705 struct Packet *pktin;
2706
2707 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2708 if (pktin) {
2709 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2710 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2711 }
2712 }
2713
2714 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2715 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2716 {
2717 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2718 *data += *datalen;
2719 *datalen = 0;
2720 }
2721
2722 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2723 {
2724 void *vdata;
2725 unsigned char *data;
2726 int len, origlen;
2727
2728 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2729 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2730 data = vdata;
2731 origlen = len;
2732
2733 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2734 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2735
2736 if (origlen > len)
2737 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2738 }
2739 }
2740
2741 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2742 {
2743 if (ssh->s)
2744 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2745 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2746 }
2747
2748 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2749 {
2750 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2751 if (ssh->logctx)
2752 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2753 0, NULL, NULL);
2754
2755 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2756
2757 /*
2758 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2759 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2760 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2761 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2762 */
2763 while (1) {
2764 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2765 if (datalen == 0)
2766 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2767 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2768 data++;
2769 datalen--;
2770 if (ret == 0)
2771 break;
2772 }
2773
2774 /*
2775 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2776 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2777 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2778 * to the proper protocol handler.
2779 */
2780
2781 while (1) {
2782 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2783 if (ssh->frozen) {
2784 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2785 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2786 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2787 * return, so break out. */
2788 break;
2789 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2790 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2791 * session. */
2792 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2793 } else {
2794 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2795 * session. */
2796 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2797 }
2798 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2799 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2800 return;
2801 }
2802 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2803 crReturnV;
2804 }
2805 crFinishV;
2806 }
2807
2808 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2809 {
2810 int ret = 0;
2811 struct ssh_channel *c;
2812
2813 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2814 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2815 if (ssh->s) {
2816 sk_close(ssh->s);
2817 ssh->s = NULL;
2818 if (notify_exit)
2819 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2820 else
2821 ret = 1;
2822 }
2823 /*
2824 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2825 * through this connection.
2826 */
2827 if (ssh->channels) {
2828 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2829 switch (c->type) {
2830 case CHAN_X11:
2831 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2832 break;
2833 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2834 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2835 break;
2836 }
2837 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2838 if (ssh->version == 2)
2839 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2840 sfree(c);
2841 }
2842 }
2843 /*
2844 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2845 * listening sockets.
2846 */
2847 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2848 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2849 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2850 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2851 if (pf->local)
2852 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2853 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2854 free_portfwd(pf);
2855 }
2856 }
2857
2858 return ret;
2859 }
2860
2861 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2862 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2863 {
2864 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2865 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2866
2867 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2868
2869 if (type == 0)
2870 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2871 else
2872 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2873
2874 logevent(msg);
2875 sfree(msg);
2876 }
2877
2878 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2879 int calling_back)
2880 {
2881 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2882 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2883
2884 if (!error_msg) {
2885 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2886 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2887 else
2888 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2889 }
2890
2891 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2892 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2893
2894 if (need_notify)
2895 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2896
2897 if (error_msg)
2898 logevent(error_msg);
2899 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2900 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2901 return 0;
2902 }
2903
2904 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2905 {
2906 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2907 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2908 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2909 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2910 return 0;
2911 }
2912 return 1;
2913 }
2914
2915 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2916 {
2917 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2918 /*
2919 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2920 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2921 */
2922 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2923 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2924 }
2925
2926 /*
2927 * Connect to specified host and port.
2928 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2929 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2930 * freed by the caller.
2931 */
2932 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2933 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2934 {
2935 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2936 ssh_log,
2937 ssh_closing,
2938 ssh_receive,
2939 ssh_sent,
2940 NULL
2941 };
2942
2943 SockAddr addr;
2944 const char *err;
2945
2946 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
2947 char *colon;
2948
2949 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
2950 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
2951
2952 /*
2953 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
2954 * savedport.
2955 *
2956 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
2957 */
2958 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
2959 if (colon) {
2960 *colon++ = '\0';
2961 if (*colon)
2962 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
2963 }
2964 } else {
2965 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
2966 if (port < 0)
2967 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
2968 ssh->savedport = port;
2969 }
2970
2971 /*
2972 * Try to find host.
2973 */
2974 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
2975 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
2976 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
2977 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
2978 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
2979 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
2980 sk_addr_free(addr);
2981 return err;
2982 }
2983 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
2984
2985 /*
2986 * Open socket.
2987 */
2988 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
2989 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
2990 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
2991 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
2992 ssh->s = NULL;
2993 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2994 return err;
2995 }
2996
2997 /*
2998 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
2999 * send the version string too.
3000 */
3001 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
3002 ssh->version = 1;
3003 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
3004 ssh->version = 2;
3005 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3006 }
3007
3008 /*
3009 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3010 */
3011 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
3012 sfree(*realhost);
3013 *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
3014 }
3015
3016 return NULL;
3017 }
3018
3019 /*
3020 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3021 */
3022 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3023 {
3024 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3025 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3026 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3027 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3028 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3029 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3030 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3031 }
3032 }
3033
3034 /*
3035 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3036 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3037 */
3038 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3039 {
3040 int i;
3041 struct ssh_channel *c;
3042
3043 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3044 return;
3045 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3046 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3047 if (!ssh->channels)
3048 return;
3049 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3050 switch (c->type) {
3051 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3052 /*
3053 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3054 */
3055 break;
3056 case CHAN_X11:
3057 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3058 break;
3059 case CHAN_AGENT:
3060 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3061 break;
3062 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3063 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3064 break;
3065 }
3066 }
3067 }
3068
3069 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3070 {
3071 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3072
3073 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3074 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3075
3076 if (ssh->version == 1)
3077 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3078 else
3079 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3080 }
3081
3082 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3083 {
3084 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3085
3086 ssh->user_response = ret;
3087
3088 if (ssh->version == 1)
3089 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3090 else
3091 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3092
3093 /*
3094 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3095 * queued-data run.
3096 */
3097 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3098 }
3099
3100 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3101 {
3102 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3103 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3104 void *sentreply = reply;
3105
3106 if (!sentreply) {
3107 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3108 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3109 replylen = 5;
3110 }
3111 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3112 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3113 ssh2_try_send(c);
3114 } else {
3115 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3116 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3117 PKT_INT, replylen,
3118 PKTT_DATA,
3119 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3120 PKTT_OTHER,
3121 PKT_END);
3122 }
3123 if (reply)
3124 sfree(reply);
3125 }
3126
3127 /*
3128 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3129 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3130 * => log `wire_reason'.
3131 */
3132 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3133 int code, int clean_exit)
3134 {
3135 char *error;
3136 if (!client_reason)
3137 client_reason = wire_reason;
3138 if (client_reason)
3139 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3140 else
3141 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3142 if (wire_reason) {
3143 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3144 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3145 PKT_END);
3146 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3147 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3148 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3149 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3150 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3151 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3152 }
3153 }
3154 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3155 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3156 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3157 sfree(error);
3158 }
3159
3160 /*
3161 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3162 */
3163 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3164 struct Packet *pktin)
3165 {
3166 int i, j, ret;
3167 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3168 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3169 struct MD5Context md5c;
3170 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3171 int len;
3172 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3173 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3174 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3175 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3176 unsigned char session_id[16];
3177 int cipher_type;
3178 char username[100];
3179 void *publickey_blob;
3180 int publickey_bloblen;
3181 char *publickey_comment;
3182 int publickey_encrypted;
3183 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3184 char c;
3185 int pwpkt_type;
3186 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3187 int responselen;
3188 int keyi, nkeys;
3189 int authed;
3190 struct RSAKey key;
3191 Bignum challenge;
3192 char *commentp;
3193 int commentlen;
3194 int dlgret;
3195 };
3196 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3197
3198 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
3199
3200 if (!pktin)
3201 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3202
3203 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3204 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3205 crStop(0);
3206 }
3207
3208 logevent("Received public keys");
3209
3210 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3211 if (!ptr) {
3212 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3213 crStop(0);
3214 }
3215 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3216
3217 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3218 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3219 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3220 crStop(0);
3221 }
3222
3223 /*
3224 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3225 */
3226 {
3227 char logmsg[80];
3228 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3229 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3230 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3231 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3232 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3233 logevent(logmsg);
3234 }
3235
3236 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3237 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3238 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3239 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3240 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3241
3242 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3243 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3244 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3245
3246 MD5Init(&md5c);
3247 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3248 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3249 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3250 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3251
3252 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3253 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3254
3255 /*
3256 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3257 */
3258 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3259 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3260 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3261 crStop(0);
3262 }
3263
3264 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3265
3266 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3267
3268 /*
3269 * Verify the host key.
3270 */
3271 {
3272 /*
3273 * First format the key into a string.
3274 */
3275 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3276 char fingerprint[100];
3277 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3278 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3279 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3280
3281 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3282 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3283 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3284 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3285 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3286 sfree(keystr);
3287 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3288 do {
3289 crReturn(0);
3290 if (pktin) {
3291 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3292 " for user host key response"));
3293 crStop(0);
3294 }
3295 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3296 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3297 }
3298 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3299
3300 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3301 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3302 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3303 crStop(0);
3304 }
3305 }
3306
3307 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3308 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3309 if (i < 16)
3310 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3311 }
3312
3313 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3314 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3315 if (ret)
3316 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3317 } else {
3318 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3319 if (ret)
3320 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3321 }
3322 if (!ret) {
3323 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3324 crStop(0);
3325 }
3326
3327 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3328
3329 {
3330 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3331 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3332 int i;
3333 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3334 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3335 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3336 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3337 warn = 1;
3338 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3339 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3340 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3341 } else {
3342 switch (next_cipher) {
3343 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3344 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3345 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3346 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3347 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3348 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3349 }
3350 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3351 cipher_chosen = 1;
3352 }
3353 }
3354 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3355 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3356 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3357 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3358 else
3359 /* shouldn't happen */
3360 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3361 crStop(0);
3362 }
3363
3364 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3365 if (warn) {
3366 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3367 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3368 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3369 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3370 do {
3371 crReturn(0);
3372 if (pktin) {
3373 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3374 " for user response"));
3375 crStop(0);
3376 }
3377 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3378 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3379 }
3380 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3381 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3382 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3383 0, TRUE);
3384 crStop(0);
3385 }
3386 }
3387 }
3388
3389 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3390 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3391 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3392 break;
3393 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3394 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3395 break;
3396 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3397 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3398 break;
3399 }
3400
3401 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3402 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3403 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3404 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3405 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3406 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3407
3408 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3409
3410 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3411
3412 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3413 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3414 &ssh_3des);
3415 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3416 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3417 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3418
3419 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3420 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3421
3422 if (servkey.modulus) {
3423 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3424 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3425 }
3426 if (servkey.exponent) {
3427 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3428 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3429 }
3430 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3431 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3432 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3433 }
3434 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3435 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3436 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3437 }
3438 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3439
3440 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3441 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3442 crStop(0);
3443 }
3444
3445 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3446
3447 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3448 {
3449 if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
3450 sizeof(s->username))) {
3451 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3452 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3453 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3454 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3455 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
3456 lenof(s->username));
3457 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3458 while (ret < 0) {
3459 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3460 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3461 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3462 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3463 }
3464 if (!ret) {
3465 /*
3466 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3467 */
3468 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3469 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3470 crStop(0);
3471 }
3472 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3473 lenof(s->username));
3474 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3475 }
3476
3477 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3478 {
3479 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3480 logevent(userlog);
3481 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3482 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3483 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3484 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3485 }
3486 sfree(userlog);
3487 }
3488 }
3489
3490 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3491
3492 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3493 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3494 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3495 } else {
3496 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3497 }
3498 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3499 /*
3500 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3501 */
3502 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3503 int keytype;
3504 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3505 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3506 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3507 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3508 const char *error;
3509 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3510 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3511 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3512 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3513 NULL);
3514 } else {
3515 char *msgbuf;
3516 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3517 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3518 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3519 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3520 error);
3521 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3522 sfree(msgbuf);
3523 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3524 }
3525 } else {
3526 char *msgbuf;
3527 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3528 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3529 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3530 " (%s)\r\n",
3531 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3532 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3533 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3534 sfree(msgbuf);
3535 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3536 }
3537 } else
3538 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3539
3540 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3541 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3542
3543 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3544 /*
3545 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3546 */
3547 void *r;
3548
3549 s->authed = FALSE;
3550 s->tried_agent = 1;
3551 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3552
3553 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3554 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3555 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3556 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3557 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3558 do {
3559 crReturn(0);
3560 if (pktin) {
3561 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3562 " for agent response"));
3563 crStop(0);
3564 }
3565 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3566 r = ssh->agent_response;
3567 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3568 }
3569 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3570 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3571 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3572 s->p = s->response + 5;
3573 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3574 s->p += 4;
3575 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3576 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3577 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3578 s->p += 4;
3579 {
3580 int n, ok = FALSE;
3581 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3582 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3583 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3584 &s->key.exponent);
3585 if (n < 0)
3586 break;
3587 s->p += n;
3588 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3589 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3590 &s->key.modulus);
3591 if (n < 0)
3592 break;
3593 s->p += n;
3594 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3595 break;
3596 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3597 s->p += 4;
3598 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3599 s->commentlen)
3600 break;
3601 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3602 s->p += s->commentlen;
3603 ok = TRUE;
3604 } while (0);
3605 if (!ok) {
3606 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3607 break;
3608 }
3609 }
3610 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3611 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3612 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3613 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3614 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3615 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3616 } else
3617 /* Skip non-configured key */
3618 continue;
3619 }
3620 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3621 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3622 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3623 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3624 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3625 logevent("Key refused");
3626 continue;
3627 }
3628 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3629 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3630 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3631 crStop(0);
3632 }
3633
3634 {
3635 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3636 void *vret;
3637 int len, retlen;
3638 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3639 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3640 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3641 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3642 len += 16; /* session id */
3643 len += 4; /* response format */
3644 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3645 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3646 q = agentreq + 4;
3647 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3648 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3649 q += 4;
3650 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3651 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3652 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3653 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3654 q += 16;
3655 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3656 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3657 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3658 sfree(agentreq);
3659 do {
3660 crReturn(0);
3661 if (pktin) {
3662 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3663 " while waiting for agent"
3664 " response"));
3665 crStop(0);
3666 }
3667 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3668 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3669 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3670 } else
3671 sfree(agentreq);
3672 ret = vret;
3673 if (ret) {
3674 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3675 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3676 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3677 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3678 PKT_END);
3679 sfree(ret);
3680 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3681 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3682 logevent
3683 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3684 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3685 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3686 " RSA key \"");
3687 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3688 s->commentlen);
3689 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3690 }
3691 s->authed = TRUE;
3692 } else
3693 logevent
3694 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3695 } else {
3696 logevent
3697 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3698 sfree(ret);
3699 }
3700 } else {
3701 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3702 }
3703 }
3704 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3705 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3706 freebn(s->challenge);
3707 if (s->authed)
3708 break;
3709 }
3710 sfree(s->response);
3711 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3712 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3713 }
3714 if (s->authed)
3715 break;
3716 }
3717 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3718 /*
3719 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3720 * key file.
