17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
114 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
130 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[] = {
132 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
149 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
154 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
157 * Various remote-bug flags.
159 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
160 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
161 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
162 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
163 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
164 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
165 /* 64 was BUG_SSH2_DH_GEX, now spare */
166 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
168 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
169 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
170 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type
)
172 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
173 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
174 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
175 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER
);
176 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
);
177 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
178 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
179 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
);
180 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
);
181 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
);
182 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
);
183 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
);
184 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
185 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
);
186 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
);
187 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
);
188 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
);
189 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF
);
190 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
);
191 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
192 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
193 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
194 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
195 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
);
196 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
);
197 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
);
198 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
);
199 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
200 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
);
201 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
);
202 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
);
203 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
);
204 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
);
205 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
);
206 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
);
207 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
);
208 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
);
209 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
);
210 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
);
211 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
);
212 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
);
215 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx
, int type
)
217 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
218 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
219 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
220 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
);
221 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
222 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
);
223 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
224 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
225 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
226 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
);
227 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
228 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
229 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
230 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
);
231 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
232 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
);
233 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
);
234 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
);
235 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
);
236 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
);
237 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
238 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
);
239 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
240 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
);
241 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
242 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
243 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
244 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
245 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
246 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
247 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
);
248 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
249 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
250 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
251 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
);
252 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
);
258 #define GET_32BIT(cp) \
259 (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
260 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
261 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
262 ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
264 #define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) { \
265 (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24); \
266 (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16); \
267 (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8); \
268 (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value); }
270 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
272 PKT_END
, PKT_INT
, PKT_CHAR
, PKT_DATA
, PKT_STR
, PKT_BIGNUM
,
273 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
274 * fields to the packet logging code. */
275 PKTT_OTHER
, PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKTT_DATA
279 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
280 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
283 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
285 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
287 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
288 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
289 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
290 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
292 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
294 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
295 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
296 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
298 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
301 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
303 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
304 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
305 #define crReturn(z) \
307 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
311 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
313 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
314 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
315 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
316 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
318 typedef struct ssh_tag
*Ssh
;
321 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
);
322 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*, unsigned char value
);
323 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*, unsigned long value
);
324 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*);
325 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
326 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*, char *data
, int len
);
327 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*, char *data
);
328 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
);
329 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*, Bignum b
);
330 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
331 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
332 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh
, struct Packet
*);
333 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
334 struct Packet
*pktin
);
335 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
336 struct Packet
*pktin
);
339 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
340 * various different purposes:
342 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
343 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
344 * connection (in SSH1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
345 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
348 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
349 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
350 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
351 * thankfully unlikely in SSH2 since the window mechanism should
352 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
353 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
355 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH2
359 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
360 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
361 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
363 const static struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey_algs
[] = { &ssh_rsa
, &ssh_dss
};
365 static void *nullmac_make_context(void)
369 static void nullmac_free_context(void *handle
)
372 static void nullmac_key(void *handle
, unsigned char *key
)
375 static void nullmac_generate(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
379 static int nullmac_verify(void *handle
, unsigned char *blk
, int len
,
384 const static struct ssh_mac ssh_mac_none
= {
385 nullmac_make_context
, nullmac_free_context
, nullmac_key
,
386 nullmac_generate
, nullmac_verify
, "none", 0
388 const static struct ssh_mac
*macs
[] = {
389 &ssh_sha1
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
391 const static struct ssh_mac
*buggymacs
[] = {
392 &ssh_sha1_buggy
, &ssh_md5
, &ssh_mac_none
395 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
399 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle
)
402 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle
, unsigned char *block
, int len
,
403 unsigned char **outblock
, int *outlen
)
407 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle
)
411 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none
= {
413 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
414 ssh_comp_none_init
, ssh_comp_none_cleanup
, ssh_comp_none_block
,
415 ssh_comp_none_disable
, NULL
417 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib
;
418 const static struct ssh_compress
*compressions
[] = {
419 &ssh_zlib
, &ssh_comp_none
422 enum { /* channel types */
427 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
/* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
431 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
434 Ssh ssh
; /* pointer back to main context */
435 unsigned remoteid
, localid
;
438 * In SSH1, this value contains four bits:
440 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
441 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
442 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
443 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
445 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
449 struct ssh1_data_channel
{
452 struct ssh2_data_channel
{
454 unsigned remwindow
, remmaxpkt
;
459 struct ssh_agent_channel
{
460 unsigned char *message
;
461 unsigned char msglen
[4];
462 unsigned lensofar
, totallen
;
464 struct ssh_x11_channel
{
467 struct ssh_pfd_channel
{
474 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH 1 and SSH
475 * 2 use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH 2's
476 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
478 * In SSH 1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
479 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
480 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
481 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
482 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
483 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
484 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
485 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
486 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
487 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
488 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
490 * In SSH 2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
491 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
492 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
493 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
494 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
495 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
497 * Hence: in SSH 1 this structure stores host:port pairs we intend
498 * to allow connections to, and is indexed by those host:port
499 * pairs. In SSH 2 it stores a mapping from source port to
500 * destination host:port pair, and is indexed by source port.
502 struct ssh_rportfwd
{
503 unsigned sport
, dport
;
510 unsigned long sequence
;
515 long encrypted_len
; /* for SSH2 total-size counting */
518 * State associated with packet logging
522 struct logblank_t
*blanks
;
525 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
526 struct Packet
*pktin
);
527 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
528 struct Packet
*pktin
);
529 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
530 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
);
531 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
);
532 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special
);
533 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
);
534 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
);
535 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
);
536 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
);
537 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
);
538 static void ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
);
539 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
);
540 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
);
541 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
);
542 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
);
543 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
544 struct Packet
*pktin
);
546 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
{
547 long len
, pad
, biglen
, to_read
;
548 unsigned long realcrc
, gotcrc
;
552 struct Packet
*pktin
;
555 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
{
556 long len
, pad
, payload
, packetlen
, maclen
;
559 unsigned long incoming_sequence
;
560 struct Packet
*pktin
;
563 typedef void (*handler_fn_t
)(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
);
566 const struct plug_function_table
*fn
;
567 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
569 SHA_State exhash
, exhashbase
;
576 unsigned char session_key
[32];
578 int v1_remote_protoflags
;
579 int v1_local_protoflags
;
580 int agentfwd_enabled
;
583 const struct ssh_cipher
*cipher
;
586 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher
, *sccipher
;
587 void *cs_cipher_ctx
, *sc_cipher_ctx
;
588 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac
, *scmac
;
589 void *cs_mac_ctx
, *sc_mac_ctx
;
590 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp
, *sccomp
;
591 void *cs_comp_ctx
, *sc_comp_ctx
;
592 const struct ssh_kex
*kex
;
593 const struct ssh_signkey
*hostkey
;
594 unsigned char v2_session_id
[20];
600 int echoing
, editing
;
604 int ospeed
, ispeed
; /* temporaries */
605 int term_width
, term_height
;
607 tree234
*channels
; /* indexed by local id */
608 struct ssh_channel
*mainchan
; /* primary session channel */
615 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
,
621 int size_needed
, eof_needed
;
623 struct Packet
**queue
;
624 int queuelen
, queuesize
;
626 unsigned char *deferred_send_data
;
627 int deferred_len
, deferred_size
;
630 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
631 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
632 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
638 * Used for username and password input.
640 char *userpass_input_buffer
;
641 int userpass_input_buflen
;
642 int userpass_input_bufpos
;
643 int userpass_input_echo
;
645 char *portfwd_strptr
;
651 int v1_throttle_count
;
654 int v1_stdout_throttling
;
655 int v2_outgoing_sequence
;
657 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
;
658 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
;
659 int do_ssh_init_crstate
;
660 int ssh_gotdata_crstate
;
661 int do_ssh1_login_crstate
;
662 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate
;
663 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate
;
664 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
;
666 void *do_ssh_init_state
;
667 void *do_ssh1_login_state
;
668 void *do_ssh2_transport_state
;
669 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state
;
671 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state
;
672 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state
;
674 /* ssh1 and ssh2 use this for different things, but both use it */
675 int protocol_initial_phase_done
;
677 void (*protocol
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
679 struct Packet
*(*s_rdpkt
) (Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
);
682 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
683 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
684 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
685 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
690 * Used to transfer data back from async agent callbacks.
692 void *agent_response
;
693 int agent_response_len
;
696 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
699 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch
[256];
702 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
707 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
710 unsigned long incoming_data_size
, outgoing_data_size
, deferred_data_size
;
715 #define MAX_DATA_BEFORE_REKEY (0x40000000UL)
716 #define REKEY_TIMEOUT (3600 * TICKSPERSEC)
718 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
720 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
721 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh
, const char *fmt
, ...)
727 buf
= dupvprintf(fmt
, ap
);
733 #define bombout(msg) \
735 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
738 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
742 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
744 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
746 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitpass
)
747 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
750 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
, int blanktype
)
752 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
)
753 pkt
->logmode
= blanktype
;
756 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
758 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
761 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av
, void *bv
)
763 struct ssh_channel
*a
= (struct ssh_channel
*) av
;
764 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
765 if (a
->localid
< b
->localid
)
767 if (a
->localid
> b
->localid
)
771 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av
, void *bv
)
773 unsigned *a
= (unsigned *) av
;
774 struct ssh_channel
*b
= (struct ssh_channel
*) bv
;
782 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av
, void *bv
)
784 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
785 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
787 if ( (i
= strcmp(a
->dhost
, b
->dhost
)) != 0)
788 return i
< 0 ?
-1 : +1;
789 if (a
->dport
> b
->dport
)
791 if (a
->dport
< b
->dport
)
796 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av
, void *bv
)
798 struct ssh_rportfwd
*a
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) av
;
799 struct ssh_rportfwd
*b
= (struct ssh_rportfwd
*) bv
;
801 if (a
->sport
> b
->sport
)
803 if (a
->sport
< b
->sport
)
808 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh
)
810 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
= 256;
811 unsigned low
, high
, mid
;
813 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
816 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
817 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
818 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
819 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
820 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
821 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
823 tsize
= count234(ssh
->channels
);
827 while (high
- low
> 1) {
828 mid
= (high
+ low
) / 2;
829 c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, mid
);
830 if (c
->localid
== mid
+ CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
)
831 low
= mid
; /* this one is fine */
833 high
= mid
; /* this one is past it */
836 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
837 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
840 unsigned i
= low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
841 assert(NULL
== find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
));
843 return low
+ 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET
;
846 static void c_write(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
848 if ((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
)) {
850 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
852 fputc(buf
[i
], stderr
);
855 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, 1, buf
, len
);
858 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
, int len
)
861 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
863 c_write(ssh
, "\r\n", 2);
864 else if ((buf
[i
] & 0x60) || (buf
[i
] == '\r'))
865 c_write(ssh
, buf
+ i
, 1);
869 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh
, const char *buf
)
871 c_write(ssh
, buf
, strlen(buf
));
874 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet
*pkt
)
879 static struct Packet
*ssh_new_packet(void)
881 struct Packet
*pkt
= snew(struct Packet
);
885 pkt
->logmode
= PKTLOG_EMIT
;
893 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
894 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
895 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
896 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
897 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
899 static struct Packet
*ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
901 struct rdpkt1_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt1_state
;
903 crBegin(ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
);
905 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
908 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
910 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< 4; st
->i
++) {
911 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
913 st
->len
= (st
->len
<< 8) + **data
;
914 (*data
)++, (*datalen
)--;
917 st
->pad
= 8 - (st
->len
% 8);
918 st
->biglen
= st
->len
+ st
->pad
;
919 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->len
- 5;
921 if (st
->biglen
< 0) {
922 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
923 " data stream corruption"));
924 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
928 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->biglen
;
929 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->biglen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
931 st
->to_read
= st
->biglen
;
932 st
->p
= st
->pktin
->data
;
933 while (st
->to_read
> 0) {
934 st
->chunk
= st
->to_read
;
935 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
937 if (st
->chunk
> (*datalen
))
938 st
->chunk
= (*datalen
);
939 memcpy(st
->p
, *data
, st
->chunk
);
941 *datalen
-= st
->chunk
;
943 st
->to_read
-= st
->chunk
;
946 if (ssh
->cipher
&& detect_attack(ssh
->crcda_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
,
948 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
949 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
954 ssh
->cipher
->decrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
);
956 st
->realcrc
= crc32_compute(st
->pktin
->data
, st
->biglen
- 4);
957 st
->gotcrc
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->biglen
- 4);
958 if (st
->gotcrc
!= st
->realcrc
) {
959 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
960 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
964 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
965 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 0;
967 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
968 unsigned char *decompblk
;
970 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
971 st
->pktin
->body
- 1, st
->pktin
->length
+ 1,
972 &decompblk
, &decomplen
)) {
973 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
974 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
978 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< st
->pad
+ decomplen
) {
979 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->pad
+ decomplen
;
980 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
981 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
983 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->pad
+ 1;
986 memcpy(st
->pktin
->body
- 1, decompblk
, decomplen
);
988 st
->pktin
->length
= decomplen
- 1;
991 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->body
[-1];
994 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
998 struct logblank_t blank
;
999 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1000 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1001 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1002 if ((st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
) ||
1003 (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
)) {
1004 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 0;
1005 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1006 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1009 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1010 blank
.len
= st
->pktin
->length
;
1011 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1015 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
,
1016 PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1017 ssh1_pkt_type(st
->pktin
->type
),
1018 st
->pktin
->body
, st
->pktin
->length
,
1022 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1025 static struct Packet
*ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char **data
, int *datalen
)
1027 struct rdpkt2_state_tag
*st
= &ssh
->rdpkt2_state
;
1029 crBegin(ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
);
1031 st
->pktin
= ssh_new_packet();
1033 st
->pktin
->type
= 0;
1034 st
->pktin
->length
= 0;
1036 st
->cipherblk
= ssh
->sccipher
->blksize
;
1039 if (st
->cipherblk
< 8)
1042 st
->pktin
->data
= snewn(st
->cipherblk
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1045 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1046 * contain the length and padding details.
1048 for (st
->i
= st
->len
= 0; st
->i
< st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
++) {
1049 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1051 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1056 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1057 st
->pktin
->data
, st
->cipherblk
);
1060 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1062 st
->len
= GET_32BIT(st
->pktin
->data
);
1063 st
->pad
= st
->pktin
->data
[4];
1066 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1067 * do us any more damage.
1069 if (st
->len
< 0 || st
->pad
< 0 || st
->len
+ st
->pad
< 0) {
1070 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1071 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1076 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1078 st
->payload
= st
->len
- st
->pad
- 1;
1080 st
->pktin
->length
= st
->payload
+ 5;
1083 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1085 st
->packetlen
= st
->len
+ 4;
1086 st
->maclen
= ssh
->scmac ? ssh
->scmac
->len
: 0;
1089 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1091 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1092 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1093 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1097 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1099 for (st
->i
= st
->cipherblk
; st
->i
< st
->packetlen
+ st
->maclen
;
1101 while ((*datalen
) == 0)
1103 st
->pktin
->data
[st
->i
] = *(*data
)++;
1106 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1108 ssh
->sccipher
->decrypt(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
,
1109 st
->pktin
->data
+ st
->cipherblk
,
1110 st
->packetlen
- st
->cipherblk
);
1112 st
->pktin
->encrypted_len
= st
->packetlen
;
1118 && !ssh
->scmac
->verify(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, st
->pktin
->data
, st
->len
+ 4,
1119 st
->incoming_sequence
)) {
1120 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1121 ssh_free_packet(st
->pktin
);
1125 st
->pktin
->sequence
= st
->incoming_sequence
++;
1128 * Decompress packet payload.
