17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
114 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
130 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
132 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
149 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
154 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
157 * Various remote-bug flags.
159 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
160 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
161 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
162 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
163 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
164 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX 64
166 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
168 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
169 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
170 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
172 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
173 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
174 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
175 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
176 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
177 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
178 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
179 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
180 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
181 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
182 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
183 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
184 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
185 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
186 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
187 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
188 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
189 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
190 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
191 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
192 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
193 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
194 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
195 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
196 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
197 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
198 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
199 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
200 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
201 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
202 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
203 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
204 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
205 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
206 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
207 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
208 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
209 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
210 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
211 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
212 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
215 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
217 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
218 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
219 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
220 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
221 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
222 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
223 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
224 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
225 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
);
226 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
);
227 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
228 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
229 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
230 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
231 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
232 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
233 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
234 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
235 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
236 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
237 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
238 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
239 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
240 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
241 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
242 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
243 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
244 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
245 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
246 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
247 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
248 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
249 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
250 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
251 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
252 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
258 #define GET_32BIT(cp) \
259 (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
260 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
261 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
262 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
264 #define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) { \
265 (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24); \
266 (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16); \
267 (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8); \
268 (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value); }
270 enum { PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
};
273 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
274 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
277 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
279 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
281 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
282 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
283 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
284 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
286 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
288 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
289 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
290 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
292 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
295 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
297 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
298 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
299 #define crReturn(z) \
301 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
305 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
307 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
308 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
309 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
310 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
312 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
314 static void ssh2_pkt_init(Ssh
, int pkt_type
);
315 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(Ssh
, unsigned char value
);
316 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(Ssh
, unsigned long value
);
317 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(Ssh
);
318 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(Ssh
, char *data
);
319 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(Ssh
, char *data
, int len
);
320 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(Ssh
, char *data
);
321 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
322 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(Ssh
, Bignum b
);
323 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
);
324 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
);
327 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
328 * various different purposes:
330 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
331 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
332 * connection (in SSH1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
333 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
336 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
337 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
338 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
339 * thankfully unlikely in SSH2 since the window mechanism should
340 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
341 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
343 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH2
347 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
348 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
349 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
351 const static struct ssh_kex
*kex_algs
[] = {
352 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
,
356 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
358 static void *nullmac_make_context(void)
362 static void nullmac_free_context(void *handle
)
365 static void nullmac_key(void *handle
, unsigned char *key
)
368 static void nullmac_generate(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
372 static int nullmac_verify(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
377 const static struct ssh_mac ssh_mac_none
= {
378 nullmac_make_context
, nullmac_free_context
, nullmac_key
,
379 nullmac_generate
, nullmac_verify
, "none", 0
381 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
382 &ssh_sha1
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
384 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
385 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
388 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
392 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
395 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
396 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
400 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
404 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
406 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
407 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
408 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
410 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
411 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
412 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
415 enum { /* channel types */
420 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
424 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
427 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
428 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
431 * In SSH1, this value contains four bits:
433 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
434 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
435 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
436 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
438 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
442 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
445 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
447 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
452 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
453 unsigned char *message
;
454 unsigned char msglen
[4];
455 int lensofar
, totallen
;
457 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
460 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
467 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH 1 and SSH
468 * 2 use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH 2's
469 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
471 * In SSH 1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
472 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
473 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
474 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
475 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
476 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
477 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
478 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
479 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
480 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
481 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
483 * In SSH 2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
484 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
485 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
486 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
487 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
488 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
490 * Hence: in SSH 1 this structure stores host:port pairs we intend
491 * to allow connections to, and is indexed by those host:port
492 * pairs. In SSH 2 it stores a mapping from source port to
493 * destination host:port pair, and is indexed by source port.
495 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
496 unsigned sport
, dport
;
509 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
510 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
511 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
512 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
513 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
514 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
515 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
516 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
517 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
518 static void ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
);
520 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
521 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
522 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
528 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
529 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
532 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
536 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
537 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
539 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
546 unsigned char session_key
[32];
548 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
549 int v1_local_protoflags
;
550 int agentfwd_enabled
;
553 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
556 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
557 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
558 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
559 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
560 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
561 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
562 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
563 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
564 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
570 int echoing
, editing
;
574 int term_width
, term_height
;
576 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
577 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
584 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
590 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
593 struct Packet pktout
;
594 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
595 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
598 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
599 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
600 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
606 * Used for username and password input.
608 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
609 int userpass_input_buflen
;
610 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
611 int userpass_input_echo
;
613 char *portfwd_strptr
;
619 int v1_throttle_count
;
622 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
623 int v2_outgoing_sequence
;
625 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
626 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
627 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
628 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
629 int ssh1_protocol_crstate
;
630 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
631 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
632 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
634 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
635 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
636 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
637 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
639 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
640 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
642 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
);
643 int (*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
646 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
647 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
648 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
649 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
654 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
656 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
657 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, char *fmt
, ...)
663 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
669 #define bombout(msg) \
671 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
674 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
678 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
680 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
681 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
682 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
684 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
688 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
690 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
691 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
699 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
701 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
702 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
704 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
705 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
706 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
708 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
713 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
715 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
716 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
718 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
720 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
725 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
727 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
728 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
730 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
733 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
734 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
735 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
736 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
737 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
738 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
740 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
744 while (high
- low
> 1) {
745 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
746 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
747 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
748 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
750 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
753 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
754 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
757 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
758 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
760 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
763 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
765 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
767 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
769 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
772 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
775 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
778 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
780 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
781 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
782 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
786 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
788 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
792 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
793 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
794 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
795 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
796 * Return the additional nr of bytes needed, or 0 when
797 * a complete packet is available.
799 static int ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
801 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
803 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
808 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 0;
810 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
811 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
813 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
814 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
817 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
818 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
819 ssh
->pktin
.length
= st
->len
- 5;
821 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->biglen
) {
822 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
823 ssh
->pktin
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
,
827 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
828 st
->p
= ssh
->pktin
.data
;
829 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
830 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
831 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
832 crReturn(st
->to_read
);
833 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
834 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
835 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
837 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
839 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
842 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
,
844 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
849 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
);
851 st
->realcrc
= crc32(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
852 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
853 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
854 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
858 ssh
->pktin
.body
= ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
860 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
861 unsigned char *decompblk
;
863 zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
864 ssh
->pktin
.body
- 1, ssh
->pktin
.length
+ 1,
865 &decompblk
, &decomplen
);
867 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
868 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
869 ssh
->pktin
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
870 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
872 ssh
->pktin
.body
= ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
875 memcpy(ssh
->pktin
.body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
877 ssh
->pktin
.length
= decomplen
- 1;
880 ssh
->pktin
.type
= ssh
->pktin
.body
[-1];
883 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
884 PKT_INCOMING
, ssh
->pktin
.type
,
885 ssh1_pkt_type(ssh
->pktin
.type
),
886 ssh
->pktin
.body
, ssh
->pktin
.length
);
888 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
||
889 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
||
890 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
||
891 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
||
892 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
893 long stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
894 if (stringlen
+ 4 != ssh
->pktin
.length
) {
895 bombout(("Received data packet with bogus string length"));
900 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
) {
901 /* log debug message */
903 int stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
904 strcpy(buf
, "Remote debug message: ");
907 memcpy(buf
+ 8, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, stringlen
);
908 buf
[8 + stringlen
] = '\0';
911 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
) {
916 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
) {
917 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
919 unsigned msglen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
921 strcpy(buf
, "Remote sent disconnect: ");
922 nowlen
= strlen(buf
);
923 if (msglen
> sizeof(buf
) - nowlen
- 1)
924 msglen
= sizeof(buf
) - nowlen
- 1;
925 memcpy(buf
+ nowlen
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, msglen
);
926 buf
[nowlen
+ msglen
] = '\0';
927 /* logevent(buf); (this is now done within the bombout macro) */
928 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%s\"", buf
+nowlen
));
935 static int ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
937 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
939 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
943 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 0;
945 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
948 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
951 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->cipherblk
) {
952 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->cipherblk
;
953 ssh
->pktin
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
,
958 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
959 * contain the length and padding details.
961 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
962 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
963 crReturn(st
->cipherblk
- st
->i
);
964 ssh
->pktin
.data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
969 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
970 ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->cipherblk
);
973 * Now get the length and padding figures.
975 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
);
976 st
->pad
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[4];
979 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
980 * do us any more damage.
