Tweak to SSH coroutine code: put line number in the coroutine state
[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c
1 /*
2 * SSH backend.
3 */
4
5 #include <stdio.h>
6 #include <stdlib.h>
7 #include <stdarg.h>
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <limits.h>
10 #include <signal.h>
11
12 #include "putty.h"
13 #include "tree234.h"
14 #include "ssh.h"
15 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
16 #include "sshgssc.h"
17 #include "sshgss.h"
18 #endif
19
20 #ifndef FALSE
21 #define FALSE 0
22 #endif
23 #ifndef TRUE
24 #define TRUE 1
25 #endif
26
27 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
28 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
29 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
30 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
33 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
35 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
36 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
37 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
38 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
39 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
40 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
41 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
42 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
43 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
47 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
48 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
49 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
51 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
53 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
55 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
56 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
58 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
59 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
60 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
61 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
62 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
63 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
64 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
65 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
66 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
67 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
68
69 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
70 #define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
71 #define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
72 #define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
73 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
74 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
75
76 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
77 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
78 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
79
80 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
102 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
103 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
104 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
105 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
106 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
107 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
108 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
109 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
110 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
111 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
112 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
113 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
114 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
115 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
116 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
117 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
118 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
119 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
120 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
121 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
122 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
123 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
124 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
125
126 /*
127 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
128 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
129 */
130 typedef enum {
131 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
132 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
133 SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
134 SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
135 } Pkt_KCtx;
136 typedef enum {
137 SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
138 SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
139 SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
140 SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
141 SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
142 } Pkt_ACtx;
143
144 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
145 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
146 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
147 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
148 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
149 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
150 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
151 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
152 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
153 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
154 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
155 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
156 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
157 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
158 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
159
160 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
161 NULL,
162 "host not allowed to connect",
163 "protocol error",
164 "key exchange failed",
165 "host authentication failed",
166 "MAC error",
167 "compression error",
168 "service not available",
169 "protocol version not supported",
170 "host key not verifiable",
171 "connection lost",
172 "by application",
173 "too many connections",
174 "auth cancelled by user",
175 "no more auth methods available",
176 "illegal user name",
177 };
178
179 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
180 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
181 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
182 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
183
184 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
185
186 /*
187 * Various remote-bug flags.
188 */
189 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
190 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
191 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
192 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
193 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
194 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
195 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
196 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
197 #define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
198 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
199 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ 1024
200
201 /*
202 * Codes for terminal modes.
203 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
204 * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
205 * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
206 */
207 static const struct {
208 const char* const mode;
209 int opcode;
210 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
211 } ssh_ttymodes[] = {
212 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
213 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
214 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
215 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
216 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
217 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
218 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
219 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
220 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
221 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
222 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
223 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
224 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
225 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
226 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
227 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
228 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
229 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
230 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
231 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
234 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
235 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
236 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
237 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
238 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
239 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
240 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
241 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
242 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
243 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
244 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
245 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
246 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
247 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
248 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
249 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
250 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
251 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
252 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
253 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
254 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
255 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
256 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
257 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
258 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
259 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
260 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
261 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
262 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
263 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
264 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
265 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
266 };
267
268 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
269 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
270 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
271 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
272 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
273 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
274 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
275
276 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
277 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
278 {
279 unsigned int ret;
280 if (*s) {
281 char *next = NULL;
282 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
283 if (!next) ret = s[0];
284 } else {
285 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
286 }
287 return ret;
288 }
289 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
290 {
291 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
292 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
293 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
294 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
295 return 1; /* true */
296 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
297 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
298 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
299 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
300 return 0; /* false */
301 else
302 return (atoi(s) != 0);
303 }
304
305 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
306 #define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
307 #define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
308 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
309 {
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
311 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
313 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
315 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
316 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
318 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
319 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
320 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
321 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
322 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
323 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
324 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
325 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
326 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
327 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
328 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
329 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
330 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
331 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
332 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
333 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
334 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
335 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
336 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
337 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
338 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
339 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
340 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
341 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
342 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
343 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
344 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
345 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
346 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
347 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
348 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
349 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
350 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
351 return "unknown";
352 }
353 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
354 {
355 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
356 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
357 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
358 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
359 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
360 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
361 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
362 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
363 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
364 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
365 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
366 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
367 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
368 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
369 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
370 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
371 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
372 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
373 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
374 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
375 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
376 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
377 translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
378 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
379 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
380 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
381 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
382 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
383 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
384 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
385 translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
386 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
387 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
388 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
389 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
390 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
391 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
392 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
393 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
394 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
395 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
396 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
397 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
398 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
399 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
400 return "unknown";
401 }
402 #undef translate
403 #undef translatec
404
405 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
406 enum {
407 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
408 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
409 * fields to the packet logging code. */
410 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
411 };
412
413 /*
414 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
415 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
416 * read
417 *
418 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
419 *
420 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
421 *
422 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
423 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
424 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
425 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
426 *
427 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
428 * - click Settings
429 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
430 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
431 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
432 */
433 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
434 #define crBeginState crBegin(s->crLine)
435 #define crStateP(t, v) \
436 struct t *s; \
437 if (!(v)) { s = (v) = snew(struct t); s->crLine = 0; } \
438 s = (v);
439 #define crState(t) crStateP(t, ssh->t)
440 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
441 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
442 #define crReturn(z) \
443 do {\
444 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
445 } while (0)
446 #define crReturnV \
447 do {\
448 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
449 } while (0)
450 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
451 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
452 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
453 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
454
455 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
456 struct Packet;
457
458 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
459 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
460 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
461 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
462 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
463 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
464 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
465 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
466 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
467 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
468 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
469 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
470 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
471 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
472 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
473 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
474 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
475 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
476 struct Packet *pktin);
477 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
478 struct Packet *pktin);
479 static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
480 static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
481
482 /*
483 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
484 * various different purposes:
485 *
486 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
487 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
488 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
489 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
490 * happen very often.
491 *
492 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
493 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
494 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
495 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
496 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
497 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
498 *
499 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
500 * channels.
501 *
502 * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
503 * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
504 *
505 * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
506 * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
507 * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
508 * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
509 * data message.
510 *
511 * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
512 * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
513 * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
514 */
515
516 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
517 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
518 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
519 #define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
520 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
521 #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
522
523 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
524
525 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
526 &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
527 };
528 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
529 &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
530 };
531
532 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
533 {
534 return NULL;
535 }
536 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
537 {
538 }
539 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
540 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
541 {
542 return 0;
543 }
544 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
545 {
546 return 0;
547 }
548 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
549 "none", NULL,
550 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
551 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
552 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
553 };
554 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
555 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
556 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
557 };
558
559 enum { /* channel types */
560 CHAN_MAINSESSION,
561 CHAN_X11,
562 CHAN_AGENT,
563 CHAN_SOCKDATA,
564 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT, /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
565 /*
566 * CHAN_ZOMBIE is used to indicate a channel for which we've
567 * already destroyed the local data source: for instance, if a
568 * forwarded port experiences a socket error on the local side, we
569 * immediately destroy its local socket and turn the SSH channel
570 * into CHAN_ZOMBIE.
571 */
572 CHAN_ZOMBIE
573 };
574
575 /*
576 * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
577 */
578 struct winadj {
579 struct winadj *next;
580 unsigned size;
581 };
582
583 /*
584 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
585 */
586 struct ssh_channel {
587 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
588 unsigned remoteid, localid;
589 int type;
590 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
591 int halfopen;
592 /*
593 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
594 *
595 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
596 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
597 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
598 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
599 *
600 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
601 *
602 * In SSH-2, the four bits mean:
603 *
604 * 1 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
605 * 2 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
606 * 4 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
607 * 8 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
608 *
609 * A channel is completely finished with when we have both sent
610 * and received CLOSE.
611 *
612 * The symbolic constants below use the SSH-2 terminology, which
613 * is a bit confusing in SSH-1, but we have to use _something_.
614 */
615 #define CLOSES_SENT_EOF 1
616 #define CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE 2
617 #define CLOSES_RCVD_EOF 4
618 #define CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE 8
619 int closes;
620
621 /*
622 * This flag indicates that an EOF is pending on the outgoing side
623 * of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data for
624 * this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We can't
625 * actually send the EOF until we've finished sending the data, so
626 * we set this flag instead to remind us to do so once our buffer
627 * is clear.
628 */
629 int pending_eof;
630
631 /*
632 * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
633 * throttled.
634 */
635 int throttling_conn;
636 union {
637 struct ssh2_data_channel {
638 bufchain outbuffer;
639 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
640 /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
641 int locwindow, locmaxwin;
642 /*
643 * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
644 * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
645 * last data packet or window adjust ack.
646 */
647 int remlocwin;
648 /*
649 * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
650 * been acked.
651 */
652 struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
653 enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
654 } v2;
655 } v;
656 union {
657 struct ssh_agent_channel {
658 unsigned char *message;
659 unsigned char msglen[4];
660 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
661 } a;
662 struct ssh_x11_channel {
663 Socket s;
664 } x11;
665 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
666 Socket s;
667 } pfd;
668 } u;
669 };
670
671 /*
672 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
673 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
674 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
675 *
676 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
677 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
678 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
679 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
680 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
681 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
682 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
683 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
684 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
685 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
686 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
687 *
688 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
689 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
690 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
691 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
692 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
693 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
694 *
695 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
696 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
697 */
698 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
699
700 struct ssh_rportfwd {
701 unsigned sport, dport;
702 char dhost[256];
703 char *sportdesc;
704 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
705 };
706 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
707 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
708
709 /*
710 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
711 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
712 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
713 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
714 * it.
715 */
716 struct ssh_portfwd {
717 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
718 int type;
719 unsigned sport, dport;
720 char *saddr, *daddr;
721 char *sserv, *dserv;
722 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
723 int addressfamily;
724 void *local;
725 };
726 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
727 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
728 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
729
730 struct Packet {
731 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
732 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
733 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
734 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
735 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
736 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
737 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
738 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
739 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
740
741 /*
742 * State associated with packet logging
743 */
744 int logmode;
745 int nblanks;
746 struct logblank_t *blanks;
747 };
748
749 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
750 struct Packet *pktin);
751 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
752 struct Packet *pktin);
753 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
754 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
755 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
756 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
757 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
758 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
759 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
760 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
761 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
762 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
763 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
764 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
765 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
766 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
767 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
768 struct Packet *pktin);
769
770 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
771 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
772 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
773 unsigned char *p;
774 int i;
775 int chunk;
776 struct Packet *pktin;
777 };
778
779 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
780 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
781 int i;
782 int cipherblk;
783 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
784 struct Packet *pktin;
785 };
786
787 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
788 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
789
790 struct queued_handler;
791 struct queued_handler {
792 int msg1, msg2;
793 chandler_fn_t handler;
794 void *ctx;
795 struct queued_handler *next;
796 };
797
798 struct ssh_tag {
799 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
800 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
801
802 char *v_c, *v_s;
803 void *exhash;
804
805 Socket s;
806
807 void *ldisc;
808 void *logctx;
809
810 unsigned char session_key[32];
811 int v1_compressing;
812 int v1_remote_protoflags;
813 int v1_local_protoflags;
814 int agentfwd_enabled;
815 int X11_fwd_enabled;
816 int remote_bugs;
817 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
818 void *v1_cipher_ctx;
819 void *crcda_ctx;
820 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
821 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
822 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
823 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
824 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
825 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
826 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
827 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
828 unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
829 int v2_session_id_len;
830 void *kex_ctx;
831
832 char *savedhost;
833 int savedport;
834 int send_ok;
835 int echoing, editing;
836
837 void *frontend;
838
839 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
840 int term_width, term_height;
841
842 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
843 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
844 int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
845 int exitcode;
846 int close_expected;
847 int clean_exit;
848
849 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
850
851 enum {
852 SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
853 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
854 SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
855 SSH_STATE_SESSION,
856 SSH_STATE_CLOSED
857 } state;
858
859 int size_needed, eof_needed;
860 int sent_console_eof;
861 int got_pty; /* affects EOF behaviour on main channel */
862
863 struct Packet **queue;
864 int queuelen, queuesize;
865 int queueing;
866 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
867 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
868
869 /*
870 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
871 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
872 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
873 * got.
874 */
875 int fallback_cmd;
876
877 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
878
879 Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
880 Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
881
882 struct X11Display *x11disp;
883
884 int version;
885 int conn_throttle_count;
886 int overall_bufsize;
887 int throttled_all;
888 int v1_stdout_throttling;
889 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
890
891 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
892 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
893 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
894 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
895
896 void *do_ssh_init_state;
897 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
898 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
899 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
900
901 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
902 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
903
904 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
905 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
906
907 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
908 struct Packet *pkt);
909 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
910
911 /*
912 * We maintain our own copy of a Conf structure here. That way,
913 * when we're passed a new one for reconfiguration, we can check
914 * the differences and potentially reconfigure port forwardings
915 * etc in mid-session.
916 */
917 Conf *conf;
918
919 /*
920 * Values cached out of conf so as to avoid the tree234 lookup
921 * cost every time they're used.
922 */
923 int logomitdata;
924
925 /*
926 * Dynamically allocated username string created during SSH
927 * login. Stored in here rather than in the coroutine state so
928 * that it'll be reliably freed if we shut down the SSH session
929 * at some unexpected moment.
930 */
931 char *username;
932
933 /*
934 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
935 */
936 void *agent_response;
937 int agent_response_len;
938 int user_response;
939
940 /*
941 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
942 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
943 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
944 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
945 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
946 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
947 * store that data.
948 */
949 int frozen;
950 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
951
952 /*
953 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
954 * with at any time.
955 */
956 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
957
958 /*
959 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
960 * indications from a request.
961 */
962 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
963
964 /*
965 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
966 */
967 Pinger pinger;
968
969 /*
970 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
971 * size-based rekeys.
972 */
973 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
974 unsigned long max_data_size;
975 int kex_in_progress;
976 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
977 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
978
979 /*
980 * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
981 */
982 char *fullhostname;
983
984 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
985 /*
986 * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
987 */
988 struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
989 #endif
990 };
991
992 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
993
994 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
995 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
996 {
997 va_list ap;
998 char *buf;
999
1000 va_start(ap, fmt);
1001 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
1002 va_end(ap);
1003 logevent(buf);
1004 sfree(buf);
1005 }
1006
1007 #define bombout(msg) \
1008 do { \
1009 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
1010 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
1011 logevent(text); \
1012 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
1013 sfree(text); \
1014 } while (0)
1015
1016 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
1017
1018 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
1019 {
1020 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass))
1021 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
1022 }
1023
1024 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
1025 {
1026 if (ssh->logomitdata)
1027 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
1028 }
1029
1030 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1031 {
1032 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1033 }
1034
1035 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing ttymodes. */
1036 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh,
1037 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
1038 void *data)
1039 {
1040 char *key, *val;
1041
1042 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, NULL, &key);
1043 val != NULL;
1044 val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, key, &key)) {
1045 /*
1046 * val[0] is either 'V', indicating that an explicit value
1047 * follows it, or 'A' indicating that we should pass the
1048 * value through from the local environment via get_ttymode.
