When iterating over all channels for a dead SSH connection, don't miss out
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgssc.h"
17 #include "sshgss.h"
18 #endif
19
20 #ifndef FALSE
21 #define FALSE 0
22 #endif
23 #ifndef TRUE
24 #define TRUE 1
25 #endif
26
27 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
28 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
38 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
40 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
41 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
43 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
51 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
53 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
55 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
56 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
59 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
60 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
62 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
63 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
65 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
66 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
67 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
68
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
74 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
75
76 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
77 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
78 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
79
80 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
124 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
125
126 /*
127 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
128 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
129 */
130 typedef enum {
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
134 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
135 } Pkt_KCtx;
136 typedef enum {
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
141 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
142 } Pkt_ACtx;
143
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
158 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
159
160 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
161 NULL,
162 "host not allowed to connect",
163 "protocol error",
164 "key exchange failed",
165 "host authentication failed",
166 "MAC error",
167 "compression error",
168 "service not available",
169 "protocol version not supported",
170 "host key not verifiable",
171 "connection lost",
172 "by application",
173 "too many connections",
174 "auth cancelled by user",
175 "no more auth methods available",
176 "illegal user name",
177 };
178
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
182 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
183
184 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
185
186 /*
187 * Various remote-bug flags.
188 */
189 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
190 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
191 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
192 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
193 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
194 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
195 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
196 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
197 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
198 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
199
200 /*
201 * Codes for terminal modes.
202 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
203 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
204 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
205 */
206 static const struct {
207 const char* const mode;
208 int opcode;
209 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
210 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
211 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
212 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
213 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
229 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
230 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
253 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
255 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
256 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
263 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
264 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
265 };
266
267 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
268 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
269 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
270 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
271 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
272 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
273 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
274
275 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
276 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
277 {
278 unsigned int ret;
279 if (*s) {
280 char *next = NULL;
281 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
282 if (!next) ret = s[0];
283 } else {
284 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
285 }
286 return ret;
287 }
288 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
289 {
290 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
291 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
292 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
293 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
294 return 1; /* true */
295 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
296 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
297 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
298 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
299 return 0; /* false */
300 else
301 return (atoi(s) != 0);
302 }
303
304 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
305 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
306 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
307 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
308 {
309 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
310 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
314 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
320 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
321 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
323 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
324 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
326 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
327 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
328 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
331 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
332 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
333 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
334 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
335 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
336 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
337 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
338 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
339 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
340 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
342 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
343 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
345 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
346 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
348 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
349 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
350 return "unknown";
351 }
352 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
353 {
354 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
360 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
366 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
367 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
368 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
375 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
376 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
377 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
379 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
380 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
381 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
383 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
384 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
385 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
397 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
398 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
399 return "unknown";
400 }
401 #undef translate
402 #undef translatec
403
404 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
405 enum {
406 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
407 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
408 * fields to the packet logging code. */
409 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
410 };
411
412 /*
413 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
414 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
415 * read
416 *
417 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
418 *
419 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
420 *
421 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
422 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
423 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
424 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
425 *
426 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
427 * - click Settings
428 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
429 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
430 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
431 */
432 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
433 #define crState(t) \
434 struct t *s; \
435 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
436 s = ssh->t;
437 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
438 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
439 #define crReturn(z) \
440 do {\
441 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
442 } while (0)
443 #define crReturnV \
444 do {\
445 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
446 } while (0)
447 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
448 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
449 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
450 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
451
452 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
453 struct Packet;
454
455 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
456 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
457 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
458 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
459 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
460 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
461 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
463 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
464 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
465 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
466 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
467 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
468 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
469 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
470 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
471 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
472 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
473 struct Packet *pktin);
474 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
475 struct Packet *pktin);
476
477 /*
478 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
479 * various different purposes:
480 *
481 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
482 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
483 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
484 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
485 * happen very often.
486 *
487 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
488 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
489 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
490 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
491 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
492 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
493 *
494 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
495 * channels.
496 *
497 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
498 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
499 *
500 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
501 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
502 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
503 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
504 * data message.
505 *
506 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
507 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
508 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
509 */
510
511 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
512 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
513 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
514 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
515 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
516 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
517
518 /* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
519 #define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
520
521 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
522
523 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
524 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
525 };
526 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
527 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
528 };
529
530 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
531 {
532 return NULL;
533 }
534 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
535 {
536 }
537 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
538 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
539 {
540 return 0;
541 }
542 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
543 {
544 return 0;
545 }
546 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
547 "none",
548 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
549 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
550 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
551 };
552 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
553 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
554 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
555 };
556
557 enum { /* channel types */
558 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
559 CHAN_X11,
560 CHAN_AGENT,
561 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
562 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
563 };
564
565 /*
566 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
567 */
568 struct winadj {
569 struct winadj *next;
570 unsigned size;
571 };
572
573 /*
574 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
575 */
576 struct ssh_channel {
577 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
578 unsigned remoteid, localid;
579 int type;
580 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
581 int halfopen;
582 /*
583 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
584 *
585 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
586 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
587 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
588 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
589 *
590 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
591 */
592 int closes;
593
594 /*
595 * This flag indicates that a close is pending on the outgoing
596 * side of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data
597 * for this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We
598 * can't actually close the channel until we've finished sending
599 * the data, so we set this flag instead to remind us to
600 * initiate the closing process once our buffer is clear.
601 */
602 int pending_close;
603
604 /*
605 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
606 * throttled.
607 */
608 int throttling_conn;
609 union {
610 struct ssh2_data_channel {
611 bufchain outbuffer;
612 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
613 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
614 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
615 /*
616 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
617 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
618 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
619 */
620 int remlocwin;
621 /*
622 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
623 * been acked.
624 */
625 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
626 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
627 } v2;
628 } v;
629 union {
630 struct ssh_agent_channel {
631 unsigned char *message;
632 unsigned char msglen[4];
633 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
634 } a;
635 struct ssh_x11_channel {
636 Socket s;
637 } x11;
638 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
639 Socket s;
640 } pfd;
641 } u;
642 };
643
644 /*
645 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
646 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
647 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
648 *
649 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
650 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
651 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
652 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
653 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
654 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
655 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
656 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
657 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
658 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
659 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
660 *
661 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
662 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
663 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
664 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
665 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
666 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
667 *
668 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
669 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
670 */
671 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
672
673 struct ssh_rportfwd {
674 unsigned sport, dport;
675 char dhost[256];
676 char *sportdesc;
677 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
678 };
679 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
680 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
681
682 /*
683 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
684 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
685 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
686 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
687 * it.
688 */
689 struct ssh_portfwd {
690 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
691 int type;
692 unsigned sport, dport;
693 char *saddr, *daddr;
694 char *sserv, *dserv;
695 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
696 int addressfamily;
697 void *local;
698 };
699 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
700 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
701 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
702
703 struct Packet {
704 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
705 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
706 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
707 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
708 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
709 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
710 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
711 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
712 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
713
714 /*
715 * State associated with packet logging
716 */
717 int logmode;
718 int nblanks;
719 struct logblank_t *blanks;
720 };
721
722 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
723 struct Packet *pktin);
724 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
725 struct Packet *pktin);
726 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
727 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
728 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
729 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
730 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
731 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
732 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
733 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
734 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
735 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
736 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
737 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
738 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
739 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
740 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
741 struct Packet *pktin);
742
743 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
744 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
745 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
746 unsigned char *p;
747 int i;
748 int chunk;
749 struct Packet *pktin;
750 };
751
752 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
753 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
754 int i;
755 int cipherblk;
756 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
757 struct Packet *pktin;
758 };
759
760 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
761 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
762
763 struct queued_handler;
764 struct queued_handler {
765 int msg1, msg2;
766 chandler_fn_t handler;
767 void *ctx;
768 struct queued_handler *next;
769 };
770
771 struct ssh_tag {
772 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
773 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
774
775 char *v_c, *v_s;
776 void *exhash;
777
778 Socket s;
779
780 void *ldisc;
781 void *logctx;
782
783 unsigned char session_key[32];
784 int v1_compressing;
785 int v1_remote_protoflags;
786 int v1_local_protoflags;
787 int agentfwd_enabled;
788 int X11_fwd_enabled;
789 int remote_bugs;
790 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
791 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
792 void *crcda_ctx;
793 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
794 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
795 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
796 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
797 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
798 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
799 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
800 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
801 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
802 int v2_session_id_len;
803 void *kex_ctx;
804
805 char *savedhost;
806 int savedport;
807 int send_ok;
808 int echoing, editing;
809
810 void *frontend;
811
812 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
813 int term_width, term_height;
814
815 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
816 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
817 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
818 int exitcode;
819 int close_expected;
820 int clean_exit;
821
822 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
823
824 enum {
825 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
826 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
827 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
828 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
829 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
830 } state;
831
832 int size_needed, eof_needed;
833
834 struct Packet **queue;
835 int queuelen, queuesize;
836 int queueing;
837 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
838 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
839
840 /*
841 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
842 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
843 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
844 * got.
845 */
846 int fallback_cmd;
847
848 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
849
850 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
851 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
852
853 struct X11Display *x11disp;
854
855 int version;
856 int conn_throttle_count;
857 int overall_bufsize;
858 int throttled_all;
859 int v1_stdout_throttling;
860 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
861
862 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
863 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
864 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
865 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
866 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
867 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
868 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
869 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
870
871 void *do_ssh_init_state;
872 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
873 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
874 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
875
876 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
877 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
878
879 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
880 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
881
882 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
883 struct Packet *pkt);
884 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
885
886 /*
887 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
888 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
889 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
890 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
891 */
892 Config cfg;
893
894 /*
895 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
896 */
897 void *agent_response;
898 int agent_response_len;
899 int user_response;
900
901 /*
902 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
903 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
904 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
905 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
906 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
907 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
908 * store that data.
909 */
910 int frozen;
911 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
912
913 /*
914 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
915 * with at any time.
916 */
917 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
918
919 /*
920 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
921 * indications from a request.
922 */
923 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
924
925 /*
926 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
927 */
928 Pinger pinger;
929
930 /*
931 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
932 * size-based rekeys.
933 */
934 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
935 unsigned long max_data_size;
936 int kex_in_progress;
937 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
938 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
939
940 /*
941 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
942 */
943 char *fullhostname;
944
945 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
946 /*
947 * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
948 */
949 struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
950 #endif
951 };
952
953 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
954
955 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
956 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
957 {
958 va_list ap;
959 char *buf;
960
961 va_start(ap, fmt);
962 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
963 va_end(ap);
964 logevent(buf);
965 sfree(buf);
966 }
967
968 #define bombout(msg) \
969 do { \
970 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
971 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
972 logevent(text); \
973 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
974 sfree(text); \
975 } while (0)
976
977 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
978
979 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
980 {
981 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
982 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
983 }
984
985 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
986 {
987 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
988 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
989 }
990
991 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
992 {
993 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
994 }
995
996 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
997 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
998 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
999 void *data)
1000 {
1001 while (*modes) {
1002 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
1003 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
1004 char *val;
1005 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
1006 m[t-modes] = '\0';
1007 if (*(t+1) == 'A')
1008 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
1009 else
1010 val = dupstr(t+2);
1011 if (val)
1012 do_mode(data, m, val);
1013 sfree(m);
1014 sfree(val);
1015 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
1016 }
1017 }
1018
1019 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1020 {
1021 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1022 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1023 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1024 return -1;
1025 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1026 return +1;
1027 return 0;
1028 }
1029 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1030 {
1031 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1032 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1033 if (*a < b->localid)
1034 return -1;
1035 if (*a > b->localid)
1036 return +1;
1037 return 0;
1038 }
1039
1040 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1041 {
1042 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1043 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1044 int i;
1045 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1046 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1047 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1048 return +1;
1049 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1050 return -1;
1051 return 0;
1052 }
1053
1054 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1055 {
1056 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1057 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1058
1059 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1060 return +1;
1061 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1062 return -1;
1063 return 0;
1064 }
1065
1066 /*
1067 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1068 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1069 */
1070 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1071 {
1072 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1073 return 0;
1074 if (a == NULL)
1075 return -1;
1076 if (b == NULL)
1077 return +1;
1078 return strcmp(a, b);
1079 }
1080
1081 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1082 {
1083 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1084 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1085 int i;
1086 if (a->type > b->type)
1087 return +1;
1088 if (a->type < b->type)
1089 return -1;
1090 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1091 return +1;
1092 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1093 return -1;
1094 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1095 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1096 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1097 return +1;
1098 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1099 return -1;
1100 if (a->type != 'D') {
1101 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1102 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1103 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1104 return +1;
1105 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1106 return -1;
1107 }
1108 return 0;
1109 }
1110
1111 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1112 {
1113 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1114 unsigned low, high, mid;
1115 int tsize;
1116 struct ssh_channel *c;
1117
1118 /*
1119 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1120 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1121 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1122 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1123 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1124 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1125 */
1126 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1127
1128 low = -1;
1129 high = tsize;
1130 while (high - low > 1) {
1131 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1132 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1133 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1134 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1135 else
1136 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1137 }
1138 /*
1139 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1140 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1141 */
1142 {
1143 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1144 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1145 }
1146 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1147 }
1148
1149 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1150 {
1151 int i;
1152 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1153 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1154 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1155 }
1156
1157 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1158 {
1159 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1160 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1161 else
1162 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1163 }
1164
1165 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1166 {
1167 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1168 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1169 else
1170 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1171 }
1172
1173 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1174 {
1175 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1176 }
1177
1178 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1179 {
1180 sfree(pkt->data);
1181 sfree(pkt);
1182 }
1183 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1184 {
1185 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1186
1187 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1188 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1189 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1190 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1191 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1192
1193 return pkt;
1194 }
1195
1196 /*
1197 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1198 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1199 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1200 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1201 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1202 */
1203 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1204 {
1205 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1206
1207 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1208
1209 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1210
1211 st->pktin->type = 0;
1212 st->pktin->length = 0;
1213
1214 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1215 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1216 crReturn(NULL);
1217 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1218 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1219 }
1220
1221 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1222 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1223 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1224
1225 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1226 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1227 " data stream corruption"));
1228 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1229 crStop(NULL);
1230 }
1231
1232 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1233 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1234
1235 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1236 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1237 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1238 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1239 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1240 crReturn(NULL);
1241 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1242 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1243 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1244 *data += st->chunk;
1245 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1246 st->p += st->chunk;
1247 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1248 }
1249
1250 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1251 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1252 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1253 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1254 crStop(NULL);
1255 }
1256
1257 if (ssh->cipher)
1258 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1259
1260 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1261 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1262 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1263 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1264 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1265 crStop(NULL);
1266 }
1267
1268 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1269 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1270
1271 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1272 unsigned char *decompblk;
1273 int decomplen;
1274 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1275 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1276 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1277 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1278 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1279 crStop(NULL);
1280 }
1281
1282 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1283 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1284 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1285 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1286 unsigned char);
1287 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1288 }
1289
1290 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1291 sfree(decompblk);
1292 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1293 }
1294
1295 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1296
1297 /*
1298 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1299 */
1300 if (ssh->logctx) {
1301 int nblanks = 0;
1302 struct logblank_t blank;
1303 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1304 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1305 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1306 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1307 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1308 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1309 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1310 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1311 }
1312 if (do_blank) {
1313 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1314 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1315 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1316 nblanks = 1;
1317 }
1318 }
1319 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1320 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1321 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1322 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1323 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1324 }
1325
1326 crFinish(st->pktin);
1327 }
1328
1329 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1330 {
1331 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1332
1333 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1334
1335 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1336
1337 st->pktin->type = 0;
1338 st->pktin->length = 0;
1339 if (ssh->sccipher)
1340 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1341 else
1342 st->cipherblk = 8;
1343 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1344 st->cipherblk = 8;
1345 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1346
1347 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1348 ssh->scmac) {
1349 /*
1350 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1351 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1352 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1353 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1354 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1355 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1356 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1357 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1358 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1359 * plausible.
1360 */
1361
1362 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1363 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1364 unsigned char);
1365
1366 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1367 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1368 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1369 crReturn(NULL);
1370 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1371 (*datalen)--;
1372 }
1373
1374 st->packetlen = 0;
1375 {
1376 unsigned char seq[4];
1377 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1378 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1379 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1380 }
1381
1382 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1383 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1384 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1385 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1386 crReturn(NULL);
1387 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1388 (*datalen)--;
1389 }
1390 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1391 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1392 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1393 st->cipherblk);
1394 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1395 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1396 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1397 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1398 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1399 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1400 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1401 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1402 break;
1403 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1404 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1405 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1406 crStop(NULL);
1407 }
1408 }
1409 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1410 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1411 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1412 unsigned char);
1413 } else {
1414 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1415
1416 /*
1417 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1418 * contain the length and padding details.
1419 */
1420 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1421 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1422 crReturn(NULL);
1423 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1424 (*datalen)--;
1425 }
1426
1427 if (ssh->sccipher)
1428 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1429 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1430
1431 /*
1432 * Now get the length figure.
1433 */
1434 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1435
1436 /*
1437 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1438 * do us any more damage.