982 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->pad
< 0 || st
->len
+ st
->pad
< 0) {
983 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
988 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
990 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
992 ssh
->pktin
.length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
995 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
997 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
998 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
1001 * Adjust memory allocation if packet is too big.
1003 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
) {
1004 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1005 ssh
->pktin
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
1006 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1011 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1013 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1015 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1016 crReturn(st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
- st
->i
);
1017 ssh
->pktin
.data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1020 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1022 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1023 ssh
->pktin
.data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
1024 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1030 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1031 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1032 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1035 st
->incoming_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1038 * Decompress packet payload.
1041 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1044 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1045 ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktin
.length
- 5,
1046 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1047 if (ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1048 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1049 ssh
->pktin
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktin
.data
,
1050 ssh
->pktin
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1053 ssh
->pktin
.length
= 5 + newlen
;
1054 memcpy(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1059 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
= 6;
1060 ssh
->pktin
.type
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[5];
1063 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, ssh
->pktin
.type
,
1064 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, ssh
->pktin
.type
),
1065 ssh
->pktin
.data
+6, ssh
->pktin
.length
-6);
1067 switch (ssh
->pktin
.type
) {
1069 * These packets we must handle instantly.
1071 case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
:
1073 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
1076 int reason
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 6);
1077 unsigned msglen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 10);
1079 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
1080 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
1081 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
1083 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
1084 " type %d)", reason
);
1088 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
1089 &nowlen
, msglen
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 14);
1091 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
1093 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
1094 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
1100 case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
:
1102 case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
:
1104 /* log the debug message */
1106 /* int display = ssh->pktin.body[6]; */
1107 int stringlen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+7);
1109 strcpy(buf
, "Remote debug message: ");
1110 prefix
= strlen(buf
);
1111 if (stringlen
> (int)(sizeof(buf
)-prefix
-1))
1112 stringlen
= sizeof(buf
)-prefix
-1;
1113 memcpy(buf
+ prefix
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 11, stringlen
);
1114 buf
[prefix
+ stringlen
] = '\0';
1117 goto next_packet
; /* FIXME: print the debug message */
1120 * These packets we need do nothing about here.
1122 case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
:
1123 case SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
:
1124 case SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
:
1125 case SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
:
1126 case SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
:
1127 case SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
:
1128 case SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
:
1129 /* case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST: duplicate case value */
1130 /* case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP: duplicate case value */
1131 case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
:
1132 case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
:
1133 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
:
1134 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
:
1135 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
:
1136 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
:
1137 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
:
1138 /* case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ: duplicate case value */
1139 /* case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST: duplicate case value */
1140 case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
:
1141 case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
:
1142 case SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
:
1143 case SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
:
1144 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
:
1145 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
:
1146 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
:
1147 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
:
1148 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
:
1149 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
:
1150 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
:
1151 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
:
1152 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
:
1153 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
:
1154 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
:
1158 * For anything else we send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
1161 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
1162 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, st
->incoming_sequence
- 1);
1170 static void ssh1_pktout_size(Ssh ssh
, int len
)
1174 len
+= 5; /* type and CRC */
1175 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1178 ssh
->pktout
.length
= len
- 5;
1179 if (ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
< biglen
) {
1180 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
= biglen
;
1182 /* Allocate enough buffer space for extra block
1183 * for MS CryptEncrypt() */
1184 ssh
->pktout
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktout
.data
, biglen
+ 12,
1187 ssh
->pktout
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktout
.data
, biglen
+ 4,
1191 ssh
->pktout
.body
= ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4 + pad
+ 1;
1194 static void s_wrpkt_start(Ssh ssh
, int type
, int len
)
1196 ssh1_pktout_size(ssh
, len
);
1197 ssh
->pktout
.type
= type
;
1200 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
)
1206 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1207 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1208 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1209 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1215 ssh
->pktout
.body
[-1] = ssh
->pktout
.type
;
1218 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, ssh
->pktout
.type
,
1219 ssh1_pkt_type(ssh
->pktout
.type
),
1220 ssh
->pktout
.body
, ssh
->pktout
.length
);
1222 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1223 unsigned char *compblk
;
1225 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1226 ssh
->pktout
.body
- 1, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ 1,
1227 &compblk
, &complen
);
1228 ssh1_pktout_size(ssh
, complen
- 1);
1229 memcpy(ssh
->pktout
.body
- 1, compblk
, complen
);
1233 len
= ssh
->pktout
.length
+ 5; /* type and CRC */
1234 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1237 for (i
= 0; i
< pad
; i
++)
1238 ssh
->pktout
.data
[i
+ 4] = random_byte();
1239 crc
= crc32(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4, biglen
- 4);
1240 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ biglen
, crc
);
1241 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1244 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 4, biglen
);
1249 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
)
1252 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
);
1253 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1254 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1255 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1258 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
)
1261 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
);
1262 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1263 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1264 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1268 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1269 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1273 * Construct a packet with the specified contents.
1275 static void construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, va_list ap1
, va_list ap2
)
1277 unsigned char *p
, *argp
, argchar
;
1278 unsigned long argint
;
1279 int pktlen
, argtype
, arglen
;
1283 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap1
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1286 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1290 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1294 (void) va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1295 arglen
= va_arg(ap1
, int);
1299 argp
= va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1300 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1301 pktlen
+= 4 + arglen
;
1304 bn
= va_arg(ap1
, Bignum
);
1305 pktlen
+= ssh1_bignum_length(bn
);
1312 s_wrpkt_start(ssh
, pkttype
, pktlen
);
1313 p
= ssh
->pktout
.body
;
1315 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap2
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1318 argint
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1319 PUT_32BIT(p
, argint
);
1323 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap2
, int);
1328 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1329 arglen
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1330 memcpy(p
, argp
, arglen
);
1334 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1335 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1336 PUT_32BIT(p
, arglen
);
1337 memcpy(p
+ 4, argp
, arglen
);
1341 bn
= va_arg(ap2
, Bignum
);
1342 p
+= ssh1_write_bignum(p
, bn
);
1348 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1351 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1352 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1353 construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1357 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1360 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1361 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1362 construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1366 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1369 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1371 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1372 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1374 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1379 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1380 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1382 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1387 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1388 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1391 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1393 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1394 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1395 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1396 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1399 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1401 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1402 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1403 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1407 * SSH2 packet construction functions.
1409 static void ssh2_pkt_ensure(Ssh ssh
, int length
)
1411 if (ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
< length
) {
1412 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1413 ssh
->pktout
.data
= sresize(ssh
->pktout
.data
,
1414 ssh
->pktout
.maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1416 if (!ssh
->pktout
.data
)
1417 fatalbox("Out of memory");
1420 static void ssh2_pkt_adddata(Ssh ssh
, void *data
, int len
)
1422 ssh
->pktout
.length
+= len
;
1423 ssh2_pkt_ensure(ssh
, ssh
->pktout
.length
);
1424 memcpy(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.length
- len
, data
, len
);
1426 static void ssh2_pkt_addbyte(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char byte
)
1428 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, &byte
, 1);
1430 static void ssh2_pkt_init(Ssh ssh
, int pkt_type
)
1432 ssh
->pktout
.length
= 5;
1433 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(ssh
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1435 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char value
)
1437 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, &value
, 1);
1439 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(Ssh ssh
, unsigned long value
)
1442 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1443 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, x
, 4);
1445 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(Ssh ssh
)
1447 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
1448 ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
= ssh
->pktout
.length
;
1450 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(Ssh ssh
, char *data
)
1452 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, data
, strlen(data
));
1453 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
- 4,
1454 ssh
->pktout
.length
- ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
);
1456 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(Ssh ssh
, char *data
, int len
)
1458 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, data
, len
);
1459 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
+ ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
- 4,
1460 ssh
->pktout
.length
- ssh
->pktout
.savedpos
);
1462 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(Ssh ssh
, char *data
)
1464 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1465 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, data
);
1467 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1470 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1471 p
= snewn(n
+ 1, unsigned char);
1473 fatalbox("out of memory");
1475 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1476 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1478 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1480 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1484 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(Ssh ssh
, Bignum b
)
1488 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1489 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1490 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)p
, len
);
1495 * Construct an SSH2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1496 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1497 * ssh->pktout.data. Total length is returned.
1499 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
)
1501 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1504 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, ssh
->pktout
.data
[5],
1505 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
[5]),
1506 ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 6, ssh
->pktout
.length
- 6);
1509 * Compress packet payload.