1131 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1134 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
,
1135 st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, st
->pktin
->length
- 5,
1136 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1137 if (st
->pktin
->maxlen
< newlen
+ 5) {
1138 st
->pktin
->maxlen
= newlen
+ 5;
1139 st
->pktin
->data
= sresize(st
->pktin
->data
,
1140 st
->pktin
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
,
1143 st
->pktin
->length
= 5 + newlen
;
1144 memcpy(st
->pktin
->data
+ 5, newpayload
, newlen
);
1149 st
->pktin
->savedpos
= 6;
1150 st
->pktin
->body
= st
->pktin
->data
;
1151 st
->pktin
->type
= st
->pktin
->data
[5];
1154 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1158 struct logblank_t blank
;
1159 if (ssh
->cfg
.logomitdata
) {
1160 int do_blank
= FALSE
, blank_prefix
= 0;
1161 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1162 if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
) {
1163 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 4;
1164 } else if (st
->pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
) {
1165 do_blank
= TRUE
; blank_prefix
= 8;
1168 blank
.offset
= blank_prefix
;
1169 blank
.len
= (st
->pktin
->length
-6) - blank_prefix
;
1170 blank
.type
= PKTLOG_OMIT
;
1174 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_INCOMING
, st
->pktin
->type
,
1175 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, st
->pktin
->type
),
1176 st
->pktin
->data
+6, st
->pktin
->length
-6,
1180 crFinish(st
->pktin
);
1183 static void ssh1_pktout_size(struct Packet
*pkt
, int len
)
1187 len
+= 5; /* type and CRC */
1188 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1191 pkt
->length
= len
- 5;
1192 if (pkt
->maxlen
< biglen
) {
1193 pkt
->maxlen
= biglen
;
1194 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, biglen
+ 4 + APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1196 pkt
->body
= pkt
->data
+ 4 + pad
+ 1;
1199 static struct Packet
*s_wrpkt_start(int type
, int len
)
1201 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1202 ssh1_pktout_size(pkt
, len
);
1204 /* Initialise log omission state */
1210 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1216 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1217 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1218 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1219 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1225 pkt
->body
[-1] = pkt
->type
;
1228 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->type
,
1229 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt
->type
),
1230 pkt
->body
, pkt
->length
,
1231 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1232 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1235 if (ssh
->v1_compressing
) {
1236 unsigned char *compblk
;
1238 zlib_compress_block(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
,
1239 pkt
->body
- 1, pkt
->length
+ 1,
1240 &compblk
, &complen
);
1241 ssh1_pktout_size(pkt
, complen
- 1);
1242 memcpy(pkt
->body
- 1, compblk
, complen
);
1246 len
= pkt
->length
+ 5; /* type and CRC */
1247 pad
= 8 - (len
% 8);
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< pad
; i
++)
1251 pkt
->data
[i
+ 4] = random_byte();
1252 crc
= crc32_compute(pkt
->data
+ 4, biglen
- 4);
1253 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ biglen
, crc
);
1254 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, len
);
1257 ssh
->cipher
->encrypt(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 4, biglen
);
1262 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1265 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
);
1266 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1267 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1268 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1271 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1274 len
= s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh
, pkt
);
1275 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1276 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1277 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1281 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1282 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1286 * Construct a packet with the specified contents.
1288 static struct Packet
*construct_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
,
1289 va_list ap1
, va_list ap2
)
1291 unsigned char *p
, *argp
, argchar
;
1292 unsigned long argint
;
1293 int pktlen
, argtype
, arglen
;
1298 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap1
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1301 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1305 (void) va_arg(ap1
, int);
1309 (void) va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1310 arglen
= va_arg(ap1
, int);
1314 argp
= va_arg(ap1
, unsigned char *);
1315 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1316 pktlen
+= 4 + arglen
;
1319 bn
= va_arg(ap1
, Bignum
);
1320 pktlen
+= ssh1_bignum_length(bn
);
1325 /* ignore this pass */
1332 pkt
= s_wrpkt_start(pkttype
, pktlen
);
1335 while ((argtype
= va_arg(ap2
, int)) != PKT_END
) {
1336 int offset
= p
- pkt
->body
, len
= 0;
1338 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1340 argint
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1341 PUT_32BIT(p
, argint
);
1345 argchar
= (unsigned char) va_arg(ap2
, int);
1350 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1351 arglen
= va_arg(ap2
, int);
1352 memcpy(p
, argp
, arglen
);
1356 argp
= va_arg(ap2
, unsigned char *);
1357 arglen
= strlen((char *)argp
);
1358 PUT_32BIT(p
, arglen
);
1359 memcpy(p
+ 4, argp
, arglen
);
1363 bn
= va_arg(ap2
, Bignum
);
1364 len
= ssh1_write_bignum(p
, bn
);
1366 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1368 dont_log_password(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
1371 dont_log_data(ssh
, pkt
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
1374 end_log_omission(ssh
, pkt
);
1378 /* Deal with logfile omission, if required. */
1379 if (len
&& (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
)) {
1381 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
,
1383 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= offset
;
1384 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1385 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1392 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1396 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1397 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1398 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1402 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1405 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh
, int pkttype
, ...)
1409 va_start(ap1
, pkttype
);
1410 va_start(ap2
, pkttype
);
1411 pkt
= construct_packet(ssh
, pkttype
, ap1
, ap2
);
1414 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh
, pkt
);
1415 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1418 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a
, char *b
)
1421 unsigned long av
, bv
;
1423 av
= strtoul(a
, &ae
, 10);
1424 bv
= strtoul(b
, &be
, 10);
1426 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1431 av
= strtoul(ae
, &ae
, 10);
1432 bv
= strtoul(be
, &be
, 10);
1434 return (av
< bv ?
-1 : +1);
1439 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1440 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1443 static void sha_string(SHA_State
* s
, void *str
, int len
)
1445 unsigned char lenblk
[4];
1446 PUT_32BIT(lenblk
, len
);
1447 SHA_Bytes(s
, lenblk
, 4);
1448 SHA_Bytes(s
, str
, len
);
1451 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State
* s
, unsigned i
)
1453 unsigned char intblk
[4];
1454 PUT_32BIT(intblk
, i
);
1455 SHA_Bytes(s
, intblk
, 4);
1459 * SSH2 packet construction functions.
1461 static void ssh2_pkt_ensure(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1463 if (pkt
->maxlen
< length
) {
1464 pkt
->maxlen
= length
+ 256;
1465 pkt
->data
= sresize(pkt
->data
, pkt
->maxlen
+ APIEXTRA
, unsigned char);
1468 static void ssh2_pkt_adddata(struct Packet
*pkt
, void *data
, int len
)
1470 if (pkt
->logmode
!= PKTLOG_EMIT
) {
1472 pkt
->blanks
= sresize(pkt
->blanks
, pkt
->nblanks
, struct logblank_t
);
1473 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].offset
= pkt
->length
- 6;
1474 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].len
= len
;
1475 pkt
->blanks
[pkt
->nblanks
-1].type
= pkt
->logmode
;
1478 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
);
1479 memcpy(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->length
- len
, data
, len
);
1481 static void ssh2_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char byte
)
1483 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &byte
, 1);
1485 static struct Packet
*ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type
)
1487 struct Packet
*pkt
= ssh_new_packet();
1489 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt
, (unsigned char) pkt_type
);
1492 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned char value
)
1494 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, &value
, 1);
1496 static void ssh2_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet
*pkt
, unsigned long value
)
1499 PUT_32BIT(x
, value
);
1500 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, x
, 4);
1502 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1504 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt
, 0);
1505 pkt
->savedpos
= pkt
->length
;
1507 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1509 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, strlen(data
));
1510 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1512 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
, int len
)
1514 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, data
, len
);
1515 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
+ pkt
->savedpos
- 4, pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
);
1517 static void ssh2_pkt_addstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char *data
)
1519 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1520 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt
, data
);
1522 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b
, int *len
)
1525 int i
, n
= (bignum_bitcount(b
) + 7) / 8;
1526 p
= snewn(n
+ 1, unsigned char);
1528 fatalbox("out of memory");
1530 for (i
= 1; i
<= n
; i
++)
1531 p
[i
] = bignum_byte(b
, n
- i
);
1533 while (i
<= n
&& p
[i
] == 0 && (p
[i
+ 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1535 memmove(p
, p
+ i
, n
+ 1 - i
);
1539 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet
*pkt
, Bignum b
)
1543 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1544 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1545 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)p
, len
);
1550 * Construct an SSH2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1551 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1552 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1554 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1556 int cipherblk
, maclen
, padding
, i
;
1559 log_packet(ssh
->logctx
, PKT_OUTGOING
, pkt
->data
[5],
1560 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh
->pkt_ctx
, pkt
->data
[5]),
1561 pkt
->data
+ 6, pkt
->length
- 6,
1562 pkt
->nblanks
, pkt
->blanks
);
1563 sfree(pkt
->blanks
); pkt
->blanks
= NULL
;
1567 * Compress packet payload.
1570 unsigned char *newpayload
;
1573 ssh
->cscomp
->compress(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
, pkt
->data
+ 5,
1575 &newpayload
, &newlen
)) {
1577 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt
, newpayload
, newlen
);
1583 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1584 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1586 cipherblk
= ssh
->cscipher ? ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
: 8; /* block size */
1587 cipherblk
= cipherblk
< 8 ?
8 : cipherblk
; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1590 (cipherblk
- (pkt
->length
+ padding
) % cipherblk
) % cipherblk
;
1591 maclen
= ssh
->csmac ? ssh
->csmac
->len
: 0;
1592 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt
, pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
);
1593 pkt
->data
[4] = padding
;
1594 for (i
= 0; i
< padding
; i
++)
1595 pkt
->data
[pkt
->length
+ i
] = random_byte();
1596 PUT_32BIT(pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
- 4);
1598 ssh
->csmac
->generate(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, pkt
->data
,
1599 pkt
->length
+ padding
,
1600 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
);
1601 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1604 ssh
->cscipher
->encrypt(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
,
1605 pkt
->data
, pkt
->length
+ padding
);
1607 pkt
->encrypted_len
= pkt
->length
+ padding
;
1609 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1610 return pkt
->length
+ padding
+ maclen
;
1614 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1615 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1616 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1618 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1619 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1620 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1621 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1622 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1623 * works after packet encryption.
1625 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1626 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1627 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1628 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1629 * then send them once we've finished.
1631 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1632 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1634 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1635 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1636 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1637 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1638 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1639 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1643 * Send an SSH2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1645 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1649 len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1650 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)pkt
->data
, len
);
1651 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1652 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1654 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1655 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1656 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> MAX_DATA_BEFORE_REKEY
)
1657 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange "
1658 "(too much data sent)", -1, NULL
);
1660 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1664 * Defer an SSH2 packet.
1666 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1668 int len
= ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh
, pkt
);
1669 if (ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
> ssh
->deferred_size
) {
1670 ssh
->deferred_size
= ssh
->deferred_len
+ len
+ 128;
1671 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= sresize(ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1675 memcpy(ssh
->deferred_send_data
+ ssh
->deferred_len
, pkt
->data
, len
);
1676 ssh
->deferred_len
+= len
;
1677 ssh
->deferred_data_size
+= pkt
->encrypted_len
;
1678 ssh_free_packet(pkt
);
1682 * Queue an SSH2 packet.
1684 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1686 assert(ssh
->queueing
);
1688 if (ssh
->queuelen
>= ssh
->queuesize
) {
1689 ssh
->queuesize
= ssh
->queuelen
+ 32;
1690 ssh
->queue
= sresize(ssh
->queue
, ssh
->queuesize
, struct Packet
*);
1693 ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
++] = pkt
;
1697 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1700 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1703 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1705 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1709 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1712 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
)
1715 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh
, pkt
);
1717 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, pkt
);
1721 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1722 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH1's defer_packet().
1724 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1725 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1726 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1727 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1728 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1729 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1730 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1733 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh
)
1736 backlog
= sk_write(ssh
->s
, (char *)ssh
->deferred_send_data
,
1738 ssh
->deferred_len
= ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
1739 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
1740 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
1741 if (backlog
> SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
1742 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 1, backlog
);
1744 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
+= ssh
->deferred_data_size
;
1745 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
1746 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
> MAX_DATA_BEFORE_REKEY
)
1747 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange "
1748 "(too much data sent)", -1, NULL
);
1749 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0;
1753 * Send all queued SSH2 packets. We send them by means of
1754 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1755 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1757 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh
)
1761 assert(!ssh
->queueing
);
1763 for (i
= 0; i
< ssh
->queuelen
; i
++)
1764 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh
, ssh
->queue
[i
]);
1767 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
1771 void bndebug(char *string
, Bignum b
)
1775 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1776 debug(("%s", string
));
1777 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++)
1778 debug((" %02x", p
[i
]));
1784 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State
* s
, Bignum b
)
1788 p
= ssh2_mpint_fmt(b
, &len
);
1789 sha_string(s
, p
, len
);
1794 * Packet decode functions for both SSH1 and SSH2.
1796 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1798 unsigned long value
;
1799 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1800 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1801 value
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1805 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1807 unsigned long value
;
1808 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 1)
1809 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1810 value
= pkt
->body
[pkt
->savedpos
] != 0;
1814 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet
*pkt
, char **p
, int *length
)
1819 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< 4)
1821 len
= GET_32BIT(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1826 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< *length
)
1828 *p
= (char *)(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
);
1829 pkt
->savedpos
+= *length
;
1831 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet
*pkt
, int length
)
1833 if (pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
< length
)
1835 pkt
->savedpos
+= length
;
1836 return pkt
->body
+ (pkt
->savedpos
- length
);
1838 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet
*pkt
, struct RSAKey
*key
,
1839 unsigned char **keystr
)
1843 j
= makekey(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
1844 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
,
1851 assert(pkt
->savedpos
< pkt
->length
);
1855 static Bignum
ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1860 j
= ssh1_read_bignum(pkt
->body
+ pkt
->savedpos
,
1861 pkt
->length
- pkt
->savedpos
, &b
);
1869 static Bignum
ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet
*pkt
)
1875 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt
, &p
, &length
);
1880 b
= bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p
, length
);
1885 * Helper function to add an SSH2 signature blob to a packet.
1886 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
1887 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
1888 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
1889 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
1891 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pkt
,
1892 void *pkblob_v
, int pkblob_len
,
1893 void *sigblob_v
, int sigblob_len
)
1895 unsigned char *pkblob
= (unsigned char *)pkblob_v
;
1896 unsigned char *sigblob
= (unsigned char *)sigblob_v
;
1898 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
1899 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
1902 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
1903 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
1905 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
) &&
1906 (GET_32BIT(pkblob
) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob
+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
1907 int pos
, len
, siglen
;
1910 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
1913 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1914 pos
+= 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* skip over exponent */
1915 len
= GET_32BIT(pkblob
+pos
); /* find length of modulus */
1916 pos
+= 4; /* find modulus itself */
1917 while (len
> 0 && pkblob
[pos
] == 0)
1919 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
1922 * Now find the signature integer.
1924 pos
= 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
1925 siglen
= GET_32BIT(sigblob
+pos
);
1926 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
1928 if (len
!= siglen
) {
1929 unsigned char newlen
[4];
1930 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1931 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, pos
);
1932 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
1933 pos
+= 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
1934 PUT_32BIT(newlen
, len
);
1935 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 4);
1936 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
1938 while (len
-- > siglen
) {
1939 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)newlen
, 1);
1940 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
1942 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)(sigblob
+pos
), siglen
);
1943 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
1947 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
1950 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt
);
1951 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt
, (char *)sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
1955 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
1956 * a list of known buggy implementations.
1958 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh
, char *vstring
)
1960 char *imp
; /* pointer to implementation part */
1962 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1964 imp
+= strcspn(imp
, "-");
1967 ssh
->remote_bugs
= 0;
1969 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== FORCE_ON
||
1970 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_ignore1
== AUTO
&&
1971 (!strcmp(imp
, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.19") ||
1972 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.21") ||
1973 !strcmp(imp
, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") ||
1974 !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
1976 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
1977 * to use a different defence against password length
1980 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
;
1981 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH1 ignore bug");
1984 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== FORCE_ON
||
1985 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_plainpw1
== AUTO
&&
1986 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp
, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
1988 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
1989 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
1992 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
;
1993 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH1 password");
1996 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== FORCE_ON
||
1997 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsa1
== AUTO
&&
1998 (!strcmp(imp
, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2000 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2001 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2002 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2004 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
;
2005 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle RSA authentication");
2008 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== FORCE_ON
||
2009 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_hmac2
== AUTO
&&
2010 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2011 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp
) ||
2012 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp
) ||
2013 wc_match("2.1 *", imp
)))) {
2015 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2017 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_HMAC
;
2018 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 HMAC bug");
2021 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== FORCE_ON
||
2022 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_derivekey2
== AUTO
&&
2023 !wc_match("* VShell", imp
) &&
2024 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp
) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp
) ))) {
2026 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2027 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2028 * generate the keys).
2030 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
;
2031 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 key-derivation bug");
2034 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== FORCE_ON
||
2035 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_rsapad2
== AUTO
&&
2036 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp
) ||
2037 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp
)))) {
2039 * These versions have the SSH2 RSA padding bug.
2041 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING
;
2042 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 RSA padding bug");
2045 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== FORCE_ON
||
2046 (ssh
->cfg
.sshbug_pksessid2
== AUTO
&&
2047 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp
))) {
2049 * These versions have the SSH2 session-ID bug in
2050 * public-key authentication.
