Null out the socket pointers in X- and port-forwarding channels for
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgss.h"
17 #endif
18
19 #ifndef FALSE
20 #define FALSE 0
21 #endif
22 #ifndef TRUE
23 #define TRUE 1
24 #endif
25
26 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
27 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
31 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
32 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
38 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
40 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
43 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
44 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
45 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
50 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
52 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
53 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
54 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
55 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
56 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
59 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
60 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
62 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
63 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
65 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
66 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
67
68 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
74
75 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
76 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
77 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
78
79 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
124
125 /*
126 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
127 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
128 */
129 typedef enum {
130 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
134 } Pkt_KCtx;
135 typedef enum {
136 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
141 } Pkt_ACtx;
142
143 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
158
159 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
160 NULL,
161 "host not allowed to connect",
162 "protocol error",
163 "key exchange failed",
164 "host authentication failed",
165 "MAC error",
166 "compression error",
167 "service not available",
168 "protocol version not supported",
169 "host key not verifiable",
170 "connection lost",
171 "by application",
172 "too many connections",
173 "auth cancelled by user",
174 "no more auth methods available",
175 "illegal user name",
176 };
177
178 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
182
183 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
184
185 /*
186 * Various remote-bug flags.
187 */
188 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
189 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
190 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
191 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
192 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
193 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
194 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
195 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
196 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
197
198 /*
199 * Codes for terminal modes.
200 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
201 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
202 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
203 */
204 static const struct {
205 const char* const mode;
206 int opcode;
207 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
208 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
209 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
210 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
211 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
212 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
213 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
229 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
230 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
253 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
255 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
256 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
263 };
264
265 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
266 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
267 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
268 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
269 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
270 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
271 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
272
273 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
274 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
275 {
276 unsigned int ret;
277 if (*s) {
278 char *next = NULL;
279 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
280 if (!next) ret = s[0];
281 } else {
282 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
283 }
284 return ret;
285 }
286 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
287 {
288 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
289 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
290 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
291 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
292 return 1; /* true */
293 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
294 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
295 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
296 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
297 return 0; /* false */
298 else
299 return (atoi(s) != 0);
300 }
301
302 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
303 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
304 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
305 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
306 {
307 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
308 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
310 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
312 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
319 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
320 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
321 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
323 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
324 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
326 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
327 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
328 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
331 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
332 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
333 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
334 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
335 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
336 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
337 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
338 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
339 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
340 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
342 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
343 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
345 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
346 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
348 return "unknown";
349 }
350 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
351 {
352 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
353 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
354 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
359 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
360 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
366 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
367 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
368 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
375 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
376 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
377 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
379 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
380 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
381 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
383 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
384 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
385 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
397 return "unknown";
398 }
399 #undef translate
400 #undef translatec
401
402 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
403 enum {
404 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
405 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
406 * fields to the packet logging code. */
407 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
408 };
409
410 /*
411 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
412 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
413 * read
414 *
415 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
416 *
417 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
418 *
419 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
420 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
421 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
422 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
423 *
424 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
425 * - click Settings
426 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
427 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
428 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
429 */
430 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
431 #define crState(t) \
432 struct t *s; \
433 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
434 s = ssh->t;
435 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
436 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
437 #define crReturn(z) \
438 do {\
439 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
440 } while (0)
441 #define crReturnV \
442 do {\
443 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
444 } while (0)
445 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
446 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
447 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
448 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
449
450 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
451 struct Packet;
452
453 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
454 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
455 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
456 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
457 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
458 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
459 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
460 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
461 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
463 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
464 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
465 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
466 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
467 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
468 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
469 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
470 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
471 struct Packet *pktin);
472 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
473 struct Packet *pktin);
474
475 /*
476 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
477 * various different purposes:
478 *
479 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
480 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
481 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
482 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
483 * happen very often.
484 *
485 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
486 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
487 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
488 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
489 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
490 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
491 *
492 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
493 * channels.
494 *
495 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
496 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
497 *
498 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
499 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
500 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
501 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
502 * data message.
503 *
504 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
505 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
506 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
507 */
508
509 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
510 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
511 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
512 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
513 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
514 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
515
516 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
517 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
518
519 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
520
521 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
522 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
523 };
524 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
525 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
526 };
527
528 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
529 {
530 return NULL;
531 }
532 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
533 {
534 }
535 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
536 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
537 {
538 return 0;
539 }
540 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
541 {
542 return 0;
543 }
544 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
545 "none",
546 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
547 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
548 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
549 };
550 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
551 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
552 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
553 };
554
555 enum { /* channel types */
556 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
557 CHAN_X11,
558 CHAN_AGENT,
559 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
560 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
561 };
562
563 /*
564 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
565 */
566 struct winadj {
567 struct winadj *next;
568 unsigned size;
569 };
570
571 /*
572 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
573 */
574 struct ssh_channel {
575 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
576 unsigned remoteid, localid;
577 int type;
578 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
579 int halfopen;
580 /*
581 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
582 *
583 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
584 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
585 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
586 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
587 *
588 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
589 */
590 int closes;
591 /*
592 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
593 * throttled.
594 */
595 int throttling_conn;
596 union {
597 struct ssh2_data_channel {
598 bufchain outbuffer;
599 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
600 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
601 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
602 /*
603 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
604 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
605 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
606 */
607 int remlocwin;
608 /*
609 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
610 * been acked.
611 */
612 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
613 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
614 } v2;
615 } v;
616 union {
617 struct ssh_agent_channel {
618 unsigned char *message;
619 unsigned char msglen[4];
620 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
621 } a;
622 struct ssh_x11_channel {
623 Socket s;
624 } x11;
625 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
626 Socket s;
627 } pfd;
628 } u;
629 };
630
631 /*
632 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
633 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
634 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
635 *
636 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
637 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
638 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
639 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
640 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
641 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
642 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
643 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
644 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
645 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
646 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
647 *
648 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
649 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
650 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
651 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
652 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
653 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
654 *
655 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
656 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
657 */
658 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
659
660 struct ssh_rportfwd {
661 unsigned sport, dport;
662 char dhost[256];
663 char *sportdesc;
664 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
665 };
666 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
667 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
668
669 /*
670 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
671 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
672 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
673 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
674 * it.
675 */
676 struct ssh_portfwd {
677 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
678 int type;
679 unsigned sport, dport;
680 char *saddr, *daddr;
681 char *sserv, *dserv;
682 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
683 int addressfamily;
684 void *local;
685 };
686 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
687 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
688 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
689
690 struct Packet {
691 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
692 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
693 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
694 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
695 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
696 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
697 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
698 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
699 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
700
701 /*
702 * State associated with packet logging
703 */
704 int logmode;
705 int nblanks;
706 struct logblank_t *blanks;
707 };
708
709 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
710 struct Packet *pktin);
711 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
712 struct Packet *pktin);
713 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
714 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
715 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
716 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
717 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
718 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
719 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
720 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
721 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
722 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
723 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
724 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
725 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
726 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
727 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
728 struct Packet *pktin);
729
730 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
731 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
732 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
733 unsigned char *p;
734 int i;
735 int chunk;
736 struct Packet *pktin;
737 };
738
739 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
740 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
741 int i;
742 int cipherblk;
743 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
744 struct Packet *pktin;
745 };
746
747 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
748 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
749
750 struct queued_handler;
751 struct queued_handler {
752 int msg1, msg2;
753 chandler_fn_t handler;
754 void *ctx;
755 struct queued_handler *next;
756 };
757
758 struct ssh_tag {
759 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
760 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
761
762 char *v_c, *v_s;
763 void *exhash;
764
765 Socket s;
766
767 void *ldisc;
768 void *logctx;
769
770 unsigned char session_key[32];
771 int v1_compressing;
772 int v1_remote_protoflags;
773 int v1_local_protoflags;
774 int agentfwd_enabled;
775 int X11_fwd_enabled;
776 int remote_bugs;
777 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
778 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
779 void *crcda_ctx;
780 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
781 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
782 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
783 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
784 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
785 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
786 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
787 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
788 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
789 int v2_session_id_len;
790 void *kex_ctx;
791
792 char *savedhost;
793 int savedport;
794 int send_ok;
795 int echoing, editing;
796
797 void *frontend;
798
799 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
800 int term_width, term_height;
801
802 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
803 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
804 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
805 int exitcode;
806 int close_expected;
807 int clean_exit;
808
809 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
810
811 enum {
812 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
813 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
814 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
815 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
816 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
817 } state;
818
819 int size_needed, eof_needed;
820
821 struct Packet **queue;
822 int queuelen, queuesize;
823 int queueing;
824 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
825 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
826
827 /*
828 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
829 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
830 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
831 * got.
832 */
833 int fallback_cmd;
834
835 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
836
837 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
838 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
839
840 struct X11Display *x11disp;
841
842 int version;
843 int conn_throttle_count;
844 int overall_bufsize;
845 int throttled_all;
846 int v1_stdout_throttling;
847 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
848
849 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
850 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
851 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
852 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
853 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
854 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
855 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
856 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
857
858 void *do_ssh_init_state;
859 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
860 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
861 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
862
863 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
864 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
865
866 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
867 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
868
869 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
870 struct Packet *pkt);
871 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
872
873 /*
874 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
875 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
876 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
877 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
878 */
879 Config cfg;
880
881 /*
882 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
883 */
884 void *agent_response;
885 int agent_response_len;
886 int user_response;
887
888 /*
889 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
890 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
891 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
892 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
893 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
894 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
895 * store that data.
896 */
897 int frozen;
898 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
899
900 /*
901 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
902 * with at any time.
903 */
904 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
905
906 /*
907 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
908 * indications from a request.
909 */
910 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
911
912 /*
913 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
914 */
915 Pinger pinger;
916
917 /*
918 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
919 * size-based rekeys.
920 */
921 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
922 unsigned long max_data_size;
923 int kex_in_progress;
924 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
925 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
926
927 /*
928 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
929 */
930 char *fullhostname;
931 };
932
933 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
934
935 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
936 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
937 {
938 va_list ap;
939 char *buf;
940
941 va_start(ap, fmt);
942 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
943 va_end(ap);
944 logevent(buf);
945 sfree(buf);
946 }
947
948 #define bombout(msg) \
949 do { \
950 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
951 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
952 logevent(text); \
953 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
954 sfree(text); \
955 } while (0)
956
957 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
958
959 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
960 {
961 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
962 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
963 }
964
965 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
966 {
967 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
968 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
969 }
970
971 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
972 {
973 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
974 }
975
976 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
977 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
978 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
979 void *data)
980 {
981 while (*modes) {
982 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
983 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
984 char *val;
985 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
986 m[t-modes] = '\0';
987 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
988 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
989 else
990 val = dupstr(t+2);
991 if (val)
992 do_mode(data, m, val);
993 sfree(m);
994 sfree(val);
995 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
996 }
997 }
998
999 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1000 {
1001 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1002 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1003 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1004 return -1;
1005 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1006 return +1;
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1010 {
1011 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1012 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1013 if (*a < b->localid)
1014 return -1;
1015 if (*a > b->localid)
1016 return +1;
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019
1020 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1021 {
1022 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1023 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1024 int i;
1025 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1026 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1027 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1028 return +1;
1029 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1030 return -1;
1031 return 0;
1032 }
1033
1034 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1035 {
1036 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1037 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1038
1039 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1040 return +1;
1041 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1042 return -1;
1043 return 0;
1044 }
1045
1046 /*
1047 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1048 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1049 */
1050 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1051 {
1052 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1053 return 0;
1054 if (a == NULL)
1055 return -1;
1056 if (b == NULL)
1057 return +1;
1058 return strcmp(a, b);
1059 }
1060
1061 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1062 {
1063 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1064 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1065 int i;
1066 if (a->type > b->type)
1067 return +1;
1068 if (a->type < b->type)
1069 return -1;
1070 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1071 return +1;
1072 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1073 return -1;
1074 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1075 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1076 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1077 return +1;
1078 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1079 return -1;
1080 if (a->type != 'D') {
1081 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1082 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1083 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1084 return +1;
1085 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1086 return -1;
1087 }
1088 return 0;
1089 }
1090
1091 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1092 {
1093 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1094 unsigned low, high, mid;
1095 int tsize;
1096 struct ssh_channel *c;
1097
1098 /*
1099 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1100 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1101 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1102 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1103 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1104 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1105 */
1106 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1107
1108 low = -1;
1109 high = tsize;
1110 while (high - low > 1) {
1111 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1112 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1113 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1114 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1115 else
1116 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1117 }
1118 /*
1119 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1120 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1121 */
1122 {
1123 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1124 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1125 }
1126 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1127 }
1128
1129 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1130 {
1131 int i;
1132 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1133 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1134 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1135 }
1136
1137 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1138 {
1139 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1140 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1141 else
1142 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1143 }
1144
1145 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1146 {
1147 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1148 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1149 else
1150 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1151 }
1152
1153 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1154 {
1155 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1156 }
1157
1158 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1159 {
1160 sfree(pkt->data);
1161 sfree(pkt);
1162 }
1163 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1164 {
1165 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1166
1167 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1168 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1169 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1170 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1171 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1172
1173 return pkt;
1174 }
1175
1176 /*
1177 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1178 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1179 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1180 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1181 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1182 */
1183 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1184 {
1185 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1186
1187 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1188
1189 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1190
1191 st->pktin->type = 0;
1192 st->pktin->length = 0;
1193
1194 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1195 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1196 crReturn(NULL);
1197 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1198 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1199 }
1200
1201 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1202 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1203 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1204
1205 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1206 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1207 " data stream corruption"));
1208 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1209 crStop(NULL);
1210 }
1211
1212 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1213 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1214
1215 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1216 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1217 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1218 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1219 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1220 crReturn(NULL);
1221 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1222 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1223 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1224 *data += st->chunk;
1225 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1226 st->p += st->chunk;
1227 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1228 }
1229
1230 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1231 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1232 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1233 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1234 crStop(NULL);
1235 }
1236
1237 if (ssh->cipher)
1238 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1239
1240 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1241 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1242 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1243 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1244 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1245 crStop(NULL);
1246 }
1247
1248 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1249 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1250
1251 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1252 unsigned char *decompblk;
1253 int decomplen;
1254 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1255 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1256 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1257 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1258 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1259 crStop(NULL);
1260 }
1261
1262 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1263 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1264 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1265 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1266 unsigned char);
1267 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1268 }
1269
1270 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1271 sfree(decompblk);
1272 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1273 }
1274
1275 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1276
1277 /*
1278 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1279 */
1280 if (ssh->logctx) {
1281 int nblanks = 0;
1282 struct logblank_t blank;
1283 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1284 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1285 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1286 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1287 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1288 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1289 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1290 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1291 }
1292 if (do_blank) {
1293 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1294 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1295 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1296 nblanks = 1;
1297 }
1298 }
1299 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1300 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1301 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1302 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1303 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1304 }
1305
1306 crFinish(st->pktin);
1307 }
1308
1309 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1310 {
1311 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1312
1313 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1314
1315 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1316
1317 st->pktin->type = 0;
1318 st->pktin->length = 0;
1319 if (ssh->sccipher)
1320 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1321 else
1322 st->cipherblk = 8;
1323 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1324 st->cipherblk = 8;
1325 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1326
1327 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1328 ssh->scmac) {
1329 /*
1330 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1331 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1332 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1333 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1334 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1335 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1336 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1337 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1338 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1339 * plausible.
1340 */
1341
1342 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1343 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1344 unsigned char);
1345
1346 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1347 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1348 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1349 crReturn(NULL);
1350 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1351 (*datalen)--;
1352 }
1353
1354 st->packetlen = 0;
1355 {
1356 unsigned char seq[4];
1357 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1358 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1359 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1360 }
1361
1362 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1363 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1364 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1365 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1366 crReturn(NULL);
1367 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1368 (*datalen)--;
1369 }
1370 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1371 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1372 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1373 st->cipherblk);
1374 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1375 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1376 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1377 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1378 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1379 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1380 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1381 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1382 break;
1383 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1384 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1385 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1386 crStop(NULL);
1387 }
1388 }
1389 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1390 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1391 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1392 unsigned char);
1393 } else {
1394 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1395
1396 /*
1397 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1398 * contain the length and padding details.
1399 */
1400 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1401 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1402 crReturn(NULL);
1403 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1404 (*datalen)--;
1405 }
1406
1407 if (ssh->sccipher)
1408 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1409 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1410
1411 /*
1412 * Now get the length figure.
1413 */
1414 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1415
1416 /*
1417 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1418 * do us any more damage.