1512 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1515 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
1516 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5,
1517 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1518 ssh
->pktout
.length
= 5;
1519 ssh2_pkt_adddata(ssh
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1525 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1526 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1528 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1529 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1532 (cipherblk
- (ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1533 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1534 ssh2_pkt_ensure(ssh
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1535 ssh
->pktout
.data
[4] = padding
;
1536 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1537 ssh
->pktout
.data
[ssh
->pktout
.length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1538 PUT_32BIT(ssh
->pktout
.data
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
- 4);
1540 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, ssh
->pktout
.data
,
1541 ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
,
1542 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1543 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1546 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1547 ssh
->pktout
.data
, ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
);
1549 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at ssh->pktout.data. We return length. */
1550 return ssh
->pktout
.length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1554 * Construct and send an SSH2 packet immediately.
1556 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
)
1560 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
);
1561 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1562 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1563 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1567 * Construct an SSH2 packet and add it to a deferred data block.
1568 * Useful for sending multiple packets in a single sk_write() call,
1569 * to prevent a traffic-analysing listener from being able to work
1570 * out the length of any particular packet (such as the password
1573 * Note that because SSH2 sequence-numbers its packets, this can
1574 * NOT be used as an m4-style `defer' allowing packets to be
1575 * constructed in one order and sent in another.
1577 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
)
1579 int len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
);
1580 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1581 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1582 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1586 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, ssh
->pktout
.data
, len
);
1587 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1591 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1592 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH1's defer_packet().
1594 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1597 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1599 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1600 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1601 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1602 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1603 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1607 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1611 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1612 debug(("%s", string
));
1613 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1614 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1620 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1624 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1625 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1630 * SSH2 packet decode functions.
1632 static unsigned long ssh2_pkt_getuint32(Ssh ssh
)
1634 unsigned long value
;
1635 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 4)
1636 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1637 value
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1638 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 4;
1641 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(Ssh ssh
)
1643 unsigned long value
;
1644 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 1)
1645 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1646 value
= ssh
->pktin
.data
[ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
] != 0;
1647 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
++;
1650 static void ssh2_pkt_getstring(Ssh ssh
, char **p
, int *length
)
1655 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< 4)
1657 len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1661 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 4;
1662 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
- ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
< *length
)
1664 *p
= (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.data
+ ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
);
1665 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= *length
;
1667 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(Ssh ssh
)
1673 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &p
, &length
);
1677 bombout(("internal error: Can't handle negative mpints"));
1680 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
1685 * Helper function to add an SSH2 signature blob to a packet.
1686 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
1687 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
1688 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
1689 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
1691 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
1692 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
1694 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
1695 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
1697 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
1698 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
1701 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
1702 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
1704 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
1705 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
1706 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
1709 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
1712 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1713 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
1714 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
1715 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
1716 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
1718 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
1721 * Now find the signature integer.
1723 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1724 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
1725 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
1727 if (len
!= siglen
) {
1728 unsigned char newlen
[4];
1729 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1730 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
1731 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
1732 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
1733 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
1734 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
1735 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
1737 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
1738 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
1739 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
1741 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
1742 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
1746 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
1749 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
1750 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
1754 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
1755 * a list of known buggy implementations.
1757 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
1759 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
1761 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1763 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1766 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
1768 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
1769 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
1770 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
1771 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
1772 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1774 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
1775 * to use a different defence against password length
1778 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
1779 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH1 ignore bug");
1782 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
1783 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
1784 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1786 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
1787 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
1790 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
1791 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH1 password");
1794 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
1795 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
1796 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
1798 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
1799 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
1800 * an AUTH_RSA message.
1802 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
1803 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle RSA authentication");
1806 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
1807 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
1808 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
1809 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
1810 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
1812 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
1814 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
1815 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 HMAC bug");
1818 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
1819 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
1820 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
1822 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
1823 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
1824 * generate the keys).
1826 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
1827 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 key-derivation bug");
1830 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
1831 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
1832 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
1833 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
1835 * These versions have the SSH2 RSA padding bug.
1837 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
1838 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 RSA padding bug");
1841 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
1842 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
1843 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
1845 * These versions have the SSH2 session-ID bug in
1846 * public-key authentication.
1848 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
1849 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 public-key-session-ID bug");
1852 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_dhgex2
== FORCE_ON
) {
1854 * User specified the SSH2 DH GEX bug.
1856 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
;
1857 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 DH group exchange bug");
1861 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
1863 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
1871 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
1873 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
1875 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
1878 static const int transS
[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
1879 static const int transH
[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
1880 static const int transminus
[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
1882 s
->i
= transS
[s
->i
];
1884 s
->i
= transH
[s
->i
];
1886 s
->i
= transminus
[s
->i
];
1891 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
1895 s
->vstring
= snewn(s
->vstrsize
, char);
1896 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
1900 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
1901 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
1903 s
->vstring
= sresize(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
, char);
1905 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
1908 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
1910 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
1911 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
1912 } else if (c
== '\012')
1916 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
1917 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
1919 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
1920 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\r\n")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
1923 vlog
= snewn(20 + s
->vslen
, char);
1924 sprintf(vlog
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
1928 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
1931 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
1934 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
1935 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
1936 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
1937 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
1939 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
1940 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
1943 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
1944 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
1948 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
1952 char verstring
[80], vlog
[100];
1953 sprintf(verstring
, "SSH-2.0-%s", sshver
);
1954 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
1956 * Hash our version string and their version string.
1958 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1959 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
, strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\r\n"));
1960 sprintf(vlog
, "We claim version: %s", verstring
);
1962 strcat(verstring
, "\012");
1963 logevent("Using SSH protocol version 2");
1964 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1965 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
1967 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
1972 char verstring
[80], vlog
[100];
1973 sprintf(verstring
, "SSH-%s-%s",
1974 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ? s
->version
: "1.5"),
1976 sprintf(vlog
, "We claim version: %s", verstring
);
1978 strcat(verstring
, "\012");
1980 logevent("Using SSH protocol version 1");
1981 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
1982 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
1984 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
1986 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
1987 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
1994 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
1996 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
1999 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2000 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2001 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2002 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2005 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2007 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
2008 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
2016 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2017 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2018 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2019 * to the proper protocol handler.
2024 while (datalen
> 0) {
2025 if (ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
) == 0) {
2026 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2029 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, 1);
2030 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2040 static void ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
)
2043 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2045 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2051 * Now we must shut down any port and X forwardings going
2052 * through this connection.
2054 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2057 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
2060 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
2063 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
2064 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2065 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
2070 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2073 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2076 /* A socket error has occurred. */
2077 logevent(error_msg
);
2078 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, error_msg
);
2080 /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
2085 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2087 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2088 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2089 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2096 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2098 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2100 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2101 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2103 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2104 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2108 * Connect to specified host and port.
2109 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2110 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2111 * freed by the caller.
2113 static char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2114 char **realhost
, int nodelay
)
2116 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2126 ssh
->savedhost
= snewn(1 + strlen(host
), char);
2127 if (!ssh
->savedhost
)
2128 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2129 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2132 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2133 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2138 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"", host
);
2139 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2140 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
)
2148 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, 100);
2149 logeventf(ssh
, "Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2151 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2152 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2153 0, 1, nodelay
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2154 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2163 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2165 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2167 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2168 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2169 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2170 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2171 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
2172 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2173 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
2178 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2179 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2181 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2184 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2186 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2188 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2189 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2192 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2194 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2196 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2200 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2203 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2206 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, enable
);
2213 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2214 * reusable in several places - even between SSH1 and SSH2.
2217 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2218 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2220 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2221 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2222 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2223 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2227 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2228 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2229 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2230 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2232 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2237 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2240 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2241 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2246 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2247 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2248 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2249 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2254 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2255 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2256 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2257 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2266 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2267 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2268 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2270 if ((!ssh
->userpass_input_echo
||
2271 (c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2272 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2273 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2274 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2275 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2276 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2285 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2287 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
2290 unsigned char cookie
[8];
2291 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2292 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2293 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2295 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2296 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2297 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2298 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2299 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2302 void *publickey_blob
;
2303 int publickey_bloblen
;
2309 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2318 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2320 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2325 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2326 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2330 logevent("Received public keys");
2332 memcpy(cookie
, ssh
->pktin
.body
, 8);
2334 i
= makekey(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
, 0);
2335 j
= makekey(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8 + i
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
, 0);
2338 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2342 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2343 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2344 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2345 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2346 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2350 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8 + i
+ j
);
2351 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 12 + i
+ j
);
2352 s
->supported_auths_mask
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 16 + i
+ j
);
2354 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2355 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2356 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2359 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2360 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2361 MD5Update(&md5c
, ssh
->pktin
.body
, 8);
2362 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
2364 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
2365 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
2367 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
2369 s
->rsabuf
= snewn(s
->len
, unsigned char);
2371 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2374 * Verify the host key.