2052 ssh
->remote_bugs
|= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
;
2053 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2058 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2059 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2061 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str
)
2063 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2064 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2065 assert(*str
== 'S'); str
++;
2066 assert(*str
== 'H'); str
++;
2067 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2068 while (*str
&& *str
!= '-') str
++;
2069 assert(*str
== '-'); str
++;
2071 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2074 if (*str
== '-' || *str
== ' ')
2080 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char c
)
2082 struct do_ssh_init_state
{
2090 crState(do_ssh_init_state
);
2092 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
);
2094 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2097 static const int transS
[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
2098 static const int transH
[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
2099 static const int transminus
[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
2101 s
->i
= transS
[s
->i
];
2103 s
->i
= transH
[s
->i
];
2105 s
->i
= transminus
[s
->i
];
2110 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
2114 s
->vstring
= snewn(s
->vstrsize
, char);
2115 strcpy(s
->vstring
, "SSH-");
2119 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2120 if (s
->vslen
>= s
->vstrsize
- 1) {
2122 s
->vstring
= sresize(s
->vstring
, s
->vstrsize
, char);
2124 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
++] = c
;
2127 s
->version
[s
->i
] = '\0';
2129 } else if (s
->i
< sizeof(s
->version
) - 1)
2130 s
->version
[s
->i
++] = c
;
2131 } else if (c
== '\012')
2135 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= FALSE
;
2136 ssh
->rdpkt2_state
.incoming_sequence
= 0;
2138 s
->vstring
[s
->vslen
] = 0;
2139 s
->vstring
[strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2142 vlog
= snewn(20 + s
->vslen
, char);
2143 sprintf(vlog
, "Server version: %s", s
->vstring
);
2147 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh
, s
->vstring
);
2150 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2153 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2154 s
->proto1
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "2.0") < 0;
2155 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2156 s
->proto2
= ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.99") >= 0;
2158 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 0 && !s
->proto1
) {
2159 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2162 if (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
== 3 && !s
->proto2
) {
2163 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2170 if (s
->proto2
&& (ssh
->cfg
.sshprot
>= 2 || !s
->proto1
)) {
2172 * Construct a v2 version string.
2174 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver
);
2178 * Construct a v1 version string.
2180 verstring
= dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2181 (ssh_versioncmp(s
->version
, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2182 s
->version
: "1.5"),
2187 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring
);
2189 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2191 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2193 SHA_Init(&ssh
->exhashbase
);
2194 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, verstring
,
2195 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"));
2196 sha_string(&ssh
->exhashbase
, s
->vstring
,
2197 strcspn(s
->vstring
, "\015\012"));
2200 * Initialise SSHv2 protocol.
2202 ssh
->protocol
= ssh2_protocol
;
2203 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2204 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh2_rdpkt
;
2207 * Initialise SSHv1 protocol.
2209 ssh
->protocol
= ssh1_protocol
;
2210 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh
);
2211 ssh
->s_rdpkt
= ssh1_rdpkt
;
2213 logeventf(ssh
, "We claim version: %.*s",
2214 strcspn(verstring
, "\015\012"), verstring
);
2215 sk_write(ssh
->s
, verstring
, strlen(verstring
));
2219 logeventf(ssh
, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh
->version
);
2221 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
2222 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
;
2223 ssh
->pinger
= pinger_new(&ssh
->cfg
, &ssh_backend
, ssh
);
2230 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *data
, int datalen
)
2232 crBegin(ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
);
2235 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2236 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2237 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2238 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2241 int ret
; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2243 crReturnV
; /* more data please */
2244 ret
= do_ssh_init(ssh
, *data
);
2252 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2253 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2254 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2255 * to the proper protocol handler.
2260 while (datalen
> 0) {
2261 struct Packet
*pktin
= ssh
->s_rdpkt(ssh
, &data
, &datalen
);
2263 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, NULL
, 0, pktin
);
2264 ssh_free_packet(pktin
);
2266 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
2274 static void ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh
)
2277 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2279 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_CLOSED
;
2283 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2286 * Now we must shut down any port and X forwardings going
2287 * through this connection.
2289 if (ssh
->channels
) {
2290 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2293 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
2296 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
2299 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
2300 if (ssh
->version
== 2)
2301 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
2307 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug
, const char *error_msg
, int error_code
,
2310 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2313 /* A socket error has occurred. */
2314 logevent(error_msg
);
2315 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", error_msg
);
2317 /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
2322 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug
, int urgent
, char *data
, int len
)
2324 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2325 ssh_gotdata(ssh
, (unsigned char *)data
, len
);
2326 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
) {
2333 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug
, int bufsize
)
2335 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) plug
;
2337 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2338 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2340 if (bufsize
< SSH_MAX_BACKLOG
)
2341 ssh_throttle_all(ssh
, 0, bufsize
);
2345 * Connect to specified host and port.
2346 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2347 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2348 * freed by the caller.
2350 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh
, char *host
, int port
,
2351 char **realhost
, int nodelay
, int keepalive
)
2353 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table
= {
2363 ssh
->savedhost
= snewn(1 + strlen(host
), char);
2364 if (!ssh
->savedhost
)
2365 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2366 strcpy(ssh
->savedhost
, host
);
2369 port
= 22; /* default ssh port */
2370 ssh
->savedport
= port
;
2375 logeventf(ssh
, "Looking up host \"%s\"", host
);
2376 addr
= name_lookup(host
, port
, realhost
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2377 if ((err
= sk_addr_error(addr
)) != NULL
) {
2387 sk_getaddr(addr
, addrbuf
, 100);
2388 logeventf(ssh
, "Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf
, port
);
2390 ssh
->fn
= &fn_table
;
2391 ssh
->s
= new_connection(addr
, *realhost
, port
,
2392 0, 1, nodelay
, keepalive
, (Plug
) ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
2393 if ((err
= sk_socket_error(ssh
->s
)) != NULL
) {
2395 notify_remote_exit(ssh
->frontend
);
2403 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2405 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh
, int adjust
)
2407 int old_count
= ssh
->v1_throttle_count
;
2408 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
+= adjust
;
2409 assert(ssh
->v1_throttle_count
>= 0);
2410 if (ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& !old_count
) {
2411 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 1);
2412 } else if (!ssh
->v1_throttle_count
&& old_count
) {
2413 sk_set_frozen(ssh
->s
, 0);
2418 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2419 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2421 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh
, int enable
, int bufsize
)
2424 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
2426 if (enable
== ssh
->throttled_all
)
2428 ssh
->throttled_all
= enable
;
2429 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= bufsize
;
2432 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
2434 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
2436 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2440 x11_override_throttle(c
->u
.x11
.s
, enable
);
2443 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2446 pfd_override_throttle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, enable
);
2453 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2454 * reusable in several places - even between SSH1 and SSH2.
2457 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2458 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, char *buffer
, int buflen
, int echo
)
2460 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
= buffer
;
2461 ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
= buflen
;
2462 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
= 0;
2463 ssh
->userpass_input_echo
= echo
;
2467 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2468 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2469 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2470 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2472 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
)
2477 switch (c
= *in
++) {
2480 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
] = 0;
2481 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1] = 0;
2486 if (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2487 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2488 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2489 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2494 while (ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
> 0) {
2495 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2496 c_write_str(ssh
, "\b \b");
2497 ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
--;
2506 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2507 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2508 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2510 if ((!ssh
->userpass_input_echo
||
2511 (c
>= ' ' && c
<= '~') ||
2512 ((unsigned char) c
>= 160))
2513 && ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
< ssh
->userpass_input_buflen
-1) {
2514 ssh
->userpass_input_buffer
[ssh
->userpass_input_bufpos
++] = c
;
2515 if (ssh
->userpass_input_echo
)
2516 c_write(ssh
, &c
, 1);
2524 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2526 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) sshv
;
2528 ssh
->agent_response
= reply
;
2529 ssh
->agent_response_len
= replylen
;
2531 if (ssh
->version
== 1)
2532 do_ssh1_login(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2534 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, -1, NULL
);
2537 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv
, void *reply
, int replylen
)
2539 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)cv
;
2541 void *sentreply
= reply
;
2544 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2545 sentreply
= "\0\0\0\1\5";
2548 if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
2549 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, sentreply
, replylen
);
2552 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
2553 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
2556 PKT_DATA
, sentreply
, replylen
,
2565 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2567 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
2568 struct Packet
*pktin
)
2571 unsigned char cookie
[8], *ptr
;
2572 struct RSAKey servkey
, hostkey
;
2573 struct MD5Context md5c
;
2574 struct do_ssh1_login_state
{
2576 unsigned char *rsabuf
, *keystr1
, *keystr2
;
2577 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask
, supported_auths_mask
;
2578 int tried_publickey
, tried_agent
;
2579 int tis_auth_refused
, ccard_auth_refused
;
2580 unsigned char session_id
[16];
2583 void *publickey_blob
;
2584 int publickey_bloblen
;
2590 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
2599 crState(do_ssh1_login_state
);
2601 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
);
2606 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
) {
2607 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2611 logevent("Received public keys");
2613 ptr
= ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin
, 8);
2615 bombout(("SSH1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2618 memcpy(cookie
, ptr
, 8);
2620 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &servkey
, &s
->keystr1
) ||
2621 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin
, &hostkey
, &s
->keystr2
)) {
2622 bombout(("Failed to read SSH1 public keys from public key packet"));
2627 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2631 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2632 strcpy(logmsg
, " ");
2633 hostkey
.comment
= NULL
;
2634 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg
+ strlen(logmsg
),
2635 sizeof(logmsg
) - strlen(logmsg
), &hostkey
);
2639 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2640 s
->supported_ciphers_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2641 s
->supported_auths_mask
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
2643 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
=
2644 ssh
->v1_remote_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED
;
2645 ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
|= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
;
2648 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr2
, hostkey
.bytes
);
2649 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->keystr1
, servkey
.bytes
);
2650 MD5Update(&md5c
, cookie
, 8);
2651 MD5Final(s
->session_id
, &md5c
);
2653 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++)
2654 ssh
->session_key
[i
] = random_byte();
2657 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
2659 if (hostkey
.bits
> hostkey
.bytes
* 8 ||
2660 servkey
.bits
> servkey
.bytes
* 8) {
2661 bombout(("SSH1 public keys were badly formatted"));
2665 s
->len
= (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes ? hostkey
.bytes
: servkey
.bytes
);
2667 s
->rsabuf
= snewn(s
->len
, unsigned char);
2669 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2672 * Verify the host key.
2676 * First format the key into a string.
2678 int len
= rsastr_len(&hostkey
);
2679 char fingerprint
[100];
2680 char *keystr
= snewn(len
, char);
2682 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2683 rsastr_fmt(keystr
, &hostkey
);
2684 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint
, sizeof(fingerprint
), &hostkey
);
2685 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
2686 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, "rsa", keystr
,
2691 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
2692 s
->rsabuf
[i
] = ssh
->session_key
[i
];
2694 s
->rsabuf
[i
] ^= s
->session_id
[i
];
2697 if (hostkey
.bytes
> servkey
.bytes
) {
2698 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &servkey
);
2700 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, servkey
.bytes
, &hostkey
);
2702 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, 32, &hostkey
);
2704 ret
= rsaencrypt(s
->rsabuf
, hostkey
.bytes
, &servkey
);
2707 bombout(("SSH1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
2711 logevent("Encrypted session key");
2714 int cipher_chosen
= 0, warn
= 0;
2715 char *cipher_string
= NULL
;
2717 for (i
= 0; !cipher_chosen
&& i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
2718 int next_cipher
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
];
2719 if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_WARN
) {
2720 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
2722 } else if (next_cipher
== CIPHER_AES
) {
2723 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
2724 logevent("AES not supported in SSH1, skipping");
2726 switch (next_cipher
) {
2727 case CIPHER_3DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_3DES
;
2728 cipher_string
= "3DES"; break;
2729 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
;
2730 cipher_string
= "Blowfish"; break;
2731 case CIPHER_DES
: s
->cipher_type
= SSH_CIPHER_DES
;
2732 cipher_string
= "single-DES"; break;
2734 if (s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << s
->cipher_type
))
2738 if (!cipher_chosen
) {
2739 if ((s
->supported_ciphers_mask
& (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES
)) == 0)
2740 bombout(("Server violates SSH 1 protocol by not "
2741 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
2743 /* shouldn't happen */
2744 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
2748 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
2750 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "cipher", cipher_string
);
2753 switch (s
->cipher_type
) {
2754 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES
:
2755 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
2757 case SSH_CIPHER_DES
:
2758 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
2760 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
2761 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
2765 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
,
2766 PKT_CHAR
, s
->cipher_type
,
2767 PKT_DATA
, cookie
, 8,
2768 PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR
, (s
->len
* 8) & 0xFF,
2769 PKT_DATA
, s
->rsabuf
, s
->len
,
2770 PKT_INT
, ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
, PKT_END
);
2772 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
2776 ssh
->cipher
= (s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ?
&ssh_blowfish_ssh1
:
2777 s
->cipher_type
== SSH_CIPHER_DES ?
&ssh_des
:
2779 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cipher
->make_context();
2780 ssh
->cipher
->sesskey(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
, ssh
->session_key
);
2781 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh
->cipher
->text_name
);
2783 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= crcda_make_context();
2784 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
2786 if (servkey
.modulus
) {
2787 sfree(servkey
.modulus
);
2788 servkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
2790 if (servkey
.exponent
) {
2791 sfree(servkey
.exponent
);
2792 servkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
2794 if (hostkey
.modulus
) {
2795 sfree(hostkey
.modulus
);
2796 hostkey
.modulus
= NULL
;
2798 if (hostkey
.exponent
) {
2799 sfree(hostkey
.exponent
);
2800 hostkey
.exponent
= NULL
;
2804 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
2805 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
2809 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
2813 if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
2814 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
2815 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
2816 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
2818 * get_line failed to get a username.
2821 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
2822 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
2826 int ret
; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
2827 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
2830 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
2832 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
2833 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
2837 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
2840 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
2841 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
2844 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_USER
, PKT_STR
, s
->username
, PKT_END
);
2846 char userlog
[22 + sizeof(s
->username
)];
2847 sprintf(userlog
, "Sent username \"%s\"", s
->username
);
2849 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
&&
2850 (!((flags
& FLAG_STDERR
) && (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)))) {
2851 strcat(userlog
, "\r\n");
2852 c_write_str(ssh
, userlog
);
2859 if ((ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA
)) {
2860 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
2861 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 1;
2863 s
->tried_publickey
= s
->tried_agent
= 0;
2865 s
->tis_auth_refused
= s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 0;
2866 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
2867 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
2868 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
2869 &s
->publickey_blob
, &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
))
2870 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2872 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
2874 while (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
2875 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
2877 if (agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
2879 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
2885 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
2887 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
2888 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
2889 s
->request
[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
;
2890 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
2891 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
2895 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
2896 " for agent response"));
2899 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
2900 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
2901 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
2903 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
2904 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
2905 s
->response
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
2906 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
2907 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2911 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH1 keys", s
->nkeys
);
2914 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
2917 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
2920 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
2921 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
2922 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
2923 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
2924 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
2929 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
2930 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
2931 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
2936 n
= ssh1_read_bignum
2937 (s
->p
, s
->responselen
-(s
->p
-s
->response
),
2942 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) < 4)
2944 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
2946 if (s
->responselen
- (s
->p
-s
->response
) <
2949 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
2950 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
2954 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
2958 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
2959 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
2961 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
2962 logevent("Key refused");
2965 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
2966 if ((s
->challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
2967 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
2972 char *agentreq
, *q
, *ret
;
2975 len
= 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
2976 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.exponent
);
2977 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->key
.modulus
);
2978 len
+= ssh1_bignum_length(s
->challenge
);
2979 len
+= 16; /* session id */
2980 len
+= 4; /* response format */
2981 agentreq
= snewn(4 + len
, char);
2982 PUT_32BIT(agentreq
, len
);
2984 *q
++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
;
2985 PUT_32BIT(q
, bignum_bitcount(s
->key
.modulus
));
2987 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.exponent
);
2988 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->key
.modulus
);
2989 q
+= ssh1_write_bignum(q
, s
->challenge
);
2990 memcpy(q
, s
->session_id
, 16);
2992 PUT_32BIT(q
, 1); /* response format */
2993 if (!agent_query(agentreq
, len
+ 4, &vret
, &retlen
,
2994 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
2999 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3000 " while waiting for agent"
3004 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
3005 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
3006 retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
3011 if (ret
[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
) {
3012 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3013 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3014 PKT_DATA
, ret
+ 5, 16,
3018 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3020 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3021 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
3022 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticated using"
3024 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
,
3026 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
3031 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3034 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3038 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3041 freebn(s
->key
.exponent
);
3042 freebn(s
->key
.modulus
);
3043 freebn(s
->challenge
);
3052 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
) && !s
->tried_publickey
)
3053 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
;
3055 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3056 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS
)) &&
3057 !s
->tis_auth_refused
) {
3058 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE
;
3059 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3060 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS
, PKT_END
);
3062 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
) {
3063 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3064 if (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)
3065 c_write_str(ssh
, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3066 s
->tis_auth_refused
= 1;
3072 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3074 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3077 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3078 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3079 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3080 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3081 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3082 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3083 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3084 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3085 (sizeof s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3086 s
->prompt
[(sizeof s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3089 if (ssh
->cfg
.try_tis_auth
&&
3090 (s
->supported_auths_mask
& (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD
)) &&
3091 !s
->ccard_auth_refused
) {
3092 s
->pwpkt_type
= SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE
;
3093 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3094 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD
, PKT_END
);
3096 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE
) {
3097 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3098 c_write_str(ssh
, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3099 s
->ccard_auth_refused
= 1;
3105 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &challenge
, &challengelen
);
3107 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3110 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3111 if (challengelen
> sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1)
3112 challengelen
= sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3113 memcpy(s
->prompt
, challenge
, challengelen
);
3114 strncpy(s
->prompt
+ challengelen
,
3115 memchr(s
->prompt
, '\n', challengelen
) ?