1419 */
1420 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1421 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1422 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1423 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1424 crStop(NULL);
1425 }
1426
1427 /*
1428 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1429 */
1430 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1431
1432 /*
1433 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1434 */
1435 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1436 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1437 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1438 unsigned char);
1439
1440 /*
1441 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1442 */
1443 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1444 st->i++) {
1445 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1446 crReturn(NULL);
1447 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1448 (*datalen)--;
1449 }
1450 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1451 if (ssh->sccipher)
1452 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1453 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1454 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Check the MAC.
1458 */
1459 if (ssh->scmac
1460 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1461 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1462 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1463 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1464 crStop(NULL);
1465 }
1466 }
1467 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1468 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1469 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1470 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1471 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1472 crStop(NULL);
1473 }
1474 /*
1475 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1476 */
1477 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1478
1479 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1480 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1481
1482 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1483
1484 /*
1485 * Decompress packet payload.
1486 */
1487 {
1488 unsigned char *newpayload;
1489 int newlen;
1490 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1491 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1492 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1493 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1494 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1495 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1496 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1497 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1498 unsigned char);
1499 }
1500 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1501 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1502 sfree(newpayload);
1503 }
1504 }
1505
1506 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1507 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1508 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1509
1510 /*
1511 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1512 */
1513 if (ssh->logctx) {
1514 int nblanks = 0;
1515 struct logblank_t blank;
1516 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1517 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1518 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1519 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1520 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1521 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1522 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1523 }
1524 if (do_blank) {
1525 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1526 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1527 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1528 nblanks = 1;
1529 }
1530 }
1531 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1532 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1533 st->pktin->type),
1534 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1535 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1536 }
1537
1538 crFinish(st->pktin);
1539 }
1540
1541 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1542 {
1543 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1544 unsigned long crc;
1545 #ifdef __SC__
1546 /*
1547 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1548 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1549 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1550 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1551 */
1552 volatile
1553 #endif
1554 int len;
1555
1556 if (ssh->logctx)
1557 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1558 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1559 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1560 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1561 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1562 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1563
1564 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1565 unsigned char *compblk;
1566 int complen;
1567 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1568 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1569 &compblk, &complen);
1570 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1571 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1572 sfree(compblk);
1573 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1574 }
1575
1576 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1577 pkt->length += 4;
1578 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1579 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1580 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1581 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1582
1583 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1584 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1585 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1586 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1587 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1588
1589 if (ssh->cipher)
1590 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1591 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1592
1593 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1594 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1595 }
1596
1597 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1598 {
1599 if (ssh->logctx)
1600 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1601 0, NULL, NULL);
1602 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1603 }
1604
1605 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1606 {
1607 int len, backlog, offset;
1608 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1609 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1610 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1611 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1612 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1613 }
1614
1615 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1616 {
1617 int len, offset;
1618 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1619 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1620 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1621 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1622 ssh->deferred_size,
1623 unsigned char);
1624 }
1625 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1626 pkt->data + offset, len);
1627 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1628 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1629 }
1630
1631 /*
1632 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1633 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1634 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1635 */
1636 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1637 {
1638 int argtype;
1639 Bignum bn;
1640 struct Packet *pkt;
1641
1642 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1643
1644 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1645 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1646 char *sargp;
1647 unsigned long argint;
1648 int arglen;
1649 switch (argtype) {
1650 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1651 case PKT_INT:
1652 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1653 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1654 break;
1655 case PKT_CHAR:
1656 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1657 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1658 break;
1659 case PKT_DATA:
1660 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1661 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1662 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1663 break;
1664 case PKT_STR:
1665 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1666 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1667 break;
1668 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1669 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1670 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1671 break;
1672 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1673 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1674 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1675 break;
1676 case PKTT_DATA:
1677 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1678 break;
1679 case PKTT_OTHER:
1680 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1681 break;
1682 }
1683 }
1684
1685 return pkt;
1686 }
1687
1688 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1689 {
1690 struct Packet *pkt;
1691 va_list ap;
1692 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1693 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1694 va_end(ap);
1695 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1696 }
1697
1698 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1699 {
1700 struct Packet *pkt;
1701 va_list ap;
1702 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1703 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1704 va_end(ap);
1705 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1706 }
1707
1708 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1709 {
1710 char *ae, *be;
1711 unsigned long av, bv;
1712
1713 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1714 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1715 if (av != bv)
1716 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1717 if (*ae == '.')
1718 ae++;
1719 if (*be == '.')
1720 be++;
1721 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1722 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1723 if (av != bv)
1724 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1725 return 0;
1726 }
1727
1728 /*
1729 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1730 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1731 */
1732 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1733 {
1734 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1735 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1736 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1737 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1738 }
1739
1740 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1741 {
1742 unsigned char intblk[4];
1743 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1744 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1745 }
1746
1747 /*
1748 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1749 */
1750 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1751 {
1752 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1753 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1754 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1755 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1756 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1757 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1758 }
1759 }
1760 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1761 {
1762 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1763 pkt->nblanks++;
1764 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1765 assert(pkt->body);
1766 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1767 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1768 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1769 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1770 }
1771 pkt->length += len;
1772 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1773 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1774 }
1775 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1776 {
1777 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1778 }
1779 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1780 {
1781 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1782 }
1783 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1784 {
1785 unsigned char x[4];
1786 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1787 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1788 }
1789 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1790 {
1791 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1792 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1793 }
1794 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1795 {
1796 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1797 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1798 }
1799 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1800 {
1801 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1802 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1803 }
1804 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1805 {
1806 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1807 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1808 }
1809 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1810 {
1811 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1812 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1813 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1814 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1815 sfree(data);
1816 }
1817 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1818 {
1819 unsigned char *p;
1820 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1821 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1822 p[0] = 0;
1823 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1824 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1825 i = 0;
1826 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1827 i++;
1828 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1829 *len = n + 1 - i;
1830 return p;
1831 }
1832 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1833 {
1834 unsigned char *p;
1835 int len;
1836 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1837 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1838 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1839 sfree(p);
1840 }
1841
1842 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1843 {
1844 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1845 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1846 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1847 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1848 return pkt;
1849 }
1850
1851 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1852 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1853 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1854 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1855 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1856 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1857 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1858 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1859 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1860
1861 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1862 {
1863 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1864 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1865 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1866 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1867 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1868 return pkt;
1869 }
1870
1871 /*
1872 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1873 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1874 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1875 */
1876 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1877 {
1878 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1879
1880 if (ssh->logctx)
1881 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1882 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1883 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1884 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1885 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1886 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1887
1888 /*
1889 * Compress packet payload.
1890 */
1891 {
1892 unsigned char *newpayload;
1893 int newlen;
1894 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1895 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1896 pkt->length - 5,
1897 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1898 pkt->length = 5;
1899 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1900 sfree(newpayload);
1901 }
1902 }
1903
1904 /*
1905 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1906 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1907 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1908 * after padding.
1909 */
1910 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1911 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1912 padding = 4;
1913 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1914 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1915 padding +=
1916 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1917 assert(padding <= 255);
1918 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1919 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1920 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1921 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1922 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1923 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1924 if (ssh->csmac)
1925 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1926 pkt->length + padding,
1927 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1928 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1929
1930 if (ssh->cscipher)
1931 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1932 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1933
1934 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1935
1936 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1937 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1938 }
1939
1940 /*
1941 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1942 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1943 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1944 *
1945 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1946 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1947 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1948 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1949 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1950 * works after packet encryption.
1951 *
1952 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1953 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1954 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1955 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1956 * then send them once we've finished.
1957 *
1958 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1959 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1960 *
1961 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1962 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1963 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1964 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1965 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1966 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1967 *
1968 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1969 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1970 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1971 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1972 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1973 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1974 * CBC.
1975 */
1976
1977 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1978 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1979
1980 /*
1981 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1982 */
1983 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1984 {
1985 int len;
1986 int backlog;
1987 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
1988 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1989 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1990 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1991 return;
1992 }
1993 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1994 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
1995 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1996 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1997
1998 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1999 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2000 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2001 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2002 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2003
2004 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2005 }
2006
2007 /*
2008 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2009 */
2010 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2011 {
2012 int len;
2013 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2014 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
2015 /*
2016 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2017 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2018 */
2019 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2020 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2021 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2022 }
2023 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2024 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2025 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2026 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2027 ssh->deferred_size,
2028 unsigned char);
2029 }
2030 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2031 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2032 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2033 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2034 }
2035
2036 /*
2037 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2038 */
2039 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2040 {
2041 assert(ssh->queueing);
2042
2043 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2044 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2045 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2046 }
2047
2048 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2049 }
2050
2051 /*
2052 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2053 * set.
2054 */
2055 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2056 {
2057 if (ssh->queueing)
2058 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2059 else
2060 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2061 }
2062
2063 /*
2064 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2065 * set.
2066 */
2067 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2068 {
2069 if (ssh->queueing)
2070 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2071 else
2072 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2073 }
2074
2075 /*
2076 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2077 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2078 *
2079 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2080 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2081 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2082 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2083 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2084 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2085 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2086 * ssh->queueing.
2087 */
2088 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2089 {
2090 int backlog;
2091 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2092 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2093 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2094 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2095 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2096 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2097
2098 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2099 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2100 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2101 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2102 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2103 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2104 }
2105
2106 /*
2107 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2108 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2109 */
2110 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2111 int padsize)
2112 {
2113 #if 0
2114 if (0) {
2115 /*
2116 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2117 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2118 *
2119 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2120 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2121 * always Cisco?)
2122 */
2123 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2124 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2125 } else
2126 #endif
2127 {
2128 /*
2129 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2130 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2131 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2132 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2133 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2134 */
2135 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2136
2137 /*
2138 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2139 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2140 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2141 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2142 * gain nothing by it.)
2143 */
2144 if (ssh->cscipher) {
2145 int stringlen, i;
2146
2147 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2148 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2149 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2150 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2151 /*
2152 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2153 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2154 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2155 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2156 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2157 * by.
2158 */
2159 stringlen -=
2160 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2161 }
2162 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2163 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2164 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2165 char c = (char) random_byte();
2166 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2167 }
2168 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2169 }
2170 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2171 }
2172 }
2173
2174 /*
2175 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2176 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2177 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2178 */
2179 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2180 {
2181 int i;
2182
2183 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2184
2185 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2186 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2187 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2188
2189 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2190 }
2191
2192 #if 0
2193 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2194 {
2195 unsigned char *p;
2196 int i, len;
2197 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2198 debug(("%s", string));
2199 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2200 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2201 debug(("\n"));
2202 sfree(p);
2203 }
2204 #endif
2205
2206 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2207 {
2208 unsigned char *p;
2209 int len;
2210 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2211 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2212 sfree(p);
2213 }
2214
2215 /*
2216 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2217 */
2218 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2219 {
2220 unsigned long value;
2221 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2222 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2223 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2224 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2225 return value;
2226 }
2227 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2228 {
2229 unsigned long value;
2230 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2231 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2232 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2233 pkt->savedpos++;
2234 return value;
2235 }
2236 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2237 {
2238 int len;
2239 *p = NULL;
2240 *length = 0;
2241 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2242 return;
2243 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2244 if (len < 0)
2245 return;
2246 *length = len;
2247 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2248 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2249 return;
2250 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2251 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2252 }
2253 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2254 {
2255 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2256 return NULL;
2257 pkt->savedpos += length;
2258 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2259 }
2260 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2261 unsigned char **keystr)
2262 {
2263 int j;
2264
2265 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2266 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2267 key, keystr, 0);
2268
2269 if (j < 0)
2270 return FALSE;
2271
2272 pkt->savedpos += j;
2273 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2274
2275 return TRUE;
2276 }
2277 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2278 {
2279 int j;
2280 Bignum b;
2281
2282 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2283 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2284
2285 if (j < 0)
2286 return NULL;
2287
2288 pkt->savedpos += j;
2289 return b;
2290 }
2291 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2292 {
2293 char *p;
2294 int length;
2295 Bignum b;
2296
2297 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2298 if (!p)
2299 return NULL;
2300 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2301 return NULL;
2302 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2303 return b;
2304 }
2305
2306 /*
2307 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2308 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2309 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2310 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2311 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2312 */
2313 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2314 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2315 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2316 {
2317 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2318 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2319
2320 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2321 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2322
2323 /*
2324 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2325 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2326 */
2327 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2328 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2329 int pos, len, siglen;
2330
2331 /*
2332 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2333 */
2334
2335 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2336 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2337 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2338 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2339 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2340 len--, pos++;
2341 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2342
2343 /*
2344 * Now find the signature integer.
2345 */
2346 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2347 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2348 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2349
2350 if (len != siglen) {
2351 unsigned char newlen[4];
2352 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2353 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2354 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2355 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2356 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2357 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2358 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2359 newlen[0] = 0;
2360 while (len-- > siglen) {
2361 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2362 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2363 }
2364 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2365 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2366 return;
2367 }
2368
2369 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2370 }
2371
2372 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2373 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2374 }
2375
2376 /*
2377 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2378 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2379 */
2380 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2381 {
2382 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2383 imp = vstring;
2384 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2385 if (*imp) imp++;
2386 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2387 if (*imp) imp++;
2388
2389 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2390
2391 /*
2392 * General notes on server version strings:
2393 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2394 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2395 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2396 * so we can't distinguish them.
2397 */
2398 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2399 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2400 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2401 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2402 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2403 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2404 /*
2405 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2406 * to use a different defence against password length
2407 * sniffing.
2408 */
2409 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2410 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2411 }
2412
2413 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2414 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2415 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2416 /*
2417 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2418 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2419 * the password.
2420 */
2421 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2422 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2423 }
2424
2425 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2426 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2427 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2428 /*
2429 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2430 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2431 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2432 */
2433 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2434 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2435 }
2436
2437 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2438 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2439 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2440 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2441 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2442 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2443 /*
2444 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2445 */
2446 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2447 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2448 }
2449
2450 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2451 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2452 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2453 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2454 /*
2455 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2456 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2457 * generate the keys).
2458 */
2459 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2460 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2461 }
2462
2463 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2464 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2465 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2466 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2467 /*
2468 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2469 */
2470 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2471 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2472 }
2473
2474 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2475 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2476 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2477 /*
2478 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2479 * public-key authentication.
2480 */
2481 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2482 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2483 }
2484
2485 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2486 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2487 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2488 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2489 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2490 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2491 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2492 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2493 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2494 /*
2495 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2496 */
2497 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2498 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2499 }
2500
2501 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
2502 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
2503 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2504 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2505 /*
2506 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2507 */
2508 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2509 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2510 }
2511 }
2512
2513 /*
2514 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2515 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2516 */
2517 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2518 {
2519 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2520 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2521 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2522 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2523 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2524 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2525 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2526
2527 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2528 * underscores. */
2529 while (*str) {
2530 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2531 *str = '_';
2532 str++;
2533 }
2534 }
2535
2536 /*
2537 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2538 */
2539 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2540 {
2541 char *verstring;
2542
2543 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2544 /*
2545 * Construct a v2 version string.
2546 */
2547 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2548 } else {
2549 /*
2550 * Construct a v1 version string.
2551 */
2552 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2553 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2554 svers : "1.5"),
2555 sshver);
2556 }
2557
2558 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2559
2560 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2561 size_t len;
2562 /*
2563 * Record our version string.
2564 */
2565 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2566 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2567 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2568 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2572 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2573 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2574 sfree(verstring);
2575 }
2576
2577 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2578 {
2579 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2580 int vslen;
2581 char version[10];
2582 char *vstring;
2583 int vstrsize;
2584 int i;
2585 int proto1, proto2;
2586 };
2587 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2588
2589 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2590
2591 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2592 for (;;) {
2593 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2594 crReturn(1);
2595 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2596 crReturn(1);
2597 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2598 crReturn(1);
2599 if (c != '-') goto no;
2600 break;
2601 no:
2602 while (c != '\012')
2603 crReturn(1);
2604 crReturn(1);
2605 }
2606
2607 s->vstrsize = 16;
2608 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2609 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2610 s->vslen = 4;
2611 s->i = 0;
2612 while (1) {
2613 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2614 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2615 s->vstrsize += 16;
2616 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2617 }
2618 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2619 if (s->i >= 0) {
2620 if (c == '-') {
2621 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2622 s->i = -1;
2623 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2624 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2625 } else if (c == '\012')
2626 break;
2627 }
2628
2629 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2630 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2631
2632 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2633 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2634 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2635 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2636
2637 /*
2638 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2639 */
2640
2641 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2642 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2643 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2644 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2645
2646 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2647 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2648 crStop(0);
2649 }
2650 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2651 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2652 crStop(0);
2653 }
2654
2655 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2656 ssh->version = 2;
2657 else
2658 ssh->version = 1;
2659
2660 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2661
2662 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2663 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
2664 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2665
2666 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2667 size_t len;
2668 /*
2669 * Record their version string.