1049 */
1050 if (val[0] == 'A')
1051 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, key);
1052 else
1053 val++; /* skip the 'V' */
1054 if (val)
1055 do_mode(data, key, val);
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1060 {
1061 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
1062 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1063 if (a->localid < b->localid)
1064 return -1;
1065 if (a->localid > b->localid)
1066 return +1;
1067 return 0;
1068 }
1069 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
1070 {
1071 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
1072 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
1073 if (*a < b->localid)
1074 return -1;
1075 if (*a > b->localid)
1076 return +1;
1077 return 0;
1078 }
1079
1080 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
1081 {
1082 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1083 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1084 int i;
1085 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
1086 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1087 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1088 return +1;
1089 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1090 return -1;
1091 return 0;
1092 }
1093
1094 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
1095 {
1096 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
1097 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
1098
1099 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1100 return +1;
1101 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1102 return -1;
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105
1106 /*
1107 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
1108 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
1109 */
1110 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1111 {
1112 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
1113 return 0;
1114 if (a == NULL)
1115 return -1;
1116 if (b == NULL)
1117 return +1;
1118 return strcmp(a, b);
1119 }
1120
1121 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
1122 {
1123 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
1124 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
1125 int i;
1126 if (a->type > b->type)
1127 return +1;
1128 if (a->type < b->type)
1129 return -1;
1130 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
1131 return +1;
1132 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
1133 return -1;
1134 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
1135 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1136 if (a->sport > b->sport)
1137 return +1;
1138 if (a->sport < b->sport)
1139 return -1;
1140 if (a->type != 'D') {
1141 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1142 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1143 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1144 return +1;
1145 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1146 return -1;
1147 }
1148 return 0;
1149 }
1150
1151 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1152 {
1153 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1154 unsigned low, high, mid;
1155 int tsize;
1156 struct ssh_channel *c;
1157
1158 /*
1159 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1160 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1161 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1162 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1163 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1164 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1165 */
1166 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1167
1168 low = -1;
1169 high = tsize;
1170 while (high - low > 1) {
1171 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1172 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1173 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1174 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1175 else
1176 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1177 }
1178 /*
1179 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1180 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1181 */
1182 {
1183 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1184 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1185 }
1186 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1187 }
1188
1189 static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
1190 {
1191 int i;
1192 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1193 if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
1194 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1195 }
1196
1197 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1198 {
1199 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1200 c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
1201 else
1202 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1203 }
1204
1205 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1206 {
1207 if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
1208 c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
1209 else
1210 from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
1211 }
1212
1213 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1214 {
1215 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1216 }
1217
1218 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1219 {
1220 sfree(pkt->data);
1221 sfree(pkt);
1222 }
1223 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1224 {
1225 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1226
1227 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1228 pkt->maxlen = 0;
1229 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1230 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1231 pkt->blanks = NULL;
1232
1233 return pkt;
1234 }
1235
1236 /*
1237 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1238 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1239 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1240 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1241 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1242 */
1243 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1244 {
1245 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1246
1247 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1248
1249 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1250
1251 st->pktin->type = 0;
1252 st->pktin->length = 0;
1253
1254 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1255 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1256 crReturn(NULL);
1257 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1258 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1259 }
1260
1261 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1262 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1263 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1264
1265 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1266 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1267 " data stream corruption"));
1268 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1269 crStop(NULL);
1270 }
1271
1272 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1273 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1274
1275 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1276 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1277 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1278 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1279 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1280 crReturn(NULL);
1281 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1282 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1283 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1284 *data += st->chunk;
1285 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1286 st->p += st->chunk;
1287 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1288 }
1289
1290 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1291 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1292 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1293 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1294 crStop(NULL);
1295 }
1296
1297 if (ssh->cipher)
1298 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1299
1300 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1301 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1302 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1303 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1304 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1305 crStop(NULL);
1306 }
1307
1308 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1309 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1310
1311 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1312 unsigned char *decompblk;
1313 int decomplen;
1314 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1315 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1316 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1317 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1318 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1319 crStop(NULL);
1320 }
1321
1322 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1323 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1324 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1325 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1326 unsigned char);
1327 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1328 }
1329
1330 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1331 sfree(decompblk);
1332 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1333 }
1334
1335 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1336
1337 /*
1338 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1339 */
1340 if (ssh->logctx) {
1341 int nblanks = 0;
1342 struct logblank_t blank;
1343 if (ssh->logomitdata) {
1344 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1345 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1346 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1347 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1348 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1349 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1350 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1351 }
1352 if (do_blank) {
1353 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1354 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1355 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1356 nblanks = 1;
1357 }
1358 }
1359 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1360 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1361 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1362 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1363 nblanks, &blank, NULL);
1364 }
1365
1366 crFinish(st->pktin);
1367 }
1368
1369 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1370 {
1371 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1372
1373 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1374
1375 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1376
1377 st->pktin->type = 0;
1378 st->pktin->length = 0;
1379 if (ssh->sccipher)
1380 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1381 else
1382 st->cipherblk = 8;
1383 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1384 st->cipherblk = 8;
1385 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1386
1387 if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1388 ssh->scmac) {
1389 /*
1390 * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
1391 * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
1392 * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
1393 * cipher more than once and thus leak information
1394 * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
1395 * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
1396 * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
1397 * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
1398 * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
1399 * plausible.
1400 */
1401
1402 /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
1403 st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
1404 unsigned char);
1405
1406 /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
1407 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
1408 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1409 crReturn(NULL);
1410 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1411 (*datalen)--;
1412 }
1413
1414 st->packetlen = 0;
1415 {
1416 unsigned char seq[4];
1417 ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
1418 PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
1419 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
1420 }
1421
1422 for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
1423 /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
1424 for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1425 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1426 crReturn(NULL);
1427 st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
1428 (*datalen)--;
1429 }
1430 /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
1431 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1432 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
1433 st->cipherblk);
1434 /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
1435 ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1436 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
1437 st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
1438 /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
1439 if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
1440 st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
1441 (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
1442 break;
1443 if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
1444 bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
1445 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1446 crStop(NULL);
1447 }
1448 }
1449 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1450 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1451 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1452 unsigned char);
1453 } else {
1454 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1455
1456 /*
1457 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1458 * contain the length and padding details.
1459 */
1460 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1461 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1462 crReturn(NULL);
1463 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1464 (*datalen)--;
1465 }
1466
1467 if (ssh->sccipher)
1468 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1469 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1470
1471 /*
1472 * Now get the length figure.
1473 */
1474 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1475
1476 /*
1477 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1478 * do us any more damage.
1479 */
1480 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
1481 (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1482 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1483 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1484 crStop(NULL);
1485 }
1486
1487 /*
1488 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1489 */
1490 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1491
1492 /*
1493 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1494 */
1495 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1496 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1497 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1498 unsigned char);
1499
1500 /*
1501 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1502 */
1503 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1504 st->i++) {
1505 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1506 crReturn(NULL);
1507 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1508 (*datalen)--;
1509 }
1510 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1511 if (ssh->sccipher)
1512 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1513 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1514 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1515
1516 /*
1517 * Check the MAC.
1518 */
1519 if (ssh->scmac
1520 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1521 st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
1522 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1523 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1524 crStop(NULL);
1525 }
1526 }
1527 /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
1528 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1529 if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
1530 bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
1531 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1532 crStop(NULL);
1533 }
1534 /*
1535 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1536 */
1537 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1538
1539 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1540 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1541
1542 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1543
1544 /*
1545 * Decompress packet payload.
1546 */
1547 {
1548 unsigned char *newpayload;
1549 int newlen;
1550 if (ssh->sccomp &&
1551 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1552 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1553 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1554 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1555 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1556 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1557 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1558 unsigned char);
1559 }
1560 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1561 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1562 sfree(newpayload);
1563 }
1564 }
1565
1566 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1567 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1568 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1569
1570 /*
1571 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1572 */
1573 if (ssh->logctx) {
1574 int nblanks = 0;
1575 struct logblank_t blank;
1576 if (ssh->logomitdata) {
1577 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1578 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1579 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1580 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1581 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1582 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
1583 }
1584 if (do_blank) {
1585 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1586 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1587 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1588 nblanks = 1;
1589 }
1590 }
1591 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1592 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
1593 st->pktin->type),
1594 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1595 nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
1596 }
1597
1598 crFinish(st->pktin);
1599 }
1600
1601 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1602 {
1603 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1604 unsigned long crc;
1605 #ifdef __SC__
1606 /*
1607 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1608 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1609 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1610 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1611 */
1612 volatile
1613 #endif
1614 int len;
1615
1616 if (ssh->logctx)
1617 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1618 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1619 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1620 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
1621 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1622 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1623
1624 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1625 unsigned char *compblk;
1626 int complen;
1627 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1628 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1629 &compblk, &complen);
1630 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
1631 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1632 sfree(compblk);
1633 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1634 }
1635
1636 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1637 pkt->length += 4;
1638 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1639 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1640 pktoffs = 8 - pad;
1641 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1642
1643 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1644 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1645 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1646 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1647 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1648
1649 if (ssh->cipher)
1650 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1651 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1652
1653 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1654 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1655 }
1656
1657 static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
1658 {
1659 if (ssh->logctx)
1660 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
1661 0, NULL, NULL);
1662 return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
1663 }
1664
1665 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1666 {
1667 int len, backlog, offset;
1668 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1669 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
1670 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1671 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1672 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1673 }
1674
1675 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1676 {
1677 int len, offset;
1678 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1679 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1680 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1681 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1682 ssh->deferred_size,
1683 unsigned char);
1684 }
1685 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1686 pkt->data + offset, len);
1687 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1688 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1689 }
1690
1691 /*
1692 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1693 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1694 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1695 */
1696 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1697 {
1698 int argtype;
1699 Bignum bn;
1700 struct Packet *pkt;
1701
1702 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1703
1704 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1705 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1706 char *sargp;
1707 unsigned long argint;
1708 int arglen;
1709 switch (argtype) {
1710 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1711 case PKT_INT:
1712 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1713 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1714 break;
1715 case PKT_CHAR:
1716 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1717 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1718 break;
1719 case PKT_DATA:
1720 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1721 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1722 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1723 break;
1724 case PKT_STR:
1725 sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
1726 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
1727 break;
1728 case PKT_BIGNUM:
1729 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1730 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1731 break;
1732 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1733 case PKTT_PASSWORD:
1734 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1735 break;
1736 case PKTT_DATA:
1737 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1738 break;
1739 case PKTT_OTHER:
1740 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1741 break;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 return pkt;
1746 }
1747
1748 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1749 {
1750 struct Packet *pkt;
1751 va_list ap;
1752 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1753 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1754 va_end(ap);
1755 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
1756 }
1757
1758 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1759 {
1760 struct Packet *pkt;
1761 va_list ap;
1762 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1763 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1764 va_end(ap);
1765 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1766 }
1767
1768 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1769 {
1770 char *ae, *be;
1771 unsigned long av, bv;
1772
1773 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1774 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1775 if (av != bv)
1776 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1777 if (*ae == '.')
1778 ae++;
1779 if (*be == '.')
1780 be++;
1781 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1782 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1783 if (av != bv)
1784 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1785 return 0;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1790 * `uint32' into a hash state.
1791 */
1792 static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
1793 {
1794 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1795 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1796 h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1797 h->bytes(s, str, len);
1798 }
1799
1800 static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
1801 {
1802 unsigned char intblk[4];
1803 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1804 h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1805 }
1806
1807 /*
1808 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1809 */
1810 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1811 {
1812 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1813 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1814 int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
1815 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1816 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1817 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1818 }
1819 }
1820 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1821 {
1822 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1823 pkt->nblanks++;
1824 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1825 assert(pkt->body);
1826 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1827 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1828 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1829 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1830 }
1831 pkt->length += len;
1832 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1833 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1834 }
1835 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1836 {
1837 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1838 }
1839 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1840 {
1841 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1842 }
1843 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1844 {
1845 unsigned char x[4];
1846 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1847 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1848 }
1849 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1850 {
1851 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1852 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1853 }
1854 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1855 {
1856 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1857 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1858 }
1859 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1860 {
1861 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1862 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1863 }
1864 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1865 {
1866 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1867 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1868 }
1869 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1870 {
1871 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1872 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
1873 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1874 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1875 sfree(data);
1876 }
1877 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1878 {
1879 unsigned char *p;
1880 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1881 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1882 p[0] = 0;
1883 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1884 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1885 i = 0;
1886 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1887 i++;
1888 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1889 *len = n + 1 - i;
1890 return p;
1891 }
1892 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1893 {
1894 unsigned char *p;
1895 int len;
1896 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1897 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1898 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1899 sfree(p);
1900 }
1901
1902 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1903 {
1904 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1905 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1906 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1907 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1908 return pkt;
1909 }
1910
1911 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1912 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1913 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1914 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1915 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1916 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1917 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1918 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1919 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1920
1921 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1922 {
1923 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1924 pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
1925 pkt->forcepad = 0;
1926 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1927 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
1928 return pkt;
1929 }
1930
1931 /*
1932 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1933 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1934 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1935 */
1936 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1937 {
1938 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1939
1940 if (ssh->logctx)
1941 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1942 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
1943 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1944 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1945 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1946 pkt->nblanks = 0;
1947
1948 /*
1949 * Compress packet payload.
1950 */
1951 {
1952 unsigned char *newpayload;
1953 int newlen;
1954 if (ssh->cscomp &&
1955 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1956 pkt->length - 5,
1957 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1958 pkt->length = 5;
1959 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1960 sfree(newpayload);
1961 }
1962 }
1963
1964 /*
1965 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1966 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1967 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1968 * after padding.
1969 */
1970 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1971 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1972 padding = 4;
1973 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1974 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1975 padding +=
1976 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1977 assert(padding <= 255);
1978 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1979 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1980 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1981 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1982 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1983 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1984 if (ssh->csmac)
1985 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1986 pkt->length + padding,
1987 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1988 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1989
1990 if (ssh->cscipher)
1991 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1992 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1993
1994 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1995
1996 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1997 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1998 }
1999
2000 /*
2001 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
2002 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
2003 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
2004 *
2005 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
2006 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
2007 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
2008 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
2009 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
2010 * works after packet encryption.
2011 *
2012 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
2013 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
2014 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
2015 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
2016 * then send them once we've finished.
2017 *
2018 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
2019 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
2020 *
2021 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
2022 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
2023 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
2024 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
2025 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
2026 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
2027 *
2028 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
2029 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
2030 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
2031 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
2032 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
2033 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
2034 * CBC.
2035 */
2036
2037 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
2038 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
2039
2040 /*
2041 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
2042 */
2043 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2044 {
2045 int len;
2046 int backlog;
2047 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
2048 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
2049 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2050 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2051 return;
2052 }
2053 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2054 backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
2055 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2056 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2057
2058 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2059 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2060 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2061 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2062 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2063
2064 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2065 }
2066
2067 /*
2068 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
2069 */
2070 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
2071 {
2072 int len;
2073 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
2074 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
2075 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2076 /*
2077 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
2078 * get encrypted with a known IV.
2079 */
2080 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2081 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
2082 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
2083 }
2084 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
2085 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
2086 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
2087 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
2088 ssh->deferred_size,
2089 unsigned char);
2090 }
2091 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
2092 ssh->deferred_len += len;
2093 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
2094 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
2095 }
2096
2097 /*
2098 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
2099 */
2100 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2101 {
2102 assert(ssh->queueing);
2103
2104 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
2105 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
2106 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
2107 }
2108
2109 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
2110 }
2111
2112 /*
2113 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2114 * set.
2115 */
2116 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2117 {
2118 if (ssh->queueing)
2119 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2120 else
2121 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
2122 }
2123
2124 /*
2125 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
2126 * set.
2127 */
2128 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
2129 {
2130 if (ssh->queueing)
2131 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
2132 else
2133 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
2134 }
2135
2136 /*
2137 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
2138 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
2139 *
2140 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
2141 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
2142 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
2143 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
2144 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
2145 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
2146 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
2147 * ssh->queueing.