1439 */
1440 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1441 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1442 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1443 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1444 crStop(NULL);
1445 }
1446
1447 /*
1448 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1449 */
1450 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1451
1452 /*
1453 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1454 */
1455 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1456 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1457 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1458 unsigned char);
1459
1460 /*
1461 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1462 */
1463 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1464 st->i++) {
1465 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1466 crReturn(NULL);
1467 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1468 (*datalen)--;
1469 }
1470 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1471 if (ssh->sccipher)
1472 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1473 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1474 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1475
1476 /*
1477 * Check the MAC.
1478 */
1479 if (ssh->scmac
1480 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1481 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1482 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1483 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1484 crStop(NULL);
1485 }
1486 }
1487 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1488 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1489 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1490 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1491 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1492 crStop(NULL);
1493 }
1494 /*
1495 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1496 */
1497 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1498
1499 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1500 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1501
1502 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1503
1504 /*
1505 * Decompress packet payload.
1506 */
1507 {
1508 unsigned char *newpayload;
1509 int newlen;
1510 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1511 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1512 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1513 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1514 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1515 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1516 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1517 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1518 unsigned char);
1519 }
1520 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1521 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1522 sfree(newpayload);
1523 }
1524 }
1525
1526 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1527 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1528 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1529
1530 /*
1531 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1532 */
1533 if (ssh->logctx) {
1534 int nblanks = 0;
1535 struct logblank_t blank;
1536 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1537 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1538 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1539 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1540 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1541 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1542 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1543 }
1544 if (do_blank) {
1545 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1546 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1547 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1548 nblanks = 1;
1549 }
1550 }
1551 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1552 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1553 st->pktin->type),
1554 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1555 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1556 }
1557
1558 crFinish(st->pktin);
1559 }
1560
1561 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1562 {
1563 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1564 unsigned long crc;
1565 #ifdef __SC__
1566 /*
1567 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1568 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1569 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1570 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1571 */
1572 volatile
1573 #endif
1574 int len;
1575
1576 if (ssh->logctx)
1577 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1578 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1579 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1580 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1581 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1582 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1583
1584 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1585 unsigned char *compblk;
1586 int complen;
1587 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1588 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1589 &compblk, &complen);
1590 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1591 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1592 sfree(compblk);
1593 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1594 }
1595
1596 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1597 pkt->length += 4;
1598 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1599 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1600 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1601 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1602
1603 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1604 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1605 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1606 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1607 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1608
1609 if (ssh->cipher)
1610 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1611 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1612
1613 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1614 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1615 }
1616
1617 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1618 {
1619 if (ssh->logctx)
1620 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1621 0, NULL, NULL);
1622 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1623 }
1624
1625 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1626 {
1627 int len, backlog, offset;
1628 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1629 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1630 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1631 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1632 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1633 }
1634
1635 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1636 {
1637 int len, offset;
1638 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1639 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1640 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1641 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1642 ssh->deferred_size,
1643 unsigned char);
1644 }
1645 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1646 pkt->data + offset, len);
1647 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1648 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1649 }
1650
1651 /*
1652 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1653 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1654 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1655 */
1656 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1657 {
1658 int argtype;
1659 Bignum bn;
1660 struct Packet *pkt;
1661
1662 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1663
1664 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1665 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1666 char *sargp;
1667 unsigned long argint;
1668 int arglen;
1669 switch (argtype) {
1670 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1671 case PKT_INT:
1672 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1673 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1674 break;
1675 case PKT_CHAR:
1676 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1677 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1678 break;
1679 case PKT_DATA:
1680 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1681 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1682 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1683 break;
1684 case PKT_STR:
1685 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1686 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1687 break;
1688 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1689 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1690 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1691 break;
1692 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1693 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1694 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1695 break;
1696 case PKTT_DATA:
1697 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1698 break;
1699 case PKTT_OTHER:
1700 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1701 break;
1702 }
1703 }
1704
1705 return pkt;
1706 }
1707
1708 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1709 {
1710 struct Packet *pkt;
1711 va_list ap;
1712 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1713 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1714 va_end(ap);
1715 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1716 }
1717
1718 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1719 {
1720 struct Packet *pkt;
1721 va_list ap;
1722 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1723 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1724 va_end(ap);
1725 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1726 }
1727
1728 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1729 {
1730 char *ae, *be;
1731 unsigned long av, bv;
1732
1733 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1734 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1735 if (av != bv)
1736 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1737 if (*ae == '.')
1738 ae++;
1739 if (*be == '.')
1740 be++;
1741 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1742 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1743 if (av != bv)
1744 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1745 return 0;
1746 }
1747
1748 /*
1749 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1750 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1751 */
1752 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1753 {
1754 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1755 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1756 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1757 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1758 }
1759
1760 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1761 {
1762 unsigned char intblk[4];
1763 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1764 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1765 }
1766
1767 /*
1768 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1769 */
1770 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1771 {
1772 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1773 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1774 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1775 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1776 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1777 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1778 }
1779 }
1780 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1781 {
1782 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1783 pkt->nblanks++;
1784 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1785 assert(pkt->body);
1786 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1787 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1788 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1789 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1790 }
1791 pkt->length += len;
1792 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1793 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1794 }
1795 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1796 {
1797 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1798 }
1799 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1800 {
1801 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1802 }
1803 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1804 {
1805 unsigned char x[4];
1806 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1807 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1808 }
1809 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1810 {
1811 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1812 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1813 }
1814 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1815 {
1816 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1817 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1818 }
1819 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1820 {
1821 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1822 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1823 }
1824 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1825 {
1826 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1827 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1828 }
1829 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1830 {
1831 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1832 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1833 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1834 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1835 sfree(data);
1836 }
1837 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1838 {
1839 unsigned char *p;
1840 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1841 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1842 p[0] = 0;
1843 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1844 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1845 i = 0;
1846 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1847 i++;
1848 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1849 *len = n + 1 - i;
1850 return p;
1851 }
1852 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1853 {
1854 unsigned char *p;
1855 int len;
1856 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1857 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1858 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1859 sfree(p);
1860 }
1861
1862 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1863 {
1864 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1865 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1866 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1867 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1868 return pkt;
1869 }
1870
1871 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1872 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1873 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1874 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1875 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1876 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1877 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1878 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1879 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1880
1881 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1882 {
1883 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1884 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1885 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1886 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1887 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1888 return pkt;
1889 }
1890
1891 /*
1892 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1893 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1894 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1895 */
1896 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1897 {
1898 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1899
1900 if (ssh->logctx)
1901 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1902 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1903 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1904 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1905 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1906 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1907
1908 /*
1909 * Compress packet payload.
1910 */
1911 {
1912 unsigned char *newpayload;
1913 int newlen;
1914 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1915 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1916 pkt->length - 5,
1917 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1918 pkt->length = 5;
1919 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1920 sfree(newpayload);
1921 }
1922 }
1923
1924 /*
1925 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1926 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1927 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1928 * after padding.
1929 */
1930 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1931 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1932 padding = 4;
1933 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1934 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1935 padding +=
1936 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1937 assert(padding <= 255);
1938 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1939 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1940 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1941 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1942 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1943 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1944 if (ssh->csmac)
1945 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1946 pkt->length + padding,
1947 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1948 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1949
1950 if (ssh->cscipher)
1951 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1952 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1953
1954 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1955
1956 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1957 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1958 }
1959
1960 /*
1961 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1962 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1963 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1964 *
1965 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1966 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1967 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1968 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1969 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1970 * works after packet encryption.
1971 *
1972 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1973 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1974 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1975 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1976 * then send them once we've finished.
1977 *
1978 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1979 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1980 *
1981 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1982 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1983 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1984 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1985 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1986 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1987 *
1988 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1989 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1990 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1991 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1992 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1993 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1994 * CBC.
1995 */
1996
1997 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1998 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1999
2000 /*
2001 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
2002 */
2003 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2004 {
2005 int len;
2006 int backlog;
2007 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
2008 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
2009 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2010 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2011 return;
2012 }
2013 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2014 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
2015 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2016 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2017
2018 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2019 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2020 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2021 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2022 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2023
2024 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2025 }
2026
2027 /*
2028 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2029 */
2030 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2031 {
2032 int len;
2033 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2034 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
2035 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2036 /*
2037 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2038 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2039 */
2040 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2041 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2042 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2043 }
2044 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2045 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2046 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2047 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2048 ssh->deferred_size,
2049 unsigned char);
2050 }
2051 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2052 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2053 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2054 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2055 }
2056
2057 /*
2058 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2059 */
2060 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2061 {
2062 assert(ssh->queueing);
2063
2064 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2065 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2066 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2067 }
2068
2069 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2070 }
2071
2072 /*
2073 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2074 * set.
2075 */
2076 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2077 {
2078 if (ssh->queueing)
2079 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2080 else
2081 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2082 }
2083
2084 /*
2085 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2086 * set.
2087 */
2088 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2089 {
2090 if (ssh->queueing)
2091 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2092 else
2093 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2094 }
2095
2096 /*
2097 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2098 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2099 *
2100 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2101 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2102 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2103 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2104 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2105 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2106 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2107 * ssh->queueing.
2108 */
2109 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2110 {
2111 int backlog;
2112 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2113 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2114 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2115 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2116 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2117 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2118
2119 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2120 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2121 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2122 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2123 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2124 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2125 }
2126
2127 /*
2128 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2129 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2130 */
2131 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2132 int padsize)
2133 {
2134 #if 0
2135 if (0) {
2136 /*
2137 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2138 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2139 *
2140 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2141 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2142 * always Cisco?)
2143 */
2144 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2145 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2146 } else
2147 #endif
2148 {
2149 /*
2150 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2151 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2152 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2153 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2154 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2155 */
2156 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2157
2158 /*
2159 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2160 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2161 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2162 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2163 * gain nothing by it.)
2164 */
2165 if (ssh->cscipher &&
2166 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2167 int stringlen, i;
2168
2169 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2170 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2171 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2172 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2173 /*
2174 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2175 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2176 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2177 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2178 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2179 * by.
2180 */
2181 stringlen -=
2182 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2183 }
2184 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2185 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2186 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2187 char c = (char) random_byte();
2188 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2189 }
2190 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2191 }
2192 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2193 }
2194 }
2195
2196 /*
2197 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2198 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2199 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2200 */
2201 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2202 {
2203 int i;
2204
2205 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2206
2207 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2208 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2209 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2210
2211 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2212 }
2213
2214 #if 0
2215 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2216 {
2217 unsigned char *p;
2218 int i, len;
2219 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2220 debug(("%s", string));
2221 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2222 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2223 debug(("\n"));
2224 sfree(p);
2225 }
2226 #endif
2227
2228 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2229 {
2230 unsigned char *p;
2231 int len;
2232 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2233 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2234 sfree(p);
2235 }
2236
2237 /*
2238 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2239 */
2240 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2241 {
2242 unsigned long value;
2243 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2244 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2245 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2246 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2247 return value;
2248 }
2249 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2250 {
2251 unsigned long value;
2252 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2253 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2254 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2255 pkt->savedpos++;
2256 return value;
2257 }
2258 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2259 {
2260 int len;
2261 *p = NULL;
2262 *length = 0;
2263 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2264 return;
2265 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2266 if (len < 0)
2267 return;
2268 *length = len;
2269 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2270 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2271 return;
2272 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2273 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2274 }
2275 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2276 {
2277 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2278 return NULL;
2279 pkt->savedpos += length;
2280 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2281 }
2282 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2283 unsigned char **keystr)
2284 {
2285 int j;
2286
2287 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2288 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2289 key, keystr, 0);
2290
2291 if (j < 0)
2292 return FALSE;
2293
2294 pkt->savedpos += j;
2295 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2296
2297 return TRUE;
2298 }
2299 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2300 {
2301 int j;
2302 Bignum b;
2303
2304 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2305 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2306
2307 if (j < 0)
2308 return NULL;
2309
2310 pkt->savedpos += j;
2311 return b;
2312 }
2313 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2314 {
2315 char *p;
2316 int length;
2317 Bignum b;
2318
2319 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2320 if (!p)
2321 return NULL;
2322 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2323 return NULL;
2324 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2325 return b;
2326 }
2327
2328 /*
2329 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2330 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2331 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2332 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2333 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2334 */
2335 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2336 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2337 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2338 {
2339 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2340 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2341
2342 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2343 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2344
2345 /*
2346 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2347 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2348 */
2349 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2350 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2351 int pos, len, siglen;
2352
2353 /*
2354 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2355 */
2356
2357 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2358 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2359 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2360 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2361 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2362 len--, pos++;
2363 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2364
2365 /*
2366 * Now find the signature integer.
2367 */
2368 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2369 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2370 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2371
2372 if (len != siglen) {
2373 unsigned char newlen[4];
2374 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2375 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2376 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2377 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2378 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2379 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2380 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2381 newlen[0] = 0;
2382 while (len-- > siglen) {
2383 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2384 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2385 }
2386 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2387 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2388 return;
2389 }
2390
2391 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2392 }
2393
2394 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2395 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2396 }
2397
2398 /*
2399 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2400 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2401 */
2402 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2403 {
2404 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2405 imp = vstring;
2406 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2407 if (*imp) imp++;
2408 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2409 if (*imp) imp++;
2410
2411 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2412
2413 /*
2414 * General notes on server version strings:
2415 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2416 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2417 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2418 * so we can't distinguish them.
2419 */
2420 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2421 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2422 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2423 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2424 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2425 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2426 /*
2427 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2428 * to use a different defence against password length
2429 * sniffing.
2430 */
2431 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2432 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2433 }
2434
2435 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2436 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2437 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2438 /*
2439 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2440 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2441 * the password.
2442 */
2443 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2444 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2445 }
2446
2447 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2448 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2449 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2450 /*
2451 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2452 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2453 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2454 */
2455 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2456 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2457 }
2458
2459 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2460 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2461 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2462 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2463 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2464 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2465 /*
2466 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2467 */
2468 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2469 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2470 }
2471
2472 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2473 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2474 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2475 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2476 /*
2477 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2478 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2479 * generate the keys).
2480 */
2481 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2482 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2483 }
2484
2485 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2486 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2487 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2488 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2489 /*
2490 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2491 */
2492 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2493 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2494 }
2495
2496 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2497 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2498 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2499 /*
2500 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2501 * public-key authentication.
2502 */
2503 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2504 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2505 }
2506
2507 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2508 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2509 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2510 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2511 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2512 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2513 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2514 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2515 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2516 /*
2517 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2518 */
2519 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2520 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2521 }
2522
2523 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
2524 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
2525 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2526 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2527 /*
2528 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2529 */
2530 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2531 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2532 }
2533
2534 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore2 == FORCE_ON) {
2535 /*
2536 * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
2537 * none detected automatically.
2538 */
2539 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
2540 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
2541 }
2542 }
2543
2544 /*
2545 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2546 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2547 */
2548 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2549 {
2550 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2551 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2552 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2553 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2554 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2555 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2556 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2557
2558 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2559 * underscores. */
2560 while (*str) {
2561 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2562 *str = '_';
2563 str++;
2564 }
2565 }
2566
2567 /*
2568 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2569 */
2570 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2571 {
2572 char *verstring;
2573
2574 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2575 /*
2576 * Construct a v2 version string.
2577 */
2578 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2579 } else {
2580 /*
2581 * Construct a v1 version string.
2582 */
2583 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2584 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2585 svers : "1.5"),
2586 sshver);
2587 }
2588
2589 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2590
2591 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2592 size_t len;
2593 /*
2594 * Record our version string.
2595 */
2596 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2597 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2598 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2599 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2600 }
2601
2602 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2603 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2604 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2605 sfree(verstring);
2606 }
2607
2608 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2609 {
2610 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2611 int vslen;
2612 char version[10];
2613 char *vstring;
2614 int vstrsize;
2615 int i;
2616 int proto1, proto2;
2617 };
2618 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2619
2620 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2621
2622 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2623 for (;;) {
2624 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2625 crReturn(1);
2626 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2627 crReturn(1);
2628 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2629 crReturn(1);
2630 if (c != '-') goto no;
2631 break;
2632 no:
2633 while (c != '\012')
2634 crReturn(1);
2635 crReturn(1);
2636 }
2637
2638 s->vstrsize = 16;
2639 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2640 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2641 s->vslen = 4;
2642 s->i = 0;
2643 while (1) {
2644 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2645 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2646 s->vstrsize += 16;
2647 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2648 }
2649 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2650 if (s->i >= 0) {
2651 if (c == '-') {
2652 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2653 s->i = -1;
2654 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2655 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2656 } else if (c == '\012')
2657 break;
2658 }
2659
2660 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2661 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2662
2663 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2664 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2665 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2666 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2667
2668 /*
2669 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2670 */
2671
2672 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2673 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2674 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2675 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2676
2677 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2678 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2679 crStop(0);
2680 }
2681 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2682 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2683 crStop(0);
2684 }
2685
2686 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2687 ssh->version = 2;
2688 else
2689 ssh->version = 1;
2690
2691 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2692
2693 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2694 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
2695 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2696
2697 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2698 size_t len;
2699 /*
2700 * Record their version string.