3721 */
3722 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3723 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3724 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3725 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3726 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3727 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3728 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3729 while (!got_passphrase) {
3730 /*
3731 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3732 */
3733 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3734 const char *error;
3735 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3736 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3737 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3738 passphrase = NULL;
3739 } else {
3740 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3741 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3742 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3743 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3744 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3745 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3746 s->publickey_comment),
3747 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3748 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3749 while (ret < 0) {
3750 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3751 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3752 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3753 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3754 }
3755 if (!ret) {
3756 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3757 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3758 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3759 0, TRUE);
3760 crStop(0);
3761 }
3762 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3763 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3764 }
3765 /*
3766 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3767 */
3768 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3769 &error);
3770 if (passphrase) {
3771 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
3772 sfree(passphrase);
3773 }
3774 if (ret == 1) {
3775 /* Correct passphrase. */
3776 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3777 } else if (ret == 0) {
3778 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3779 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3780 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3781 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3782 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3783 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3784 break; /* go and try something else */
3785 } else if (ret == -1) {
3786 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3787 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3788 /* and try again */
3789 } else {
3790 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3791 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3792 }
3793 }
3794
3795 if (got_passphrase) {
3796
3797 /*
3798 * Send a public key attempt.
3799 */
3800 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3801 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3802
3803 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3804 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3805 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3806 continue; /* go and try something else */
3807 }
3808 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3809 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3810 crStop(0);
3811 }
3812
3813 {
3814 int i;
3815 unsigned char buffer[32];
3816 Bignum challenge, response;
3817
3818 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3819 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3820 crStop(0);
3821 }
3822 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3823 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3824
3825 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3826 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3827 }
3828
3829 MD5Init(&md5c);
3830 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3831 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3832 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3833
3834 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3835 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3836
3837 freebn(challenge);
3838 freebn(response);
3839 }
3840
3841 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3842 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3843 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3844 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3845 " our public key.\r\n");
3846 continue; /* go and try something else */
3847 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3848 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3849 crStop(0);
3850 }
3851
3852 break; /* we're through! */
3853 }
3854
3855 }
3856
3857 /*
3858 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3859 */
3860 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3861
3862 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3863 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3864 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3865 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3866 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3867 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3868 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3869 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3870 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3871 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3872 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3873 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3874 continue;
3875 } else {
3876 char *challenge;
3877 int challengelen;
3878 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3879
3880 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3881 if (!challenge) {
3882 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3883 crStop(0);
3884 }
3885 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3886 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3887 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3888 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3889 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3890 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3891 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3892 } else {
3893 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3894 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3895 }
3896 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3897 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3898 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3899 instr_suf);
3900 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3901 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3902 sfree(instr_suf);
3903 }
3904 }
3905 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3906 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3907 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3908 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3909 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3910 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3911 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3912 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3913 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3914 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3915 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3916 continue;
3917 } else {
3918 char *challenge;
3919 int challengelen;
3920 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3921
3922 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3923 if (!challenge) {
3924 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3925 crStop(0);
3926 }
3927 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3928 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3929 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
3930 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
3931 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3932 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3933 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3934 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3935 } else {
3936 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3937 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3938 }
3939 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3940 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
3941 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3942 instr_suf);
3943 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3944 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3945 sfree(instr_suf);
3946 }
3947 }
3948 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3949 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
3950 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
3951 crStop(0);
3952 }
3953 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3954 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
3955 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3956 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
3957 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3958 }
3959
3960 /*
3961 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3962 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3963 * authentication.
3964 */
3965 {
3966 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3967 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3968 while (ret < 0) {
3969 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3970 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3971 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3972 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3973 }
3974 if (!ret) {
3975 /*
3976 * Failed to get a password (for example
3977 * because one was supplied on the command line
3978 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3979 */
3980 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3981 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
3982 crStop(0);
3983 }
3984 }
3985
3986 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3987 /*
3988 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3989 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3990 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3991 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3992 * The others are all random data in
3993 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3994 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3995 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3996 *
3997 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3998 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3999 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4000 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4001 * do is:
4002 *
4003 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4004 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4005 *
4006 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4007 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4008 * packets containing string lengths N through
4009 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4010 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4011 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4012 *
4013 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4014 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4015 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4016 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4017 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4018 *
4019 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4020 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4021 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4022 * against password length sniffing.
4023 */
4024 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4025 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4026 /*
4027 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4028 * we can use the primary defence.
4029 */
4030 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4031 char *randomstr;
4032
4033 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4034 if (pwlen < 16) {
4035 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4036 top = 15;
4037 } else {
4038 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4039 top = bottom + 7;
4040 }
4041
4042 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4043
4044 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4045
4046 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4047 if (i == pwlen) {
4048 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4049 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4050 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4051 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4052 } else {
4053 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4054 do {
4055 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4056 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4057 }
4058 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4059 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4060 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4061 }
4062 }
4063 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4064 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4065 sfree(randomstr);
4066 }
4067 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4068 /*
4069 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4070 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4071 * can use the secondary defence.
4072 */
4073 char string[64];
4074 char *ss;
4075 int len;
4076
4077 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4078 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4079 ss = string;
4080 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4081 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4082 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4083 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4084 }
4085 } else {
4086 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4087 }
4088 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4089 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4090 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4091 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4092 } else {
4093 /*
4094 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4095 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4096 */
4097 int len;
4098 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4099 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4100 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4101 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4102 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4103 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4104 }
4105 } else {
4106 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4107 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4108 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4109 }
4110 logevent("Sent password");
4111 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4112 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4113 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4114 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4115 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4116 logevent("Authentication refused");
4117 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4118 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4119 crStop(0);
4120 }
4121 }
4122
4123 /* Clear up */
4124 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4125 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4126 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4127 }
4128
4129 logevent("Authentication successful");
4130
4131 crFinish(1);
4132 }
4133
4134 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4135 {
4136 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4137
4138 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4139 return;
4140
4141 if (c && !c->closes) {
4142 /*
4143 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
4144 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
4145 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
4146 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
4147 * open, we can close it then.
4148 */
4149 if (!c->halfopen) {
4150 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4151 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4152 PKT_END);
4153 } else {
4154 struct Packet *pktout;
4155 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4156 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4157 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4158 }
4159 }
4160 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4161 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
4162 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4163 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4164 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
4165 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4166 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4167 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4168 }
4169 }
4170 }
4171
4172 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4173 {
4174 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4175
4176 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4177 return 0;
4178
4179 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4180 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4181 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4182 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4183 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4184 /*
4185 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4186 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4187 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4188 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4189 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4190 */
4191 return 0;
4192 } else {
4193 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4194 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4195 }
4196 }
4197
4198 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4199 {
4200 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4201 int buflimit;
4202
4203 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4204 return;
4205
4206 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4207 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4208 } else {
4209 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4210 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4211 }
4212 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4213 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4214 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4215 }
4216 }
4217
4218 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4219 {
4220 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4221
4222 assert(qh != NULL);
4223
4224 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4225
4226 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4227 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4228 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4229 }
4230 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4231 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4232 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4233 }
4234
4235 if (qh->next) {
4236 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4237
4238 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4239 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4240 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4241 }
4242 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4243 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4244 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4245 }
4246 } else {
4247 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4248 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4249 }
4250
4251 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4252
4253 sfree(qh);
4254 }
4255
4256 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4257 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4258 {
4259 struct queued_handler *qh;
4260
4261 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4262 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4263 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4264 qh->handler = handler;
4265 qh->ctx = ctx;
4266 qh->next = NULL;
4267
4268 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4269 ssh->qhead = qh;
4270
4271 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4272 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4273 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4274 }
4275 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4276 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4277 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4278 }
4279 } else {
4280 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4281 }
4282 ssh->qtail = qh;
4283 }
4284
4285 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4286 {
4287 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4288
4289 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4290 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4291 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4292 pf->sportdesc);
4293 } else {
4294 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4295 pf->sportdesc);
4296
4297 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4298 assert(rpf == pf);
4299 free_rportfwd(pf);
4300 }
4301 }
4302
4303 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
4304 {
4305 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
4306 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4307 int i;
4308
4309 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4310 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4311 } else {
4312 /*
4313 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4314 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4315 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4316 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4317 * they were before.
4318 */
4319 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4320 int i;
4321 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4322 epf->status = DESTROY;
4323 }
4324
4325 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4326 char address_family, type;
4327 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4328 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
4329 int n;
4330
4331 address_family = 'A';
4332 type = 'L';
4333 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
4334 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
4335 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
4336 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
4337 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
4338 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
4339 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
4340 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4341
4342 saddr[0] = '\0';
4343
4344 n = 0;
4345 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4346 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4347 /*
4348 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4349 * source port number. This means that
4350 * everything we've seen until now is the
4351 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4352 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4353 * again.
4354 */
4355 portfwd_strptr++;
4356 sports[n] = '\0';
4357 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4358 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4359 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4360 } else
4361 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4362 n = 0;
4363 }
4364 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4365 }
4366 sports[n] = 0;
4367 if (type != 'D') {
4368 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4369 portfwd_strptr++;
4370 n = 0;
4371 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4372 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4373 }
4374 host[n] = 0;
4375 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4376 portfwd_strptr++;
4377 n = 0;
4378 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4379 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4380 }
4381 dports[n] = 0;
4382 portfwd_strptr++;
4383 dport = atoi(dports);
4384 dserv = 0;
4385 if (dport == 0) {
4386 dserv = 1;
4387 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4388 if (!dport) {
4389 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4390 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4391 }
4392 }
4393 } else {
4394 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4395 host[0] = 0;
4396 dports[0] = 0;
4397 dport = dserv = -1;
4398 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4399 }
4400 sport = atoi(sports);
4401 sserv = 0;
4402 if (sport == 0) {
4403 sserv = 1;
4404 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4405 if (!sport) {
4406 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4407 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4408 }
4409 }
4410 if (sport && dport) {
4411 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4412 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4413
4414 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4415 pfrec->type = type;
4416 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4417 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4418 pfrec->sport = sport;
4419 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4420 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4421 pfrec->dport = dport;
4422 pfrec->local = NULL;
4423 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4424 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4425 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4426 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4427
4428 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4429 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4430 /*
4431 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4432 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4433 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4434 */
4435 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4436 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4437 } else {
4438 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4439 }
4440 }
4441 }
4442
4443 /*
4444 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4445 * not re-enabled.