3116 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3117 sizeof(s
->prompt
) - challengelen
);
3118 s
->prompt
[sizeof(s
->prompt
) - 1] = '\0';
3121 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3122 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3123 s
->username
, ssh
->savedhost
);
3125 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3126 char *comment
= NULL
;
3129 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3130 c_write_str(ssh
, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3131 logeventf(ssh
, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3132 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3133 type
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
3134 if (type
!= SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1
) {
3135 sprintf(msgbuf
, "Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3136 key_type_to_str(type
));
3138 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
3139 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3140 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3143 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
3144 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3145 c_write_str(ssh
, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3148 sprintf(s
->prompt
, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment
);
3153 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3154 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3158 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->prompt
, s
->password
,
3159 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
3161 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3162 * because one was supplied on the command line
3163 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3165 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
,
3166 PKT_STR
, "No more passwords available to try",
3168 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
3169 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "Unable to authenticate");
3170 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
3174 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3175 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3176 int ret
; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3177 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->prompt
, strlen(s
->prompt
));
3180 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
, sizeof(s
->password
), 0);
3182 crWaitUntil(!pktin
);
3183 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
3187 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
3191 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
) {
3193 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3196 s
->tried_publickey
= 1;
3199 const char *error
= NULL
;
3200 int ret
= loadrsakey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &s
->key
, s
->password
,
3203 c_write_str(ssh
, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3204 c_write_str(ssh
, filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
3205 c_write_str(ssh
, " (");
3206 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
3207 c_write_str(ssh
, ").\r\n");
3208 continue; /* go and try password */
3211 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3212 s
->tried_publickey
= 0;
3213 continue; /* try again */
3218 * Send a public key attempt.
3220 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA
,
3221 PKT_BIGNUM
, s
->key
.modulus
, PKT_END
);
3224 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3225 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3226 continue; /* go and try password */
3228 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
) {
3229 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3235 unsigned char buffer
[32];
3236 Bignum challenge
, response
;
3238 if ((challenge
= ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin
)) == NULL
) {
3239 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3242 response
= rsadecrypt(challenge
, &s
->key
);
3243 freebn(s
->key
.private_exponent
);/* burn the evidence */
3245 for (i
= 0; i
< 32; i
++) {
3246 buffer
[i
] = bignum_byte(response
, 31 - i
);
3250 MD5Update(&md5c
, buffer
, 32);
3251 MD5Update(&md5c
, s
->session_id
, 16);
3252 MD5Final(buffer
, &md5c
);
3254 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
,
3255 PKT_DATA
, buffer
, 16, PKT_END
);
3262 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3263 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3264 c_write_str(ssh
, "Failed to authenticate with"
3265 " our public key.\r\n");
3266 continue; /* go and try password */
3267 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3268 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3272 break; /* we're through! */
3274 if (s
->pwpkt_type
== SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
3276 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3277 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3278 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3279 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3280 * The others are all random data in
3281 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3282 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3283 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3285 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3286 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3287 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3288 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3291 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3292 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3294 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3295 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3296 * packets containing string lengths N through
3297 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3298 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3299 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3301 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3302 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3303 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3304 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3305 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3308 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3309 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3310 * For this server we are left with no defences
3311 * against password length sniffing.
3313 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
)) {
3315 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3316 * we can use the primary defence.
3318 int bottom
, top
, pwlen
, i
;
3321 pwlen
= strlen(s
->password
);
3323 bottom
= 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3326 bottom
= pwlen
& ~7;
3330 assert(pwlen
>= bottom
&& pwlen
<= top
);
3332 randomstr
= snewn(top
+ 1, char);
3334 for (i
= bottom
; i
<= top
; i
++) {
3336 defer_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3337 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_STR
, s
->password
,
3338 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3340 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
3342 randomstr
[j
] = random_byte();
3343 } while (randomstr
[j
] == '\0');
3345 randomstr
[i
] = '\0';
3346 defer_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
,
3347 PKT_STR
, randomstr
, PKT_END
);
3350 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3351 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
3354 else if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD
)) {
3356 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3357 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3358 * can use the secondary defence.
3364 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3365 if (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3367 strcpy(string
, s
->password
);
3368 len
++; /* cover the zero byte */
3369 while (len
< sizeof(string
)) {
3370 string
[len
++] = (char) random_byte();
3375 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3376 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3377 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, ss
, len
,
3378 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3381 * The server has _both_
3382 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3383 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3384 * therefore nothing we can do.
3387 len
= strlen(s
->password
);
3388 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3389 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
,
3390 PKTT_PASSWORD
, PKT_INT
, len
,
3391 PKT_DATA
, s
->password
, len
,
3392 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3395 send_packet(ssh
, s
->pwpkt_type
, PKTT_PASSWORD
,
3396 PKT_STR
, s
->password
, PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3399 logevent("Sent password");
3400 memset(s
->password
, 0, strlen(s
->password
));
3402 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3403 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
)
3404 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
3405 logevent("Authentication refused");
3406 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
3407 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin
->type
));
3412 logevent("Authentication successful");
3417 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
3421 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3422 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3426 if (c
&& !c
->closes
) {
3428 * If the channel's remoteid is -1, we have sent
3429 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3430 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3431 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3432 * open, we can close it then.
3434 if (((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
3435 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3436 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3439 struct Packet
*pktout
;
3440 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
3441 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
3442 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
3445 c
->closes
= 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3446 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
3448 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3449 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
||
3450 c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3452 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3457 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
, int len
)
3461 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3462 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3466 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3467 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
,
3468 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3470 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, buf
, len
,
3471 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
3473 * In SSH1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3474 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3475 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3476 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3477 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3481 ssh2_add_channel_data(c
, buf
, len
);
3482 return ssh2_try_send(c
);
3486 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel
*c
, int bufsize
)
3490 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
3491 assert(ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
);
3495 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
3496 if (c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3497 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3498 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
3501 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
3505 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3508 int stringlen
, bufsize
;
3510 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &string
, &stringlen
);
3511 if (string
== NULL
) {
3512 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
3516 bufsize
= from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
,
3518 if (!ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3519 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 1;
3520 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3524 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3526 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3527 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
3528 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3529 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3531 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
3532 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
3533 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
) {
3534 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3535 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3536 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
3538 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3541 if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
3542 ssh
->x11auth
, NULL
, -1, &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
3543 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
3545 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3546 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3549 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
3550 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
3551 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3553 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3554 c
->type
= CHAN_X11
; /* identify channel type */
3555 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3556 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3557 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3558 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3559 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
3564 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3566 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
3567 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
3568 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3569 int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3571 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
3572 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
) {
3573 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3574 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3576 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3578 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
3579 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3581 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3582 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
3583 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3584 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3585 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3586 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
3591 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3593 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
3594 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
3595 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3596 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
;
3599 char *host
, buf
[1024];
3601 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
3604 remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3605 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &host
, &hostsize
);
3606 port
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3608 if (hostsize
>= lenof(pf
.dhost
))
3609 hostsize
= lenof(pf
.dhost
)-1;
3610 memcpy(pf
.dhost
, host
, hostsize
);
3611 pf
.dhost
[hostsize
] = '\0';
3614 if (find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
3615 sprintf(buf
, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
3618 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3619 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3621 sprintf(buf
, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
3624 e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
, pf
.dhost
, port
,
3628 sprintf(buf
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
3631 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
,
3632 PKT_INT
, remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3634 c
->remoteid
= remoteid
;
3635 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
3637 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3638 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
; /* identify channel type */
3639 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3640 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
,
3641 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_INT
,
3642 c
->localid
, PKT_END
);
3643 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
3648 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3650 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3651 unsigned int localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3652 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3654 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3655 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3656 c
->remoteid
= localid
;
3657 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
3658 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 0;
3659 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3662 if (c
&& c
->closes
) {
3664 * We have a pending close on this channel,
3665 * which we decided on before the server acked
3666 * the channel open. So now we know the
3667 * remoteid, we can close it again.
3669 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
,
3670 PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
, PKT_END
);
3674 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3676 unsigned int remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3677 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3679 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &remoteid
, ssh_channelfind
);
3680 if (c
&& c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
) {
3681 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
3682 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3683 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3688 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3690 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
3691 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3692 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3693 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3694 if (c
&& ((int)c
->remoteid
) != -1) {
3697 (pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
1 : 2);
3699 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
)) {
3700 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3701 assert(c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
);
3702 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
3705 if ((c
->closes
== 0) && (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
)) {
3706 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3707 assert(c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
);
3708 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
3712 c
->closes
|= (closetype
<< 2); /* seen this message */
3713 if (!(c
->closes
& closetype
)) {
3714 send_packet(ssh
, pktin
->type
, PKT_INT
, c
->remoteid
,
3716 c
->closes
|= closetype
; /* sent it too */
3719 if (c
->closes
== 15) {
3720 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
3724 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
3725 pktin
->type
== SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ?
"" :
3726 "_CONFIRMATION", c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent",
3731 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3733 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
3734 int i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3737 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
3739 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &p
, &len
);
3741 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
3746 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, p
, len
);
3749 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, p
, len
);
3752 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
3754 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
3755 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, len
);
3756 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3760 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3762 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
3764 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
3765 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
3767 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
3769 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && len
> 0) {
3771 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
3773 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, p
,
3777 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
3779 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
3782 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
3785 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
3786 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
3787 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
3788 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
3791 bufsize
= 0; /* agent channels never back up */
3794 if (!c
->v
.v1
.throttling
&& bufsize
> SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
3795 c
->v
.v1
.throttling
= 1;
3796 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, +1);
3801 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
3804 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
3805 sprintf(buf
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
3808 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
, PKT_END
);
3810 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
3811 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
3812 * session which we might mistake for another
3813 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
3814 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
3816 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
3819 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
3820 struct Packet
*pktin
)
3822 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
);
3824 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
] =
3825 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
] =
3826 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data
;
3828 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
3829 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
3830 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
3831 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure
;
3832 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] =
3833 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
] =
3834 ssh1_msg_channel_close
;
3835 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = ssh1_msg_channel_data
;
3836 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS
] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status
;
3838 if (ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
3839 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
3840 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
, PKT_END
);
3844 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3845 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3846 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3848 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3849 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
3851 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
3852 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3853 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open
;
3857 if (ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
3858 char proto
[20], data
[64];
3859 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
3860 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
3861 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
3862 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
3863 if (ssh
->v1_local_protoflags
& SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER
) {
3864 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3865 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
,
3866 PKT_INT
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
),
3869 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
,
3870 PKT_STR
, proto
, PKT_STR
, data
, PKT_END
);
3875 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
3876 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3877 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
3879 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
3880 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
3882 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
3883 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
3884 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN
] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open
;
3891 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
3892 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
3894 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1
);
3895 /* Add port forwardings. */
3896 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
3897 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3898 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3901 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
3902 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
3904 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3905 * source port number. This means that
3906 * everything we've seen until now is the
3907 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
3908 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
3911 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3913 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
3916 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3920 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
3921 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3923 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
3924 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3927 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
3928 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3930 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
3931 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3934 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3935 dport
= atoi(dports
);
3939 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
3941 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for"
3942 " destination port \"%s\"", dports
);
3946 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
3948 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
3950 sport
= atoi(sports
);
3954 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
3956 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
3957 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
3960 if (sport
&& dport
) {
3961 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
3962 static char *sportdesc
;
3963 sportdesc
= dupprintf("%.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3964 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
3965 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
3966 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
3967 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")");
3969 /* Verbose description of the destination port */
3970 char *dportdesc
= dupprintf("%s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
3972 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
3973 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
3974 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(host
, dport
,
3975 *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
3976 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3978 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s forward to %s"
3979 " failed: %s", sportdesc
, dportdesc
, err
);
3981 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s forwarding to %s",
3982 sportdesc
, dportdesc
);
3985 } else if (type
== 'D') {
3986 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1,
3987 *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
3988 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
3990 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s SOCKS dynamic forward"
3991 " setup failed: %s", sportdesc
, err
);
3993 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s doing SOCKS"
3994 " dynamic forwarding", sportdesc
);
3997 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
3998 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
3999 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
4003 "SSH1 cannot handle source address spec \"%s:%d\"; ignoring",
4006 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
4008 "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4012 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %.*s%.*s%d%.*s"
4013 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
4014 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
4015 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")",
4017 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
4018 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
4019 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
,
4027 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4028 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4029 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4031 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4032 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused port"
4034 logevent("Server refused this port forwarding");
4036 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
4037 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
] =
4047 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
4048 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4049 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4050 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4051 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
4052 /* Send the pty request. */
4053 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
,
4054 PKT_STR
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
,
4055 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
4056 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
4057 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, /* width,height in pixels */
4058 PKT_CHAR
, 192, PKT_INT
, ssh
->ispeed
, /* TTY_OP_ISPEED */
4059 PKT_CHAR
, 193, PKT_INT
, ssh
->ospeed
, /* TTY_OP_OSPEED */
4060 PKT_CHAR
, 0, PKT_END
);
4061 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
4065 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4066 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4067 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4069 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4070 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4071 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4073 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4074 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
4076 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
4079 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
) {
4080 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
, PKT_INT
, 6, PKT_END
);
4084 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4085 && pktin
->type
!= SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4086 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4088 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4089 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4091 logevent("Started compression");
4092 ssh
->v1_compressing
= TRUE
;
4093 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= zlib_compress_init();
4094 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4095 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= zlib_decompress_init();
4096 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4100 * Start the shell or command.
4102 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH2
4103 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4104 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4107 char *cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
4109 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
) {
4110 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
4111 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
4114 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
, PKT_STR
, cmd
, PKT_END
);
4116 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
, PKT_END
);
4117 logevent("Started session");
4120 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
4121 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
4122 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
4123 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
4124 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
4127 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4129 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
4133 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4134 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4135 * attention to the unusual ones.
4140 if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
) {
4141 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4142 } else if (pktin
->type
== SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE
) {
4143 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4144 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4146 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
4151 int len
= min(inlen
, 512);
4152 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
, PKTT_DATA
,
4153 PKT_INT
, len
, PKT_DATA
, in
, len
,
4154 PKTT_OTHER
, PKT_END
);
4165 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
4167 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4172 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4173 buf
= dupprintf("Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
4178 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4180 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4184 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
4185 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen
, msg
));
4188 void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
4190 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4193 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
4198 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4200 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
4201 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = NULL
;
4204 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4206 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh1_msg_disconnect
;
4207 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
;
4208 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh1_msg_debug
;
4211 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
4212 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4214 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
4217 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
4218 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
4222 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
4223 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
))
4224 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
4229 do_ssh1_connection(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
4233 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4235 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle
, char *haystack
, int haylen
)
4238 if (!needle
|| !haystack
) /* protect against null pointers */
4240 needlen
= strlen(needle
);
4243 * Is it at the start of the string?
4245 if (haylen
>= needlen
&& /* haystack is long enough */
4246 !memcmp(needle
, haystack
, needlen
) && /* initial match */
4247 (haylen
== needlen
|| haystack
[needlen
] == ',')
4248 /* either , or EOS follows */
4252 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4253 * If no comma found, terminate.
4255 while (haylen
> 0 && *haystack
!= ',')
4256 haylen
--, haystack
++;
4259 haylen
--, haystack
++; /* skip over comma itself */
4264 * SSH2 key creation method.
4266 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh
, Bignum K
, unsigned char *H
,
4267 unsigned char *sessid
, char chr
,
4268 unsigned char *keyspace
)
4271 /* First 20 bytes. */
4273 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4275 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4276 SHA_Bytes(&s
, &chr
, 1);
4277 SHA_Bytes(&s
, sessid
, 20);
4278 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
);
4279 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4281 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY
))
4283 SHA_Bytes(&s
, H
, 20);
4284 SHA_Bytes(&s
, keyspace
, 20);
4285 SHA_Final(&s
, keyspace
+ 20);
4289 * Handle the SSH2 transport layer.
