17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK 0x000F
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
113 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
131 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
147 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
153 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
155 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
158 * Various remote-bug flags.
160 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
161 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
162 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
163 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
164 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
166 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
167 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
170 * Codes for terminal modes.
171 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
172 * This list is derived from draft-ietf-secsh-connect-25 and
175 static const struct {
176 const char* const mode
;
178 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR
, TTY_OP_BOOL
} type
;
180 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
181 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
182 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
183 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
184 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
185 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
186 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
187 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
188 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
189 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
190 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
191 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
192 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
193 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
194 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
195 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
196 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
197 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
198 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR
},
199 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
200 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
201 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
202 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
203 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
204 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
205 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
206 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
207 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
208 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
209 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
210 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
211 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
212 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
213 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
214 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
215 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
216 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
217 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
218 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
219 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
220 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
221 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
222 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
223 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL
}, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
224 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
225 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
226 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
227 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
228 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
229 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
230 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
231 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
232 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL
},
233 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL
}
236 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
237 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
238 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
239 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
240 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
241 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
242 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
244 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
245 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s
)
250 ret
= ctrlparse(s
, &next
);
251 if (!next
) ret
= s
[0];
253 ret
= 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
257 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s
)
259 if (stricmp(s
, "yes") == 0 ||
260 stricmp(s
, "on") == 0 ||
261 stricmp(s
, "true") == 0 ||
262 stricmp(s
, "+") == 0)
264 else if (stricmp(s
, "no") == 0 ||
265 stricmp(s
, "off") == 0 ||
266 stricmp(s
, "false") == 0 ||
267 stricmp(s
, "-") == 0)
268 return 0; /* false */
270 return (atoi(s
) != 0);
273 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
274 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
275 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
277 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
278 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
279 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
280 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
281 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
282 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
283 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
284 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
285 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
286 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
287 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
288 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
289 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
290 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
291 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
292 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
293 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
294 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
295 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
296 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
297 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
298 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
299 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
300 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
301 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
302 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
303 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
304 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
305 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
306 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
307 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
308 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
313 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
316 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
320 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
322 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
323 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
324 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
325 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
326 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
327 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
328 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
329 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
330 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
331 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
332 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
333 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
334 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
335 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
336 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
337 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
338 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
339 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
340 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
341 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
342 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
343 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
344 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
345 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
346 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
347 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
348 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
349 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
350 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
351 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
352 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
353 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
354 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
355 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
356 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
357 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
363 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
365 PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
,
366 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
367 * fields to the packet logging code. */
368 PKTT_OTHER
, PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKTT_DATA
372 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
373 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
376 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
378 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
380 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
381 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
382 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
383 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
385 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
387 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
388 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
389 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
391 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
394 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
396 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
397 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
398 #define crReturn(z) \
400 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
404 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
406 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
407 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
408 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
409 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
411 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
414 static struct Packet
*ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
415 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
416 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*, int length
);
417 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*, void *data
, int len
);
418 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
419 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
420 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*, unsigned long value
);
421 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*);
422 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
423 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*, char *data
, int len
);
424 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
425 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
426 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
427 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
428 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
429 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
430 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
431 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
432 struct Packet
*pktin
);
433 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
434 struct Packet
*pktin
);
437 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
438 * various different purposes:
440 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
441 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
442 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
443 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
446 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
447 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
448 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
449 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
450 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
451 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
453 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
457 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
458 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
459 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
460 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
462 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
464 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
467 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
468 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
471 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
475 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
478 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
479 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
483 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
487 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
489 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
490 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
491 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
493 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
494 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
495 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
498 enum { /* channel types */
503 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
507 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
510 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
511 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
513 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
516 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
518 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
519 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
520 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
521 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
523 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
527 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
530 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
532 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
537 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
538 unsigned char *message
;
539 unsigned char msglen
[4];
540 unsigned lensofar
, totallen
;
542 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
545 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
552 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
553 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
554 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
556 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
557 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
558 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
559 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
560 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
561 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
562 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
563 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
564 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
565 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
566 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
568 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
569 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
570 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
571 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
572 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
573 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
575 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
576 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
578 struct ssh_portfwd
; /* forward declaration */
580 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
581 unsigned sport
, dport
;
584 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
;
586 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
587 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
590 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
591 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
592 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
593 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
597 enum { DESTROY
, KEEP
, CREATE
} status
;
599 unsigned sport
, dport
;
602 struct ssh_rportfwd
*remote
;
606 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
607 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
608 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
611 long length
; /* length of `data' actually used */
612 long forcepad
; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
613 int type
; /* only used for incoming packets */
614 unsigned long sequence
; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
615 unsigned char *data
; /* allocated storage */
616 unsigned char *body
; /* offset of payload within `data' */
617 long savedpos
; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
618 long maxlen
; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
619 long encrypted_len
; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
622 * State associated with packet logging
626 struct logblank_t
*blanks
;
629 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
630 struct Packet
*pktin
);
631 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
632 struct Packet
*pktin
);
633 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
634 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
635 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
636 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
637 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
638 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
639 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
640 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
641 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
642 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
);
643 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
);
644 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
);
645 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
);
646 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
);
647 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
648 struct Packet
*pktin
);
650 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
651 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
652 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
656 struct Packet
*pktin
;
659 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
660 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
663 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
664 struct Packet
*pktin
;
667 typedef void (*handler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
);
668 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
);
670 struct queued_handler
;
671 struct queued_handler
{
673 chandler_fn_t handler
;
675 struct queued_handler
*next
;
679 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
680 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
682 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
689 unsigned char session_key
[32];
691 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
692 int v1_local_protoflags
;
693 int agentfwd_enabled
;
696 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
699 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
700 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
701 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
702 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
703 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
704 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
705 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
706 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
707 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
713 int echoing
, editing
;
717 int ospeed
, ispeed
; /* temporaries */
718 int term_width
, term_height
;
720 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
721 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
726 tree234
*rportfwds
, *portfwds
;
730 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
736 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
738 struct Packet
**queue
;
739 int queuelen
, queuesize
;
741 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
742 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
745 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
746 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
747 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
752 bufchain banner
; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
754 * Used for username and password input.
756 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
757 int userpass_input_buflen
;
758 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
759 int userpass_input_echo
;
766 int v1_throttle_count
;
769 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
770 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence
;
772 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
773 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
774 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
775 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
776 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
777 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate
;
778 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
779 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
781 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
782 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
783 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
784 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
786 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
787 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
789 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
790 int protocol_initial_phase_done
;
792 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
794 struct Packet
*(*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
797 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
798 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
799 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
800 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
805 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
807 void *agent_response
;
808 int agent_response_len
;
812 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
813 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
814 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
815 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
816 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
817 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
821 bufchain queued_incoming_data
;
824 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
827 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch
[256];
830 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
831 * indications from a request.
833 struct queued_handler
*qhead
, *qtail
;
836 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
841 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
844 unsigned long incoming_data_size
, outgoing_data_size
, deferred_data_size
;
845 unsigned long max_data_size
;
847 long next_rekey
, last_rekey
;
848 char *deferred_rekey_reason
; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
851 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
853 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
854 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, const char *fmt
, ...)
860 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
866 #define bombout(msg) \
868 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
869 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
871 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
875 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
877 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
879 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitpass
)
880 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
883 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
885 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
)
886 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
889 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
891 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
894 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
895 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh
, char *modes
,
896 void (*do_mode
)(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
),
900 char *t
= strchr(modes
, '\t');
901 char *m
= snewn(t
-modes
+1, char);
903 strncpy(m
, modes
, t
-modes
);
906 val
= get_ttymode(ssh
->frontend
, m
);
910 do_mode(data
, m
, val
);
913 modes
+= strlen(modes
) + 1;
917 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
919 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
920 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
921 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
923 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
927 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
929 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
930 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
938 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
940 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
941 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
943 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
944 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
945 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
947 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
952 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
954 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
955 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
957 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
959 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
965 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
966 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
968 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a
, const char *b
)
970 if (a
== NULL
&& b
== NULL
)
979 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
981 struct ssh_portfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) av
;
982 struct ssh_portfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_portfwd
*) bv
;
984 if (a
->type
> b
->type
)
986 if (a
->type
< b
->type
)
988 if (a
->addressfamily
> b
->addressfamily
)
990 if (a
->addressfamily
< b
->addressfamily
)
992 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->saddr
, b
->saddr
)) != 0)
993 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
994 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
996 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
998 if (a
->type
!= 'D') {
999 if ( (i
= nullstrcmp(a
->daddr
, b
->daddr
)) != 0)
1000 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
1001 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
1003 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
1009 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
1011 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
1012 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
1014 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
1017 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1018 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1019 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1020 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1021 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1022 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1024 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
1028 while (high
- low
> 1) {
1029 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
1030 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
1031 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
1032 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
1034 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
1037 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1038 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1041 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
1042 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
1044 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
1047 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
1049 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
1051 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1053 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
1056 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
1059 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
1062 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
1064 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
1065 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
1066 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
1070 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
1072 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
1075 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1080 static struct Packet
*ssh_new_packet(void)
1082 struct Packet
*pkt
= snew(struct Packet
);
1084 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
= NULL
;
1086 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
1094 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1095 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1096 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1097 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1098 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1100 static struct Packet
*ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1102 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
1104 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
1106 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1108 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1109 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1111 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
1112 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1114 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
1115 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
1118 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
1119 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
1120 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->len
- 5;
1122 if (st
->biglen
< 0) {
1123 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1124 " data stream corruption"));
1125 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1129 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
1130 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1132 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
1133 st
->p
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1134 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
1135 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
1136 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1138 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
1139 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
1140 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
1142 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
1144 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
1147 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
,
1148 st
->biglen
, NULL
)) {
1149 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1150 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1155 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
);
1157 st
->realcrc
= crc32_compute(st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
1158 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
1159 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
1160 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1161 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1165 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1166 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 0;
1168 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1169 unsigned char *decompblk
;
1171 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1172 st
->pktin
->body
- 1, st
->pktin
->length
+ 1,
1173 &decompblk
, &decomplen
)) {
1174 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1175 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1179 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
1180 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
1181 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1182 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1184 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
1187 memcpy(st
->pktin
->body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
1189 st
->pktin
->length
= decomplen
- 1;
1192 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->body
[-1];
1195 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1199 struct logblank_t blank
;
1200 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1201 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1202 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1203 if ((st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
) ||
1204 (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
)) {
1205 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 0;
1206 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1207 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1210 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1211 blank
.len
= st
->pktin
->length
;
1212 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1216 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
1217 PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1218 ssh1_pkt_type(st
->pktin
->type
),
1219 st
->pktin
->body
, st
->pktin
->length
,
1223 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1226 static struct Packet
*ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1228 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
1230 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
1232 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1234 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1235 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1237 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
1240 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
1243 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1246 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1247 * contain the length and padding details.
1249 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
1250 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1252 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1257 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1258 st
->pktin
->data
, st
->cipherblk
);
1261 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1263 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
);
1264 st
->pad
= st
->pktin
->data
[4];
1267 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1268 * do us any more damage.