2701 */
2702 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2703 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2704 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2705 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2706
2707 /*
2708 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2709 */
2710 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2711 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2712 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2713 } else {
2714 /*
2715 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2716 */
2717 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2718 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2719 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2720 }
2721 if (ssh->version == 2)
2722 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2723
2724 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2725 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2726 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2727
2728 sfree(s->vstring);
2729
2730 crFinish(0);
2731 }
2732
2733 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2734 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2735 {
2736 struct Packet *pktin;
2737
2738 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2739 if (pktin) {
2740 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2741 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2742 }
2743 }
2744
2745 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2746 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2747 {
2748 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2749 *data += *datalen;
2750 *datalen = 0;
2751 }
2752
2753 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2754 {
2755 void *vdata;
2756 unsigned char *data;
2757 int len, origlen;
2758
2759 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2760 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2761 data = vdata;
2762 origlen = len;
2763
2764 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2765 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2766
2767 if (origlen > len)
2768 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2769 }
2770 }
2771
2772 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2773 {
2774 if (ssh->s)
2775 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2776 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2777 }
2778
2779 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2780 {
2781 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2782 if (ssh->logctx)
2783 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2784 0, NULL, NULL);
2785
2786 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2787
2788 /*
2789 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2790 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2791 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2792 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2793 */
2794 while (1) {
2795 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2796 if (datalen == 0)
2797 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2798 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2799 data++;
2800 datalen--;
2801 if (ret == 0)
2802 break;
2803 }
2804
2805 /*
2806 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2807 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2808 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2809 * to the proper protocol handler.
2810 */
2811
2812 while (1) {
2813 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2814 if (ssh->frozen) {
2815 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2816 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2817 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2818 * return, so break out. */
2819 break;
2820 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2821 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2822 * session. */
2823 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2824 } else {
2825 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2826 * session. */
2827 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2828 }
2829 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2830 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2831 return;
2832 }
2833 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2834 crReturnV;
2835 }
2836 crFinishV;
2837 }
2838
2839 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2840 {
2841 int ret = 0;
2842 struct ssh_channel *c;
2843
2844 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2845 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2846 if (ssh->s) {
2847 sk_close(ssh->s);
2848 ssh->s = NULL;
2849 if (notify_exit)
2850 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2851 else
2852 ret = 1;
2853 }
2854 /*
2855 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2856 * through this connection.
2857 */
2858 if (ssh->channels) {
2859 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2860 switch (c->type) {
2861 case CHAN_X11:
2862 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2863 break;
2864 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2865 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
2866 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2867 break;
2868 }
2869 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2870 if (ssh->version == 2)
2871 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2872 sfree(c);
2873 }
2874 }
2875 /*
2876 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2877 * listening sockets.
2878 */
2879 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2880 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2881 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2882 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2883 if (pf->local)
2884 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2885 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2886 free_portfwd(pf);
2887 }
2888 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
2889 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
2890 }
2891
2892 return ret;
2893 }
2894
2895 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2896 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2897 {
2898 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2899 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2900
2901 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2902
2903 if (type == 0)
2904 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2905 else
2906 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2907
2908 logevent(msg);
2909 sfree(msg);
2910 }
2911
2912 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2913 int calling_back)
2914 {
2915 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2916 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2917
2918 if (!error_msg) {
2919 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2920 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2921 else
2922 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2923 }
2924
2925 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2926 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2927
2928 if (need_notify)
2929 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2930
2931 if (error_msg)
2932 logevent(error_msg);
2933 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2934 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2935 return 0;
2936 }
2937
2938 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2939 {
2940 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2941 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2942 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2943 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2944 return 0;
2945 }
2946 return 1;
2947 }
2948
2949 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2950 {
2951 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2952 /*
2953 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2954 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2955 */
2956 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2957 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2958 }
2959
2960 /*
2961 * Connect to specified host and port.
2962 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2963 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2964 * freed by the caller.
2965 */
2966 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2967 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2968 {
2969 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2970 ssh_log,
2971 ssh_closing,
2972 ssh_receive,
2973 ssh_sent,
2974 NULL
2975 };
2976
2977 SockAddr addr;
2978 const char *err;
2979
2980 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
2981 char *colon;
2982
2983 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
2984 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
2985
2986 /*
2987 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
2988 * savedport.
2989 *
2990 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
2991 */
2992 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
2993 if (colon) {
2994 *colon++ = '\0';
2995 if (*colon)
2996 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
2997 }
2998 } else {
2999 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
3000 if (port < 0)
3001 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
3002 ssh->savedport = port;
3003 }
3004
3005 /*
3006 * Try to find host.
3007 */
3008 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
3009 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
3010 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
3011 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
3012 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
3013 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
3014 sk_addr_free(addr);
3015 return err;
3016 }
3017 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
3018
3019 /*
3020 * Open socket.
3021 */
3022 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
3023 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
3024 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
3025 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
3026 ssh->s = NULL;
3027 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
3028 return err;
3029 }
3030
3031 /*
3032 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
3033 * send the version string too.
3034 */
3035 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
3036 ssh->version = 1;
3037 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
3038 ssh->version = 2;
3039 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3040 }
3041
3042 /*
3043 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3044 */
3045 if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
3046 sfree(*realhost);
3047 *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
3048 }
3049
3050 return NULL;
3051 }
3052
3053 /*
3054 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3055 */
3056 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3057 {
3058 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3059 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3060 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3061 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3062 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3063 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3064 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3065 }
3066 }
3067
3068 /*
3069 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3070 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3071 */
3072 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3073 {
3074 int i;
3075 struct ssh_channel *c;
3076
3077 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3078 return;
3079 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3080 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3081 if (!ssh->channels)
3082 return;
3083 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3084 switch (c->type) {
3085 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3086 /*
3087 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3088 */
3089 break;
3090 case CHAN_X11:
3091 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3092 break;
3093 case CHAN_AGENT:
3094 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3095 break;
3096 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3097 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3098 break;
3099 }
3100 }
3101 }
3102
3103 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3104 {
3105 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3106
3107 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3108 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3109
3110 if (ssh->version == 1)
3111 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3112 else
3113 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3114 }
3115
3116 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3117 {
3118 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3119
3120 ssh->user_response = ret;
3121
3122 if (ssh->version == 1)
3123 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3124 else
3125 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3126
3127 /*
3128 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3129 * queued-data run.
3130 */
3131 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3132 }
3133
3134 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3135 {
3136 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3137 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3138 void *sentreply = reply;
3139
3140 if (!sentreply) {
3141 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3142 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3143 replylen = 5;
3144 }
3145 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3146 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3147 ssh2_try_send(c);
3148 } else {
3149 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3150 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3151 PKT_INT, replylen,
3152 PKTT_DATA,
3153 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3154 PKTT_OTHER,
3155 PKT_END);
3156 }
3157 if (reply)
3158 sfree(reply);
3159 }
3160
3161 /*
3162 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3163 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3164 * => log `wire_reason'.
3165 */
3166 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3167 int code, int clean_exit)
3168 {
3169 char *error;
3170 if (!client_reason)
3171 client_reason = wire_reason;
3172 if (client_reason)
3173 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3174 else
3175 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3176 if (wire_reason) {
3177 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3178 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3179 PKT_END);
3180 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3181 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3182 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3183 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3184 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3185 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3186 }
3187 }
3188 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3189 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3190 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3191 sfree(error);
3192 }
3193
3194 /*
3195 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3196 */
3197 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3198 struct Packet *pktin)
3199 {
3200 int i, j, ret;
3201 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3202 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3203 struct MD5Context md5c;
3204 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3205 int len;
3206 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3207 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3208 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3209 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3210 unsigned char session_id[16];
3211 int cipher_type;
3212 char username[100];
3213 void *publickey_blob;
3214 int publickey_bloblen;
3215 char *publickey_comment;
3216 int publickey_encrypted;
3217 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3218 char c;
3219 int pwpkt_type;
3220 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3221 int responselen;
3222 int keyi, nkeys;
3223 int authed;
3224 struct RSAKey key;
3225 Bignum challenge;
3226 char *commentp;
3227 int commentlen;
3228 int dlgret;
3229 };
3230 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3231
3232 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
3233
3234 if (!pktin)
3235 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3236
3237 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3238 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3239 crStop(0);
3240 }
3241
3242 logevent("Received public keys");
3243
3244 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3245 if (!ptr) {
3246 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3247 crStop(0);
3248 }
3249 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3250
3251 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3252 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3253 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3254 crStop(0);
3255 }
3256
3257 /*
3258 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3259 */
3260 {
3261 char logmsg[80];
3262 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3263 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3264 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3265 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3266 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3267 logevent(logmsg);
3268 }
3269
3270 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3271 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3272 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3273 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3274 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3275
3276 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3277 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3278 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3279
3280 MD5Init(&md5c);
3281 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3282 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3283 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3284 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3285
3286 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3287 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3288
3289 /*
3290 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3291 */
3292 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3293 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3294 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3295 crStop(0);
3296 }
3297
3298 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3299
3300 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3301
3302 /*
3303 * Verify the host key.
3304 */
3305 {
3306 /*
3307 * First format the key into a string.
3308 */
3309 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3310 char fingerprint[100];
3311 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3312 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3313 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3314
3315 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3316 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3317 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3318 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3319 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3320 sfree(keystr);
3321 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3322 do {
3323 crReturn(0);
3324 if (pktin) {
3325 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3326 " for user host key response"));
3327 crStop(0);
3328 }
3329 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3330 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3331 }
3332 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3333
3334 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3335 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3336 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3337 crStop(0);
3338 }
3339 }
3340
3341 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3342 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3343 if (i < 16)
3344 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3345 }
3346
3347 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3348 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3349 if (ret)
3350 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3351 } else {
3352 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3353 if (ret)
3354 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3355 }
3356 if (!ret) {
3357 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3358 crStop(0);
3359 }
3360
3361 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3362
3363 {
3364 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3365 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3366 int i;
3367 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3368 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3369 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3370 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3371 warn = 1;
3372 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3373 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3374 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3375 } else {
3376 switch (next_cipher) {
3377 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3378 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3379 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3380 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3381 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3382 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3383 }
3384 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3385 cipher_chosen = 1;
3386 }
3387 }
3388 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3389 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3390 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3391 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3392 else
3393 /* shouldn't happen */
3394 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3395 crStop(0);
3396 }
3397
3398 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3399 if (warn) {
3400 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3401 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3402 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3403 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3404 do {
3405 crReturn(0);
3406 if (pktin) {
3407 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3408 " for user response"));
3409 crStop(0);
3410 }
3411 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3412 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3413 }
3414 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3415 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3416 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3417 0, TRUE);
3418 crStop(0);
3419 }
3420 }
3421 }
3422
3423 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3424 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3425 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3426 break;
3427 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3428 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3429 break;
3430 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3431 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3432 break;
3433 }
3434
3435 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3436 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3437 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3438 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3439 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3440 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3441
3442 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3443
3444 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3445
3446 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3447 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3448 &ssh_3des);
3449 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3450 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3451 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3452
3453 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3454 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3455
3456 if (servkey.modulus) {
3457 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3458 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3459 }
3460 if (servkey.exponent) {
3461 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3462 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3463 }
3464 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3465 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3466 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3467 }
3468 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3469 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3470 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3471 }
3472 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3473
3474 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3475 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3476 crStop(0);
3477 }
3478
3479 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3480
3481 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3482 {
3483 if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
3484 sizeof(s->username))) {
3485 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3486 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3487 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3488 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3489 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
3490 lenof(s->username));
3491 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3492 while (ret < 0) {
3493 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3494 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3495 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3496 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3497 }
3498 if (!ret) {
3499 /*
3500 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3501 */
3502 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3503 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3504 crStop(0);
3505 }
3506 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
3507 lenof(s->username));
3508 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3509 }
3510
3511 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3512 {
3513 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3514 logevent(userlog);
3515 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3516 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3517 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3518 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3519 }
3520 sfree(userlog);
3521 }
3522 }
3523
3524 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3525
3526 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3527 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3528 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3529 } else {
3530 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3531 }
3532 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3533 /*
3534 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3535 */
3536 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3537 int keytype;
3538 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3539 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3540 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3541 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3542 const char *error;
3543 if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3544 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3545 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3546 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3547 NULL);
3548 } else {
3549 char *msgbuf;
3550 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3551 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3552 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3553 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3554 error);
3555 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3556 sfree(msgbuf);
3557 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3558 }
3559 } else {
3560 char *msgbuf;
3561 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3562 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3563 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3564 " (%s)\r\n",
3565 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
3566 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3567 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3568 sfree(msgbuf);
3569 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3570 }
3571 } else
3572 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3573
3574 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3575 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3576
3577 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3578 /*
3579 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3580 */
3581 void *r;
3582
3583 s->authed = FALSE;
3584 s->tried_agent = 1;
3585 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3586
3587 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3588 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3589 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3590 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3591 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3592 do {
3593 crReturn(0);
3594 if (pktin) {
3595 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3596 " for agent response"));
3597 crStop(0);
3598 }
3599 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3600 r = ssh->agent_response;
3601 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3602 }
3603 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3604 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3605 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3606 s->p = s->response + 5;
3607 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3608 s->p += 4;
3609 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3610 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3611 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3612 s->p += 4;
3613 {
3614 int n, ok = FALSE;
3615 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3616 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3617 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3618 &s->key.exponent);
3619 if (n < 0)
3620 break;
3621 s->p += n;
3622 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3623 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3624 &s->key.modulus);
3625 if (n < 0)
3626 break;
3627 s->p += n;
3628 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3629 break;
3630 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3631 s->p += 4;
3632 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3633 s->commentlen)
3634 break;
3635 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3636 s->p += s->commentlen;
3637 ok = TRUE;
3638 } while (0);
3639 if (!ok) {
3640 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3641 break;
3642 }
3643 }
3644 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3645 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3646 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3647 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3648 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3649 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3650 } else
3651 /* Skip non-configured key */
3652 continue;
3653 }
3654 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3655 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3656 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3657 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3658 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3659 logevent("Key refused");
3660 continue;
3661 }
3662 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3663 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3664 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3665 crStop(0);
3666 }
3667
3668 {
3669 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3670 void *vret;
3671 int len, retlen;
3672 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3673 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3674 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3675 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3676 len += 16; /* session id */
3677 len += 4; /* response format */
3678 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3679 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3680 q = agentreq + 4;
3681 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3682 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3683 q += 4;
3684 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3685 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3686 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3687 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3688 q += 16;
3689 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3690 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3691 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3692 sfree(agentreq);
3693 do {
3694 crReturn(0);
3695 if (pktin) {
3696 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3697 " while waiting for agent"
3698 " response"));
3699 crStop(0);
3700 }
3701 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3702 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3703 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3704 } else
3705 sfree(agentreq);
3706 ret = vret;
3707 if (ret) {
3708 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3709 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3710 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3711 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3712 PKT_END);
3713 sfree(ret);
3714 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3715 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3716 logevent
3717 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3718 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3719 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3720 " RSA key \"");
3721 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3722 s->commentlen);
3723 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3724 }
3725 s->authed = TRUE;
3726 } else
3727 logevent
3728 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3729 } else {
3730 logevent
3731 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3732 sfree(ret);
3733 }
3734 } else {
3735 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3736 }
3737 }
3738 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3739 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3740 freebn(s->challenge);
3741 if (s->authed)
3742 break;
3743 }
3744 sfree(s->response);
3745 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3746 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3747 }
3748 if (s->authed)
3749 break;
3750 }
3751 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3752 /*
3753 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3754 * key file.
3755 */
3756 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3757 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3758 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3759 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3760 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3761 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3762 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3763 while (!got_passphrase) {
3764 /*
3765 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3766 */
3767 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3768 const char *error;
3769 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3770 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3771 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3772 passphrase = NULL;
3773 } else {
3774 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3775 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3776 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3777 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3778 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3779 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3780 s->publickey_comment),
3781 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3782 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3783 while (ret < 0) {
3784 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3785 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3786 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3787 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3788 }
3789 if (!ret) {
3790 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3791 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3792 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3793 0, TRUE);
3794 crStop(0);
3795 }
3796 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3797 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3798 }
3799 /*
3800 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3801 */
3802 ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3803 &error);
3804 if (passphrase) {
3805 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
3806 sfree(passphrase);
3807 }
3808 if (ret == 1) {
3809 /* Correct passphrase. */
3810 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3811 } else if (ret == 0) {
3812 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3813 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3814 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3815 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3816 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3817 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3818 break; /* go and try something else */
3819 } else if (ret == -1) {
3820 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3821 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3822 /* and try again */
3823 } else {
3824 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3825 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3826 }
3827 }
3828
3829 if (got_passphrase) {
3830
3831 /*
3832 * Send a public key attempt.