2670 */
2671 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2672 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2673 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2674 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2675
2676 /*
2677 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2678 */
2679 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2680 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2681 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2682 } else {
2683 /*
2684 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2685 */
2686 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2687 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2688 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2689 }
2690 if (ssh->version == 2)
2691 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2692
2693 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2694 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2695 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2696
2697 sfree(s->vstring);
2698
2699 crFinish(0);
2700 }
2701
2702 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2703 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2704 {
2705 struct Packet *pktin;
2706
2707 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2708 if (pktin) {
2709 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2710 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2711 }
2712 }
2713
2714 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2715 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2716 {
2717 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2718 *data += *datalen;
2719 *datalen = 0;
2720 }
2721
2722 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2723 {
2724 void *vdata;
2725 unsigned char *data;
2726 int len, origlen;
2727
2728 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2729 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2730 data = vdata;
2731 origlen = len;
2732
2733 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2734 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2735
2736 if (origlen > len)
2737 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2738 }
2739 }
2740
2741 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2742 {
2743 if (ssh->s)
2744 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2745 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2746 }
2747
2748 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2749 {
2750 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2751 if (ssh->logctx)
2752 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2753 0, NULL, NULL);
2754
2755 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2756
2757 /*
2758 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2759 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2760 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2761 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2762 */
2763 while (1) {
2764 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2765 if (datalen == 0)
2766 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2767 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2768 data++;
2769 datalen--;
2770 if (ret == 0)
2771 break;
2772 }
2773
2774 /*
2775 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2776 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2777 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2778 * to the proper protocol handler.
2779 */
2780
2781 while (1) {
2782 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2783 if (ssh->frozen) {
2784 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2785 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2786 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2787 * return, so break out. */
2788 break;
2789 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2790 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2791 * session. */
2792 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2793 } else {
2794 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2795 * session. */
2796 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2797 }
2798 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2799 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2800 return;
2801 }
2802 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2803 crReturnV;
2804 }
2805 crFinishV;
2806 }
2807
2808 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2809 {
2810 int ret = 0;
2811 struct ssh_channel *c;
2812
2813 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2814 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2815 if (ssh->s) {
2816 sk_close(ssh->s);
2817 ssh->s = NULL;
2818 if (notify_exit)
2819 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2820 else
2821 ret = 1;
2822 }
2823 /*
2824 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2825 * through this connection.
2826 */
2827 if (ssh->channels) {
2828 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2829 switch (c->type) {
2830 case CHAN_X11:
2831 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2832 break;
2833 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2834 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2835 break;
2836 }
2837 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2838 if (ssh->version == 2)
2839 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2840 sfree(c);
2841 }
2842 }
2843 /*
2844 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2845 * listening sockets.
2846 */
2847 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2848 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2849 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2850 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2851 if (pf->local)
2852 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2853 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2854 free_portfwd(pf);
2855 }
2856 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
2857 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
2858 }
2859
2860 return ret;
2861 }
2862
2863 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2864 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2865 {
2866 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2867 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2868
2869 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2870
2871 if (type == 0)
2872 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2873 else
2874 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2875
2876 logevent(msg);
2877 sfree(msg);
2878 }
2879
2880 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2881 int calling_back)
2882 {
2883 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2884 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2885
2886 if (!error_msg) {
2887 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2888 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2889 else
2890 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2891 }
2892
2893 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2894 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2895
2896 if (need_notify)
2897 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2898
2899 if (error_msg)
2900 logevent(error_msg);
2901 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2902 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2903 return 0;
2904 }
2905
2906 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2907 {
2908 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2909 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2910 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2911 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2912 return 0;
2913 }
2914 return 1;
2915 }
2916
2917 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2918 {
2919 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2920 /*
2921 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2922 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2923 */
2924 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2925 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2926 }
2927
2928 /*
2929 * Connect to specified host and port.
2930 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2931 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2932 * freed by the caller.
2933 */
2934 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2935 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2936 {
2937 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2938 ssh_log,
2939 ssh_closing,
2940 ssh_receive,
2941 ssh_sent,
2942 NULL
2943 };
2944
2945 SockAddr addr;
2946 const char *err;
2947
2948 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
2949 char *colon;
2950
2951 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
2952 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
2953
2954 /*
2955 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
2956 * savedport.
2957 *
2958 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
2959 */
2960 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
2961 if (colon) {
2962 *colon++ = '\0';
2963 if (*colon)
2964 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
2965 }
2966 } else {
2967 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
2968 if (port < 0)
2969 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
2970 ssh->savedport = port;
2971 }
2972
2973 /*
2974 * Try to find host.
2975 */
2976 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
2977 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
2978 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
2979 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
2980 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
2981 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
2982 sk_addr_free(addr);
2983 return err;
2984 }
2985 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
2986
2987 /*
2988 * Open socket.
2989 */
2990 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
2991 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
2992 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
2993 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
2994 ssh->s = NULL;
2995 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2996 return err;
2997 }
2998
2999 /*
3000 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
3001 * send the version string too.
3002 */
3003 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
3004 ssh->version = 1;
3005 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
3006 ssh->version = 2;
3007 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3008 }
3009
3010 /*
3011 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3012 */
3013 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
3014 sfree(*realhost);
3015 *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
3016 }
3017
3018 return NULL;
3019 }
3020
3021 /*
3022 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3023 */
3024 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3025 {
3026 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3027 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3028 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3029 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3030 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3031 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3032 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3033 }
3034 }
3035
3036 /*
3037 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3038 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3039 */
3040 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3041 {
3042 int i;
3043 struct ssh_channel *c;
3044
3045 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3046 return;
3047 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3048 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3049 if (!ssh->channels)
3050 return;
3051 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3052 switch (c->type) {
3053 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3054 /*
3055 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3056 */
3057 break;
3058 case CHAN_X11:
3059 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3060 break;
3061 case CHAN_AGENT:
3062 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3063 break;
3064 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3065 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3066 break;
3067 }
3068 }
3069 }
3070
3071 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3072 {
3073 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3074
3075 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3076 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3077
3078 if (ssh->version == 1)
3079 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3080 else
3081 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3082 }
3083
3084 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3085 {
3086 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3087
3088 ssh->user_response = ret;
3089
3090 if (ssh->version == 1)
3091 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3092 else
3093 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3094
3095 /*
3096 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3097 * queued-data run.
3098 */
3099 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3100 }
3101
3102 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3103 {
3104 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3105 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3106 void *sentreply = reply;
3107
3108 if (!sentreply) {
3109 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3110 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3111 replylen = 5;
3112 }
3113 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3114 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3115 ssh2_try_send(c);
3116 } else {
3117 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3118 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3119 PKT_INT, replylen,
3120 PKTT_DATA,
3121 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3122 PKTT_OTHER,
3123 PKT_END);
3124 }
3125 if (reply)
3126 sfree(reply);
3127 }
3128
3129 /*
3130 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3131 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3132 * => log `wire_reason'.
3133 */
3134 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3135 int code, int clean_exit)
3136 {
3137 char *error;
3138 if (!client_reason)
3139 client_reason = wire_reason;
3140 if (client_reason)
3141 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3142 else
3143 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3144 if (wire_reason) {
3145 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3146 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3147 PKT_END);
3148 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3149 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3150 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3151 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3152 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3153 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3154 }
3155 }
3156 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3157 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3158 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3159 sfree(error);
3160 }
3161
3162 /*
3163 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3164 */
3165 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3166 struct Packet *pktin)
3167 {
3168 int i, j, ret;
3169 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3170 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3171 struct MD5Context md5c;
3172 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3173 int len;
3174 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3175 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3176 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3177 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3178 unsigned char session_id[16];
3179 int cipher_type;
3180 char username[100];
3181 void *publickey_blob;
3182 int publickey_bloblen;
3183 char *publickey_comment;
3184 int publickey_encrypted;
3185 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3186 char c;
3187 int pwpkt_type;
3188 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3189 int responselen;
3190 int keyi, nkeys;
3191 int authed;
3192 struct RSAKey key;
3193 Bignum challenge;
3194 char *commentp;
3195 int commentlen;
3196 int dlgret;
3197 };
3198 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3199
3200 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
3201
3202 if (!pktin)
3203 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3204
3205 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3206 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3207 crStop(0);
3208 }
3209
3210 logevent("Received public keys");
3211
3212 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3213 if (!ptr) {
3214 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3215 crStop(0);
3216 }
3217 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3218
3219 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3220 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3221 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3222 crStop(0);
3223 }
3224
3225 /*
3226 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3227 */
3228 {
3229 char logmsg[80];
3230 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3231 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3232 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3233 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3234 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3235 logevent(logmsg);
3236 }
3237
3238 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3239 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3240 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3241 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3242 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3243
3244 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3245 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3246 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3247
3248 MD5Init(&md5c);
3249 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3250 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3251 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3252 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3253
3254 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3255 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3256
3257 /*
3258 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3259 */
3260 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3261 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3262 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3263 crStop(0);
3264 }
3265
3266 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3267
3268 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3269
3270 /*
3271 * Verify the host key.
3272 */
3273 {
3274 /*
3275 * First format the key into a string.
3276 */
3277 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3278 char fingerprint[100];
3279 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3280 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3281 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3282
3283 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3284 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3285 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3286 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3287 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3288 sfree(keystr);
3289 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3290 do {
3291 crReturn(0);
3292 if (pktin) {
3293 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3294 " for user host key response"));
3295 crStop(0);
3296 }
3297 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3298 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3299 }
3300 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3301
3302 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3303 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3304 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3305 crStop(0);
3306 }
3307 }
3308
3309 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3310 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3311 if (i < 16)
3312 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3313 }
3314
3315 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3316 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3317 if (ret)
3318 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3319 } else {
3320 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3321 if (ret)
3322 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3323 }
3324 if (!ret) {
3325 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3326 crStop(0);
3327 }
3328
3329 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3330
3331 {
3332 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3333 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3334 int i;
3335 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3336 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3337 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3338 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3339 warn = 1;
3340 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3341 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3342 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3343 } else {
3344 switch (next_cipher) {
3345 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3346 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3347 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3348 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3349 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3350 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3351 }
3352 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3353 cipher_chosen = 1;
3354 }
3355 }
3356 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3357 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3358 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3359 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3360 else
3361 /* shouldn't happen */
3362 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3363 crStop(0);
3364 }
3365
3366 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3367 if (warn) {
3368 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3369 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3370 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3371 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3372 do {
3373 crReturn(0);
3374 if (pktin) {
3375 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3376 " for user response"));
3377 crStop(0);
3378 }
3379 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3380 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3381 }
3382 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3383 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3384 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3385 0, TRUE);
3386 crStop(0);
3387 }
3388 }
3389 }
3390
3391 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3392 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3393 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3394 break;
3395 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3396 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3397 break;
3398 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3399 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3400 break;
3401 }
3402
3403 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3404 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3405 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3406 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3407 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3408 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3409
3410 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3411
3412 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3413
3414 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3415 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3416 &ssh_3des);
3417 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3418 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3419 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3420
3421 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3422 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3423
3424 if (servkey.modulus) {
3425 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3426 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3427 }
3428 if (servkey.exponent) {
3429 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3430 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3431 }
3432 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3433 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3434 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3435 }
3436 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3437 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3438 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3439 }
3440 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3441
3442 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3443 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3444 crStop(0);
3445 }
3446
3447 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3448
3449 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3450 {
3451 if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
3452 sizeof(s->username))) {
3453 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3454 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3455 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3456 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3457 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
3458 lenof(s->username));
3459 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3460 while (ret < 0) {
3461 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3462 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3463 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3464 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3465 }
3466 if (!ret) {
3467 /*
3468 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3469 */
3470 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3471 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3472 crStop(0);
3473 }
3474 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3475 lenof(s->username));
3476 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3477 }
3478
3479 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3480 {
3481 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3482 logevent(userlog);
3483 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3484 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3485 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3486 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3487 }
3488 sfree(userlog);
3489 }
3490 }
3491
3492 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3493
3494 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3495 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3496 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3497 } else {
3498 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3499 }
3500 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3501 /*
3502 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3503 */
3504 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3505 int keytype;
3506 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3507 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3508 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3509 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3510 const char *error;
3511 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3512 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3513 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3514 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3515 NULL);
3516 } else {
3517 char *msgbuf;
3518 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3519 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3520 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3521 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3522 error);
3523 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3524 sfree(msgbuf);
3525 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3526 }
3527 } else {
3528 char *msgbuf;
3529 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3530 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3531 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3532 " (%s)\r\n",
3533 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3534 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3535 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3536 sfree(msgbuf);
3537 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3538 }
3539 } else
3540 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3541
3542 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3543 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3544
3545 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3546 /*
3547 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3548 */
3549 void *r;
3550
3551 s->authed = FALSE;
3552 s->tried_agent = 1;
3553 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3554
3555 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3556 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3557 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3558 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3559 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3560 do {
3561 crReturn(0);
3562 if (pktin) {
3563 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3564 " for agent response"));
3565 crStop(0);
3566 }
3567 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3568 r = ssh->agent_response;
3569 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3570 }
3571 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3572 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3573 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3574 s->p = s->response + 5;
3575 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3576 s->p += 4;
3577 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3578 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3579 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3580 s->p += 4;
3581 {
3582 int n, ok = FALSE;
3583 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3584 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3585 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3586 &s->key.exponent);
3587 if (n < 0)
3588 break;
3589 s->p += n;
3590 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3591 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3592 &s->key.modulus);
3593 if (n < 0)
3594 break;
3595 s->p += n;
3596 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3597 break;
3598 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3599 s->p += 4;
3600 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3601 s->commentlen)
3602 break;
3603 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3604 s->p += s->commentlen;
3605 ok = TRUE;
3606 } while (0);
3607 if (!ok) {
3608 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3609 break;
3610 }
3611 }
3612 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3613 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3614 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3615 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3616 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3617 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3618 } else
3619 /* Skip non-configured key */
3620 continue;
3621 }
3622 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3623 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3624 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3625 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3626 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3627 logevent("Key refused");
3628 continue;
3629 }
3630 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3631 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3632 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3633 crStop(0);
3634 }
3635
3636 {
3637 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3638 void *vret;
3639 int len, retlen;
3640 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3641 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3642 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3643 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3644 len += 16; /* session id */
3645 len += 4; /* response format */
3646 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3647 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3648 q = agentreq + 4;
3649 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3650 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3651 q += 4;
3652 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3653 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3654 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3655 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3656 q += 16;
3657 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3658 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3659 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3660 sfree(agentreq);
3661 do {
3662 crReturn(0);
3663 if (pktin) {
3664 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3665 " while waiting for agent"
3666 " response"));
3667 crStop(0);
3668 }
3669 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3670 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3671 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3672 } else
3673 sfree(agentreq);
3674 ret = vret;
3675 if (ret) {
3676 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3677 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3678 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3679 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3680 PKT_END);
3681 sfree(ret);
3682 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3683 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3684 logevent
3685 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3686 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3687 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3688 " RSA key \"");
3689 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3690 s->commentlen);
3691 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3692 }
3693 s->authed = TRUE;
3694 } else
3695 logevent
3696 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3697 } else {
3698 logevent
3699 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3700 sfree(ret);
3701 }
3702 } else {
3703 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3704 }
3705 }
3706 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3707 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3708 freebn(s->challenge);
3709 if (s->authed)
3710 break;
3711 }
3712 sfree(s->response);
3713 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3714 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3715 }
3716 if (s->authed)
3717 break;
3718 }
3719 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3720 /*
3721 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3722 * key file.
3723 */
3724 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3725 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3726 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3727 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3728 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3729 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3730 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3731 while (!got_passphrase) {
3732 /*
3733 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3734 */
3735 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3736 const char *error;
3737 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3738 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3739 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3740 passphrase = NULL;
3741 } else {
3742 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3743 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3744 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3745 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3746 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3747 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3748 s->publickey_comment),
3749 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3750 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3751 while (ret < 0) {
3752 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3753 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3754 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3755 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3756 }
3757 if (!ret) {
3758 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3759 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3760 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3761 0, TRUE);
3762 crStop(0);
3763 }
3764 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3765 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3766 }
3767 /*
3768 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3769 */
3770 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3771 &error);
3772 if (passphrase) {
3773 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
3774 sfree(passphrase);
3775 }
3776 if (ret == 1) {
3777 /* Correct passphrase. */
3778 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3779 } else if (ret == 0) {
3780 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3781 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3782 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3783 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3784 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3785 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3786 break; /* go and try something else */
3787 } else if (ret == -1) {
3788 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3789 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3790 /* and try again */
3791 } else {
3792 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3793 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3794 }
3795 }
3796
3797 if (got_passphrase) {
3798
3799 /*
3800 * Send a public key attempt.