1270 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->len
> 35000 || st
->pad
< 4 ||
1271 st
->len
- st
->pad
< 1 || (st
->len
+ 4) % st
->cipherblk
!= 0) {
1272 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1273 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1278 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1280 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
1282 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
1285 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1287 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
1288 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
1291 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1293 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1294 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1295 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1299 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1301 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1303 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1305 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1308 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1310 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1311 st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
1312 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1314 st
->pktin
->encrypted_len
= st
->packetlen
;
1320 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1321 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1322 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1323 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1327 st
->pktin
->sequence
= st
->incoming_sequence
++;
1330 * Decompress packet payload.
1333 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1336 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1337 st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, st
->pktin
->length
- 5,
1338 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1339 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1340 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1341 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1342 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1345 st
->pktin
->length
= 5 + newlen
;
1346 memcpy(st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1351 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 6;
1352 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1353 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->data
[5];
1356 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1360 struct logblank_t blank
;
1361 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1362 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1363 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1364 if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1365 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1366 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
1367 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 8;
1370 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1371 blank
.len
= (st
->pktin
->length
-6) - blank_prefix
;
1372 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1376 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1377 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, st
->pktin
->type
),
1378 st
->pktin
->data
+6, st
->pktin
->length
-6,
1382 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1385 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int *offset_p
)
1387 int pad
, biglen
, i
, pktoffs
;
1391 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1392 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1393 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1394 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1401 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[12],
1402 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt
->data
[12]),
1403 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
- (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
),
1404 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1405 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1408 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1409 unsigned char *compblk
;
1411 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1412 pkt
->data
+ 12, pkt
->length
- 12,
1413 &compblk
, &complen
);
1414 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ 12, compblk
, complen
);
1416 pkt
->length
= complen
+ 12;
1419 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ 4); /* space for CRC */
1421 len
= pkt
->length
- 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1422 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1424 biglen
= len
+ pad
; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1426 for (i
= pktoffs
; i
< 4+8; i
++)
1427 pkt
->data
[i
] = random_byte();
1428 crc
= crc32_compute(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4, biglen
- 4); /* all ex len */
1429 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4 + biglen
- 4, crc
);
1430 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
, len
);
1433 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
,
1434 pkt
->data
+ pktoffs
+ 4, biglen
);
1436 if (offset_p
) *offset_p
= pktoffs
;
1437 return biglen
+ 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1440 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1442 int len
, backlog
, offset
;
1443 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
, &offset
);
1444 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
+ offset
, len
);
1445 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1446 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1447 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1450 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1453 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
, &offset
);
1454 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1455 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1456 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1460 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
,
1461 pkt
->data
+ offset
, len
);
1462 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1463 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1467 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1468 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1469 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1471 static struct Packet
*construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, va_list ap
)
1477 pkt
= ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype
);
1479 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1480 unsigned char *argp
, argchar
;
1481 unsigned long argint
;
1484 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1486 argint
= va_arg(ap
, int);
1487 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, argint
);
1490 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap
, int);
1491 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, argchar
);
1494 argp
= va_arg(ap
, unsigned char *);
1495 arglen
= va_arg(ap
, int);
1496 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, argp
, arglen
);
1499 argp
= va_arg(ap
, unsigned char *);
1500 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt
, argp
);
1503 bn
= va_arg(ap
, Bignum
);
1504 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt
, bn
);
1506 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1508 dont_log_password(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
1511 dont_log_data(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
1514 end_log_omission(ssh
, pkt
);
1522 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1526 va_start(ap
, pkttype
);
1527 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap
);
1532 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1536 va_start(ap
, pkttype
);
1537 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap
);
1539 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh
, pkt
);
1542 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1545 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1547 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1548 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1550 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1555 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1556 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1558 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1563 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1564 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1566 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1568 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1569 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1570 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1571 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1574 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1576 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1577 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1578 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1582 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1584 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1586 if (pkt
->maxlen
< length
) {
1587 unsigned char *body
= pkt
->body
;
1588 int offset
= body ? pkt
->data
- body
: 0;
1589 pkt
->maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1590 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, pkt
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1591 if (body
) pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ offset
;
1594 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*pkt
, void *data
, int len
)
1596 if (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
) {
1598 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
, struct logblank_t
);
1600 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= pkt
->length
-
1601 (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
);
1602 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1603 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1606 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
);
1607 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
- len
, data
, len
);
1609 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char byte
)
1611 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &byte
, 1);
1613 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char value
)
1615 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &value
, 1);
1617 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned long value
)
1620 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1621 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, x
, 4);
1623 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1625 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0);
1626 pkt
->savedpos
= pkt
->length
;
1628 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1630 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, strlen(data
));
1631 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1633 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
, int len
)
1635 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1636 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1638 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1640 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1641 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt
, data
);
1643 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1645 int len
= ssh1_bignum_length(b
);
1646 unsigned char *data
= snewn(len
, char);
1647 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data
, b
);
1648 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1651 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1654 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1655 p
= snewn(n
+ 1, unsigned char);
1657 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1658 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1660 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1662 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1666 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1670 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1671 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1672 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)p
, len
);
1676 static struct Packet
*ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1678 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1679 pkt
->length
= 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1680 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, pkt_type
);
1681 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
;
1685 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1686 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1687 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1688 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1689 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1690 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1691 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1692 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1693 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1695 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1697 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1700 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1701 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
;
1706 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1707 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1708 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1710 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1712 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1715 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[5],
1716 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, pkt
->data
[5]),
1717 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
- (pkt
->body
- pkt
->data
),
1718 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1719 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1723 * Compress packet payload.
1726 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1729 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 5,
1731 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1733 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1739 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1740 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1741 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1744 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1745 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1747 if (pkt
->length
+ padding
< pkt
->forcepad
)
1748 padding
= pkt
->forcepad
- pkt
->length
;
1750 (cipherblk
- (pkt
->length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1751 assert(padding
<= 255);
1752 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1753 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1754 pkt
->data
[4] = padding
;
1755 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1756 pkt
->data
[pkt
->length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1757 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
- 4);
1759 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, pkt
->data
,
1760 pkt
->length
+ padding
,
1761 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1762 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1765 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1766 pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
);
1768 pkt
->encrypted_len
= pkt
->length
+ padding
;
1770 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1771 return pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1775 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1776 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1777 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1779 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1780 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1781 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1782 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1783 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1784 * works after packet encryption.
1786 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1787 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1788 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1789 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1790 * then send them once we've finished.
1792 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1793 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1795 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1796 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1797 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1798 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1799 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1800 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1802 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1803 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1804 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1805 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1806 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1807 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1811 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*, int);
1812 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh
);
1815 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1817 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1821 if (ssh
->cscipher
!= NULL
&& (ssh
->cscipher
->flags
& SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC
)) {
1822 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1823 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
, FALSE
);
1824 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1827 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1828 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1829 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1830 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1832 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1833 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1834 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1835 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1836 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1838 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1842 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
1844 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int noignore
)
1847 if (ssh
->cscipher
!= NULL
&& (ssh
->cscipher
->flags
& SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC
) &&
1848 ssh
->deferred_len
== 0 && !noignore
) {
1850 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
1851 * get encrypted with a known IV.
1853 struct Packet
*ipkt
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
1854 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ipkt
, TRUE
);
1856 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1857 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1858 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1859 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1863 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1864 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1865 ssh
->deferred_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1866 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1870 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
1872 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1874 assert(ssh
->queueing
);
1876 if (ssh
->queuelen
>= ssh
->queuesize
) {
1877 ssh
->queuesize
= ssh
->queuelen
+ 32;
1878 ssh
->queue
= sresize(ssh
->queue
, ssh
->queuesize
, struct Packet
*);
1881 ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
++] = pkt
;
1885 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1888 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1891 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1893 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1898 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1901 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1904 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1906 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
, FALSE
);
1911 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1912 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
1914 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1915 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1916 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1917 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1918 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1919 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1920 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1923 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1926 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1928 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1929 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1930 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1931 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1932 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1934 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= ssh
->deferred_data_size
;
1935 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1936 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
1937 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
1938 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data sent", -1, NULL
);
1939 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0;
1943 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
1944 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1945 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1947 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh
)
1951 assert(!ssh
->queueing
);
1953 for (i
= 0; i
< ssh
->queuelen
; i
++)
1954 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ssh
->queue
[i
], FALSE
);
1957 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1961 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1965 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1966 debug(("%s", string
));
1967 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1968 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1974 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1978 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1979 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1984 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1986 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1988 unsigned long value
;
1989 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1990 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1991 value
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1995 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1997 unsigned long value
;
1998 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 1)
1999 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2000 value
= pkt
->body
[pkt
->savedpos
] != 0;
2004 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
)
2009 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
2011 len
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
2016 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< *length
)
2018 *p
= (char *)(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
2019 pkt
->savedpos
+= *length
;
2021 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
2023 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< length
)
2025 pkt
->savedpos
+= length
;
2026 return pkt
->body
+ (pkt
->savedpos
- length
);
2028 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet
*pkt
, struct RSAKey
*key
,
2029 unsigned char **keystr
)
2033 j
= makekey(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
2034 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
,
2041 assert(pkt
->savedpos
< pkt
->length
);
2045 static Bignum
ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
2050 j
= ssh1_read_bignum(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
2051 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
, &b
);
2059 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
2065 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt
, &p
, &length
);
2070 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
2075 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2076 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2077 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2078 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2079 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2081 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
,
2082 void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
2083 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
2085 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
2086 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
2088 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2089 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2092 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2093 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2095 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
2096 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2097 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
2100 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2103 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2104 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
2105 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
2106 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
2107 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
2109 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2112 * Now find the signature integer.
2114 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2115 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
2116 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2118 if (len
!= siglen
) {
2119 unsigned char newlen
[4];
2120 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
2122 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2123 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2124 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
2125 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
2126 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2128 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
2129 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
2130 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2132 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
2133 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2137 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2140 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
2141 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
2145 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2146 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2148 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
2150 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
2152 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2154 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
2157 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
2159 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
2160 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
2161 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
2162 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
2163 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2164 !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2166 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2167 * to use a different defence against password length
2170 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
2171 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2174 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
2175 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
2176 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2178 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2179 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2182 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
2183 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2186 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
2187 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
2188 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2190 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2191 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2192 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2194 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
2195 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2198 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
2199 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
2200 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2201 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
2202 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
2203 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
2205 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2207 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
2208 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2211 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2212 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
2213 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2214 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
2216 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2217 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2218 * generate the keys).
2220 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
2221 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2224 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
2225 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
2226 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
2227 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
2229 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2231 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
2232 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2235 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
2236 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
2237 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
2239 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2240 * public-key authentication.
2242 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
2243 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2246 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2247 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rekey2
== AUTO
&&
2248 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp
) ||
2249 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp
) ||
2250 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp
) ||
2251 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp
) ||
2252 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp
)))) {
2254 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2256 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_REKEY
;
2257 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2262 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2263 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2265 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str
)
2267 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2268 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2269 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2270 assert(*str
== 'H'); str
++;
2271 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2272 while (*str
&& *str
!= '-') str
++;
2273 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2275 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2278 if (*str
== '-' || *str
== ' ')
2284 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
2286 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
2294 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
2296 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
2298 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2300 if (c
!= 'S') goto no
;
2302 if (c
!= 'S') goto no
;
2304 if (c
!= 'H') goto no
;
2306 if (c
!= '-') goto no
;
2315 s
->vstring
= snewn(s
->vstrsize
, char);
2316 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
2320 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2321 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
2323 s
->vstring
= sresize(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
, char);
2325 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
2328 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
2330 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
2331 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
2332 } else if (c
== '\012')
2336 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
2337 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
2339 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
2340 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2341 logeventf(ssh
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
2342 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
2345 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2348 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2349 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
2350 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2351 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
2353 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
2354 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2357 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
2358 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2365 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
2367 * Construct a v2 version string.