2148 */
2149 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
2150 {
2151 int backlog;
2152 backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
2153 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
2154 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
2155 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
2156 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2157 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
2158
2159 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
2160 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
2161 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
2162 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
2163 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
2164 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
2165 }
2166
2167 /*
2168 * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
2169 * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
2170 */
2171 static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2172 int padsize)
2173 {
2174 #if 0
2175 if (0) {
2176 /*
2177 * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
2178 * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
2179 *
2180 * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
2181 * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
2182 * always Cisco?)
2183 */
2184 pkt->forcepad = padsize;
2185 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
2186 } else
2187 #endif
2188 {
2189 /*
2190 * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
2191 * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
2192 * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
2193 * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
2194 * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
2195 */
2196 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2197
2198 /*
2199 * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
2200 * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
2201 * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
2202 * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
2203 * gain nothing by it.)
2204 */
2205 if (ssh->cscipher &&
2206 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
2207 int stringlen, i;
2208
2209 stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
2210 stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
2211 stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
2212 if (ssh->cscomp) {
2213 /*
2214 * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
2215 * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
2216 * length we want it. The compression-disabling
2217 * routine should return an integer indicating how
2218 * many bytes we should adjust our string length
2219 * by.
2220 */
2221 stringlen -=
2222 ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
2223 }
2224 pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2225 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2226 for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
2227 char c = (char) random_byte();
2228 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
2229 }
2230 ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
2231 }
2232 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2233 }
2234 }
2235
2236 /*
2237 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
2238 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
2239 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
2240 */
2241 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
2242 {
2243 int i;
2244
2245 assert(!ssh->queueing);
2246
2247 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
2248 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
2249 ssh->queuelen = 0;
2250
2251 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
2252 }
2253
2254 #if 0
2255 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
2256 {
2257 unsigned char *p;
2258 int i, len;
2259 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2260 debug(("%s", string));
2261 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
2262 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
2263 debug(("\n"));
2264 sfree(p);
2265 }
2266 #endif
2267
2268 static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
2269 {
2270 unsigned char *p;
2271 int len;
2272 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
2273 hash_string(h, s, p, len);
2274 sfree(p);
2275 }
2276
2277 /*
2278 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2279 */
2280 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
2281 {
2282 unsigned long value;
2283 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2284 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2285 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2286 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2287 return value;
2288 }
2289 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
2290 {
2291 unsigned long value;
2292 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2293 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2294 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2295 pkt->savedpos++;
2296 return value;
2297 }
2298 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2299 {
2300 int len;
2301 *p = NULL;
2302 *length = 0;
2303 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2304 return;
2305 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2306 if (len < 0)
2307 return;
2308 *length = len;
2309 pkt->savedpos += 4;
2310 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2311 return;
2312 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2313 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2314 }
2315 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2316 {
2317 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2318 return NULL;
2319 pkt->savedpos += length;
2320 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2321 }
2322 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2323 unsigned char **keystr)
2324 {
2325 int j;
2326
2327 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2328 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2329 key, keystr, 0);
2330
2331 if (j < 0)
2332 return FALSE;
2333
2334 pkt->savedpos += j;
2335 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2336
2337 return TRUE;
2338 }
2339 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2340 {
2341 int j;
2342 Bignum b;
2343
2344 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2345 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2346
2347 if (j < 0)
2348 return NULL;
2349
2350 pkt->savedpos += j;
2351 return b;
2352 }
2353 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2354 {
2355 char *p;
2356 int length;
2357 Bignum b;
2358
2359 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2360 if (!p)
2361 return NULL;
2362 if (p[0] & 0x80)
2363 return NULL;
2364 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2365 return b;
2366 }
2367
2368 /*
2369 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2370 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2371 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2372 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2373 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2374 */
2375 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2376 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2377 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2378 {
2379 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2380 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2381
2382 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2383 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2384
2385 /*
2386 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2387 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2388 */
2389 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2390 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2391 int pos, len, siglen;
2392
2393 /*
2394 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2395 */
2396
2397 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2398 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2399 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2400 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2401 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2402 len--, pos++;
2403 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2404
2405 /*
2406 * Now find the signature integer.
2407 */
2408 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2409 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2410 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2411
2412 if (len != siglen) {
2413 unsigned char newlen[4];
2414 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2415 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2416 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2417 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2418 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2419 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2420 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2421 newlen[0] = 0;
2422 while (len-- > siglen) {
2423 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2424 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2425 }
2426 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2427 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2428 return;
2429 }
2430
2431 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2432 }
2433
2434 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2435 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2436 }
2437
2438 /*
2439 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2440 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2441 */
2442 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2443 {
2444 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2445 imp = vstring;
2446 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2447 if (*imp) imp++;
2448 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2449 if (*imp) imp++;
2450
2451 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2452
2453 /*
2454 * General notes on server version strings:
2455 * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
2456 * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
2457 * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
2458 * so we can't distinguish them.
2459 */
2460 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == FORCE_ON ||
2461 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == AUTO &&
2462 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2463 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2464 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2465 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2466 /*
2467 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2468 * to use a different defence against password length
2469 * sniffing.
2470 */
2471 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2472 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2473 }
2474
2475 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == FORCE_ON ||
2476 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == AUTO &&
2477 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2478 /*
2479 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2480 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2481 * the password.
2482 */
2483 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2484 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2485 }
2486
2487 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == FORCE_ON ||
2488 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == AUTO &&
2489 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2490 /*
2491 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2492 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2493 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2494 */
2495 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2496 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2497 }
2498
2499 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == FORCE_ON ||
2500 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == AUTO &&
2501 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2502 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2503 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2504 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2505 /*
2506 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2507 */
2508 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2509 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2510 }
2511
2512 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
2513 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == AUTO &&
2514 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2515 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2516 /*
2517 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2518 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2519 * generate the keys).
2520 */
2521 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2522 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2523 }
2524
2525 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == FORCE_ON ||
2526 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == AUTO &&
2527 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2528 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2529 /*
2530 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2531 */
2532 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2533 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2534 }
2535
2536 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == FORCE_ON ||
2537 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == AUTO &&
2538 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2539 /*
2540 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2541 * public-key authentication.
2542 */
2543 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2544 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2545 }
2546
2547 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
2548 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == AUTO &&
2549 (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
2550 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2551 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2552 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2553 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
2554 /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
2555 wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
2556 /*
2557 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2558 */
2559 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2560 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2561 }
2562
2563 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == FORCE_ON ||
2564 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == AUTO &&
2565 (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
2566 wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
2567 /*
2568 * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
2569 */
2570 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
2571 logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
2572 }
2573
2574 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore2) == FORCE_ON) {
2575 /*
2576 * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
2577 * none detected automatically.
2578 */
2579 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
2580 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
2581 }
2582
2583 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_winadj) == FORCE_ON) {
2584 /*
2585 * Servers that don't support our winadj request for one
2586 * reason or another. Currently, none detected automatically.
2587 */
2588 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ;
2589 logevent("We believe remote version has winadj bug");
2590 }
2591 }
2592
2593 /*
2594 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2595 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2596 */
2597 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2598 {
2599 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2600 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2601 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2602 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2603 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2604 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2605 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2606
2607 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2608 * underscores. */
2609 while (*str) {
2610 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2611 *str = '_';
2612 str++;
2613 }
2614 }
2615
2616 /*
2617 * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
2618 */
2619 static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
2620 {
2621 char *verstring;
2622
2623 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2624 /*
2625 * Construct a v2 version string.
2626 */
2627 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2628 } else {
2629 /*
2630 * Construct a v1 version string.
2631 */
2632 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2633 (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2634 svers : "1.5"),
2635 sshver);
2636 }
2637
2638 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2639
2640 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2641 size_t len;
2642 /*
2643 * Record our version string.
2644 */
2645 len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
2646 ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
2647 memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
2648 ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2652 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2653 s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2654 sfree(verstring);
2655 }
2656
2657 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2658 {
2659 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2660 int crLine;
2661 int vslen;
2662 char version[10];
2663 char *vstring;
2664 int vstrsize;
2665 int i;
2666 int proto1, proto2;
2667 };
2668 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2669
2670 crBeginState;
2671
2672 /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2673 for (;;) {
2674 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2675 crReturn(1);
2676 if (c != 'S') goto no;
2677 crReturn(1);
2678 if (c != 'H') goto no;
2679 crReturn(1);
2680 if (c != '-') goto no;
2681 break;
2682 no:
2683 while (c != '\012')
2684 crReturn(1);
2685 crReturn(1);
2686 }
2687
2688 s->vstrsize = 16;
2689 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2690 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2691 s->vslen = 4;
2692 s->i = 0;
2693 while (1) {
2694 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2695 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2696 s->vstrsize += 16;
2697 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2698 }
2699 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2700 if (s->i >= 0) {
2701 if (c == '-') {
2702 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2703 s->i = -1;
2704 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2705 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2706 } else if (c == '\012')
2707 break;
2708 }
2709
2710 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2711 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2712
2713 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2714 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2715 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2716 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2717
2718 /*
2719 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2720 */
2721
2722 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2723 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2724 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2725 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2726
2727 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2728 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2729 crStop(0);
2730 }
2731 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2732 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2733 crStop(0);
2734 }
2735
2736 if (s->proto2 && (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) >= 2 || !s->proto1))
2737 ssh->version = 2;
2738 else
2739 ssh->version = 1;
2740
2741 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2742
2743 /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
2744 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) != 3)
2745 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
2746
2747 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2748 size_t len;
2749 /*
2750 * Record their version string.
2751 */
2752 len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
2753 ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
2754 memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
2755 ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
2756
2757 /*
2758 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2759 */
2760 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2761 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2762 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2763 } else {
2764 /*
2765 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2766 */
2767 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2768 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2769 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2770 }
2771 if (ssh->version == 2)
2772 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2773
2774 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2775 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2776 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2777
2778 sfree(s->vstring);
2779
2780 crFinish(0);
2781 }
2782
2783 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2784 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2785 {
2786 struct Packet *pktin;
2787
2788 pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2789 if (pktin) {
2790 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2791 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2792 }
2793 }
2794
2795 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2796 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2797 {
2798 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2799 *data += *datalen;
2800 *datalen = 0;
2801 }
2802
2803 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2804 {
2805 void *vdata;
2806 unsigned char *data;
2807 int len, origlen;
2808
2809 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2810 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2811 data = vdata;
2812 origlen = len;
2813
2814 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2815 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2816
2817 if (origlen > len)
2818 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2819 }
2820 }
2821
2822 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2823 {
2824 if (ssh->s)
2825 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2826 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2827 }
2828
2829 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2830 {
2831 /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
2832 if (ssh->logctx)
2833 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
2834 0, NULL, NULL);
2835
2836 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2837
2838 /*
2839 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2840 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2841 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2842 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2843 */
2844 while (1) {
2845 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2846 if (datalen == 0)
2847 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2848 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2849 data++;
2850 datalen--;
2851 if (ret == 0)
2852 break;
2853 }
2854
2855 /*
2856 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2857 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2858 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2859 * to the proper protocol handler.
2860 */
2861
2862 while (1) {
2863 while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
2864 if (ssh->frozen) {
2865 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2866 /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
2867 * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
2868 * return, so break out. */
2869 break;
2870 } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
2871 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2872 * session. */
2873 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2874 } else {
2875 /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
2876 * session. */
2877 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2878 }
2879 /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
2880 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2881 return;
2882 }
2883 /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
2884 crReturnV;
2885 }
2886 crFinishV;
2887 }
2888
2889 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2890 {
2891 int ret = 0;
2892 struct ssh_channel *c;
2893
2894 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2895 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2896 if (ssh->s) {
2897 sk_close(ssh->s);
2898 ssh->s = NULL;
2899 if (notify_exit)
2900 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2901 else
2902 ret = 1;
2903 }
2904 /*
2905 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2906 * through this connection.
2907 */
2908 if (ssh->channels) {
2909 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2910 switch (c->type) {
2911 case CHAN_X11:
2912 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2913 break;
2914 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
2915 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
2916 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2917 break;
2918 }
2919 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2920 if (ssh->version == 2)
2921 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2922 sfree(c);
2923 }
2924 }
2925 /*
2926 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2927 * listening sockets.
2928 */
2929 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2930 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2931 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2932 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2933 if (pf->local)
2934 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2935 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2936 free_portfwd(pf);
2937 }
2938 freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
2939 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
2940 }
2941
2942 return ret;
2943 }
2944
2945 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2946 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2947 {
2948 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2949 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2950
2951 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2952
2953 if (type == 0)
2954 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2955 else
2956 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2957
2958 logevent(msg);
2959 sfree(msg);
2960 }
2961
2962 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2963 int calling_back)
2964 {
2965 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2966 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2967
2968 if (!error_msg) {
2969 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2970 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2971 else
2972 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2973 }
2974
2975 if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
2976 ssh->exitcode = 0;
2977
2978 if (need_notify)
2979 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2980
2981 if (error_msg)
2982 logevent(error_msg);
2983 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2984 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2985 return 0;
2986 }
2987
2988 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2989 {
2990 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2991 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2992 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2993 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2994 return 0;
2995 }
2996 return 1;
2997 }
2998
2999 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
3000 {
3001 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
3002 /*
3003 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
3004 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
3005 */
3006 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
3007 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
3008 }
3009
3010 /*
3011 * Connect to specified host and port.
3012 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
3013 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
3014 * freed by the caller.
3015 */
3016 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
3017 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
3018 {
3019 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
3020 ssh_log,
3021 ssh_closing,
3022 ssh_receive,
3023 ssh_sent,
3024 NULL
3025 };
3026
3027 SockAddr addr;
3028 const char *err;
3029 char *loghost;
3030 int addressfamily, sshprot;
3031
3032 loghost = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_loghost);
3033 if (*loghost) {
3034 char *colon;
3035
3036 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(loghost);
3037 ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
3038
3039 /*
3040 * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
3041 * savedport.
3042 *
3043 * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
3044 */
3045 colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
3046 if (colon) {
3047 *colon++ = '\0';
3048 if (*colon)
3049 ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
3050 }
3051 } else {
3052 ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
3053 if (port < 0)
3054 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
3055 ssh->savedport = port;
3056 }
3057
3058 /*
3059 * Try to find host.
3060 */
3061 addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
3062 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
3063 (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
3064 (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
3065 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
3066 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
3067 sk_addr_free(addr);
3068 return err;
3069 }
3070 ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
3071
3072 /*
3073 * Open socket.
3074 */
3075 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
3076 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
3077 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
3078 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
3079 ssh->s = NULL;
3080 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
3081 return err;
3082 }
3083
3084 /*
3085 * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
3086 * send the version string too.
3087 */
3088 sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
3089 if (sshprot == 0)
3090 ssh->version = 1;
3091 if (sshprot == 3) {
3092 ssh->version = 2;
3093 ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
3094 }
3095
3096 /*
3097 * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
3098 */
3099 if (*loghost) {
3100 sfree(*realhost);
3101 *realhost = dupstr(loghost);
3102 }
3103
3104 return NULL;
3105 }
3106
3107 /*
3108 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
3109 */
3110 static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
3111 {
3112 int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
3113 ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
3114 assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
3115 if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
3116 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3117 } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
3118 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3119 }
3120 }
3121
3122 /*
3123 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
3124 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
3125 */
3126 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
3127 {
3128 int i;
3129 struct ssh_channel *c;
3130
3131 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
3132 return;
3133 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
3134 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
3135 if (!ssh->channels)
3136 return;
3137 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
3138 switch (c->type) {
3139 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
3140 /*
3141 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
3142 */
3143 break;
3144 case CHAN_X11:
3145 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
3146 break;
3147 case CHAN_AGENT:
3148 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
3149 break;
3150 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
3151 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
3152 break;
3153 }
3154 }
3155 }
3156
3157 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
3158 {
3159 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3160
3161 ssh->agent_response = reply;
3162 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
3163
3164 if (ssh->version == 1)
3165 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3166 else
3167 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3168 }
3169
3170 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
3171 {
3172 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
3173
3174 ssh->user_response = ret;
3175
3176 if (ssh->version == 1)
3177 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3178 else
3179 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
3180
3181 /*
3182 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
3183 * queued-data run.