4291 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
4292 struct Packet
*pktin
)
4294 struct do_ssh2_transport_state
{
4295 int nbits
, pbits
, warn
;
4296 Bignum p
, g
, e
, f
, K
;
4297 int kex_init_value
, kex_reply_value
;
4298 const struct ssh_mac
**maclist
;
4300 const struct ssh2_cipher
*cscipher_tobe
;
4301 const struct ssh2_cipher
*sccipher_tobe
;
4302 const struct ssh_mac
*csmac_tobe
;
4303 const struct ssh_mac
*scmac_tobe
;
4304 const struct ssh_compress
*cscomp_tobe
;
4305 const struct ssh_compress
*sccomp_tobe
;
4306 char *hostkeydata
, *sigdata
, *keystr
, *fingerprint
;
4307 int hostkeylen
, siglen
;
4308 void *hkey
; /* actual host key */
4309 unsigned char exchange_hash
[20];
4310 int n_preferred_kex
;
4311 const struct ssh_kex
*preferred_kex
[KEX_MAX
];
4312 int n_preferred_ciphers
;
4313 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*preferred_ciphers
[CIPHER_MAX
];
4314 const struct ssh_compress
*preferred_comp
;
4316 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4318 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state
);
4320 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
);
4322 s
->cscipher_tobe
= s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4323 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4324 s
->cscomp_tobe
= s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4331 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
4333 s
->n_preferred_kex
= 0;
4334 for (i
= 0; i
< KEX_MAX
; i
++) {
4335 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_kexlist
[i
]) {
4337 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4338 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
;
4341 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4342 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14
;
4345 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] =
4346 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1
;
4349 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
4351 if (i
< KEX_MAX
- 1) {
4352 s
->preferred_kex
[s
->n_preferred_kex
++] = NULL
;
4362 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
4364 s
->n_preferred_ciphers
= 0;
4365 for (i
= 0; i
< CIPHER_MAX
; i
++) {
4366 switch (ssh
->cfg
.ssh_cipherlist
[i
]) {
4367 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH
:
4368 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_blowfish
;
4371 if (ssh
->cfg
.ssh2_des_cbc
) {
4372 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_des
;
4376 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_3des
;
4379 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = &ssh2_aes
;
4382 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
4384 if (i
< CIPHER_MAX
- 1) {
4385 s
->preferred_ciphers
[s
->n_preferred_ciphers
++] = NULL
;
4393 * Set up preferred compression.
4395 if (ssh
->cfg
.compression
)
4396 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_zlib
;
4398 s
->preferred_comp
= &ssh_comp_none
;
4401 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
4403 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_HMAC
)
4404 s
->maclist
= buggymacs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(buggymacs
);
4406 s
->maclist
= macs
, s
->nmacs
= lenof(macs
);
4410 int i
, j
, commalist_started
;
4413 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
4414 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
4416 ssh
->queueing
= TRUE
;
4419 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
4421 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= TRUE
;
4424 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
4426 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
);
4427 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
4428 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, (unsigned char) random_byte());
4429 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
4430 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4431 commalist_started
= 0;
4432 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
4433 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
4434 if (!k
) continue; /* warning flag */
4435 if (commalist_started
)
4436 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4437 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_kex
[i
]->name
);
4438 commalist_started
= 1;
4440 /* List server host key algorithms. */
4441 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4442 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
4443 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
);
4444 if (i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
) - 1)
4445 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4447 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
4448 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4449 commalist_started
= 0;
4450 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4451 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4452 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
4453 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4454 if (commalist_started
)
4455 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4456 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
4457 commalist_started
= 1;
4460 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
4461 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4462 commalist_started
= 0;
4463 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4464 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4465 if (!c
) continue; /* warning flag */
4466 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4467 if (commalist_started
)
4468 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4469 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->list
[j
]->name
);
4470 commalist_started
= 1;
4473 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
4474 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4475 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4476 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
4477 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
4478 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4480 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
4481 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4482 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4483 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->maclist
[i
]->name
);
4484 if (i
< s
->nmacs
- 1)
4485 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4487 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
4488 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4489 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
4490 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
4491 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
4492 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
4493 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
4494 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4495 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
4498 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
4499 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4500 assert(lenof(compressions
) > 1);
4501 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, s
->preferred_comp
->name
);
4502 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
); i
++) {
4503 const struct ssh_compress
*c
= compressions
[i
];
4504 if (c
!= s
->preferred_comp
) {
4505 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, ",");
4506 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s
->pktout
, c
->name
);
4509 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
4510 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4511 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
4512 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
4513 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
4514 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
4516 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0);
4519 ssh
->exhash
= ssh
->exhashbase
;
4520 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5, s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
4522 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
4526 if (pktin
->length
> 5)
4527 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, pktin
->data
+ 5, pktin
->length
- 5);
4530 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
4537 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) {
4538 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
4542 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
4543 s
->cscipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4544 s
->sccipher_tobe
= NULL
;
4545 s
->csmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4546 s
->scmac_tobe
= NULL
;
4547 s
->cscomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4548 s
->sccomp_tobe
= NULL
;
4549 pktin
->savedpos
+= 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
4550 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* key exchange algorithms */
4552 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_kex
; i
++) {
4553 const struct ssh_kex
*k
= s
->preferred_kex
[i
];
4556 } else if (in_commasep_string(k
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4561 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "key-exchange algorithm",
4567 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
4568 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4571 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* host key algorithms */
4572 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(hostkey_algs
); i
++) {
4573 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4574 ssh
->hostkey
= hostkey_algs
[i
];
4578 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server cipher */
4580 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4581 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4585 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4586 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4587 s
->cscipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
4592 if (s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
4594 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "client-to-server cipher",
4595 s
->cscipher_tobe
->name
);
4599 if (!s
->cscipher_tobe
) {
4600 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
4601 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4605 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client cipher */
4607 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->n_preferred_ciphers
; i
++) {
4608 const struct ssh2_ciphers
*c
= s
->preferred_ciphers
[i
];
4612 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->nciphers
; j
++) {
4613 if (in_commasep_string(c
->list
[j
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4614 s
->sccipher_tobe
= c
->list
[j
];
4619 if (s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
4621 askalg(ssh
->frontend
, "server-to-client cipher",
4622 s
->sccipher_tobe
->name
);
4626 if (!s
->sccipher_tobe
) {
4627 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
4628 str ? str
: "(null)"));
4632 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server mac */
4633 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4634 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4635 s
->csmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
4639 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client mac */
4640 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->nmacs
; i
++) {
4641 if (in_commasep_string(s
->maclist
[i
]->name
, str
, len
)) {
4642 s
->scmac_tobe
= s
->maclist
[i
];
4646 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* client->server compression */
4647 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
4648 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
4649 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
4650 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4655 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &str
, &len
); /* server->client compression */
4656 for (i
= 0; i
< lenof(compressions
) + 1; i
++) {
4657 const struct ssh_compress
*c
=
4658 i
== 0 ? s
->preferred_comp
: compressions
[i
- 1];
4659 if (in_commasep_string(c
->name
, str
, len
)) {
4667 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
4668 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
4674 csbits
= s
->cscipher_tobe
->keylen
;
4675 scbits
= s
->sccipher_tobe
->keylen
;
4676 s
->nbits
= (csbits
> scbits ? csbits
: scbits
);
4678 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
4679 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
4684 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
4685 * requesting a group.
4687 if (!ssh
->kex
->pdata
) {
4688 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
4689 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX
;
4691 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
4694 s
->pbits
= 512 << ((s
->nbits
- 1) / 64);
4695 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST
);
4696 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->pbits
);
4697 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
4700 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
) {
4701 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
4704 s
->p
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
4705 s
->g
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
4706 if (!s
->p
|| !s
->g
) {
4707 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
4710 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_gex(s
->p
, s
->g
);
4711 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
;
4712 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
;
4714 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP
;
4715 ssh
->kex_ctx
= dh_setup_group(ssh
->kex
);
4716 s
->kex_init_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
;
4717 s
->kex_reply_value
= SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
;
4718 logeventf(ssh
, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
4719 ssh
->kex
->groupname
);
4722 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
4724 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
4726 s
->e
= dh_create_e(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->nbits
* 2);
4727 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(s
->kex_init_value
);
4728 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s
->pktout
, s
->e
);
4729 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
4732 if (pktin
->type
!= s
->kex_reply_value
) {
4733 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
4736 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->hostkeydata
, &s
->hostkeylen
);
4737 s
->f
= ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin
);
4739 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
4742 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &s
->sigdata
, &s
->siglen
);
4744 s
->K
= dh_find_K(ssh
->kex_ctx
, s
->f
);
4746 sha_string(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4747 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
4748 sha_uint32(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->pbits
);
4749 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->p
);
4750 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->g
);
4752 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->e
);
4753 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->f
);
4754 sha_mpint(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->K
);
4755 SHA_Final(&ssh
->exhash
, s
->exchange_hash
);
4757 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
4758 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
4761 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
4762 dmemdump(s
->exchange_hash
, 20);
4765 s
->hkey
= ssh
->hostkey
->newkey(s
->hostkeydata
, s
->hostkeylen
);
4767 !ssh
->hostkey
->verifysig(s
->hkey
, s
->sigdata
, s
->siglen
,
4768 (char *)s
->exchange_hash
, 20)) {
4769 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
4774 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
4775 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
4777 s
->keystr
= ssh
->hostkey
->fmtkey(s
->hkey
);
4778 s
->fingerprint
= ssh
->hostkey
->fingerprint(s
->hkey
);
4779 verify_ssh_host_key(ssh
->frontend
,
4780 ssh
->savedhost
, ssh
->savedport
, ssh
->hostkey
->keytype
,
4781 s
->keystr
, s
->fingerprint
);
4782 if (s
->first_kex
) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
4783 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
4784 logevent(s
->fingerprint
);
4786 sfree(s
->fingerprint
);
4788 ssh
->hostkey
->freekey(s
->hkey
);
4791 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
4792 * the session id, used in session key construction and
4796 memcpy(ssh
->v2_session_id
, s
->exchange_hash
,
4797 sizeof(s
->exchange_hash
));
4800 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
4802 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
);
4803 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
4804 ssh
->outgoing_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
4807 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
4808 * client-to-server session keys.
4810 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
4811 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
4812 ssh
->cscipher
= s
->cscipher_tobe
;
4813 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->cscipher
->make_context();
4815 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
4816 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
4817 ssh
->csmac
= s
->csmac_tobe
;
4818 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= ssh
->csmac
->make_context();
4820 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
)
4821 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
4822 ssh
->cscomp
= s
->cscomp_tobe
;
4823 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= ssh
->cscomp
->compress_init();
4826 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
4827 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
4830 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
4831 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'C',keyspace
);
4832 ssh
->cscipher
->setkey(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4833 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'A',keyspace
);
4834 ssh
->cscipher
->setiv(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4835 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'E',keyspace
);
4836 ssh
->csmac
->setkey(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4839 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
4840 ssh
->cscipher
->text_name
);
4841 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
4842 ssh
->csmac
->text_name
);
4843 if (ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
)
4844 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s compression",
4845 ssh
->cscomp
->text_name
);
4848 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
4849 * our queued higher-layer packets.
4851 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
4852 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh
);
4855 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
4858 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
) {
4859 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
4862 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= 0; /* start counting from here */
4865 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
4866 * server-to-client session keys.
4868 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
4869 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
4870 ssh
->sccipher
= s
->sccipher_tobe
;
4871 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= ssh
->sccipher
->make_context();
4873 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
4874 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
4875 ssh
->scmac
= s
->scmac_tobe
;
4876 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= ssh
->scmac
->make_context();
4878 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
)
4879 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
4880 ssh
->sccomp
= s
->sccomp_tobe
;
4881 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_init();
4884 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
4885 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
4888 unsigned char keyspace
[40];
4889 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'D',keyspace
);
4890 ssh
->sccipher
->setkey(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4891 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'B',keyspace
);
4892 ssh
->sccipher
->setiv(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
, keyspace
);
4893 ssh2_mkkey(ssh
,s
->K
,s
->exchange_hash
,ssh
->v2_session_id
,'F',keyspace
);
4894 ssh
->scmac
->setkey(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
, keyspace
);
4896 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
4897 ssh
->sccipher
->text_name
);
4898 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
4899 ssh
->scmac
->text_name
);
4900 if (ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
)
4901 logeventf(ssh
, "Initialised %s decompression",
4902 ssh
->sccomp
->text_name
);
4905 * Free key exchange data.
4909 if (ssh
->kex
== &ssh_diffiehellman_gex
) {
4915 * Key exchange is over. Schedule a timer for our next rekey.
4917 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
4918 ssh
->next_rekey
= schedule_timer(REKEY_TIMEOUT
, ssh2_timer
, ssh
);
4921 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
4922 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
4923 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
4924 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
4925 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
4926 * it would only confuse the layer above.
4928 if (!s
->first_kex
) {
4934 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
4935 * function so that other things can run on top of the
4936 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
4939 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
4940 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
4941 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
4942 * giving the reason for the rekey.
4944 while (!((pktin
&& pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
) ||
4945 (!pktin
&& inlen
== -1))) {
4949 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
4951 logevent((char *)in
);
4953 goto begin_key_exchange
;
4959 * Add data to an SSH2 channel output buffer.
4961 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel
*c
, char *buf
,
4964 bufchain_add(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, buf
, len
);
4968 * Attempt to send data on an SSH2 channel.
4970 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel
*c
)
4973 struct Packet
*pktout
;
4975 while (c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
> 0 && bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
) > 0) {
4978 bufchain_prefix(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, &data
, &len
);
4979 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
)
4980 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
;
4981 if ((unsigned)len
> c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
)
4982 len
= c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
;
4983 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
);
4984 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
4985 dont_log_data(ssh
, pktout
, PKTLOG_OMIT
);
4986 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
4987 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout
, data
, len
);
4988 end_log_omission(ssh
, pktout
);
4989 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
4990 bufchain_consume(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
, len
);
4991 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
-= len
;
4995 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
4998 return bufchain_size(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5002 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH2 channel.
5004 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel
*c
, unsigned newwin
)
5009 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5010 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5011 * be sending any more data anyway.
5016 if (newwin
> c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
) {
5017 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5019 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
);
5020 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5021 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, newwin
- c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5022 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5023 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= newwin
;
5027 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5029 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5030 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5031 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5032 if (c
&& !c
->closes
)
5033 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
+= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5036 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5040 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5041 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5042 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5044 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5045 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
&&
5046 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR
)
5047 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5048 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &data
, &length
);
5051 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
-= length
;
5053 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5055 from_backend(ssh
->frontend
, pktin
->type
==
5056 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
,
5060 bufsize
= x11_send(c
->u
.x11
.s
, data
, length
);
5063 bufsize
= pfd_send(c
->u
.pfd
.s
, data
, length
);
5066 while (length
> 0) {
5067 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
< 4) {
5068 int l
= min(4 - c
->u
.a
.lensofar
, length
);
5069 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.msglen
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5073 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5075 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== 4) {
5077 4 + GET_32BIT(c
->u
.a
.msglen
);
5078 c
->u
.a
.message
= snewn(c
->u
.a
.totallen
,
5080 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
, c
->u
.a
.msglen
, 4);
5082 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
>= 4 && length
> 0) {
5084 min(c
->u
.a
.totallen
- c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5086 memcpy(c
->u
.a
.message
+ c
->u
.a
.lensofar
,
5090 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
+= l
;
5092 if (c
->u
.a
.lensofar
== c
->u
.a
.totallen
) {
5095 if (agent_query(c
->u
.a
.message
,
5098 ssh_agentf_callback
, c
))
5099 ssh_agentf_callback(c
, reply
, replylen
);
5100 sfree(c
->u
.a
.message
);
5101 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5108 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5109 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5111 if (bufsize
< OUR_V2_WINSIZE
)
5112 ssh2_set_window(c
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
5116 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5118 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5119 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5121 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5123 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5125 if (c
->type
== CHAN_X11
) {
5127 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5128 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5130 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5132 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_AGENT
) {
5134 } else if (c
->type
== CHAN_SOCKDATA
) {
5135 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5140 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5142 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5143 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5144 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5146 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5147 if (!c
|| ((int)c
->remoteid
) == -1) {
5148 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
5149 c ?
"half-open" : "nonexistent", i
));
5152 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
5154 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
5155 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
5156 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
5159 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
5160 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
5167 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
5168 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5172 if (c
->closes
== 0) {
5173 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5174 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5175 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5177 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5178 bufchain_clear(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5182 * See if that was the last channel left open.