2378 * First format the key into a string.
2380 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
2381 char fingerprint
[100];
2382 char *keystr
= snewn(len
, char);
2384 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2385 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
2386 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
2387 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
2388 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, "rsa", keystr
,
2393 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2394 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
2396 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
2399 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
2400 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
2401 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
2403 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
2404 rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
2407 logevent("Encrypted session key");
2410 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
2411 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
2413 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
2414 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
2415 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
2416 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
2418 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
2419 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
2420 logevent("AES not supported in SSH1, skipping");
2422 switch (next_cipher
) {
2423 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
2424 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
2425 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
2426 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
2427 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
2428 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
2430 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
2434 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
2435 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
2436 bombout(("Server violates SSH 1 protocol by not "
2437 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
2439 /* shouldn't happen */
2440 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
2444 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
2446 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, cipher_string
, 0);
2449 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
2450 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
2451 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
2453 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
2454 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
2456 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
2457 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
2461 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
2462 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
2463 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
2464 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
2465 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
2466 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
2468 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
2472 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
2473 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
2475 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
2476 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
2477 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
2479 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
2480 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
2484 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2485 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
2489 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
2493 if ((flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
) && !*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
2494 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
2495 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
2496 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
2498 * get_line failed to get a username.
2501 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
2502 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
2506 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
2507 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
2510 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
2512 crWaitUntil(!ispkt
);
2513 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2517 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2520 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
2521 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
2524 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
2526 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
2527 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
2529 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
2530 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
2531 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
2532 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
2539 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
2540 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
2541 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
2543 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
2545 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
2546 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
2547 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
2548 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
2549 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
))
2550 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2552 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2554 while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2555 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
2557 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
2559 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
2565 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
2567 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
2568 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
2569 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
2570 agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
);
2571 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
2572 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
2573 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
2574 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
2575 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2579 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
2582 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
2585 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
2588 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
2589 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
2590 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
2591 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
2592 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2595 s
->p
+= ssh1_read_bignum(s
->p
, &s
->key
.exponent
);
2596 s
->p
+= ssh1_read_bignum(s
->p
, &s
->key
.modulus
);
2597 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2599 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
2600 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
2601 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
2602 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
2604 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
2605 logevent("Key refused");
2608 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
2609 ssh1_read_bignum(ssh
->pktin
.body
, &s
->challenge
);
2611 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
2614 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
2615 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
2616 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
2617 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
2618 len
+= 16; /* session id */
2619 len
+= 4; /* response format */
2620 agentreq
= snewn(4 + len
, char);
2621 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
2623 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
2624 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
2626 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
2627 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
2628 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
2629 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
2631 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
2632 agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
);
2636 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
2637 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
2638 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
2639 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
2643 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2645 ("Pageant's response accepted");
2646 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
2647 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
2649 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
2651 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
2656 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
2659 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
2663 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
2666 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
2667 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
2668 freebn(s
->challenge
);
2676 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
2677 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
2679 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
2680 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
2681 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
2682 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
2683 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
2684 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
2686 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
2687 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
2688 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
2689 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
2690 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
2693 int challengelen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
2694 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
2695 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
2696 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
2697 memcpy(s
->prompt
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, challengelen
);
2698 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
2699 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
2700 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
2701 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
2702 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
2703 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
2706 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
2707 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
2708 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
2709 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
2710 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
2711 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
2713 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
2714 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
2715 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
2716 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
2719 int challengelen
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
2720 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
2721 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
2722 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
2723 memcpy(s
->prompt
, ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4, challengelen
);
2724 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
2725 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
2726 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
2727 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
2728 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
2731 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
2732 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
2733 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
2735 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
2736 char *comment
= NULL
;
2739 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2740 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
2741 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
2742 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
2743 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
2744 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
2745 sprintf(msgbuf
, "Key is of wrong type (%s)",
2746 key_type_to_str(type
));
2748 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
2749 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2750 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2753 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
2754 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2755 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
2758 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
2763 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
2764 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
2768 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
2769 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
2771 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
2772 * because one was supplied on the command line
2773 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
2775 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
,
2776 PKT_STR
, "No more passwords available to try",
2778 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
2779 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "Unable to authenticate");
2780 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
2784 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
2785 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
2786 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
2787 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
2790 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
2792 crWaitUntil(!ispkt
);
2793 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2797 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2801 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
2803 * Try public key authentication with the specified
2806 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2809 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
);
2811 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
2812 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
2813 c_write_str(ssh
, ".\r\n");
2814 continue; /* go and try password */
2817 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
2818 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
2819 continue; /* try again */
2824 * Send a public key attempt.
2826 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
2827 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
2830 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2831 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
2832 continue; /* go and try password */
2834 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
2835 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
2841 unsigned char buffer
[32];
2842 Bignum challenge
, response
;
2844 ssh1_read_bignum(ssh
->pktin
.body
, &challenge
);
2845 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
2846 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
2848 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2849 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
2853 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
2854 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
2855 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
2857 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
2858 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
2865 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2866 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
2867 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
2868 " our public key.\r\n");
2869 continue; /* go and try password */
2870 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2871 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
2875 break; /* we're through! */
2877 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
2879 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
2880 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
2881 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
2882 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
2883 * The others are all random data in
2884 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
2885 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
2886 * hence can't deduce the password length.
2888 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
2889 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
2890 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
2891 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
2894 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
2895 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
2897 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
2898 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
2899 * packets containing string lengths N through
2900 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
2901 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
2902 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
2904 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
2905 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
2906 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
2907 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
2908 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
2911 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
2912 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
2913 * For this server we are left with no defences
2914 * against password length sniffing.
2916 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
2918 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
2919 * we can use the primary defence.
2921 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
2924 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
2926 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
2929 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
2933 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
2935 randomstr
= snewn(top
+ 1, char);
2937 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
2939 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
2940 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKT_END
);
2942 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
2944 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
2945 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
2947 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
2948 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
2949 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
2952 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
2953 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
2955 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
2957 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
2958 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
2959 * can use the secondary defence.
2965 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
2966 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
2968 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
2969 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
2970 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
2971 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
2976 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
2977 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_INT
, len
,
2978 PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
, PKT_END
);
2981 * The server has _both_
2982 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
2983 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
2984 * therefore nothing we can do.
2987 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
2988 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
2989 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_INT
, len
,
2990 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
, PKT_END
);
2993 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKT_END
);
2996 logevent("Sent password");
2997 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
2999 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3000 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3001 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
3002 logevent("Authentication refused");
3003 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3004 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
3009 logevent("Authentication successful");
3014 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
3018 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3019 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3023 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
3025 * If the channel's remoteid is -1, we have sent
3026 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3027 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3028 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3029 * open, we can close it then.
3031 if (((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
3032 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3033 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3036 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
3037 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
3041 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3042 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
3044 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3045 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
3046 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3048 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3053 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
3057 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3058 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3062 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3063 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3064 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3065 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
, PKT_END
);
3067 * In SSH1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3068 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3069 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3070 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3071 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3075 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3076 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3080 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3084 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3085 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3089 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3090 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3091 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3092 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3095 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3099 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
3101 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_protocol_crstate
);
3105 while (!do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
)) {
3108 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3111 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
3112 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
3113 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
3117 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3118 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3119 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3121 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3122 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
3124 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
3125 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3129 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
3130 char proto
[20], data
[64];
3131 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
3132 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
3133 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
3134 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
3135 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
3136 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3137 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
,
3138 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
3141 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3142 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKT_END
);
3147 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3148 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3149 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3151 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3152 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
3154 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
3155 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3162 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3163 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3165 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
3166 /* Add port forwardings. */
3167 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
3168 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3169 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3172 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3173 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
3175 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3176 * source port number. This means that
3177 * everything we've seen until now is the
3178 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
3179 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
3182 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3184 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
3187 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3191 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
3192 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3194 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
3195 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3198 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
3199 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3201 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3202 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3205 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3206 dport
= atoi(dports
);
3210 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
3212 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for"
3213 " destination port \"%s\"", dports
);
3217 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3220 sport
= atoi(sports
);
3224 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
3226 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
3227 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
3230 if (sport
&& dport
) {
3232 pfd_addforward(host
, dport
, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
3233 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3234 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
3235 " forwarding to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3236 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
3237 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
3238 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3239 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
3241 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
3242 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
3243 } else if (type
== 'D') {
3244 pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
3245 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3246 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
3247 " doing SOCKS dynamic forwarding",
3248 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
3249 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
3250 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3251 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")");
3253 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
3254 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
3255 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
3259 "SSH1 cannot handle source address spec \"%s:%d\"; ignoring",
3262 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
3264 "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
3268 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
3269 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3270 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3271 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
3273 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
3274 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
3275 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
3283 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3284 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3285 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3287 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3288 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused port"
3291 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
3298 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
3299 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
,
3300 PKT_STR
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
,
3301 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
3302 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
3303 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_CHAR
, 0, PKT_END
);
3304 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
3308 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3309 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3310 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3312 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3313 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
3314 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
3316 logevent("Allocated pty");
3318 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
3321 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
3322 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
3326 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3327 && ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3328 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3330 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3331 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
3333 logevent("Started compression");
3334 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
3335 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
3336 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
3337 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
3338 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
3342 * Start the shell or command.