4446 */
4447 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4448 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4449 char *message;
4450
4451 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4452 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4453 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4454 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4455 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4456 epf->sport);
4457
4458 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4459 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4460 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4461 sfree(message);
4462 message = msg2;
4463 }
4464
4465 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4466 sfree(message);
4467
4468 if (epf->remote) {
4469 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4470 struct Packet *pktout;
4471
4472 /*
4473 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4474 * end.
4475 */
4476 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4477 /*
4478 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4479 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4480 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4481 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4482 * so that any connections the server tries
4483 * to make on it are rejected.
4484 */
4485 } else {
4486 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4487 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4488 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4489 if (epf->saddr) {
4490 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4491 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4492 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4493 * what was used to open the original connection,
4494 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4495 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4496 } else {
4497 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4498 }
4499 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4500 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4501 }
4502
4503 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4504 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4505 } else if (epf->local) {
4506 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4507 }
4508
4509 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4510 free_portfwd(epf);
4511 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4512 }
4513
4514 /*
4515 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4516 */
4517 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4518 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4519 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4520 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4521 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4522 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4523 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4524 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4525 epf->sport,
4526 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4527 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4528 dportdesc = NULL;
4529 } else {
4530 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4531 epf->daddr,
4532 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4533 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4534 epf->dport,
4535 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4536 }
4537
4538 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4539 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4540 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4541 ssh, cfg,
4542 &epf->local,
4543 epf->addressfamily);
4544
4545 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4546 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4547 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4548 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4549 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4550 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4551 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4552 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4553 ssh, cfg,
4554 &epf->local,
4555 epf->addressfamily);
4556
4557 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4558 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4559 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4560 sportdesc,
4561 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4562 } else {
4563 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4564
4565 /*
4566 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4567 */
4568 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4569 if (ssh->version == 1)
4570 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4571 else
4572 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4573 }
4574
4575 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4576 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4577 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4578 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4579 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4580 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4581 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4582 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4583 sfree(pf);
4584 } else {
4585 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4586 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4587
4588 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4589 sportdesc = NULL;
4590 epf->remote = pf;
4591 pf->pfrec = epf;
4592
4593 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4594 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4595 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4596 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4597 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4598 PKT_END);
4599 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4600 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4601 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4602 } else {
4603 struct Packet *pktout;
4604 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4605 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4606 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4607 if (epf->saddr) {
4608 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4609 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4610 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4611 } else {
4612 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4613 }
4614 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4615 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4616
4617 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4618 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4619 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4620 }
4621 }
4622 }
4623 sfree(sportdesc);
4624 sfree(dportdesc);
4625 }
4626 }
4627
4628 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4629 {
4630 char *string;
4631 int stringlen, bufsize;
4632
4633 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4634 if (string == NULL) {
4635 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4636 return;
4637 }
4638
4639 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4640 string, stringlen);
4641 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4642 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4643 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4644 }
4645 }
4646
4647 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4648 {
4649 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4650 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4651 struct ssh_channel *c;
4652 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4653
4654 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4655 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4656 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4657 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4658 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4659 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4660 } else {
4661 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4662 c->ssh = ssh;
4663
4664 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4665 NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4666 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4667 sfree(c);
4668 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4669 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4670 } else {
4671 logevent
4672 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4673 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4674 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4675 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4676 c->closes = 0;
4677 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4678 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4679 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4680 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4681 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4682 c->localid, PKT_END);
4683 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4684 }
4685 }
4686 }
4687
4688 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4689 {
4690 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4691 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4692 struct ssh_channel *c;
4693 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4694
4695 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4696 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4697 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4698 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4699 } else {
4700 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4701 c->ssh = ssh;
4702 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4703 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4704 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4705 c->closes = 0;
4706 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4707 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4708 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4709 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4710 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4711 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4712 PKT_END);
4713 }
4714 }
4715
4716 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4717 {
4718 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4719 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4720 struct ssh_channel *c;
4721 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4722 int remoteid;
4723 int hostsize, port;
4724 char *host;
4725 const char *e;
4726 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4727 c->ssh = ssh;
4728
4729 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4730 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4731 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4732
4733 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4734 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4735 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4736 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4737 pf.dport = port;
4738 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4739
4740 if (pfp == NULL) {
4741 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4742 pf.dhost, port);
4743 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4744 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4745 } else {
4746 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4747 pf.dhost, port);
4748 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4749 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4750 if (e != NULL) {
4751 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4752 sfree(c);
4753 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4754 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4755 } else {
4756 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4757 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4758 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4759 c->closes = 0;
4760 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4761 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4762 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4763 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4764 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4765 c->localid, PKT_END);
4766 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4767 }
4768 }
4769 }
4770
4771 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4772 {
4773 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4774 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4775 struct ssh_channel *c;
4776
4777 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4778 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4779 c->remoteid = localid;
4780 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4781 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4782 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4783 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4784 }
4785
4786 if (c && c->closes) {
4787 /*
4788 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4789 * which we decided on before the server acked
4790 * the channel open. So now we know the
4791 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4792 */
4793 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4794 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4795 }
4796 }
4797
4798 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4799 {
4800 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4801 struct ssh_channel *c;
4802
4803 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4804 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4805 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4806 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4807 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4808 sfree(c);
4809 }
4810 }
4811
4812 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4813 {
4814 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4815 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4816 struct ssh_channel *c;
4817 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4818 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4819 int closetype;
4820 closetype =
4821 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4822
4823 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4824 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4825 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4826 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4827 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4828 }
4829 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4830 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4831 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4832 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4833 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4834 }
4835
4836 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4837 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4838 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4839 PKT_END);
4840 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4841 }
4842
4843 if (c->closes == 15) {
4844 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4845 sfree(c);
4846 }
4847 } else {
4848 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4849 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4850 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4851 i));
4852 }
4853 }
4854
4855 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4856 {
4857 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4858 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4859 char *p;
4860 int len;
4861 struct ssh_channel *c;
4862
4863 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4864
4865 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4866 if (c) {
4867 int bufsize = 0;
4868 switch (c->type) {
4869 case CHAN_X11:
4870 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4871 break;
4872 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4873 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4874 break;
4875 case CHAN_AGENT:
4876 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4877 while (len > 0) {
4878 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4879 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
4880 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4881 l);
4882 p += l;
4883 len -= l;
4884 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4885 }
4886 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4887 c->u.a.totallen =
4888 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4889 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4890 unsigned char);
4891 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4892 }
4893 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4894 unsigned int l =
4895 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4896 (unsigned)len);
4897 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4898 l);
4899 p += l;
4900 len -= l;
4901 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4902 }
4903 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4904 void *reply;
4905 int replylen;
4906 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4907 c->u.a.totallen,
4908 &reply, &replylen,
4909 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4910 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4911 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4912 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4913 }
4914 }
4915 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4916 break;
4917 }
4918 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4919 c->throttling_conn = 1;
4920 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4921 }
4922 }
4923 }
4924
4925 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4926 {
4927 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4928 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
4929 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
4930 /*
4931 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4932 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4933 * session which we might mistake for another
4934 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4935 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4936 */
4937 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
4938 }
4939
4940 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4941 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
4942 {
4943 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
4944 int i = 0;
4945 unsigned int arg = 0;
4946 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
4947 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
4948 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
4949 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
4950 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
4951 break;
4952 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
4953 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
4954 break;
4955 }
4956 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
4957 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
4958 }
4959
4960
4961 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
4962 struct Packet *pktin)
4963 {
4964 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
4965
4966 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
4967 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
4968 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
4969
4970 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
4971 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
4972 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
4973 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
4974 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
4975 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
4976 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
4977 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
4978 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
4979
4980 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
4981 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4982 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
4983 do {
4984 crReturnV;
4985 } while (!pktin);
4986 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4987 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4988 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4989 crStopV;
4990 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4991 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4992 } else {
4993 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4994 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
4995 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
4996 }
4997 }
4998
4999 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
5000 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
5001 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
5002 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5003 /*
5004 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5005 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5006 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5007 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5008 * cookie into the log.
5009 */
5010 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5011 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5012 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5013 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5014 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5015 PKTT_OTHER,
5016 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5017 PKT_END);
5018 } else {
5019 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5020 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5021 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5022 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5023 PKTT_OTHER,
5024 PKT_END);
5025 }
5026 do {
5027 crReturnV;
5028 } while (!pktin);
5029 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5030 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5031 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5032 crStopV;
5033 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5034 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5035 } else {
5036 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5037 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5038 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5039 }
5040 }
5041
5042 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
5043 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5044
5045 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
5046 struct Packet *pkt;
5047 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5048 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5049 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5050 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5051 /* Send the pty request. */
5052 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5053 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
5054 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5055 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5056 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5057 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5058 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
5059 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5060 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5061 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5062 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5063 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5064 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5065 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5066 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5067 do {
5068 crReturnV;
5069 } while (!pktin);
5070 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5071 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5072 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5073 crStopV;
5074 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5075 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5076 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5077 }
5078 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5079 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5080 } else {
5081 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5082 }
5083
5084 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
5085 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5086 do {
5087 crReturnV;
5088 } while (!pktin);
5089 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5090 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5091 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5092 crStopV;
5093 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5094 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5095 }
5096 logevent("Started compression");
5097 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5098 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5099 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5100 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5101 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5102 }
5103
5104 /*
5105 * Start the shell or command.
5106 *
5107 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5108 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5109 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5110 */
5111 {
5112 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
5113
5114 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
5115
5116 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
5117 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
5118 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5119 }
5120 if (*cmd)
5121 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5122 else
5123 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5124 logevent("Started session");
5125 }
5126
5127 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5128 if (ssh->size_needed)
5129 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5130 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5131 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5132
5133 if (ssh->ldisc)
5134 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5135 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5136 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5137 while (1) {
5138
5139 /*
5140 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5141 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5142 * attention to the unusual ones.
5143 */
5144
5145 crReturnV;
5146 if (pktin) {
5147 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5148 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5149 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5150 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5151 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5152 } else {
5153 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5154 crStopV;
5155 }
5156 } else {
5157 while (inlen > 0) {
5158 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5159 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5160 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5161 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5162 in += len;
5163 inlen -= len;
5164 }
5165 }
5166 }
5167
5168 crFinishV;
5169 }
5170
5171 /*
5172 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5173 */
5174 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5175 {
5176 char *msg;
5177 int msglen;
5178
5179 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5180 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5181 }
5182
5183 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5184 {
5185 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5186 char *msg;
5187 int msglen;
5188
5189 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5190 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5191 }
5192
5193 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5194 {
5195 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5196 }
5197
5198 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5199 {
5200 int i;
5201
5202 /*
5203 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5204 */
5205 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5206 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5207
5208 /*
5209 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5210 */
5211 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5212 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5213 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5214 }
5215
5216 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5217 struct Packet *pktin)
5218 {
5219 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5220 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5221 return;
5222
5223 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5224 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5225 return;
5226 }
5227
5228 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5229 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5230 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5231 else
5232 return;
5233 }
5234
5235 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5236 }
5237
5238 /*
5239 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5240 */
5241 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5242 {
5243 int needlen;
5244 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5245 return 0;
5246 needlen = strlen(needle);
5247 while (1) {
5248 /*
5249 * Is it at the start of the string?
5250 */
5251 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5252 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5253 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5254 /* either , or EOS follows */
5255 )
5256 return 1;
5257 /*
5258 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5259 * If no comma found, terminate.
5260 */
5261 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5262 haylen--, haystack++;
5263 if (haylen == 0)
5264 return 0;
5265 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5266 }
5267 }
5268
5269 /*
5270 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5271 */
5272 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5273 {
5274 int needlen;
5275 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5276 return 0;
5277 needlen = strlen(needle);
5278 /*
5279 * Is it at the start of the string?