2369 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver
);
2373 * Construct a v1 version string.
2375 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2376 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2377 s
->version
: "1.5"),
2382 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring
);
2384 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2386 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2388 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
2389 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
,
2390 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"));
2391 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
,
2392 strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012"));
2395 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2397 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
2398 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2399 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
2402 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2404 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
2405 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2406 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
2408 logeventf(ssh
, "We claim version: %.*s",
2409 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"), verstring
);
2410 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
2412 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2413 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2416 logeventf(ssh
, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh
->version
);
2418 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
2419 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
2420 ssh
->pinger
= pinger_new(&ssh
->cfg
, &ssh_backend
, ssh
);
2427 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
,
2428 unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
2430 struct Packet
*pktin
= ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, data
, datalen
);
2432 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, pktin
);
2433 ssh_free_packet(pktin
);
2437 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
,
2438 unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
2440 bufchain_add(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, *data
, *datalen
);
2445 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh
)
2448 unsigned char *data
;
2451 while (!ssh
->frozen
&& bufchain_size(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
)) {
2452 bufchain_prefix(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, &vdata
, &len
);
2456 while (!ssh
->frozen
&& len
> 0)
2457 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &len
);
2460 bufchain_consume(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
, origlen
- len
);
2464 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh
, int frozen
)
2467 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, frozen
);
2468 ssh
->frozen
= frozen
;
2471 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
2473 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
2476 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2477 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2478 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2479 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2482 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2484 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
2485 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
2493 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2494 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2495 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2496 * to the proper protocol handler.
2502 * Process queued data if there is any.
2504 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh
);
2507 while (datalen
> 0) {
2509 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2511 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2513 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
2521 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
, int notify_exit
)
2524 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2526 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2527 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
2532 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2537 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2538 * through this connection.
2540 if (ssh
->channels
) {
2541 while (NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, 0))) {
2544 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
2547 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
2550 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2551 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2552 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
2557 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2558 * listening sockets.
2560 if (ssh
->portfwds
) {
2561 struct ssh_portfwd
*pf
;
2562 while (NULL
!= (pf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, 0))) {
2563 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2565 pfd_terminate(pf
->local
);
2566 del234(ssh
->portfwds
, pf
); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2574 static void ssh_log(Plug plug
, int type
, SockAddr addr
, int port
,
2575 const char *error_msg
, int error_code
)
2577 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2578 char addrbuf
[256], *msg
;
2580 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, lenof(addrbuf
));
2583 msg
= dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2585 msg
= dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf
, error_msg
);
2591 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, const char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2594 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2595 int need_notify
= ssh_do_close(ssh
, FALSE
);
2598 if (!ssh
->close_expected
)
2599 error_msg
= "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2601 error_msg
= "Server closed network connection";
2605 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2608 logevent(error_msg
);
2609 if (!ssh
->close_expected
|| !ssh
->clean_exit
)
2610 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", error_msg
);
2614 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2616 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2617 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2618 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2619 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
2625 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2627 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2629 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2630 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2632 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2633 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2637 * Connect to specified host and port.
2638 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2639 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2640 * freed by the caller.
2642 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2643 char **realhost
, int nodelay
, int keepalive
)
2645 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2656 ssh
->savedhost
= snewn(1 + strlen(host
), char);
2657 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2660 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2661 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2666 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host
,
2667 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
" (IPv4)" :
2668 (ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
" (IPv6)" : "")));
2669 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
,
2670 ssh
->cfg
.addressfamily
);
2671 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
) {
2679 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2680 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2681 0, 1, nodelay
, keepalive
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2682 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2684 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2692 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2694 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2696 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2697 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2698 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2699 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2700 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
2701 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2702 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
2707 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2708 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2710 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2713 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2715 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2717 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2718 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2721 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2723 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2725 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2729 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2732 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2735 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, enable
);
2742 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2743 * reusable in several places - even between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2746 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2747 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2749 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2750 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2751 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2752 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2756 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2757 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2758 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2759 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2761 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2766 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2769 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2770 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2775 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2776 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2777 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2778 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2783 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2784 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2785 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2786 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2795 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2796 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2797 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2799 if ((!ssh
->userpass_input_echo
||
2800 (c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2801 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2802 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2803 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2804 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2805 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2813 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2815 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2817 ssh
->agent_response
= reply
;
2818 ssh
->agent_response_len
= replylen
;
2820 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2821 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2823 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2826 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv
, int ret
)
2828 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2830 ssh
->user_response
= ret
;
2832 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2833 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2835 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2838 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
2841 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh
);
2844 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2846 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)cv
;
2848 void *sentreply
= reply
;
2851 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2852 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
2855 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2856 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
2859 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
2860 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2863 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
2872 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
2873 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
2874 * => log `wire_reason'.
2876 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, char *client_reason
, char *wire_reason
,
2877 int code
, int clean_exit
)
2881 client_reason
= wire_reason
;
2883 error
= dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason
);
2885 error
= dupstr("Disconnected");
2887 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
2888 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
, PKT_STR
, wire_reason
,
2890 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2891 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
2892 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, code
);
2893 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, wire_reason
);
2894 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
2895 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
2898 ssh
->close_expected
= TRUE
;
2899 ssh
->clean_exit
= clean_exit
;
2900 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, error
, 0, 0);
2905 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2907 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
2908 struct Packet
*pktin
)
2911 unsigned char cookie
[8], *ptr
;
2912 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2913 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2914 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2916 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2917 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2918 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2919 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2920 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2923 void *publickey_blob
;
2924 int publickey_bloblen
;
2930 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2940 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2942 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2947 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2948 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2952 logevent("Received public keys");
2954 ptr
= ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin
, 8);
2956 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2959 memcpy(cookie
, ptr
, 8);
2961 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
) ||
2962 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
)) {
2963 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
2968 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2972 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2973 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2974 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2975 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2976 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2980 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2981 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2982 s
->supported_auths_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2984 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2985 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2986 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2989 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2990 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2991 MD5Update(&md5c
, cookie
, 8);
2992 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
2994 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
2995 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
2998 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3000 if (hostkey
.bits
> hostkey
.bytes
* 8 ||
3001 servkey
.bits
> servkey
.bytes
* 8) {
3002 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3006 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
3008 s
->rsabuf
= snewn(s
->len
, unsigned char);
3011 * Verify the host key.
3015 * First format the key into a string.
3017 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
3018 char fingerprint
[100];
3019 char *keystr
= snewn(len
, char);
3020 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
3021 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
3023 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
3024 s
->dlgret
= verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
3025 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
,
3026 "rsa", keystr
, fingerprint
,
3027 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
3029 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
3033 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3034 " for user host key response"));
3037 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3038 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
3040 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
3042 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
3043 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at host key verification",
3049 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3050 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
3052 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
3055 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
3056 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
3058 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
3060 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
3062 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
3065 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3069 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3072 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
3073 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
3075 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
3076 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
3077 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
3078 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3080 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
3081 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3082 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3084 switch (next_cipher
) {
3085 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
3086 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
3087 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
3088 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
3089 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
3090 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
3092 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
3096 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
3097 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
3098 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3099 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3101 /* shouldn't happen */
3102 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3106 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3108 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
3109 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "cipher", cipher_string
,
3110 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
3111 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
3115 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3116 " for user response"));
3119 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3120 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
3122 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
3123 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
3124 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
3131 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
3132 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
3133 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3135 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
3136 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3138 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
3139 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3143 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
3144 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
3145 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
3146 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
3147 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
3148 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
3150 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3154 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
3155 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
3157 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
3158 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
3159 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
3161 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
3162 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3164 if (servkey
.modulus
) {
3165 sfree(servkey
.modulus
);
3166 servkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
3168 if (servkey
.exponent
) {
3169 sfree(servkey
.exponent
);
3170 servkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
3172 if (hostkey
.modulus
) {
3173 sfree(hostkey
.modulus
);
3174 hostkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
3176 if (hostkey
.exponent
) {
3177 sfree(hostkey
.exponent
);
3178 hostkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
3182 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3183 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3187 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3191 if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
3192 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
3193 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
3194 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
3196 * get_line failed to get a username.
3199 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "No username provided", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
3203 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3204 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
3207 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
3209 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3210 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3214 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3217 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
3218 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
3221 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
3223 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
3224 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
3226 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
3227 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
3228 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
3229 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
3236 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
3237 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3238 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
3240 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
3242 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
3243 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
3244 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
3245 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
3246 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
))
3247 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3249 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
3251 while (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3252 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
3254 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
3256 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3262 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3264 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3265 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
3266 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
3267 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
3268 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3272 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3273 " for agent response"));
3276 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3277 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3278 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3280 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
3281 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
3282 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
3283 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
3284 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3286 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
3287 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
3288 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
3289 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
3290 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
3291 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
3292 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
3293 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3298 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3299 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3300 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3305 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
3306 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
3311 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) < 4)
3313 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
3315 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) <
3318 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
3319 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
3323 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3327 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3328 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3330 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3331 logevent("Key refused");
3334 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3335 if ((s
->challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3336 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3341 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
3344 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3345 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
3346 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
3347 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
3348 len
+= 16; /* session id */
3349 len
+= 4; /* response format */
3350 agentreq
= snewn(4 + len
, char);
3351 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
3353 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
3354 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
3356 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
3357 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
3358 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
3359 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3361 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
3362 if (!agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
,
3363 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
3368 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3369 " while waiting for agent"
3373 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3374 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3375 retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3380 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
3381 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3382 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3383 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
3387 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3389 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3390 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
3391 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
3393 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
3395 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
3400 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3403 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3407 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3410 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
3411 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
3412 freebn(s
->challenge
);
3421 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
3422 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
3424 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3425 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
3426 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
3427 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
3428 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3429 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
3431 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
3432 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3433 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
3434 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3435 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
3441 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3443 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3446 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using TIS authentication.\r\n");
3447 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3448 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3449 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3450 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3451 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3452 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3453 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3454 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3455 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3456 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3459 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3460 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
3461 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
3462 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
3463 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3464 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
3466 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
3467 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3468 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3469 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
3475 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3477 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3480 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using CryptoCard authentication.\r\n");
3481 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3482 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3483 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3484 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3485 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3486 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3487 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3488 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3489 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3492 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3493 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3494 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
3496 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3497 char *comment
= NULL
;
3499 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3500 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3501 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3502 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3503 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
3504 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
3505 char *msg
= dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3506 key_type_to_str(type
));
3508 c_write_str(ssh
, msg
);
3509 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3511 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3514 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
3515 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3516 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3519 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
3524 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3525 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3529 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
3530 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
3532 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3533 * because one was supplied on the command line
3534 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3536 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, "Unable to authenticate", 0, FALSE
);
3540 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3541 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3542 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3543 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
3546 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
3548 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3549 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3553 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3557 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3559 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3562 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3565 const char *error
= NULL
;
3566 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
,
3569 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3570 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3571 c_write_str(ssh
, " (");
3572 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
3573 c_write_str(ssh
, ").\r\n");
3574 continue; /* go and try password */
3577 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3578 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
3579 continue; /* try again */
3584 * Send a public key attempt.