3344 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH2
3345 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
3346 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
3349 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
3351 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
3352 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
3353 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
3356 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
3358 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
3359 logevent("Started session");
3362 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
3363 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
3364 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
3365 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
3366 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
3369 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
3371 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
3375 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
||
3376 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
) {
3377 long len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3379 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
,
3380 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
3381 (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.body
) + 4, len
);
3382 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3383 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
3384 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3386 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
) {
3387 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
3388 logevent("Received disconnect request");
3390 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
) {
3391 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3392 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
3393 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3395 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
3396 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
3397 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
3398 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3399 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3400 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
3402 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3405 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
3406 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
3407 logevent("opening X11 forward connection failed");
3409 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3410 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
),
3414 ("opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
3415 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3416 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3418 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3419 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
3420 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3421 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3422 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3423 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3424 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
3427 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
) {
3428 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3429 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
3430 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3432 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
3433 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
3434 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3435 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3437 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3439 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3440 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3442 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3443 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
3444 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3445 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3446 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3447 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
3450 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
) {
3451 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
3452 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
3453 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3454 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
;
3456 char host
[256], buf
[1024];
3458 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3461 hostsize
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+4);
3462 for (h
= host
, p
= (char *)(ssh
->pktin
.body
+8);
3463 hostsize
!= 0; hostsize
--) {
3464 if (h
+1 < host
+sizeof(host
))
3469 port
= GET_32BIT(p
);
3471 strcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
);
3474 if (find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
3475 sprintf(buf
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
3478 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3479 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
), PKT_END
);
3481 sprintf(buf
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
3484 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, host
, port
, c
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3487 sprintf(buf
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
3490 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3491 PKT_INT
, GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
),
3494 c
->remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3495 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3497 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3498 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
3499 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3500 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3501 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3502 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3503 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
3507 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
3508 unsigned int remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3509 unsigned int localid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+4);
3510 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3512 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3513 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3514 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
3515 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
3516 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3517 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3520 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
3522 * We have a pending close on this channel,
3523 * which we decided on before the server acked
3524 * the channel open. So now we know the
3525 * remoteid, we can close it again.
3527 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
3528 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3531 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
) {
3532 unsigned int remoteid
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3533 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3535 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3536 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3537 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
3538 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3539 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3543 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
||
3544 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
) {
3545 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
3546 unsigned i
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3547 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3548 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3549 if (c
&& ((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
3552 (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
3554 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
3555 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3556 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
3557 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
3560 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
3561 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3562 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
3563 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3567 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
3568 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
3569 send_packet(ssh
, ssh
->pktin
.type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3571 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
3574 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
3575 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3579 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
3580 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
3581 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
3585 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
3586 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
3587 int i
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3588 int len
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 4);
3589 unsigned char *p
= ssh
->pktin
.body
+ 8;
3590 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3591 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3596 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, (char *)p
, len
);
3599 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, (char *)p
, len
);
3602 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
3604 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
3605 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
3606 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3610 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3612 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
3614 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
3615 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
3617 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
3619 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
3621 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
3623 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3627 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3629 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
3630 void *reply
, *sentreply
;
3632 agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
3633 c
->u
.a
.totallen
, &reply
,
3638 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3639 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
3642 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3643 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3645 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
3649 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
3650 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3653 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
3656 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3657 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
3658 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3661 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3662 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
3663 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3664 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
3665 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
3666 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
) {
3668 ssh
->exitcode
= GET_32BIT(ssh
->pktin
.body
);
3669 sprintf(buf
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
3672 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
3674 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
3675 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
3676 * session which we might mistake for another
3677 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
3678 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
3680 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
3683 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
3688 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
3689 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
,
3690 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
, PKT_END
);
3701 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
3703 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
3706 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
3708 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
3711 * Is it at the start of the string?
3713 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
3714 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
3715 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
3716 /* either , or EOS follows */
3720 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
3721 * If no comma found, terminate.
3723 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
3724 haylen
--, haystack
++;
3727 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
3732 * SSH2 key creation method.
3734 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
3735 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
3736 unsigned char *keyspace
)
3739 /* First 20 bytes. */
3741 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
3743 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
3744 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
3745 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
3746 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
3747 /* Next 20 bytes. */
3749 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
3751 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
3752 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
3753 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
3757 * Handle the SSH2 transport layer.
3759 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
3761 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
3762 int nbits
, pbits
, warn
;
3763 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
3764 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
3765 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
3767 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
3768 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
3769 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
3770 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
3771 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
3772 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
3773 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
3774 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
3775 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
3776 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
3777 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
3778 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
3779 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
3782 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
3784 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
3786 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3787 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3788 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3796 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
3798 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
3799 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
3800 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
3801 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
3802 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
3805 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
3806 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
3810 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
3813 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
3816 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
3818 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
3819 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
3827 * Set up preferred compression.
3829 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
3830 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
3832 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
3835 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
3837 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
3838 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
3840 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
3844 int i
, j
, cipherstr_started
;
3847 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
3849 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
3850 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
3851 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(ssh
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
3852 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
3853 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3854 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(kex_algs
); i
++) {
3855 if (kex_algs
[i
] == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
&&
3856 (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
))
3858 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, kex_algs
[i
]->name
);
3859 if (i
< lenof(kex_algs
) - 1)
3860 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3862 /* List server host key algorithms. */
3863 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3864 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
3865 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
3866 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
3867 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3869 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
3870 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3871 cipherstr_started
= 0;
3872 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3873 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3874 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
3875 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3876 if (cipherstr_started
)
3877 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3878 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
3879 cipherstr_started
= 1;
3882 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
3883 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3884 cipherstr_started
= 0;
3885 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3886 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3887 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
3888 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3889 if (cipherstr_started
)
3890 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3891 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
3892 cipherstr_started
= 1;
3895 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
3896 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3897 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3898 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
3899 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
3900 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3902 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
3903 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3904 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
3905 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
3906 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
3907 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3909 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
3910 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3911 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3912 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3913 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3914 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->name
);
3915 if (i
< lenof(compressions
))
3916 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3918 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
3919 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3920 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
3921 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
3922 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
3923 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, c
->name
);
3924 if (i
< lenof(compressions
))
3925 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(ssh
, ",");
3927 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
3928 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3929 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
3930 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
3931 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
3932 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
);
3934 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
3937 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
3938 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
3944 if (ssh
->pktin
.length
> 5)
3945 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, ssh
->pktin
.data
+ 5, ssh
->pktin
.length
- 5);
3948 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
3955 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
3956 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
3960 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
3961 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3962 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
3963 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3964 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
3965 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3966 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
3967 ssh
->pktin
.savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
3968 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
3969 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(kex_algs
); i
++) {
3970 if (kex_algs
[i
] == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
&&
3971 (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX
))
3973 if (in_commasep_string(kex_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3974 ssh
->kex
= kex_algs
[i
];
3978 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
3979 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
3980 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3981 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
3985 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
3987 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
3988 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
3992 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
3993 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
3994 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
3999 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
4001 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
, 1);
4005 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
4006 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
4007 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4011 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
4013 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4014 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4018 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4019 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4020 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
4025 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
4027 askcipher(ssh
->frontend
, s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
, 2);
4031 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
4032 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
4033 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4037 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
4038 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4039 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4040 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
4044 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
4045 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4046 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4047 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
4051 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
4052 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
4053 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
4054 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
4055 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4060 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
4061 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
4062 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
4063 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
4064 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4072 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
4073 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
4079 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
4080 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
4081 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
4083 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
4084 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
4089 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
4090 * requesting a group.