5280 */
5281 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5282 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5283 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5284 /* either , or EOS follows */
5285 )
5286 return 1;
5287 return 0;
5288 }
5289
5290
5291 /*
5292 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5293 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5294 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5295 */
5296 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5297 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5298 unsigned char *keyspace)
5299 {
5300 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5301 void *s;
5302 /* First hlen bytes. */
5303 s = h->init();
5304 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5305 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5306 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5307 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5308 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5309 h->final(s, keyspace);
5310 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5311 s = h->init();
5312 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5313 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5314 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5315 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5316 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5317 }
5318
5319 /*
5320 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5321 */
5322 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5323 struct Packet *pktin)
5324 {
5325 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5326 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5327 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5328 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5329 void *our_kexinit;
5330 int our_kexinitlen;
5331 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5332 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5333 int nmacs;
5334 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5335 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5336 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5337 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5338 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5339 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5340 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5341 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5342 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5343 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5344 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5345 int n_preferred_kex;
5346 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5347 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5348 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5349 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5350 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5351 struct Packet *pktout;
5352 int dlgret;
5353 int guessok;
5354 int ignorepkt;
5355 };
5356 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5357
5358 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5359
5360 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5361 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5362 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5363
5364 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5365
5366 /*
5367 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5368 */
5369 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5370 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5371 else
5372 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5373
5374 begin_key_exchange:
5375 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5376 {
5377 int i, j, commalist_started;
5378
5379 /*
5380 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5381 */
5382 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5383 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5384 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5385 case KEX_DHGEX:
5386 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5387 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5388 break;
5389 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5390 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5391 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5392 break;
5393 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5394 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5395 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5396 break;
5397 case KEX_RSA:
5398 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5399 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5400 break;
5401 case KEX_WARN:
5402 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5403 * the list. */
5404 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5405 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5406 }
5407 break;
5408 }
5409 }
5410
5411 /*
5412 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5413 */
5414 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5415 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5416 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5417 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5418 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5419 break;
5420 case CIPHER_DES:
5421 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5422 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5423 }
5424 break;
5425 case CIPHER_3DES:
5426 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5427 break;
5428 case CIPHER_AES:
5429 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5430 break;
5431 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5432 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5433 break;
5434 case CIPHER_WARN:
5435 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5436 * the list. */
5437 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5438 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5439 }
5440 break;
5441 }
5442 }
5443
5444 /*
5445 * Set up preferred compression.
5446 */
5447 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5448 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5449 else
5450 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5451
5452 /*
5453 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5454 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5455 */
5456 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5457
5458 /*
5459 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5460 */
5461 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5462
5463 /*
5464 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5465 */
5466 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5467 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5468 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5469 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5470 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5471 commalist_started = 0;
5472 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5473 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5474 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5475 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5476 if (commalist_started)
5477 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5478 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5479 commalist_started = 1;
5480 }
5481 }
5482 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5483 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5484 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5485 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5486 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5487 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5488 }
5489 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5490 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5491 commalist_started = 0;
5492 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5493 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5494 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5495 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5496 if (commalist_started)
5497 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5498 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5499 commalist_started = 1;
5500 }
5501 }
5502 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5503 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5504 commalist_started = 0;
5505 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5506 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5507 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5508 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5509 if (commalist_started)
5510 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5511 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5512 commalist_started = 1;
5513 }
5514 }
5515 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5516 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5517 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5518 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5519 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5520 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5521 }
5522 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5523 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5524 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5525 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5526 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5527 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5528 }
5529 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5530 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5531 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5532 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5533 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5534 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5535 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5536 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5537 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5538 }
5539 }
5540 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5541 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5542 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5543 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5544 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5545 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5546 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5547 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5548 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5549 }
5550 }
5551 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5552 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5553 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5554 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5555 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5556 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5557 /* Reserved. */
5558 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5559 }
5560
5561 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5562 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5563 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5564
5565 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5566
5567 if (!pktin)
5568 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5569
5570 /*
5571 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5572 * to.
5573 */
5574 {
5575 char *str, *preferred;
5576 int i, j, len;
5577
5578 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5579 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5580 crStop(0);
5581 }
5582 ssh->kex = NULL;
5583 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5584 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5585 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5586 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5587 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5588 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5589 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5590 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5591
5592 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5593 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5594
5595 preferred = NULL;
5596 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5597 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5598 if (!k) {
5599 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5600 } else {
5601 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5602 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5603 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5604 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5605 break;
5606 }
5607 }
5608 }
5609 if (ssh->kex)
5610 break;
5611 }
5612 if (!ssh->kex) {
5613 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5614 str ? str : "(null)"));
5615 crStop(0);
5616 }
5617 /*
5618 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5619 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5620 * we end up using.
5621 */
5622 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5623 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5624 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5625 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5626 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5627 break;
5628 }
5629 }
5630 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5631 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5632 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5633 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5634 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5635 if (!c) {
5636 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5637 } else {
5638 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5639 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5640 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5641 break;
5642 }
5643 }
5644 }
5645 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5646 break;
5647 }
5648 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5649 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5650 str ? str : "(null)"));
5651 crStop(0);
5652 }
5653
5654 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5655 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5656 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5657 if (!c) {
5658 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5659 } else {
5660 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5661 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5662 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5663 break;
5664 }
5665 }
5666 }
5667 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5668 break;
5669 }
5670 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5671 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5672 str ? str : "(null)"));
5673 crStop(0);
5674 }
5675
5676 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5677 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5678 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5679 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5680 break;
5681 }
5682 }
5683 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5684 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5685 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5686 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5687 break;
5688 }
5689 }
5690 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5691 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5692 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5693 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5694 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5695 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5696 break;
5697 }
5698 }
5699 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5700 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5701 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5702 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5703 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5704 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5705 break;
5706 }
5707 }
5708 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5709 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5710 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5711
5712 if (s->warn_kex) {
5713 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5714 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5715 ssh->kex->name,
5716 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5717 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5718 do {
5719 crReturn(0);
5720 if (pktin) {
5721 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5722 " waiting for user response"));
5723 crStop(0);
5724 }
5725 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5726 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5727 }
5728 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5729 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5730 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5731 0, TRUE);
5732 crStop(0);
5733 }
5734 }
5735
5736 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5737 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5738 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5739 "client-to-server cipher",
5740 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5741 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5742 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5743 do {
5744 crReturn(0);
5745 if (pktin) {
5746 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5747 " waiting for user response"));
5748 crStop(0);
5749 }
5750 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5751 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5752 }
5753 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5754 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5755 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5756 0, TRUE);
5757 crStop(0);
5758 }
5759 }
5760
5761 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5762 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5763 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5764 "server-to-client cipher",
5765 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5766 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5767 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5768 do {
5769 crReturn(0);
5770 if (pktin) {
5771 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5772 " waiting for user response"));
5773 crStop(0);
5774 }
5775 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5776 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5777 }
5778 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5779 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5780 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5781 0, TRUE);
5782 crStop(0);
5783 }
5784 }
5785
5786 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5787 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5788 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5789 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5790 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5791 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5792 if (pktin->length > 5)
5793 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5794 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5795
5796 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5797 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5798 }
5799
5800 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5801 /*
5802 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5803 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5804 * either cipher...
5805 */
5806 {
5807 int csbits, scbits;
5808
5809 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5810 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5811 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5812 }
5813 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
5814 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
5815 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
5816 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
5817
5818 /*
5819 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5820 * requesting a group.
5821 */
5822 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5823 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5824 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5825 /*
5826 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5827 * much data.
5828 */
5829 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5830 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5831 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5832 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5833
5834 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5835 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5836 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5837 crStop(0);
5838 }
5839 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5840 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5841 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5842 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5843 crStop(0);
5844 }
5845 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5846 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5847 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5848 } else {
5849 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5850 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5851 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5852 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5853 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5854 ssh->kex->groupname);
5855 }
5856
5857 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
5858 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5859 /*
5860 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5861 */
5862 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5863 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5864 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5865 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5866 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5867
5868 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5869 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5870 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5871 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5872 crStop(0);
5873 }
5874 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5875 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5876 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5877 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5878 if (!s->f) {
5879 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5880 crStop(0);
5881 }
5882 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5883
5884 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5885
5886 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5887 * involve user interaction. */
5888 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5889
5890 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5891 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5892 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5893 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
5894 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
5895 }
5896 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
5897 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
5898
5899 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5900 freebn(s->f);
5901 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5902 freebn(s->g);
5903 freebn(s->p);
5904 }
5905 } else {
5906 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
5907 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5908 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
5909 /*
5910 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
5911 * from the server.
5912 */
5913 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5914 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
5915 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
5916 crStop(0);
5917 }
5918
5919 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5920 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5921 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5922 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5923
5924 {
5925 char *keydata;
5926 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
5927 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
5928 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
5929 }
5930
5931 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5932 if (!s->rsakey) {
5933 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5934 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
5935 crStop(0);
5936 }
5937
5938 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5939
5940 /*
5941 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
5942 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
5943 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
5944 * we're using.
5945 */
5946 {
5947 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
5948 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
5949 int i, byte = 0;
5950 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
5951 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
5952
5953 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
5954
5955 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
5956 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
5957 byte = random_byte();
5958 }
5959 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
5960 }
5961
5962 /*
5963 * Encode this as an mpint.
5964 */
5965 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
5966 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
5967 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
5968 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
5969
5970 /*
5971 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
5972 */
5973 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
5974 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
5975 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
5976 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
5977
5978 /*
5979 * And send it off in a return packet.
5980 */
5981 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
5982 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5983 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
5984 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5985
5986 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
5987
5988 sfree(kstr2);
5989 sfree(kstr1);
5990 sfree(outstr);
5991 }
5992
5993 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
5994
5995 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5996 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
5997 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5998 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
5999 crStop(0);
6000 }
6001
6002 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6003
6004 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6005 }
6006
6007 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6008 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6009 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6010
6011 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6012
6013 #if 0
6014 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6015 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6016 #endif
6017
6018 if (!s->hkey ||
6019 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6020 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6021 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6022 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6023 crStop(0);
6024 }
6025
6026 /*
6027 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6028 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6029 */
6030 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6031 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6032 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6033 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6034 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6035 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6036 s->fingerprint,
6037 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6038 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6039 do {
6040 crReturn(0);
6041 if (pktin) {
6042 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6043 " for user host key response"));
6044 crStop(0);
6045 }
6046 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6047 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6048 }
6049 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6050 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6051 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6052 0, TRUE);
6053 crStop(0);
6054 }
6055 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6056 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6057 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6058 }
6059 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6060 sfree(s->keystr);
6061 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6062
6063 /*
6064 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6065 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6066 * authentication.
6067 */
6068 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6069 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6070 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6071 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6072 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6073 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6074 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6075 }
6076
6077 /*
6078 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6079 */
6080 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6081 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6082 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6083
6084 /*
6085 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6086 * client-to-server session keys.
6087 */
6088 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6089 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6090 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6091 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6092
6093 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6094 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6095 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6096 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6097
6098 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6099 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6100 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6101 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6102
6103 /*
6104 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6105 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6106 */
6107 {
6108 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6109 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6110 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6111 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6112 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6113 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6114 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6115 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6116 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6117 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6118 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6119 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6120 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6121 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6122 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6123 }
6124
6125 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6126 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6127 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6128 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6129 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6130 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6131 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6132
6133 /*
6134 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6135 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6136 */
6137 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6138 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6139
6140 /*
6141 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6142 */
6143 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6144 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6145 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6146 crStop(0);
6147 }
6148 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6149
6150 /*
6151 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6152 * server-to-client session keys.
6153 */
6154 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6155 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6156 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6157 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6158
6159 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6160 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6161 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6162 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6163
6164 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6165 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6166 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6167 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6168
6169 /*
6170 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6171 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6172 */
6173 {
6174 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6175 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6176 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6177 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6178 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6179 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6180 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6181 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6182 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6183 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6184 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6185 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6186 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6187 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6188 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6189 }
6190 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6191 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6192 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6193 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6194 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6195 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6196 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6197
6198 /*
6199 * Free shared secret.
6200 */
6201 freebn(s->K);
6202
6203 /*
6204 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6205 * deferred rekey reason.
6206 */
6207 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6208 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6209 pktin = NULL;
6210 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6211 goto begin_key_exchange;
6212 }
6213
6214 /*
6215 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6216 */
6217 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6218 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6219 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
6220 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6221 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6222
6223 /*
6224 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6225 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6226 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6227 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6228 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6229 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6230 */
6231 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6232 crReturn(0);
6233 }
6234 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6235
6236 /*
6237 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6238 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6239 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6240 * start.
6241 *
6242 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6243 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
6244 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6245 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6246 */
6247 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6248 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
6249 wait_for_rekey:
6250 crReturn(1);
6251 }
6252 if (pktin) {
6253 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6254 } else {
6255 /*
6256 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6257 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6258 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6259 * we process it anyway!)