3586 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3587 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3590 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3591 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3592 continue; /* go and try password */
3594 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3595 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3601 unsigned char buffer
[32];
3602 Bignum challenge
, response
;
3604 if ((challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3605 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3608 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
3609 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
3611 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3612 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
3616 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
3617 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3618 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
3620 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3621 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
3628 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3629 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3630 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
3631 " our public key.\r\n");
3632 continue; /* go and try password */
3633 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3634 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3638 break; /* we're through! */
3640 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3642 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3643 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3644 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3645 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3646 * The others are all random data in
3647 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3648 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3649 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3651 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3652 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3653 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3654 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3657 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3658 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3660 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3661 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3662 * packets containing string lengths N through
3663 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3664 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3665 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3667 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3668 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3669 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3670 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3671 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3674 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3675 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3676 * For this server we are left with no defences
3677 * against password length sniffing.
3679 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
3681 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3682 * we can use the primary defence.
3684 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
3687 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
3689 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3692 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
3696 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
3698 randomstr
= snewn(top
+ 1, char);
3700 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
3702 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3703 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
,
3704 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3706 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
3708 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
3709 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
3711 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
3712 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
3713 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
3716 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3717 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
3720 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
3722 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3723 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3724 * can use the secondary defence.
3730 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3731 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3733 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
3734 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
3735 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3736 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
3741 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3742 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3743 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
,
3744 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3747 * The server has _both_
3748 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3749 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3750 * therefore nothing we can do.
3753 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3754 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3755 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3756 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_INT
, len
,
3757 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
,
3758 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3761 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3762 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3765 logevent("Sent password");
3766 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
3768 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3769 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3770 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
3771 logevent("Authentication refused");
3772 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3773 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin
->type
));
3778 logevent("Authentication successful");
3783 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
3787 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3790 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
3792 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3793 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3794 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3795 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3796 * open, we can close it then.
3799 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3800 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3803 struct Packet
*pktout
;
3804 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
3805 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
3806 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
3809 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3810 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
3812 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3813 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
3814 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3816 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3821 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
3825 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3828 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3829 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3830 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3832 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
,
3833 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3835 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3836 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3837 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3838 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3839 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3843 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3844 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3848 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3852 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
3855 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3856 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3857 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3858 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3861 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3865 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3867 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
3871 assert(pktin
->type
== qh
->msg1
|| pktin
->type
== qh
->msg2
);
3874 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3875 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = NULL
;
3878 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == ssh_queueing_handler
);
3879 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = NULL
;
3883 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
3885 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg1
> 0) {
3886 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3887 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3889 if (ssh
->qhead
->msg2
> 0) {
3890 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3891 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[ssh
->qhead
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3894 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
3895 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
] = NULL
;
3898 qh
->handler(ssh
, pktin
, qh
->ctx
);
3903 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh
, int msg1
, int msg2
,
3904 chandler_fn_t handler
, void *ctx
)
3906 struct queued_handler
*qh
;
3908 qh
= snew(struct queued_handler
);
3911 qh
->handler
= handler
;
3915 if (ssh
->qtail
== NULL
) {
3919 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] == NULL
);
3920 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg1
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3923 assert(ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] == NULL
);
3924 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[qh
->msg2
] = ssh_queueing_handler
;
3927 ssh
->qtail
->next
= qh
;
3932 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
, void *ctx
)
3934 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
, *pf
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*)ctx
;
3936 if (pktin
->type
== (ssh
->version
== 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
:
3937 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
)) {
3938 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
3941 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
3944 rpf
= del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
);
3950 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh
, const Config
*cfg
)
3952 const char *portfwd_strptr
= cfg
->portfwd
;
3953 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3956 if (!ssh
->portfwds
) {
3957 ssh
->portfwds
= newtree234(ssh_portcmp
);
3960 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
3961 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
3962 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
3963 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
3966 struct ssh_portfwd
*epf
;
3968 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
3969 epf
->status
= DESTROY
;
3972 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
3973 char address_family
, type
;
3974 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3975 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3978 address_family
= 'A';
3980 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'A' ||
3981 *portfwd_strptr
== '4' ||
3982 *portfwd_strptr
== '6')
3983 address_family
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3984 if (*portfwd_strptr
== 'L' ||
3985 *portfwd_strptr
== 'R' ||
3986 *portfwd_strptr
== 'D')
3987 type
= *portfwd_strptr
++;
3992 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3993 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
3995 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3996 * source port number. This means that
3997 * everything we've seen until now is the
3998 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
3999 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4004 if (ssh
->version
== 1 && type
== 'R') {
4005 logeventf(ssh
, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4006 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports
);
4008 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
4011 if (n
< lenof(sports
)-1) sports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4015 if (*portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
4018 while (*portfwd_strptr
&& *portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
4019 if (n
< lenof(host
)-1) host
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4022 if (*portfwd_strptr
== ':')
4025 while (*portfwd_strptr
) {
4026 if (n
< lenof(dports
)-1) dports
[n
++] = *portfwd_strptr
++;
4030 dport
= atoi(dports
);
4034 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
4036 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4037 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
4041 while (*portfwd_strptr
) portfwd_strptr
++;
4045 portfwd_strptr
++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4047 sport
= atoi(sports
);
4051 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
4053 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
4054 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
4057 if (sport
&& dport
) {
4058 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4059 struct ssh_portfwd
*pfrec
, *epfrec
;
4061 pfrec
= snew(struct ssh_portfwd
);
4063 pfrec
->saddr
= *saddr ?
dupstr(saddr
) : NULL
;
4064 pfrec
->sserv
= sserv ?
dupstr(sports
) : NULL
;
4065 pfrec
->sport
= sport
;
4066 pfrec
->daddr
= *host ?
dupstr(host
) : NULL
;
4067 pfrec
->dserv
= dserv ?
dupstr(dports
) : NULL
;
4068 pfrec
->dport
= dport
;
4069 pfrec
->local
= NULL
;
4070 pfrec
->remote
= NULL
;
4071 pfrec
->addressfamily
= (address_family
== '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4
:
4072 address_family
== '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6
:
4075 epfrec
= add234(ssh
->portfwds
, pfrec
);
4076 if (epfrec
!= pfrec
) {
4078 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4079 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4080 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4082 epfrec
->status
= KEEP
;
4083 free_portfwd(pfrec
);
4085 pfrec
->status
= CREATE
;
4091 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4094 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
4095 if (epf
->status
== DESTROY
) {
4098 message
= dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4099 epf
->type
== 'L' ?
"local" :
4100 epf
->type
== 'R' ?
"remote" : "dynamic",
4101 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
4102 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
4105 if (epf
->type
!= 'D') {
4106 char *msg2
= dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message
,
4107 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
4112 logeventf(ssh
, "Cancelling %s", message
);
4116 struct ssh_rportfwd
*rpf
= epf
->remote
;
4117 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4120 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4123 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
4125 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4126 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4127 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4128 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4129 * so that any connections the server tries
4130 * to make on it are rejected.
4133 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
4134 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4135 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4137 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
4138 } else if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
) {
4139 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4140 * what was used to open the original connection,
4141 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4142 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
4144 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
4146 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
4147 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4150 del234(ssh
->rportfwds
, rpf
);
4152 } else if (epf
->local
) {
4153 pfd_terminate(epf
->local
);
4156 delpos234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
);
4158 i
--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4162 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4164 for (i
= 0; (epf
= index234(ssh
->portfwds
, i
)) != NULL
; i
++)
4165 if (epf
->status
== CREATE
) {
4166 char *sportdesc
, *dportdesc
;
4167 sportdesc
= dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4168 epf
->saddr ? epf
->saddr
: "",
4169 epf
->saddr ?
":" : "",
4170 epf
->sserv ? epf
->sserv
: "",
4171 epf
->sserv ?
"(" : "",
4173 epf
->sserv ?
")" : "");
4174 if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
4177 dportdesc
= dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4179 epf
->dserv ? epf
->dserv
: "",
4180 epf
->dserv ?
"(" : "",
4182 epf
->dserv ?
")" : "");
4185 if (epf
->type
== 'L') {
4186 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
,
4187 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
4190 epf
->addressfamily
);
4192 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4193 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
4194 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
4195 sportdesc
, dportdesc
,
4196 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
4197 } else if (epf
->type
== 'D') {
4198 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1,
4199 epf
->saddr
, epf
->sport
,
4202 epf
->addressfamily
);
4204 logeventf(ssh
, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4205 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ?
"IPv4 " :
4206 epf
->addressfamily
== ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ?
"IPv6 " : "",
4208 err ?
" failed: " : "", err ? err
: "");
4210 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
4213 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4215 if (!ssh
->rportfwds
) {
4216 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
4217 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
4219 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
4222 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
4223 strncpy(pf
->dhost
, epf
->daddr
, lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1);
4224 pf
->dhost
[lenof(pf
->dhost
)-1] = '\0';
4225 pf
->dport
= epf
->dport
;
4226 pf
->sport
= epf
->sport
;
4227 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
4228 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4229 epf
->daddr
, epf
->dport
);
4232 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %s"
4233 " forward to %s", sportdesc
, dportdesc
);
4235 pf
->sportdesc
= sportdesc
;
4240 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
4241 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
4242 PKT_INT
, epf
->sport
,
4243 PKT_STR
, epf
->daddr
,
4244 PKT_INT
, epf
->dport
,
4246 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
,
4248 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4250 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4251 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
4252 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "tcpip-forward");
4253 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 1);/* want reply */
4255 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, epf
->saddr
);
4256 } else if (cfg
->rport_acceptall
) {
4257 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
4259 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
4261 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, epf
->sport
);
4262 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4264 ssh_queue_handler(ssh
, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
,
4265 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
,
4266 ssh_rportfwd_succfail
, pf
);
4275 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4278 int stringlen
, bufsize
;
4280 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &string
, &stringlen
);
4281 if (string
== NULL
) {
4282 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4286 bufsize
= from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
4288 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4289 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
4290 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4294 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4296 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4297 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4298 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4299 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4301 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4302 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4303 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
4304 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4305 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4306 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4308 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4311 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
4312 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
4313 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4315 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4316 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4319 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4320 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4321 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4322 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4324 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4325 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
4326 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4327 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4328 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4329 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4330 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4335 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4337 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4338 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4339 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4340 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4342 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4343 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
4344 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4345 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4347 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4349 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4350 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4351 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4353 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4354 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
4355 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4356 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4357 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4358 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
4363 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4365 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4366 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4367 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4368 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *pfp
;
4373 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
4376 remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4377 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &host
, &hostsize
);
4378 port
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4380 if (hostsize
>= lenof(pf
.dhost
))
4381 hostsize
= lenof(pf
.dhost
)-1;
4382 memcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
, hostsize
);
4383 pf
.dhost
[hostsize
] = '\0';
4385 pfp
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
4388 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4390 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4391 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4393 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4395 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, pf
.dhost
, port
,
4396 c
, &ssh
->cfg
, pfp
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
4398 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
4400 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
4401 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4403 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
4404 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4405 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
4407 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4408 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
4409 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4410 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
4411 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
4412 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
4413 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4418 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4420 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4421 unsigned int localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4422 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4424 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4425 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4426 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
4427 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
4428 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
4429 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
4430 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4433 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
4435 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4436 * which we decided on before the server acked
4437 * the channel open. So now we know the
4438 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4440 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
4441 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
4445 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4447 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4448 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4450 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
4451 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
4452 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4453 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4454 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4459 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4461 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4462 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4463 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4464 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4465 if (c
&& !c
->halfopen
) {
4468 (pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
4470 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
4471 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4472 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
4473 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
4476 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
4477 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4478 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
4479 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
4483 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
4484 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
4485 send_packet(ssh
, pktin
->type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
4487 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
4490 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
4491 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
4495 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4496 pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
4497 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
4502 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4504 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4505 int i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4508 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
4510 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &p
, &len
);
4512 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
4517 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, p
, len
);
4520 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, p
, len
);
4523 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4525 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
4526 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
4527 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4531 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4533 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
4535 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
4536 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
4538 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
4540 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
4542 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
4544 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
4548 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
4550 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
4553 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
4556 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
4557 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
4558 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
4559 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
4562 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4565 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
4566 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
4567 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
4572 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4574 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
4575 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh
->exitcode
);
4576 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
4578 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4579 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4580 * session which we might mistake for another
4581 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4582 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4584 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
4587 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4588 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
)
4590 struct Packet
*pktout
= (struct Packet
*)data
;
4592 unsigned int arg
= 0;
4593 while (strcmp(mode
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].mode
) != 0) i
++;
4594 if (i
== lenof(ssh_ttymodes
)) return;
4595 switch (ssh_ttymodes
[i
].type
) {
4597 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val
);
4600 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val
);
4603 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].opcode
);
4604 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, arg
);
4608 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
4609 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4611 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
);
4613 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
] =
4614 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
] =
4615 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data
;
4617 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
4618 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
4619 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
4620 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure
;
4621 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] =
4622 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
] =
4623 ssh1_msg_channel_close
;
4624 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = ssh1_msg_channel_data
;
4625 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status
;
4627 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
4628 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4629 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
4633 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4634 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4635 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4637 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4638 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4640 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4641 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4642 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open
;
4646 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
4647 char proto
[20], data
[64];
4648 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4649 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
4650 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
4651 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
4653 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
4654 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
4655 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
4656 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
4657 * cookie into the log.