4092 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
4093 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
4094 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
4096 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
4099 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
4100 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
4101 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, s
->pbits
);
4105 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
4106 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
4109 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4110 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4111 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(s
->p
, s
->g
);
4112 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
4113 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
4115 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP1
;
4116 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group1();
4117 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
4118 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
4121 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
4123 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
4125 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
4126 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, s
->kex_init_value
);
4127 ssh2_pkt_addmp(ssh
, s
->e
);
4131 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
4132 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
4135 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
4136 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(ssh
);
4137 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
4139 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
4141 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4142 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
4143 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
4144 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
4145 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
4147 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
4148 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
4149 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
4150 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
4152 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
4153 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
4156 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
4157 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
4160 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4162 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
4163 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
4164 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
4169 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
4170 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
4172 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
4173 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
4174 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
4175 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
,
4176 s
->keystr
, s
->fingerprint
);
4177 if (s
->first_kex
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
4178 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
4179 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
4181 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
4183 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
4186 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
4188 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
4192 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
4195 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
4196 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
4201 * Create and initialise session keys.
4203 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
4204 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
4205 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
4206 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
4208 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
4209 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
4210 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
4211 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
4213 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
4214 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
4215 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
4216 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
4218 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
4219 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
4220 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
4221 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
4223 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
4224 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
4225 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
4226 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
4228 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
4229 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
4230 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
4231 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
4234 * Set IVs after keys. Here we use the exchange hash from the
4235 * _first_ key exchange.
4238 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
4240 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
4241 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
4242 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
4243 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4244 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
4245 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4246 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
4247 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4248 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
4249 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4250 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
4251 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4252 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
4253 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4255 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
4256 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
4257 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
4258 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
4259 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
4260 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
4261 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
4262 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
4263 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
4264 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
4267 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
4268 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
4269 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
4270 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
4271 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
4272 * it would only confuse the layer above.
4274 if (!s
->first_kex
) {
4280 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
4281 * function so that other things can run on top of the
4282 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
4285 while (!(ispkt
&& ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
)) {
4288 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
4289 goto begin_key_exchange
;
4295 * Add data to an SSH2 channel output buffer.
4297 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
4300 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
4304 * Attempt to send data on an SSH2 channel.
4306 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
4310 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
4313 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
4314 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
4315 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
4316 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
4317 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
4318 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
4319 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
4320 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4321 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, data
, len
);
4323 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
4324 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
4328 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
4331 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
4335 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH2 channel.
4337 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
4342 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
4343 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
4344 * be sending any more data anyway.
4349 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
) {
4350 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
4351 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
4352 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
4354 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
4359 * Handle the SSH2 userauth and connection layers.
4361 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
4363 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
4365 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
4367 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
4371 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
4372 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
4373 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
4375 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
4376 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
4378 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
4379 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
, tried_keyb_inter
;
4380 int kbd_inter_running
;
4382 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
4387 void *publickey_blob
;
4388 int publickey_bloblen
;
4389 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
4393 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
4394 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
4395 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
4396 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
4399 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
4401 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
4404 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
4406 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
4407 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-userauth");
4409 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4410 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
4411 bombout(("Server refused user authentication protocol"));
4416 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
4417 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
4418 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
4419 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
4420 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
4421 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
4423 * I think this best serves the needs of
4425 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
4426 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
4427 * type both correctly
4429 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
4430 * need to fall back to passwords
4432 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
4433 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
4434 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
4435 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
4436 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
4439 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
4440 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
4445 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
4447 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
4448 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
4451 } else if ((flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
) && !*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
4452 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
4453 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
4454 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
4456 * get_line failed to get a username.
4459 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
4460 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
4464 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
4465 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
4467 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
4469 crWaitUntilV(!ispkt
);
4470 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
4474 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4476 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
4479 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
4480 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
4481 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
4482 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
4483 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
4487 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
4490 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
4491 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
4492 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
4494 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4496 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4497 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4498 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
4499 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "none"); /* method */
4501 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
4503 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
4505 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
4506 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
4507 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= FALSE
;
4508 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
4509 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
4510 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
4512 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
4513 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
4514 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
4515 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
4517 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
4518 &s
->publickey_bloblen
);
4521 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
4522 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
4523 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
4525 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
4526 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
4527 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
4529 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
4532 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
4536 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
4539 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4540 while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
) {
4544 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
4545 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
4546 * a script, which means nobody will read the
4547 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
4548 * the banner will screw up processing on the
4549 * output of (say) plink.)
4551 if (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
4552 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &banner
, &size
);
4554 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
4556 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4558 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
4559 logevent("Access granted");
4560 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
4564 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
4565 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
4567 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
4568 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
4569 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
4570 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
4571 * curr_prompt variable.
4575 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
4576 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
4584 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
4585 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
4586 * helpfully try next.
4588 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
4591 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &methods
, &methlen
);
4592 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
4593 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
)) {
4595 * We have received an unequivocal Access
4596 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
4599 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
4600 * it's not worth printing anything at all
4602 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
4603 * the message should be "Server refused our
4604 * key" (or no message at all if the key
4605 * came from Pageant)
4607 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
4608 * message really should be "Access denied".
4610 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
4611 * authentication, we should break out of this
4612 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
4615 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
4617 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
4618 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
4619 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
4620 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
4621 logevent("Server refused public key");
4622 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
4623 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
4625 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
4626 logevent("Access denied");
4627 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
) {
4628 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
4633 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
4634 logevent("Further authentication required");
4638 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
4640 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
4641 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
4642 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
4646 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4649 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
4650 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
4651 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
4652 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
4656 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
4657 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
4659 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
4664 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4665 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
4667 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
4669 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
4671 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
4672 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
4673 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
4674 agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
);
4675 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
4676 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
4677 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
4678 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
4679 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4683 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
4686 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
4691 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
4694 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4696 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
4697 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
4698 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
4699 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
4700 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
4701 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
4703 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
4705 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
4706 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
4707 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
4709 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
4710 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
4711 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4712 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4713 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4714 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4715 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
4716 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4717 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
4718 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4719 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4722 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4723 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
4724 logevent("Key refused");
4728 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
4729 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
4731 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
4732 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
4736 * Server is willing to accept the key.
4737 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
4739 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4740 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4741 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4742 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4743 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, TRUE
);
4744 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4745 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
4746 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4747 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4749 s
->siglen
= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
4750 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
4752 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
4753 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
4754 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
4755 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
4756 s
->agentreq
= snewn(4 + s
->len
, char);
4757 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
4758 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
4759 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
4760 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
4762 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
4764 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
4766 /* Now the data to be signed... */
4767 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
4768 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
4771 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
4773 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
4774 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
4775 s
->q
+= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5;
4776 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
4778 agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4, &vret
, &s
->retlen
);
4782 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
4783 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
4784 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
4786 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
4792 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
4802 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
4803 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
4804 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
4805 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
4808 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
4810 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4811 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
4814 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
4816 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
4817 * willing to accept it.
4820 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
4824 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4825 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4826 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4827 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
4828 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
4829 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, algorithm
);
4830 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
4831 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)pub_blob
,
4834 logevent("Offered public key"); /* FIXME */
4836 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4837 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
4839 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
4840 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
4843 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
4845 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
4848 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
4849 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
4850 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
4856 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
4857 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
4858 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
4859 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
4863 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->tried_keyb_inter
) {
4864 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4865 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4866 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
4868 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4869 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
4871 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
4872 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
4873 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
4874 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
4875 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, ""); /* lang */
4876 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "");
4879 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
4880 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
4881 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
4883 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
4884 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
4888 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
4892 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
4893 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4894 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
4895 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
4897 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4898 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
4900 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
4902 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
4903 * Display header data, and start going through
4906 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
4907 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
4909 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &name
, &name_len
);
4910 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
4911 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
4913 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
4914 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4917 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
4918 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4920 s
->num_prompts
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
4924 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
4925 * display one and get a response.
4927 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
4931 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
4932 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
4933 strncpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, sizeof(s
->pwprompt
));
4934 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
< sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) ?