3833 */
3834 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3835 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3836
3837 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3838 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3839 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3840 continue; /* go and try something else */
3841 }
3842 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3843 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3844 crStop(0);
3845 }
3846
3847 {
3848 int i;
3849 unsigned char buffer[32];
3850 Bignum challenge, response;
3851
3852 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3853 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3854 crStop(0);
3855 }
3856 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3857 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3858
3859 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3860 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3861 }
3862
3863 MD5Init(&md5c);
3864 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3865 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3866 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3867
3868 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3869 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3870
3871 freebn(challenge);
3872 freebn(response);
3873 }
3874
3875 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3876 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3877 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3878 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3879 " our public key.\r\n");
3880 continue; /* go and try something else */
3881 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3882 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3883 crStop(0);
3884 }
3885
3886 break; /* we're through! */
3887 }
3888
3889 }
3890
3891 /*
3892 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3893 */
3894 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3895
3896 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3897 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3898 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3899 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3900 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3901 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3902 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3903 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3904 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3905 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3906 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3907 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3908 continue;
3909 } else {
3910 char *challenge;
3911 int challengelen;
3912 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3913
3914 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3915 if (!challenge) {
3916 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3917 crStop(0);
3918 }
3919 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3920 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3921 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3922 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3923 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3924 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3925 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3926 } else {
3927 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3928 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3929 }
3930 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3931 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3932 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3933 instr_suf);
3934 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3935 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3936 sfree(instr_suf);
3937 }
3938 }
3939 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3940 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3941 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3942 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3943 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3944 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3945 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3946 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3947 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3948 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3949 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3950 continue;
3951 } else {
3952 char *challenge;
3953 int challengelen;
3954 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3955
3956 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3957 if (!challenge) {
3958 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3959 crStop(0);
3960 }
3961 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3962 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3963 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
3964 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
3965 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3966 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3967 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3968 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3969 } else {
3970 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3971 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3972 }
3973 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3974 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
3975 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3976 instr_suf);
3977 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3978 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3979 sfree(instr_suf);
3980 }
3981 }
3982 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3983 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
3984 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
3985 crStop(0);
3986 }
3987 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3988 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
3989 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3990 s->username, ssh->savedhost),
3991 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
3992 }
3993
3994 /*
3995 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3996 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3997 * authentication.
3998 */
3999 {
4000 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
4001 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
4002 while (ret < 0) {
4003 ssh->send_ok = 1;
4004 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
4005 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
4006 ssh->send_ok = 0;
4007 }
4008 if (!ret) {
4009 /*
4010 * Failed to get a password (for example
4011 * because one was supplied on the command line
4012 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
4013 */
4014 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4015 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
4016 crStop(0);
4017 }
4018 }
4019
4020 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4021 /*
4022 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
4023 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
4024 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
4025 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
4026 * The others are all random data in
4027 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
4028 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
4029 * hence can't deduce the password length.
4030 *
4031 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
4032 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
4033 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4034 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4035 * do is:
4036 *
4037 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4038 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4039 *
4040 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4041 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4042 * packets containing string lengths N through
4043 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4044 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4045 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4046 *
4047 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4048 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4049 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4050 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4051 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4052 *
4053 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4054 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4055 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4056 * against password length sniffing.
4057 */
4058 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4059 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4060 /*
4061 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4062 * we can use the primary defence.
4063 */
4064 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4065 char *randomstr;
4066
4067 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4068 if (pwlen < 16) {
4069 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4070 top = 15;
4071 } else {
4072 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4073 top = bottom + 7;
4074 }
4075
4076 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4077
4078 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4079
4080 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4081 if (i == pwlen) {
4082 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4083 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4084 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4085 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4086 } else {
4087 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4088 do {
4089 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4090 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4091 }
4092 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4093 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4094 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4095 }
4096 }
4097 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4098 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4099 sfree(randomstr);
4100 }
4101 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4102 /*
4103 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4104 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4105 * can use the secondary defence.
4106 */
4107 char string[64];
4108 char *ss;
4109 int len;
4110
4111 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4112 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4113 ss = string;
4114 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4115 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4116 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4117 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4118 }
4119 } else {
4120 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4121 }
4122 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4123 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4124 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4125 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4126 } else {
4127 /*
4128 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4129 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4130 */
4131 int len;
4132 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4133 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4134 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4135 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4136 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4137 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4138 }
4139 } else {
4140 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4141 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4142 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4143 }
4144 logevent("Sent password");
4145 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4146 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4147 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4148 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4149 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4150 logevent("Authentication refused");
4151 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4152 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4153 crStop(0);
4154 }
4155 }
4156
4157 /* Clear up */
4158 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4159 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4160 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4161 }
4162
4163 logevent("Authentication successful");
4164
4165 crFinish(1);
4166 }
4167
4168 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4169 {
4170 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4171
4172 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4173 return;
4174
4175 if (!c->closes) {
4176 /*
4177 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
4178 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
4179 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
4180 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
4181 * open, we can close it then.
4182 */
4183 if (!c->halfopen) {
4184 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4185 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4186 PKT_END);
4187 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4188 } else {
4189 int bytes_to_send = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
4190 if (bytes_to_send > 0) {
4191 /*
4192 * If we still have unsent data in our outgoing
4193 * buffer for this channel, we can't actually
4194 * initiate a close operation yet or that data
4195 * will be lost. Instead, set the pending_close
4196 * flag so that when we do clear the buffer
4197 * we'll start closing the channel.
4198 */
4199 char logmsg[160] = {'\0'};
4200 sprintf(
4201 logmsg,
4202 "Forwarded port pending to be closed : "
4203 "%d bytes remaining",
4204 bytes_to_send);
4205 logevent(logmsg);
4206
4207 c->pending_close = TRUE;
4208 } else {
4209 /*
4210 * No locally buffered data, so we can send the
4211 * close message immediately.
4212 */
4213 struct Packet *pktout;
4214 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4215 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4216 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4217 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
4218 logevent("Nothing left to send, closing channel");
4219 }
4220 }
4221 }
4222
4223 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
4224 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4225 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4226 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
4227 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4228 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4229 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4230 }
4231 }
4232 }
4233
4234 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4235 {
4236 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4237
4238 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4239 return 0;
4240
4241 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4242 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4243 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4244 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4245 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4246 /*
4247 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4248 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4249 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4250 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4251 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4252 */
4253 return 0;
4254 } else {
4255 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4256 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4257 }
4258 }
4259
4260 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4261 {
4262 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4263 int buflimit;
4264
4265 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4266 return;
4267
4268 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4269 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4270 } else {
4271 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4272 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4273 }
4274 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4275 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4276 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4277 }
4278 }
4279
4280 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4281 {
4282 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4283
4284 assert(qh != NULL);
4285
4286 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4287
4288 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4289 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4290 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4291 }
4292 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4293 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4294 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4295 }
4296
4297 if (qh->next) {
4298 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4299
4300 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4301 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4302 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4303 }
4304 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4305 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4306 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4307 }
4308 } else {
4309 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4310 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4311 }
4312
4313 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4314
4315 sfree(qh);
4316 }
4317
4318 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4319 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4320 {
4321 struct queued_handler *qh;
4322
4323 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4324 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4325 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4326 qh->handler = handler;
4327 qh->ctx = ctx;
4328 qh->next = NULL;
4329
4330 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4331 ssh->qhead = qh;
4332
4333 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4334 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4335 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4336 }
4337 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4338 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4339 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4340 }
4341 } else {
4342 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4343 }
4344 ssh->qtail = qh;
4345 }
4346
4347 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4348 {
4349 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4350
4351 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4352 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4353 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4354 pf->sportdesc);
4355 } else {
4356 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4357 pf->sportdesc);
4358
4359 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4360 assert(rpf == pf);
4361 pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
4362 free_rportfwd(pf);
4363 }
4364 }
4365
4366 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
4367 {
4368 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
4369 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4370 int i;
4371
4372 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4373 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4374 } else {
4375 /*
4376 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4377 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4378 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4379 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4380 * they were before.
4381 */
4382 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4383 int i;
4384 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4385 epf->status = DESTROY;
4386 }
4387
4388 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4389 char address_family, type;
4390 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4391 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
4392 int n;
4393
4394 address_family = 'A';
4395 type = 'L';
4396 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
4397 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
4398 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
4399 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
4400 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
4401 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
4402 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
4403 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4404
4405 saddr[0] = '\0';
4406
4407 n = 0;
4408 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4409 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4410 /*
4411 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4412 * source port number. This means that
4413 * everything we've seen until now is the
4414 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4415 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4416 * again.
4417 */
4418 portfwd_strptr++;
4419 sports[n] = '\0';
4420 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4421 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4422 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4423 } else
4424 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4425 n = 0;
4426 }
4427 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4428 }
4429 sports[n] = 0;
4430 if (type != 'D') {
4431 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4432 portfwd_strptr++;
4433 n = 0;
4434 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4435 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4436 }
4437 host[n] = 0;
4438 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4439 portfwd_strptr++;
4440 n = 0;
4441 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4442 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4443 }
4444 dports[n] = 0;
4445 portfwd_strptr++;
4446 dport = atoi(dports);
4447 dserv = 0;
4448 if (dport == 0) {
4449 dserv = 1;
4450 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4451 if (!dport) {
4452 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4453 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4454 }
4455 }
4456 } else {
4457 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4458 host[0] = 0;
4459 dports[0] = 0;
4460 dport = dserv = -1;
4461 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4462 }
4463 sport = atoi(sports);
4464 sserv = 0;
4465 if (sport == 0) {
4466 sserv = 1;
4467 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4468 if (!sport) {
4469 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4470 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4471 }
4472 }
4473 if (sport && dport) {
4474 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4475 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4476
4477 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4478 pfrec->type = type;
4479 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4480 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4481 pfrec->sport = sport;
4482 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4483 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4484 pfrec->dport = dport;
4485 pfrec->local = NULL;
4486 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4487 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4488 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4489 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4490
4491 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4492 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4493 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
4494 /*
4495 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
4496 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
4497 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
4498 * as KEEP.
4499 */
4500 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4501 }
4502 /*
4503 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
4504 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
4505 */
4506 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4507 } else {
4508 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4509 }
4510 }
4511 }
4512
4513 /*
4514 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4515 * not re-enabled.
4516 */
4517 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4518 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4519 char *message;
4520
4521 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4522 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4523 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4524 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4525 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4526 epf->sport);
4527
4528 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4529 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4530 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4531 sfree(message);
4532 message = msg2;
4533 }
4534
4535 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4536 sfree(message);
4537
4538 /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
4539 * forwarding failed. */
4540 if (epf->remote) {
4541 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4542 struct Packet *pktout;
4543
4544 /*
4545 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4546 * end.
4547 */
4548 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4549 /*
4550 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4551 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4552 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4553 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4554 * so that any connections the server tries
4555 * to make on it are rejected.
4556 */
4557 } else {
4558 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4559 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4560 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4561 if (epf->saddr) {
4562 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4563 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4564 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4565 * what was used to open the original connection,
4566 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4567 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4568 } else {
4569 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4570 }
4571 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4572 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4573 }
4574
4575 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4576 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4577 } else if (epf->local) {
4578 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4579 }
4580
4581 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4582 free_portfwd(epf);
4583 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4584 }
4585
4586 /*
4587 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4588 */
4589 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4590 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4591 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4592 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4593 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4594 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4595 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4596 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4597 epf->sport,
4598 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4599 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4600 dportdesc = NULL;
4601 } else {
4602 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4603 epf->daddr,
4604 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4605 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4606 epf->dport,
4607 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4608 }
4609
4610 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4611 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4612 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4613 ssh, cfg,
4614 &epf->local,
4615 epf->addressfamily);
4616
4617 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4618 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4619 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4620 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4621 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4622 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4623 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4624 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4625 ssh, cfg,
4626 &epf->local,
4627 epf->addressfamily);
4628
4629 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4630 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4631 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4632 sportdesc,
4633 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4634 } else {
4635 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4636
4637 /*
4638 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4639 */
4640 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4641 if (ssh->version == 1)
4642 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4643 else
4644 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4645 }
4646
4647 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4648 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4649 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4650 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4651 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4652 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4653 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4654 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4655 sfree(pf);
4656 } else {
4657 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4658 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4659
4660 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4661 sportdesc = NULL;
4662 epf->remote = pf;
4663 pf->pfrec = epf;
4664
4665 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4666 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4667 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4668 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4669 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4670 PKT_END);
4671 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4672 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4673 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4674 } else {
4675 struct Packet *pktout;
4676 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4677 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4678 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4679 if (epf->saddr) {
4680 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4681 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4682 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4683 } else {
4684 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4685 }
4686 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4687 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4688
4689 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4690 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4691 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4692 }
4693 }
4694 }
4695 sfree(sportdesc);
4696 sfree(dportdesc);
4697 }
4698 }
4699
4700 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4701 {
4702 char *string;
4703 int stringlen, bufsize;
4704
4705 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4706 if (string == NULL) {
4707 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4708 return;
4709 }
4710
4711 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4712 string, stringlen);
4713 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4714 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4715 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4716 }
4717 }
4718
4719 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4720 {
4721 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4722 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4723 struct ssh_channel *c;
4724 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4725
4726 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4727 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4728 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4729 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4730 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4731 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4732 } else {
4733 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4734 c->ssh = ssh;
4735
4736 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4737 NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4738 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4739 sfree(c);
4740 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4741 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4742 } else {
4743 logevent
4744 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4745 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4746 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4747 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4748 c->closes = 0;
4749 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4750 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4751 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4752 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4753 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4754 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4755 c->localid, PKT_END);
4756 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4757 }
4758 }
4759 }
4760
4761 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4762 {
4763 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4764 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4765 struct ssh_channel *c;
4766 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4767
4768 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4769 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4770 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4771 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4772 } else {
4773 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4774 c->ssh = ssh;
4775 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4776 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4777 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4778 c->closes = 0;
4779 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4780 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4781 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4782 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4783 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4784 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4785 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4786 PKT_END);
4787 }
4788 }
4789
4790 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4791 {
4792 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4793 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4794 struct ssh_channel *c;
4795 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4796 int remoteid;
4797 int hostsize, port;
4798 char *host;
4799 const char *e;
4800 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4801 c->ssh = ssh;
4802
4803 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4804 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4805 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4806
4807 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4808 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4809 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4810 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4811 pf.dport = port;
4812 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4813
4814 if (pfp == NULL) {
4815 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4816 pf.dhost, port);
4817 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4818 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4819 } else {
4820 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4821 pf.dhost, port);
4822 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4823 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4824 if (e != NULL) {
4825 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4826 sfree(c);
4827 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4828 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4829 } else {
4830 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4831 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4832 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4833 c->closes = 0;
4834 c->pending_close = FALSE;
4835 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4836 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4837 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4838 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4839 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4840 c->localid, PKT_END);
4841 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4842 }
4843 }
4844 }
4845
4846 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4847 {
4848 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4849 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4850 struct ssh_channel *c;
4851
4852 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4853 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4854 c->remoteid = localid;
4855 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4856 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4857 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4858 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4859 }
4860
4861 if (c && c->closes) {
4862 /*
4863 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4864 * which we decided on before the server acked
4865 * the channel open. So now we know the
4866 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4867 */
4868 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4869 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4870 }
4871 }
4872
4873 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4874 {
4875 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4876 struct ssh_channel *c;
4877
4878 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4879 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4880 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4881 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4882 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4883 sfree(c);
4884 }
4885 }
4886
4887 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4888 {
4889 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4890 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4891 struct ssh_channel *c;
4892 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4893 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4894 int closetype;
4895 closetype =
4896 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4897
4898 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4899 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4900 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4901 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4902 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
4903 }
4904 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4905 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4906 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4907 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4908 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
4909 }
4910
4911 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4912 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4913 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4914 PKT_END);
4915 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4916 }
4917
4918 if (c->closes == 15) {
4919 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4920 sfree(c);
4921 }
4922 } else {
4923 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4924 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4925 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4926 i));
4927 }
4928 }
4929
4930 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4931 {
4932 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4933 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4934 char *p;
4935 int len;
4936 struct ssh_channel *c;
4937
4938 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4939
4940 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4941 if (c) {
4942 int bufsize = 0;
4943 switch (c->type) {
4944 case CHAN_X11:
4945 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4946 break;
4947 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4948 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4949 break;
4950 case CHAN_AGENT:
4951 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4952 while (len > 0) {
4953 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4954 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
4955 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4956 l);
4957 p += l;
4958 len -= l;
4959 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4960 }
4961 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4962 c->u.a.totallen =
4963 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4964 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4965 unsigned char);
4966 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4967 }
4968 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4969 unsigned int l =
4970 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4971 (unsigned)len);
4972 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4973 l);
4974 p += l;
4975 len -= l;
4976 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4977 }
4978 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4979 void *reply;
4980 int replylen;
4981 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4982 c->u.a.totallen,
4983 &reply, &replylen,
4984 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4985 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4986 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4987 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4988 }
4989 }
4990 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4991 break;
4992 }
4993 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4994 c->throttling_conn = 1;
4995 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4996 }
4997 }
4998 }
4999
5000 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5001 {
5002 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5003 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
5004 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
5005 /*
5006 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
5007 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
5008 * session which we might mistake for another
5009 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
5010 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
5011 */
5012 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
5013 }
5014
5015 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
5016 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
5017 {
5018 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
5019 int i = 0;
5020 unsigned int arg = 0;
5021 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
5022 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
5023 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
5024 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
5025 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
5026 break;
5027 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
5028 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
5029 break;
5030 }
5031 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
5032 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
5033 }
5034
5035
5036 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
5037 struct Packet *pktin)
5038 {
5039 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
5040
5041 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
5042 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
5043 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
5044
5045 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
5046 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
5047 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
5048 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
5049 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
5050 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
5051 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
5052 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
5053 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
5054
5055 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
5056 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
5057 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
5058 do {
5059 crReturnV;
5060 } while (!pktin);
5061 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5062 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5063 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5064 crStopV;
5065 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5066 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5067 } else {
5068 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5069 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
5070 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
5071 }
5072 }
5073
5074 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
5075 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
5076 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
5077 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5078 /*
5079 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5080 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5081 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5082 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5083 * cookie into the log.