4659 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
4660 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4662 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKTT_OTHER
,
4663 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
4666 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
4668 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4673 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4674 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4675 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4677 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4678 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4680 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4681 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
4682 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open
;
4686 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
4687 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
] = ssh1_msg_port_open
;
4689 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
4691 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4692 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4693 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4694 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
4695 /* Send the pty request. */
4696 pkt
= ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
4697 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
4698 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->term_height
);
4699 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->term_width
);
4700 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0); /* width in pixels */
4701 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0); /* height in pixels */
4702 parse_ttymodes(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.ttymodes
,
4703 ssh1_send_ttymode
, (void *)pkt
);
4704 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED
);
4705 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4706 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED
);
4707 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, ssh
->ospeed
);
4708 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, SSH_TTY_OP_END
);
4710 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
4714 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4715 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4716 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4718 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4719 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4720 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4722 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4723 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4725 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4728 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
4729 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
4733 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4734 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4735 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4737 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4738 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4740 logevent("Started compression");
4741 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
4742 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
4743 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4744 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
4745 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4749 * Start the shell or command.
4751 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
4752 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4753 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4756 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
4758 if (!cmd
) cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd
;
4760 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
4761 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
4762 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
4765 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
4767 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
4768 logevent("Started session");
4771 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
4772 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
4773 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
4774 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
4775 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
4778 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4780 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
4784 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4785 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4786 * attention to the unusual ones.
4791 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
4792 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4793 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4794 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4795 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4797 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
4802 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
4803 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
, PKTT_DATA
,
4804 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
,
4805 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4816 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
4818 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4823 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4824 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
4827 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4829 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4833 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4834 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen
, msg
));
4837 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4839 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4842 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
4847 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4849 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
4850 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = NULL
;
4853 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4855 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh1_msg_disconnect
;
4856 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
;
4857 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh1_msg_debug
;
4860 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4861 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4863 unsigned char *in
=(unsigned char*)vin
;
4864 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
4867 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
4868 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
4872 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
4873 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
))
4874 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
4879 do_ssh1_connection(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
4883 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4885 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4888 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4890 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4893 * Is it at the start of the string?
4895 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4896 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4897 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4898 /* either , or EOS follows */
4902 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4903 * If no comma found, terminate.
4905 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
4906 haylen
--, haystack
++;
4909 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
4914 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
4916 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4919 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4921 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4923 * Is it at the start of the string?
4925 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4926 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4927 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4928 /* either , or EOS follows */
4936 * SSH-2 key creation method.
4938 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
4939 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
4940 unsigned char *keyspace
)
4943 /* First 20 bytes. */
4945 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4947 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4948 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
4949 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
4950 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
4951 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4953 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4955 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4956 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
4957 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
4961 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
4963 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
4964 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4966 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
4967 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
4968 int nbits
, pbits
, warn_kex
, warn_cscipher
, warn_sccipher
;
4969 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
4970 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
4971 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
4973 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
4974 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
4975 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
4976 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
4977 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
4978 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
4979 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
4980 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
4981 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
4982 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
4983 int n_preferred_kex
;
4984 const struct ssh_kex
*preferred_kex
[KEX_MAX
];
4985 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
4986 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
4987 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
4988 int got_session_id
, activated_authconn
;
4989 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4994 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
4996 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
4998 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4999 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5000 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5002 s
->got_session_id
= s
->activated_authconn
= FALSE
;
5005 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5007 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
5008 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
5010 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
5013 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK
;
5015 int i
, j
, commalist_started
;
5018 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5020 s
->n_preferred_kex
= 0;
5021 for (i
= 0; i
< KEX_MAX
; i
++) {
5022 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_kexlist
[i
]) {
5024 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5025 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
;
5028 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5029 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14
;
5032 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
5033 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1
;
5036 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5038 if (i
< KEX_MAX
- 1) {
5039 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] = NULL
;
5046 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5048 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
5049 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
5050 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
5051 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
5052 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
5055 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
5056 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
5060 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
5063 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
5065 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR
:
5066 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_arcfour
;
5069 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5071 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
5072 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
5079 * Set up preferred compression.
5081 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
5082 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
5084 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
5087 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5088 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5090 ssh
->queueing
= TRUE
;
5093 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5095 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= TRUE
;
5098 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5100 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
5101 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
5102 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5103 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5104 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5105 commalist_started
= 0;
5106 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
5107 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
5108 if (!k
) continue; /* warning flag */
5109 if (commalist_started
)
5110 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5111 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_kex
[i
]->name
);
5112 commalist_started
= 1;
5114 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5115 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5116 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
5117 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
5118 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
5119 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5121 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5122 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5123 commalist_started
= 0;
5124 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5125 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5126 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
5127 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5128 if (commalist_started
)
5129 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5130 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
5131 commalist_started
= 1;
5134 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5135 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5136 commalist_started
= 0;
5137 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5138 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5139 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
5140 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5141 if (commalist_started
)
5142 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5143 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
5144 commalist_started
= 1;
5147 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5148 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5149 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5150 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
5151 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
5152 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5154 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5155 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5156 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5157 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
5158 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
5159 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5161 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5162 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5163 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
5164 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
5165 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
5166 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
5167 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
5168 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5169 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
5172 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5173 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5174 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
5175 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
5176 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
5177 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
5178 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
5179 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
5180 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
5183 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5184 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5185 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5186 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5187 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5188 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
5190 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0);
5193 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
5194 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5, s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
5196 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5200 if (pktin
->length
> 5)
5201 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, pktin
->data
+ 5, pktin
->length
- 5);
5204 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5208 char *str
, *preferred
;
5211 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
5212 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5216 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
5217 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
5218 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
5219 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5220 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
5221 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5222 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
5223 s
->warn_kex
= s
->warn_cscipher
= s
->warn_sccipher
= FALSE
;
5225 pktin
->savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5226 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
5229 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
5230 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
5234 if (!preferred
) preferred
= k
->name
;
5235 if (in_commasep_string(k
->name
, str
, len
))
5242 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5243 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5247 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5248 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5251 s
->guessok
= first_in_commasep_string(preferred
, str
, len
);
5252 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
5253 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
5254 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5255 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
5259 s
->guessok
= s
->guessok
&&
5260 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[0]->name
, str
, len
);
5261 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
5262 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5263 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5265 s
->warn_cscipher
= TRUE
;
5267 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5268 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5269 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5274 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
)
5277 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
5278 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5279 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5283 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
5284 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
5285 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
5287 s
->warn_sccipher
= TRUE
;
5289 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
5290 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5291 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
5296 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
)
5299 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
5300 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5301 str ? str
: "(null)"));
5305 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
5306 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5307 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5308 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5312 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
5313 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
5314 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
5315 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
5319 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
5320 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5321 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5322 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5323 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5328 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
5329 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
5330 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
5331 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
5332 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
5337 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server language */
5338 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client language */
5339 s
->ignorepkt
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
) && !s
->guessok
;
5342 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5343 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "key-exchange algorithm",
5345 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5346 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5350 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5351 " waiting for user response"));
5354 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5355 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5357 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5358 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5359 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL
,
5365 if (s
->warn_cscipher
) {
5366 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5367 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
,
5368 "client-to-server cipher",
5369 s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
,
5370 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5371 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5375 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5376 " waiting for user response"));
5379 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5380 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5382 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5383 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5384 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
5390 if (s
->warn_sccipher
) {
5391 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5392 s
->dlgret
= askalg(ssh
->frontend
,
5393 "server-to-client cipher",
5394 s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
,
5395 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5396 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5400 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5401 " waiting for user response"));
5404 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5405 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5407 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5408 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5409 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL
,
5415 if (s
->ignorepkt
) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5416 crWaitUntil(pktin
); /* Ignore packet */
5420 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
5421 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
5427 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5428 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
5429 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
5431 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
5432 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
5437 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5438 * requesting a group.
5440 if (!ssh
->kex
->pdata
) {
5441 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5442 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
5444 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5447 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
5448 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
5449 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->pbits
);
5450 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5453 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
5454 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5457 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5458 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5459 if (!s
->p
|| !s
->g
) {
5460 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5463 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_gex(s
->p
, s
->g
);
5464 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
5465 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
5467 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
;
5468 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(ssh
->kex
);
5469 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
5470 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
5471 logeventf(ssh
, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5472 ssh
->kex
->groupname
);
5475 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
5477 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5479 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_CPU
); /* this can take a while */
5480 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
5481 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(s
->kex_init_value
);
5482 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s
->pktout
, s
->e
);
5483 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5485 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_WAITING
); /* wait for server */
5487 if (pktin
->type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
5488 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5491 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_CPU
); /* cogitate */
5492 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
5493 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
5495 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5498 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
5500 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
5502 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5503 * involve user interaction. */
5504 set_busy_status(ssh
->frontend
, BUSY_NOT
);
5506 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5507 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5508 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
5509 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
5510 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
5512 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
5513 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
5514 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
5515 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
5517 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
5518 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
5521 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5522 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
5525 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
5527 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
5528 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
5529 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5534 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5535 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5537 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
5538 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
5539 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 1);
5540 s
->dlgret
= verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
5541 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
,
5542 ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
, s
->keystr
,
5544 ssh_dialog_callback
, ssh
);
5545 if (s
->dlgret
< 0) {
5549 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
5550 " for user host key response"));
5553 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5554 s
->dlgret
= ssh
->user_response
;
5556 ssh_set_frozen(ssh
, 0);
5557 if (s
->dlgret
== 0) {
5558 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL
,
5562 if (!s
->got_session_id
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5563 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5564 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
5566 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
5568 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
5571 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5572 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5575 if (!s
->got_session_id
) {
5576 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
5577 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
5578 s
->got_session_id
= TRUE
;
5582 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5584 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
5585 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5586 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5589 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5590 * client-to-server session keys.