3801 */
3802 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3803 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3804
3805 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3806 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3807 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3808 continue; /* go and try something else */
3809 }
3810 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3811 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3812 crStop(0);
3813 }
3814
3815 {
3816 int i;
3817 unsigned char buffer[32];
3818 Bignum challenge, response;
3819
3820 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3821 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3822 crStop(0);
3823 }
3824 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3825 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3826
3827 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3828 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3829 }
3830
3831 MD5Init(&md5c);
3832 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3833 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3834 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3835
3836 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3837 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3838
3839 freebn(challenge);
3840 freebn(response);
3841 }
3842
3843 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3844 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3845 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3846 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3847 " our public key.\r\n");
3848 continue; /* go and try something else */
3849 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3850 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3851 crStop(0);
3852 }
3853
3854 break; /* we're through! */
3855 }
3856
3857 }
3858
3859 /*
3860 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3861 */
3862 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3863
3864 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3865 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3866 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3867 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3868 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3869 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3870 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3871 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3872 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3873 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3874 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3875 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3876 continue;
3877 } else {
3878 char *challenge;
3879 int challengelen;
3880 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3881
3882 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3883 if (!challenge) {
3884 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3885 crStop(0);
3886 }
3887 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3888 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3889 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3890 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3891 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3892 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3893 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3894 } else {
3895 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3896 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3897 }
3898 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3899 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3900 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3901 instr_suf);
3902 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3903 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3904 sfree(instr_suf);
3905 }
3906 }
3907 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3908 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3909 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3910 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3911 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3912 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3913 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3914 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3915 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3916 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3917 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3918 continue;
3919 } else {
3920 char *challenge;
3921 int challengelen;
3922 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3923
3924 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3925 if (!challenge) {
3926 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3927 crStop(0);
3928 }
3929 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3930 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3931 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
3932 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
3933 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3934 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3935 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3936 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3937 } else {
3938 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3939 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3940 }
3941 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3942 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
3943 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3944 instr_suf);
3945 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3946 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3947 sfree(instr_suf);
3948 }
3949 }
3950 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3951 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
3952 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
3953 crStop(0);
3954 }
3955 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3956 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
3957 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3958 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
3959 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3960 }
3961
3962 /*
3963 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3964 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3965 * authentication.
3966 */
3967 {
3968 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3969 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3970 while (ret < 0) {
3971 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3972 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3973 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3974 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3975 }
3976 if (!ret) {
3977 /*
3978 * Failed to get a password (for example
3979 * because one was supplied on the command line
3980 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3981 */
3982 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3983 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
3984 crStop(0);
3985 }
3986 }
3987
3988 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3989 /*
3990 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3991 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3992 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3993 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3994 * The others are all random data in
3995 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3996 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3997 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3998 *
3999 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
4000 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
4001 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4002 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4003 * do is:
4004 *
4005 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4006 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4007 *
4008 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4009 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4010 * packets containing string lengths N through
4011 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4012 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4013 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4014 *
4015 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4016 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4017 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4018 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4019 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4020 *
4021 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4022 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4023 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4024 * against password length sniffing.
4025 */
4026 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4027 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4028 /*
4029 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4030 * we can use the primary defence.
4031 */
4032 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4033 char *randomstr;
4034
4035 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4036 if (pwlen < 16) {
4037 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4038 top = 15;
4039 } else {
4040 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4041 top = bottom + 7;
4042 }
4043
4044 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4045
4046 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4047
4048 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4049 if (i == pwlen) {
4050 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4051 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4052 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4053 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4054 } else {
4055 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4056 do {
4057 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4058 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4059 }
4060 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4061 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4062 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4063 }
4064 }
4065 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4066 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4067 sfree(randomstr);
4068 }
4069 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4070 /*
4071 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4072 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4073 * can use the secondary defence.
4074 */
4075 char string[64];
4076 char *ss;
4077 int len;
4078
4079 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4080 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4081 ss = string;
4082 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4083 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4084 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4085 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4086 }
4087 } else {
4088 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4089 }
4090 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4091 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4092 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4093 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4094 } else {
4095 /*
4096 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4097 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4098 */
4099 int len;
4100 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4101 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4102 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4103 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4104 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4105 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4106 }
4107 } else {
4108 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4109 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4110 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4111 }
4112 logevent("Sent password");
4113 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4114 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4115 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4116 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4117 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4118 logevent("Authentication refused");
4119 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4120 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4121 crStop(0);
4122 }
4123 }
4124
4125 /* Clear up */
4126 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4127 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4128 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4129 }
4130
4131 logevent("Authentication successful");
4132
4133 crFinish(1);
4134 }
4135
4136 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4137 {
4138 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4139
4140 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4141 return;
4142
4143 if (c && !c->closes) {
4144 /*
4145 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
4146 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
4147 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
4148 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
4149 * open, we can close it then.
4150 */
4151 if (!c->halfopen) {
4152 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4153 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4154 PKT_END);
4155 } else {
4156 struct Packet *pktout;
4157 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4158 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4159 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4160 }
4161 }
4162 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4163 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
4164 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4165 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4166 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
4167 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4168 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4169 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4170 }
4171 }
4172 }
4173
4174 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4175 {
4176 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4177
4178 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4179 return 0;
4180
4181 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4182 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4183 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4184 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4185 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4186 /*
4187 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4188 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4189 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4190 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4191 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4192 */
4193 return 0;
4194 } else {
4195 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4196 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4197 }
4198 }
4199
4200 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4201 {
4202 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4203 int buflimit;
4204
4205 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4206 return;
4207
4208 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4209 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4210 } else {
4211 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4212 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4213 }
4214 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4215 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4216 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4217 }
4218 }
4219
4220 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4221 {
4222 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4223
4224 assert(qh != NULL);
4225
4226 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4227
4228 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4229 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4230 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4231 }
4232 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4233 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4234 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4235 }
4236
4237 if (qh->next) {
4238 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4239
4240 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4241 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4242 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4243 }
4244 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4245 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4246 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4247 }
4248 } else {
4249 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4250 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4251 }
4252
4253 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4254
4255 sfree(qh);
4256 }
4257
4258 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4259 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4260 {
4261 struct queued_handler *qh;
4262
4263 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4264 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4265 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4266 qh->handler = handler;
4267 qh->ctx = ctx;
4268 qh->next = NULL;
4269
4270 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4271 ssh->qhead = qh;
4272
4273 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4274 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4275 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4276 }
4277 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4278 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4279 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4280 }
4281 } else {
4282 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4283 }
4284 ssh->qtail = qh;
4285 }
4286
4287 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4288 {
4289 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4290
4291 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4292 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4293 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4294 pf->sportdesc);
4295 } else {
4296 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4297 pf->sportdesc);
4298
4299 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4300 assert(rpf == pf);
4301 free_rportfwd(pf);
4302 }
4303 }
4304
4305 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
4306 {
4307 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
4308 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4309 int i;
4310
4311 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4312 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4313 } else {
4314 /*
4315 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4316 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4317 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4318 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4319 * they were before.
4320 */
4321 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4322 int i;
4323 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4324 epf->status = DESTROY;
4325 }
4326
4327 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4328 char address_family, type;
4329 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4330 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
4331 int n;
4332
4333 address_family = 'A';
4334 type = 'L';
4335 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
4336 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
4337 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
4338 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
4339 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
4340 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
4341 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
4342 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4343
4344 saddr[0] = '\0';
4345
4346 n = 0;
4347 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4348 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4349 /*
4350 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4351 * source port number. This means that
4352 * everything we've seen until now is the
4353 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4354 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4355 * again.
4356 */
4357 portfwd_strptr++;
4358 sports[n] = '\0';
4359 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4360 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4361 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4362 } else
4363 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4364 n = 0;
4365 }
4366 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4367 }
4368 sports[n] = 0;
4369 if (type != 'D') {
4370 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4371 portfwd_strptr++;
4372 n = 0;
4373 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4374 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4375 }
4376 host[n] = 0;
4377 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4378 portfwd_strptr++;
4379 n = 0;
4380 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4381 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4382 }
4383 dports[n] = 0;
4384 portfwd_strptr++;
4385 dport = atoi(dports);
4386 dserv = 0;
4387 if (dport == 0) {
4388 dserv = 1;
4389 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4390 if (!dport) {
4391 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4392 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4393 }
4394 }
4395 } else {
4396 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4397 host[0] = 0;
4398 dports[0] = 0;
4399 dport = dserv = -1;
4400 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4401 }
4402 sport = atoi(sports);
4403 sserv = 0;
4404 if (sport == 0) {
4405 sserv = 1;
4406 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4407 if (!sport) {
4408 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4409 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4410 }
4411 }
4412 if (sport && dport) {
4413 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4414 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4415
4416 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4417 pfrec->type = type;
4418 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4419 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4420 pfrec->sport = sport;
4421 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4422 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4423 pfrec->dport = dport;
4424 pfrec->local = NULL;
4425 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4426 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4427 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4428 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4429
4430 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4431 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4432 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
4433 /*
4434 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
4435 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
4436 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
4437 * as KEEP.
4438 */
4439 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4440 }
4441 /*
4442 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
4443 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
4444 */
4445 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4446 } else {
4447 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4448 }
4449 }
4450 }
4451
4452 /*
4453 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4454 * not re-enabled.
4455 */
4456 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4457 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4458 char *message;
4459
4460 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4461 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4462 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4463 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4464 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4465 epf->sport);
4466
4467 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4468 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4469 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4470 sfree(message);
4471 message = msg2;
4472 }
4473
4474 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4475 sfree(message);
4476
4477 if (epf->remote) {
4478 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4479 struct Packet *pktout;
4480
4481 /*
4482 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4483 * end.
4484 */
4485 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4486 /*
4487 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4488 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4489 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4490 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4491 * so that any connections the server tries
4492 * to make on it are rejected.
4493 */
4494 } else {
4495 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4496 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4497 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4498 if (epf->saddr) {
4499 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4500 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4501 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4502 * what was used to open the original connection,
4503 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4504 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4505 } else {
4506 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4507 }
4508 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4509 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4510 }
4511
4512 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4513 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4514 } else if (epf->local) {
4515 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4516 }
4517
4518 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4519 free_portfwd(epf);
4520 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4521 }
4522
4523 /*
4524 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4525 */
4526 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4527 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4528 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4529 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4530 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4531 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4532 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4533 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4534 epf->sport,
4535 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4536 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4537 dportdesc = NULL;
4538 } else {
4539 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4540 epf->daddr,
4541 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4542 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4543 epf->dport,
4544 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4545 }
4546
4547 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4548 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4549 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4550 ssh, cfg,
4551 &epf->local,
4552 epf->addressfamily);
4553
4554 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4555 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4556 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4557 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4558 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4559 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4560 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4561 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4562 ssh, cfg,
4563 &epf->local,
4564 epf->addressfamily);
4565
4566 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4567 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4568 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4569 sportdesc,
4570 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4571 } else {
4572 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4573
4574 /*
4575 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4576 */
4577 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4578 if (ssh->version == 1)
4579 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4580 else
4581 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4582 }
4583
4584 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4585 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4586 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4587 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4588 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4589 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4590 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4591 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4592 sfree(pf);
4593 } else {
4594 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4595 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4596
4597 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4598 sportdesc = NULL;
4599 epf->remote = pf;
4600 pf->pfrec = epf;
4601
4602 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4603 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4604 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4605 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4606 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4607 PKT_END);
4608 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4609 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4610 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4611 } else {
4612 struct Packet *pktout;
4613 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4614 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4615 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4616 if (epf->saddr) {
4617 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4618 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4619 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4620 } else {
4621 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4622 }
4623 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4624 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4625
4626 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4627 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4628 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4629 }
4630 }
4631 }
4632 sfree(sportdesc);
4633 sfree(dportdesc);
4634 }
4635 }
4636
4637 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4638 {
4639 char *string;
4640 int stringlen, bufsize;
4641
4642 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4643 if (string == NULL) {
4644 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4645 return;
4646 }
4647
4648 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4649 string, stringlen);
4650 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4651 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4652 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4653 }
4654 }
4655
4656 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4657 {
4658 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4659 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4660 struct ssh_channel *c;
4661 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4662
4663 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4664 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4665 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4666 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4667 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4668 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4669 } else {
4670 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4671 c->ssh = ssh;
4672
4673 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4674 NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4675 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4676 sfree(c);
4677 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4678 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4679 } else {
4680 logevent
4681 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4682 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4683 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4684 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4685 c->closes = 0;
4686 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4687 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4688 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4689 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4690 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4691 c->localid, PKT_END);
4692 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4693 }
4694 }
4695 }
4696
4697 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4698 {
4699 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4700 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4701 struct ssh_channel *c;
4702 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4703
4704 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4705 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4706 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4707 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4708 } else {
4709 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4710 c->ssh = ssh;
4711 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4712 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4713 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4714 c->closes = 0;
4715 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4716 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4717 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4718 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4719 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4720 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4721 PKT_END);
4722 }
4723 }
4724
4725 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4726 {
4727 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4728 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4729 struct ssh_channel *c;
4730 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4731 int remoteid;
4732 int hostsize, port;
4733 char *host;
4734 const char *e;
4735 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4736 c->ssh = ssh;
4737
4738 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4739 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4740 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4741
4742 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4743 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4744 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4745 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4746 pf.dport = port;
4747 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4748
4749 if (pfp == NULL) {
4750 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4751 pf.dhost, port);
4752 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4753 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4754 } else {
4755 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4756 pf.dhost, port);
4757 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4758 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4759 if (e != NULL) {
4760 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4761 sfree(c);
4762 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4763 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4764 } else {
4765 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4766 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4767 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4768 c->closes = 0;
4769 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4770 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4771 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4772 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4773 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4774 c->localid, PKT_END);
4775 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4776 }
4777 }
4778 }
4779
4780 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4781 {
4782 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4783 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4784 struct ssh_channel *c;
4785
4786 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4787 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4788 c->remoteid = localid;
4789 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4790 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4791 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4792 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4793 }
4794
4795 if (c && c->closes) {
4796 /*
4797 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4798 * which we decided on before the server acked
4799 * the channel open. So now we know the
4800 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4801 */
4802 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4803 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4804 }
4805 }
4806
4807 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4808 {
4809 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4810 struct ssh_channel *c;
4811
4812 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4813 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4814 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4815 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4816 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4817 sfree(c);
4818 }
4819 }
4820
4821 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4822 {
4823 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4824 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4825 struct ssh_channel *c;
4826 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4827 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4828 int closetype;
4829 closetype =
4830 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4831
4832 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4833 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4834 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4835 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4836 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4837 }
4838 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4839 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4840 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4841 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4842 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4843 }
4844
4845 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4846 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4847 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4848 PKT_END);
4849 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4850 }
4851
4852 if (c->closes == 15) {
4853 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4854 sfree(c);
4855 }
4856 } else {
4857 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4858 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4859 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4860 i));
4861 }
4862 }
4863
4864 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4865 {
4866 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4867 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4868 char *p;
4869 int len;
4870 struct ssh_channel *c;
4871
4872 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4873
4874 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4875 if (c) {
4876 int bufsize = 0;
4877 switch (c->type) {
4878 case CHAN_X11:
4879 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4880 break;
4881 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4882 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4883 break;
4884 case CHAN_AGENT:
4885 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4886 while (len > 0) {
4887 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4888 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
4889 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4890 l);
4891 p += l;
4892 len -= l;
4893 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4894 }
4895 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4896 c->u.a.totallen =
4897 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4898 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4899 unsigned char);
4900 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4901 }
4902 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4903 unsigned int l =
4904 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4905 (unsigned)len);
4906 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4907 l);
4908 p += l;
4909 len -= l;
4910 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4911 }
4912 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4913 void *reply;
4914 int replylen;
4915 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4916 c->u.a.totallen,
4917 &reply, &replylen,
4918 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4919 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4920 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4921 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4922 }
4923 }
4924 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4925 break;
4926 }
4927 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4928 c->throttling_conn = 1;
4929 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4930 }
4931 }
4932 }
4933
4934 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4935 {
4936 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4937 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
4938 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
4939 /*
4940 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4941 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4942 * session which we might mistake for another
4943 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4944 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4945 */
4946 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
4947 }
4948
4949 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4950 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
4951 {
4952 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
4953 int i = 0;
4954 unsigned int arg = 0;
4955 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
4956 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
4957 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
4958 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
4959 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
4960 break;
4961 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
4962 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
4963 break;
4964 }
4965 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
4966 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
4967 }
4968
4969
4970 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
4971 struct Packet *pktin)
4972 {
4973 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
4974
4975 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
4976 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
4977 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
4978
4979 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
4980 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
4981 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
4982 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
4983 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
4984 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
4985 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
4986 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
4987 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
4988
4989 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
4990 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4991 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
4992 do {
4993 crReturnV;
4994 } while (!pktin);
4995 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4996 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4997 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4998 crStopV;
4999 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5000 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5001 } else {
5002 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5003 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
5004 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
5005 }
5006 }
5007
5008 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
5009 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
5010 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
5011 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5012 /*
5013 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5014 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5015 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5016 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5017 * cookie into the log.