5084 */
5085 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5086 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5087 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5088 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5089 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5090 PKTT_OTHER,
5091 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5092 PKT_END);
5093 } else {
5094 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5095 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5096 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5097 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5098 PKTT_OTHER,
5099 PKT_END);
5100 }
5101 do {
5102 crReturnV;
5103 } while (!pktin);
5104 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5105 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5106 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5107 crStopV;
5108 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5109 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5110 } else {
5111 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5112 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5113 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5114 }
5115 }
5116
5117 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
5118 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5119
5120 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
5121 struct Packet *pkt;
5122 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5123 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5124 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5125 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5126 /* Send the pty request. */
5127 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5128 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
5129 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5130 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5131 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5132 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5133 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
5134 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5135 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5136 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5137 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5138 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5139 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5140 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5141 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5142 do {
5143 crReturnV;
5144 } while (!pktin);
5145 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5146 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5147 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5148 crStopV;
5149 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5150 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5151 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5152 }
5153 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5154 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5155 } else {
5156 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5157 }
5158
5159 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
5160 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5161 do {
5162 crReturnV;
5163 } while (!pktin);
5164 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5165 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5166 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5167 crStopV;
5168 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5169 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5170 }
5171 logevent("Started compression");
5172 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5173 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5174 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5175 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5176 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5177 }
5178
5179 /*
5180 * Start the shell or command.
5181 *
5182 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5183 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5184 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5185 */
5186 {
5187 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
5188
5189 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
5190
5191 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
5192 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
5193 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5194 }
5195 if (*cmd)
5196 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5197 else
5198 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5199 logevent("Started session");
5200 }
5201
5202 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5203 if (ssh->size_needed)
5204 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5205 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5206 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5207
5208 if (ssh->ldisc)
5209 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5210 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5211 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5212 while (1) {
5213
5214 /*
5215 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5216 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5217 * attention to the unusual ones.
5218 */
5219
5220 crReturnV;
5221 if (pktin) {
5222 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5223 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5224 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5225 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5226 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5227 } else {
5228 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5229 crStopV;
5230 }
5231 } else {
5232 while (inlen > 0) {
5233 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5234 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5235 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5236 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5237 in += len;
5238 inlen -= len;
5239 }
5240 }
5241 }
5242
5243 crFinishV;
5244 }
5245
5246 /*
5247 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5248 */
5249 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5250 {
5251 char *msg;
5252 int msglen;
5253
5254 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5255 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5256 }
5257
5258 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5259 {
5260 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5261 char *msg;
5262 int msglen;
5263
5264 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5265 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5266 }
5267
5268 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5269 {
5270 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5271 }
5272
5273 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5274 {
5275 int i;
5276
5277 /*
5278 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5279 */
5280 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5281 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5282
5283 /*
5284 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5285 */
5286 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5287 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5288 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5289 }
5290
5291 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5292 struct Packet *pktin)
5293 {
5294 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5295 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5296 return;
5297
5298 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5299 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5300 return;
5301 }
5302
5303 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5304 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5305 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5306 else
5307 return;
5308 }
5309
5310 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5311 }
5312
5313 /*
5314 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5315 */
5316 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5317 {
5318 int needlen;
5319 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5320 return 0;
5321 needlen = strlen(needle);
5322 while (1) {
5323 /*
5324 * Is it at the start of the string?
5325 */
5326 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5327 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5328 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5329 /* either , or EOS follows */
5330 )
5331 return 1;
5332 /*
5333 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5334 * If no comma found, terminate.
5335 */
5336 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5337 haylen--, haystack++;
5338 if (haylen == 0)
5339 return 0;
5340 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5341 }
5342 }
5343
5344 /*
5345 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5346 */
5347 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5348 {
5349 int needlen;
5350 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5351 return 0;
5352 needlen = strlen(needle);
5353 /*
5354 * Is it at the start of the string?
5355 */
5356 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5357 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5358 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5359 /* either , or EOS follows */
5360 )
5361 return 1;
5362 return 0;
5363 }
5364
5365
5366 /*
5367 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5368 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5369 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5370 */
5371 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5372 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5373 unsigned char *keyspace)
5374 {
5375 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5376 void *s;
5377 /* First hlen bytes. */
5378 s = h->init();
5379 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5380 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5381 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5382 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5383 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5384 h->final(s, keyspace);
5385 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5386 s = h->init();
5387 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5388 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5389 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5390 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5391 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5392 }
5393
5394 /*
5395 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5396 */
5397 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5398 struct Packet *pktin)
5399 {
5400 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5401 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5402 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5403 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5404 void *our_kexinit;
5405 int our_kexinitlen;
5406 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5407 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5408 int nmacs;
5409 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5410 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5411 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5412 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5413 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5414 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5415 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5416 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5417 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5418 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5419 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5420 int n_preferred_kex;
5421 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5422 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5423 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5424 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5425 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5426 struct Packet *pktout;
5427 int dlgret;
5428 int guessok;
5429 int ignorepkt;
5430 };
5431 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5432
5433 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5434
5435 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5436 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5437 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5438
5439 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5440
5441 /*
5442 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5443 */
5444 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5445 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5446 else
5447 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5448
5449 begin_key_exchange:
5450 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5451 {
5452 int i, j, commalist_started;
5453
5454 /*
5455 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5456 */
5457 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5458 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5459 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5460 case KEX_DHGEX:
5461 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5462 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5463 break;
5464 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5465 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5466 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5467 break;
5468 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5469 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5470 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5471 break;
5472 case KEX_RSA:
5473 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5474 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5475 break;
5476 case KEX_WARN:
5477 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5478 * the list. */
5479 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5480 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5481 }
5482 break;
5483 }
5484 }
5485
5486 /*
5487 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5488 */
5489 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5490 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5491 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5492 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5493 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5494 break;
5495 case CIPHER_DES:
5496 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5497 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5498 }
5499 break;
5500 case CIPHER_3DES:
5501 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5502 break;
5503 case CIPHER_AES:
5504 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5505 break;
5506 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5507 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5508 break;
5509 case CIPHER_WARN:
5510 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5511 * the list. */
5512 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5513 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5514 }
5515 break;
5516 }
5517 }
5518
5519 /*
5520 * Set up preferred compression.
5521 */
5522 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5523 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5524 else
5525 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5526
5527 /*
5528 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5529 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5530 */
5531 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5532
5533 /*
5534 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5535 */
5536 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5537
5538 /*
5539 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5540 */
5541 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5542 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5543 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5544 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5545 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5546 commalist_started = 0;
5547 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5548 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5549 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5550 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5551 if (commalist_started)
5552 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5553 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5554 commalist_started = 1;
5555 }
5556 }
5557 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5558 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5559 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5560 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5561 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5562 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5563 }
5564 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5565 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5566 commalist_started = 0;
5567 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5568 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5569 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5570 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5571 if (commalist_started)
5572 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5573 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5574 commalist_started = 1;
5575 }
5576 }
5577 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5578 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5579 commalist_started = 0;
5580 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5581 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5582 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5583 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5584 if (commalist_started)
5585 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5586 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5587 commalist_started = 1;
5588 }
5589 }
5590 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5591 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5592 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5593 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5594 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5595 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5596 }
5597 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5598 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5599 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5600 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5601 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5602 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5603 }
5604 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5605 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5606 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5607 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5608 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5609 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5610 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5611 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5612 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5613 }
5614 }
5615 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5616 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5617 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5618 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5619 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5620 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5621 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5622 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5623 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5624 }
5625 }
5626 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5627 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5628 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5629 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5630 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5631 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5632 /* Reserved. */
5633 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5634 }
5635
5636 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5637 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5638 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5639
5640 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5641
5642 if (!pktin)
5643 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5644
5645 /*
5646 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5647 * to.
5648 */
5649 {
5650 char *str, *preferred;
5651 int i, j, len;
5652
5653 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5654 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5655 crStop(0);
5656 }
5657 ssh->kex = NULL;
5658 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5659 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5660 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5661 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5662 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5663 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5664 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5665 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5666
5667 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5668 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5669
5670 preferred = NULL;
5671 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5672 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5673 if (!k) {
5674 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5675 } else {
5676 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5677 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5678 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5679 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5680 break;
5681 }
5682 }
5683 }
5684 if (ssh->kex)
5685 break;
5686 }
5687 if (!ssh->kex) {
5688 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5689 str ? str : "(null)"));
5690 crStop(0);
5691 }
5692 /*
5693 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5694 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5695 * we end up using.
5696 */
5697 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5698 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5699 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5700 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5701 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5702 break;
5703 }
5704 }
5705 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5706 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5707 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5708 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5709 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5710 if (!c) {
5711 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5712 } else {
5713 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5714 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5715 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5716 break;
5717 }
5718 }
5719 }
5720 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5721 break;
5722 }
5723 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5724 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5725 str ? str : "(null)"));
5726 crStop(0);
5727 }
5728
5729 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5730 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5731 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5732 if (!c) {
5733 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5734 } else {
5735 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5736 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5737 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5738 break;
5739 }
5740 }
5741 }
5742 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5743 break;
5744 }
5745 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5746 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5747 str ? str : "(null)"));
5748 crStop(0);
5749 }
5750
5751 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5752 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5753 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5754 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5755 break;
5756 }
5757 }
5758 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5759 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5760 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5761 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5762 break;
5763 }
5764 }
5765 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5766 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5767 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5768 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5769 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5770 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5771 break;
5772 }
5773 }
5774 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5775 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5776 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5777 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5778 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5779 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5780 break;
5781 }
5782 }
5783 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5784 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5785 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5786
5787 if (s->warn_kex) {
5788 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5789 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5790 ssh->kex->name,
5791 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5792 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5793 do {
5794 crReturn(0);
5795 if (pktin) {
5796 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5797 " waiting for user response"));
5798 crStop(0);
5799 }
5800 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5801 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5802 }
5803 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5804 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5805 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5806 0, TRUE);
5807 crStop(0);
5808 }
5809 }
5810
5811 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5812 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5813 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5814 "client-to-server cipher",
5815 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5816 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5817 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5818 do {
5819 crReturn(0);
5820 if (pktin) {
5821 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5822 " waiting for user response"));
5823 crStop(0);
5824 }
5825 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5826 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5827 }
5828 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5829 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5830 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5831 0, TRUE);
5832 crStop(0);
5833 }
5834 }
5835
5836 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5837 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5838 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5839 "server-to-client cipher",
5840 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5841 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5842 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5843 do {
5844 crReturn(0);
5845 if (pktin) {
5846 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5847 " waiting for user response"));
5848 crStop(0);
5849 }
5850 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5851 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5852 }
5853 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5854 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5855 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5856 0, TRUE);
5857 crStop(0);
5858 }
5859 }
5860
5861 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5862 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5863 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5864 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5865 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5866 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5867 if (pktin->length > 5)
5868 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5869 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5870
5871 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5872 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5873 }
5874
5875 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5876 /*
5877 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5878 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5879 * either cipher...
5880 */
5881 {
5882 int csbits, scbits;
5883
5884 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5885 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5886 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5887 }
5888 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
5889 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
5890 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
5891 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
5892
5893 /*
5894 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5895 * requesting a group.
5896 */
5897 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5898 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5899 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5900 /*
5901 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5902 * much data.
5903 */
5904 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5905 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5906 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5907 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5908
5909 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5910 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5911 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5912 crStop(0);
5913 }
5914 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5915 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5916 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5917 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5918 crStop(0);
5919 }
5920 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5921 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5922 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5923 } else {
5924 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5925 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5926 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5927 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5928 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5929 ssh->kex->groupname);
5930 }
5931
5932 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
5933 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5934 /*
5935 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5936 */
5937 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5938 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5939 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5940 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5941 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5942
5943 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5944 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5945 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5946 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5947 crStop(0);
5948 }
5949 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5950 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5951 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5952 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5953 if (!s->f) {
5954 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5955 crStop(0);
5956 }
5957 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5958
5959 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5960
5961 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5962 * involve user interaction. */
5963 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5964
5965 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5966 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5967 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5968 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
5969 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
5970 }
5971 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
5972 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
5973
5974 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5975 freebn(s->f);
5976 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5977 freebn(s->g);
5978 freebn(s->p);
5979 }
5980 } else {
5981 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
5982 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
5983 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
5984 /*
5985 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
5986 * from the server.
5987 */
5988 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5989 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
5990 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
5991 crStop(0);
5992 }
5993
5994 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5995 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5996 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5997 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5998
5999 {
6000 char *keydata;
6001 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
6002 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
6003 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
6004 }
6005
6006 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6007 if (!s->rsakey) {
6008 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6009 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
6010 crStop(0);
6011 }
6012
6013 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6014
6015 /*
6016 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
6017 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
6018 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
6019 * we're using.
6020 */
6021 {
6022 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
6023 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
6024 int i, byte = 0;
6025 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
6026 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
6027
6028 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
6029
6030 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
6031 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
6032 byte = random_byte();
6033 }
6034 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
6035 }
6036
6037 /*
6038 * Encode this as an mpint.
6039 */
6040 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
6041 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
6042 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
6043 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
6044
6045 /*
6046 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
6047 */
6048 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
6049 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
6050 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
6051 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
6052
6053 /*
6054 * And send it off in a return packet.
6055 */
6056 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
6057 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6058 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
6059 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6060
6061 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
6062
6063 sfree(kstr2);
6064 sfree(kstr1);
6065 sfree(outstr);
6066 }
6067
6068 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
6069
6070 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6071 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
6072 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6073 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
6074 crStop(0);
6075 }
6076
6077 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6078
6079 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6080 }
6081
6082 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6083 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6084 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6085
6086 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6087
6088 #if 0
6089 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6090 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6091 #endif
6092
6093 if (!s->hkey ||
6094 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6095 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6096 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6097 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6098 crStop(0);
6099 }
6100
6101 /*
6102 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6103 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6104 */
6105 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6106 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6107 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6108 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6109 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6110 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6111 s->fingerprint,
6112 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6113 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6114 do {
6115 crReturn(0);
6116 if (pktin) {
6117 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6118 " for user host key response"));
6119 crStop(0);
6120 }
6121 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6122 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6123 }
6124 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6125 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6126 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6127 0, TRUE);
6128 crStop(0);
6129 }
6130 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6131 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6132 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6133 }
6134 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6135 sfree(s->keystr);
6136 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6137
6138 /*
6139 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6140 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6141 * authentication.
6142 */
6143 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6144 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6145 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6146 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6147 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6148 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6149 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6150 }
6151
6152 /*
6153 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6154 */
6155 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6156 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6157 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6158
6159 /*
6160 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6161 * client-to-server session keys.
6162 */
6163 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6164 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6165 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6166 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6167
6168 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6169 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6170 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6171 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6172
6173 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6174 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6175 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6176 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6177
6178 /*
6179 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6180 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6181 */
6182 {
6183 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6184 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6185 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6186 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6187 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6188 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6189 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6190 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6191 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6192 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6193 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6194 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6195 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6196 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6197 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6198 }
6199
6200 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6201 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6202 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6203 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6204 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6205 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6206 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6207
6208 /*
6209 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6210 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6211 */
6212 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6213 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6214
6215 /*
6216 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6217 */
6218 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6219 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6220 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6221 crStop(0);
6222 }
6223 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6224
6225 /*
6226 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6227 * server-to-client session keys.
6228 */
6229 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6230 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6231 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6232 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6233
6234 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6235 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6236 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6237 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6238
6239 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6240 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6241 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6242 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6243
6244 /*
6245 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6246 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6247 */
6248 {
6249 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6250 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6251 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6252 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6253 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6254 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6255 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6256 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6257 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6258 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6259 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6260 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6261 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6262 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6263 memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
6264 }
6265 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6266 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6267 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6268 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6269 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6270 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6271 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6272
6273 /*
6274 * Free shared secret.
6275 */
6276 freebn(s->K);
6277
6278 /*
6279 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6280 * deferred rekey reason.
6281 */
6282 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6283 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6284 pktin = NULL;
6285 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6286 goto begin_key_exchange;
6287 }
6288
6289 /*
6290 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6291 */
6292 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6293 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6294 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
6295 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6296 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6297
6298 /*
6299 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6300 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6301 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6302 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6303 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6304 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6305 */
6306 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6307 crReturn(0);
6308 }
6309 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6310
6311 /*
6312 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6313 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6314 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6315 * start.
6316 *
6317 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6318 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
6319 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6320 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6321 */
6322 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6323 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
6324 wait_for_rekey:
6325 crReturn(1);
6326 }
6327 if (pktin) {
6328 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6329 } else {
6330 /*
6331 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6332 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6333 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6334 * we process it anyway!)