5592 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
5593 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
5594 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
5595 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
5597 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
5598 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
5599 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
5600 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
5602 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
5603 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
5604 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
5605 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
5608 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5609 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5612 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5613 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
5614 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5615 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
5616 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5617 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
5618 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5621 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5622 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
5623 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5624 ssh
->csmac
->text_name
);
5625 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
5626 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
5627 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
5630 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5631 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5633 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
5634 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh
);
5637 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5640 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
5641 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5644 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
5647 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5648 * server-to-client session keys.
5650 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
5651 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
5652 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
5653 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
5655 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
5656 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
5657 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
5658 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
5660 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
5661 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
5662 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
5663 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
5666 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5667 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5670 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
5671 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
5672 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5673 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
5674 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
5675 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
5676 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
5678 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
5679 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
5680 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
5681 ssh
->scmac
->text_name
);
5682 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
5683 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
5684 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
5687 * Free key exchange data.
5691 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
5697 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
5698 * deferred rekey reason.
5700 if (ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
) {
5701 logevent(ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
);
5703 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
5704 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5708 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
5710 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
5711 ssh
->last_rekey
= GETTICKCOUNT();
5712 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0)
5713 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5717 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
5718 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
5719 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
5720 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
5721 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
5722 * it would only confuse the layer above.
5724 if (s
->activated_authconn
) {
5727 s
->activated_authconn
= TRUE
;
5730 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
5731 * function so that other things can run on top of the
5732 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
5735 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
5736 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
5737 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
5738 * giving the reason for the rekey.
5740 while (!((pktin
&& pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) ||
5741 (!pktin
&& inlen
== -1))) {
5746 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
5749 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
5750 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
5751 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
5752 * we process it anyway!)
5754 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_REKEY
)) {
5755 logeventf(ssh
, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
5757 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
5758 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
5759 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0;
5760 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0;
5761 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
5763 schedule_timer(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
,
5766 goto wait_for_rekey
; /* this is utterly horrid */
5768 logeventf(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in
);
5771 goto begin_key_exchange
;
5777 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
5779 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
5782 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
5786 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
5788 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
5791 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5793 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
5796 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
5797 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
5798 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
5799 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
5800 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
5801 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
5802 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5803 dont_log_data(ssh
, pktout
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
5804 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
5805 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout
, data
, len
);
5806 end_log_omission(ssh
, pktout
);
5807 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5808 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
5809 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
5813 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
5816 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5819 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
5823 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
5824 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
5827 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5828 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5829 * notification since it will be polled */
5832 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5835 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
5836 * buffer management */
5839 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5846 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
5848 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
5853 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5854 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5855 * be sending any more data anyway.
5861 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
5862 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
5863 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
5865 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
5867 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
* 2) {
5868 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5870 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5871 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5872 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5873 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5874 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
5878 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5880 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5881 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5882 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5883 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
5884 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5885 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c
);
5889 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5893 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5894 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5895 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5897 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5898 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5899 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5900 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5901 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &data
, &length
);
5904 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5906 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5908 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
==
5909 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5913 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5916 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5919 while (length
> 0) {
5920 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5921 unsigned int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5922 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5926 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5928 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5930 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5931 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
5933 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5935 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5937 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5939 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5943 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5945 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5948 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5951 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
5952 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
5953 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5954 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5961 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5962 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5964 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5965 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5969 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5971 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5972 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5974 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5976 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5978 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5980 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5981 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5983 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5985 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5987 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5988 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5993 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5995 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5996 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5997 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5999 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6000 if (!c
|| c
->halfopen
) {
6001 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
6002 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
6005 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6007 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
6008 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
6009 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
6012 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
6013 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6020 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
6021 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6025 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
6026 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
6027 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6028 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6030 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6031 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6035 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6036 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6037 * not running in -N mode.)
6039 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
&& count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
6041 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6042 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6043 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6044 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6045 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6046 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6047 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6048 * this is more polite than sending a
6049 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6051 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "All channels closed", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
6055 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6057 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6058 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6059 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6061 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6063 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6064 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
6065 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6066 c
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6067 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
6068 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
6069 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6070 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6072 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6075 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6076 * which we decided on before the server acked
6077 * the channel open. So now we know the
6078 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6080 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
6081 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6082 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6086 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6088 static const char *const reasons
[] = {
6089 "<unknown reason code>",
6090 "Administratively prohibited",
6092 "Unknown channel type",
6093 "Resource shortage",
6095 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6096 unsigned reason_code
;
6097 char *reason_string
;
6099 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6100 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
6102 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6103 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
6104 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6106 reason_code
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6107 if (reason_code
>= lenof(reasons
))
6108 reason_code
= 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6109 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &reason_string
, &reason_length
);
6110 logeventf(ssh
, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6111 reasons
[reason_code
], reason_length
, reason_string
);
6113 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6115 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6119 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6123 int typelen
, want_reply
;
6124 int reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
; /* default */
6125 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6126 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6128 localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6129 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6130 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6133 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
6134 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
6136 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
6138 char *buf
= dupprintf("Received channel request for nonexistent"
6139 " channel %d", localid
);
6140 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, buf
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR
, FALSE
);
6146 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6147 * the request type string to see if it's something
6150 if (c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
6152 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6153 * the primary channel.
6155 if (typelen
== 11 &&
6156 !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11)) {
6158 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6159 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6161 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
6163 } else if (typelen
== 11 &&
6164 !memcmp(type
, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6166 int is_plausible
= TRUE
, is_int
= FALSE
;
6167 char *fmt_sig
= "", *fmt_msg
= "";
6169 int msglen
= 0, core
= FALSE
;
6170 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6171 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6172 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
6173 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6174 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6176 unsigned char *p
= pktin
->body
+
6178 long len
= pktin
->length
- pktin
->savedpos
;
6179 unsigned long num
= GET_32BIT(p
); /* what is it? */
6180 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6184 int maybe_int
= FALSE
, maybe_str
= FALSE
;
6185 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6188 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6189 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6190 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6191 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6195 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int
);
6196 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num
+1, maybe_str
);
6197 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6198 if (maybe_int
&& !maybe_str
)
6200 else if (!maybe_int
&& maybe_str
)
6203 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6204 is_plausible
= FALSE
;
6209 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6210 int signum
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6211 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" %d", signum
);
6213 /* As per the drafts. */
6216 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &sig
, &siglen
);
6217 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6218 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6220 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6224 core
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6225 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
6227 fmt_msg
= dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen
, msg
);
6229 /* ignore lang tag */
6230 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6231 logeventf(ssh
, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6232 fmt_sig
, core ?
" (core dumped)" : "",
6234 if (*fmt_sig
) sfree(fmt_sig
);
6235 if (*fmt_msg
) sfree(fmt_msg
);
6236 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
6241 * This is a channel request we don't know
6242 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6243 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6246 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
;
6249 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(reply
);
6250 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6251 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6255 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6258 int typelen
, want_reply
;
6259 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6261 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6262 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6265 * We currently don't support any global requests
6266 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6267 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6271 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
6272 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6276 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6284 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6285 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
6286 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6288 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
6289 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
6292 remid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6293 winsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6294 pktsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6296 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
6299 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
6300 addrstr
= snewn(peeraddrlen
+1, char);
6301 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
6302 addrstr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
6303 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6305 logeventf(ssh
, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
6308 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
6309 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
6310 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
6311 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, peerport
,
6312 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
6313 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
6315 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
6320 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
6321 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
6322 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
6325 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
6326 pf
.sport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6327 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
6328 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6329 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
6330 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port %d open request "
6331 "from %s:%d", pf
.sport
, peeraddr
, peerport
);
6332 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
6333 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
6335 const char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
,
6339 realpf
->pfrec
->addressfamily
);
6340 logeventf(ssh
, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
6341 "%s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
6343 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
6344 error
= "Port open failed";
6346 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
6347 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
6350 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
6351 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
6352 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
6353 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
6355 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
6356 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
6359 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
6362 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
6363 c
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
6365 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
6366 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6367 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
6368 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, error
);
6369 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6370 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6371 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected channel open: %s", error
);
6374 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6376 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6377 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
6378 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
6379 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6380 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
6381 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
6382 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
6383 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
6384 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
6385 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
6386 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
6391 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
6393 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6395 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
6396 if (bufchain_size(&ssh
->banner
) <= 131072) {
6397 char *banner
= NULL
;
6399 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &banner
, &size
);
6401 bufchain_add(&ssh
->banner
, banner
, size
);
6405 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
6406 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data
, char *mode
, char *val
)
6408 struct Packet
*pktout
= (struct Packet
*)data
;
6410 unsigned int arg
= 0;
6411 while (strcmp(mode
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].mode
) != 0) i
++;
6412 if (i
== lenof(ssh_ttymodes
)) return;
6413 switch (ssh_ttymodes
[i
].type
) {
6415 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val
);
6418 arg
= ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val
);
6421 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout
, ssh_ttymodes
[i
].opcode
);
6422 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, arg
);
6426 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
6428 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
6429 struct Packet
*pktin
)
6431 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
6433 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
6435 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
6439 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
6440 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
6441 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
6443 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
6444 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6446 int done_service_req
;
6447 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
6448 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
;
6449 int kbd_inter_running
, kbd_inter_refused
;
6451 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
6456 void *publickey_blob
;
6457 int publickey_bloblen
;
6458 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
6462 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
6463 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
6464 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
6465 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
6467 int num_env
, env_left
, env_ok
;
6468 struct Packet
*pktout
;
6470 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
6472 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
6474 s
->done_service_req
= FALSE
;
6475 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6476 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_userauth
) {
6478 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6480 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
6481 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-userauth");
6482 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6483 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6484 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
)
6485 s
->done_service_req
= TRUE
;
6487 if (!s
->done_service_req
) {
6489 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
6491 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
6492 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");
6493 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6494 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6495 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
6496 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
; /* no auth required */
6498 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
6504 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
6505 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
6506 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
6507 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
6508 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
6509 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
6511 * I think this best serves the needs of
6513 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
6514 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
6515 * type both correctly
6517 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
6518 * need to fall back to passwords
6520 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
6521 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
6522 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
6523 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
6524 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
6527 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
6528 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
6529 bufchain_init(&ssh
->banner
);
6530 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] =
6531 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner
;
6532 while (!s
->we_are_in
) {
6536 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6538 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
6539 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
6542 } else if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
6543 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
6544 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
6545 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
6547 * get_line failed to get a username.