5018 */
5019 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5020 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5021 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5022 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5023 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5024 PKTT_OTHER,
5025 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5026 PKT_END);
5027 } else {
5028 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5029 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5030 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5031 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5032 PKTT_OTHER,
5033 PKT_END);
5034 }
5035 do {
5036 crReturnV;
5037 } while (!pktin);
5038 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5039 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5040 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5041 crStopV;
5042 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5043 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5044 } else {
5045 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5046 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5047 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5048 }
5049 }
5050
5051 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
5052 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5053
5054 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
5055 struct Packet *pkt;
5056 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5057 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5058 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5059 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5060 /* Send the pty request. */
5061 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5062 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
5063 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5064 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5065 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5066 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5067 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
5068 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5069 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5070 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5071 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5072 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5073 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5074 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5075 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5076 do {
5077 crReturnV;
5078 } while (!pktin);
5079 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5080 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5081 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5082 crStopV;
5083 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5084 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5085 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5086 }
5087 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5088 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5089 } else {
5090 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5091 }
5092
5093 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
5094 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5095 do {
5096 crReturnV;
5097 } while (!pktin);
5098 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5099 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5100 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5101 crStopV;
5102 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5103 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5104 }
5105 logevent("Started compression");
5106 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5107 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5108 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5109 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5110 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5111 }
5112
5113 /*
5114 * Start the shell or command.
5115 *
5116 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5117 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5118 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5119 */
5120 {
5121 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
5122
5123 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
5124
5125 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
5126 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
5127 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5128 }
5129 if (*cmd)
5130 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5131 else
5132 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5133 logevent("Started session");
5134 }
5135
5136 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5137 if (ssh->size_needed)
5138 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5139 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5140 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5141
5142 if (ssh->ldisc)
5143 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5144 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5145 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5146 while (1) {
5147
5148 /*
5149 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5150 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5151 * attention to the unusual ones.
5152 */
5153
5154 crReturnV;
5155 if (pktin) {
5156 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5157 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5158 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5159 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5160 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5161 } else {
5162 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5163 crStopV;
5164 }
5165 } else {
5166 while (inlen > 0) {
5167 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5168 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5169 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5170 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5171 in += len;
5172 inlen -= len;
5173 }
5174 }
5175 }
5176
5177 crFinishV;
5178 }
5179
5180 /*
5181 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5182 */
5183 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5184 {
5185 char *msg;
5186 int msglen;
5187
5188 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5189 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5190 }
5191
5192 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5193 {
5194 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5195 char *msg;
5196 int msglen;
5197
5198 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5199 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5200 }
5201
5202 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5203 {
5204 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5205 }
5206
5207 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5208 {
5209 int i;
5210
5211 /*
5212 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5213 */
5214 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5215 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5216
5217 /*
5218 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5219 */
5220 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5221 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5222 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5223 }
5224
5225 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5226 struct Packet *pktin)
5227 {
5228 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5229 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5230 return;
5231
5232 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5233 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5234 return;
5235 }
5236
5237 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5238 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5239 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5240 else
5241 return;
5242 }
5243
5244 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5245 }
5246
5247 /*
5248 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5249 */
5250 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5251 {
5252 int needlen;
5253 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5254 return 0;
5255 needlen = strlen(needle);
5256 while (1) {
5257 /*
5258 * Is it at the start of the string?
5259 */
5260 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5261 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5262 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5263 /* either , or EOS follows */
5264 )
5265 return 1;
5266 /*
5267 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5268 * If no comma found, terminate.
5269 */
5270 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5271 haylen--, haystack++;
5272 if (haylen == 0)
5273 return 0;
5274 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5275 }
5276 }
5277
5278 /*
5279 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5280 */
5281 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5282 {
5283 int needlen;
5284 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5285 return 0;
5286 needlen = strlen(needle);
5287 /*
5288 * Is it at the start of the string?
5289 */
5290 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5291 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5292 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5293 /* either , or EOS follows */
5294 )
5295 return 1;
5296 return 0;
5297 }
5298
5299
5300 /*
5301 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5302 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5303 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5304 */
5305 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5306 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5307 unsigned char *keyspace)
5308 {
5309 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5310 void *s;
5311 /* First hlen bytes. */
5312 s = h->init();
5313 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5314 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5315 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5316 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5317 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5318 h->final(s, keyspace);
5319 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5320 s = h->init();
5321 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5322 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5323 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5324 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5325 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5326 }
5327
5328 /*
5329 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5330 */
5331 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5332 struct Packet *pktin)
5333 {
5334 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5335 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5336 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5337 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5338 void *our_kexinit;
5339 int our_kexinitlen;
5340 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5341 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5342 int nmacs;
5343 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5344 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5345 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5346 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5347 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5348 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5349 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5350 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5351 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5352 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5353 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5354 int n_preferred_kex;
5355 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5356 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5357 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5358 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5359 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5360 struct Packet *pktout;
5361 int dlgret;
5362 int guessok;
5363 int ignorepkt;
5364 };
5365 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5366
5367 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5368
5369 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5370 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5371 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5372
5373 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5374
5375 /*
5376 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5377 */
5378 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5379 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5380 else
5381 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5382
5383 begin_key_exchange:
5384 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5385 {
5386 int i, j, commalist_started;
5387
5388 /*
5389 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5390 */
5391 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5392 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5393 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5394 case KEX_DHGEX:
5395 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5396 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5397 break;
5398 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5399 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5400 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5401 break;
5402 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5403 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5404 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5405 break;
5406 case KEX_RSA:
5407 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5408 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5409 break;
5410 case KEX_WARN:
5411 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5412 * the list. */
5413 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5414 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5415 }
5416 break;
5417 }
5418 }
5419
5420 /*
5421 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5422 */
5423 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5424 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5425 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5426 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5427 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5428 break;
5429 case CIPHER_DES:
5430 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5431 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5432 }
5433 break;
5434 case CIPHER_3DES:
5435 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5436 break;
5437 case CIPHER_AES:
5438 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5439 break;
5440 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5441 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5442 break;
5443 case CIPHER_WARN:
5444 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5445 * the list. */
5446 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5447 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5448 }
5449 break;
5450 }
5451 }
5452
5453 /*
5454 * Set up preferred compression.
5455 */
5456 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5457 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5458 else
5459 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5460
5461 /*
5462 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5463 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5464 */
5465 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5466
5467 /*
5468 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5469 */
5470 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5471
5472 /*
5473 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5474 */
5475 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5476 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5477 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5478 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5479 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5480 commalist_started = 0;
5481 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5482 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5483 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5484 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5485 if (commalist_started)
5486 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5487 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5488 commalist_started = 1;
5489 }
5490 }
5491 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5492 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5493 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5494 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5495 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5496 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5497 }
5498 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5499 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5500 commalist_started = 0;
5501 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5502 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5503 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5504 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5505 if (commalist_started)
5506 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5507 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5508 commalist_started = 1;
5509 }
5510 }
5511 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5512 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5513 commalist_started = 0;
5514 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5515 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5516 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5517 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5518 if (commalist_started)
5519 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5520 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5521 commalist_started = 1;
5522 }
5523 }
5524 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5525 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5526 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5527 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5528 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5529 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5530 }
5531 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5532 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5533 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5534 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5535 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5536 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5537 }
5538 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5539 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5540 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5541 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5542 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5543 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5544 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5545 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5546 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5547 }
5548 }
5549 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5550 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5551 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5552 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5553 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5554 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5555 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5556 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5557 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5558 }
5559 }
5560 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5561 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5562 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5563 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5564 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5565 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5566 /* Reserved. */
5567 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5568 }
5569
5570 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5571 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5572 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5573
5574 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5575
5576 if (!pktin)
5577 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5578
5579 /*
5580 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5581 * to.
5582 */
5583 {
5584 char *str, *preferred;
5585 int i, j, len;
5586
5587 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5588 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5589 crStop(0);
5590 }
5591 ssh->kex = NULL;
5592 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5593 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5594 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5595 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5596 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5597 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5598 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5599 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5600
5601 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5602 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5603
5604 preferred = NULL;
5605 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5606 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5607 if (!k) {
5608 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5609 } else {
5610 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5611 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5612 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5613 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5614 break;
5615 }
5616 }
5617 }
5618 if (ssh->kex)
5619 break;
5620 }
5621 if (!ssh->kex) {
5622 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5623 str ? str : "(null)"));
5624 crStop(0);
5625 }
5626 /*
5627 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5628 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5629 * we end up using.
5630 */
5631 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5632 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5633 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5634 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5635 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5636 break;
5637 }
5638 }
5639 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5640 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5641 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5642 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5643 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5644 if (!c) {
5645 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5646 } else {
5647 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5648 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5649 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5650 break;
5651 }
5652 }
5653 }
5654 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5655 break;
5656 }
5657 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5658 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5659 str ? str : "(null)"));
5660 crStop(0);
5661 }
5662
5663 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5664 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5665 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5666 if (!c) {
5667 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5668 } else {
5669 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5670 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5671 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5672 break;
5673 }
5674 }
5675 }
5676 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5677 break;
5678 }
5679 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5680 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5681 str ? str : "(null)"));
5682 crStop(0);
5683 }
5684
5685 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5686 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5687 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5688 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5689 break;
5690 }
5691 }
5692 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5693 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5694 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5695 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5696 break;
5697 }
5698 }
5699 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5700 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5701 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5702 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5703 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5704 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5705 break;
5706 }
5707 }
5708 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5709 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5710 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5711 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5712 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5713 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5714 break;
5715 }
5716 }
5717 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5718 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5719 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5720
5721 if (s->warn_kex) {
5722 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5723 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5724 ssh->kex->name,
5725 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5726 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5727 do {
5728 crReturn(0);
5729 if (pktin) {
5730 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5731 " waiting for user response"));
5732 crStop(0);
5733 }
5734 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5735 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5736 }
5737 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5738 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5739 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5740 0, TRUE);
5741 crStop(0);
5742 }
5743 }
5744
5745 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5746 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5747 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5748 "client-to-server cipher",
5749 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5750 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5751 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5752 do {
5753 crReturn(0);
5754 if (pktin) {
5755 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5756 " waiting for user response"));
5757 crStop(0);
5758 }
5759 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5760 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5761 }
5762 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5763 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5764 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5765 0, TRUE);
5766 crStop(0);
5767 }
5768 }
5769
5770 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5771 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5772 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5773 "server-to-client cipher",
5774 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5775 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5776 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5777 do {
5778 crReturn(0);
5779 if (pktin) {
5780 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5781 " waiting for user response"));
5782 crStop(0);
5783 }
5784 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5785 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5786 }
5787 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5788 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5789 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5790 0, TRUE);
5791 crStop(0);
5792 }
5793 }
5794
5795 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5796 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5797 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5798 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5799 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5800 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5801 if (pktin->length > 5)
5802 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5803 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5804
5805 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5806 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5807 }
5808
5809 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5810 /*
5811 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5812 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5813 * either cipher...
5814 */
5815 {
5816 int csbits, scbits;
5817
5818 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5819 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5820 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5821 }
5822 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
5823 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
5824 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
5825 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
5826
5827 /*
5828 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5829 * requesting a group.
5830 */
5831 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5832 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5833 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5834 /*
5835 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5836 * much data.
5837 */
5838 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5839 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5840 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5841 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5842
5843 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5844 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5845 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5846 crStop(0);
5847 }
5848 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5849 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5850 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5851 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5852 crStop(0);
5853 }
5854 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5855 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5856 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5857 } else {
5858 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5859 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5860 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5861 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5862 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5863 ssh->kex->groupname);
5864 }
5865
5866 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
5867 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5868 /*
5869 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5870 */
5871 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5872 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5873 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5874 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5875 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5876
5877 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5878 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5879 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5880 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5881 crStop(0);
5882 }
5883 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5884 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5885 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5886 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5887 if (!s->f) {
5888 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5889 crStop(0);
5890 }
5891 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5892
5893 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5894
5895 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5896 * involve user interaction. */
5897 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5898
5899 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5900 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5901 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5902 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
5903 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
5904 }
5905 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
5906 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
5907
5908 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5909 freebn(s->f);
5910 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5911 freebn(s->g);
5912 freebn(s->p);
5913 }
5914 } else {
5915 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
5916 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5917 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
5918 /*
5919 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
5920 * from the server.
5921 */
5922 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5923 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
5924 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
5925 crStop(0);
5926 }
5927
5928 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5929 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5930 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5931 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5932
5933 {
5934 char *keydata;
5935 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
5936 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
5937 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
5938 }
5939
5940 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5941 if (!s->rsakey) {
5942 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
5943 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
5944 crStop(0);
5945 }
5946
5947 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
5948
5949 /*
5950 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
5951 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
5952 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
5953 * we're using.
5954 */
5955 {
5956 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
5957 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
5958 int i, byte = 0;
5959 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
5960 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
5961
5962 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
5963
5964 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
5965 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
5966 byte = random_byte();
5967 }
5968 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
5969 }
5970
5971 /*
5972 * Encode this as an mpint.
5973 */
5974 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
5975 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
5976 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
5977 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
5978
5979 /*
5980 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
5981 */
5982 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
5983 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
5984 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
5985 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
5986
5987 /*
5988 * And send it off in a return packet.
5989 */
5990 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
5991 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5992 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
5993 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5994
5995 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
5996
5997 sfree(kstr2);
5998 sfree(kstr1);
5999 sfree(outstr);
6000 }
6001
6002 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
6003
6004 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6005 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
6006 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6007 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
6008 crStop(0);
6009 }
6010
6011 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6012
6013 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6014 }
6015
6016 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6017 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6018 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6019
6020 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6021
6022 #if 0
6023 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6024 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6025 #endif
6026
6027 if (!s->hkey ||
6028 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6029 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6030 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6031 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6032 crStop(0);
6033 }
6034
6035 /*
6036 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6037 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6038 */
6039 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6040 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6041 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6042 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6043 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6044 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6045 s->fingerprint,
6046 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6047 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6048 do {
6049 crReturn(0);
6050 if (pktin) {
6051 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6052 " for user host key response"));
6053 crStop(0);
6054 }
6055 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6056 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6057 }
6058 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6059 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6060 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6061 0, TRUE);
6062 crStop(0);
6063 }
6064 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6065 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6066 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6067 }
6068 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6069 sfree(s->keystr);
6070 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6071
6072 /*
6073 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6074 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6075 * authentication.
6076 */
6077 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6078 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6079 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6080 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6081 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6082 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6083 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6084 }
6085
6086 /*
6087 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6088 */
6089 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6090 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6091 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6092
6093 /*
6094 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6095 * client-to-server session keys.
6096 */
6097 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6098 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6099 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6100 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6101
6102 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6103 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6104 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6105 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6106
6107 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6108 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6109 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6110 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6111
6112 /*
6113 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6114 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6115 */
6116 {
6117 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6118 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6119 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6120 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6121 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6122 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6123 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6124 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6125 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6126 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6127 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6128 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6129 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6130 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6131 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6132 }
6133
6134 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6135 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6136 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6137 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6138 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6139 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6140 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6141
6142 /*
6143 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6144 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6145 */
6146 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6147 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6148
6149 /*
6150 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6151 */
6152 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6153 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6154 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6155 crStop(0);
6156 }
6157 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6158
6159 /*
6160 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6161 * server-to-client session keys.
6162 */
6163 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6164 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6165 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6166 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6167
6168 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6169 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6170 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6171 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6172
6173 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6174 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6175 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6176 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6177
6178 /*
6179 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6180 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6181 */
6182 {
6183 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6184 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6185 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6186 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6187 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6188 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6189 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6190 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6191 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6192 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6193 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6194 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6195 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6196 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6197 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6198 }
6199 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6200 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6201 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6202 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6203 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6204 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6205 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6206
6207 /*
6208 * Free shared secret.
6209 */
6210 freebn(s->K);
6211
6212 /*
6213 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6214 * deferred rekey reason.
6215 */
6216 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6217 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6218 pktin = NULL;
6219 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6220 goto begin_key_exchange;
6221 }
6222
6223 /*
6224 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6225 */
6226 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6227 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6228 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
6229 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6230 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6231
6232 /*
6233 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6234 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6235 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6236 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6237 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6238 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6239 */
6240 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6241 crReturn(0);
6242 }
6243 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6244
6245 /*
6246 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6247 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6248 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6249 * start.
6250 *
6251 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6252 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
6253 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6254 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6255 */
6256 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6257 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
6258 wait_for_rekey:
6259 crReturn(1);
6260 }
6261 if (pktin) {
6262 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6263 } else {
6264 /*
6265 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6266 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6267 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6268 * we process it anyway!)