4935 prompt_len
: sizeof(s
->pwprompt
)-1] = '\0';
4938 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
4940 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
4946 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
4947 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
4948 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
4949 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
4950 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
4957 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
4958 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
4960 * get_line failed to get a password (for
4961 * example because one was supplied on the
4962 * command line which has already failed to
4965 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
4966 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
,SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
4967 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "No more passwords available"
4969 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
4971 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
4972 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
,
4973 "Unable to authenticate");
4974 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
4978 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
4979 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
4982 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
4983 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
4985 crWaitUntilV(!ispkt
);
4986 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
4990 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
4994 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
4996 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
4998 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
5000 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
);
5001 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
5002 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
5003 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
5004 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
5006 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key\r\n");
5007 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
5009 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
5010 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5011 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
5012 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
5013 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "none"); /* method */
5015 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
5017 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
5018 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
5022 * We have loaded the private key and the server
5023 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
5024 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
5026 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5027 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
5028 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
5029 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "publickey"); /* method */
5030 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, TRUE
);
5031 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, key
->alg
->name
);
5032 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
5033 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
5034 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
5037 * The data to be signed is:
5041 * followed by everything so far placed in the
5044 sigdata_len
= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
5045 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
5047 sigdata
= snewn(sigdata_len
, unsigned char);
5049 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
5050 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
5053 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
5054 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->pktout
.data
+ 5,
5055 ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5);
5056 p
+= ssh
->pktout
.length
- 5;
5057 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
5058 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
5059 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
5060 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
5061 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
5067 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
5069 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
5071 * We send the password packet lumped tightly together with
5072 * an SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet. The IGNORE packet contains a
5073 * string long enough to make the total length of the two
5074 * packets constant. This should ensure that a passive
5075 * listener doing traffic analyis can't work out the length
5078 * For this to work, we need an assumption about the
5079 * maximum length of the password packet. I think 256 is
5080 * pretty conservative. Anyone using a password longer than
5081 * that probably doesn't have much to worry about from
5082 * people who find out how long their password is!
5084 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5085 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->username
);
5086 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
5087 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "password");
5088 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, FALSE
);
5089 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->password
);
5090 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
5091 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
);
5093 * We'll include a string that's an exact multiple of the
5094 * cipher block size. If the cipher is NULL for some
5095 * reason, we don't do this trick at all because we gain
5098 if (ssh
->cscipher
) {
5101 stringlen
= (256 - ssh
->deferred_len
);
5102 stringlen
+= ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
- 1;
5103 stringlen
-= (stringlen
% ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
);
5106 * Temporarily disable actual compression,
5107 * so we can guarantee to get this string
5108 * exactly the length we want it. The
5109 * compression-disabling routine should
5110 * return an integer indicating how many
5111 * bytes we should adjust our string length
5115 ssh
->cscomp
->disable_compression(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
5117 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
5118 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
5119 for (i
= 0; i
< stringlen
; i
++) {
5120 char c
= (char) random_byte();
5121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, &c
, 1);
5123 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
);
5125 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
5126 logevent("Sent password");
5127 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
5128 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
5129 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
5130 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
5131 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, s
->num_prompts
);
5133 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
5134 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, s
->password
);
5135 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
5138 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
5142 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
5143 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
5144 * another packet. Then we go back round the
5145 * loop and will end up retrieving another
5146 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
5151 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
5153 c_write_str(ssh
, "No supported authentication methods"
5154 " left to try!\r\n");
5155 logevent("No supported authentications offered."
5157 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5158 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5159 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "No supported authentication"
5160 " methods available");
5161 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5163 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5167 } while (!s
->we_are_in
);
5170 * Now we're authenticated for the connection protocol. The
5171 * connection protocol will automatically have started at this
5172 * point; there's no need to send SERVICE_REQUEST.
5176 * So now create a channel with a session in it.
5178 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
5179 ssh
->mainchan
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
5180 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
5181 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
5182 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
5183 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "session");
5184 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
5185 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
5186 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
5187 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
5189 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5190 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
5191 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
5193 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
5195 if (ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
5196 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
5199 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5200 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
5201 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
5202 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5203 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5204 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5205 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
5206 logevent("Opened channel for session");
5209 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
5211 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
5212 char proto
[20], data
[64];
5213 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5214 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
5215 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
5216 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
5217 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5218 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
5219 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "x11-req");
5220 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5221 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 0); /* many connections */
5222 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, proto
);
5223 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, data
);
5224 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
5228 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5229 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5230 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5231 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5232 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5234 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5235 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5237 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5239 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5240 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5241 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
5242 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5245 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5247 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5248 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
5253 * Enable port forwardings.
5258 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
5259 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
5261 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
5262 /* Add port forwardings. */
5263 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
5264 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
5265 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5268 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
5269 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
5271 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
5272 * source port number. This means that
5273 * everything we've seen until now is the
5274 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
5275 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
5278 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5280 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
5283 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5287 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
5288 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5290 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
5291 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5294 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
5295 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5297 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
5298 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5301 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5302 dport
= atoi(dports
);
5306 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
5308 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
5309 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
5313 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
5316 sport
= atoi(sports
);
5320 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
5322 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
5323 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
5326 if (sport
&& dport
) {
5328 pfd_addforward(host
, dport
, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
5329 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
5330 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
5331 " forwarding to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
5332 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
5333 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
5334 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
5335 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
5337 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
5338 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
5339 } else if (type
== 'D') {
5340 pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1, *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
5341 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
5342 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
5343 " doing SOCKS dynamic forwarding",
5344 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
5345 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
5346 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
5347 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")");
5349 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
5350 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
5351 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
5354 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
5355 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding"
5356 " to %s:%d", host
, dport
);
5359 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port "
5360 "%.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
5361 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
5362 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0),
5364 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
5365 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
5366 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
5368 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
5369 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
5370 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
5371 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "tcpip-forward");
5372 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1);/* want reply */
5374 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, saddr
);
5375 if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
)
5376 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "0.0.0.0");
5378 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "127.0.0.1");
5379 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, sport
);
5383 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5384 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5385 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5386 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5387 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5389 continue;/* nonexistent channel */
5390 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5392 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5394 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
) {
5395 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
) {
5396 bombout(("Unexpected response to port "
5397 "forwarding request: packet type %d",
5401 logevent("Server refused this port forwarding");
5403 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
5412 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
5414 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
5415 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
5416 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5417 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
5418 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
5419 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5423 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5424 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5425 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5426 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5427 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5429 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5430 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5432 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5434 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5435 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5436 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
5437 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5440 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5442 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5443 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
5448 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
5450 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
5451 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5452 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
5453 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "pty-req");
5454 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5455 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
5456 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
);
5457 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_height
);
5458 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0); /* pixel width */
5459 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0); /* pixel height */
5460 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
5461 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(ssh
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END, no special options */
5463 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
5466 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5467 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5468 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5469 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5470 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5472 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5473 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5475 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5477 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5478 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5479 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
5480 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5483 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5484 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
5486 logevent("Allocated pty");
5489 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
5493 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
5494 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
5501 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
5502 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
5503 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
5505 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
5506 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
5509 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
5510 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
5512 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "subsystem");
5513 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5514 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, cmd
);
5516 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "exec");
5517 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5518 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, cmd
);
5520 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "shell");
5521 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 1); /* want reply */
5525 crWaitUntilV(ispkt
);
5526 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5527 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5528 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5529 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5531 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5532 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5534 } while (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5535 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
5536 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
5537 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
5538 " packet type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5542 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
5543 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
5544 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
5545 * back to it before complaining.
5547 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
5548 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
5549 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
5552 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
5555 logevent("Started a shell/command");
5560 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
5561 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
5562 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
5563 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
5564 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
5570 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5574 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
5576 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
||
5577 ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
5580 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5581 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5582 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5584 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5585 if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5586 ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5587 continue; /* extended but not stderr */
5588 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &data
, &length
);
5591 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5593 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5595 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, ssh
->pktin
.type
==
5596 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5600 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5603 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5606 while (length
> 0) {
5607 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5608 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5609 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5613 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5615 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5617 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5618 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
5620 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5622 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5624 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5626 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5630 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5632 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5633 void *reply
, *sentreply
;
5635 agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5636 c
->u
.a
.totallen
, &reply
,
5641 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
5642 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
5645 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
5649 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5650 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5657 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5658 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5660 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5661 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5663 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
) {
5664 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5665 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5667 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5669 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5671 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5673 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5674 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5676 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5678 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5680 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5681 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5684 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
) {
5685 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5686 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5688 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5689 if (!c
|| ((int)c
->remoteid
) == -1) {
5690 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
5691 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
5694 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
5696 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5697 break; /* nothing to see here, move along */
5699 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
5700 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5707 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
5708 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5712 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
5713 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5714 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5717 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5718 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5722 * See if that was the last channel left open.