6550 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, "No username provided", NULL
, 0, TRUE
);
6554 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6555 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
6557 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
6559 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
6560 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
6564 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6566 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
6569 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
6570 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
6571 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
6572 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
6573 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
6577 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
6580 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
6581 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
6582 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
6584 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6586 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6587 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6588 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
6589 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
6590 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6591 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
6593 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6595 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
6596 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
6597 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6598 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= FALSE
;
6599 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
6600 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
6602 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6603 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
6604 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
6605 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
6607 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
6608 &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
);
6611 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6612 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6613 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6615 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
6616 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
6617 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
6619 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6622 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
6626 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
6629 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6631 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
6632 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
6633 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
6637 int size
= bufchain_size(&ssh
->banner
);
6639 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
6640 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
6641 * a script, which means nobody will read the
6642 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
6643 * the banner will screw up processing on the
6644 * output of (say) plink.)
6646 if (size
&& (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
))) {
6647 char *banner
= snewn(size
, char);
6648 bufchain_fetch(&ssh
->banner
, banner
, size
);
6649 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
6652 bufchain_clear(&ssh
->banner
);
6654 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
6655 logevent("Access granted");
6656 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
6660 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
6661 pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
6663 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
6664 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
6665 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
6666 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
6667 * curr_prompt variable.
6671 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
) {
6672 /* FIXME: perhaps we should support this? */
6673 bombout(("PASSWD_CHANGEREQ not yet supported"));
6675 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6676 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
6684 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
6685 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
6686 * helpfully try next.
6688 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
6691 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &methods
, &methlen
);
6692 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
6693 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
)) {
6695 * We have received an unequivocal Access
6696 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
6699 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
6700 * it's not worth printing anything at all
6702 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
6703 * the message should be "Server refused our
6704 * key" (or no message at all if the key
6705 * came from Pageant)
6707 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
6708 * message really should be "Access denied".
6710 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
6711 * authentication, we should break out of this
6712 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
6713 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
6714 * username change attempts).
6716 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
6718 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
6719 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
6720 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
6721 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
6722 logevent("Server refused public key");
6723 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
6724 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
6726 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
6727 logevent("Access denied");
6728 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
&&
6729 ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
6730 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
6731 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
6732 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
6737 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
6738 logevent("Further authentication required");
6742 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
6744 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
6745 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
6746 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
6750 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6754 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
6755 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
6756 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
6757 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
6761 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
6762 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
6764 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
6769 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6770 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6772 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
6774 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6776 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6777 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
6778 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
6779 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
6780 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6784 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6785 " waiting for agent response"));
6788 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6789 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6790 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6792 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
6793 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
6794 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
6795 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
6796 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6798 logeventf(ssh
, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
6799 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
6802 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
6803 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6805 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
6806 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
6807 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
6808 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
6809 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
6810 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
6812 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
6814 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
6815 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
6816 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
6818 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
6819 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
6820 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6821 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6822 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6823 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6824 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6825 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6826 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6827 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6828 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6829 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6831 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6832 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6833 logevent("Key refused");
6837 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6838 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
6840 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
6841 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
6845 * Server is willing to accept the key.
6846 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
6848 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6849 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6850 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6851 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6852 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
6853 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6854 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
6855 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6856 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6858 s
->siglen
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
6859 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
6861 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
6862 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
6863 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
6864 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
6865 s
->agentreq
= snewn(4 + s
->len
, char);
6866 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
6867 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
6868 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
6869 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
6871 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
6873 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
6875 /* Now the data to be signed... */
6876 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
6877 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
6880 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
6882 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
6883 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
6884 s
->q
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
6885 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
6887 if (!agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4,
6889 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
6893 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6894 " while waiting for agent"
6898 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6899 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6900 s
->retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6905 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
6906 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6907 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
,
6908 s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
6910 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
6911 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6916 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6927 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
6928 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
6929 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
6930 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
6933 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6935 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6936 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6939 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6941 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6942 * willing to accept it.
6945 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
6950 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6951 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6952 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6953 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6954 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6955 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, algorithm
);
6956 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6957 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pub_blob
,
6959 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6960 logevent("Offered public key");
6962 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6963 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6965 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
6966 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6969 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6971 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6974 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
6975 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
6976 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6982 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6983 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6984 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
6985 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
6987 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
6991 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->kbd_inter_refused
&&
6992 !s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
6993 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6994 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6996 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6997 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
6999 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7000 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7001 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7002 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
7003 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ""); /* lang */
7004 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "");
7005 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7007 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7008 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
7009 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
7011 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
7012 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
7013 s
->kbd_inter_refused
= TRUE
; /* don't try it again */
7017 c_write_str(ssh
, "Using keyboard-interactive authentication.\r\n");
7018 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
7022 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
7023 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7024 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7026 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
7027 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
7029 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
7031 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
7032 * Display header data, and start going through
7035 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
7036 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
7038 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &name
, &name_len
);
7039 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
7040 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
7042 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
7043 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7046 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
7047 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7049 s
->num_prompts
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7053 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
7054 * display one and get a response.
7056 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
7060 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
7061 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
7062 static const char trunc
[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
7063 static const int prlen
= sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) -
7065 if (prompt_len
> prlen
) {
7066 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prlen
);
7067 strcpy(s
->pwprompt
+ prlen
, trunc
);
7069 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prompt_len
);
7070 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
] = '\0';
7074 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
7076 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
7082 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
7083 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
7084 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
7085 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
7086 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
7093 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
7094 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
7096 * get_line failed to get a password (for
7097 * example because one was supplied on the
7098 * command line which has already failed to
7101 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
, "Unable to authenticate",
7102 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER
,
7107 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
7108 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
7111 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
7112 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
7114 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
7115 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
7119 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
7123 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
7125 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
7127 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
7128 const char *error
= NULL
;
7130 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
,
7132 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
7133 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
7134 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7135 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
7137 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key (");
7138 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
7139 c_write_str(ssh
, ")\r\n");
7140 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
7142 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
7143 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7144 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7145 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7146 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
7147 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7148 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
7150 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
7151 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
7155 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7156 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7157 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7159 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7160 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7161 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7162 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
7163 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
7164 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, key
->alg
->name
);
7165 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
7166 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7167 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
7170 * The data to be signed is:
7174 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7177 sigdata_len
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
7178 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
7180 sigdata
= snewn(sigdata_len
, unsigned char);
7182 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
7183 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
7186 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
7187 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
7188 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
7189 p
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
7190 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
7191 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
7192 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
7193 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
7194 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
7199 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7200 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
7201 key
->alg
->freekey(key
->data
);
7203 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
7205 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
7206 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
7209 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
7210 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
7211 * people who find out how long their password is!
7213 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
7214 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
7215 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
7216 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7217 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "password");
7218 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
7219 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7220 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
7221 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
7222 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7223 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7224 logevent("Sent password");
7225 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
7226 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
7227 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
7228 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
7229 s
->pktout
->forcepad
= 256;
7230 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->num_prompts
);
7232 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
7233 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7234 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
7235 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
7236 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7239 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
7240 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7243 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
7244 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
7245 * another packet. Then we go back round the
7246 * loop and will end up retrieving another
7247 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
7252 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
7254 ssh_disconnect(ssh
, NULL
,
7255 "No supported authentication methods available",
7256 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE
,
7262 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7265 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
7268 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
7271 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
7272 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
7274 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] =
7275 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust
;
7276 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] =
7277 ssh2_msg_global_request
;
7280 * Create the main session channel.
7282 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
) {
7283 ssh
->mainchan
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
7284 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
7285 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
7286 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
7287 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "session");
7288 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
7289 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
7290 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
7291 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
7292 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7293 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7294 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
7295 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
7297 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
7299 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
7300 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
7303 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7304 ssh
->mainchan
->halfopen
= FALSE
;
7305 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
7306 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
7307 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7308 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7309 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
7310 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
7311 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
7312 logevent("Opened channel for session");
7314 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7317 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
7318 * general channel-based messages.
7320 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] =
7321 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] =
7322 ssh2_msg_channel_data
;
7323 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof
;
7324 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = ssh2_msg_channel_close
;
7325 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
7326 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
7327 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
7328 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure
;
7329 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] =
7330 ssh2_msg_channel_request
;
7331 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] =
7332 ssh2_msg_channel_open
;
7335 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
7337 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
7338 char proto
[20], data
[64];
7339 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
7340 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
7341 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
7342 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
7343 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7344 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7345 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "x11-req");
7346 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7347 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 0); /* many connections */
7348 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, proto
);
7350 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
7351 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
7352 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
7353 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
7354 * cookie into the log.
7356 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
7357 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, data
);
7358 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7359 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
7360 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7362 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7364 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7365 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7366 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
7367 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7370 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
7372 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
7373 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
7378 * Enable port forwardings.
7380 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
7383 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
7385 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
7386 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
7387 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7388 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7389 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
7390 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7391 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7393 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7395 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7396 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7397 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
7398 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7401 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
7403 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
7404 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
7409 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
7411 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& !ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
7412 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
7413 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
7414 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
7415 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
7416 /* Build the pty request. */
7417 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7418 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
7419 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "pty-req");
7420 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7421 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
7422 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
7423 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
7424 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel width */
7425 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel height */
7426 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7427 parse_ttymodes(ssh
, ssh
->cfg
.ttymodes
,
7428 ssh2_send_ttymode
, (void *)s
->pktout
);
7429 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED
);
7430 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7431 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED
);
7432 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ospeed
);
7433 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
7434 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7435 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
7437 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7439 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7440 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7441 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
7442 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7445 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
7446 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7448 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
7449 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
7452 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
7456 * Send environment variables.
7458 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
7459 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
7461 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& *ssh
->cfg
.environmt
) {
7462 char *e
= ssh
->cfg
.environmt
;
7463 char *var
, *varend
, *val
;
7469 while (*e
&& *e
!= '\t') e
++;
7471 if (*e
== '\t') e
++;
7476 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7477 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7478 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "env");
7479 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7480 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
7481 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, var
, varend
-var
);
7482 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, val
);
7483 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7488 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent %d environment variables", s
->num_env
);
7491 s
->env_left
= s
->num_env
;
7493 while (s
->env_left
> 0) {
7494 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7496 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7497 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7498 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
7499 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7509 if (s
->env_ok
== s
->num_env
) {
7510 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
7511 } else if (s
->env_ok
== 0) {
7512 logevent("All environment variables refused");
7513 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
7515 logeventf(ssh
, "%d environment variables refused",
7516 s
->num_env
- s
->env_ok
);
7517 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
7522 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
7523 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
7526 if (ssh
->mainchan
) while (1) {
7530 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
7531 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
7532 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
7534 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
7535 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
7536 if (!cmd
) cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd
;
7539 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7540 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
7542 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "subsystem");
7543 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7544 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7546 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "exec");
7547 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7548 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
7550 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "shell");
7551 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
7553 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
7555 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
7557 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
7558 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
7559 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
7560 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
7564 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
7565 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
7566 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
7567 * back to it before complaining.