3184 */
3185 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
3186 }
3187
3188 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
3189 {
3190 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
3191 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
3192 void *sentreply = reply;
3193
3194 if (!sentreply) {
3195 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
3196 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
3197 replylen = 5;
3198 }
3199 if (ssh->version == 2) {
3200 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
3201 ssh2_try_send(c);
3202 } else {
3203 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3204 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3205 PKT_INT, replylen,
3206 PKTT_DATA,
3207 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
3208 PKTT_OTHER,
3209 PKT_END);
3210 }
3211 if (reply)
3212 sfree(reply);
3213 }
3214
3215 /*
3216 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
3217 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
3218 * => log `wire_reason'.
3219 */
3220 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
3221 int code, int clean_exit)
3222 {
3223 char *error;
3224 if (!client_reason)
3225 client_reason = wire_reason;
3226 if (client_reason)
3227 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
3228 else
3229 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
3230 if (wire_reason) {
3231 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3232 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
3233 PKT_END);
3234 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
3235 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
3236 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
3237 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
3238 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
3239 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
3240 }
3241 }
3242 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
3243 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
3244 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
3245 sfree(error);
3246 }
3247
3248 /*
3249 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
3250 */
3251 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
3252 struct Packet *pktin)
3253 {
3254 int i, j, ret;
3255 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
3256 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
3257 struct MD5Context md5c;
3258 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
3259 int crLine;
3260 int len;
3261 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
3262 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
3263 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
3264 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
3265 unsigned char session_id[16];
3266 int cipher_type;
3267 void *publickey_blob;
3268 int publickey_bloblen;
3269 char *publickey_comment;
3270 int publickey_encrypted;
3271 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
3272 char c;
3273 int pwpkt_type;
3274 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
3275 int responselen;
3276 int keyi, nkeys;
3277 int authed;
3278 struct RSAKey key;
3279 Bignum challenge;
3280 char *commentp;
3281 int commentlen;
3282 int dlgret;
3283 Filename *keyfile;
3284 };
3285 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
3286
3287 crBeginState;
3288
3289 if (!pktin)
3290 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3291
3292 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
3293 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
3294 crStop(0);
3295 }
3296
3297 logevent("Received public keys");
3298
3299 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
3300 if (!ptr) {
3301 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
3302 crStop(0);
3303 }
3304 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
3305
3306 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
3307 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
3308 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
3309 crStop(0);
3310 }
3311
3312 /*
3313 * Log the host key fingerprint.
3314 */
3315 {
3316 char logmsg[80];
3317 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
3318 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
3319 hostkey.comment = NULL;
3320 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
3321 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
3322 logevent(logmsg);
3323 }
3324
3325 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3326 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3327 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
3328 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
3329 s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
3330
3331 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
3332 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
3333 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
3334
3335 MD5Init(&md5c);
3336 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
3337 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
3338 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
3339 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
3340
3341 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3342 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3343
3344 /*
3345 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3346 */
3347 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3348 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3349 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3350 crStop(0);
3351 }
3352
3353 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3354
3355 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3356
3357 /*
3358 * Verify the host key.
3359 */
3360 {
3361 /*
3362 * First format the key into a string.
3363 */
3364 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3365 char fingerprint[100];
3366 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3367 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3368 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3369
3370 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3371 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3372 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3373 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3374 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3375 sfree(keystr);
3376 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3377 do {
3378 crReturn(0);
3379 if (pktin) {
3380 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3381 " for user host key response"));
3382 crStop(0);
3383 }
3384 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3385 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3386 }
3387 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3388
3389 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3390 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3391 NULL, 0, TRUE);
3392 crStop(0);
3393 }
3394 }
3395
3396 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3397 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3398 if (i < 16)
3399 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3400 }
3401
3402 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3403 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3404 if (ret)
3405 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3406 } else {
3407 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3408 if (ret)
3409 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3410 }
3411 if (!ret) {
3412 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3413 crStop(0);
3414 }
3415
3416 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3417
3418 {
3419 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3420 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3421 int i;
3422 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3423 int next_cipher = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
3424 CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i);
3425 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3426 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3427 warn = 1;
3428 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3429 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3430 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3431 } else {
3432 switch (next_cipher) {
3433 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3434 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3435 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3436 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3437 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3438 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3439 }
3440 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3441 cipher_chosen = 1;
3442 }
3443 }
3444 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3445 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3446 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3447 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3448 else
3449 /* shouldn't happen */
3450 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3451 crStop(0);
3452 }
3453
3454 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3455 if (warn) {
3456 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3457 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3458 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3459 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3460 do {
3461 crReturn(0);
3462 if (pktin) {
3463 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3464 " for user response"));
3465 crStop(0);
3466 }
3467 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3468 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3469 }
3470 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3471 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3472 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3473 0, TRUE);
3474 crStop(0);
3475 }
3476 }
3477 }
3478
3479 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3480 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3481 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3482 break;
3483 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3484 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3485 break;
3486 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3487 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3488 break;
3489 }
3490
3491 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3492 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3493 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3494 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3495 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3496 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3497
3498 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3499
3500 sfree(s->rsabuf);
3501
3502 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3503 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3504 &ssh_3des);
3505 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3506 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3507 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3508
3509 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3510 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3511
3512 if (servkey.modulus) {
3513 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3514 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3515 }
3516 if (servkey.exponent) {
3517 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3518 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3519 }
3520 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3521 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3522 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3523 }
3524 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3525 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3526 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3527 }
3528 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3529
3530 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3531 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3532 crStop(0);
3533 }
3534
3535 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3536
3537 fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
3538 {
3539 if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
3540 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3541 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3542 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3543 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
3544 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
3545 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3546 while (ret < 0) {
3547 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3548 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3549 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3550 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3551 }
3552 if (!ret) {
3553 /*
3554 * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
3555 */
3556 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3557 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3558 crStop(0);
3559 }
3560 ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3561 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3562 }
3563
3564 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, ssh->username, PKT_END);
3565 {
3566 char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", ssh->username);
3567 logevent(userlog);
3568 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3569 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3570 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3571 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3572 }
3573 sfree(userlog);
3574 }
3575 }
3576
3577 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3578
3579 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
3580 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3581 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3582 } else {
3583 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3584 }
3585 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3586 /*
3587 * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
3588 */
3589 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3590 if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
3591 int keytype;
3592 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
3593 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3594 keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
3595 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3596 const char *error;
3597 if (rsakey_pubblob(s->keyfile,
3598 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
3599 &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
3600 s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
3601 NULL);
3602 } else {
3603 char *msgbuf;
3604 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
3605 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
3606 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
3607 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
3608 error);
3609 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3610 sfree(msgbuf);
3611 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3612 }
3613 } else {
3614 char *msgbuf;
3615 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
3616 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3617 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
3618 " (%s)\r\n",
3619 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
3620 key_type_to_str(keytype));
3621 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
3622 sfree(msgbuf);
3623 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3624 }
3625 } else
3626 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3627
3628 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3629 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3630
3631 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3632 /*
3633 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3634 */
3635 void *r;
3636
3637 s->authed = FALSE;
3638 s->tried_agent = 1;
3639 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3640
3641 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3642 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3643 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3644 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3645 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3646 do {
3647 crReturn(0);
3648 if (pktin) {
3649 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3650 " for agent response"));
3651 crStop(0);
3652 }
3653 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3654 r = ssh->agent_response;
3655 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3656 }
3657 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3658 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3659 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3660 s->p = s->response + 5;
3661 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3662 s->p += 4;
3663 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3664 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3665 unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
3666 s->p += 4;
3667 {
3668 int n, ok = FALSE;
3669 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3670 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3671 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3672 &s->key.exponent);
3673 if (n < 0)
3674 break;
3675 s->p += n;
3676 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3677 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3678 &s->key.modulus);
3679 if (n < 0)
3680 break;
3681 s->p += n;
3682 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3683 break;
3684 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3685 s->p += 4;
3686 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3687 s->commentlen)
3688 break;
3689 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3690 s->p += s->commentlen;
3691 ok = TRUE;
3692 } while (0);
3693 if (!ok) {
3694 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3695 break;
3696 }
3697 }
3698 if (s->publickey_blob) {
3699 if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
3700 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3701 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
3702 "configured key file", s->keyi);
3703 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3704 } else
3705 /* Skip non-configured key */
3706 continue;
3707 }
3708 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3709 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3710 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3711 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3712 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3713 logevent("Key refused");
3714 continue;
3715 }
3716 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3717 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3718 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3719 crStop(0);
3720 }
3721
3722 {
3723 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3724 void *vret;
3725 int len, retlen;
3726 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3727 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3728 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3729 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3730 len += 16; /* session id */
3731 len += 4; /* response format */
3732 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3733 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3734 q = agentreq + 4;
3735 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3736 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3737 q += 4;
3738 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3739 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3740 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3741 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3742 q += 16;
3743 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3744 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3745 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3746 sfree(agentreq);
3747 do {
3748 crReturn(0);
3749 if (pktin) {
3750 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3751 " while waiting for agent"
3752 " response"));
3753 crStop(0);
3754 }
3755 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3756 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3757 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3758 } else
3759 sfree(agentreq);
3760 ret = vret;
3761 if (ret) {
3762 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3763 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3764 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3765 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3766 PKT_END);
3767 sfree(ret);
3768 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3769 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3770 logevent
3771 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3772 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3773 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3774 " RSA key \"");
3775 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3776 s->commentlen);
3777 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3778 }
3779 s->authed = TRUE;
3780 } else
3781 logevent
3782 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3783 } else {
3784 logevent
3785 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3786 sfree(ret);
3787 }
3788 } else {
3789 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3790 }
3791 }
3792 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3793 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3794 freebn(s->challenge);
3795 if (s->authed)
3796 break;
3797 }
3798 sfree(s->response);
3799 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
3800 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
3801 } else {
3802 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
3803 }
3804 if (s->authed)
3805 break;
3806 }
3807 if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
3808 /*
3809 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3810 * key file.
3811 */
3812 int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3813 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3814 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3815 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3816 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3817 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3818 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3819 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3820 while (!got_passphrase) {
3821 /*
3822 * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
3823 */
3824 char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
3825 const char *error;
3826 if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
3827 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3828 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3829 passphrase = NULL;
3830 } else {
3831 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3832 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3833 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
3834 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
3835 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
3836 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
3837 s->publickey_comment), FALSE);
3838 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
3839 while (ret < 0) {
3840 ssh->send_ok = 1;
3841 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3842 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
3843 ssh->send_ok = 0;
3844 }
3845 if (!ret) {
3846 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
3847 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3848 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
3849 0, TRUE);
3850 crStop(0);
3851 }
3852 passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
3853 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
3854 }
3855 /*
3856 * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
3857 */
3858 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
3859 ret = loadrsakey(s->keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
3860 &error);
3861 if (passphrase) {
3862 smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
3863 sfree(passphrase);
3864 }
3865 if (ret == 1) {
3866 /* Correct passphrase. */
3867 got_passphrase = TRUE;
3868 } else if (ret == 0) {
3869 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3870 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
3871 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3872 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3873 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3874 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3875 break; /* go and try something else */
3876 } else if (ret == -1) {
3877 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
3878 got_passphrase = FALSE;
3879 /* and try again */
3880 } else {
3881 assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
3882 got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
3883 }
3884 }
3885
3886 if (got_passphrase) {
3887
3888 /*
3889 * Send a public key attempt.
3890 */
3891 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3892 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3893
3894 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3895 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3896 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3897 continue; /* go and try something else */
3898 }
3899 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3900 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3901 crStop(0);
3902 }
3903
3904 {
3905 int i;
3906 unsigned char buffer[32];
3907 Bignum challenge, response;
3908
3909 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3910 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3911 crStop(0);
3912 }
3913 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3914 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3915
3916 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3917 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3918 }
3919
3920 MD5Init(&md5c);
3921 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3922 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3923 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3924
3925 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3926 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3927
3928 freebn(challenge);
3929 freebn(response);
3930 }
3931
3932 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3933 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3934 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3935 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3936 " our public key.\r\n");
3937 continue; /* go and try something else */
3938 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3939 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3940 crStop(0);
3941 }
3942
3943 break; /* we're through! */
3944 }
3945
3946 }
3947
3948 /*
3949 * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
3950 */
3951 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
3952
3953 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
3954 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3955 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3956 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3957 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3958 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3959 crWaitUntil(pktin);
3960 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3961 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3962 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3963 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3964 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3965 continue;
3966 } else {
3967 char *challenge;
3968 int challengelen;
3969 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
3970
3971 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3972 if (!challenge) {
3973 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3974 crStop(0);
3975 }
3976 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3977 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
3978 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
3979 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3980 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
3981 instr_suf = dupstr("");
3982 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3983 } else {
3984 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
3985 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
3986 }
3987 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
3988 dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
3989 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
3990 instr_suf);
3991 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
3992 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
3993 sfree(instr_suf);
3994 }
3995 }
3996 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
3997 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3998 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3999 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
4000 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
4001 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
4002 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4003 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
4004 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
4005 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
4006 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
4007 continue;
4008 } else {
4009 char *challenge;
4010 int challengelen;
4011 char *instr_suf, *prompt;
4012
4013 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
4014 if (!challenge) {
4015 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
4016 crStop(0);
4017 }
4018 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
4019 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
4020 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
4021 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
4022 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
4023 if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
4024 instr_suf = dupstr("");
4025 prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
4026 } else {
4027 instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
4028 prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
4029 }
4030 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
4031 dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
4032 (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
4033 instr_suf);
4034 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
4035 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
4036 sfree(instr_suf);
4037 }
4038 }
4039 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4040 if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
4041 bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
4042 crStop(0);
4043 }
4044 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
4045 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
4046 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
4047 ssh->username, ssh->savedhost),
4048 FALSE);
4049 }
4050
4051 /*
4052 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
4053 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
4054 * authentication.
4055 */
4056 {
4057 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
4058 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
4059 while (ret < 0) {
4060 ssh->send_ok = 1;
4061 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
4062 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
4063 ssh->send_ok = 0;
4064 }
4065 if (!ret) {
4066 /*
4067 * Failed to get a password (for example
4068 * because one was supplied on the command line
4069 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
4070 */
4071 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4072 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
4073 crStop(0);
4074 }
4075 }
4076
4077 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
4078 /*
4079 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
4080 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
4081 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
4082 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
4083 * The others are all random data in
4084 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
4085 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
4086 * hence can't deduce the password length.
4087 *
4088 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
4089 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
4090 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
4091 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
4092 * do is:
4093 *
4094 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
4095 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
4096 *
4097 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
4098 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
4099 * packets containing string lengths N through
4100 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
4101 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
4102 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
4103 *
4104 * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
4105 * least in this context. For these servers, we need
4106 * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
4107 * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
4108 * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
4109 *
4110 * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4111 * here _nor_ a padded password string.
4112 * For these servers we are left with no defences
4113 * against password length sniffing.
4114 */
4115 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
4116 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4117 /*
4118 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
4119 * we can use the primary defence.