6260 */
6261 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6262 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6263 (char *)in);
6264 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6265 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6266 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6267 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6268 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
6269 ssh->next_rekey =
6270 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6271 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6272 }
6273 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6274 } else {
6275 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6276 }
6277 }
6278 goto begin_key_exchange;
6279
6280 crFinish(1);
6281 }
6282
6283 /*
6284 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6285 */
6286 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6287 int len)
6288 {
6289 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6290 }
6291
6292 /*
6293 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6294 */
6295 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6296 {
6297 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6298 struct Packet *pktout;
6299
6300 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6301 int len;
6302 void *data;
6303 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6304 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6305 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6306 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6307 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6308 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6309 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6310 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6311 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6312 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6313 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6314 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6315 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6316 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6317 }
6318
6319 /*
6320 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6321 * still buffered.
6322 */
6323 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6324 }
6325
6326 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
6327 {
6328 int bufsize;
6329 if (c->closes)
6330 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
6331 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6332 if (bufsize == 0) {
6333 switch (c->type) {
6334 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6335 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6336 * notification since it will be polled */
6337 break;
6338 case CHAN_X11:
6339 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6340 break;
6341 case CHAN_AGENT:
6342 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6343 * buffer management */
6344 break;
6345 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6346 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6347 break;
6348 }
6349 }
6350 }
6351
6352 /*
6353 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6354 */
6355 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6356 {
6357 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6358 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6359 c->closes = 0;
6360 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6361 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6362 ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6363 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6364 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6365 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6366 }
6367
6368 /*
6369 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6370 */
6371 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6372 {
6373 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6374
6375 /*
6376 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
6377 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
6378 * be sending any more data anyway.
6379 */
6380 if (c->closes != 0)
6381 return;
6382
6383 /*
6384 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6385 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6386 * window as well).
6387 */
6388 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6389 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6390
6391
6392 /*
6393 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6394 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6395 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6396 *
6397 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6398 */
6399 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6400 struct Packet *pktout;
6401 struct winadj *wa;
6402
6403 /*
6404 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6405 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6406 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6407 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6408 *
6409 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6410 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6411 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6412 *
6413 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6414 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6415 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6416 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6417 */
6418 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6419 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
6420 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6421 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6422 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6423 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6424 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6425
6426 /*
6427 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6428 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6429 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6430 */
6431 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6432 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6433 wa->next = NULL;
6434 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6435 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6436 else
6437 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6438 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6439 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6440 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6441 } else {
6442 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6443 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6444 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6445 }
6446 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6447 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6448 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6449 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6450 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6451 }
6452 }
6453
6454 /*
6455 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6456 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6457 */
6458 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6459 {
6460 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6461 struct ssh_channel *c;
6462
6463 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6464 if (!c ||
6465 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6466 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6467 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6468 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6469 pktin->type),
6470 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6471 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6472 sfree(buf);
6473 return NULL;
6474 }
6475 return c;
6476 }
6477
6478 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6479 {
6480 /*
6481 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6482 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6483 * installed.
6484 */
6485 struct ssh_channel *c;
6486 struct winadj *wa;
6487
6488 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6489 if (!c)
6490 return;
6491 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6492 if (wa)
6493 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS for "
6494 "\"winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org\"",
6495 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6496 else
6497 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6498 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6499 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6500 }
6501
6502 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6503 {
6504 /*
6505 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6506 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6507 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6508 * installed.
6509 */
6510 struct ssh_channel *c;
6511 struct winadj *wa;
6512
6513 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6514 if (!c)
6515 return;
6516 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6517 if (!wa) {
6518 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6519 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6520 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6521 return;
6522 }
6523 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6524 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6525 sfree(wa);
6526 /*
6527 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6528 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6529 * complete.
6530 */
6531 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6532 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6533 }
6534
6535 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6536 {
6537 struct ssh_channel *c;
6538 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6539 if (!c)
6540 return;
6541 if (!c->closes) {
6542 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6543 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
6544 }
6545 }
6546
6547 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6548 {
6549 char *data;
6550 int length;
6551 struct ssh_channel *c;
6552 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6553 if (!c)
6554 return;
6555 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6556 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6557 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6558 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6559 if (data) {
6560 int bufsize = 0;
6561 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6562 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6563 switch (c->type) {
6564 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6565 bufsize =
6566 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6567 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6568 data, length);
6569 break;
6570 case CHAN_X11:
6571 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6572 break;
6573 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6574 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6575 break;
6576 case CHAN_AGENT:
6577 while (length > 0) {
6578 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6579 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6580 (unsigned)length);
6581 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6582 data, l);
6583 data += l;
6584 length -= l;
6585 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6586 }
6587 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6588 c->u.a.totallen =
6589 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6590 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6591 unsigned char);
6592 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6593 }
6594 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6595 unsigned int l =
6596 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6597 (unsigned)length);
6598 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6599 data, l);
6600 data += l;
6601 length -= l;
6602 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6603 }
6604 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6605 void *reply;
6606 int replylen;
6607 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6608 c->u.a.totallen,
6609 &reply, &replylen,
6610 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6611 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6612 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6613 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6614 }
6615 }
6616 bufsize = 0;
6617 break;
6618 }
6619 /*
6620 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6621 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6622 * larger window.
6623 */
6624 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6625 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6626 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6627 /*
6628 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6629 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6630 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6631 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6632 * sent excess data.
6633 */
6634 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6635 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6636 /*
6637 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6638 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6639 * throttle the whole channel.
6640 */
6641 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6642 (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
6643 !c->throttling_conn) {
6644 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6645 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6646 }
6647 }
6648 }
6649
6650 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6651 {
6652 struct ssh_channel *c;
6653
6654 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6655 if (!c)
6656 return;
6657
6658 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6659 /*
6660 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
6661 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
6662 */
6663 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6664 sshfwd_close(c);
6665 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6666 sshfwd_close(c);
6667 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6668 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6669 sshfwd_close(c);
6670 }
6671 }
6672
6673 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6674 {
6675 struct ssh_channel *c;
6676 struct Packet *pktout;
6677
6678 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6679 if (!c)
6680 return;
6681 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6682 switch (c->type) {
6683 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6684 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6685 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6686 break;
6687 case CHAN_X11:
6688 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6689 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6690 sshfwd_close(c);
6691 break;
6692 case CHAN_AGENT:
6693 sshfwd_close(c);
6694 break;
6695 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6696 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6697 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6698 sshfwd_close(c);
6699 break;
6700 }
6701 if (c->closes == 0) {
6702 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6703 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6704 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6705 }
6706 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6707 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6708 sfree(c);
6709
6710 /*
6711 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6712 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6713 * not running in -N mode.)
6714 */
6715 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6716 /*
6717 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6718 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6719 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6720 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6721 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6722 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6723 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6724 * this is more polite than sending a
6725 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6726 */
6727 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6728 }
6729 }
6730
6731 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6732 {
6733 struct ssh_channel *c;
6734 struct Packet *pktout;
6735
6736 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6737 if (!c)
6738 return;
6739 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6740 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6741 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6742 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6743 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6744 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6745 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6746 if (c->u.pfd.s)
6747 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6748 if (c->closes) {
6749 /*
6750 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6751 * which we decided on before the server acked
6752 * the channel open. So now we know the
6753 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6754 */
6755 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6756 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6757 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6758 }
6759 }
6760
6761 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6762 {
6763 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6764 "<unknown reason code>",
6765 "Administratively prohibited",
6766 "Connect failed",
6767 "Unknown channel type",
6768 "Resource shortage",
6769 };
6770 unsigned reason_code;
6771 char *reason_string;
6772 int reason_length;
6773 struct ssh_channel *c;
6774 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6775 if (!c)
6776 return;
6777 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6778 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6779
6780 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6781 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6782 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6783 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6784 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6785 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6786
6787 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6788
6789 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6790 sfree(c);
6791 }
6792
6793 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6794 {
6795 char *type;
6796 int typelen, want_reply;
6797 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6798 struct ssh_channel *c;
6799 struct Packet *pktout;
6800
6801 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6802 if (!c)
6803 return;
6804 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6805 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6806
6807 /*
6808 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6809 * the request type string to see if it's something
6810 * we recognise.
6811 */
6812 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6813 /*
6814 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6815 * the primary channel.
6816 */
6817 if (typelen == 11 &&
6818 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6819
6820 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6821 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6822 ssh->exitcode);
6823 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6824
6825 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6826 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6827
6828 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6829 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6830 char *msg;
6831 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6832 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6833 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6834 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
6835 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6836 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6837 {
6838 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6839 pktin->savedpos;
6840 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6841 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6842 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6843 if (num == 0) {
6844 is_int = FALSE;
6845 } else {
6846 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6847 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6848 do { \
6849 long q = offset; \
6850 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6851 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6852 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6853 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6854 result = TRUE; \
6855 } \
6856 } while(0)
6857 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6858 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6859 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6860 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6861 is_int = TRUE;
6862 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6863 is_int = FALSE;
6864 else
6865 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6866 is_plausible = FALSE;
6867 }
6868 }
6869 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
6870 if (is_plausible) {
6871 if (is_int) {
6872 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6873 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6874 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6875 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
6876 } else {
6877 /* As per RFC 4254. */
6878 char *sig;
6879 int siglen;
6880 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6881 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6882 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6883 if (siglen) {
6884 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6885 siglen, sig);
6886 }
6887
6888 /*
6889 * Really hideous method of translating the
6890 * signal description back into a locally
6891 * meaningful number.
6892 */
6893
6894 if (0)
6895 ;
6896 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
6897 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
6898 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
6899 #ifdef SIGABRT
6900 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
6901 #endif
6902 #ifdef SIGALRM
6903 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
6904 #endif
6905 #ifdef SIGFPE
6906 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
6907 #endif
6908 #ifdef SIGHUP
6909 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
6910 #endif
6911 #ifdef SIGILL
6912 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
6913 #endif
6914 #ifdef SIGINT
6915 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
6916 #endif
6917 #ifdef SIGKILL
6918 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
6919 #endif
6920 #ifdef SIGPIPE
6921 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
6922 #endif
6923 #ifdef SIGQUIT
6924 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
6925 #endif
6926 #ifdef SIGSEGV
6927 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
6928 #endif
6929 #ifdef SIGTERM
6930 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
6931 #endif
6932 #ifdef SIGUSR1
6933 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
6934 #endif
6935 #ifdef SIGUSR2
6936 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
6937 #endif
6938 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
6939 else
6940 ssh->exitcode = 128;
6941 }
6942 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6943 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
6944 if (msglen) {
6945 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
6946 }
6947 /* ignore lang tag */
6948 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6949 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6950 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
6951 fmt_msg);
6952 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
6953 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
6954 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6955
6956 }
6957 } else {
6958 /*
6959 * This is a channel request we don't know
6960 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6961 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6962 * on want_reply.
6963 */
6964 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
6965 }
6966 if (want_reply) {
6967 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
6968 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6969 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6970 }
6971 }
6972
6973 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6974 {
6975 char *type;
6976 int typelen, want_reply;
6977 struct Packet *pktout;
6978
6979 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6980 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6981
6982 /*
6983 * We currently don't support any global requests
6984 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6985 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6986 * want_reply.