7569 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
7570 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
7571 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
7574 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
7577 logevent("Started a shell/command");
7582 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
7583 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
7584 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
7585 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
7586 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
7592 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
7597 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
7601 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
7602 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
7603 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
7606 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
7608 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7610 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
7612 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
7617 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7619 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
7621 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++)
7622 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c
);
7630 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
7632 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7634 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
7636 int nowlen
, reason
, msglen
;
7638 reason
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
7639 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7641 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
7642 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
7643 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
7645 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
7646 " type %d)", reason
);
7650 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
7651 &nowlen
, msglen
, msg
);
7653 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
7655 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
7656 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
7661 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7663 /* log the debug message */
7668 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
7669 always_display
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
7670 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
7672 logeventf(ssh
, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
7675 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7677 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7678 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
7679 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, pktin
->sequence
);
7681 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7682 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7684 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7688 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
7690 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
7695 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7697 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
7698 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented
;
7701 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7702 * the coroutines will get it.
7704 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
] = NULL
;
7705 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7706 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
] = NULL
;
7707 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
] = NULL
;
7708 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
] = NULL
;
7709 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
] = NULL
;
7710 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7711 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7712 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7713 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
] = NULL
;
7714 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7715 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7716 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7717 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7718 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7719 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
] = NULL
;
7720 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7721 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7722 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
] = NULL
;
7723 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7724 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7725 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7726 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] = NULL
;
7727 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] = NULL
;
7728 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7729 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] = NULL
;
7730 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = NULL
;
7731 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] = NULL
;
7732 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = NULL
;
7733 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = NULL
;
7734 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7735 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7736 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7739 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7741 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh2_msg_disconnect
;
7742 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
; /* shared with SSH-1 */
7743 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh2_msg_debug
;
7746 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
)
7750 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7753 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= 0 &&
7754 now
- ssh
->next_rekey
>= 0) {
7755 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "timeout", -1, NULL
);
7759 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, void *vin
, int inlen
,
7760 struct Packet
*pktin
)
7762 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)vin
;
7763 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7767 ssh
->incoming_data_size
+= pktin
->encrypted_len
;
7768 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
7769 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0 &&
7770 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
7771 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "too much data received", -1, NULL
);
7774 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
7775 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
7779 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
||
7780 (pktin
&& pktin
->type
>= 20 && pktin
->type
< 50)) {
7781 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
) &&
7782 !ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
7783 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
7785 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7787 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, 0, NULL
);
7790 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
7795 * Called to set up the connection.
7797 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7799 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
7801 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
,
7807 ssh
= snew(struct ssh_tag
);
7808 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7809 ssh
->version
= 0; /* when not ready yet */
7812 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7813 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7814 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
7815 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7816 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
7817 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7819 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7821 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7823 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7825 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7827 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
7828 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
7830 ssh
->close_expected
= FALSE
;
7831 ssh
->clean_exit
= FALSE
;
7832 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
7833 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
7834 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
7837 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
7838 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
7839 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
7840 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7842 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
7843 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
7844 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
7845 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7846 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7847 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
7848 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
7849 ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
= 0;
7850 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
7851 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
7852 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
7853 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
7854 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
7855 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
7856 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
7857 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7858 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
7859 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7861 ssh
->queuelen
= ssh
->queuesize
= 0;
7862 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
7863 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7864 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= NULL
;
7865 bufchain_init(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
);
7866 ssh
->frozen
= FALSE
;
7868 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
7871 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7872 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7875 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
7876 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
7877 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
7879 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7880 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7881 ssh
->portfwds
= NULL
;
7886 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
7887 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
7888 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7890 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
7892 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= FALSE
;
7896 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= ssh
->outgoing_data_size
=
7897 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0L;
7898 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_data
);
7899 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
7901 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
, keepalive
);
7910 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
7912 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7913 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7914 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
7916 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
7917 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
7918 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
7919 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
7920 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
7921 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
7922 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
7923 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
7924 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
7925 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
7926 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
) {
7928 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7930 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7932 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
) {
7934 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7936 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7939 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
7940 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
7942 while (ssh
->queuelen
-- > 0)
7943 ssh_free_packet(ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
]);
7946 while (ssh
->qhead
) {
7947 struct queued_handler
*qh
= ssh
->qhead
;
7948 ssh
->qhead
= qh
->next
;
7951 ssh
->qhead
= ssh
->qtail
= NULL
;
7953 if (ssh
->channels
) {
7954 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
7957 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
7958 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
7961 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
7962 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
7967 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
7968 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7971 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
7972 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
7974 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
7975 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7977 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
7979 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
7980 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
7981 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
7982 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
7983 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
7984 if (ssh
->crcda_ctx
) {
7985 crcda_free_context(ssh
->crcda_ctx
);
7986 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7989 ssh_do_close(ssh
, TRUE
);
7990 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
7992 pinger_free(ssh
->pinger
);
7993 bufchain_clear(&ssh
->queued_incoming_data
);
8000 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
8002 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
8004 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8005 char *rekeying
= NULL
, rekey_mandatory
= FALSE
;
8006 unsigned long old_max_data_size
;
8008 pinger_reconfig(ssh
->pinger
, &ssh
->cfg
, cfg
);
8010 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh
, cfg
);
8012 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_rekey_time
!= cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
&&
8013 cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
!= 0) {
8014 long new_next
= ssh
->last_rekey
+ cfg
->ssh_rekey_time
*60*TICKSPERSEC
;
8015 long now
= GETTICKCOUNT();
8017 if (new_next
- now
< 0) {
8018 rekeying
= "timeout shortened";
8020 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(new_next
- now
, ssh2_timer
, ssh
);
8024 old_max_data_size
= ssh
->max_data_size
;
8025 ssh
->max_data_size
= parse_blocksize(cfg
->ssh_rekey_data
);
8026 if (old_max_data_size
!= ssh
->max_data_size
&&
8027 ssh
->max_data_size
!= 0) {
8028 if (ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
||
8029 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> ssh
->max_data_size
)
8030 rekeying
= "data limit lowered";
8033 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
!= cfg
->compression
) {
8034 rekeying
= "compression setting changed";
8035 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
8038 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
!= cfg
->ssh2_des_cbc
||
8039 memcmp(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
, cfg
->ssh_cipherlist
,
8040 sizeof(ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
))) {
8041 rekeying
= "cipher settings changed";
8042 rekey_mandatory
= TRUE
;
8045 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8048 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
) {
8049 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, rekeying
, -1, NULL
);
8050 } else if (rekey_mandatory
) {
8051 ssh
->deferred_rekey_reason
= rekeying
;
8057 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
8059 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
8061 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8063 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
8066 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
8068 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
8072 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
8074 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
8076 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8079 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
8083 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
8084 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
8087 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
8088 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
8090 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8091 return override_value
;
8092 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
8093 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
8094 return override_value
;
8096 return (override_value
+
8097 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
8104 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
8106 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
8108 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8109 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8111 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
8112 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
8114 switch (ssh
->state
) {
8115 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
8116 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
8117 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
8118 break; /* do nothing */
8119 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
8120 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
8122 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
8123 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
8124 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8125 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
8126 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
8127 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
8128 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
8129 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8130 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8131 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8132 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "window-change");
8133 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8134 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
8135 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
8136 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8137 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8138 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8146 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
8149 static const struct telnet_special
*ssh_get_specials(void *handle
)
8151 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special
[] = {
8152 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
}
8154 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials
[] = {
8155 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
8156 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY
},
8158 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials
[] = {
8161 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
8162 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
8163 * required signals. */
8164 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT
},
8165 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM
},
8166 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL
},
8167 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT
},
8168 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP
},
8169 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU
},
8170 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT
}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM
},
8171 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE
}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL
},
8172 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE
}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV
},
8173 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1
}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2
},
8176 static const struct telnet_special specials_end
[] = {
8179 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
8180 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials
[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials
) +
8181 lenof(ssh2_session_specials
) +
8182 lenof(specials_end
)];
8183 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8185 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
8187 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
8188 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
8192 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8193 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
8194 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
8196 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
8197 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special
);
8198 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
8199 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials
);
8201 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials
);
8202 } /* else we're not ready yet */
8205 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end
);
8206 return ssh_specials
;
8214 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
8215 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
8218 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
8220 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8221 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8223 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
8224 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
8226 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
8227 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
8230 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
8233 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8234 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
8235 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8236 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
8237 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8238 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8239 ssh
->send_ok
= 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
8241 logevent("Sent EOF message");
8242 } else if (code
== TS_PING
|| code
== TS_NOP
) {
8243 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8244 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
8245 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8246 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
8247 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
8249 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
8250 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
8251 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
8253 } else if (code
== TS_REKEY
) {
8254 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->version
== 2) {
8255 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "at user request", -1, NULL
);
8257 } else if (code
== TS_BRK
) {
8258 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8259 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
8260 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8261 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
8262 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
8263 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8264 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8265 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "break");
8266 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8267 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0); /* default break length */
8268 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8271 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
8272 char *signame
= NULL
;
8273 if (code
== TS_SIGABRT
) signame
= "ABRT";
8274 if (code
== TS_SIGALRM
) signame
= "ALRM";
8275 if (code
== TS_SIGFPE
) signame
= "FPE";
8276 if (code
== TS_SIGHUP
) signame
= "HUP";
8277 if (code
== TS_SIGILL
) signame
= "ILL";
8278 if (code
== TS_SIGINT
) signame
= "INT";
8279 if (code
== TS_SIGKILL
) signame
= "KILL";
8280 if (code
== TS_SIGPIPE
) signame
= "PIPE";
8281 if (code
== TS_SIGQUIT
) signame
= "QUIT";
8282 if (code
== TS_SIGSEGV
) signame
= "SEGV";
8283 if (code
== TS_SIGTERM
) signame
= "TERM";
8284 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR1
) signame
= "USR1";
8285 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR2
) signame
= "USR2";
8286 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
8287 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
8289 /* It's a signal. */
8290 if (ssh
->version
== 2 && ssh
->mainchan
) {
8291 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
8292 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
8293 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "signal");
8294 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
8295 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, signame
);
8296 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8297 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame
);
8300 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
8305 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
8307 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8308 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
8309 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
8314 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
8316 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
8318 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
8319 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
8325 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
8326 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
8328 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
8330 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8331 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8332 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
8333 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
8334 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
8337 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
8338 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
8342 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
8344 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
8346 struct Packet
*pktout
;
8348 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
8350 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
8351 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
8352 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
8355 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
8358 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
8359 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "direct-tcpip");
8360 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
8361 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
8362 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
8363 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, OUR_V2_MAXPKT
); /* our max pkt size */
8364 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, hostname
);
8365 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, port
);
8367 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
8368 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
8369 * convinced the server should be told details like that
8370 * about my local network configuration.
8372 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "client-side-connection");
8373 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
8374 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
8378 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
8380 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8384 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
8386 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8387 return ssh
->send_ok
;
8390 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
8392 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8393 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
8394 return ssh
->echoing
;
8395 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
8396 return ssh
->editing
;
8400 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
8402 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8406 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
8408 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8409 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
8412 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
8414 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8418 return (ssh
->exitcode
>= 0 ? ssh
->exitcode
: 0);
8422 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
8423 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
8425 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle
)
8427 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8428 return ssh
->version
;
8432 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
8433 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
8434 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
8436 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
8438 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
8439 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
8442 Backend ssh_backend
= {
8452 ssh_return_exitcode
,