4120 */
4121 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
4122 char *randomstr;
4123
4124 pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4125 if (pwlen < 16) {
4126 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
4127 top = 15;
4128 } else {
4129 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
4130 top = bottom + 7;
4131 }
4132
4133 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
4134
4135 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
4136
4137 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
4138 if (i == pwlen) {
4139 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4140 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
4141 s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4142 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4143 } else {
4144 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
4145 do {
4146 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
4147 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
4148 }
4149 randomstr[i] = '\0';
4150 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
4151 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
4152 }
4153 }
4154 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
4155 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
4156 sfree(randomstr);
4157 }
4158 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
4159 /*
4160 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
4161 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
4162 * can use the secondary defence.
4163 */
4164 char string[64];
4165 char *ss;
4166 int len;
4167
4168 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4169 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
4170 ss = string;
4171 strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4172 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
4173 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
4174 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
4175 }
4176 } else {
4177 ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
4178 }
4179 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
4180 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4181 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
4182 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4183 } else {
4184 /*
4185 * The server is believed unable to cope with
4186 * any of our password camouflage methods.
4187 */
4188 int len;
4189 len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
4190 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
4191 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
4192 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
4193 PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
4194 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4195 }
4196 } else {
4197 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
4198 PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
4199 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4200 }
4201 logevent("Sent password");
4202 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
4203 crWaitUntil(pktin);
4204 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4205 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
4206 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
4207 logevent("Authentication refused");
4208 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4209 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
4210 crStop(0);
4211 }
4212 }
4213
4214 /* Clear up */
4215 if (s->publickey_blob) {
4216 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
4217 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
4218 }
4219
4220 logevent("Authentication successful");
4221
4222 crFinish(1);
4223 }
4224
4225 static void ssh_channel_try_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
4226 {
4227 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4228 assert(c->pending_eof); /* precondition for calling us */
4229 if (c->halfopen)
4230 return; /* can't close: not even opened yet */
4231 if (ssh->version == 2 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0)
4232 return; /* can't send EOF: pending outgoing data */
4233
4234 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4235 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4236 PKT_END);
4237 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4238 } else {
4239 struct Packet *pktout;
4240 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
4241 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4242 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4243 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4244 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes)) {
4245 /*
4246 * Also send MSG_CLOSE.
4247 */
4248 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4249 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4250 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4251 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4252 }
4253 }
4254 c->pending_eof = FALSE; /* we've sent it now */
4255 }
4256
4257 void sshfwd_write_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
4258 {
4259 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4260
4261 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4262 return;
4263
4264 if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
4265 return;
4266
4267 c->pending_eof = TRUE;
4268 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
4269 }
4270
4271 void sshfwd_unclean_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
4272 {
4273 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4274 struct Packet *pktout;
4275
4276 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4277 return;
4278
4279 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
4280 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
4281 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
4282 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4283 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4284 }
4285
4286 switch (c->type) {
4287 case CHAN_X11:
4288 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4289 break;
4290 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4291 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
4292 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4293 break;
4294 }
4295 c->type = CHAN_ZOMBIE;
4296
4297 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
4298 }
4299
4300 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
4301 {
4302 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4303
4304 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4305 return 0;
4306
4307 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4308 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
4309 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4310 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
4311 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4312 /*
4313 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
4314 * connections are never individually throttled - because
4315 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
4316 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
4317 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
4318 */
4319 return 0;
4320 } else {
4321 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
4322 return ssh2_try_send(c);
4323 }
4324 }
4325
4326 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
4327 {
4328 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
4329 int buflimit;
4330
4331 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4332 return;
4333
4334 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4335 buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
4336 } else {
4337 buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
4338 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
4339 }
4340 if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
4341 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4342 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
4343 }
4344 }
4345
4346 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4347 {
4348 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
4349
4350 assert(qh != NULL);
4351
4352 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
4353
4354 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4355 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4356 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
4357 }
4358 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4359 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
4360 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
4361 }
4362
4363 if (qh->next) {
4364 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
4365
4366 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
4367 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
4368 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4369 }
4370 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
4371 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
4372 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4373 }
4374 } else {
4375 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
4376 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
4377 }
4378
4379 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
4380
4381 sfree(qh);
4382 }
4383
4384 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
4385 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
4386 {
4387 struct queued_handler *qh;
4388
4389 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
4390 qh->msg1 = msg1;
4391 qh->msg2 = msg2;
4392 qh->handler = handler;
4393 qh->ctx = ctx;
4394 qh->next = NULL;
4395
4396 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
4397 ssh->qhead = qh;
4398
4399 if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
4400 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
4401 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4402 }
4403 if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
4404 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
4405 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
4406 }
4407 } else {
4408 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
4409 }
4410 ssh->qtail = qh;
4411 }
4412
4413 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
4414 {
4415 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
4416
4417 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
4418 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
4419 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
4420 pf->sportdesc);
4421 } else {
4422 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
4423 pf->sportdesc);
4424
4425 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
4426 assert(rpf == pf);
4427 pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
4428 free_rportfwd(pf);
4429 }
4430 }
4431
4432 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, Conf *conf)
4433 {
4434 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4435 int i;
4436 char *key, *val;
4437
4438 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
4439 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
4440 } else {
4441 /*
4442 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
4443 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
4444 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
4445 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
4446 * they were before.
4447 */
4448 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
4449 int i;
4450 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4451 epf->status = DESTROY;
4452 }
4453
4454 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, NULL, &key);
4455 val != NULL;
4456 val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, key, &key)) {
4457 char *kp, *kp2, *vp, *vp2;
4458 char address_family, type;
4459 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
4460 char *sports, *dports, *saddr, *host;
4461
4462 kp = key;
4463
4464 address_family = 'A';
4465 type = 'L';
4466 if (*kp == 'A' || *kp == '4' || *kp == '6')
4467 address_family = *kp++;
4468 if (*kp == 'L' || *kp == 'R')
4469 type = *kp++;
4470
4471 if ((kp2 = strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
4472 /*
4473 * There's a colon in the middle of the source port
4474 * string, which means that the part before it is
4475 * actually a source address.
4476 */
4477 saddr = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
4478 sports = kp2+1;
4479 } else {
4480 saddr = NULL;
4481 sports = kp;
4482 }
4483 sport = atoi(sports);
4484 sserv = 0;
4485 if (sport == 0) {
4486 sserv = 1;
4487 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4488 if (!sport) {
4489 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4490 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4491 }
4492 }
4493
4494 if (type == 'L' && !strcmp(val, "D")) {
4495 /* dynamic forwarding */
4496 host = NULL;
4497 dports = NULL;
4498 dport = -1;
4499 dserv = 0;
4500 type = 'D';
4501 } else {
4502 /* ordinary forwarding */
4503 vp = val;
4504 vp2 = vp + strcspn(vp, ":");
4505 host = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(vp2 - vp), vp);
4506 if (vp2)
4507 vp2++;
4508 dports = vp2;
4509 dport = atoi(dports);
4510 dserv = 0;
4511 if (dport == 0) {
4512 dserv = 1;
4513 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4514 if (!dport) {
4515 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4516 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4517 }
4518 }
4519 }
4520
4521 if (sport && dport) {
4522 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4523 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4524
4525 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4526 pfrec->type = type;
4527 pfrec->saddr = saddr;
4528 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4529 pfrec->sport = sport;
4530 pfrec->daddr = host;
4531 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4532 pfrec->dport = dport;
4533 pfrec->local = NULL;
4534 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4535 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4536 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4537 ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
4538
4539 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4540 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4541 if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
4542 /*
4543 * We already have a port forwarding up and running
4544 * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
4545 * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
4546 * as KEEP.
4547 */
4548 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4549 }
4550 /*
4551 * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
4552 * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
4553 */
4554 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4555 } else {
4556 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4557 }
4558 } else {
4559 sfree(saddr);
4560 sfree(host);
4561 }
4562 }
4563
4564 /*
4565 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4566 * not re-enabled.
4567 */
4568 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4569 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4570 char *message;
4571
4572 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4573 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4574 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4575 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4576 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4577 epf->sport);
4578
4579 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4580 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4581 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4582 sfree(message);
4583 message = msg2;
4584 }
4585
4586 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4587 sfree(message);
4588
4589 /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
4590 * forwarding failed. */
4591 if (epf->remote) {
4592 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4593 struct Packet *pktout;
4594
4595 /*
4596 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4597 * end.
4598 */
4599 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4600 /*
4601 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4602 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4603 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4604 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4605 * so that any connections the server tries
4606 * to make on it are rejected.
4607 */
4608 } else {
4609 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4610 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4611 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4612 if (epf->saddr) {
4613 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4614 } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
4615 /* XXX: rport_acceptall may not represent
4616 * what was used to open the original connection,
4617 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4618 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4619 } else {
4620 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4621 }
4622 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4623 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4624 }
4625
4626 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4627 free_rportfwd(rpf);
4628 } else if (epf->local) {
4629 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4630 }
4631
4632 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4633 free_portfwd(epf);
4634 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4635 }
4636
4637 /*
4638 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4639 */
4640 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4641 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4642 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4643 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4644 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4645 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4646 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4647 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4648 epf->sport,
4649 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4650 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4651 dportdesc = NULL;
4652 } else {
4653 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4654 epf->daddr,
4655 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4656 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4657 epf->dport,
4658 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4659 }
4660
4661 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4662 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4663 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4664 ssh, conf,
4665 &epf->local,
4666 epf->addressfamily);
4667
4668 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4669 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4670 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4671 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4672 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4673 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4674 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4675 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4676 ssh, conf,
4677 &epf->local,
4678 epf->addressfamily);
4679
4680 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4681 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4682 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4683 sportdesc,
4684 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4685 } else {
4686 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4687
4688 /*
4689 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4690 */
4691 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4692 if (ssh->version == 1)
4693 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4694 else
4695 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4696 }
4697
4698 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4699 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4700 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4701 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4702 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4703 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4704 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4705 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4706 sfree(pf);
4707 } else {
4708 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4709 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4710
4711 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4712 sportdesc = NULL;
4713 epf->remote = pf;
4714 pf->pfrec = epf;
4715
4716 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4717 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4718 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4719 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4720 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4721 PKT_END);
4722 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4723 SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
4724 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4725 } else {
4726 struct Packet *pktout;
4727 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4728 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4729 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4730 if (epf->saddr) {
4731 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4732 } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
4733 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4734 } else {
4735 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4736 }
4737 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4738 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4739
4740 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4741 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4742 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4743 }
4744 }
4745 }
4746 sfree(sportdesc);
4747 sfree(dportdesc);
4748 }
4749 }
4750
4751 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4752 {
4753 char *string;
4754 int stringlen, bufsize;
4755
4756 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4757 if (string == NULL) {
4758 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4759 return;
4760 }
4761
4762 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4763 string, stringlen);
4764 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4765 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4766 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
4767 }
4768 }
4769
4770 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4771 {
4772 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4773 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4774 struct ssh_channel *c;
4775 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4776
4777 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4778 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4779 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4780 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4781 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4782 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4783 } else {
4784 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4785 c->ssh = ssh;
4786
4787 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
4788 NULL, -1, ssh->conf) != NULL) {
4789 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4790 sfree(c);
4791 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4792 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4793 } else {
4794 logevent
4795 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4796 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4797 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4798 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4799 c->closes = 0;
4800 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4801 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4802 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4803 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4804 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4805 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4806 c->localid, PKT_END);
4807 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4808 }
4809 }
4810 }
4811
4812 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4813 {
4814 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4815 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4816 struct ssh_channel *c;
4817 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4818
4819 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4820 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4821 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4822 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4823 } else {
4824 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4825 c->ssh = ssh;
4826 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4827 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4828 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4829 c->closes = 0;
4830 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4831 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4832 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4833 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4834 c->u.a.message = NULL;
4835 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4836 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4837 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4838 PKT_END);
4839 }
4840 }
4841
4842 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4843 {
4844 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4845 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4846 struct ssh_channel *c;
4847 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4848 int remoteid;
4849 int hostsize, port;
4850 char *host;
4851 const char *e;
4852 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4853 c->ssh = ssh;
4854
4855 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4856 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4857 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4858
4859 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4860 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4861 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4862 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4863 pf.dport = port;
4864 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4865
4866 if (pfp == NULL) {
4867 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4868 pf.dhost, port);
4869 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4870 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4871 } else {
4872 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4873 pf.dhost, port);
4874 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4875 c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4876 if (e != NULL) {
4877 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4878 sfree(c);
4879 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4880 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4881 } else {
4882 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4883 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4884 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4885 c->closes = 0;
4886 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
4887 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4888 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4889 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4890 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4891 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4892 c->localid, PKT_END);
4893 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4894 }
4895 }
4896 }
4897
4898 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4899 {
4900 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4901 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4902 struct ssh_channel *c;
4903
4904 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4905 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4906 c->remoteid = localid;
4907 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4908 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4909 c->throttling_conn = 0;
4910 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4911 }
4912
4913 if (c && c->pending_eof) {
4914 /*
4915 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4916 * which we decided on before the server acked
4917 * the channel open. So now we know the
4918 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4919 */
4920 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
4921 }
4922 }
4923
4924 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4925 {
4926 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4927 struct ssh_channel *c;
4928
4929 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4930 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4931 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4932 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4933 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4934 sfree(c);
4935 }
4936 }
4937
4938 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4939 {
4940 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4941 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4942 struct ssh_channel *c;
4943 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4944 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4945
4946 if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE &&
4947 !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)) {
4948 /*
4949 * Received CHANNEL_CLOSE, which we translate into
4950 * outgoing EOF.
4951 */
4952 int send_close = FALSE;
4953
4954 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
4955
4956 switch (c->type) {
4957 case CHAN_X11:
4958 if (c->u.x11.s)
4959 x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
4960 else
4961 send_close = TRUE;
4962 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
4963 if (c->u.pfd.s)
4964 x11_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
4965 else
4966 send_close = TRUE;
4967 case CHAN_AGENT:
4968 send_close = TRUE;
4969 }
4970
4971 if (send_close && !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
4972 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4973 PKT_END);
4974 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
4975 }
4976 }
4977
4978 if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION &&
4979 !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
4980
4981 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
4982 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION for channel %d"
4983 " for which we never sent CHANNEL_CLOSE\n", i));
4984 }
4985
4986 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
4987 }
4988
4989 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes) &&
4990 !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
4991 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION,
4992 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4993 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
4994 }
4995
4996 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes))
4997 ssh_channel_destroy(c);
4998 } else {
4999 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
5000 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
5001 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
5002 i));
5003 }
5004 }
5005
5006 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5007 {
5008 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
5009 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5010 char *p;
5011 int len;
5012 struct ssh_channel *c;
5013
5014 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
5015
5016 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5017 if (c) {
5018 int bufsize = 0;
5019 switch (c->type) {
5020 case CHAN_X11:
5021 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
5022 break;
5023 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
5024 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
5025 break;
5026 case CHAN_AGENT:
5027 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
5028 while (len > 0) {
5029 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
5030 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
5031 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
5032 l);
5033 p += l;
5034 len -= l;
5035 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5036 }
5037 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
5038 c->u.a.totallen =
5039 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
5040 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
5041 unsigned char);
5042 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
5043 }
5044 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
5045 unsigned int l =
5046 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
5047 (unsigned)len);
5048 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
5049 l);
5050 p += l;
5051 len -= l;
5052 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5053 }
5054 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
5055 void *reply;
5056 int replylen;
5057 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
5058 c->u.a.totallen,
5059 &reply, &replylen,
5060 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
5061 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
5062 sfree(c->u.a.message);
5063 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
5064 }
5065 }
5066 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
5067 break;
5068 }
5069 if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
5070 c->throttling_conn = 1;
5071 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
5072 }
5073 }
5074 }
5075
5076 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5077 {
5078 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5079 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
5080 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
5081 /*
5082 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
5083 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
5084 * session which we might mistake for another
5085 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
5086 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
5087 */
5088 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
5089 }
5090
5091 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
5092 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
5093 {
5094 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
5095 int i = 0;
5096 unsigned int arg = 0;
5097 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
5098 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
5099 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
5100 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
5101 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
5102 break;
5103 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
5104 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
5105 break;
5106 }
5107 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
5108 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
5109 }
5110
5111
5112 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
5113 struct Packet *pktin)
5114 {
5115 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
5116
5117 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
5118 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
5119 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
5120
5121 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
5122 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
5123 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
5124 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
5125 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
5126 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
5127 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
5128 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
5129 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
5130
5131 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
5132 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
5133 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
5134 do {
5135 crReturnV;
5136 } while (!pktin);
5137 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5138 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5139 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5140 crStopV;
5141 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5142 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
5143 } else {
5144 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
5145 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
5146 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
5147 }
5148 }
5149
5150 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
5151 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
5152 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
5153 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
5154 /*
5155 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
5156 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
5157 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
5158 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
5159 * cookie into the log.