6269 */
6270 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6271 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6272 (char *)in);
6273 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6274 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6275 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6276 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6277 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
6278 ssh->next_rekey =
6279 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6280 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6281 }
6282 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6283 } else {
6284 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6285 }
6286 }
6287 goto begin_key_exchange;
6288
6289 crFinish(1);
6290 }
6291
6292 /*
6293 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6294 */
6295 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6296 int len)
6297 {
6298 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6299 }
6300
6301 /*
6302 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6303 */
6304 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6305 {
6306 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6307 struct Packet *pktout;
6308
6309 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6310 int len;
6311 void *data;
6312 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6313 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6314 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6315 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6316 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6317 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6318 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6319 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6320 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6321 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6322 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6323 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6324 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6325 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6326 }
6327
6328 /*
6329 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6330 * still buffered.
6331 */
6332 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6333 }
6334
6335 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
6336 {
6337 int bufsize;
6338 if (c->closes)
6339 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
6340 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6341 if (bufsize == 0) {
6342 switch (c->type) {
6343 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6344 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6345 * notification since it will be polled */
6346 break;
6347 case CHAN_X11:
6348 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6349 break;
6350 case CHAN_AGENT:
6351 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6352 * buffer management */
6353 break;
6354 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6355 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6356 break;
6357 }
6358 }
6359 }
6360
6361 /*
6362 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6363 */
6364 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6365 {
6366 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6367 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6368 c->closes = 0;
6369 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6370 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6371 ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6372 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6373 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6374 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6375 }
6376
6377 /*
6378 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6379 */
6380 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6381 {
6382 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6383
6384 /*
6385 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
6386 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
6387 * be sending any more data anyway.
6388 */
6389 if (c->closes != 0)
6390 return;
6391
6392 /*
6393 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6394 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6395 * window as well).
6396 */
6397 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6398 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6399
6400
6401 /*
6402 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6403 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6404 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6405 *
6406 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6407 */
6408 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6409 struct Packet *pktout;
6410 struct winadj *wa;
6411
6412 /*
6413 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6414 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6415 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6416 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6417 *
6418 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6419 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6420 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6421 *
6422 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6423 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6424 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6425 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6426 */
6427 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6428 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
6429 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6430 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6431 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6432 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6433 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6434
6435 /*
6436 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6437 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6438 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6439 */
6440 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6441 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6442 wa->next = NULL;
6443 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6444 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6445 else
6446 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6447 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6448 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6449 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6450 } else {
6451 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6452 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6453 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6454 }
6455 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6456 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6457 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6458 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6459 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6460 }
6461 }
6462
6463 /*
6464 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6465 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6466 */
6467 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6468 {
6469 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6470 struct ssh_channel *c;
6471
6472 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6473 if (!c ||
6474 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6475 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6476 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6477 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6478 pktin->type),
6479 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6480 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6481 sfree(buf);
6482 return NULL;
6483 }
6484 return c;
6485 }
6486
6487 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6488 {
6489 /*
6490 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6491 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6492 * installed.
6493 */
6494 struct ssh_channel *c;
6495 struct winadj *wa;
6496
6497 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6498 if (!c)
6499 return;
6500 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6501 if (wa)
6502 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS for "
6503 "\"winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org\"",
6504 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6505 else
6506 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6507 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6508 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6509 }
6510
6511 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6512 {
6513 /*
6514 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6515 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6516 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6517 * installed.
6518 */
6519 struct ssh_channel *c;
6520 struct winadj *wa;
6521
6522 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6523 if (!c)
6524 return;
6525 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6526 if (!wa) {
6527 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6528 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6529 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6530 return;
6531 }
6532 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6533 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6534 sfree(wa);
6535 /*
6536 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6537 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6538 * complete.
6539 */
6540 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6541 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6542 }
6543
6544 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6545 {
6546 struct ssh_channel *c;
6547 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6548 if (!c)
6549 return;
6550 if (!c->closes) {
6551 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6552 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
6553 }
6554 }
6555
6556 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6557 {
6558 char *data;
6559 int length;
6560 struct ssh_channel *c;
6561 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6562 if (!c)
6563 return;
6564 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6565 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6566 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6567 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6568 if (data) {
6569 int bufsize = 0;
6570 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6571 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6572 switch (c->type) {
6573 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6574 bufsize =
6575 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6576 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6577 data, length);
6578 break;
6579 case CHAN_X11:
6580 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6581 break;
6582 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6583 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6584 break;
6585 case CHAN_AGENT:
6586 while (length > 0) {
6587 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6588 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6589 (unsigned)length);
6590 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6591 data, l);
6592 data += l;
6593 length -= l;
6594 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6595 }
6596 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6597 c->u.a.totallen =
6598 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6599 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6600 unsigned char);
6601 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6602 }
6603 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6604 unsigned int l =
6605 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6606 (unsigned)length);
6607 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6608 data, l);
6609 data += l;
6610 length -= l;
6611 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6612 }
6613 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6614 void *reply;
6615 int replylen;
6616 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6617 c->u.a.totallen,
6618 &reply, &replylen,
6619 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6620 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6621 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6622 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6623 }
6624 }
6625 bufsize = 0;
6626 break;
6627 }
6628 /*
6629 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6630 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6631 * larger window.
6632 */
6633 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6634 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6635 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6636 /*
6637 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6638 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6639 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6640 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6641 * sent excess data.
6642 */
6643 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6644 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6645 /*
6646 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6647 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6648 * throttle the whole channel.
6649 */
6650 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6651 (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
6652 !c->throttling_conn) {
6653 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6654 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6655 }
6656 }
6657 }
6658
6659 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6660 {
6661 struct ssh_channel *c;
6662
6663 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6664 if (!c)
6665 return;
6666
6667 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6668 /*
6669 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
6670 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
6671 */
6672 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6673 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
6674 sshfwd_close(c);
6675 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6676 sshfwd_close(c);
6677 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6678 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6679 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
6680 sshfwd_close(c);
6681 }
6682 }
6683
6684 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6685 {
6686 struct ssh_channel *c;
6687 struct Packet *pktout;
6688
6689 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6690 if (!c)
6691 return;
6692 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6693 switch (c->type) {
6694 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6695 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6696 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6697 break;
6698 case CHAN_X11:
6699 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6700 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6701 sshfwd_close(c);
6702 break;
6703 case CHAN_AGENT:
6704 sshfwd_close(c);
6705 break;
6706 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6707 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6708 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6709 sshfwd_close(c);
6710 break;
6711 }
6712 if (c->closes == 0) {
6713 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6714 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6715 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6716 }
6717 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6718 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6719 sfree(c);
6720
6721 /*
6722 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6723 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6724 * not running in -N mode.)
6725 */
6726 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6727 /*
6728 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6729 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6730 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6731 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6732 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6733 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6734 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6735 * this is more polite than sending a
6736 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6737 */
6738 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6739 }
6740 }
6741
6742 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6743 {
6744 struct ssh_channel *c;
6745 struct Packet *pktout;
6746
6747 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6748 if (!c)
6749 return;
6750 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6751 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6752 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6753 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6754 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6755 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6756 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6757 if (c->u.pfd.s)
6758 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6759 if (c->closes) {
6760 /*
6761 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6762 * which we decided on before the server acked
6763 * the channel open. So now we know the
6764 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6765 */
6766 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6767 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6768 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6769 }
6770 }
6771
6772 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6773 {
6774 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6775 "<unknown reason code>",
6776 "Administratively prohibited",
6777 "Connect failed",
6778 "Unknown channel type",
6779 "Resource shortage",
6780 };
6781 unsigned reason_code;
6782 char *reason_string;
6783 int reason_length;
6784 struct ssh_channel *c;
6785 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6786 if (!c)
6787 return;
6788 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6789 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6790
6791 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6792 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6793 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6794 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6795 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6796 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6797
6798 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6799
6800 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6801 sfree(c);
6802 }
6803
6804 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6805 {
6806 char *type;
6807 int typelen, want_reply;
6808 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6809 struct ssh_channel *c;
6810 struct Packet *pktout;
6811
6812 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6813 if (!c)
6814 return;
6815 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6816 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6817
6818 /*
6819 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6820 * the request type string to see if it's something
6821 * we recognise.
6822 */
6823 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6824 /*
6825 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6826 * the primary channel.
6827 */
6828 if (typelen == 11 &&
6829 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6830
6831 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6832 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6833 ssh->exitcode);
6834 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6835
6836 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6837 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6838
6839 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6840 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6841 char *msg;
6842 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6843 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6844 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6845 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
6846 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6847 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6848 {
6849 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6850 pktin->savedpos;
6851 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6852 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6853 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6854 if (num == 0) {
6855 is_int = FALSE;
6856 } else {
6857 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6858 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6859 do { \
6860 long q = offset; \
6861 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6862 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6863 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6864 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6865 result = TRUE; \
6866 } \
6867 } while(0)
6868 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6869 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6870 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6871 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6872 is_int = TRUE;
6873 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6874 is_int = FALSE;
6875 else
6876 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6877 is_plausible = FALSE;
6878 }
6879 }
6880 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
6881 if (is_plausible) {
6882 if (is_int) {
6883 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6884 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6885 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6886 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
6887 } else {
6888 /* As per RFC 4254. */
6889 char *sig;
6890 int siglen;
6891 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6892 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6893 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6894 if (siglen) {
6895 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6896 siglen, sig);
6897 }
6898
6899 /*
6900 * Really hideous method of translating the
6901 * signal description back into a locally
6902 * meaningful number.
6903 */
6904
6905 if (0)
6906 ;
6907 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
6908 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
6909 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
6910 #ifdef SIGABRT
6911 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
6912 #endif
6913 #ifdef SIGALRM
6914 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
6915 #endif
6916 #ifdef SIGFPE
6917 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
6918 #endif
6919 #ifdef SIGHUP
6920 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
6921 #endif
6922 #ifdef SIGILL
6923 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
6924 #endif
6925 #ifdef SIGINT
6926 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
6927 #endif
6928 #ifdef SIGKILL
6929 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
6930 #endif
6931 #ifdef SIGPIPE
6932 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
6933 #endif
6934 #ifdef SIGQUIT
6935 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
6936 #endif
6937 #ifdef SIGSEGV
6938 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
6939 #endif
6940 #ifdef SIGTERM
6941 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
6942 #endif
6943 #ifdef SIGUSR1
6944 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
6945 #endif
6946 #ifdef SIGUSR2
6947 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
6948 #endif
6949 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
6950 else
6951 ssh->exitcode = 128;
6952 }
6953 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6954 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
6955 if (msglen) {
6956 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
6957 }
6958 /* ignore lang tag */
6959 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6960 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6961 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
6962 fmt_msg);
6963 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
6964 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
6965 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6966
6967 }
6968 } else {
6969 /*
6970 * This is a channel request we don't know
6971 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6972 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6973 * on want_reply.
6974 */
6975 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
6976 }
6977 if (want_reply) {
6978 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
6979 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6980 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6981 }
6982 }
6983
6984 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6985 {
6986 char *type;
6987 int typelen, want_reply;
6988 struct Packet *pktout;
6989
6990 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6991 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6992
6993 /*
6994 * We currently don't support any global requests
6995 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6996 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6997 * want_reply.
6998 */
6999 if (want_reply) {
7000 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
7001 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7002 }
7003 }
7004
7005 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7006 {
7007 char *type;
7008 int typelen;
7009 char *peeraddr;
7010 int peeraddrlen;
7011 int peerport;
7012 char *error = NULL;
7013 struct ssh_channel *c;
7014 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7015 struct Packet *pktout;
7016
7017 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7018 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7019 c->ssh = ssh;
7020
7021 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7022 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7023 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7024
7025 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7026 char *addrstr;
7027 const char *x11err;
7028
7029 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7030 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7031 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7032 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7033 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7034
7035 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7036 addrstr, peerport);
7037
7038 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7039 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7040 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7041 addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
7042 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7043 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7044 } else {
7045 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7046 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7047 }
7048
7049 sfree(addrstr);
7050 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7051 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7052 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7053 char *dummy;
7054 int dummylen;
7055 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7056 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7057 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7058 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7059 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7060 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7061 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7062 if (realpf == NULL) {
7063 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7064 } else {
7065 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7066 realpf->dhost,
7067 realpf->dport, c,
7068 &ssh->cfg,
7069 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7070 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7071 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7072 if (e != NULL) {
7073 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7074 error = "Port open failed";
7075 } else {
7076 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7077 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7078 }
7079 }
7080 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7081 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7082 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7083 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7084 else {
7085 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7086 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7087 }
7088 } else {
7089 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7090 }
7091
7092 c->remoteid = remid;
7093 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7094 if (error) {
7095 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7096 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7097 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7098 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7099 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7100 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7101 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7102 sfree(c);
7103 } else {
7104 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7105 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7106 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7107 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7108 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7109 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7110 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7111 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7112 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7113 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7114 }
7115 }
7116
7117 /*
7118 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
7119 */
7120 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7121 {
7122 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7123 if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7124 char *banner = NULL;
7125 int size = 0;
7126 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7127 if (banner)
7128 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7129 }
7130 }
7131
7132 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7133 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7134 {
7135 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7136 int i = 0;
7137 unsigned int arg = 0;
7138 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7139 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7140 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7141 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7142 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7143 break;
7144 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7145 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7146 break;
7147 }
7148 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7149 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7150 }
7151
7152 /*
7153 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7154 */
7155 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7156 struct Packet *pktin)
7157 {
7158 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7159 enum {
7160 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7161 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7162 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7163 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7164 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7165 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI,
7166 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7167 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7168 } type;
7169 int done_service_req;
7170 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7171 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7172 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7173 int can_gssapi;
7174 int tried_gssapi;
7175 #endif
7176 int kbd_inter_refused;
7177 int we_are_in;
7178 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7179 int num_prompts;
7180 char username[100];
7181 char *password;
7182 int got_username;
7183 void *publickey_blob;
7184 int publickey_bloblen;
7185 int publickey_encrypted;
7186 char *publickey_algorithm;
7187 char *publickey_comment;
7188 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7189 int agent_responselen;
7190 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7191 int keyi, nkeys;
7192 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7193 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7194 int siglen, retlen, len;
7195 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7196 int try_send;
7197 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7198 struct Packet *pktout;
7199 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7200 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7201 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7202 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7203 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7204 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7205 #endif
7206 };
7207 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7208
7209 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
7210
7211 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7212 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7213 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7214 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7215 #endif
7216
7217 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
7218 /*
7219 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7220 */
7221 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7222 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7223 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7224 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7225 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7226 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7227 }
7228 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7229 /*
7230 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7231 */
7232 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7233 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7234 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7235 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7236 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7237 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7238 } else {
7239 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7240 crStopV;
7241 }
7242 }
7243
7244 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7245 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7246 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7247 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7248 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7249
7250 /*
7251 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7252 */
7253 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7254 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7255
7256 /*
7257 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7258 * for later use.
7259 */
7260 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
7261 int keytype;
7262 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7263 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
7264 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
7265 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7266 const char *error;
7267 s->publickey_blob =
7268 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
7269 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7270 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7271 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7272 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7273 s->publickey_encrypted =
7274 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
7275 } else {
7276 char *msgbuf;
7277 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7278 error);
7279 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7280 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7281 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7282 error);
7283 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7284 sfree(msgbuf);
7285 }
7286 } else {
7287 char *msgbuf;
7288 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7289 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7290 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7291 " (%s)\r\n",
7292 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7293 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7294 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7295 sfree(msgbuf);
7296 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7297 }
7298 }
7299
7300 /*
7301 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7302 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7303 */
7304 s->nkeys = 0;
7305 s->agent_response = NULL;
7306 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7307 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
7308
7309 void *r;
7310
7311 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7312
7313 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7314 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7315 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7316 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7317 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7318 do {
7319 crReturnV;
7320 if (pktin) {
7321 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7322 " waiting for agent response"));
7323 crStopV;
7324 }
7325 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7326 r = ssh->agent_response;
7327 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7328 }
7329 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7330 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7331 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7332 int keyi;
7333 unsigned char *p;
7334 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7335 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7336 p += 4;
7337 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7338 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7339 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7340 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7341 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7342 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7343 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7344 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7345 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7346 "configured key file", keyi);
7347 s->keyi = keyi;
7348 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7349 break;
7350 }
7351 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7352 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7353 }
7354 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7355 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7356 s->nkeys = 0;
7357 }
7358 }
7359 }
7360 }
7361
7362 }
7363
7364 /*
7365 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7366 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7367 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7368 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7369 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7370 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7371 *
7372 * I think this best serves the needs of
7373 *
7374 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7375 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7376 * type both correctly
7377 *
7378 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7379 * need to fall back to passwords
7380 *
7381 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7382 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7383 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7384 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7385 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7386 * retype it!