6987 */
6988 if (want_reply) {
6989 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
6990 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6991 }
6992 }
6993
6994 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6995 {
6996 char *type;
6997 int typelen;
6998 char *peeraddr;
6999 int peeraddrlen;
7000 int peerport;
7001 char *error = NULL;
7002 struct ssh_channel *c;
7003 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7004 struct Packet *pktout;
7005
7006 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7007 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7008 c->ssh = ssh;
7009
7010 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7011 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7012 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7013
7014 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7015 char *addrstr;
7016 const char *x11err;
7017
7018 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7019 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7020 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7021 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7022 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7023
7024 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7025 addrstr, peerport);
7026
7027 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7028 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7029 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7030 addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
7031 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7032 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7033 } else {
7034 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7035 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7036 }
7037
7038 sfree(addrstr);
7039 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7040 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7041 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7042 char *dummy;
7043 int dummylen;
7044 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7045 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7046 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7047 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7048 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7049 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7050 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7051 if (realpf == NULL) {
7052 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7053 } else {
7054 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7055 realpf->dhost,
7056 realpf->dport, c,
7057 &ssh->cfg,
7058 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7059 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7060 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7061 if (e != NULL) {
7062 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7063 error = "Port open failed";
7064 } else {
7065 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7066 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7067 }
7068 }
7069 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7070 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7071 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7072 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7073 else {
7074 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7075 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7076 }
7077 } else {
7078 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7079 }
7080
7081 c->remoteid = remid;
7082 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7083 if (error) {
7084 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7085 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7086 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7087 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7088 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7089 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7090 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7091 sfree(c);
7092 } else {
7093 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7094 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7095 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7096 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7097 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7098 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7099 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7100 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7101 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7102 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7103 }
7104 }
7105
7106 /*
7107 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
7108 */
7109 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7110 {
7111 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7112 if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7113 char *banner = NULL;
7114 int size = 0;
7115 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7116 if (banner)
7117 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7118 }
7119 }
7120
7121 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7122 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7123 {
7124 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7125 int i = 0;
7126 unsigned int arg = 0;
7127 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7128 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7129 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7130 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7131 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7132 break;
7133 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7134 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7135 break;
7136 }
7137 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7138 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7139 }
7140
7141 /*
7142 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7143 */
7144 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7145 struct Packet *pktin)
7146 {
7147 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7148 enum {
7149 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7150 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7151 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7152 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7153 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7154 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI,
7155 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7156 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7157 } type;
7158 int done_service_req;
7159 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7160 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7161 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7162 int can_gssapi;
7163 int tried_gssapi;
7164 #endif
7165 int kbd_inter_refused;
7166 int we_are_in;
7167 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7168 int num_prompts;
7169 char username[100];
7170 char *password;
7171 int got_username;
7172 void *publickey_blob;
7173 int publickey_bloblen;
7174 int publickey_encrypted;
7175 char *publickey_algorithm;
7176 char *publickey_comment;
7177 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7178 int agent_responselen;
7179 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7180 int keyi, nkeys;
7181 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7182 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7183 int siglen, retlen, len;
7184 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7185 int try_send;
7186 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7187 struct Packet *pktout;
7188 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7189 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7190 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7191 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7192 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7193 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7194 #endif
7195 };
7196 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7197
7198 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
7199
7200 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7201 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7202 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7203 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7204 #endif
7205
7206 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
7207 /*
7208 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7209 */
7210 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7211 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7212 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7213 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7214 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7215 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7216 }
7217 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7218 /*
7219 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7220 */
7221 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7222 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7223 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7224 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7225 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7226 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7227 } else {
7228 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7229 crStopV;
7230 }
7231 }
7232
7233 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7234 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7235 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7236 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7237 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7238
7239 /*
7240 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7241 */
7242 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7243 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7244
7245 /*
7246 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7247 * for later use.
7248 */
7249 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
7250 int keytype;
7251 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7252 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
7253 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
7254 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7255 const char *error;
7256 s->publickey_blob =
7257 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
7258 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7259 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7260 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7261 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7262 s->publickey_encrypted =
7263 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
7264 } else {
7265 char *msgbuf;
7266 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7267 error);
7268 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7269 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7270 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7271 error);
7272 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7273 sfree(msgbuf);
7274 }
7275 } else {
7276 char *msgbuf;
7277 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7278 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7279 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7280 " (%s)\r\n",
7281 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7282 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7283 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7284 sfree(msgbuf);
7285 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7286 }
7287 }
7288
7289 /*
7290 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7291 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7292 */
7293 s->nkeys = 0;
7294 s->agent_response = NULL;
7295 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7296 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
7297
7298 void *r;
7299
7300 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7301
7302 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7303 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7304 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7305 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7306 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7307 do {
7308 crReturnV;
7309 if (pktin) {
7310 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7311 " waiting for agent response"));
7312 crStopV;
7313 }
7314 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7315 r = ssh->agent_response;
7316 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7317 }
7318 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7319 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7320 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7321 int keyi;
7322 unsigned char *p;
7323 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7324 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7325 p += 4;
7326 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7327 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7328 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7329 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7330 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7331 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7332 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7333 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7334 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7335 "configured key file", keyi);
7336 s->keyi = keyi;
7337 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7338 break;
7339 }
7340 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7341 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7342 }
7343 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7344 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7345 s->nkeys = 0;
7346 }
7347 }
7348 }
7349 }
7350
7351 }
7352
7353 /*
7354 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7355 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7356 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7357 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7358 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7359 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7360 *
7361 * I think this best serves the needs of
7362 *
7363 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7364 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7365 * type both correctly
7366 *
7367 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7368 * need to fall back to passwords
7369 *
7370 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7371 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7372 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7373 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7374 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7375 * retype it!
7376 */
7377 s->username[0] = '\0';
7378 s->got_username = FALSE;
7379 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7380 /*
7381 * Get a username.
7382 */
7383 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7384 /*
7385 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7386 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7387 * it again.
7388 */
7389 } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
7390 sizeof(s->username))) {
7391 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7392 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7393 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7394 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7395 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
7396 lenof(s->username));
7397 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7398 while (ret < 0) {
7399 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7400 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7401 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7402 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7403 }
7404 if (!ret) {
7405 /*
7406 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7407 * Terminate.
7408 */
7409 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7410 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7411 crStopV;
7412 }
7413 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
7414 lenof(s->username));
7415 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7416 } else {
7417 char *stuff;
7418 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7419 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
7420 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7421 sfree(stuff);
7422 }
7423 }
7424 s->got_username = TRUE;
7425
7426 /*
7427 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7428 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7429 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7430 */
7431 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7432
7433 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7434 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7435 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7436 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7437 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7438 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7439 s->gotit = FALSE;
7440 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7441
7442 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7443 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7444
7445 /* Reset agent request state. */
7446 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7447 if (s->agent_response) {
7448 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7449 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7450 } else {
7451 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7452 s->keyi = 0;
7453 }
7454 }
7455
7456 while (1) {
7457 /*
7458 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7459 */
7460 if (!s->gotit)
7461 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7462 /*
7463 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7464 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7465 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7466 * with.)
7467 */
7468 {
7469 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7470 /*
7471 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7472 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7473 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7474 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7475 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7476 * output of (say) plink.)
7477 */
7478 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7479 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7480 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7481 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7482 sfree(banner);
7483 }
7484 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7485 }
7486 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7487 logevent("Access granted");
7488 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
7489 break;
7490 }
7491
7492 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7493 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7494 "type %d", pktin->type));
7495 crStopV;
7496 }
7497
7498 s->gotit = FALSE;
7499
7500 /*
7501 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7502 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7503 * helpfully try next.
7504 */
7505 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7506 char *methods;
7507 int methlen;
7508 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7509 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7510 /*
7511 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7512 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7513 * messages:
7514 *
7515 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
7516 * it's not worth printing anything at all
7517 *
7518 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
7519 * the message should be "Server refused our
7520 * key" (or no message at all if the key
7521 * came from Pageant)
7522 *
7523 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
7524 * message really should be "Access denied".
7525 *
7526 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7527 * authentication, we should break out of this
7528 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7529 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7530 * username change attempts).
7531 */
7532 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7533 /* do nothing */
7534 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7535 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7536 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7537 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7538 logevent("Server refused public key");
7539 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7540 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
7541 } else {
7542 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7543 logevent("Access denied");
7544 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
7545 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7546 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7547 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7548 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7549 break;
7550 }
7551 }
7552 } else {
7553 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7554 logevent("Further authentication required");
7555 }
7556
7557 s->can_pubkey =
7558 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7559 s->can_passwd =
7560 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7561 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
7562 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7563 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7564 s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
7565 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7566 ssh_gss_init();
7567 #endif
7568 }
7569
7570 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7571
7572 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7573
7574 /*
7575 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7576 */
7577
7578 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7579
7580 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7581
7582 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7583 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7584 s->agentp += 4;
7585 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7586 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7587 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7588 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7589 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7590 s->agentp += 4;
7591 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7592 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7593 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7594
7595 /* See if server will accept it */
7596 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7597 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7598 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7599 /* service requested */
7600 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7601 /* method */
7602 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7603 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7604 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7605 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7606 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7607 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7608 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7609
7610 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7611 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7612
7613 /* Offer of key refused. */
7614 s->gotit = TRUE;
7615
7616 } else {
7617
7618 void *vret;
7619
7620 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7621 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7622 "public key \"");
7623 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7624 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7625 }
7626
7627 /*
7628 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7629 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7630 */
7631 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7632 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7633 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7634 /* service requested */
7635 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7636 /* method */
7637 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7638 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7639 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7640 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7641 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7642
7643 /* Ask agent for signature. */
7644 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7645 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7646 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7647 s->siglen -= 4;
7648 s->len = 1; /* message type */
7649 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
7650 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
7651 s->len += 4; /* flags */
7652 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
7653 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
7654 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
7655 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
7656 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
7657 s->q += 4;
7658 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7659 s->q += s->pklen;
7660 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
7661 s->q += 4;
7662 /* Now the data to be signed... */
7663 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7664 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7665 s->q += 4;
7666 }
7667 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
7668 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7669 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7670 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
7671 s->pktout->length - 5);
7672 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
7673 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
7674 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
7675 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
7676 &vret, &s->retlen,
7677 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7678 do {
7679 crReturnV;
7680 if (pktin) {
7681 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
7682 " while waiting for agent"
7683 " response"));
7684 crStopV;
7685 }
7686 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7687 vret = ssh->agent_response;
7688 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7689 }
7690 s->ret = vret;
7691 sfree(s->agentreq);
7692 if (s->ret) {
7693 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
7694 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
7695 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
7696 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
7697 s->ret + 9,
7698 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
7699 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7700 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7701 } else {
7702 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
7703 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
7704 crStopV;
7705 }
7706 }
7707 }
7708
7709 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
7710 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7711 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7712 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7713 } else {
7714 s->keyi++;
7715 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
7716 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7717 }
7718
7719 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
7720 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
7721
7722 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
7723 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
7724
7725 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7726
7727 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7728
7729 /*
7730 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
7731 *
7732 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
7733 * willing to accept it.
7734 */
7735 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7736 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7737 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7738 /* service requested */
7739 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7740 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7741 /* no signature included */
7742 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
7743 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7744 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
7745 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
7746 s->publickey_bloblen);
7747 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7748 logevent("Offered public key");
7749
7750 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7751 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7752 /* Key refused. Give up. */
7753 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
7754 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
7755 continue; /* process this new message */
7756 }
7757 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
7758
7759 /*
7760 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
7761 * the key.
7762 */
7763 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7764 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
7765 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
7766 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
7767 }
7768 key = NULL;
7769 while (!key) {
7770 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
7771 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
7772 /*
7773 * Get a passphrase from the user.
7774 */
7775 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7776 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7777 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
7778 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
7779 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7780 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
7781 s->publickey_comment),
7782 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7783 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7784 while (ret < 0) {
7785 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7786 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7787 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
7788 in, inlen);
7789 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7790 }
7791 if (!ret) {
7792 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
7793 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7794 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7795 "Unable to authenticate",
7796 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7797 TRUE);
7798 crStopV;
7799 }
7800 passphrase =
7801 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7802 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7803 } else {
7804 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
7805 }
7806
7807 /*
7808 * Try decrypting the key.
7809 */
7810 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
7811 &error);
7812 if (passphrase) {
7813 /* burn the evidence */
7814 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
7815 sfree(passphrase);
7816 }
7817 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7818 if (passphrase &&
7819 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
7820 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7821 key = NULL;
7822 /* and loop again */
7823 } else {
7824 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7825 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7826 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7827 key = NULL;
7828 break; /* try something else */
7829 }
7830 }
7831 }
7832
7833 if (key) {
7834 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7835 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7836 int p;
7837
7838 /*
7839 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7840 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7841 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7842 */
7843 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7844 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7845 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7846 /* service requested */
7847 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7848 /* method */
7849 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7850 /* signature follows */
7851 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7852 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
7853 &pkblob_len);
7854 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7855 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
7856 pkblob_len);
7857
7858 /*
7859 * The data to be signed is:
7860 *
7861 * string session-id
7862 *
7863 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7864 * outgoing packet.