5160 */
5161 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
5162 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5163 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5164 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5165 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5166 PKTT_OTHER,
5167 PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
5168 PKT_END);
5169 } else {
5170 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
5171 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
5172 PKTT_PASSWORD,
5173 PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
5174 PKTT_OTHER,
5175 PKT_END);
5176 }
5177 do {
5178 crReturnV;
5179 } while (!pktin);
5180 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5181 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5182 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5183 crStopV;
5184 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5185 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
5186 } else {
5187 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
5188 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
5189 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
5190 }
5191 }
5192
5193 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
5194 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
5195
5196 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
5197 struct Packet *pkt;
5198 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
5199 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
5200 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
5201 sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
5202 /* Send the pty request. */
5203 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
5204 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
5205 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
5206 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
5207 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
5208 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
5209 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
5210 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
5211 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
5212 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
5213 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
5214 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
5215 s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
5216 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
5217 do {
5218 crReturnV;
5219 } while (!pktin);
5220 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5221 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5222 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5223 crStopV;
5224 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5225 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
5226 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5227 } else {
5228 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
5229 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
5230 ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
5231 }
5232 } else {
5233 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
5234 }
5235
5236 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression)) {
5237 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
5238 do {
5239 crReturnV;
5240 } while (!pktin);
5241 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
5242 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5243 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
5244 crStopV;
5245 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5246 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
5247 }
5248 logevent("Started compression");
5249 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
5250 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
5251 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
5252 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
5253 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
5254 }
5255
5256 /*
5257 * Start the shell or command.
5258 *
5259 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
5260 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
5261 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
5262 */
5263 {
5264 char *cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
5265
5266 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys) &&
5267 conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
5268 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
5269 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
5270 }
5271 if (*cmd)
5272 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
5273 else
5274 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
5275 logevent("Started session");
5276 }
5277
5278 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
5279 if (ssh->size_needed)
5280 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
5281 if (ssh->eof_needed)
5282 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
5283
5284 if (ssh->ldisc)
5285 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
5286 ssh->send_ok = 1;
5287 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
5288 while (1) {
5289
5290 /*
5291 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
5292 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
5293 * attention to the unusual ones.
5294 */
5295
5296 crReturnV;
5297 if (pktin) {
5298 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
5299 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
5300 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
5301 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
5302 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
5303 } else {
5304 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
5305 crStopV;
5306 }
5307 } else {
5308 while (inlen > 0) {
5309 int len = min(inlen, 512);
5310 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
5311 PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
5312 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
5313 in += len;
5314 inlen -= len;
5315 }
5316 }
5317 }
5318
5319 crFinishV;
5320 }
5321
5322 /*
5323 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
5324 */
5325 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5326 {
5327 char *msg;
5328 int msglen;
5329
5330 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5331 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
5332 }
5333
5334 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5335 {
5336 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
5337 char *msg;
5338 int msglen;
5339
5340 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
5341 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
5342 }
5343
5344 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5345 {
5346 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
5347 }
5348
5349 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
5350 {
5351 int i;
5352
5353 /*
5354 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
5355 */
5356 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
5357 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
5358
5359 /*
5360 * These special message types we install handlers for.
5361 */
5362 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
5363 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
5364 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
5365 }
5366
5367 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5368 struct Packet *pktin)
5369 {
5370 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
5371 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
5372 return;
5373
5374 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
5375 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
5376 return;
5377 }
5378
5379 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
5380 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
5381 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
5382 else
5383 return;
5384 }
5385
5386 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
5387 }
5388
5389 /*
5390 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
5391 */
5392 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5393 {
5394 int needlen;
5395 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5396 return 0;
5397 needlen = strlen(needle);
5398 while (1) {
5399 /*
5400 * Is it at the start of the string?
5401 */
5402 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5403 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5404 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5405 /* either , or EOS follows */
5406 )
5407 return 1;
5408 /*
5409 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
5410 * If no comma found, terminate.
5411 */
5412 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
5413 haylen--, haystack++;
5414 if (haylen == 0)
5415 return 0;
5416 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
5417 }
5418 }
5419
5420 /*
5421 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
5422 */
5423 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
5424 {
5425 int needlen;
5426 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
5427 return 0;
5428 needlen = strlen(needle);
5429 /*
5430 * Is it at the start of the string?
5431 */
5432 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
5433 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
5434 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
5435 /* either , or EOS follows */
5436 )
5437 return 1;
5438 return 0;
5439 }
5440
5441
5442 /*
5443 * SSH-2 key creation method.
5444 * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
5445 * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
5446 */
5447 #define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
5448 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
5449 unsigned char *keyspace)
5450 {
5451 const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
5452 void *s;
5453 /* First hlen bytes. */
5454 s = h->init();
5455 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5456 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5457 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5458 h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
5459 h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
5460 h->final(s, keyspace);
5461 /* Next hlen bytes. */
5462 s = h->init();
5463 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
5464 hash_mpint(h, s, K);
5465 h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
5466 h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
5467 h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
5468 }
5469
5470 /*
5471 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
5472 */
5473 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
5474 struct Packet *pktin)
5475 {
5476 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
5477 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
5478 int crLine;
5479 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
5480 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
5481 void *our_kexinit;
5482 int our_kexinitlen;
5483 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
5484 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
5485 int nmacs;
5486 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
5487 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
5488 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
5489 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
5490 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
5491 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
5492 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
5493 int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
5494 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
5495 void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
5496 unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
5497 int n_preferred_kex;
5498 const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
5499 int n_preferred_ciphers;
5500 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
5501 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
5502 int userauth_succeeded; /* for delayed compression */
5503 int pending_compression;
5504 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
5505 struct Packet *pktout;
5506 int dlgret;
5507 int guessok;
5508 int ignorepkt;
5509 };
5510 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5511
5512 crBeginState;
5513
5514 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5515 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5516 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5517
5518 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5519 s->userauth_succeeded = FALSE;
5520 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
5521
5522 /*
5523 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5524 */
5525 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5526 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5527 else
5528 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5529
5530 begin_key_exchange:
5531 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
5532 {
5533 int i, j, commalist_started;
5534
5535 /*
5536 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5537 */
5538 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5539 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5540 switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_kexlist, i)) {
5541 case KEX_DHGEX:
5542 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5543 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5544 break;
5545 case KEX_DHGROUP14:
5546 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5547 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5548 break;
5549 case KEX_DHGROUP1:
5550 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5551 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5552 break;
5553 case KEX_RSA:
5554 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5555 &ssh_rsa_kex;
5556 break;
5557 case KEX_WARN:
5558 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5559 * the list. */
5560 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5561 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5562 }
5563 break;
5564 }
5565 }
5566
5567 /*
5568 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5569 */
5570 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5571 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5572 switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
5573 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5574 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5575 break;
5576 case CIPHER_DES:
5577 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
5578 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5579 }
5580 break;
5581 case CIPHER_3DES:
5582 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5583 break;
5584 case CIPHER_AES:
5585 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5586 break;
5587 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5588 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5589 break;
5590 case CIPHER_WARN:
5591 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5592 * the list. */
5593 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5594 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5595 }
5596 break;
5597 }
5598 }
5599
5600 /*
5601 * Set up preferred compression.
5602 */
5603 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression))
5604 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5605 else
5606 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5607
5608 /*
5609 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5610 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5611 */
5612 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5613
5614 /*
5615 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5616 */
5617 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5618
5619 /*
5620 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5621 */
5622 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5623 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5624 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5625 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5626 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5627 commalist_started = 0;
5628 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5629 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5630 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5631 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5632 if (commalist_started)
5633 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5634 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
5635 commalist_started = 1;
5636 }
5637 }
5638 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5639 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5640 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5641 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5642 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5643 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5644 }
5645 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5646 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5647 commalist_started = 0;
5648 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5649 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5650 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5651 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5652 if (commalist_started)
5653 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5654 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5655 commalist_started = 1;
5656 }
5657 }
5658 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5659 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5660 commalist_started = 0;
5661 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5662 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5663 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5664 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5665 if (commalist_started)
5666 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5667 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5668 commalist_started = 1;
5669 }
5670 }
5671 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5672 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5673 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5674 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5675 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5676 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5677 }
5678 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5679 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5680 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5681 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5682 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5683 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5684 }
5685 /* List client->server compression algorithms,
5686 * then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
5687 * same set twice.) */
5688 for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
5689 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5690 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5691 /* Prefer non-delayed versions */
5692 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5693 /* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
5694 * they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
5695 * this function. */
5696 if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
5697 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5698 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
5699 s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
5700 }
5701 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5702 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5703 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5704 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5705 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5706 if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
5707 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5708 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
5709 }
5710 }
5711 }
5712 }
5713 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5714 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5715 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5716 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5717 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5718 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5719 /* Reserved. */
5720 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5721 }
5722
5723 s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
5724 s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
5725 memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
5726
5727 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5728
5729 if (!pktin)
5730 crWaitUntil(pktin);
5731
5732 /*
5733 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5734 * to.
5735 */
5736 {
5737 char *str, *preferred;
5738 int i, j, len;
5739
5740 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5741 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5742 crStop(0);
5743 }
5744 ssh->kex = NULL;
5745 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5746 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5747 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5748 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5749 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5750 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5751 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5752 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5753
5754 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5755 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5756
5757 preferred = NULL;
5758 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5759 const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5760 if (!k) {
5761 s->warn_kex = TRUE;
5762 } else {
5763 for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
5764 if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
5765 if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5766 ssh->kex = k->list[j];
5767 break;
5768 }
5769 }
5770 }
5771 if (ssh->kex)
5772 break;
5773 }
5774 if (!ssh->kex) {
5775 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5776 str ? str : "(null)"));
5777 crStop(0);
5778 }
5779 /*
5780 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5781 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5782 * we end up using.
5783 */
5784 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5785 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5786 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5787 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5788 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5789 break;
5790 }
5791 }
5792 if (!ssh->hostkey) {
5793 bombout(("Couldn't agree a host key algorithm (available: %s)",
5794 str ? str : "(null)"));
5795 crStop(0);
5796 }
5797
5798 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5799 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5800 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5801 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5802 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5803 if (!c) {
5804 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5805 } else {
5806 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5807 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5808 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5809 break;
5810 }
5811 }
5812 }
5813 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5814 break;
5815 }
5816 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5817 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5818 str ? str : "(null)"));
5819 crStop(0);
5820 }
5821
5822 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5823 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5824 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5825 if (!c) {
5826 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5827 } else {
5828 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5829 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5830 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5831 break;
5832 }
5833 }
5834 }
5835 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5836 break;
5837 }
5838 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5839 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5840 str ? str : "(null)"));
5841 crStop(0);
5842 }
5843
5844 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5845 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5846 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5847 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5848 break;
5849 }
5850 }
5851 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5852 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5853 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5854 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5855 break;
5856 }
5857 }
5858 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5859 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5860 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5861 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5862 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5863 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5864 break;
5865 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
5866 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
5867 s->cscomp_tobe = c;
5868 break;
5869 } else {
5870 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
5871 }
5872 }
5873 }
5874 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5875 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5876 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5877 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5878 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5879 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5880 break;
5881 } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
5882 if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
5883 s->sccomp_tobe = c;
5884 break;
5885 } else {
5886 s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
5887 }
5888 }
5889 }
5890 if (s->pending_compression) {
5891 logevent("Server supports delayed compression; "
5892 "will try this later");
5893 }
5894 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5895 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5896 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5897
5898 if (s->warn_kex) {
5899 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5900 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5901 ssh->kex->name,
5902 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5903 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5904 do {
5905 crReturn(0);
5906 if (pktin) {
5907 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5908 " waiting for user response"));
5909 crStop(0);
5910 }
5911 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5912 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5913 }
5914 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5915 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5916 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5917 0, TRUE);
5918 crStop(0);
5919 }
5920 }
5921
5922 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5923 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5924 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5925 "client-to-server cipher",
5926 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5927 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5928 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5929 do {
5930 crReturn(0);
5931 if (pktin) {
5932 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5933 " waiting for user response"));
5934 crStop(0);
5935 }
5936 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5937 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5938 }
5939 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5940 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5941 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5942 0, TRUE);
5943 crStop(0);
5944 }
5945 }
5946
5947 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5948 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5949 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5950 "server-to-client cipher",
5951 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5952 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5953 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5954 do {
5955 crReturn(0);
5956 if (pktin) {
5957 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5958 " waiting for user response"));
5959 crStop(0);
5960 }
5961 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5962 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5963 }
5964 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5965 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5966 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5967 0, TRUE);
5968 crStop(0);
5969 }
5970 }
5971
5972 ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
5973 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
5974 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
5975 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5976 s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
5977 sfree(s->our_kexinit);
5978 if (pktin->length > 5)
5979 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
5980 pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5981
5982 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5983 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5984 }
5985
5986 if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
5987 /*
5988 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
5989 * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
5990 * either cipher...
5991 */
5992 {
5993 int csbits, scbits;
5994
5995 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5996 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5997 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5998 }
5999 /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
6000 * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
6001 if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
6002 s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
6003
6004 /*
6005 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
6006 * requesting a group.
6007 */
6008 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6009 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
6010 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
6011 /*
6012 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
6013 * much data.
6014 */
6015 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
6016 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
6017 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
6018 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6019
6020 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6021 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
6022 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
6023 crStop(0);
6024 }
6025 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6026 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6027 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
6028 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
6029 crStop(0);
6030 }
6031 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
6032 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
6033 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
6034 } else {
6035 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
6036 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
6037 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
6038 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
6039 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
6040 ssh->kex->groupname);
6041 }
6042
6043 logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
6044 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
6045 /*
6046 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
6047 */
6048 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
6049 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
6050 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
6051 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
6052 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6053
6054 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
6055 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6056 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
6057 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
6058 crStop(0);
6059 }
6060 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
6061 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
6062 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6063 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
6064 if (!s->f) {
6065 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
6066 crStop(0);
6067 }
6068 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6069
6070 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
6071
6072 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
6073 * involve user interaction. */
6074 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
6075
6076 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6077 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6078 hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
6079 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
6080 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
6081 }
6082 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
6083 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
6084
6085 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
6086 freebn(s->f);
6087 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
6088 freebn(s->g);
6089 freebn(s->p);
6090 }
6091 } else {
6092 logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
6093 ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
6094 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
6095 /*
6096 * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
6097 * from the server.