6335 */
6336 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6337 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6338 (char *)in);
6339 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6340 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6341 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6342 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6343 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
6344 ssh->next_rekey =
6345 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6346 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6347 }
6348 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6349 } else {
6350 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6351 }
6352 }
6353 goto begin_key_exchange;
6354
6355 crFinish(1);
6356 }
6357
6358 /*
6359 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6360 */
6361 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6362 int len)
6363 {
6364 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6365 }
6366
6367 /*
6368 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6369 */
6370 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6371 {
6372 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6373 struct Packet *pktout;
6374
6375 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6376 int len;
6377 void *data;
6378 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6379 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6380 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6381 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6382 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6383 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6384 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6385 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6386 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6387 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6388 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6389 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6390 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6391 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6392 }
6393
6394 /*
6395 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6396 * still buffered.
6397 */
6398 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6399 }
6400
6401 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
6402 {
6403 int bufsize;
6404 if (c->closes)
6405 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
6406 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6407 if (bufsize == 0) {
6408 switch (c->type) {
6409 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6410 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6411 * notification since it will be polled */
6412 break;
6413 case CHAN_X11:
6414 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6415 break;
6416 case CHAN_AGENT:
6417 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6418 * buffer management */
6419 break;
6420 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6421 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6422 break;
6423 }
6424 }
6425
6426 /*
6427 * If we've emptied the channel's output buffer and there's a
6428 * pending close event, start the channel-closing procedure.
6429 */
6430 if (c->pending_close && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) == 0) {
6431 struct Packet *pktout;
6432 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6433 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6434 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6435 c->closes = 1;
6436 c->pending_close = FALSE;
6437 }
6438 }
6439
6440 /*
6441 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6442 */
6443 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6444 {
6445 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6446 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6447 c->closes = 0;
6448 c->pending_close = FALSE;
6449 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6450 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6451 ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6452 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6453 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6454 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6455 }
6456
6457 /*
6458 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6459 */
6460 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6461 {
6462 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6463
6464 /*
6465 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
6466 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
6467 * be sending any more data anyway.
6468 */
6469 if (c->closes != 0)
6470 return;
6471
6472 /*
6473 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6474 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6475 * window as well).
6476 */
6477 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6478 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6479
6480
6481 /*
6482 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6483 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6484 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6485 *
6486 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6487 */
6488 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6489 struct Packet *pktout;
6490 struct winadj *wa;
6491
6492 /*
6493 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6494 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6495 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6496 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6497 *
6498 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6499 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6500 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6501 *
6502 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6503 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6504 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6505 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6506 */
6507 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6508 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
6509 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6510 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6511 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6512 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6513 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6514
6515 /*
6516 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6517 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6518 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6519 */
6520 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6521 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6522 wa->next = NULL;
6523 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6524 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6525 else
6526 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6527 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6528 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6529 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6530 } else {
6531 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6532 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6533 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6534 }
6535 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6536 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6537 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6538 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6539 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6540 }
6541 }
6542
6543 /*
6544 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6545 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6546 */
6547 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6548 {
6549 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6550 struct ssh_channel *c;
6551
6552 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6553 if (!c ||
6554 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6555 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6556 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6557 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6558 pktin->type),
6559 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6560 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6561 sfree(buf);
6562 return NULL;
6563 }
6564 return c;
6565 }
6566
6567 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6568 {
6569 /*
6570 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6571 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6572 * installed.
6573 */
6574 struct ssh_channel *c;
6575 struct winadj *wa;
6576
6577 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6578 if (!c)
6579 return;
6580 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6581 if (wa)
6582 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS for "
6583 "\"winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org\"",
6584 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6585 else
6586 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6587 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6588 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6589 }
6590
6591 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6592 {
6593 /*
6594 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6595 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6596 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6597 * installed.
6598 */
6599 struct ssh_channel *c;
6600 struct winadj *wa;
6601
6602 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6603 if (!c)
6604 return;
6605 wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6606 if (!wa) {
6607 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6608 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6609 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6610 return;
6611 }
6612 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6613 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6614 sfree(wa);
6615 /*
6616 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6617 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6618 * complete.
6619 */
6620 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6621 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6622 }
6623
6624 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6625 {
6626 struct ssh_channel *c;
6627 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6628 if (!c)
6629 return;
6630 if (!c->closes) {
6631 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6632 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
6633 }
6634 }
6635
6636 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6637 {
6638 char *data;
6639 int length;
6640 struct ssh_channel *c;
6641 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6642 if (!c)
6643 return;
6644 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6645 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6646 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6647 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6648 if (data) {
6649 int bufsize = 0;
6650 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6651 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6652 switch (c->type) {
6653 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6654 bufsize =
6655 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6656 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6657 data, length);
6658 break;
6659 case CHAN_X11:
6660 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6661 break;
6662 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6663 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6664 break;
6665 case CHAN_AGENT:
6666 while (length > 0) {
6667 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6668 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6669 (unsigned)length);
6670 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6671 data, l);
6672 data += l;
6673 length -= l;
6674 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6675 }
6676 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6677 c->u.a.totallen =
6678 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6679 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6680 unsigned char);
6681 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6682 }
6683 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6684 unsigned int l =
6685 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6686 (unsigned)length);
6687 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6688 data, l);
6689 data += l;
6690 length -= l;
6691 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6692 }
6693 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6694 void *reply;
6695 int replylen;
6696 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6697 c->u.a.totallen,
6698 &reply, &replylen,
6699 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6700 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6701 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6702 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6703 }
6704 }
6705 bufsize = 0;
6706 break;
6707 }
6708 /*
6709 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6710 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6711 * larger window.
6712 */
6713 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6714 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6715 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6716 /*
6717 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6718 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6719 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6720 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6721 * sent excess data.
6722 */
6723 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6724 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6725 /*
6726 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6727 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6728 * throttle the whole channel.
6729 */
6730 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6731 (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
6732 !c->throttling_conn) {
6733 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6734 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6735 }
6736 }
6737 }
6738
6739 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6740 {
6741 struct ssh_channel *c;
6742
6743 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6744 if (!c)
6745 return;
6746
6747 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6748 /*
6749 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
6750 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
6751 */
6752 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6753 c->u.x11.s = NULL;
6754 sshfwd_close(c);
6755 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6756 sshfwd_close(c);
6757 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6758 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6759 c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
6760 sshfwd_close(c);
6761 }
6762 }
6763
6764 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6765 {
6766 struct ssh_channel *c;
6767 struct Packet *pktout;
6768
6769 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6770 if (!c)
6771 return;
6772 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6773 switch (c->type) {
6774 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6775 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6776 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6777 break;
6778 case CHAN_X11:
6779 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6780 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6781 sshfwd_close(c);
6782 break;
6783 case CHAN_AGENT:
6784 sshfwd_close(c);
6785 break;
6786 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6787 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6788 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6789 sshfwd_close(c);
6790 break;
6791 }
6792 if (c->closes == 0) {
6793 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6794 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6795 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6796 }
6797 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6798 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6799 sfree(c);
6800
6801 /*
6802 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6803 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6804 * not running in -N mode.)
6805 */
6806 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6807 /*
6808 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6809 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6810 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6811 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6812 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6813 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6814 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6815 * this is more polite than sending a
6816 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6817 */
6818 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6819 }
6820 }
6821
6822 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6823 {
6824 struct ssh_channel *c;
6825 struct Packet *pktout;
6826
6827 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6828 if (!c)
6829 return;
6830 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6831 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6832 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6833 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6834 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6835 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6836 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6837 if (c->u.pfd.s)
6838 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6839 if (c->closes) {
6840 /*
6841 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6842 * which we decided on before the server acked
6843 * the channel open. So now we know the
6844 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6845 */
6846 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6847 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6848 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6849 }
6850 }
6851
6852 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6853 {
6854 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6855 "<unknown reason code>",
6856 "Administratively prohibited",
6857 "Connect failed",
6858 "Unknown channel type",
6859 "Resource shortage",
6860 };
6861 unsigned reason_code;
6862 char *reason_string;
6863 int reason_length;
6864 struct ssh_channel *c;
6865 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6866 if (!c)
6867 return;
6868 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6869 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6870
6871 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6872 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6873 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6874 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6875 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6876 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6877
6878 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6879
6880 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6881 sfree(c);
6882 }
6883
6884 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6885 {
6886 char *type;
6887 int typelen, want_reply;
6888 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6889 struct ssh_channel *c;
6890 struct Packet *pktout;
6891
6892 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6893 if (!c)
6894 return;
6895 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6896 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6897
6898 /*
6899 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6900 * the request type string to see if it's something
6901 * we recognise.
6902 */
6903 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6904 /*
6905 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6906 * the primary channel.
6907 */
6908 if (typelen == 11 &&
6909 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6910
6911 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6912 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6913 ssh->exitcode);
6914 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6915
6916 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6917 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6918
6919 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6920 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6921 char *msg;
6922 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6923 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6924 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6925 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
6926 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6927 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6928 {
6929 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6930 pktin->savedpos;
6931 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6932 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6933 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6934 if (num == 0) {
6935 is_int = FALSE;
6936 } else {
6937 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6938 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6939 do { \
6940 long q = offset; \
6941 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6942 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6943 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6944 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6945 result = TRUE; \
6946 } \
6947 } while(0)
6948 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6949 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6950 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6951 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6952 is_int = TRUE;
6953 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6954 is_int = FALSE;
6955 else
6956 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6957 is_plausible = FALSE;
6958 }
6959 }
6960 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
6961 if (is_plausible) {
6962 if (is_int) {
6963 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6964 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6965 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6966 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
6967 } else {
6968 /* As per RFC 4254. */
6969 char *sig;
6970 int siglen;
6971 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6972 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6973 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6974 if (siglen) {
6975 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6976 siglen, sig);
6977 }
6978
6979 /*
6980 * Really hideous method of translating the
6981 * signal description back into a locally
6982 * meaningful number.
6983 */
6984
6985 if (0)
6986 ;
6987 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
6988 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
6989 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
6990 #ifdef SIGABRT
6991 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
6992 #endif
6993 #ifdef SIGALRM
6994 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
6995 #endif
6996 #ifdef SIGFPE
6997 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
6998 #endif
6999 #ifdef SIGHUP
7000 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
7001 #endif
7002 #ifdef SIGILL
7003 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
7004 #endif
7005 #ifdef SIGINT
7006 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
7007 #endif
7008 #ifdef SIGKILL
7009 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
7010 #endif
7011 #ifdef SIGPIPE
7012 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
7013 #endif
7014 #ifdef SIGQUIT
7015 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
7016 #endif
7017 #ifdef SIGSEGV
7018 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
7019 #endif
7020 #ifdef SIGTERM
7021 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
7022 #endif
7023 #ifdef SIGUSR1
7024 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
7025 #endif
7026 #ifdef SIGUSR2
7027 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
7028 #endif
7029 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
7030 else
7031 ssh->exitcode = 128;
7032 }
7033 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7034 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7035 if (msglen) {
7036 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
7037 }
7038 /* ignore lang tag */
7039 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
7040 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
7041 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
7042 fmt_msg);
7043 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
7044 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
7045 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7046
7047 }
7048 } else {
7049 /*
7050 * This is a channel request we don't know
7051 * about, so we now either ignore the request
7052 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
7053 * on want_reply.
7054 */
7055 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
7056 }
7057 if (want_reply) {
7058 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
7059 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7060 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7061 }
7062 }
7063
7064 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7065 {
7066 char *type;
7067 int typelen, want_reply;
7068 struct Packet *pktout;
7069
7070 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7071 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7072
7073 /*
7074 * We currently don't support any global requests
7075 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
7076 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
7077 * want_reply.
7078 */
7079 if (want_reply) {
7080 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
7081 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7082 }
7083 }
7084
7085 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7086 {
7087 char *type;
7088 int typelen;
7089 char *peeraddr;
7090 int peeraddrlen;
7091 int peerport;
7092 char *error = NULL;
7093 struct ssh_channel *c;
7094 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7095 struct Packet *pktout;
7096
7097 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7098 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7099 c->ssh = ssh;
7100
7101 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7102 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7103 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7104
7105 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7106 char *addrstr;
7107 const char *x11err;
7108
7109 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7110 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7111 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7112 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7113 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7114
7115 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7116 addrstr, peerport);
7117
7118 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7119 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7120 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7121 addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
7122 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7123 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7124 } else {
7125 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7126 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7127 }
7128
7129 sfree(addrstr);
7130 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7131 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7132 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7133 char *dummy;
7134 int dummylen;
7135 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7136 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7137 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7138 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7139 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7140 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7141 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7142 if (realpf == NULL) {
7143 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7144 } else {
7145 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7146 realpf->dhost,
7147 realpf->dport, c,
7148 &ssh->cfg,
7149 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7150 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7151 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7152 if (e != NULL) {
7153 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7154 error = "Port open failed";
7155 } else {
7156 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7157 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7158 }
7159 }
7160 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7161 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7162 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7163 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7164 else {
7165 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7166 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7167 }
7168 } else {
7169 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7170 }
7171
7172 c->remoteid = remid;
7173 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7174 if (error) {
7175 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7176 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7177 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7178 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7179 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7180 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7181 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7182 sfree(c);
7183 } else {
7184 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7185 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7186 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7187 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7188 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7189 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7190 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7191 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7192 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7193 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7194 }
7195 }
7196
7197 /*
7198 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
7199 * if we're going to display them.
7200 */
7201 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7202 {
7203 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7204 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_show_banner &&
7205 bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7206 char *banner = NULL;
7207 int size = 0;
7208 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7209 if (banner)
7210 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7211 }
7212 }
7213
7214 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7215 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7216 {
7217 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7218 int i = 0;
7219 unsigned int arg = 0;
7220 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7221 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7222 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7223 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7224 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7225 break;
7226 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7227 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7228 break;
7229 }
7230 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7231 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7232 }
7233
7234 /*
7235 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7236 */
7237 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7238 struct Packet *pktin)
7239 {
7240 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7241 enum {
7242 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7243 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7244 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7245 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7246 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7247 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI,
7248 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7249 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7250 } type;
7251 int done_service_req;
7252 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7253 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7254 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7255 int can_gssapi;
7256 int tried_gssapi;
7257 #endif
7258 int kbd_inter_refused;
7259 int we_are_in;
7260 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7261 int num_prompts;
7262 char username[100];
7263 char *password;
7264 int got_username;
7265 void *publickey_blob;
7266 int publickey_bloblen;
7267 int publickey_encrypted;
7268 char *publickey_algorithm;
7269 char *publickey_comment;
7270 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7271 int agent_responselen;
7272 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7273 int keyi, nkeys;
7274 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7275 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7276 int siglen, retlen, len;
7277 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7278 int try_send;
7279 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7280 struct Packet *pktout;
7281 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7282 struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
7283 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7284 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7285 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7286 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7287 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7288 #endif
7289 };
7290 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7291
7292 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
7293
7294 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7295 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7296 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7297 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7298 #endif
7299
7300 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
7301 /*
7302 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7303 */
7304 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7305 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7306 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7307 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7308 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7309 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7310 }
7311 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7312 /*
7313 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7314 */
7315 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7316 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7317 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7318 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7319 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7320 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7321 } else {
7322 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7323 crStopV;
7324 }
7325 }
7326
7327 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7328 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7329 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7330 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7331 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7332
7333 /*
7334 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7335 */
7336 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7337 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7338
7339 /*
7340 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7341 * for later use.
7342 */
7343 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
7344 int keytype;
7345 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7346 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
7347 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
7348 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7349 const char *error;
7350 s->publickey_blob =
7351 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
7352 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7353 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7354 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7355 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7356 s->publickey_encrypted =
7357 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
7358 } else {
7359 char *msgbuf;
7360 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7361 error);
7362 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7363 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7364 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7365 error);
7366 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7367 sfree(msgbuf);
7368 }
7369 } else {
7370 char *msgbuf;
7371 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7372 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7373 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7374 " (%s)\r\n",
7375 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
7376 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7377 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7378 sfree(msgbuf);
7379 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7380 }
7381 }
7382
7383 /*
7384 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7385 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7386 */
7387 s->nkeys = 0;
7388 s->agent_response = NULL;
7389 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7390 if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
7391
7392 void *r;
7393
7394 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7395
7396 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7397 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7398 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7399 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7400 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7401 do {
7402 crReturnV;
7403 if (pktin) {
7404 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7405 " waiting for agent response"));
7406 crStopV;
7407 }
7408 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7409 r = ssh->agent_response;
7410 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7411 }
7412 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7413 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7414 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7415 int keyi;
7416 unsigned char *p;
7417 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7418 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7419 p += 4;
7420 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7421 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7422 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7423 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7424 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7425 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7426 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7427 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7428 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7429 "configured key file", keyi);
7430 s->keyi = keyi;
7431 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7432 break;
7433 }
7434 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7435 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7436 }
7437 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7438 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7439 s->nkeys = 0;
7440 }
7441 }
7442 }
7443 }
7444
7445 }
7446
7447 /*
7448 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7449 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7450 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7451 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7452 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7453 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7454 *
7455 * I think this best serves the needs of
7456 *
7457 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7458 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7459 * type both correctly
7460 *
7461 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7462 * need to fall back to passwords
7463 *
7464 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7465 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7466 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7467 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7468 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7469 * retype it!