5183 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
5184 * not running in -N mode.)
5186 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
&& count234(ssh
->channels
) == 0) {
5187 logevent("All channels closed. Disconnecting");
5190 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
5191 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
5192 * SSH2 connection had to end with a disconnect
5193 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
5194 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
5195 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
5196 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
5197 * this is more polite than sending a
5198 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
5200 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5201 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5202 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "All open channels closed");
5203 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
5204 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5206 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5210 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5212 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5213 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5214 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5216 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5218 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5219 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5220 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
5221 c
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5222 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5223 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5224 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5226 pfd_confirm(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5229 * We have a pending close on this channel,
5230 * which we decided on before the server acked
5231 * the channel open. So now we know the
5232 * remoteid, we can close it again.
5234 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
);
5235 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5236 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5240 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5242 static const char *const reasons
[] = {
5243 "<unknown reason code>",
5244 "Administratively prohibited",
5246 "Unknown channel type",
5247 "Resource shortage",
5249 unsigned i
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5250 unsigned reason_code
;
5251 char *reason_string
;
5254 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5255 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &i
, ssh_channelfind
);
5257 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5258 if (c
->type
!= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
)
5259 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
5261 reason_code
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5262 if (reason_code
>= lenof(reasons
))
5263 reason_code
= 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
5264 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &reason_string
, &reason_length
);
5265 message
= dupprintf("Forwarded connection refused by"
5266 " server: %s [%.*s]", reasons
[reason_code
],
5267 reason_length
, reason_string
);
5271 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
5273 del234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5277 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5281 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5282 int reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
; /* default */
5283 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5284 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5286 localid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5287 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5288 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5291 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
5292 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
5294 c
= find234(ssh
->channels
, &localid
, ssh_channelfind
);
5297 sprintf(buf
, "Received channel request for nonexistent"
5298 " channel %d", localid
);
5300 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
5301 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
5302 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, buf
);
5303 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
5304 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
5305 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
, "%s", buf
);
5306 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5311 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
5312 * the request type string to see if it's something
5315 if (c
== ssh
->mainchan
) {
5317 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
5318 * the primary channel.
5320 if (typelen
== 11 &&
5321 !memcmp(type
, "exit-status", 11)) {
5323 ssh
->exitcode
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5324 logeventf(ssh
, "Server sent command exit status %d",
5326 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
5328 } else if (typelen
== 11 &&
5329 !memcmp(type
, "exit-signal", 11)) {
5331 int is_plausible
= TRUE
, is_int
= FALSE
;
5332 char *fmt_sig
= "", *fmt_msg
= "";
5334 int msglen
= 0, core
= FALSE
;
5335 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
5336 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
5337 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
5338 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
5339 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
5341 unsigned char *p
= pktin
->body
+
5343 long len
= pktin
->length
- pktin
->savedpos
;
5344 unsigned long num
= GET_32BIT(p
); /* what is it? */
5345 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
5349 int maybe_int
= FALSE
, maybe_str
= FALSE
;
5350 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
5353 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
5354 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
5355 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
5356 (q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q)) && q == len) \
5360 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int
);
5361 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num
+1, maybe_str
);
5362 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
5363 if (maybe_int
&& !maybe_str
)
5365 else if (!maybe_int
&& maybe_str
)
5368 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
5369 is_plausible
= FALSE
;
5374 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
5375 int signum
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5376 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" %d", signum
);
5378 /* As per the drafts. */
5381 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &sig
, &siglen
);
5382 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
5383 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
5385 fmt_sig
= dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
5389 core
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5390 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
5392 fmt_msg
= dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen
, msg
);
5394 /* ignore lang tag */
5395 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
5396 logeventf(ssh
, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
5397 fmt_sig
, core ?
" (core dumped)" : "",
5399 if (*fmt_sig
) sfree(fmt_sig
);
5400 if (*fmt_msg
) sfree(fmt_msg
);
5401 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
;
5406 * This is a channel request we don't know
5407 * about, so we now either ignore the request
5408 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
5411 reply
= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
;
5414 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(reply
);
5415 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5416 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5420 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5423 int typelen
, want_reply
;
5424 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5426 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5427 want_reply
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
5430 * We currently don't support any global requests
5431 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
5432 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
5436 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
);
5437 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5441 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
5449 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
5450 unsigned remid
, winsize
, pktsize
;
5451 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5453 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &type
, &typelen
);
5454 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
5457 remid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5458 winsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5459 pktsize
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5461 if (typelen
== 3 && !memcmp(type
, "x11", 3)) {
5464 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5465 addrstr
= snewn(peeraddrlen
+1, char);
5466 memcpy(addrstr
, peeraddr
, peeraddrlen
);
5467 addrstr
[peeraddrlen
] = '\0';
5468 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5470 logeventf(ssh
, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
5473 if (!ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
)
5474 error
= "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
5475 else if (x11_init(&c
->u
.x11
.s
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
, c
,
5476 ssh
->x11auth
, addrstr
, peerport
,
5477 &ssh
->cfg
) != NULL
) {
5478 error
= "Unable to open an X11 connection";
5480 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
5485 } else if (typelen
== 15 &&
5486 !memcmp(type
, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
5487 struct ssh_rportfwd pf
, *realpf
;
5490 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &dummy
, &dummylen
);/* skip address */
5491 pf
.sport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5492 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &peeraddr
, &peeraddrlen
);
5493 peerport
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
5494 realpf
= find234(ssh
->rportfwds
, &pf
, NULL
);
5495 logeventf(ssh
, "Received remote port %d open request "
5496 "from %s:%d", pf
.sport
, peeraddr
, peerport
);
5497 if (realpf
== NULL
) {
5498 error
= "Remote port is not recognised";
5500 const char *e
= pfd_newconnect(&c
->u
.pfd
.s
,
5504 logeventf(ssh
, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
5505 "%s:%d", realpf
->dhost
, realpf
->dport
);
5507 logeventf(ssh
, "Port open failed: %s", e
);
5508 error
= "Port open failed";
5510 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
5511 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA
;
5514 } else if (typelen
== 22 &&
5515 !memcmp(type
, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 3)) {
5516 if (!ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
)
5517 error
= "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
5519 c
->type
= CHAN_AGENT
; /* identify channel type */
5520 c
->u
.a
.lensofar
= 0;
5523 error
= "Unsupported channel type requested";
5526 c
->remoteid
= remid
;
5528 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
);
5529 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5530 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED
);
5531 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, error
);
5532 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
5533 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5534 logeventf(ssh
, "Rejected channel open: %s", error
);
5537 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
5539 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
5540 c
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= winsize
;
5541 c
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= pktsize
;
5542 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
5543 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
5544 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
);
5545 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->remoteid
);
5546 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
5547 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);
5548 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
5549 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
5554 * Handle the SSH2 userauth and connection layers.
5556 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
5557 struct Packet
*pktin
)
5559 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state
{
5561 AUTH_INVALID
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT
, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
,
5563 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
5567 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
,
5568 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
,
5569 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
,
5571 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
,
5572 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
5574 int gotit
, need_pw
, can_pubkey
, can_passwd
, can_keyb_inter
;
5575 int tried_pubkey_config
, tried_agent
, tried_keyb_inter
;
5576 int kbd_inter_running
;
5578 int num_prompts
, curr_prompt
, echo
;
5583 void *publickey_blob
;
5584 int publickey_bloblen
;
5585 unsigned char request
[5], *response
, *p
;
5589 char *pkblob
, *alg
, *commentp
;
5590 int pklen
, alglen
, commentlen
;
5591 int siglen
, retlen
, len
;
5592 char *q
, *agentreq
, *ret
;
5594 int num_env
, env_left
, env_ok
;
5595 struct Packet
*pktout
;
5597 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
5599 crBegin(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
);
5602 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
5604 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
);
5605 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-userauth");
5606 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5607 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
5608 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
) {
5609 bombout(("Server refused user authentication protocol"));
5614 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
5615 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
5616 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
5617 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
5618 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
5619 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
5621 * I think this best serves the needs of
5623 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
5624 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
5625 * type both correctly
5627 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
5628 * need to fall back to passwords
5630 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
5631 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
5632 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
5633 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
5634 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
5637 s
->username
[0] = '\0';
5638 s
->got_username
= FALSE
;
5643 if (s
->got_username
&& !ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
5645 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
5646 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
5649 } else if (!*ssh
->cfg
.username
) {
5650 if (ssh_get_line
&& !ssh_getline_pw_only
) {
5651 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
5652 s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), FALSE
)) {
5654 * get_line failed to get a username.
5657 logevent("No username provided. Abandoning session.");
5658 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
5662 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
5663 c_write_str(ssh
, "login as: ");
5665 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->username
, sizeof(s
->username
), 1);
5667 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
5668 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
5672 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
5674 s
->username
[strcspn(s
->username
, "\n\r")] = '\0';
5677 strncpy(s
->username
, ssh
->cfg
.username
, sizeof(s
->username
));
5678 s
->username
[sizeof(s
->username
)-1] = '\0';
5679 if ((flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) || (flags
& FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
5680 stuff
= dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s
->username
);
5681 c_write_str(ssh
, stuff
);
5685 s
->got_username
= TRUE
;
5688 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
5689 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
5690 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
5692 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
5694 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5695 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
5696 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
5697 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
5698 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5699 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
5701 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
5703 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
5704 s
->tried_agent
= FALSE
;
5705 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= FALSE
;
5706 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
5707 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
5708 if (!filename_is_null(ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
)) {
5710 logeventf(ssh
, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
5711 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
));
5712 keytype
= key_type(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
);
5713 if (keytype
== SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2
) {
5715 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, NULL
,
5716 &s
->publickey_bloblen
, NULL
);
5719 logeventf(ssh
, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
5720 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
5721 msgbuf
= dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
5723 filename_to_str(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
),
5724 key_type_to_str(keytype
));
5725 c_write_str(ssh
, msgbuf
);
5727 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
5730 s
->publickey_blob
= NULL
;
5734 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
5737 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
5738 while (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
) {
5742 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
5743 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
5744 * a script, which means nobody will read the
5745 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
5746 * the banner will screw up processing on the
5747 * output of (say) plink.)
5749 if (flags
& (FLAG_VERBOSE
| FLAG_INTERACTIVE
)) {
5750 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &banner
, &size
);
5752 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, banner
, size
);
5754 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
5756 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
) {
5757 logevent("Access granted");
5758 s
->we_are_in
= TRUE
;
5762 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
&&
5763 pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
5765 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
5766 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
5767 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
5768 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
5769 * curr_prompt variable.
5773 } else if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
5774 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
5782 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
5783 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
5784 * helpfully try next.
5786 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
) {
5789 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &methods
, &methlen
);
5790 s
->kbd_inter_running
= FALSE
;
5791 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
)) {
5793 * We have received an unequivocal Access
5794 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
5797 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
5798 * it's not worth printing anything at all
5800 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
5801 * the message should be "Server refused our
5802 * key" (or no message at all if the key
5803 * came from Pageant)
5805 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
5806 * message really should be "Access denied".
5808 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
5809 * authentication, we should break out of this
5810 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
5811 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
5812 * username change attempts).
5814 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_NONE
) {
5816 } else if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
||
5817 s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET
) {
5818 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
)
5819 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused our key\r\n");
5820 logevent("Server refused public key");
5821 } else if (s
->type
==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
) {
5822 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
5824 c_write_str(ssh
, "Access denied\r\n");
5825 logevent("Access denied");
5826 if (s
->type
== AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
&&
5827 ssh
->cfg
.change_username
) {
5828 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
5829 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
5830 s
->we_are_in
= FALSE
;
5835 c_write_str(ssh
, "Further authentication required\r\n");
5836 logevent("Further authentication required");
5840 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods
, methlen
);
5842 in_commasep_string("password", methods
, methlen
);
5843 s
->can_keyb_inter
= ssh
->cfg
.try_ki_auth
&&
5844 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods
, methlen
);
5848 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
5852 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
5853 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
5854 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
5855 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
5859 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&&
5860 agent_exists() && !s
->tried_agent
) {
5862 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
5867 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
5868 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
5870 s
->tried_agent
= TRUE
;
5872 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
5874 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
5875 PUT_32BIT(s
->request
, 1);
5876 s
->request
[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
;
5877 if (!agent_query(s
->request
, 5, &r
, &s
->responselen
,
5878 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
5882 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5883 " waiting for agent response"));
5886 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
5887 r
= ssh
->agent_response
;
5888 s
->responselen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
5890 s
->response
= (unsigned char *) r
;
5891 if (s
->response
&& s
->responselen
>= 5 &&
5892 s
->response
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
) {
5893 s
->p
= s
->response
+ 5;
5894 s
->nkeys
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
5898 sprintf(buf
, "Pageant has %d SSH2 keys", s
->nkeys
);
5901 for (s
->keyi
= 0; s
->keyi
< s
->nkeys
; s
->keyi
++) {
5906 sprintf(buf
, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s
->keyi
);
5909 s
->pklen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
5911 if (s
->publickey_blob
&&
5912 s
->pklen
== s
->publickey_bloblen
&&
5913 !memcmp(s
->p
, s
->publickey_blob
,
5914 s
->publickey_bloblen
)) {
5915 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
5916 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= 1;
5918 s
->pkblob
= (char *)s
->p
;
5920 s
->alglen
= GET_32BIT(s
->pkblob
);
5921 s
->alg
= s
->pkblob
+ 4;
5922 s
->commentlen
= GET_32BIT(s
->p
);
5924 s
->commentp
= (char *)s
->p
;
5925 s
->p
+= s
->commentlen
;
5926 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5927 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
5928 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
5929 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
5930 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
5931 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5932 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
5933 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5934 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
5935 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
5937 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
5938 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
5939 logevent("Key refused");
5943 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
5944 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with "
5946 c_write(ssh
, s
->commentp
, s
->commentlen
);
5947 c_write_str(ssh
, "\" from agent\r\n");
5951 * Server is willing to accept the key.
5952 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
5954 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
5955 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
5956 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
5957 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
5958 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
5959 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5960 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->alg
, s
->alglen
);
5961 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
5962 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
5964 s
->siglen
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
5965 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
5967 s
->len
= 1; /* message type */
5968 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->pklen
; /* key blob */
5969 s
->len
+= 4 + s
->siglen
; /* data to sign */
5970 s
->len
+= 4; /* flags */
5971 s
->agentreq
= snewn(4 + s
->len
, char);
5972 PUT_32BIT(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
);
5973 s
->q
= s
->agentreq
+ 4;
5974 *s
->q
++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
;
5975 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->pklen
);
5977 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
);
5979 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, s
->siglen
);
5981 /* Now the data to be signed... */
5982 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
5983 PUT_32BIT(s
->q
, 20);
5986 memcpy(s
->q
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20);
5988 memcpy(s
->q
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
5989 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
5990 s
->q
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
5991 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
5993 if (!agent_query(s
->agentreq
, s
->len
+ 4,
5995 ssh_agent_callback
, ssh
)) {
5999 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6000 " while waiting for agent"
6004 } while (pktin
|| inlen
> 0);
6005 vret
= ssh
->agent_response
;
6006 s
->retlen
= ssh
->agent_response_len
;
6011 if (s
->ret
[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
) {
6012 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6013 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
,
6014 s
->pkblob
, s
->pklen
,
6016 GET_32BIT(s
->ret
+ 5));
6017 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6022 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6033 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_pubkey
&& s
->publickey_blob
6034 && !s
->tried_pubkey_config
) {
6035 unsigned char *pub_blob
;
6036 char *algorithm
, *comment
;
6039 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6041 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6042 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY
;
6045 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6047 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6048 * willing to accept it.
6051 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
,
6056 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6057 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6058 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6059 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6060 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
); /* no signature included */
6061 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, algorithm
);
6062 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6063 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pub_blob
,
6065 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6066 logevent("Offered public key");
6068 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6069 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
) {
6071 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD
;
6072 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6075 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6077 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6080 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, &comment
)) {
6081 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
,
6082 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6088 if (flags
& FLAG_VERBOSE
) {
6089 c_write_str(ssh
, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6090 c_write_str(ssh
, comment
);
6091 c_write_str(ssh
, "\"\r\n");
6093 s
->method
= AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
;
6097 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_keyb_inter
&& !s
->tried_keyb_inter
) {
6098 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6099 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6100 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
6102 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6103 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
6105 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6106 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6107 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6108 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
6109 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ""); /* lang */
6110 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "");
6111 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6113 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6114 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
) {
6115 if (pktin
->type
== SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
)
6117 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
6118 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
;
6122 s
->kbd_inter_running
= TRUE
;
6126 if (s
->kbd_inter_running
) {
6127 s
->method
= AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6128 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6129 s
->tried_keyb_inter
= TRUE
;
6131 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6132 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
;
6134 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
6136 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
6137 * Display header data, and start going through
6140 char *name
, *inst
, *lang
;
6141 int name_len
, inst_len
, lang_len
;
6143 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &name
, &name_len
);
6144 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &inst
, &inst_len
);
6145 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &lang
, &lang_len
);
6147 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, name
, name_len
);
6148 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6151 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, inst
, inst_len
);
6152 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6154 s
->num_prompts
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6158 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
6159 * display one and get a response.