7387 */
7388 s->username[0] = '\0';
7389 s->got_username = FALSE;
7390 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7391 /*
7392 * Get a username.
7393 */
7394 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7395 /*
7396 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7397 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7398 * it again.
7399 */
7400 } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
7401 sizeof(s->username))) {
7402 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7403 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7404 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7405 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7406 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
7407 lenof(s->username));
7408 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7409 while (ret < 0) {
7410 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7411 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7412 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7413 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7414 }
7415 if (!ret) {
7416 /*
7417 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7418 * Terminate.
7419 */
7420 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7421 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7422 crStopV;
7423 }
7424 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
7425 lenof(s->username));
7426 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7427 } else {
7428 char *stuff;
7429 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7430 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
7431 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7432 sfree(stuff);
7433 }
7434 }
7435 s->got_username = TRUE;
7436
7437 /*
7438 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7439 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7440 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7441 */
7442 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7443
7444 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7445 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7446 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7447 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7448 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7449 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7450 s->gotit = FALSE;
7451 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7452
7453 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7454 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7455
7456 /* Reset agent request state. */
7457 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7458 if (s->agent_response) {
7459 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7460 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7461 } else {
7462 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7463 s->keyi = 0;
7464 }
7465 }
7466
7467 while (1) {
7468 /*
7469 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7470 */
7471 if (!s->gotit)
7472 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7473 /*
7474 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7475 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7476 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7477 * with.)
7478 */
7479 {
7480 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7481 /*
7482 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7483 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7484 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7485 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7486 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7487 * output of (say) plink.)
7488 */
7489 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7490 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7491 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7492 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7493 sfree(banner);
7494 }
7495 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7496 }
7497 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7498 logevent("Access granted");
7499 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
7500 break;
7501 }
7502
7503 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7504 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7505 "type %d", pktin->type));
7506 crStopV;
7507 }
7508
7509 s->gotit = FALSE;
7510
7511 /*
7512 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7513 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7514 * helpfully try next.
7515 */
7516 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7517 char *methods;
7518 int methlen;
7519 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7520 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7521 /*
7522 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7523 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7524 * messages:
7525 *
7526 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
7527 * it's not worth printing anything at all
7528 *
7529 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
7530 * the message should be "Server refused our
7531 * key" (or no message at all if the key
7532 * came from Pageant)
7533 *
7534 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
7535 * message really should be "Access denied".
7536 *
7537 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7538 * authentication, we should break out of this
7539 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7540 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7541 * username change attempts).
7542 */
7543 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7544 /* do nothing */
7545 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7546 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7547 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7548 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7549 logevent("Server refused public key");
7550 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7551 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
7552 } else {
7553 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7554 logevent("Access denied");
7555 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
7556 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7557 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7558 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7559 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7560 break;
7561 }
7562 }
7563 } else {
7564 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7565 logevent("Further authentication required");
7566 }
7567
7568 s->can_pubkey =
7569 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7570 s->can_passwd =
7571 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7572 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
7573 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7574 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7575 s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
7576 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7577 ssh_gss_init();
7578 #endif
7579 }
7580
7581 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7582
7583 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7584
7585 /*
7586 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7587 */
7588
7589 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7590
7591 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7592
7593 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7594 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7595 s->agentp += 4;
7596 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7597 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7598 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7599 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7600 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7601 s->agentp += 4;
7602 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7603 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7604 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7605
7606 /* See if server will accept it */
7607 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7608 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7609 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7610 /* service requested */
7611 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7612 /* method */
7613 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7614 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7615 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7616 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7617 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7618 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7619 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7620
7621 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7622 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7623
7624 /* Offer of key refused. */
7625 s->gotit = TRUE;
7626
7627 } else {
7628
7629 void *vret;
7630
7631 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7632 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7633 "public key \"");
7634 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7635 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7636 }
7637
7638 /*
7639 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7640 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7641 */
7642 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7643 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7644 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7645 /* service requested */
7646 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7647 /* method */
7648 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7649 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7650 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7651 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7652 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7653
7654 /* Ask agent for signature. */
7655 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7656 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7657 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7658 s->siglen -= 4;
7659 s->len = 1; /* message type */
7660 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
7661 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
7662 s->len += 4; /* flags */
7663 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
7664 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
7665 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
7666 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
7667 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
7668 s->q += 4;
7669 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7670 s->q += s->pklen;
7671 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
7672 s->q += 4;
7673 /* Now the data to be signed... */
7674 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7675 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7676 s->q += 4;
7677 }
7678 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
7679 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7680 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7681 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
7682 s->pktout->length - 5);
7683 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
7684 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
7685 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
7686 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
7687 &vret, &s->retlen,
7688 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7689 do {
7690 crReturnV;
7691 if (pktin) {
7692 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
7693 " while waiting for agent"
7694 " response"));
7695 crStopV;
7696 }
7697 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7698 vret = ssh->agent_response;
7699 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7700 }
7701 s->ret = vret;
7702 sfree(s->agentreq);
7703 if (s->ret) {
7704 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
7705 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
7706 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
7707 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
7708 s->ret + 9,
7709 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
7710 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7711 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7712 } else {
7713 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
7714 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
7715 crStopV;
7716 }
7717 }
7718 }
7719
7720 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
7721 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7722 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7723 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7724 } else {
7725 s->keyi++;
7726 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
7727 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7728 }
7729
7730 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
7731 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
7732
7733 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
7734 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
7735
7736 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7737
7738 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7739
7740 /*
7741 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
7742 *
7743 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
7744 * willing to accept it.
7745 */
7746 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7747 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7748 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7749 /* service requested */
7750 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7751 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7752 /* no signature included */
7753 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
7754 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7755 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
7756 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
7757 s->publickey_bloblen);
7758 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7759 logevent("Offered public key");
7760
7761 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7762 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7763 /* Key refused. Give up. */
7764 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
7765 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
7766 continue; /* process this new message */
7767 }
7768 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
7769
7770 /*
7771 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
7772 * the key.
7773 */
7774 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7775 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
7776 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
7777 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
7778 }
7779 key = NULL;
7780 while (!key) {
7781 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
7782 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
7783 /*
7784 * Get a passphrase from the user.
7785 */
7786 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7787 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7788 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
7789 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
7790 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7791 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
7792 s->publickey_comment),
7793 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7794 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7795 while (ret < 0) {
7796 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7797 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7798 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
7799 in, inlen);
7800 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7801 }
7802 if (!ret) {
7803 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
7804 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7805 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7806 "Unable to authenticate",
7807 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7808 TRUE);
7809 crStopV;
7810 }
7811 passphrase =
7812 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7813 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7814 } else {
7815 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
7816 }
7817
7818 /*
7819 * Try decrypting the key.
7820 */
7821 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
7822 &error);
7823 if (passphrase) {
7824 /* burn the evidence */
7825 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
7826 sfree(passphrase);
7827 }
7828 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7829 if (passphrase &&
7830 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
7831 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7832 key = NULL;
7833 /* and loop again */
7834 } else {
7835 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7836 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7837 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7838 key = NULL;
7839 break; /* try something else */
7840 }
7841 }
7842 }
7843
7844 if (key) {
7845 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7846 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7847 int p;
7848
7849 /*
7850 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7851 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7852 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7853 */
7854 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7855 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7856 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7857 /* service requested */
7858 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7859 /* method */
7860 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7861 /* signature follows */
7862 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7863 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
7864 &pkblob_len);
7865 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7866 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
7867 pkblob_len);
7868
7869 /*
7870 * The data to be signed is:
7871 *
7872 * string session-id
7873 *
7874 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7875 * outgoing packet.
7876 */
7877 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7878 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7879 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7880 sigdata_len -= 4;
7881 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7882 p = 0;
7883 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7884 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7885 p += 4;
7886 }
7887 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
7888 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7889 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7890 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7891 s->pktout->length - 5);
7892 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7893 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7894 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7895 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7896 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7897 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7898 sfree(pkblob);
7899 sfree(sigblob);
7900 sfree(sigdata);
7901
7902 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7903 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7904 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7905 }
7906
7907 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7908 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
7909
7910 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
7911
7912 int micoffset, len;
7913 char *data;
7914 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
7915 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
7916 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
7917 s->gotit = TRUE;
7918 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
7919
7920 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
7921 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7922 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7923 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7924 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
7925
7926 /* add mechanism info */
7927 ssh_gss_indicate_mech(&s->gss_buf);
7928
7929 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
7930 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
7931
7932 /* length of OID + 2 */
7933 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
7934 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
7935
7936 /* length of OID */
7937 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
7938
7939 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
7940 s->gss_buf.length);
7941 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7942 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7943 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
7944 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
7945 continue;
7946 }
7947
7948 /* check returned packet ... */
7949
7950 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
7951 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
7952 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
7953 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
7954 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
7955 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
7956 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
7957 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
7958 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
7959 continue;
7960 }
7961
7962 /* now start running */
7963 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_import_name(ssh->fullhostname,
7964 &s->gss_srv_name);
7965 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
7966 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
7967 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
7968 else
7969 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
7970 continue;
7971 }
7972
7973 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
7974 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_acquire_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
7975
7976 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
7977 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
7978 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
7979 continue;
7980 }
7981
7982 /* initial tokens are empty */
7983 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
7984 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
7985
7986 /* now enter the loop */
7987 do {
7988 s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_init_sec_context(&s->gss_ctx,
7989 s->gss_srv_name,
7990 ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
7991 &s->gss_rcvtok,
7992 &s->gss_sndtok);
7993
7994 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
7995 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
7996 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
7997
7998 if (ssh_gss_display_status(s->gss_ctx,&s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
7999 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
8000 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
8001 }
8002
8003 break;
8004 }
8005 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
8006
8007 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
8008 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
8009
8010 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8011 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8012 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8013 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8014 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8015 ssh_gss_free_tok(&s->gss_sndtok);
8016 }
8017
8018 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8019 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8020 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8021 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8022 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8023 break;
8024 }
8025 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8026 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8027 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8028 }
8029 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8030
8031 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8032 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
8033 ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
8034 continue;
8035 }
8036 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8037
8038 /* Now send the MIC */
8039
8040 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8041 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8042 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8043 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8044 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8045 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8046 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8047 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8048
8049 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8050 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8051
8052 ssh_gss_get_mic(s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8053 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8054 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8055 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8056 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8057 ssh_gss_free_mic(&mic);
8058
8059 s->gotit = FALSE;
8060
8061 ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
8062 ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
8063 continue;
8064 #endif
8065 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8066
8067 /*
8068 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8069 */
8070
8071 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8072
8073 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8074
8075 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8076 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8077 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8078 /* service requested */
8079 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8080 /* method */
8081 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8082 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8083 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8084
8085 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8086 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8087 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8088 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8089 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8090 * Give up on it entirely. */
8091 s->gotit = TRUE;
8092 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
8093 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
8094 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8095 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8096 continue;
8097 }
8098
8099 /*
8100 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8101 */
8102 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8103
8104 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8105 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8106 int i;
8107
8108 /*
8109 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8110 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8111 */
8112 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8113 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8114 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8115 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8116 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8117
8118 /*
8119 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8120 */
8121 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8122 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8123 char *prompt;
8124 int prompt_len;
8125 int echo;
8126 static char noprompt[] =
8127 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8128
8129 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8130 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8131 if (!prompt_len) {
8132 prompt = noprompt;
8133 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8134 }
8135 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8136 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8137 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8138 }
8139
8140 if (name_len) {
8141 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8142 * local prompts? */
8143 s->cur_prompt->name =
8144 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8145 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8146 } else {
8147 s->cur_prompt->name =
8148 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8149 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8150 }
8151 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8152 * has come from the server.
8153 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8154 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8155 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8156 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8157 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8158 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8159 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8160 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8161 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8162 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8163 } else {
8164 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8165 }
8166
8167 /*
8168 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8169 * response(s).
8170 */
8171 {
8172 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8173 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8174 while (ret < 0) {
8175 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8176 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8177 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8178 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8179 }
8180 if (!ret) {
8181 /*
8182 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8183 */
8184 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8185 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8186 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8187 TRUE);
8188 crStopV;
8189 }
8190 }
8191
8192 /*
8193 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8194 */
8195 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8196 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8197 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8198 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8199 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8200 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8201 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8202 }
8203 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8204
8205 /*
8206 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8207 * INFO_REQUEST.
8208 */
8209 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8210
8211 }
8212
8213 /*
8214 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8215 */
8216 s->gotit = TRUE;
8217
8218 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8219
8220 /*
8221 * Plain old password authentication.
8222 */
8223 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8224 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8225
8226 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8227
8228 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8229 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8230 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8231 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
8232 s->username,
8233 ssh->savedhost),
8234 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8235
8236 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8237 while (ret < 0) {
8238 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8239 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8240 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8241 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8242 }
8243 if (!ret) {
8244 /*
8245 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8246 */
8247 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8248 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8249 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8250 TRUE);
8251 crStopV;
8252 }
8253 /*
8254 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8255 * asked to change it.)
8256 */
8257 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8258 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8259
8260 /*
8261 * Send the password packet.
8262 *
8263 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8264 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8265 * user's password.
8266 *
8267 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8268 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8269 * people who find out how long their password is!
8270 */
8271 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8272 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8273 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8274 /* service requested */
8275 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8276 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8277 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8278 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8279 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8280 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8281 logevent("Sent password");
8282 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8283
8284 /*
8285 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8286 * request.
8287 */
8288 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8289 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8290
8291 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8292
8293 /*
8294 * We're being asked for a new password
8295 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8296 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8297 */
8298
8299 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8300 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8301 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8302
8303 {
8304 char *msg;
8305 if (changereq_first_time)
8306 msg = "Server requested password change";
8307 else
8308 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8309 logevent(msg);
8310 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8311 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8312 }
8313
8314 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8315
8316 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8317 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8318 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8319 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8320 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8321 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8322 /*
8323 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8324 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8325 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8326 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8327 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8328 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8329 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8330 *
8331 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8332 * to check this field.)
8333 */
8334 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8335 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8336 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8337 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8338 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8339 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8340 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8341
8342 /*
8343 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8344 * password twice.
8345 */
8346 while (!got_new) {
8347
8348 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8349 while (ret < 0) {
8350 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8351 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8352 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8353 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8354 }
8355 if (!ret) {
8356 /*
8357 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8358 */
8359 /* burn the evidence */
8360 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8361 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8362 sfree(s->password);
8363 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8364 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8365 TRUE);
8366 crStopV;
8367 }
8368
8369 /*
8370 * If the user specified a new original password
8371 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8372 * one.
8373 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8374 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8375 */
8376 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8377 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8378 /* burn the evidence */
8379 sfree(s->password);
8380 s->password =
8381 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8382 }
8383
8384 /*
8385 * Check the two new passwords match.
8386 */
8387 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8388 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8389 == 0);
8390 if (!got_new)
8391 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8392 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8393
8394 }
8395
8396 /*
8397 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8398 * (see above for padding rationale)
8399 */
8400 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8401 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8402 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8403 /* service requested */
8404 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8405 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8406 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8407 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8408 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8409 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8410 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8411 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8412 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8413 logevent("Sent new password");
8414
8415 /*
8416 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8417 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8418 * new password.)
8419 */
8420 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8421 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8422
8423 }
8424
8425 /*
8426 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8427 * of the loop. Either:
8428 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8429 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8430 * usual meaning
8431 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8432 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8433 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8434 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8435 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8436 * the loop and start again.
8437 */
8438 s->gotit = TRUE;
8439
8440 /*
8441 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8442 * case. Burn the evidence.
8443 */
8444 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8445 sfree(s->password);
8446
8447 } else {
8448
8449 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
8450 "No supported authentication methods available",
8451 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8452 FALSE);
8453 crStopV;
8454
8455 }
8456
8457 }
8458 }
8459 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8460
8461 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8462 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8463 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8464 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8465 }
8466 if (s->agent_response)
8467 sfree(s->agent_response);
8468
8469 /*
8470 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8471 */
8472
8473 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8474
8475 /*
8476 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8477 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8478 */
8479 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8480 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8481 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8482 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8483
8484 /*
8485 * Create the main session channel.
8486 */
8487 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
8488 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8489 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
8490 /*
8491 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8492 * channel.
8493 */
8494 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8495 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8496 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8497 logeventf(ssh,
8498 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8499 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8500 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8501 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8502 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8503 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8504 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8505 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
8506 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8507 /*
8508 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8509 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8510 * information.