5724 if (count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
5725 logevent("All channels closed. Disconnecting");
5728 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
5729 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
5730 * SSH2 connection had to end with a disconnect
5731 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
5732 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
5733 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
5734 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
5735 * this is more polite than sending a
5736 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
5738 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5739 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5740 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "All open channels closed");
5741 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5744 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5747 continue; /* remote sends close; ignore (FIXME) */
5748 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
) {
5749 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5750 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5751 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5752 if (!c
|| c
->closes
)
5753 continue; /* nonexistent or closing channel */
5754 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5756 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
5757 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5758 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5759 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5761 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5762 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5763 continue; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
5764 c
->remoteid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5765 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5766 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5767 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5769 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5772 * We have a pending close on this channel,
5773 * which we decided on before the server acked
5774 * the channel open. So now we know the
5775 * remoteid, we can close it again.
5777 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5778 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5781 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
) {
5782 unsigned i
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5783 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5784 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5786 continue; /* nonexistent channel */
5787 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5788 continue; /* dunno why they're failing this */
5790 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
5792 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5794 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5796 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
) {
5799 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5800 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5802 localid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5803 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5804 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
5807 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
5808 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
5810 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
5813 sprintf(buf
, "Received channel request for nonexistent"
5814 " channel %d", localid
);
5816 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5817 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5818 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, buf
);
5819 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5821 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", buf
);
5822 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5827 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
5828 * the request type string to see if it's something
5831 if (typelen
== 11 && !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11) &&
5832 c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
5833 /* We recognise "exit-status" on the primary channel. */
5835 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5836 sprintf(buf
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
5840 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
5841 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5846 * This is a channel request we don't know
5847 * about, so we now either ignore the request
5848 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
5852 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
5853 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5857 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
) {
5859 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5861 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5862 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(ssh
);
5865 * We currently don't support any global requests
5866 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
5867 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
5871 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
5874 } else if (ssh
->pktin
.type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
) {
5881 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5882 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
5883 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &type
, &typelen
);
5884 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
5887 remid
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5888 winsize
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5889 pktsize
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5891 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
5894 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5895 addrstr
= snewn(peeraddrlen
+1, char);
5896 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
5897 peeraddr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
5898 peerport
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5900 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
5901 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
5902 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
5903 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, peerport
,
5904 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
5905 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
5911 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
5912 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
5913 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
5916 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
5917 pf
.sport
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5918 ssh2_pkt_getstring(ssh
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5919 peerport
= ssh2_pkt_getuint32(ssh
);
5920 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
5921 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
5922 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
5924 char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, realpf
->dhost
,
5925 realpf
->dport
, c
, &ssh
->cfg
);
5926 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port open request"
5927 " for %s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
5929 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
5930 error
= "Port open failed";
5932 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
5933 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5936 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
5937 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 3)) {
5938 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
5939 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
5941 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
5942 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5945 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
5948 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
5950 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
5951 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5952 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
5953 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, error
);
5954 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "en"); /* language tag */
5958 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
5960 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
5961 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
5962 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
5963 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5964 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5965 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
5966 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->remoteid
);
5967 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->localid
);
5968 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5969 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
5973 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", ssh
->pktin
.type
));
5978 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
5980 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
5985 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5987 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
5989 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
5992 continue; /* don't send on closing channels */
5993 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
5996 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5997 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5998 * notification since it will be polled */
6001 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6004 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6005 * buffer management */
6008 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6020 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
6022 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
, int ispkt
)
6024 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
) == 0)
6026 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, ispkt
);
6030 * Called to set up the connection.
6032 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
6034 static char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
6036 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
)
6041 ssh
= snew(struct ssh_tag
);
6042 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
6043 ssh
->version
= 0; /* when not ready yet */
6046 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
6047 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
6048 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
6049 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
6050 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
6051 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
6053 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
6055 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
6057 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
6059 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
6061 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
6062 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
6064 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
6065 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
6066 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
6070 static const struct Packet empty
= { 0, 0, NULL
, NULL
, 0 };
6071 ssh
->pktin
= ssh
->pktout
= empty
;
6073 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
6074 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
6075 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
6076 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
6078 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
6079 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
6080 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
6081 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
6082 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
6083 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
6084 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
6085 ssh
->ssh1_protocol_crstate
= 0;
6086 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
6087 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
6088 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
6089 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
6090 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
6091 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
6092 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
6093 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
6094 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
6095 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
6097 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
6100 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
6101 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
6104 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
6105 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
6106 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
6108 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
6109 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
6114 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
6115 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
6116 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
6118 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
6120 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
);
6127 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
6129 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6130 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6131 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
6133 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
6134 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
6135 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
6136 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
6137 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
6138 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
6139 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
6140 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
6141 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
6142 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
6143 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
6144 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
6145 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
6146 ssh
->sccomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
6148 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
6149 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
6151 if (ssh
->channels
) {
6152 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
6155 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
6156 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6159 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
6160 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6165 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
6168 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
6169 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
6171 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
6173 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
6175 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
6176 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
6177 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
6178 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
6179 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
6187 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
6189 * Currently, this function does nothing very useful. In future,
6190 * however, we could do some handy things with it. For example, we
6191 * could make the port forwarding configurer active in the Change
6192 * Settings box, and this routine could close down existing
6193 * forwardings and open up new ones in response to changes.
6195 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
6197 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6198 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
6202 * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
6204 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
6206 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6208 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
6211 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
6213 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
6217 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
6219 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
6221 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6224 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
6228 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
6229 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
6232 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
6233 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
6235 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6236 return override_value
;
6237 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
6238 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
6239 return override_value
;
6241 return (override_value
+
6242 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
6249 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
6251 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
6253 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6255 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
6256 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
6258 switch (ssh
->state
) {
6259 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
6260 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
6261 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
6262 break; /* do nothing */
6263 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
6264 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
6266 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
6267 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
6268 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6269 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
6270 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
6271 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
6272 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
6274 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6275 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6276 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "window-change");
6277 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 0);
6278 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
);
6279 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->term_height
);
6280 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6281 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6290 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
6293 static const struct telnet_special
*ssh_get_specials(void *handle
)
6295 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6297 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6298 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_specials
[] = {
6299 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
6302 return ssh1_specials
;
6303 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
6304 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_specials
[] = {
6306 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
6309 return ssh2_specials
;
6315 * Send Telnet special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
6316 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
6319 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
6321 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6323 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
6324 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
6326 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
6327 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
6330 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
6333 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6334 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
6336 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
6337 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6340 logevent("Sent EOF message");
6341 } else if (code
== TS_PING
|| code
== TS_NOP
) {
6342 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
6343 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
6344 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6345 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
6346 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
6348 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
6349 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ssh
);
6352 } else if (code
== TS_BRK
) {
6353 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
6354 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
6355 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6356 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH1");
6358 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6359 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6360 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "break");
6361 ssh2_pkt_addbool(ssh
, 0);
6362 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0); /* default break length */
6370 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
6372 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6373 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6374 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
6378 c
->remoteid
= -1; /* to be set when open confirmed */
6379 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6381 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
6383 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6384 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6390 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
6391 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
6393 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
6395 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6396 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6397 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
6398 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
6399 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
6402 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
6403 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
6407 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
6409 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
6412 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
6414 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
6415 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
6416 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
6419 //PKT_STR, <org:orgport>,
6422 ssh2_pkt_init(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
6423 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "direct-tcpip");
6424 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->localid
);
6425 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6426 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
6427 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
6428 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, hostname
);
6429 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, port
);
6431 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
6432 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
6433 * convinced the server should be told details like that
6434 * about my local network configuration.
6436 ssh2_pkt_addstring(ssh
, "client-side-connection");
6437 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(ssh
, 0);
6443 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
6445 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6449 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
6451 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6452 return ssh
->send_ok
;
6455 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
6457 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6458 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
6459 return ssh
->echoing
;
6460 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
6461 return ssh
->editing
;
6465 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
6467 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6471 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
6473 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6474 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
6477 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
6479 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6483 return (ssh
->exitcode
>= 0 ? ssh
->exitcode
: 0);
6487 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
6488 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
6489 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
6491 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
6493 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
6494 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
6497 Backend ssh_backend
= {
6507 ssh_return_exitcode
,