6161 if (s
->curr_prompt
< s
->num_prompts
) {
6165 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &prompt
, &prompt_len
);
6166 if (prompt_len
> 0) {
6167 static const char trunc
[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
6168 static const int prlen
= sizeof(s
->pwprompt
) -
6170 if (prompt_len
> prlen
) {
6171 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prlen
);
6172 strcpy(s
->pwprompt
+ prlen
, trunc
);
6174 memcpy(s
->pwprompt
, prompt
, prompt_len
);
6175 s
->pwprompt
[prompt_len
] = '\0';
6179 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
6181 s
->echo
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6187 if (!s
->method
&& s
->can_passwd
) {
6188 s
->method
= AUTH_PASSWORD
;
6189 ssh
->pkt_ctx
&= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK
;
6190 ssh
->pkt_ctx
|= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD
;
6191 sprintf(s
->pwprompt
, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s
->username
,
6198 if (!ssh_get_line(s
->pwprompt
, s
->password
,
6199 sizeof(s
->password
), TRUE
)) {
6201 * get_line failed to get a password (for
6202 * example because one was supplied on the
6203 * command line which has already failed to
6206 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
6207 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
,SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
6208 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "No more passwords available"
6210 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6211 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6212 logevent("Unable to authenticate");
6213 connection_fatal(ssh
->frontend
,
6214 "Unable to authenticate");
6215 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
6219 int ret
; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6220 c_write_untrusted(ssh
, s
->pwprompt
, strlen(s
->pwprompt
));
6223 setup_userpass_input(ssh
, s
->password
,
6224 sizeof(s
->password
), s
->echo
);
6226 crWaitUntilV(!pktin
);
6227 ret
= process_userpass_input(ssh
, in
, inlen
);
6231 c_write_str(ssh
, "\r\n");
6235 if (s
->method
== AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE
) {
6237 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
6239 struct ssh2_userkey
*key
;
6240 const char *error
= NULL
;
6242 key
= ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh
->cfg
.keyfile
, s
->password
,
6244 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
|| key
== NULL
) {
6245 if (key
== SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE
) {
6246 c_write_str(ssh
, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
6247 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= FALSE
;
6249 c_write_str(ssh
, "Unable to load private key (");
6250 c_write_str(ssh
, error
);
6251 c_write_str(ssh
, ")\r\n");
6252 s
->tried_pubkey_config
= TRUE
;
6254 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
6255 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6256 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6257 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6258 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "none"); /* method */
6259 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6260 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_NONE
;
6262 unsigned char *pkblob
, *sigblob
, *sigdata
;
6263 int pkblob_len
, sigblob_len
, sigdata_len
;
6267 * We have loaded the private key and the server
6268 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
6269 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
6271 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6272 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6273 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6274 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "publickey"); /* method */
6275 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, TRUE
);
6276 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, key
->alg
->name
);
6277 pkblob
= key
->alg
->public_blob(key
->data
, &pkblob_len
);
6278 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6279 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, (char *)pkblob
, pkblob_len
);
6282 * The data to be signed is:
6286 * followed by everything so far placed in the
6289 sigdata_len
= s
->pktout
->length
- 5 + 4 + 20;
6290 if (ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)
6292 sigdata
= snewn(sigdata_len
, unsigned char);
6294 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID
)) {
6295 PUT_32BIT(sigdata
+p
, 20);
6298 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, ssh
->v2_session_id
, 20); p
+= 20;
6299 memcpy(sigdata
+p
, s
->pktout
->data
+ 5,
6300 s
->pktout
->length
- 5);
6301 p
+= s
->pktout
->length
- 5;
6302 assert(p
== sigdata_len
);
6303 sigblob
= key
->alg
->sign(key
->data
, (char *)sigdata
,
6304 sigdata_len
, &sigblob_len
);
6305 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh
, s
->pktout
, pkblob
, pkblob_len
,
6306 sigblob
, sigblob_len
);
6311 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6312 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY
;
6313 key
->alg
->freekey(key
->data
);
6315 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_PASSWORD
) {
6317 * We send the password packet lumped tightly together with
6318 * an SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet. The IGNORE packet contains a
6319 * string long enough to make the total length of the two
6320 * packets constant. This should ensure that a passive
6321 * listener doing traffic analyis can't work out the length
6324 * For this to work, we need an assumption about the
6325 * maximum length of the password packet. I think 256 is
6326 * pretty conservative. Anyone using a password longer than
6327 * that probably doesn't have much to worry about from
6328 * people who find out how long their password is!
6330 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
);
6331 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->username
);
6332 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6333 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "password");
6334 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, FALSE
);
6335 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
6336 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
6337 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
6338 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6339 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6341 * We'll include a string that's an exact multiple of the
6342 * cipher block size. If the cipher is NULL for some
6343 * reason, we don't do this trick at all because we gain
6346 if (ssh
->cscipher
) {
6349 stringlen
= (256 - ssh
->deferred_len
);
6350 stringlen
+= ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
- 1;
6351 stringlen
-= (stringlen
% ssh
->cscipher
->blksize
);
6354 * Temporarily disable actual compression,
6355 * so we can guarantee to get this string
6356 * exactly the length we want it. The
6357 * compression-disabling routine should
6358 * return an integer indicating how many
6359 * bytes we should adjust our string length
6363 ssh
->cscomp
->disable_compression(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
6365 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
6366 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6367 for (i
= 0; i
< stringlen
; i
++) {
6368 char c
= (char) random_byte();
6369 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, &c
, 1);
6371 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6373 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh
);
6374 logevent("Sent password");
6375 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD
;
6376 } else if (s
->method
== AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
) {
6377 if (s
->curr_prompt
== 0) {
6378 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
);
6379 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, s
->num_prompts
);
6381 if (s
->need_pw
) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
6382 dont_log_password(ssh
, s
->pktout
, PKTLOG_BLANK
);
6383 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, s
->password
);
6384 memset(s
->password
, 0, sizeof(s
->password
));
6385 end_log_omission(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6388 if (s
->curr_prompt
>= s
->num_prompts
) {
6389 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6392 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
6393 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
6394 * another packet. Then we go back round the
6395 * loop and will end up retrieving another
6396 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
6401 s
->type
= AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
;
6403 c_write_str(ssh
, "No supported authentication methods"
6404 " left to try!\r\n");
6405 logevent("No supported authentications offered."
6407 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
);
6408 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION
);
6409 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "No supported authentication"
6410 " methods available");
6411 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "en"); /* language tag */
6412 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6413 ssh_closing((Plug
)ssh
, NULL
, 0, 0);
6417 } while (!s
->we_are_in
);
6420 * Now we're authenticated for the connection protocol. The
6421 * connection protocol will automatically have started at this
6422 * point; there's no need to send SERVICE_REQUEST.
6425 ssh
->channels
= newtree234(ssh_channelcmp
);
6428 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
6429 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
6431 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] =
6432 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust
;
6433 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] =
6434 ssh2_msg_global_request
;
6437 * Create the main session channel.
6439 if (!ssh
->cfg
.ssh_no_shell
) {
6440 ssh
->mainchan
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
6441 ssh
->mainchan
->ssh
= ssh
;
6442 ssh
->mainchan
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
6443 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
6444 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "session");
6445 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->localid
);
6446 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
6447 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
6448 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
6449 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6450 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6451 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
) {
6452 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
6454 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
6456 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
) != ssh
->mainchan
->localid
) {
6457 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
6460 ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6461 ssh
->mainchan
->type
= CHAN_MAINSESSION
;
6462 ssh
->mainchan
->closes
= 0;
6463 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remwindow
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6464 ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.remmaxpkt
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6465 bufchain_init(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
6466 add234(ssh
->channels
, ssh
->mainchan
);
6467 update_specials_menu(ssh
->frontend
);
6468 logevent("Opened channel for session");
6470 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
6473 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
6474 * general channel-based messages.
6476 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] =
6477 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] =
6478 ssh2_msg_channel_data
;
6479 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof
;
6480 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = ssh2_msg_channel_close
;
6481 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] =
6482 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation
;
6483 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] =
6484 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure
;
6485 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] =
6486 ssh2_msg_channel_request
;
6487 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] =
6488 ssh2_msg_channel_open
;
6491 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
6493 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.x11_forward
) {
6494 char proto
[20], data
[64];
6495 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
6496 ssh
->x11auth
= x11_invent_auth(proto
, sizeof(proto
),
6497 data
, sizeof(data
), ssh
->cfg
.x11_auth
);
6498 x11_get_real_auth(ssh
->x11auth
, ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
);
6499 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6500 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6501 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "x11-req");
6502 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6503 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 0); /* many connections */
6504 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, proto
);
6505 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, data
);
6506 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, x11_get_screen_number(ssh
->cfg
.x11_display
));
6507 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6509 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6511 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6512 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6513 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
6514 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6517 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
6519 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
6520 ssh
->X11_fwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
6525 * Enable port forwardings.
6530 int sport
,dport
,sserv
,dserv
;
6531 char sports
[256], dports
[256], saddr
[256], host
[256];
6533 ssh
->rportfwds
= newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2
);
6534 /* Add port forwardings. */
6535 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
= ssh
->cfg
.portfwd
;
6536 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
6537 type
= *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6540 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= '\t') {
6541 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':') {
6543 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
6544 * source port number. This means that
6545 * everything we've seen until now is the
6546 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
6547 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
6550 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6552 strcpy(saddr
, sports
);
6555 if (n
< 255) sports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6559 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== '\t')
6560 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6562 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
&& *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
!= ':') {
6563 if (n
< 255) host
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6566 if (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
== ':')
6567 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6569 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) {
6570 if (n
< 255) dports
[n
++] = *ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6573 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6574 dport
= atoi(dports
);
6578 dport
= net_service_lookup(dports
);
6580 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for destination"
6581 " port \"%s\"", dports
);
6585 while (*ssh
->portfwd_strptr
) ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++;
6587 ssh
->portfwd_strptr
++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
6589 sport
= atoi(sports
);
6593 sport
= net_service_lookup(sports
);
6595 logeventf(ssh
, "Service lookup failed for source"
6596 " port \"%s\"", sports
);
6599 if (sport
&& dport
) {
6600 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
6601 static char *sportdesc
;
6602 sportdesc
= dupprintf("%.*s%.*s%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
6603 (int)(*saddr?
strlen(saddr
):0), *saddr?saddr
:NULL
,
6604 (int)(*saddr?
1:0), ":",
6605 (int)(sserv ?
strlen(sports
) : 0), sports
,
6606 sserv
, "(", sport
, sserv
, ")");
6608 /* Verbose description of the destination port */
6609 char *dportdesc
= dupprintf("%s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
6611 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
6612 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
6613 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(host
, dport
,
6614 *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
6615 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
6617 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s forward to %s"
6618 " failed: %s", sportdesc
, dportdesc
, err
);
6620 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s forwarding to %s",
6621 sportdesc
, dportdesc
);
6624 } else if (type
== 'D') {
6625 const char *err
= pfd_addforward(NULL
, -1,
6626 *saddr ? saddr
: NULL
,
6627 sport
, ssh
, &ssh
->cfg
);
6629 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s SOCKS dynamic forward"
6630 " setup failed: %s", sportdesc
, err
);
6632 logeventf(ssh
, "Local port %s doing SOCKS"
6633 " dynamic forwarding", sportdesc
);
6636 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
6637 pf
= snew(struct ssh_rportfwd
);
6638 strcpy(pf
->dhost
, host
);
6641 if (add234(ssh
->rportfwds
, pf
) != pf
) {
6642 logeventf(ssh
, "Duplicate remote port forwarding"
6643 " to %s:%d", host
, dport
);
6646 logeventf(ssh
, "Requesting remote port %s"
6647 " forward to %s:%.*s%.*s%d%.*s",
6650 (int)(dserv ?
strlen(dports
) : 0), dports
,
6651 dserv
, "(", dport
, dserv
, ")");
6652 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
);
6653 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "tcpip-forward");
6654 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1);/* want reply */
6656 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, saddr
);
6657 } else if (ssh
->cfg
.rport_acceptall
) {
6658 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "0.0.0.0");
6660 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "127.0.0.1");
6662 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, sport
);
6663 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6665 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6667 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
) {
6668 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
) {
6669 bombout(("Unexpected response to port "
6670 "forwarding request: packet type %d",
6674 logevent("Server refused this port forwarding");
6676 logevent("Remote port forwarding enabled");
6686 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
6688 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->cfg
.agentfwd
&& agent_exists()) {
6689 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
6690 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6691 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6692 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
6693 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6694 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6696 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6698 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6699 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6700 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
6701 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6704 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
6706 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
6707 ssh
->agentfwd_enabled
= TRUE
;
6712 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
6714 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& !ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
6715 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
6716 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
6717 ssh
->ospeed
= 38400; ssh
->ispeed
= 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
6718 sscanf(ssh
->cfg
.termspeed
, "%d,%d", &ssh
->ospeed
, &ssh
->ispeed
);
6719 /* Build the pty request. */
6720 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6721 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
6722 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "pty-req");
6723 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6724 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, ssh
->cfg
.termtype
);
6725 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
6726 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
6727 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel width */
6728 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, 0); /* pixel height */
6729 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6730 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, 128); /* TTY_OP_ISPEED */
6731 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ispeed
);
6732 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s
->pktout
, 129); /* TTY_OP_OSPEED */
6733 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->ospeed
);
6734 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
6735 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6736 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_INTERMED
;
6738 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6740 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6741 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6742 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
6743 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6746 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
6747 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
6749 logeventf(ssh
, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
6750 ssh
->ospeed
, ssh
->ispeed
);
6753 ssh
->editing
= ssh
->echoing
= 1;
6757 * Send environment variables.
6759 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
6760 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
6762 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& *ssh
->cfg
.environmt
) {
6763 char *e
= ssh
->cfg
.environmt
;
6764 char *var
, *varend
, *val
;
6770 while (*e
&& *e
!= '\t') e
++;
6772 if (*e
== '\t') e
++;
6777 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6778 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
6779 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "env");
6780 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6781 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s
->pktout
);
6782 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s
->pktout
, var
, varend
-var
);
6783 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, val
);
6784 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6789 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent %d environment variables", s
->num_env
);
6792 s
->env_left
= s
->num_env
;
6794 while (s
->env_left
> 0) {
6795 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6797 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6798 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6799 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
6800 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6810 if (s
->env_ok
== s
->num_env
) {
6811 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
6812 } else if (s
->env_ok
== 0) {
6813 logevent("All environment variables refused");
6814 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
6816 logeventf(ssh
, "%d environment variables refused",
6817 s
->num_env
- s
->env_ok
);
6818 c_write_str(ssh
, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
6823 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
6824 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
6827 if (ssh
->mainchan
) while (1) {
6831 if (ssh
->fallback_cmd
) {
6832 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys2
;
6833 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
;
6835 subsys
= ssh
->cfg
.ssh_subsys
;
6836 cmd
= ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr
;
6839 s
->pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
6840 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s
->pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
); /* recipient channel */
6842 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "subsystem");
6843 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6844 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
6846 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "exec");
6847 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6848 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, cmd
);
6850 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s
->pktout
, "shell");
6851 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s
->pktout
, 1); /* want reply */
6853 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, s
->pktout
);
6855 crWaitUntilV(pktin
);
6857 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
) {
6858 if (pktin
->type
!= SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
) {
6859 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
6860 " packet type %d", pktin
->type
));
6864 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
6865 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
6866 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
6867 * back to it before complaining.