7865 */
7866 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7867 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7868 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7869 sigdata_len -= 4;
7870 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7871 p = 0;
7872 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7873 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7874 p += 4;
7875 }
7876 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
7877 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7878 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7879 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7880 s->pktout->length - 5);
7881 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7882 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7883 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7884 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7885 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7886 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7887 sfree(pkblob);
7888 sfree(sigblob);
7889 sfree(sigdata);
7890
7891 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7892 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7893 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7894 }
7895
7896 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7897 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
7898
7899 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
7900
7901 int micoffset, len;
7902 char *data;
7903 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
7904 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
7905 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
7906 s->gotit = TRUE;
7907 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
7908
7909 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
7910 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7911 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7912 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7913 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
7914
7915 /* add mechanism info */
7916 ssh_gss_indicate_mech(&s->gss_buf);
7917
7918 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
7919 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
7920
7921 /* length of OID + 2 */
7922 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
7923 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
7924
7925 /* length of OID */
7926 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
7927
7928 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
7929 s->gss_buf.length);
7930 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7931 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7932 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
7933 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
7934 continue;
7935 }
7936
7937 /* check returned packet ... */
7938
7939 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
7940 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
7941 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
7942 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
7943 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
7944 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
7945 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
7946 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
7947 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
7948 continue;
7949 }
7950
7951 /* now start running */
7952 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_import_name(ssh->fullhostname,
7953 &s->gss_srv_name);
7954 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
7955 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
7956 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
7957 else
7958 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
7959 continue;
7960 }
7961
7962 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
7963 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_acquire_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
7964
7965 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
7966 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
7967 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
7968 continue;
7969 }
7970
7971 /* initial tokens are empty */
7972 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
7973 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
7974
7975 /* now enter the loop */
7976 do {
7977 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_init_sec_context(&s->gss_ctx,
7978 s->gss_srv_name,
7979 ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
7980 &s->gss_rcvtok,
7981 &s->gss_sndtok);
7982
7983 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
7984 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
7985 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
7986
7987 if (ssh_gss_display_status(s->gss_ctx,&s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
7988 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
7989 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
7990 }
7991
7992 break;
7993 }
7994 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
7995
7996 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
7997 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
7998
7999 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8000 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8001 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8002 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8003 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8004 ssh_gss_free_tok(&s->gss_sndtok);
8005 }
8006
8007 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8008 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8009 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8010 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8011 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8012 break;
8013 }
8014 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8015 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8016 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8017 }
8018 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8019
8020 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8021 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
8022 ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
8023 continue;
8024 }
8025 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8026
8027 /* Now send the MIC */
8028
8029 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8030 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8031 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8032 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8033 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8034 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8035 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8036 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8037
8038 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8039 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8040
8041 ssh_gss_get_mic(s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8042 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8043 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8044 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8045 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8046 ssh_gss_free_mic(&mic);
8047
8048 s->gotit = FALSE;
8049
8050 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
8051 ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
8052 continue;
8053 #endif
8054 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8055
8056 /*
8057 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8058 */
8059
8060 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8061
8062 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8063
8064 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8065 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8066 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8067 /* service requested */
8068 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8069 /* method */
8070 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8071 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8072 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8073
8074 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8075 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8076 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8077 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8078 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8079 * Give up on it entirely. */
8080 s->gotit = TRUE;
8081 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
8082 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
8083 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8084 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8085 continue;
8086 }
8087
8088 /*
8089 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8090 */
8091 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8092
8093 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8094 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8095 int i;
8096
8097 /*
8098 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8099 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8100 */
8101 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8102 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8103 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8104 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8105 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8106
8107 /*
8108 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8109 */
8110 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8111 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8112 char *prompt;
8113 int prompt_len;
8114 int echo;
8115 static char noprompt[] =
8116 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8117
8118 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8119 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8120 if (!prompt_len) {
8121 prompt = noprompt;
8122 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8123 }
8124 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8125 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8126 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8127 }
8128
8129 if (name_len) {
8130 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8131 * local prompts? */
8132 s->cur_prompt->name =
8133 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8134 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8135 } else {
8136 s->cur_prompt->name =
8137 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8138 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8139 }
8140 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8141 * has come from the server.
8142 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8143 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8144 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8145 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8146 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8147 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8148 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8149 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8150 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8151 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8152 } else {
8153 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8154 }
8155
8156 /*
8157 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8158 * response(s).
8159 */
8160 {
8161 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8162 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8163 while (ret < 0) {
8164 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8165 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8166 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8167 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8168 }
8169 if (!ret) {
8170 /*
8171 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8172 */
8173 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8174 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8175 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8176 TRUE);
8177 crStopV;
8178 }
8179 }
8180
8181 /*
8182 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8183 */
8184 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8185 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8186 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8187 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8188 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8189 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8190 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8191 }
8192 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8193
8194 /*
8195 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8196 * INFO_REQUEST.
8197 */
8198 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8199
8200 }
8201
8202 /*
8203 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8204 */
8205 s->gotit = TRUE;
8206
8207 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8208
8209 /*
8210 * Plain old password authentication.
8211 */
8212 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8213 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8214
8215 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8216
8217 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8218 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8219 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8220 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
8221 s->username,
8222 ssh->savedhost),
8223 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8224
8225 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8226 while (ret < 0) {
8227 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8228 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8229 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8230 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8231 }
8232 if (!ret) {
8233 /*
8234 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8235 */
8236 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8237 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8238 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8239 TRUE);
8240 crStopV;
8241 }
8242 /*
8243 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8244 * asked to change it.)
8245 */
8246 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8247 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8248
8249 /*
8250 * Send the password packet.
8251 *
8252 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8253 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8254 * user's password.
8255 *
8256 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8257 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8258 * people who find out how long their password is!
8259 */
8260 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8261 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8262 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8263 /* service requested */
8264 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8265 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8266 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8267 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8268 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8269 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8270 logevent("Sent password");
8271 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8272
8273 /*
8274 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8275 * request.
8276 */
8277 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8278 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8279
8280 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8281
8282 /*
8283 * We're being asked for a new password
8284 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8285 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8286 */
8287
8288 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8289 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8290 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8291
8292 {
8293 char *msg;
8294 if (changereq_first_time)
8295 msg = "Server requested password change";
8296 else
8297 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8298 logevent(msg);
8299 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8300 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8301 }
8302
8303 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8304
8305 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8306 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8307 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8308 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8309 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8310 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8311 /*
8312 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8313 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8314 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8315 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8316 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8317 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8318 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8319 *
8320 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8321 * to check this field.)
8322 */
8323 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8324 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8325 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8326 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8327 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8328 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8329 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8330
8331 /*
8332 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8333 * password twice.
8334 */
8335 while (!got_new) {
8336
8337 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8338 while (ret < 0) {
8339 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8340 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8341 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8342 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8343 }
8344 if (!ret) {
8345 /*
8346 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8347 */
8348 /* burn the evidence */
8349 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8350 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8351 sfree(s->password);
8352 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8353 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8354 TRUE);
8355 crStopV;
8356 }
8357
8358 /*
8359 * If the user specified a new original password
8360 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8361 * one.
8362 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8363 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8364 */
8365 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8366 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8367 /* burn the evidence */
8368 sfree(s->password);
8369 s->password =
8370 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8371 }
8372
8373 /*
8374 * Check the two new passwords match.
8375 */
8376 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8377 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8378 == 0);
8379 if (!got_new)
8380 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8381 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8382
8383 }
8384
8385 /*
8386 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8387 * (see above for padding rationale)
8388 */
8389 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8390 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8391 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8392 /* service requested */
8393 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8394 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8395 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8396 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8397 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8398 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8399 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8400 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8401 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8402 logevent("Sent new password");
8403
8404 /*
8405 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8406 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8407 * new password.)
8408 */
8409 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8410 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8411
8412 }
8413
8414 /*
8415 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8416 * of the loop. Either:
8417 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8418 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8419 * usual meaning
8420 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8421 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8422 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8423 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8424 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8425 * the loop and start again.
8426 */
8427 s->gotit = TRUE;
8428
8429 /*
8430 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8431 * case. Burn the evidence.
8432 */
8433 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8434 sfree(s->password);
8435
8436 } else {
8437
8438 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
8439 "No supported authentication methods available",
8440 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8441 FALSE);
8442 crStopV;
8443
8444 }
8445
8446 }
8447 }
8448 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8449
8450 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8451 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8452 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8453 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8454 }
8455 if (s->agent_response)
8456 sfree(s->agent_response);
8457
8458 /*
8459 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8460 */
8461
8462 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8463
8464 /*
8465 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8466 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8467 */
8468 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8469 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8470 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8471 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8472
8473 /*
8474 * Create the main session channel.
8475 */
8476 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
8477 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8478 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
8479 /*
8480 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8481 * channel.
8482 */
8483 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8484 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8485 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8486 logeventf(ssh,
8487 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8488 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8489 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8490 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8491 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8492 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8493 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8494 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
8495 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8496 /*
8497 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8498 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8499 * information.
8500 */
8501 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8502 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8503 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8504
8505 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8506 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8507 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8508 crStopV;
8509 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8510 }
8511 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8512 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8513 crStopV;
8514 }
8515 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8516 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8517 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8518 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8519 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8520 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8521 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8522 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8523 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8524 } else {
8525 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8526 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8527 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8528 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8529 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8530 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8531 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8532 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8533 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8534 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8535 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8536 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8537 crStopV;
8538 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8539 }
8540 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8541 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8542 crStopV;
8543 }
8544 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8545 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8546 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8547 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8548 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8549 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8550 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8551 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8552 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8553 }
8554
8555 /*
8556 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8557 * general channel-based messages.
8558 */
8559 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8560 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8561 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8562 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8563 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8564 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8565 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8566 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8567 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8568 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8569 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8570 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8571 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8572
8573 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
8574 /*
8575 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8576 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8577 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
8578 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
8579 */
8580 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8581 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8582 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
8583 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
8584 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8585 }
8586
8587 /*
8588 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
8589 */
8590 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
8591 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
8592 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
8593 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
8594 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8595 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8596 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
8597 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8598 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
8599 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
8600 /*
8601 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
8602 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
8603 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
8604 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
8605 * cookie into the log.
8606 */
8607 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8608 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
8609 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8610 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
8611 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8612
8613 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8614
8615 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8616 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8617 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
8618 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8619 crStopV;
8620 }
8621 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
8622 } else {
8623 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
8624 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
8625 }
8626 }
8627
8628 /*
8629 * Enable port forwardings.
8630 */
8631 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
8632
8633 /*
8634 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
8635 */
8636 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
8637 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
8638 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8639 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8640 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
8641 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8642 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8643
8644 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8645
8646 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8647 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8648 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
8649 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8650 crStopV;
8651 }
8652 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
8653 } else {
8654 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
8655 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
8656 }
8657 }
8658
8659 /*
8660 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
8661 */
8662 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8663 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
8664 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
8665 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
8666 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
8667 /* Build the pty request. */
8668 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8669 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8670 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
8671 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8672 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
8673 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
8674 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
8675 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
8676 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
8677 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8678 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
8679 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
8680 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
8681 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
8682 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
8683 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
8684 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
8685 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8686 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
8687
8688 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8689
8690 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8691 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8692 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
8693 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8694 crStopV;
8695 }
8696 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
8697 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8698 } else {
8699 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
8700 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
8701 }
8702 } else {
8703 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8704 }
8705
8706 /*
8707 * Send environment variables.
8708 *
8709 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
8710 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
8711 */
8712 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
8713 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
8714 char *var, *varend, *val;
8715
8716 s->num_env = 0;
8717
8718 while (*e) {
8719 var = e;
8720 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
8721 varend = e;
8722 if (*e == '\t') e++;
8723 val = e;
8724 while (*e) e++;
8725 e++;
8726
8727 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8728 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8729 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
8730 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8731 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8732 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
8733 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
8734 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8735
8736 s->num_env++;
8737 }
8738
8739 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
8740
8741 s->env_ok = 0;
8742 s->env_left = s->num_env;
8743
8744 while (s->env_left > 0) {
8745 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8746
8747 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8748 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8749 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
8750 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8751 crStopV;
8752 }
8753 } else {
8754 s->env_ok++;
8755 }
8756
8757 s->env_left--;
8758 }
8759
8760 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
8761 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
8762 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
8763 logevent("All environment variables refused");
8764 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
8765 } else {
8766 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
8767 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
8768 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
8769 }
8770 }
8771
8772 /*
8773 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
8774 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
8775 * of command.
8776 */
8777 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
8778 int subsys;
8779 char *cmd;
8780
8781 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
8782 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
8783 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
8784 } else {
8785 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
8786 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
8787 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
8788 }
8789
8790 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8791 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8792 if (subsys) {
8793 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
8794 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8795 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8796 } else if (*cmd) {
8797 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
8798 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8799 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8800 } else {
8801 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
8802 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8803 }
8804 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8805
8806 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8807
8808 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8809 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8810 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
8811 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8812 crStopV;
8813 }
8814 /*
8815 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
8816 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
8817 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
8818 * back to it before complaining.
8819 */
8820 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
8821 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
8822 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
8823 continue;
8824 }
8825 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
8826 crStopV;
8827 } else {
8828 logevent("Started a shell/command");
8829 }
8830 break;
8831 }
8832
8833 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
8834 if (ssh->size_needed)
8835 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
8836 if (ssh->eof_needed)
8837 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
8838
8839 /*
8840 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
8841 * failure handler.