7470 */
7471 s->username[0] = '\0';
7472 s->got_username = FALSE;
7473 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7474 /*
7475 * Get a username.
7476 */
7477 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7478 /*
7479 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7480 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7481 * it again.
7482 */
7483 } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
7484 sizeof(s->username))) {
7485 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7486 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7487 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7488 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7489 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
7490 lenof(s->username));
7491 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7492 while (ret < 0) {
7493 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7494 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7495 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7496 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7497 }
7498 if (!ret) {
7499 /*
7500 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7501 * Terminate.
7502 */
7503 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7504 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7505 crStopV;
7506 }
7507 memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
7508 lenof(s->username));
7509 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7510 } else {
7511 char *stuff;
7512 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7513 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
7514 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7515 sfree(stuff);
7516 }
7517 }
7518 s->got_username = TRUE;
7519
7520 /*
7521 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7522 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7523 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7524 */
7525 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7526
7527 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7528 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7529 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7530 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7531 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7532 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7533 s->gotit = FALSE;
7534 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7535
7536 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7537 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7538
7539 /* Reset agent request state. */
7540 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7541 if (s->agent_response) {
7542 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7543 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7544 } else {
7545 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7546 s->keyi = 0;
7547 }
7548 }
7549
7550 while (1) {
7551 char *methods = NULL;
7552 int methlen = 0;
7553
7554 /*
7555 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7556 */
7557 if (!s->gotit)
7558 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7559 /*
7560 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7561 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7562 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7563 * with.)
7564 */
7565 {
7566 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7567 /*
7568 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7569 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7570 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7571 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7572 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7573 * output of (say) plink.)
7574 */
7575 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7576 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7577 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7578 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7579 sfree(banner);
7580 }
7581 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7582 }
7583 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7584 logevent("Access granted");
7585 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
7586 break;
7587 }
7588
7589 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7590 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7591 "type %d", pktin->type));
7592 crStopV;
7593 }
7594
7595 s->gotit = FALSE;
7596
7597 /*
7598 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7599 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7600 * helpfully try next.
7601 */
7602 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7603 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7604 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7605 /*
7606 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7607 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7608 * messages:
7609 *
7610 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
7611 * it's not worth printing anything at all
7612 *
7613 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
7614 * the message should be "Server refused our
7615 * key" (or no message at all if the key
7616 * came from Pageant)
7617 *
7618 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
7619 * message really should be "Access denied".
7620 *
7621 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7622 * authentication, we should break out of this
7623 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7624 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7625 * username change attempts).
7626 */
7627 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7628 /* do nothing */
7629 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7630 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7631 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7632 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7633 logevent("Server refused public key");
7634 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7635 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
7636 } else {
7637 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7638 logevent("Access denied");
7639 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
7640 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
7641 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7642 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7643 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7644 break;
7645 }
7646 }
7647 } else {
7648 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7649 logevent("Further authentication required");
7650 }
7651
7652 s->can_pubkey =
7653 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7654 s->can_passwd =
7655 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7656 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
7657 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7658 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7659 if (!ssh->gsslibs)
7660 ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(&ssh->cfg);
7661 s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
7662 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7663 ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
7664 #endif
7665 }
7666
7667 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7668
7669 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7670
7671 /*
7672 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7673 */
7674
7675 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7676
7677 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7678
7679 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7680 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7681 s->agentp += 4;
7682 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7683 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7684 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7685 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7686 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7687 s->agentp += 4;
7688 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7689 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7690 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7691
7692 /* See if server will accept it */
7693 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7694 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7695 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7696 /* service requested */
7697 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7698 /* method */
7699 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7700 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7701 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7702 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7703 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7704 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7705 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7706
7707 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7708 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7709
7710 /* Offer of key refused. */
7711 s->gotit = TRUE;
7712
7713 } else {
7714
7715 void *vret;
7716
7717 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7718 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7719 "public key \"");
7720 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7721 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7722 }
7723
7724 /*
7725 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7726 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7727 */
7728 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7729 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7730 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7731 /* service requested */
7732 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7733 /* method */
7734 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7735 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7736 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7737 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7738 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7739
7740 /* Ask agent for signature. */
7741 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7742 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7743 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7744 s->siglen -= 4;
7745 s->len = 1; /* message type */
7746 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
7747 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
7748 s->len += 4; /* flags */
7749 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
7750 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
7751 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
7752 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
7753 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
7754 s->q += 4;
7755 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7756 s->q += s->pklen;
7757 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
7758 s->q += 4;
7759 /* Now the data to be signed... */
7760 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7761 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7762 s->q += 4;
7763 }
7764 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
7765 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7766 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7767 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
7768 s->pktout->length - 5);
7769 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
7770 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
7771 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
7772 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
7773 &vret, &s->retlen,
7774 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7775 do {
7776 crReturnV;
7777 if (pktin) {
7778 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
7779 " while waiting for agent"
7780 " response"));
7781 crStopV;
7782 }
7783 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7784 vret = ssh->agent_response;
7785 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7786 }
7787 s->ret = vret;
7788 sfree(s->agentreq);
7789 if (s->ret) {
7790 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
7791 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
7792 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
7793 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
7794 s->ret + 9,
7795 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
7796 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7797 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7798 } else {
7799 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
7800 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
7801 crStopV;
7802 }
7803 }
7804 }
7805
7806 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
7807 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7808 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7809 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7810 } else {
7811 s->keyi++;
7812 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
7813 s->done_agent = TRUE;
7814 }
7815
7816 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
7817 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
7818
7819 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
7820 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
7821
7822 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7823
7824 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7825
7826 /*
7827 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
7828 *
7829 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
7830 * willing to accept it.
7831 */
7832 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7833 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7834 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7835 /* service requested */
7836 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7837 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7838 /* no signature included */
7839 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
7840 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7841 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
7842 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
7843 s->publickey_bloblen);
7844 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7845 logevent("Offered public key");
7846
7847 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7848 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7849 /* Key refused. Give up. */
7850 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
7851 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
7852 continue; /* process this new message */
7853 }
7854 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
7855
7856 /*
7857 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
7858 * the key.
7859 */
7860 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7861 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
7862 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
7863 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
7864 }
7865 key = NULL;
7866 while (!key) {
7867 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
7868 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
7869 /*
7870 * Get a passphrase from the user.
7871 */
7872 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7873 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7874 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
7875 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
7876 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
7877 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
7878 s->publickey_comment),
7879 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
7880 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7881 while (ret < 0) {
7882 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7883 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7884 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
7885 in, inlen);
7886 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7887 }
7888 if (!ret) {
7889 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
7890 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7891 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7892 "Unable to authenticate",
7893 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7894 TRUE);
7895 crStopV;
7896 }
7897 passphrase =
7898 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7899 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7900 } else {
7901 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
7902 }
7903
7904 /*
7905 * Try decrypting the key.
7906 */
7907 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
7908 &error);
7909 if (passphrase) {
7910 /* burn the evidence */
7911 memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
7912 sfree(passphrase);
7913 }
7914 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7915 if (passphrase &&
7916 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
7917 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7918 key = NULL;
7919 /* and loop again */
7920 } else {
7921 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7922 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7923 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7924 key = NULL;
7925 break; /* try something else */
7926 }
7927 }
7928 }
7929
7930 if (key) {
7931 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7932 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7933 int p;
7934
7935 /*
7936 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7937 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7938 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7939 */
7940 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7941 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7942 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7943 /* service requested */
7944 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7945 /* method */
7946 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7947 /* signature follows */
7948 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7949 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
7950 &pkblob_len);
7951 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7952 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
7953 pkblob_len);
7954
7955 /*
7956 * The data to be signed is:
7957 *
7958 * string session-id
7959 *
7960 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7961 * outgoing packet.
7962 */
7963 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
7964 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7965 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7966 sigdata_len -= 4;
7967 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7968 p = 0;
7969 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7970 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7971 p += 4;
7972 }
7973 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
7974 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
7975 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
7976 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7977 s->pktout->length - 5);
7978 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7979 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7980 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7981 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7982 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7983 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7984 sfree(pkblob);
7985 sfree(sigblob);
7986 sfree(sigdata);
7987
7988 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7989 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7990 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7991 }
7992
7993 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7994 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
7995
7996 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
7997
7998 int micoffset, len;
7999 char *data;
8000 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
8001 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
8002 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
8003 s->gotit = TRUE;
8004 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
8005
8006 /*
8007 * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
8008 * list.
8009 */
8010 {
8011 int i, j;
8012 s->gsslib = NULL;
8013 for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
8014 int want_id = ssh->cfg.ssh_gsslist[i];
8015 for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
8016 if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
8017 s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
8018 goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
8019 }
8020 }
8021 got_gsslib:
8022 /*
8023 * We always expect to have found something in
8024 * the above loop: we only came here if there
8025 * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
8026 * preference list should always mention
8027 * everything and only change the order.
8028 */
8029 assert(s->gsslib);
8030 }
8031
8032 if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
8033 logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
8034
8035 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
8036 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8037 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8038 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8039 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8040
8041 /* add mechanism info */
8042 s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
8043
8044 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
8045 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
8046
8047 /* length of OID + 2 */
8048 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
8049 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
8050
8051 /* length of OID */
8052 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
8053
8054 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
8055 s->gss_buf.length);
8056 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8057 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8058 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
8059 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
8060 continue;
8061 }
8062
8063 /* check returned packet ... */
8064
8065 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8066 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8067 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8068 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
8069 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
8070 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
8071 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
8072 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
8073 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
8074 continue;
8075 }
8076
8077 /* now start running */
8078 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
8079 ssh->fullhostname,
8080 &s->gss_srv_name);
8081 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8082 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
8083 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
8084 else
8085 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
8086 continue;
8087 }
8088
8089 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
8090 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8091
8092 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8093 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
8094 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8095 continue;
8096 }
8097
8098 /* initial tokens are empty */
8099 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
8100 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
8101
8102 /* now enter the loop */
8103 do {
8104 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
8105 (s->gsslib,
8106 &s->gss_ctx,
8107 s->gss_srv_name,
8108 ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
8109 &s->gss_rcvtok,
8110 &s->gss_sndtok);
8111
8112 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
8113 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8114 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
8115
8116 if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
8117 &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
8118 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
8119 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
8120 }
8121
8122 break;
8123 }
8124 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
8125
8126 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
8127 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
8128
8129 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8130 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8131 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8132 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8133 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8134 s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
8135 }
8136
8137 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8138 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8139 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8140 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8141 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8142 break;
8143 }
8144 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8145 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8146 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8147 }
8148 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8149
8150 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8151 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8152 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8153 continue;
8154 }
8155 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8156
8157 /* Now send the MIC */
8158
8159 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8160 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8161 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8162 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8163 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8164 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8165 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8166 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8167
8168 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8169 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8170
8171 s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8172 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8173 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8174 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8175 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8176 s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
8177
8178 s->gotit = FALSE;
8179
8180 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8181 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8182 continue;
8183 #endif
8184 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8185
8186 /*
8187 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8188 */
8189
8190 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8191
8192 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8193
8194 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8195 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8196 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8197 /* service requested */
8198 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8199 /* method */
8200 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8201 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8202 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8203
8204 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8205 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8206 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8207 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8208 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8209 * Give up on it entirely. */
8210 s->gotit = TRUE;
8211 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
8212 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
8213 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8214 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8215 continue;
8216 }
8217
8218 /*
8219 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8220 */
8221 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8222
8223 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8224 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8225 int i;
8226
8227 /*
8228 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8229 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8230 */
8231 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8232 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8233 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8234 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8235 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8236
8237 /*
8238 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8239 */
8240 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8241 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8242 char *prompt;
8243 int prompt_len;
8244 int echo;
8245 static char noprompt[] =
8246 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8247
8248 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8249 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8250 if (!prompt_len) {
8251 prompt = noprompt;
8252 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8253 }
8254 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8255 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8256 echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8257 }
8258
8259 if (name_len) {
8260 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8261 * local prompts? */
8262 s->cur_prompt->name =
8263 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8264 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8265 } else {
8266 s->cur_prompt->name =
8267 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8268 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8269 }
8270 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8271 * has come from the server.
8272 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8273 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8274 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8275 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8276 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8277 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8278 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8279 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8280 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8281 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8282 } else {
8283 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8284 }
8285
8286 /*
8287 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8288 * response(s).
8289 */
8290 {
8291 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8292 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8293 while (ret < 0) {
8294 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8295 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8296 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8297 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8298 }
8299 if (!ret) {
8300 /*
8301 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8302 */
8303 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8304 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8305 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8306 TRUE);
8307 crStopV;
8308 }
8309 }
8310
8311 /*
8312 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8313 */
8314 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8315 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8316 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8317 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8318 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8319 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8320 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8321 }
8322 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8323
8324 /*
8325 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8326 * INFO_REQUEST.
8327 */
8328 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8329
8330 }
8331
8332 /*
8333 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8334 */
8335 s->gotit = TRUE;
8336
8337 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8338
8339 /*
8340 * Plain old password authentication.
8341 */
8342 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8343 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8344
8345 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8346
8347 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8348 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8349 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8350 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
8351 s->username,
8352 ssh->savedhost),
8353 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8354
8355 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8356 while (ret < 0) {
8357 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8358 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8359 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8360 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8361 }
8362 if (!ret) {
8363 /*
8364 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8365 */
8366 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8367 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8368 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8369 TRUE);
8370 crStopV;
8371 }
8372 /*
8373 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8374 * asked to change it.)
8375 */
8376 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8377 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8378
8379 /*
8380 * Send the password packet.
8381 *
8382 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8383 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8384 * user's password.
8385 *
8386 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8387 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8388 * people who find out how long their password is!
8389 */
8390 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8391 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8392 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8393 /* service requested */
8394 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8395 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8396 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8397 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8398 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8399 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8400 logevent("Sent password");
8401 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8402
8403 /*
8404 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8405 * request.
8406 */
8407 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8408 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8409
8410 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8411
8412 /*
8413 * We're being asked for a new password
8414 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8415 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8416 */
8417
8418 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8419 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8420 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8421
8422 {
8423 char *msg;
8424 if (changereq_first_time)
8425 msg = "Server requested password change";
8426 else
8427 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8428 logevent(msg);
8429 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8430 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8431 }
8432
8433 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8434
8435 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8436 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8437 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8438 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8439 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8440 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8441 /*
8442 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8443 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8444 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8445 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8446 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8447 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8448 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8449 *
8450 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8451 * to check this field.)
8452 */
8453 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8454 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8455 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8456 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8457 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8458 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8459 FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
8460
8461 /*
8462 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8463 * password twice.
8464 */
8465 while (!got_new) {
8466
8467 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8468 while (ret < 0) {
8469 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8470 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8471 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8472 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8473 }
8474 if (!ret) {
8475 /*
8476 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8477 */
8478 /* burn the evidence */
8479 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8480 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8481 sfree(s->password);
8482 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8483 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8484 TRUE);
8485 crStopV;
8486 }
8487
8488 /*
8489 * If the user specified a new original password
8490 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8491 * one.
8492 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8493 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8494 */
8495 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8496 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8497 /* burn the evidence */
8498 sfree(s->password);
8499 s->password =
8500 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8501 }
8502
8503 /*
8504 * Check the two new passwords match.
8505 */
8506 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8507 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8508 == 0);
8509 if (!got_new)
8510 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8511 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8512
8513 }
8514
8515 /*
8516 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8517 * (see above for padding rationale)
8518 */
8519 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8520 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
8521 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8522 /* service requested */
8523 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8524 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8525 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8526 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8527 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8528 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8529 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8530 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8531 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8532 logevent("Sent new password");
8533
8534 /*
8535 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8536 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8537 * new password.)
8538 */
8539 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8540 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8541
8542 }
8543
8544 /*
8545 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8546 * of the loop. Either:
8547 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8548 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8549 * usual meaning
8550 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8551 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8552 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8553 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8554 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8555 * the loop and start again.
8556 */
8557 s->gotit = TRUE;
8558
8559 /*
8560 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8561 * case. Burn the evidence.
8562 */
8563 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
8564 sfree(s->password);
8565
8566 } else {
8567 char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
8568 " (server sent: %.*s)",
8569 methlen, methods);
8570
8571 ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
8572 "No supported authentication methods available",
8573 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8574 FALSE);
8575 sfree(str);
8576
8577 crStopV;
8578
8579 }
8580
8581 }
8582 }
8583 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8584
8585 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8586 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8587 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8588 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8589 }
8590 if (s->agent_response)
8591 sfree(s->agent_response);
8592
8593 /*
8594 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8595 */
8596
8597 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8598
8599 /*
8600 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8601 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8602 */
8603 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8604 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8605 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8606 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8607
8608 /*
8609 * Create the main session channel.
8610 */
8611 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
8612 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8613 } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
8614 /*
8615 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8616 * channel.
8617 */
8618 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8619 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8620 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8621 logeventf(ssh,
8622 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8623 ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8624 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8625 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8626 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8627 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8628 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8629 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
8630 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
8631 /*
8632 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8633 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8634 * information.