6098 */
6099 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6100 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
6101 bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
6102 crStop(0);
6103 }
6104
6105 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
6106 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
6107 s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6108 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
6109
6110 {
6111 char *keydata;
6112 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
6113 s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
6114 memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
6115 }
6116
6117 s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6118 if (!s->rsakey) {
6119 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6120 bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
6121 crStop(0);
6122 }
6123
6124 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
6125
6126 /*
6127 * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
6128 * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
6129 * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
6130 * we're using.
6131 */
6132 {
6133 int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
6134 int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
6135 int i, byte = 0;
6136 unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
6137 int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
6138
6139 s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
6140
6141 for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
6142 if ((i & 7) == 0) {
6143 byte = random_byte();
6144 }
6145 bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
6146 }
6147
6148 /*
6149 * Encode this as an mpint.
6150 */
6151 kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
6152 kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
6153 PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
6154 memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
6155
6156 /*
6157 * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
6158 */
6159 outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
6160 outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
6161 ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
6162 outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
6163
6164 /*
6165 * And send it off in a return packet.
6166 */
6167 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
6168 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6169 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
6170 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6171
6172 hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
6173
6174 sfree(kstr2);
6175 sfree(kstr1);
6176 sfree(outstr);
6177 }
6178
6179 ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
6180
6181 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6182 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
6183 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6184 bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
6185 crStop(0);
6186 }
6187
6188 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
6189
6190 sfree(s->rsakeydata);
6191 }
6192
6193 hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
6194 assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6195 ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
6196
6197 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
6198
6199 #if 0
6200 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
6201 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
6202 #endif
6203
6204 if (!s->hkey ||
6205 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
6206 (char *)s->exchange_hash,
6207 ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
6208 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
6209 crStop(0);
6210 }
6211
6212 /*
6213 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
6214 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
6215 */
6216 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
6217 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
6218 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
6219 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
6220 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
6221 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
6222 s->fingerprint,
6223 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
6224 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
6225 do {
6226 crReturn(0);
6227 if (pktin) {
6228 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
6229 " for user host key response"));
6230 crStop(0);
6231 }
6232 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6233 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
6234 }
6235 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
6236 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
6237 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
6238 0, TRUE);
6239 crStop(0);
6240 }
6241 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
6242 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
6243 logevent(s->fingerprint);
6244 }
6245 sfree(s->fingerprint);
6246 sfree(s->keystr);
6247 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
6248
6249 /*
6250 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
6251 * the session id, used in session key construction and
6252 * authentication.
6253 */
6254 if (!s->got_session_id) {
6255 assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6256 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
6257 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
6258 ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
6259 assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
6260 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
6261 }
6262
6263 /*
6264 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
6265 */
6266 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
6267 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
6268 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6269
6270 /*
6271 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6272 * client-to-server session keys.
6273 */
6274 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
6275 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
6276 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
6277 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
6278
6279 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
6280 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
6281 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
6282 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
6283
6284 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
6285 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
6286 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
6287 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
6288
6289 /*
6290 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
6291 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6292 */
6293 {
6294 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6295 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6296 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
6297 assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6298 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6299 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6300 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
6301 assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
6302 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6303 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6304 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
6305 assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
6306 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6307 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6308 smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
6309 }
6310
6311 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
6312 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
6313 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
6314 ssh->csmac->text_name);
6315 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
6316 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
6317 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
6318
6319 /*
6320 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
6321 * our queued higher-layer packets.
6322 */
6323 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
6324 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
6325
6326 /*
6327 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
6328 */
6329 crWaitUntil(pktin);
6330 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
6331 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
6332 crStop(0);
6333 }
6334 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
6335
6336 /*
6337 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
6338 * server-to-client session keys.
6339 */
6340 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
6341 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
6342 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
6343 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
6344
6345 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
6346 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
6347 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
6348 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
6349
6350 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
6351 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
6352 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
6353 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
6354
6355 /*
6356 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
6357 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
6358 */
6359 {
6360 unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
6361 assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6362 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
6363 assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
6364 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6365 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6366 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
6367 assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
6368 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6369 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
6370 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
6371 assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
6372 ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
6373 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
6374 smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
6375 }
6376 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
6377 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
6378 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
6379 ssh->scmac->text_name);
6380 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
6381 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
6382 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
6383
6384 /*
6385 * Free shared secret.
6386 */
6387 freebn(s->K);
6388
6389 /*
6390 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
6391 * deferred rekey reason.
6392 */
6393 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
6394 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
6395 pktin = NULL;
6396 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
6397 goto begin_key_exchange;
6398 }
6399
6400 /*
6401 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
6402 */
6403 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
6404 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
6405 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0)
6406 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6407 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6408
6409 /*
6410 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
6411 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
6412 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
6413 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
6414 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
6415 * it would only confuse the layer above.
6416 */
6417 if (s->activated_authconn) {
6418 crReturn(0);
6419 }
6420 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
6421
6422 /*
6423 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
6424 * function so that other things can run on top of the
6425 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
6426 * start.
6427 *
6428 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
6429 * inlen negative, because this is a special signal meaning
6430 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
6431 * giving the reason for the rekey.
6432 *
6433 * inlen==-1 means always initiate a rekey;
6434 * inlen==-2 means that userauth has completed successfully and
6435 * we should consider rekeying (for delayed compression).
6436 */
6437 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
6438 (!pktin && inlen < 0))) {
6439 wait_for_rekey:
6440 crReturn(1);
6441 }
6442 if (pktin) {
6443 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
6444 } else {
6445 if (inlen == -2) {
6446 /*
6447 * authconn has seen a USERAUTH_SUCCEEDED. Time to enable
6448 * delayed compression, if it's available.
6449 *
6450 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00 says that you
6451 * negotiate delayed compression in the first key exchange, and
6452 * both sides start compressing when the server has sent
6453 * USERAUTH_SUCCESS. This has a race condition -- the server
6454 * can't know when the client has seen it, and thus which incoming
6455 * packets it should treat as compressed.
6456 *
6457 * Instead, we do the initial key exchange without offering the
6458 * delayed methods, but note if the server offers them; when we
6459 * get here, if a delayed method was available that was higher
6460 * on our list than what we got, we initiate a rekey in which we
6461 * _do_ list the delayed methods (and hopefully get it as a
6462 * result). Subsequent rekeys will do the same.
6463 */
6464 assert(!s->userauth_succeeded); /* should only happen once */
6465 s->userauth_succeeded = TRUE;
6466 if (!s->pending_compression)
6467 /* Can't see any point rekeying. */
6468 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
6469 /* else fall through to rekey... */
6470 s->pending_compression = FALSE;
6471 }
6472 /*
6473 * Now we've decided to rekey.
6474 *
6475 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
6476 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
6477 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
6478 * we process it anyway!)
6479 */
6480 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
6481 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
6482 (char *)in);
6483 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
6484 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
6485 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
6486 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
6487 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0) {
6488 ssh->next_rekey =
6489 schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
6490 ssh2_timer, ssh);
6491 }
6492 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is still utterly horrid */
6493 } else {
6494 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
6495 }
6496 }
6497 goto begin_key_exchange;
6498
6499 crFinish(1);
6500 }
6501
6502 /*
6503 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
6504 */
6505 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
6506 int len)
6507 {
6508 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
6509 }
6510
6511 /*
6512 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
6513 */
6514 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
6515 {
6516 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6517 struct Packet *pktout;
6518 int ret;
6519
6520 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
6521 int len;
6522 void *data;
6523 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
6524 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
6525 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
6526 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
6527 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
6528 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
6529 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6530 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
6531 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
6532 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
6533 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
6534 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6535 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
6536 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
6537 }
6538
6539 /*
6540 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
6541 * still buffered.
6542 */
6543 ret = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6544
6545 /*
6546 * And if there's no data pending but we need to send an EOF, send
6547 * it.
6548 */
6549 if (!ret && c->pending_eof)
6550 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
6551
6552 return ret;
6553 }
6554
6555 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
6556 {
6557 int bufsize;
6558 if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
6559 return; /* don't send on channels we've EOFed */
6560 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
6561 if (bufsize == 0) {
6562 switch (c->type) {
6563 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6564 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
6565 * notification since it will be polled */
6566 break;
6567 case CHAN_X11:
6568 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
6569 break;
6570 case CHAN_AGENT:
6571 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
6572 * buffer management */
6573 break;
6574 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6575 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
6576 break;
6577 }
6578 }
6579 }
6580
6581 /*
6582 * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
6583 */
6584 static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
6585 {
6586 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6587 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6588 c->closes = 0;
6589 c->pending_eof = FALSE;
6590 c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
6591 c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
6592 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6593 c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
6594 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6595 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6596 }
6597
6598 /*
6599 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
6600 */
6601 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
6602 {
6603 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6604
6605 /*
6606 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side has
6607 * already sent EOF on; there's no point, since it won't be
6608 * sending any more data anyway. Ditto if _we've_ already sent
6609 * CLOSE.
6610 */
6611 if (c->closes & (CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
6612 return;
6613
6614 /*
6615 * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
6616 * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
6617 * window as well).
6618 */
6619 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
6620 newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
6621
6622 /*
6623 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
6624 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
6625 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
6626 *
6627 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
6628 */
6629 if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
6630 struct Packet *pktout;
6631 struct winadj *wa;
6632
6633 /*
6634 * In order to keep track of how much window the client
6635 * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
6636 * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
6637 * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
6638 *
6639 * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
6640 * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
6641 * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
6642 *
6643 * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
6644 * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
6645 * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
6646 * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
6647 */
6648 if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
6649 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] &&
6650 !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ)) {
6651 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
6652 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6653 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
6654 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
6655 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6656
6657 /*
6658 * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
6659 * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
6660 * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
6661 */
6662 wa = snew(struct winadj);
6663 wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
6664 wa->next = NULL;
6665 if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
6666 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
6667 else
6668 c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
6669 c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
6670 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
6671 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
6672 } else {
6673 /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
6674 c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
6675 c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
6676 }
6677 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
6678 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6679 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
6680 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6681 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
6682 }
6683 }
6684
6685 /*
6686 * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
6687 * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
6688 */
6689 static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6690 {
6691 unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6692 struct ssh_channel *c;
6693
6694 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6695 if (!c ||
6696 (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
6697 pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
6698 char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
6699 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
6700 pktin->type),
6701 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
6702 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6703 sfree(buf);
6704 return NULL;
6705 }
6706 return c;
6707 }
6708
6709 static int ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *c)
6710 {
6711 struct winadj *wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
6712 if (!wa)
6713 return FALSE;
6714 c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
6715 c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
6716 sfree(wa);
6717 /*
6718 * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
6719 * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
6720 * complete.
6721 */
6722 if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
6723 c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
6724 /*
6725 * We may now initiate channel-closing procedures, if that winadj
6726 * was the last thing outstanding before we send CHANNEL_CLOSE.
6727 */
6728 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
6729 return TRUE;
6730 }
6731
6732 static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6733 {
6734 /*
6735 * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
6736 * sent with want_reply false, are sent before this handler gets
6737 * installed, or are "winadj@putty" requests, which servers should
6738 * never respond to with success.
6739 *
6740 * However, at least one server ("boks_sshd") is known to return
6741 * SUCCESS for channel requests it's never heard of, such as
6742 * "winadj@putty". Raised with foxt.com as bug 090916-090424, but
6743 * for the sake of a quiet life, we handle it just the same as the
6744 * expected FAILURE.
6745 */
6746 struct ssh_channel *c;
6747
6748 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6749 if (!c)
6750 return;
6751 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
6752 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6753 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
6754 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6755 }
6756
6757 static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6758 {
6759 /*
6760 * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
6761 * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
6762 * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
6763 * installed.
6764 */
6765 struct ssh_channel *c;
6766
6767 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6768 if (!c)
6769 return;
6770 if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
6771 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
6772 "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
6773 SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6774 }
6775
6776 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6777 {
6778 struct ssh_channel *c;
6779 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6780 if (!c)
6781 return;
6782 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
6783 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6784 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
6785 }
6786 }
6787
6788 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6789 {
6790 char *data;
6791 int length;
6792 struct ssh_channel *c;
6793 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
6794 if (!c)
6795 return;
6796 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
6797 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
6798 return; /* extended but not stderr */
6799 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
6800 if (data) {
6801 int bufsize = 0;
6802 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
6803 c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
6804 switch (c->type) {
6805 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6806 bufsize =
6807 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
6808 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
6809 data, length);
6810 break;
6811 case CHAN_X11:
6812 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
6813 break;
6814 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6815 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
6816 break;
6817 case CHAN_AGENT:
6818 while (length > 0) {
6819 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
6820 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
6821 (unsigned)length);
6822 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
6823 data, l);
6824 data += l;
6825 length -= l;
6826 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6827 }
6828 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
6829 c->u.a.totallen =
6830 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
6831 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
6832 unsigned char);
6833 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
6834 }
6835 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
6836 unsigned int l =
6837 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
6838 (unsigned)length);
6839 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
6840 data, l);
6841 data += l;
6842 length -= l;
6843 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
6844 }
6845 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
6846 void *reply;
6847 int replylen;
6848 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
6849 c->u.a.totallen,
6850 &reply, &replylen,
6851 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
6852 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
6853 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6854 c->u.a.message = NULL;
6855 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6856 }
6857 }
6858 bufsize = 0;
6859 break;
6860 }
6861 /*
6862 * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
6863 * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
6864 * larger window.
6865 */
6866 if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
6867 c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
6868 c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6869 /*
6870 * If we are not buffering too much data,
6871 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
6872 * If we are buffering too much, we may still
6873 * need to adjust the window if the server's
6874 * sent excess data.
6875 */
6876 ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
6877 c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
6878 /*
6879 * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
6880 * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
6881 * throttle the whole channel.
6882 */
6883 if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
6884 (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) && bufsize > 0)) &&
6885 !c->throttling_conn) {
6886 c->throttling_conn = 1;
6887 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
6888 }
6889 }
6890 }
6891
6892 static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c)
6893 {
6894 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6895
6896 switch (c->type) {
6897 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6898 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6899 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6900 break;
6901 case CHAN_X11:
6902 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6903 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6904 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
6905 break;
6906 case CHAN_AGENT:
6907 sfree(c->u.a.message);
6908 break;
6909 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
6910 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6911 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6912 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
6913 break;
6914 }
6915
6916 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6917 if (ssh->version == 2)
6918 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6919 sfree(c);
6920
6921 /*
6922 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6923 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6924 * not running in -N mode.)
6925 */
6926 if (ssh->version == 2 &&
6927 !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
6928 count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6929 /*
6930 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6931 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6932 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6933 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6934 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6935 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6936 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6937 * this is more polite than sending a
6938 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6939 */
6940 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6941 }
6942 }
6943
6944 static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
6945 {
6946 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6947 struct Packet *pktout;
6948
6949 if ((c->closes & (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
6950 == (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) && !c->v.v2.winadj_head) {
6951 /*
6952 * We have both sent and received EOF, and we have no
6953 * outstanding winadj channel requests, which means the
6954 * channel is in final wind-up. But we haven't sent CLOSE, so
6955 * let's do so now.
6956 */
6957 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6958 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6959 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6960 c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
6961 }
6962
6963 if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes)) {
6964 /*
6965 * We have both sent and received CLOSE, which means we're
6966 * completely done with the channel.