8511 */
8512 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8513 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8514 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8515
8516 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8517 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8518 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8519 crStopV;
8520 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8521 }
8522 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8523 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8524 crStopV;
8525 }
8526 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8527 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8528 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8529 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8530 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8531 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8532 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8533 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8534 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8535 } else {
8536 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8537 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8538 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8539 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8540 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8541 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8542 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8543 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8544 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8545 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8546 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8547 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8548 crStopV;
8549 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8550 }
8551 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8552 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8553 crStopV;
8554 }
8555 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8556 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8557 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8558 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8559 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8560 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8561 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8562 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8563 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8564 }
8565
8566 /*
8567 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8568 * general channel-based messages.
8569 */
8570 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8571 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8572 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8573 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8574 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8575 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8576 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8577 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8578 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8579 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8580 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8581 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8582 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8583
8584 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
8585 /*
8586 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8587 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8588 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
8589 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
8590 */
8591 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8592 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8593 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
8594 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
8595 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8596 }
8597
8598 /*
8599 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
8600 */
8601 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
8602 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
8603 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
8604 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
8605 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8606 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8607 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
8608 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8609 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
8610 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
8611 /*
8612 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
8613 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
8614 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
8615 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
8616 * cookie into the log.
8617 */
8618 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8619 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
8620 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8621 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
8622 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8623
8624 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8625
8626 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8627 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8628 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
8629 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8630 crStopV;
8631 }
8632 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
8633 } else {
8634 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
8635 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
8636 }
8637 }
8638
8639 /*
8640 * Enable port forwardings.
8641 */
8642 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
8643
8644 /*
8645 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
8646 */
8647 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
8648 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
8649 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8650 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8651 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
8652 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8653 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8654
8655 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8656
8657 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8658 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8659 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
8660 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8661 crStopV;
8662 }
8663 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
8664 } else {
8665 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
8666 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
8667 }
8668 }
8669
8670 /*
8671 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
8672 */
8673 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8674 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
8675 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
8676 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
8677 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
8678 /* Build the pty request. */
8679 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8680 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8681 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
8682 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8683 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
8684 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
8685 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
8686 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
8687 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
8688 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8689 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
8690 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
8691 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
8692 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
8693 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
8694 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
8695 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
8696 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8697 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
8698
8699 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8700
8701 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8702 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8703 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
8704 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8705 crStopV;
8706 }
8707 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
8708 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8709 } else {
8710 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
8711 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
8712 }
8713 } else {
8714 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8715 }
8716
8717 /*
8718 * Send environment variables.
8719 *
8720 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
8721 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
8722 */
8723 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
8724 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
8725 char *var, *varend, *val;
8726
8727 s->num_env = 0;
8728
8729 while (*e) {
8730 var = e;
8731 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
8732 varend = e;
8733 if (*e == '\t') e++;
8734 val = e;
8735 while (*e) e++;
8736 e++;
8737
8738 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8739 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8740 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
8741 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8742 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8743 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
8744 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
8745 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8746
8747 s->num_env++;
8748 }
8749
8750 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
8751
8752 s->env_ok = 0;
8753 s->env_left = s->num_env;
8754
8755 while (s->env_left > 0) {
8756 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8757
8758 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8759 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8760 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
8761 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8762 crStopV;
8763 }
8764 } else {
8765 s->env_ok++;
8766 }
8767
8768 s->env_left--;
8769 }
8770
8771 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
8772 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
8773 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
8774 logevent("All environment variables refused");
8775 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
8776 } else {
8777 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
8778 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
8779 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
8780 }
8781 }
8782
8783 /*
8784 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
8785 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
8786 * of command.
8787 */
8788 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
8789 int subsys;
8790 char *cmd;
8791
8792 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
8793 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
8794 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
8795 } else {
8796 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
8797 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
8798 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
8799 }
8800
8801 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8802 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8803 if (subsys) {
8804 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
8805 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8806 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8807 } else if (*cmd) {
8808 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
8809 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8810 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8811 } else {
8812 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
8813 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8814 }
8815 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8816
8817 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8818
8819 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8820 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8821 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
8822 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8823 crStopV;
8824 }
8825 /*
8826 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
8827 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
8828 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
8829 * back to it before complaining.
8830 */
8831 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
8832 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
8833 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
8834 continue;
8835 }
8836 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
8837 crStopV;
8838 } else {
8839 logevent("Started a shell/command");
8840 }
8841 break;
8842 }
8843
8844 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
8845 if (ssh->size_needed)
8846 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
8847 if (ssh->eof_needed)
8848 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
8849
8850 /*
8851 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
8852 * failure handler.
8853 */
8854 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
8855 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
8856
8857 /*
8858 * Transfer data!
8859 */
8860 if (ssh->ldisc)
8861 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
8862 if (ssh->mainchan)
8863 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8864 while (1) {
8865 crReturnV;
8866 s->try_send = FALSE;
8867 if (pktin) {
8868
8869 /*
8870 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
8871 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
8872 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
8873 */
8874
8875 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
8876 crStopV;
8877 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8878 /*
8879 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
8880 */
8881 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
8882 s->try_send = TRUE;
8883 }
8884 if (s->try_send) {
8885 int i;
8886 struct ssh_channel *c;
8887 /*
8888 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
8889 */
8890 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
8891 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
8892 }
8893 }
8894
8895 crFinishV;
8896 }
8897
8898 /*
8899 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
8900 */
8901 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8902 {
8903 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
8904 char *buf, *msg;
8905 int reason, msglen;
8906
8907 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8908 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8909
8910 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
8911 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
8912 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
8913 } else {
8914 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
8915 " type %d)", reason);
8916 }
8917 logevent(buf);
8918 sfree(buf);
8919 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
8920 msglen, msg);
8921 logevent(buf);
8922 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
8923 reason,
8924 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
8925 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
8926 msglen, msg));
8927 sfree(buf);
8928 }
8929
8930 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8931 {
8932 /* log the debug message */
8933 char *msg;
8934 int msglen;
8935 int always_display;
8936
8937 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
8938 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8939 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
8940
8941 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
8942 }
8943
8944 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
8945 {
8946 struct Packet *pktout;
8947 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
8948 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
8949 /*
8950 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
8951 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
8952 */
8953 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8954 }
8955
8956 /*
8957 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
8958 */
8959 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
8960 {
8961 int i;
8962
8963 /*
8964 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
8965 */
8966 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
8967 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
8968
8969 /*
8970 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
8971 * the coroutines will get it.
8972 */
8973 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
8974 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
8975 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
8976 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
8977 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
8978 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
8979 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
8980 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8981 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8982 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
8983 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
8984 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
8985 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
8986 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8987 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8988 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
8989 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8990 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
8991 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
8992 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
8993 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
8994 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
8995 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
8996 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
8997 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
8998 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
8999 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
9000 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
9001 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
9002 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
9003 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9004 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9005 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
9006
9007 /*
9008 * These special message types we install handlers for.
9009 */
9010 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9011 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9012 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9013 }
9014
9015 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9016 {
9017 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9018
9019 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9020 return;
9021
9022 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
9023 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9024 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9025 }
9026 }
9027
9028 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9029 struct Packet *pktin)
9030 {
9031 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9032 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9033 return;
9034
9035 if (pktin) {
9036 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9037 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9038 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9039 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9040 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9041 }
9042
9043 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9044 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9045 return;
9046 }
9047
9048 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9049 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9050 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9051 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9052 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9053 /*
9054 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9055 */
9056 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9057 }
9058 } else {
9059 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9060 }
9061 }
9062
9063 /*
9064 * Called to set up the connection.
9065 *
9066 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9067 */
9068 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9069 Config *cfg,
9070 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
9071 int keepalive)
9072 {
9073 const char *p;
9074 Ssh ssh;
9075
9076 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9077 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9078 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9079 ssh->s = NULL;
9080 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9081 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9082 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9083 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9084 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9085 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9086 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9087 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9088 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9089 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9090 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9091 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9092 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9093 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9094 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9095 ssh->kex = NULL;
9096 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9097 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9098 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9099 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9100 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9101 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9102 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9103 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9104 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9105 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9106 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9107 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9108 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9109 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9110 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9111 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9112 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9113 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9114 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9115 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9116 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9117 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
9118 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9119 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9120 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
9121 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
9122 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
9123 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9124 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9125 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9126 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9127 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9128 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9129 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9130 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9131 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9132 ssh->queue = NULL;
9133 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9134 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9135 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9136 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9137 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9138 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9139
9140 *backend_handle = ssh;
9141
9142 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9143 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9144 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9145 #endif
9146
9147 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9148 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
9149 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
9150
9151 ssh->channels = NULL;
9152 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9153 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9154
9155 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9156 ssh->editing = 0;
9157 ssh->echoing = 0;
9158 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9159 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9160 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9161
9162 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9163
9164 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9165
9166 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9167
9168 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9169 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9170 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
9171 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9172
9173 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9174 if (p != NULL)
9175 return p;
9176
9177 random_ref();
9178
9179 return NULL;
9180 }
9181
9182 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9183 {
9184 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9185 struct ssh_channel *c;
9186 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9187
9188 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9189 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9190 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9191 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9192 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9193 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9194 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9195 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9196 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9197 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9198 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9199 if (ssh->cscomp)
9200 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9201 else
9202 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9203 }
9204 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9205 if (ssh->sccomp)
9206 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9207 else
9208 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9209 }
9210 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9211 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9212 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9213
9214 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9215 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9216 sfree(ssh->queue);
9217
9218 while (ssh->qhead) {
9219 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9220 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9221 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9222 }
9223 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9224
9225 if (ssh->channels) {
9226 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9227 switch (c->type) {
9228 case CHAN_X11:
9229 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9230 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9231 break;
9232 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9233 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9234 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9235 break;
9236 }
9237 sfree(c);
9238 }
9239 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9240 ssh->channels = NULL;
9241 }
9242
9243 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9244 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9245 sfree(pf);
9246 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9247 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9248 }
9249 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9250 if (ssh->x11disp)
9251 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9252 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9253 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9254 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9255 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9256 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9257 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9258 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9259 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9260 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9261 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9262 }
9263 if (ssh->s)
9264 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9265 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9266 if (ssh->pinger)
9267 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9268 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9269 sfree(ssh);
9270
9271 random_unref();
9272 }
9273
9274 /*
9275 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9276 */
9277 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
9278 {
9279 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9280 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9281 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9282
9283 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
9284 if (ssh->portfwds)
9285 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
9286
9287 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
9288 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
9289 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9290 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9291
9292 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9293 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9294 } else {
9295 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9296 }
9297 }
9298
9299 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9300 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
9301 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9302 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9303 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9304 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9305 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9306 }
9307
9308 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
9309 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9310 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9311 }
9312
9313 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
9314 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
9315 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
9316 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9317 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9318 }
9319
9320 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9321
9322 if (rekeying) {
9323 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9324 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9325 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9326 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9327 }
9328 }
9329 }
9330
9331 /*
9332 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9333 */
9334 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9335 {
9336 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9337
9338 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9339 return 0;
9340
9341 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9342
9343 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9344 }
9345
9346 /*
9347 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9348 */
9349 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9350 {
9351 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9352 int override_value;
9353
9354 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9355 return 0;
9356
9357 /*
9358 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9359 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9360 */
9361 override_value = 0;
9362 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9363 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9364
9365 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9366 return override_value;
9367 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9368 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
9369 return override_value;
9370 else
9371 return (override_value +
9372 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9373 }
9374
9375 return 0;
9376 }
9377
9378 /*
9379 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9380 */
9381 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9382 {
9383 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9384 struct Packet *pktout;
9385
9386 ssh->term_width = width;
9387 ssh->term_height = height;
9388
9389 switch (ssh->state) {
9390 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9391 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9392 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9393 break; /* do nothing */
9394 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9395 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9396 break;
9397 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9398 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
9399 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9400 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9401 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9402 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9403 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9404 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9405 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9406 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9407 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9408 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9409 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9410 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9411 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9412 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9413 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9414 }
9415 }
9416 break;
9417 }
9418 }
9419
9420 /*
9421 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9422 * protocol.
9423 */
9424 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9425 {
9426 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9427 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9428 };
9429 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
9430 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9431 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9432 };
9433 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9434 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9435 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9436 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9437 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9438 * required signals. */
9439 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9440 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9441 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9442 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9443 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9444 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9445 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9446 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9447 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9448 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9449 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9450 };
9451 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9452 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9453 };
9454 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9455 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
9456 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9457 lenof(specials_end)];
9458 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9459 int i = 0;
9460 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9461 do { \
9462 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9463 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9464 i += lenof(name); \
9465 } while(0)
9466
9467 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9468 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9469 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9470 * asked anyway. */
9471 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9472 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9473 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9474 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
9475 if (ssh->mainchan)
9476 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9477 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9478
9479 if (i) {
9480 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9481 return ssh_specials;
9482 } else {
9483 return NULL;
9484 }
9485 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9486 }
9487
9488 /*
9489 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9490 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9491 * hostname sort').
9492 */
9493 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9494 {
9495 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9496 struct Packet *pktout;
9497
9498 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9499 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9500 /*
9501 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9502 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9503 */
9504 if (code == TS_EOF)
9505 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9506 return;
9507 }
9508 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9509 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9510 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9511 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
9512 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9513 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9514 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9515 }
9516 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9517 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9518 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9519 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9520 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9521 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9522 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9523 } else {
9524 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9525 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9526 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9527 }
9528 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9529 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9530 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9531 }
9532 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9533 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9534 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9535 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9536 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9537 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9538 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9539 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9540 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
9541 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9542 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
9543 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9544 }
9545 } else {
9546 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
9547 char *signame = NULL;
9548 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
9549 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
9550 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
9551 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
9552 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
9553 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
9554 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
9555 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
9556 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
9557 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
9558 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
9559 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
9560 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
9561 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
9562 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
9563 if (signame) {
9564 /* It's a signal. */
9565 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
9566 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9567 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9568 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
9569 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9570 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
9571 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9572 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
9573 }
9574 } else {
9575 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
9576 }
9577 }
9578 }
9579
9580 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
9581 {
9582 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9583 struct ssh_channel *c;
9584 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
9585
9586 c->ssh = ssh;
9587 ssh2_channel_init(c);
9588 c->halfopen = TRUE;
9589 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
9590 c->u.pfd.s = s;
9591 add234(ssh->channels, c);
9592 return c;
9593 }
9594
9595 /*
9596 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
9597 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
9598 */
9599 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
9600 {
9601 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9602 int buflimit;
9603
9604 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9605 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
9606 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9607 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9608 }
9609 } else {
9610 if (ssh->mainchan) {
9611 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
9612 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
9613 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
9614 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
9615 buflimit = 0;
9616 else
9617 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
9618 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
9619 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
9620 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9621 }
9622 }
9623 }
9624 }
9625
9626 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
9627 {
9628 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
9629 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
9630 struct Packet *pktout;
9631
9632 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
9633
9634 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9635 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
9636 PKT_INT, c->localid,
9637 PKT_STR, hostname,
9638 PKT_INT, port,
9639 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
9640 PKT_END);
9641 } else {
9642 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
9643 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
9644 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
9645 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
9646 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
9647 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
9648 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
9649 /*
9650 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
9651 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
9652 * convinced the server should be told details like that
9653 * about my local network configuration.
9654 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
9655 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
9656 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
9657 */
9658 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
9659 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9660 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9661 }
9662 }
9663
9664 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
9665 {
9666 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9667 return ssh->s != NULL;
9668 }
9669
9670 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
9671 {
9672 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9673 return ssh->send_ok;
9674 }
9675
9676 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
9677 {
9678 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9679 if (option == LD_ECHO)
9680 return ssh->echoing;
9681 if (option == LD_EDIT)
9682 return ssh->editing;
9683 return FALSE;
9684 }
9685
9686 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
9687 {
9688 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9689 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
9690 }
9691
9692 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
9693 {
9694 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9695 ssh->logctx = logctx;
9696 }
9697
9698 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
9699 {
9700 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9701 if (ssh->s != NULL)
9702 return -1;
9703 else
9704 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
9705 }
9706
9707 /*
9708 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
9709 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
9710 */
9711 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
9712 {
9713 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9714 return ssh->version;
9715 }
9716
9717 /*
9718 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
9719 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
9720 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
9721 */
9722 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
9723 {
9724 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9725 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
9726 }
9727
9728 Backend ssh_backend = {
9729 ssh_init,
9730 ssh_free,
9731 ssh_reconfig,
9732 ssh_send,
9733 ssh_sendbuffer,
9734 ssh_size,
9735 ssh_special,
9736 ssh_get_specials,
9737 ssh_connected,
9738 ssh_return_exitcode,
9739 ssh_sendok,
9740 ssh_ldisc,
9741 ssh_provide_ldisc,
9742 ssh_provide_logctx,
9743 ssh_unthrottle,
9744 ssh_cfg_info,
9745 "ssh",
9746 PROT_SSH,
9747 22
9748 };