8635 */
8636 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8637 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8638 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8639
8640 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8641 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8642 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8643 crStopV;
8644 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8645 }
8646 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8647 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8648 crStopV;
8649 }
8650 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8651 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8652 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8653 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8654 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8655 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8656 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8657 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8658 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8659 } else {
8660 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8661 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8662 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8663 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8664 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8665 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8666 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8667 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8668 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8669 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8670 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8671 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8672 crStopV;
8673 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8674 }
8675 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8676 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8677 crStopV;
8678 }
8679 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8680 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8681 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8682 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8683 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8684 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8685 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8686 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8687 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8688 }
8689
8690 /*
8691 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8692 * general channel-based messages.
8693 */
8694 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8695 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8696 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8697 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8698 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8699 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8700 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8701 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8702 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8703 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8704 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8705 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8706 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8707
8708 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
8709 /*
8710 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8711 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8712 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
8713 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
8714 */
8715 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8716 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8717 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
8718 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
8719 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8720 }
8721
8722 /*
8723 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
8724 */
8725 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
8726 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
8727 ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
8728 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
8729 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8730 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8731 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
8732 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8733 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
8734 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
8735 /*
8736 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
8737 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
8738 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
8739 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
8740 * cookie into the log.
8741 */
8742 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8743 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
8744 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8745 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
8746 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8747
8748 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8749
8750 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8751 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8752 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
8753 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8754 crStopV;
8755 }
8756 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
8757 } else {
8758 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
8759 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
8760 }
8761 }
8762
8763 /*
8764 * Enable port forwardings.
8765 */
8766 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
8767
8768 /*
8769 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
8770 */
8771 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
8772 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
8773 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8774 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8775 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
8776 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8777 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8778
8779 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8780
8781 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8782 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8783 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
8784 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8785 crStopV;
8786 }
8787 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
8788 } else {
8789 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
8790 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
8791 }
8792 }
8793
8794 /*
8795 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
8796 */
8797 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8798 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
8799 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
8800 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
8801 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
8802 /* Build the pty request. */
8803 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8804 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8805 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
8806 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8807 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
8808 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
8809 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
8810 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
8811 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
8812 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8813 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
8814 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
8815 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
8816 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
8817 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
8818 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
8819 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
8820 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8821 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
8822
8823 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8824
8825 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8826 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8827 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
8828 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8829 crStopV;
8830 }
8831 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
8832 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8833 } else {
8834 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
8835 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
8836 }
8837 } else {
8838 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
8839 }
8840
8841 /*
8842 * Send environment variables.
8843 *
8844 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
8845 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
8846 */
8847 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
8848 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
8849 char *var, *varend, *val;
8850
8851 s->num_env = 0;
8852
8853 while (*e) {
8854 var = e;
8855 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
8856 varend = e;
8857 if (*e == '\t') e++;
8858 val = e;
8859 while (*e) e++;
8860 e++;
8861
8862 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8863 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8864 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
8865 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8866 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8867 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
8868 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
8869 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8870
8871 s->num_env++;
8872 }
8873
8874 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
8875
8876 s->env_ok = 0;
8877 s->env_left = s->num_env;
8878
8879 while (s->env_left > 0) {
8880 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8881
8882 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8883 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8884 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
8885 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8886 crStopV;
8887 }
8888 } else {
8889 s->env_ok++;
8890 }
8891
8892 s->env_left--;
8893 }
8894
8895 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
8896 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
8897 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
8898 logevent("All environment variables refused");
8899 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
8900 } else {
8901 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
8902 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
8903 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
8904 }
8905 }
8906
8907 /*
8908 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
8909 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
8910 * of command.
8911 */
8912 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
8913 int subsys;
8914 char *cmd;
8915
8916 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
8917 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
8918 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
8919 } else {
8920 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
8921 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
8922 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
8923 }
8924
8925 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8926 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
8927 if (subsys) {
8928 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
8929 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8930 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8931 } else if (*cmd) {
8932 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
8933 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8934 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
8935 } else {
8936 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
8937 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
8938 }
8939 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8940
8941 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8942
8943 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
8944 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
8945 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
8946 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
8947 crStopV;
8948 }
8949 /*
8950 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
8951 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
8952 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
8953 * back to it before complaining.
8954 */
8955 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
8956 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
8957 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
8958 continue;
8959 }
8960 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
8961 crStopV;
8962 } else {
8963 logevent("Started a shell/command");
8964 }
8965 break;
8966 }
8967
8968 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
8969 if (ssh->size_needed)
8970 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
8971 if (ssh->eof_needed)
8972 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
8973
8974 /*
8975 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
8976 * failure handler.
8977 */
8978 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
8979 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
8980
8981 /*
8982 * Transfer data!
8983 */
8984 if (ssh->ldisc)
8985 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
8986 if (ssh->mainchan)
8987 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8988 while (1) {
8989 crReturnV;
8990 s->try_send = FALSE;
8991 if (pktin) {
8992
8993 /*
8994 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
8995 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
8996 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
8997 */
8998
8999 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
9000 crStopV;
9001 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9002 /*
9003 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
9004 */
9005 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
9006 s->try_send = TRUE;
9007 }
9008 if (s->try_send) {
9009 int i;
9010 struct ssh_channel *c;
9011 /*
9012 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
9013 */
9014 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
9015 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
9016 }
9017 }
9018
9019 crFinishV;
9020 }
9021
9022 /*
9023 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
9024 */
9025 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9026 {
9027 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
9028 char *buf, *msg;
9029 int reason, msglen;
9030
9031 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
9032 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9033
9034 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
9035 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
9036 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
9037 } else {
9038 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
9039 " type %d)", reason);
9040 }
9041 logevent(buf);
9042 sfree(buf);
9043 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
9044 msglen, msg);
9045 logevent(buf);
9046 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
9047 reason,
9048 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
9049 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
9050 msglen, msg));
9051 sfree(buf);
9052 }
9053
9054 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9055 {
9056 /* log the debug message */
9057 char *msg;
9058 int msglen;
9059 int always_display;
9060
9061 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
9062 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
9063 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9064
9065 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
9066 }
9067
9068 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9069 {
9070 struct Packet *pktout;
9071 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
9072 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
9073 /*
9074 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
9075 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
9076 */
9077 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9078 }
9079
9080 /*
9081 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
9082 */
9083 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
9084 {
9085 int i;
9086
9087 /*
9088 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
9089 */
9090 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
9091 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
9092
9093 /*
9094 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
9095 * the coroutines will get it.
9096 */
9097 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
9098 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
9099 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
9100 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
9101 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
9102 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
9103 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
9104 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9105 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9106 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
9107 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
9108 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
9109 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
9110 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9111 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
9112 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
9113 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9114 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9115 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
9116 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9117 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9118 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
9119 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
9120 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
9121 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
9122 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
9123 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
9124 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
9125 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
9126 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
9127 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9128 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9129 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
9130
9131 /*
9132 * These special message types we install handlers for.
9133 */
9134 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9135 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9136 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9137 }
9138
9139 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9140 {
9141 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9142
9143 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9144 return;
9145
9146 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
9147 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9148 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9149 }
9150 }
9151
9152 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9153 struct Packet *pktin)
9154 {
9155 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9156 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9157 return;
9158
9159 if (pktin) {
9160 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9161 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9162 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9163 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9164 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9165 }
9166
9167 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9168 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9169 return;
9170 }
9171
9172 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9173 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9174 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9175 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9176 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9177 /*
9178 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9179 */
9180 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9181 }
9182 } else {
9183 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9184 }
9185 }
9186
9187 /*
9188 * Called to set up the connection.
9189 *
9190 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9191 */
9192 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9193 Config *cfg,
9194 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
9195 int keepalive)
9196 {
9197 const char *p;
9198 Ssh ssh;
9199
9200 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9201 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9202 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9203 ssh->s = NULL;
9204 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9205 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9206 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9207 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9208 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9209 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9210 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9211 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9212 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9213 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9214 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9215 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9216 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9217 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9218 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9219 ssh->kex = NULL;
9220 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9221 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9222 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9223 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9224 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9225 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9226 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9227 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9228 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9229 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9230 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9231 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9232 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9233 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9234 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9235 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9236 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9237 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9238 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9239 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9240 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9241 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
9242 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9243 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9244 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
9245 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
9246 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
9247 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9248 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9249 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9250 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9251 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9252 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9253 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9254 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9255 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9256 ssh->queue = NULL;
9257 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9258 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9259 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9260 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9261 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9262 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9263
9264 *backend_handle = ssh;
9265
9266 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9267 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9268 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9269 #endif
9270
9271 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9272 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
9273 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
9274
9275 ssh->channels = NULL;
9276 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9277 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9278
9279 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9280 ssh->editing = 0;
9281 ssh->echoing = 0;
9282 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9283 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9284 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9285
9286 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9287
9288 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9289
9290 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9291
9292 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9293 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9294 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
9295 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9296
9297 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9298 ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
9299 #endif
9300
9301 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9302 if (p != NULL)
9303 return p;
9304
9305 random_ref();
9306
9307 return NULL;
9308 }
9309
9310 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9311 {
9312 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9313 struct ssh_channel *c;
9314 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9315
9316 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9317 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9318 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9319 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9320 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9321 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9322 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9323 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9324 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9325 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9326 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9327 if (ssh->cscomp)
9328 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9329 else
9330 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9331 }
9332 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9333 if (ssh->sccomp)
9334 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9335 else
9336 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9337 }
9338 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9339 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9340 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9341
9342 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9343 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9344 sfree(ssh->queue);
9345
9346 while (ssh->qhead) {
9347 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9348 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9349 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9350 }
9351 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9352
9353 if (ssh->channels) {
9354 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9355 switch (c->type) {
9356 case CHAN_X11:
9357 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9358 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9359 break;
9360 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9361 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
9362 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9363 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9364 break;
9365 }
9366 sfree(c);
9367 }
9368 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9369 ssh->channels = NULL;
9370 }
9371
9372 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9373 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9374 free_rportfwd(pf);
9375 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9376 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9377 }
9378 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9379 if (ssh->x11disp)
9380 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9381 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9382 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9383 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9384 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9385 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9386 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9387 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9388 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9389 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9390 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9391 }
9392 if (ssh->s)
9393 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9394 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9395 if (ssh->pinger)
9396 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9397 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9398 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9399 if (ssh->gsslibs)
9400 ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
9401 #endif
9402 sfree(ssh);
9403
9404 random_unref();
9405 }
9406
9407 /*
9408 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9409 */
9410 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
9411 {
9412 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9413 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9414 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9415
9416 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
9417 if (ssh->portfwds)
9418 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
9419
9420 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
9421 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
9422 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9423 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9424
9425 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9426 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9427 } else {
9428 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9429 }
9430 }
9431
9432 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9433 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
9434 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9435 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9436 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9437 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9438 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9439 }
9440
9441 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
9442 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9443 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9444 }
9445
9446 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
9447 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
9448 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
9449 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9450 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9451 }
9452
9453 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
9454
9455 if (rekeying) {
9456 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9457 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9458 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9459 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9460 }
9461 }
9462 }
9463
9464 /*
9465 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9466 */
9467 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9468 {
9469 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9470
9471 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9472 return 0;
9473
9474 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9475
9476 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9477 }
9478
9479 /*
9480 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9481 */
9482 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9483 {
9484 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9485 int override_value;
9486
9487 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9488 return 0;
9489
9490 /*
9491 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9492 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9493 */
9494 override_value = 0;
9495 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9496 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9497
9498 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9499 return override_value;
9500 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9501 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
9502 return override_value;
9503 else
9504 return (override_value +
9505 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9506 }
9507
9508 return 0;
9509 }
9510
9511 /*
9512 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9513 */
9514 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9515 {
9516 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9517 struct Packet *pktout;
9518
9519 ssh->term_width = width;
9520 ssh->term_height = height;
9521
9522 switch (ssh->state) {
9523 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9524 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9525 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9526 break; /* do nothing */
9527 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9528 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9529 break;
9530 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9531 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
9532 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9533 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9534 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9535 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9536 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9537 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9538 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9539 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9540 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9541 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9542 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9543 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9544 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9545 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9546 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9547 }
9548 }
9549 break;
9550 }
9551 }
9552
9553 /*
9554 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9555 * protocol.
9556 */
9557 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9558 {
9559 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9560 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9561 };
9562 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
9563 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9564 };
9565 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
9566 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9567 };
9568 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9569 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9570 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9571 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9572 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9573 * required signals. */
9574 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9575 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9576 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9577 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9578 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9579 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9580 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9581 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9582 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9583 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9584 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9585 };
9586 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9587 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9588 };
9589 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9590 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
9591 lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
9592 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9593 lenof(specials_end)];
9594 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9595 int i = 0;
9596 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9597 do { \
9598 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9599 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9600 i += lenof(name); \
9601 } while(0)
9602
9603 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9604 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9605 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9606 * asked anyway. */
9607 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9608 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9609 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9610 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
9611 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
9612 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
9613 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
9614 if (ssh->mainchan)
9615 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9616 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9617
9618 if (i) {
9619 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9620 return ssh_specials;
9621 } else {
9622 return NULL;
9623 }
9624 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9625 }
9626
9627 /*
9628 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9629 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9630 * hostname sort').
9631 */
9632 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9633 {
9634 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9635 struct Packet *pktout;
9636
9637 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9638 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9639 /*
9640 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9641 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9642 */
9643 if (code == TS_EOF)
9644 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9645 return;
9646 }
9647 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9648 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9649 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9650 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
9651 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9652 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9653 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9654 }
9655 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9656 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9657 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9658 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9659 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9660 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9661 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9662 } else {
9663 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
9664 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9665 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9666 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9667 }
9668 }
9669 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9670 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9671 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9672 }
9673 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9674 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9675 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9676 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9677 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9678 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9679 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9680 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9681 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
9682 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9683 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
9684 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9685 }
9686 } else {
9687 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
9688 char *signame = NULL;
9689 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
9690 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
9691 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
9692 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
9693 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
9694 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
9695 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
9696 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
9697 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
9698 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
9699 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
9700 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
9701 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
9702 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
9703 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
9704 if (signame) {
9705 /* It's a signal. */
9706 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
9707 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9708 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9709 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
9710 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9711 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
9712 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9713 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
9714 }
9715 } else {
9716 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
9717 }
9718 }
9719 }
9720
9721 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
9722 {
9723 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9724 struct ssh_channel *c;
9725 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
9726
9727 c->ssh = ssh;
9728 ssh2_channel_init(c);
9729 c->halfopen = TRUE;
9730 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
9731 c->u.pfd.s = s;
9732 add234(ssh->channels, c);
9733 return c;
9734 }
9735
9736 /*
9737 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
9738 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
9739 */
9740 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
9741 {
9742 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9743 int buflimit;
9744
9745 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9746 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
9747 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9748 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9749 }
9750 } else {
9751 if (ssh->mainchan) {
9752 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
9753 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
9754 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
9755 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
9756 buflimit = 0;
9757 else
9758 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
9759 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
9760 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
9761 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
9762 }
9763 }
9764 }
9765 }
9766
9767 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
9768 {
9769 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
9770 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
9771 struct Packet *pktout;
9772
9773 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
9774
9775 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9776 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
9777 PKT_INT, c->localid,
9778 PKT_STR, hostname,
9779 PKT_INT, port,
9780 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
9781 PKT_END);
9782 } else {
9783 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
9784 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
9785 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
9786 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
9787 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
9788 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
9789 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
9790 /*
9791 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
9792 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
9793 * convinced the server should be told details like that
9794 * about my local network configuration.
9795 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
9796 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
9797 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
9798 */
9799 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
9800 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9801 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9802 }
9803 }
9804
9805 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
9806 {
9807 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9808 return ssh->s != NULL;
9809 }
9810
9811 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
9812 {
9813 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9814 return ssh->send_ok;
9815 }
9816
9817 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
9818 {
9819 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9820 if (option == LD_ECHO)
9821 return ssh->echoing;
9822 if (option == LD_EDIT)
9823 return ssh->editing;
9824 return FALSE;
9825 }
9826
9827 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
9828 {
9829 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9830 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
9831 }
9832
9833 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
9834 {
9835 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9836 ssh->logctx = logctx;
9837 }
9838
9839 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
9840 {
9841 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9842 if (ssh->s != NULL)
9843 return -1;
9844 else
9845 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
9846 }
9847
9848 /*
9849 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
9850 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
9851 */
9852 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
9853 {
9854 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9855 return ssh->version;
9856 }
9857
9858 /*
9859 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
9860 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
9861 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
9862 */
9863 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
9864 {
9865 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9866 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
9867 }
9868
9869 Backend ssh_backend = {
9870 ssh_init,
9871 ssh_free,
9872 ssh_reconfig,
9873 ssh_send,
9874 ssh_sendbuffer,
9875 ssh_size,
9876 ssh_special,
9877 ssh_get_specials,
9878 ssh_connected,
9879 ssh_return_exitcode,
9880 ssh_sendok,
9881 ssh_ldisc,
9882 ssh_provide_ldisc,
9883 ssh_provide_logctx,
9884 ssh_unthrottle,
9885 ssh_cfg_info,
9886 "ssh",
9887 PROT_SSH,
9888 22
9889 };