8842 */
8843 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
8844 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
8845
8846 /*
8847 * Transfer data!
8848 */
8849 if (ssh->ldisc)
8850 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
8851 if (ssh->mainchan)
8852 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8853 while (1) {
8854 crReturnV;
8855 s->try_send = FALSE;
8856 if (pktin) {
8857
8858 /*
8859 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
8860 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
8861 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
8862 */
8863
8864 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
8865 crStopV;
8866 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8867 /*
8868 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
8869 */
8870 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
8871 s->try_send = TRUE;
8872 }
8873 if (s->try_send) {
8874 int i;
8875 struct ssh_channel *c;
8876 /*
8877 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
8878 */
8879 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
8880 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
8881 }
8882 }
8883
8884 crFinishV;
8885 }
8886
8887 /*
8888 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
8889 */
8890 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8891 {
8892 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
8893 char *buf, *msg;
8894 int reason, msglen;
8895
8896 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8897 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8898
8899 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
8900 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
8901 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
8902 } else {
8903 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
8904 " type %d)", reason);
8905 }
8906 logevent(buf);
8907 sfree(buf);
8908 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
8909 msglen, msg);
8910 logevent(buf);
8911 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
8912 reason,
8913 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
8914 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
8915 msglen, msg));
8916 sfree(buf);
8917 }
8918
8919 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8920 {
8921 /* log the debug message */
8922 char *msg;
8923 int msglen;
8924 int always_display;
8925
8926 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
8927 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8928 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8929
8930 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
8931 }
8932
8933 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8934 {
8935 struct Packet *pktout;
8936 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
8937 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
8938 /*
8939 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
8940 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
8941 */
8942 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8943 }
8944
8945 /*
8946 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
8947 */
8948 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
8949 {
8950 int i;
8951
8952 /*
8953 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
8954 */
8955 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
8956 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
8957
8958 /*
8959 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
8960 * the coroutines will get it.
8961 */
8962 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
8963 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
8964 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
8965 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
8966 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
8967 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
8968 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
8969 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8970 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8971 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
8972 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
8973 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
8974 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
8975 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8976 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8977 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
8978 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8979 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8980 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
8981 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
8982 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8983 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
8984 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
8985 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
8986 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
8987 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
8988 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
8989 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
8990 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
8991 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
8992 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
8993 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8994 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
8995
8996 /*
8997 * These special message types we install handlers for.
8998 */
8999 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9000 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9001 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9002 }
9003
9004 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9005 {
9006 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9007
9008 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9009 return;
9010
9011 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
9012 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9013 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9014 }
9015 }
9016
9017 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9018 struct Packet *pktin)
9019 {
9020 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9021 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9022 return;
9023
9024 if (pktin) {
9025 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9026 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9027 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9028 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9029 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9030 }
9031
9032 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9033 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9034 return;
9035 }
9036
9037 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9038 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9039 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9040 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9041 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9042 /*
9043 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9044 */
9045 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9046 }
9047 } else {
9048 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9049 }
9050 }
9051
9052 /*
9053 * Called to set up the connection.
9054 *
9055 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9056 */
9057 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9058 Config *cfg,
9059 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
9060 int keepalive)
9061 {
9062 const char *p;
9063 Ssh ssh;
9064
9065 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9066 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9067 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9068 ssh->s = NULL;
9069 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9070 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9071 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9072 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9073 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9074 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9075 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9076 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9077 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9078 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9079 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9080 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9081 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9082 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9083 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9084 ssh->kex = NULL;
9085 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9086 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9087 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9088 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9089 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9090 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9091 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9092 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9093 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9094 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9095 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9096 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9097 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9098 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9099 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9100 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9101 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9102 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9103 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9104 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9105 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9106 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
9107 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9108 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9109 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
9110 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
9111 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
9112 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9113 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9114 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9115 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9116 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9117 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9118 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9119 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9120 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9121 ssh->queue = NULL;
9122 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9123 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9124 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9125 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9126 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9127 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9128
9129 *backend_handle = ssh;
9130
9131 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9132 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9133 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9134 #endif
9135
9136 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9137 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
9138 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
9139
9140 ssh->channels = NULL;
9141 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9142 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9143
9144 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9145 ssh->editing = 0;
9146 ssh->echoing = 0;
9147 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9148 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9149 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9150
9151 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9152
9153 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9154
9155 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9156
9157 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9158 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9159 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
9160 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9161
9162 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9163 if (p != NULL)
9164 return p;
9165
9166 random_ref();
9167
9168 return NULL;
9169 }
9170
9171 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9172 {
9173 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9174 struct ssh_channel *c;
9175 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9176
9177 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9178 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9179 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9180 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9181 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9182 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9183 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9184 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9185 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9186 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9187 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9188 if (ssh->cscomp)
9189 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9190 else
9191 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9192 }
9193 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9194 if (ssh->sccomp)
9195 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9196 else
9197 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9198 }
9199 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9200 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9201 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9202
9203 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9204 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9205 sfree(ssh->queue);
9206
9207 while (ssh->qhead) {
9208 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9209 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9210 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9211 }
9212 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9213
9214 if (ssh->channels) {
9215 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9216 switch (c->type) {
9217 case CHAN_X11:
9218 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9219 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9220 break;
9221 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9222 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9223 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9224 break;
9225 }
9226 sfree(c);
9227 }
9228 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9229 ssh->channels = NULL;
9230 }
9231
9232 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9233 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9234 sfree(pf);
9235 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9236 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9237 }
9238 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9239 if (ssh->x11disp)
9240 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9241 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9242 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9243 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9244 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9245 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9246 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9247 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9248 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9249 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9250 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9251 }
9252 if (ssh->s)
9253 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9254 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9255 if (ssh->pinger)
9256 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9257 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9258 sfree(ssh);
9259
9260 random_unref();
9261 }
9262
9263 /*
9264 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9265 */
9266 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
9267 {
9268 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9269 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9270 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9271
9272 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
9273 if (ssh->portfwds)
9274 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
9275
9276 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
9277 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
9278 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9279 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9280
9281 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9282 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9283 } else {
9284 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9285 }
9286 }
9287
9288 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9289 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
9290 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9291 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9292 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9293 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9294 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9295 }
9296
9297 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
9298 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9299 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9300 }
9301
9302 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
9303 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
9304 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
9305 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9306 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9307 }
9308
9309 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9310
9311 if (rekeying) {
9312 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9313 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9314 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9315 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9316 }
9317 }
9318 }
9319
9320 /*
9321 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9322 */
9323 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9324 {
9325 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9326
9327 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9328 return 0;
9329
9330 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9331
9332 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9333 }
9334
9335 /*
9336 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9337 */
9338 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9339 {
9340 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9341 int override_value;
9342
9343 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9344 return 0;
9345
9346 /*
9347 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9348 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9349 */
9350 override_value = 0;
9351 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9352 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9353
9354 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9355 return override_value;
9356 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9357 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
9358 return override_value;
9359 else
9360 return (override_value +
9361 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9362 }
9363
9364 return 0;
9365 }
9366
9367 /*
9368 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9369 */
9370 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9371 {
9372 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9373 struct Packet *pktout;
9374
9375 ssh->term_width = width;
9376 ssh->term_height = height;
9377
9378 switch (ssh->state) {
9379 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9380 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9381 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9382 break; /* do nothing */
9383 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9384 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9385 break;
9386 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9387 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
9388 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9389 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9390 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9391 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9392 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9393 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9394 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9395 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9396 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9397 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9398 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9399 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9400 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9401 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9402 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9403 }
9404 }
9405 break;
9406 }
9407 }
9408
9409 /*
9410 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9411 * protocol.
9412 */
9413 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9414 {
9415 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9416 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9417 };
9418 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
9419 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9420 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9421 };
9422 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9423 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9424 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9425 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9426 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9427 * required signals. */
9428 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9429 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9430 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9431 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9432 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9433 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9434 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9435 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9436 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9437 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9438 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9439 };
9440 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9441 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9442 };
9443 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9444 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
9445 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9446 lenof(specials_end)];
9447 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9448 int i = 0;
9449 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9450 do { \
9451 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9452 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9453 i += lenof(name); \
9454 } while(0)
9455
9456 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9457 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9458 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9459 * asked anyway. */
9460 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9461 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9462 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9463 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
9464 if (ssh->mainchan)
9465 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9466 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9467
9468 if (i) {
9469 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9470 return ssh_specials;
9471 } else {
9472 return NULL;
9473 }
9474 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9475 }
9476
9477 /*
9478 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9479 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9480 * hostname sort').
9481 */
9482 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9483 {
9484 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9485 struct Packet *pktout;
9486
9487 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9488 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9489 /*
9490 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9491 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9492 */
9493 if (code == TS_EOF)
9494 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9495 return;
9496 }
9497 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9498 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9499 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9500 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
9501 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9502 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9503 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9504 }
9505 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9506 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9507 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9508 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9509 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9510 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9511 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9512 } else {
9513 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9514 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9515 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9516 }
9517 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9518 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9519 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9520 }
9521 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9522 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9523 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9524 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9525 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9526 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9527 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9528 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9529 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
9530 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9531 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
9532 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9533 }
9534 } else {
9535 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
9536 char *signame = NULL;
9537 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
9538 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
9539 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
9540 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
9541 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
9542 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
9543 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
9544 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
9545 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
9546 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
9547 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
9548 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
9549 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
9550 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
9551 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
9552 if (signame) {
9553 /* It's a signal. */
9554 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
9555 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9556 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9557 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
9558 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9559 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
9560 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9561 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
9562 }
9563 } else {
9564 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
9565 }
9566 }
9567 }
9568
9569 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
9570 {
9571 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9572 struct ssh_channel *c;
9573 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
9574
9575 c->ssh = ssh;
9576 ssh2_channel_init(c);
9577 c->halfopen = TRUE;
9578 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
9579 c->u.pfd.s = s;
9580 add234(ssh->channels, c);
9581 return c;
9582 }
9583
9584 /*
9585 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
9586 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
9587 */
9588 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
9589 {
9590 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9591 int buflimit;
9592
9593 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9594 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
9595 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9596 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9597 }
9598 } else {
9599 if (ssh->mainchan) {
9600 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
9601 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
9602 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
9603 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
9604 buflimit = 0;
9605 else
9606 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
9607 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
9608 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
9609 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9610 }
9611 }
9612 }
9613 }
9614
9615 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
9616 {
9617 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
9618 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
9619 struct Packet *pktout;
9620
9621 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
9622
9623 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9624 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
9625 PKT_INT, c->localid,
9626 PKT_STR, hostname,
9627 PKT_INT, port,
9628 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
9629 PKT_END);
9630 } else {
9631 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
9632 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
9633 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
9634 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
9635 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
9636 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
9637 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
9638 /*
9639 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
9640 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
9641 * convinced the server should be told details like that
9642 * about my local network configuration.
9643 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
9644 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
9645 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
9646 */
9647 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
9648 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9649 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9650 }
9651 }
9652
9653 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
9654 {
9655 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9656 return ssh->s != NULL;
9657 }
9658
9659 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
9660 {
9661 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9662 return ssh->send_ok;
9663 }
9664
9665 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
9666 {
9667 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9668 if (option == LD_ECHO)
9669 return ssh->echoing;
9670 if (option == LD_EDIT)
9671 return ssh->editing;
9672 return FALSE;
9673 }
9674
9675 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
9676 {
9677 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9678 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
9679 }
9680
9681 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
9682 {
9683 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9684 ssh->logctx = logctx;
9685 }
9686
9687 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
9688 {
9689 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9690 if (ssh->s != NULL)
9691 return -1;
9692 else
9693 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
9694 }
9695
9696 /*
9697 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
9698 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
9699 */
9700 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
9701 {
9702 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9703 return ssh->version;
9704 }
9705
9706 /*
9707 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
9708 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
9709 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
9710 */
9711 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
9712 {
9713 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9714 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
9715 }
9716
9717 Backend ssh_backend = {
9718 ssh_init,
9719 ssh_free,
9720 ssh_reconfig,
9721 ssh_send,
9722 ssh_sendbuffer,
9723 ssh_size,
9724 ssh_special,
9725 ssh_get_specials,
9726 ssh_connected,
9727 ssh_return_exitcode,
9728 ssh_sendok,
9729 ssh_ldisc,
9730 ssh_provide_ldisc,
9731 ssh_provide_logctx,
9732 ssh_unthrottle,
9733 ssh_cfg_info,
9734 "ssh",
9735 PROT_SSH,
9736 22
9737 };