6869 if (!ssh
->fallback_cmd
&& ssh
->cfg
.remote_cmd_ptr2
!= NULL
) {
6870 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
6871 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= TRUE
;
6874 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
6877 logevent("Started a shell/command");
6882 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_SESSION
;
6883 if (ssh
->size_needed
)
6884 ssh_size(ssh
, ssh
->term_width
, ssh
->term_height
);
6885 if (ssh
->eof_needed
)
6886 ssh_special(ssh
, TS_EOF
);
6892 ldisc_send(ssh
->ldisc
, NULL
, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
6897 s
->try_send
= FALSE
;
6901 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
6902 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
6903 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
6906 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin
->type
));
6908 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
6910 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
6912 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh
->mainchan
, (char *)in
, inlen
);
6917 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
6919 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
6921 for (i
= 0; NULL
!= (c
= index234(ssh
->channels
, i
)); i
++) {
6924 continue; /* don't send on closing channels */
6925 bufsize
= ssh2_try_send(c
);
6928 case CHAN_MAINSESSION
:
6929 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6930 * notification since it will be polled */
6933 x11_unthrottle(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
6936 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6937 * buffer management */
6940 pfd_unthrottle(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
6952 * Handlers for SSH2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
6954 void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6956 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
6958 int nowlen
, reason
, msglen
;
6960 reason
= ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin
);
6961 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
6963 if (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) {
6964 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
6965 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
]);
6967 buf
= dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
6968 " type %d)", reason
);
6972 buf
= dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
6973 &nowlen
, msglen
, msg
);
6975 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
6977 (reason
> 0 && reason
< lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons
)) ?
6978 ssh2_disconnect_reasons
[reason
] : "unknown",
6983 void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
6985 /* log the debug message */
6990 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
6991 always_display
= ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin
);
6992 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin
, &msg
, &msglen
);
6994 buf
= dupprintf("Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen
, msg
);
6999 void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh
, struct Packet
*pktin
)
7001 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7002 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
);
7003 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, pktin
->sequence
);
7005 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7006 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7008 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7012 * Handle the top-level SSH2 protocol.
7014 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh
)
7019 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7021 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
7022 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[i
] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented
;
7025 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7026 * the coroutines will get it.
7028 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
] = NULL
;
7029 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7030 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
] = NULL
;
7031 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT
] = NULL
;
7032 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS
] = NULL
;
7033 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
] = NULL
;
7034 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7035 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7036 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7037 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
] = NULL
;
7038 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
] = NULL
;
7039 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7040 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7041 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7042 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
] = NULL
;
7043 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
] = NULL
;
7044 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7045 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7046 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE
] = NULL
;
7047 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7048 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7049 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7050 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
] = NULL
;
7051 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
] = NULL
;
7052 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7053 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
] = NULL
;
7054 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
] = NULL
;
7055 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
] = NULL
;
7056 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
] = NULL
;
7057 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
] = NULL
;
7058 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
] = NULL
;
7059 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
] = NULL
;
7060 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
] = NULL
;
7063 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7065 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT
] = ssh2_msg_disconnect
;
7066 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
] = ssh_msg_ignore
; /* shared with ssh1 */
7067 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG
] = ssh2_msg_debug
;
7070 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx
, long now
)
7074 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
7075 now
- ssh
->next_rekey
>= 0) {
7076 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange (timeout)",
7081 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh
, unsigned char *in
, int inlen
,
7082 struct Packet
*pktin
)
7084 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
)
7088 ssh
->incoming_data_size
+= pktin
->encrypted_len
;
7089 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&&
7090 ssh
->incoming_data_size
> MAX_DATA_BEFORE_REKEY
)
7091 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange "
7092 "(too much data received)", -1, NULL
);
7095 if (pktin
&& ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
]) {
7096 ssh
->packet_dispatch
[pktin
->type
](ssh
, pktin
);
7100 if (!ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
||
7101 (pktin
&& pktin
->type
>= 20 && pktin
->type
< 50)) {
7102 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
) &&
7103 !ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
) {
7104 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= TRUE
;
7106 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7108 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, NULL
, 0, NULL
);
7111 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh
, in
, inlen
, pktin
);
7116 * Called to set up the connection.
7118 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7120 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle
, void **backend_handle
,
7122 char *host
, int port
, char **realhost
, int nodelay
,
7128 ssh
= snew(struct ssh_tag
);
7129 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7130 ssh
->version
= 0; /* when not ready yet */
7133 ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7134 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7135 ssh
->cscipher
= NULL
;
7136 ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7137 ssh
->sccipher
= NULL
;
7138 ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
= NULL
;
7140 ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7142 ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
= NULL
;
7144 ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7146 ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
= NULL
;
7148 ssh
->kex_ctx
= NULL
;
7149 ssh
->hostkey
= NULL
;
7151 ssh
->state
= SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
;
7152 ssh
->size_needed
= FALSE
;
7153 ssh
->eof_needed
= FALSE
;
7156 ssh
->deferred_send_data
= NULL
;
7157 ssh
->deferred_len
= 0;
7158 ssh
->deferred_size
= 0;
7159 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7161 ssh
->x11auth
= NULL
;
7162 ssh
->v1_compressing
= FALSE
;
7163 ssh
->v2_outgoing_sequence
= 0;
7164 ssh
->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7165 ssh
->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate
= 0;
7166 ssh
->do_ssh_init_crstate
= 0;
7167 ssh
->ssh_gotdata_crstate
= 0;
7168 ssh
->do_ssh1_connection_crstate
= 0;
7169 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_crstate
= 0;
7170 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_crstate
= 0;
7171 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate
= 0;
7172 ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
= NULL
;
7173 ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
= NULL
;
7174 ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
= NULL
;
7175 ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
= NULL
;
7176 ssh
->mainchan
= NULL
;
7177 ssh
->throttled_all
= 0;
7178 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7180 ssh
->queuelen
= ssh
->queuesize
= 0;
7181 ssh
->queueing
= FALSE
;
7183 *backend_handle
= ssh
;
7186 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7187 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7190 ssh
->frontend
= frontend_handle
;
7191 ssh
->term_width
= ssh
->cfg
.width
;
7192 ssh
->term_height
= ssh
->cfg
.height
;
7194 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7195 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7200 ssh
->v1_throttle_count
= 0;
7201 ssh
->overall_bufsize
= 0;
7202 ssh
->fallback_cmd
= 0;
7204 ssh
->protocol
= NULL
;
7206 ssh
->protocol_initial_phase_done
= FALSE
;
7210 ssh
->incoming_data_size
= ssh
->outgoing_data_size
=
7211 ssh
->deferred_data_size
= 0L;
7212 ssh
->kex_in_progress
= FALSE
;
7214 p
= connect_to_host(ssh
, host
, port
, realhost
, nodelay
, keepalive
);
7223 static void ssh_free(void *handle
)
7225 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7226 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7227 struct ssh_rportfwd
*pf
;
7229 if (ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
)
7230 ssh
->cipher
->free_context(ssh
->v1_cipher_ctx
);
7231 if (ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
)
7232 ssh
->cscipher
->free_context(ssh
->cs_cipher_ctx
);
7233 if (ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
)
7234 ssh
->sccipher
->free_context(ssh
->sc_cipher_ctx
);
7235 if (ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
)
7236 ssh
->csmac
->free_context(ssh
->cs_mac_ctx
);
7237 if (ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
)
7238 ssh
->scmac
->free_context(ssh
->sc_mac_ctx
);
7239 if (ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
) {
7241 ssh
->cscomp
->compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7243 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh
->cs_comp_ctx
);
7245 if (ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
) {
7247 ssh
->sccomp
->decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7249 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh
->sc_comp_ctx
);
7252 dh_cleanup(ssh
->kex_ctx
);
7253 sfree(ssh
->savedhost
);
7255 while (ssh
->queuelen
-- > 0)
7256 ssh_free_packet(ssh
->queue
[ssh
->queuelen
]);
7259 if (ssh
->channels
) {
7260 while ((c
= delpos234(ssh
->channels
, 0)) != NULL
) {
7263 if (c
->u
.x11
.s
!= NULL
)
7264 x11_close(c
->u
.x11
.s
);
7267 if (c
->u
.pfd
.s
!= NULL
)
7268 pfd_close(c
->u
.pfd
.s
);
7273 freetree234(ssh
->channels
);
7274 ssh
->channels
= NULL
;
7277 if (ssh
->rportfwds
) {
7278 while ((pf
= delpos234(ssh
->rportfwds
, 0)) != NULL
)
7280 freetree234(ssh
->rportfwds
);
7281 ssh
->rportfwds
= NULL
;
7283 sfree(ssh
->deferred_send_data
);
7285 x11_free_auth(ssh
->x11auth
);
7286 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh_init_state
);
7287 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh1_login_state
);
7288 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_transport_state
);
7289 sfree(ssh
->do_ssh2_authconn_state
);
7290 if (ssh
->crcda_ctx
) {
7291 crcda_free_context(ssh
->crcda_ctx
);
7292 ssh
->crcda_ctx
= NULL
;
7296 expire_timer_context(ssh
);
7298 pinger_free(ssh
->pinger
);
7305 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
7307 * Currently, this function does nothing very useful. In future,
7308 * however, we could do some handy things with it. For example, we
7309 * could make the port forwarding configurer active in the Change
7310 * Settings box, and this routine could close down existing
7311 * forwardings and open up new ones in response to changes.
7313 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle
, Config
*cfg
)
7315 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7316 pinger_reconfig(ssh
->pinger
, &ssh
->cfg
, cfg
);
7317 ssh
->cfg
= *cfg
; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7321 * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
7323 static int ssh_send(void *handle
, char *buf
, int len
)
7325 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7327 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
7330 ssh
->protocol(ssh
, (unsigned char *)buf
, len
, 0);
7332 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh
);
7336 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
7338 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle
)
7340 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7343 if (ssh
== NULL
|| ssh
->s
== NULL
|| ssh
->protocol
== NULL
)
7347 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
7348 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
7351 if (ssh
->throttled_all
)
7352 override_value
= ssh
->overall_bufsize
;
7354 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7355 return override_value
;
7356 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
7357 if (!ssh
->mainchan
|| ssh
->mainchan
->closes
> 0)
7358 return override_value
;
7360 return (override_value
+
7361 bufchain_size(&ssh
->mainchan
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
));
7368 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
7370 static void ssh_size(void *handle
, int width
, int height
)
7372 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7373 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7375 ssh
->term_width
= width
;
7376 ssh
->term_height
= height
;
7378 switch (ssh
->state
) {
7379 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE
:
7380 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
:
7381 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED
:
7382 break; /* do nothing */
7383 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED
:
7384 ssh
->size_needed
= TRUE
; /* buffer for later */
7386 case SSH_STATE_SESSION
:
7387 if (!ssh
->cfg
.nopty
) {
7388 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7389 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
,
7390 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_height
,
7391 PKT_INT
, ssh
->term_width
,
7392 PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_INT
, 0, PKT_END
);
7393 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7394 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7395 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7396 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "window-change");
7397 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7398 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_width
);
7399 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->term_height
);
7400 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7401 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7402 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7410 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
7413 static const struct telnet_special
*ssh_get_specials(void *handle
)
7415 static const struct telnet_special ignore_special
[] = {
7416 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP
},
7417 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY
},
7419 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials
[] = {
7422 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-19.
7423 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
7424 * required signals. */
7425 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT
},
7426 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM
},
7427 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL
},
7428 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT
},
7429 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP
},
7430 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU
},
7431 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT
}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM
},
7432 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE
}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL
},
7433 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE
}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV
},
7434 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1
}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2
},
7437 static const struct telnet_special specials_end
[] = {
7440 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials
[lenof(ignore_special
) +
7441 lenof(ssh2_session_specials
) +
7442 lenof(specials_end
)];
7443 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7445 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
7447 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
7448 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
7452 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7453 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
7454 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
7456 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
7457 ADD_SPECIALS(ignore_special
);
7458 } else if (ssh
->version
== 2) {
7459 ADD_SPECIALS(ignore_special
);
7461 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials
);
7462 } /* else we're not ready yet */
7465 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end
);
7466 return ssh_specials
;
7474 * Send Telnet special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
7475 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
7478 static void ssh_special(void *handle
, Telnet_Special code
)
7480 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7481 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7483 if (code
== TS_EOF
) {
7484 if (ssh
->state
!= SSH_STATE_SESSION
) {
7486 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
7487 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
7490 ssh
->eof_needed
= TRUE
;
7493 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7494 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_CMSG_EOF
, PKT_END
);
7495 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7496 struct Packet
*pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
);
7497 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7498 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7500 logevent("Sent EOF message");
7501 } else if (code
== TS_PING
|| code
== TS_NOP
) {
7502 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
7503 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
7504 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7505 if (!(ssh
->remote_bugs
& BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE
))
7506 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
, PKT_STR
, "", PKT_END
);
7508 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
7509 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout
);
7510 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh
, pktout
);
7512 } else if (code
== TS_REKEY
) {
7513 if (!ssh
->kex_in_progress
&& ssh
->version
== 2) {
7514 do_ssh2_transport(ssh
, "Initiating key re-exchange at"
7515 " user request", -1, NULL
);
7517 } else if (code
== TS_BRK
) {
7518 if (ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_CLOSED
7519 || ssh
->state
== SSH_STATE_PREPACKET
) return;
7520 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7521 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH1");
7522 } else if (ssh
->mainchan
) {
7523 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7524 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7525 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "break");
7526 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7527 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0); /* default break length */
7528 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7531 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
7532 char *signame
= NULL
;
7533 if (code
== TS_SIGABRT
) signame
= "ABRT";
7534 if (code
== TS_SIGALRM
) signame
= "ALRM";
7535 if (code
== TS_SIGFPE
) signame
= "FPE";
7536 if (code
== TS_SIGHUP
) signame
= "HUP";
7537 if (code
== TS_SIGILL
) signame
= "ILL";
7538 if (code
== TS_SIGINT
) signame
= "INT";
7539 if (code
== TS_SIGKILL
) signame
= "KILL";
7540 if (code
== TS_SIGPIPE
) signame
= "PIPE";
7541 if (code
== TS_SIGQUIT
) signame
= "QUIT";
7542 if (code
== TS_SIGSEGV
) signame
= "SEGV";
7543 if (code
== TS_SIGTERM
) signame
= "TERM";
7544 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR1
) signame
= "USR1";
7545 if (code
== TS_SIGUSR2
) signame
= "USR2";
7546 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
7547 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
7549 /* It's a signal. */
7550 if (ssh
->version
== 2 && ssh
->mainchan
) {
7551 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
);
7552 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, ssh
->mainchan
->remoteid
);
7553 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "signal");
7554 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout
, 0);
7555 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, signame
);
7556 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7557 logeventf(ssh
, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame
);
7560 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
7565 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle
, Socket s
)
7567 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7568 struct ssh_channel
*c
;
7569 c
= snew(struct ssh_channel
);
7573 c
->remoteid
= -1; /* to be set when open confirmed */
7574 c
->localid
= alloc_channel_id(ssh
);
7576 c
->type
= CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT
;/* identify channel type */
7578 bufchain_init(&c
->v
.v2
.outbuffer
);
7579 add234(ssh
->channels
, c
);
7585 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
7586 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
7588 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle
, int bufsize
)
7590 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7591 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7592 if (ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
&& bufsize
< SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT
) {
7593 ssh
->v1_stdout_throttling
= 0;
7594 ssh1_throttle(ssh
, -1);
7597 if (ssh
->mainchan
&& ssh
->mainchan
->closes
== 0)
7598 ssh2_set_window(ssh
->mainchan
, OUR_V2_WINSIZE
- bufsize
);
7602 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel
, char *hostname
, int port
, char *org
)
7604 struct ssh_channel
*c
= (struct ssh_channel
*)channel
;
7606 struct Packet
*pktout
;
7608 logeventf(ssh
, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname
, port
);
7610 if (ssh
->version
== 1) {
7611 send_packet(ssh
, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN
,
7612 PKT_INT
, c
->localid
,
7615 //PKT_STR, <org:orgport>,
7618 pktout
= ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
);
7619 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "direct-tcpip");
7620 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->localid
);
7621 c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
= OUR_V2_WINSIZE
;
7622 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, c
->v
.v2
.locwindow
);/* our window size */
7623 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0x4000UL
); /* our max pkt size */
7624 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, hostname
);
7625 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, port
);
7627 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
7628 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
7629 * convinced the server should be told details like that
7630 * about my local network configuration.
7632 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout
, "client-side-connection");
7633 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout
, 0);
7634 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh
, pktout
);
7638 static Socket
ssh_socket(void *handle
)
7640 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7644 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle
)
7646 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7647 return ssh
->send_ok
;
7650 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle
, int option
)
7652 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7653 if (option
== LD_ECHO
)
7654 return ssh
->echoing
;
7655 if (option
== LD_EDIT
)
7656 return ssh
->editing
;
7660 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle
, void *ldisc
)
7662 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7666 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle
, void *logctx
)
7668 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7669 ssh
->logctx
= logctx
;
7672 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle
)
7674 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7678 return (ssh
->exitcode
>= 0 ? ssh
->exitcode
: 0);
7682 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
7683 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
7684 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
7686 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle
)
7688 Ssh ssh
= (Ssh
) handle
;
7689 return ssh
->fallback_cmd
;
7692 Backend ssh_backend
= {
7702 ssh_return_exitcode
,