6967 */
6968 ssh_channel_destroy(c);
6969 }
6970 }
6971
6972 static void ssh2_channel_got_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
6973 {
6974 if (c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)
6975 return; /* already seen EOF */
6976 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
6977
6978 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
6979 x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
6980 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
6981 /* Manufacture an outgoing EOF in response to the incoming one. */
6982 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
6983 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
6984 pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
6985 } else if (c->type == CHAN_MAINSESSION) {
6986 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
6987
6988 if (!ssh->sent_console_eof &&
6989 (from_backend_eof(ssh->frontend) || ssh->got_pty)) {
6990 /*
6991 * Either from_backend_eof told us that the front end
6992 * wants us to close the outgoing side of the connection
6993 * as soon as we see EOF from the far end, or else we've
6994 * unilaterally decided to do that because we've allocated
6995 * a remote pty and hence EOF isn't a particularly
6996 * meaningful concept.
6997 */
6998 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
6999 }
7000 ssh->sent_console_eof = TRUE;
7001 }
7002
7003 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
7004 }
7005
7006 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7007 {
7008 struct ssh_channel *c;
7009
7010 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7011 if (!c)
7012 return;
7013 ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
7014 }
7015
7016 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7017 {
7018 struct ssh_channel *c;
7019
7020 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7021 if (!c)
7022 return;
7023
7024 /*
7025 * When we receive CLOSE on a channel, we assume it comes with an
7026 * implied EOF if we haven't seen EOF yet.
7027 */
7028 ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
7029
7030 /*
7031 * And we also send an outgoing EOF, if we haven't already, on the
7032 * assumption that CLOSE is a pretty forceful announcement that
7033 * the remote side is doing away with the entire channel. (If it
7034 * had wanted to send us EOF and continue receiving data from us,
7035 * it would have just sent CHANNEL_EOF.)
7036 */
7037 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
7038 /*
7039 * Make sure we don't read any more from whatever our local
7040 * data source is for this channel.
7041 */
7042 switch (c->type) {
7043 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
7044 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* stop trying to read from stdin */
7045 break;
7046 case CHAN_X11:
7047 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, 1);
7048 break;
7049 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
7050 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, 1);
7051 break;
7052 }
7053
7054 /*
7055 * Send outgoing EOF.
7056 */
7057 sshfwd_write_eof(c);
7058 }
7059
7060 /*
7061 * Now process the actual close.
7062 */
7063 if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
7064 c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
7065 ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
7066 }
7067 }
7068
7069 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7070 {
7071 struct ssh_channel *c;
7072
7073 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7074 if (!c)
7075 return;
7076 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
7077 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
7078 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7079 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7080 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7081 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7082 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7083 if (c->u.pfd.s)
7084 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
7085 if (c->pending_eof)
7086 ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
7087 }
7088
7089 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7090 {
7091 static const char *const reasons[] = {
7092 "<unknown reason code>",
7093 "Administratively prohibited",
7094 "Connect failed",
7095 "Unknown channel type",
7096 "Resource shortage",
7097 };
7098 unsigned reason_code;
7099 char *reason_string;
7100 int reason_length;
7101 struct ssh_channel *c;
7102 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7103 if (!c)
7104 return;
7105 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
7106 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
7107
7108 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7109 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
7110 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
7111 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
7112 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
7113 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
7114
7115 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
7116
7117 del234(ssh->channels, c);
7118 sfree(c);
7119 }
7120
7121 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7122 {
7123 char *type;
7124 int typelen, want_reply;
7125 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
7126 struct ssh_channel *c;
7127 struct Packet *pktout;
7128
7129 c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
7130 if (!c)
7131 return;
7132 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7133 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7134
7135 /*
7136 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
7137 * the request type string to see if it's something
7138 * we recognise.
7139 */
7140 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
7141 /*
7142 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
7143 * the primary channel.
7144 */
7145 if (typelen == 11 &&
7146 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
7147
7148 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7149 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
7150 ssh->exitcode);
7151 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7152
7153 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
7154 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
7155
7156 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
7157 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
7158 char *msg;
7159 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
7160 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
7161 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
7162 * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
7163 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
7164 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
7165 {
7166 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
7167 pktin->savedpos;
7168 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
7169 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
7170 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
7171 if (num == 0) {
7172 is_int = FALSE;
7173 } else {
7174 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
7175 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
7176 do { \
7177 long q = offset; \
7178 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
7179 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
7180 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
7181 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
7182 result = TRUE; \
7183 } \
7184 } while(0)
7185 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
7186 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
7187 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
7188 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
7189 is_int = TRUE;
7190 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
7191 is_int = FALSE;
7192 else
7193 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
7194 is_plausible = FALSE;
7195 }
7196 }
7197 ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
7198 if (is_plausible) {
7199 if (is_int) {
7200 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
7201 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7202 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
7203 ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
7204 } else {
7205 /* As per RFC 4254. */
7206 char *sig;
7207 int siglen;
7208 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
7209 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
7210 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
7211 if (siglen) {
7212 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
7213 siglen, sig);
7214 }
7215
7216 /*
7217 * Really hideous method of translating the
7218 * signal description back into a locally
7219 * meaningful number.
7220 */
7221
7222 if (0)
7223 ;
7224 #define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
7225 else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
7226 ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
7227 #ifdef SIGABRT
7228 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
7229 #endif
7230 #ifdef SIGALRM
7231 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
7232 #endif
7233 #ifdef SIGFPE
7234 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
7235 #endif
7236 #ifdef SIGHUP
7237 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
7238 #endif
7239 #ifdef SIGILL
7240 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
7241 #endif
7242 #ifdef SIGINT
7243 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
7244 #endif
7245 #ifdef SIGKILL
7246 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
7247 #endif
7248 #ifdef SIGPIPE
7249 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
7250 #endif
7251 #ifdef SIGQUIT
7252 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
7253 #endif
7254 #ifdef SIGSEGV
7255 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
7256 #endif
7257 #ifdef SIGTERM
7258 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
7259 #endif
7260 #ifdef SIGUSR1
7261 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
7262 #endif
7263 #ifdef SIGUSR2
7264 TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
7265 #endif
7266 #undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
7267 else
7268 ssh->exitcode = 128;
7269 }
7270 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7271 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7272 if (msglen) {
7273 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
7274 }
7275 /* ignore lang tag */
7276 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
7277 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
7278 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
7279 fmt_msg);
7280 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
7281 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
7282 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
7283
7284 }
7285 } else {
7286 /*
7287 * This is a channel request we don't know
7288 * about, so we now either ignore the request
7289 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
7290 * on want_reply.
7291 */
7292 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
7293 }
7294 if (want_reply) {
7295 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
7296 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7297 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7298 }
7299 }
7300
7301 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7302 {
7303 char *type;
7304 int typelen, want_reply;
7305 struct Packet *pktout;
7306
7307 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7308 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7309
7310 /*
7311 * We currently don't support any global requests
7312 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
7313 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
7314 * want_reply.
7315 */
7316 if (want_reply) {
7317 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
7318 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7319 }
7320 }
7321
7322 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7323 {
7324 char *type;
7325 int typelen;
7326 char *peeraddr;
7327 int peeraddrlen;
7328 int peerport;
7329 char *error = NULL;
7330 struct ssh_channel *c;
7331 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
7332 struct Packet *pktout;
7333
7334 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
7335 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7336 c->ssh = ssh;
7337
7338 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7339 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7340 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7341
7342 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
7343 char *addrstr;
7344 const char *x11err;
7345
7346 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7347 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
7348 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
7349 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
7350 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7351
7352 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
7353 addrstr, peerport);
7354
7355 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
7356 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
7357 else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
7358 addrstr, peerport, ssh->conf)) != NULL) {
7359 logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
7360 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
7361 } else {
7362 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
7363 c->type = CHAN_X11;
7364 }
7365
7366 sfree(addrstr);
7367 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
7368 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
7369 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
7370 char *dummy;
7371 int dummylen;
7372 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
7373 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7374 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
7375 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7376 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
7377 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
7378 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
7379 if (realpf == NULL) {
7380 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
7381 } else {
7382 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
7383 realpf->dhost,
7384 realpf->dport, c,
7385 ssh->conf,
7386 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
7387 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
7388 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
7389 if (e != NULL) {
7390 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
7391 error = "Port open failed";
7392 } else {
7393 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
7394 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
7395 }
7396 }
7397 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
7398 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
7399 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
7400 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
7401 else {
7402 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
7403 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
7404 }
7405 } else {
7406 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
7407 }
7408
7409 c->remoteid = remid;
7410 c->halfopen = FALSE;
7411 if (error) {
7412 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
7413 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7414 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
7415 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
7416 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
7417 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7418 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
7419 sfree(c);
7420 } else {
7421 ssh2_channel_init(c);
7422 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
7423 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
7424 add234(ssh->channels, c);
7425 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
7426 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
7427 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
7428 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
7429 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7430 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
7431 }
7432 }
7433
7434 /*
7435 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
7436 * if we're going to display them.
7437 */
7438 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7439 {
7440 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
7441 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner) &&
7442 bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
7443 char *banner = NULL;
7444 int size = 0;
7445 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
7446 if (banner)
7447 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7448 }
7449 }
7450
7451 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
7452 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
7453 {
7454 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
7455 int i = 0;
7456 unsigned int arg = 0;
7457 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
7458 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
7459 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
7460 case TTY_OP_CHAR:
7461 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
7462 break;
7463 case TTY_OP_BOOL:
7464 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
7465 break;
7466 }
7467 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
7468 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
7469 }
7470
7471 /*
7472 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
7473 */
7474 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
7475 struct Packet *pktin)
7476 {
7477 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
7478 int crLine;
7479 enum {
7480 AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
7481 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
7482 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
7483 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
7484 AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
7485 AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
7486 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
7487 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
7488 } type;
7489 int done_service_req;
7490 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
7491 int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
7492 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7493 int can_gssapi;
7494 int tried_gssapi;
7495 #endif
7496 int kbd_inter_refused;
7497 int we_are_in, userauth_success;
7498 prompts_t *cur_prompt;
7499 int num_prompts;
7500 char *username;
7501 char *password;
7502 int got_username;
7503 void *publickey_blob;
7504 int publickey_bloblen;
7505 int publickey_encrypted;
7506 char *publickey_algorithm;
7507 char *publickey_comment;
7508 unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
7509 int agent_responselen;
7510 unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
7511 int keyi, nkeys;
7512 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
7513 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
7514 int siglen, retlen, len;
7515 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
7516 int try_send;
7517 int requested_x11;
7518 int requested_agent;
7519 int requested_tty;
7520 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
7521 struct Packet *pktout;
7522 Filename *keyfile;
7523 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7524 struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
7525 Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
7526 Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
7527 Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
7528 Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
7529 Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
7530 #endif
7531 };
7532 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7533
7534 crBeginState;
7535
7536 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
7537 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
7538 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7539 s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
7540 #endif
7541
7542 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
7543 /*
7544 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
7545 */
7546 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7547 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
7548 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7549 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7550 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
7551 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
7552 }
7553 if (!s->done_service_req) {
7554 /*
7555 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
7556 */
7557 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
7558 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7559 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7560 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7561 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
7562 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
7563 } else {
7564 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
7565 crStopV;
7566 }
7567 }
7568
7569 /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
7570 * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
7571 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
7572 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
7573 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
7574
7575 /*
7576 * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
7577 */
7578 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7579 if (!s->we_are_in) {
7580
7581 /*
7582 * Load the public half of any configured public key file
7583 * for later use.
7584 */
7585 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
7586 if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
7587 int keytype;
7588 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
7589 filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
7590 keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
7591 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
7592 const char *error;
7593 s->publickey_blob =
7594 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(s->keyfile,
7595 &s->publickey_algorithm,
7596 &s->publickey_bloblen,
7597 &s->publickey_comment, &error);
7598 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7599 s->publickey_encrypted =
7600 ssh2_userkey_encrypted(s->keyfile, NULL);
7601 } else {
7602 char *msgbuf;
7603 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
7604 error);
7605 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
7606 "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
7607 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
7608 error);
7609 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7610 sfree(msgbuf);
7611 }
7612 } else {
7613 char *msgbuf;
7614 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
7615 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7616 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
7617 " (%s)\r\n",
7618 filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
7619 key_type_to_str(keytype));
7620 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
7621 sfree(msgbuf);
7622 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
7623 }
7624 }
7625
7626 /*
7627 * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
7628 * public key configured, filter out all others).
7629 */
7630 s->nkeys = 0;
7631 s->agent_response = NULL;
7632 s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
7633 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists()) {
7634
7635 void *r;
7636
7637 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
7638
7639 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
7640 PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
7641 s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
7642 if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
7643 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
7644 do {
7645 crReturnV;
7646 if (pktin) {
7647 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
7648 " waiting for agent response"));
7649 crStopV;
7650 }
7651 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
7652 r = ssh->agent_response;
7653 s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
7654 }
7655 s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
7656 if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
7657 s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
7658 int keyi;
7659 unsigned char *p;
7660 p = s->agent_response + 5;
7661 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
7662 p += 4;
7663 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
7664 if (s->publickey_blob) {
7665 /* See if configured key is in agent. */
7666 for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
7667 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
7668 if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
7669 !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
7670 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
7671 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
7672 "configured key file", keyi);
7673 s->keyi = keyi;
7674 s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
7675 break;
7676 }
7677 p += 4 + s->pklen;
7678 p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
7679 }
7680 if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7681 logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
7682 s->nkeys = 0;
7683 }
7684 }
7685 } else {
7686 logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
7687 }
7688 }
7689
7690 }
7691
7692 /*
7693 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
7694 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
7695 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
7696 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
7697 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
7698 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
7699 *
7700 * I think this best serves the needs of
7701 *
7702 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
7703 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
7704 * type both correctly
7705 *
7706 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
7707 * need to fall back to passwords
7708 *
7709 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
7710 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
7711 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
7712 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
7713 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
7714 * retype it!
7715 */
7716 s->got_username = FALSE;
7717 while (!s->we_are_in) {
7718 /*
7719 * Get a username.
7720 */
7721 if (s->got_username && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
7722 /*
7723 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
7724 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
7725 * it again.
7726 */
7727 } else if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
7728 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
7729 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
7730 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
7731 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
7732 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
7733 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
7734 while (ret < 0) {
7735 ssh->send_ok = 1;
7736 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7737 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
7738 ssh->send_ok = 0;
7739 }
7740 if (!ret) {
7741 /*
7742 * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
7743 * Terminate.
7744 */
7745 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7746 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
7747 crStopV;
7748 }
7749 ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
7750 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
7751 } else {
7752 char *stuff;
7753 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
7754 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", ssh->username);
7755 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
7756 sfree(stuff);
7757 }
7758 }
7759 s->got_username = TRUE;
7760
7761 /*
7762 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
7763 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
7764 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
7765 */
7766 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7767
7768 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7769 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7770 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
7771 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7772 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7773 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7774 s->gotit = FALSE;
7775 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7776
7777 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7778 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
7779
7780 /* Reset agent request state. */
7781 s->done_agent = FALSE;
7782 if (s->agent_response) {
7783 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
7784 s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
7785 } else {
7786 s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
7787 s->keyi = 0;
7788 }
7789 }
7790
7791 while (1) {
7792 char *methods = NULL;
7793 int methlen = 0;
7794
7795 /*
7796 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
7797 */
7798 if (!s->gotit)
7799 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7800 /*
7801 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
7802 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
7803 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
7804 * with.)
7805 */
7806 {
7807 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
7808 /*
7809 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
7810 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
7811 * a script, which means nobody will read the
7812 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
7813 * the banner will screw up processing on the
7814 * output of (say) plink.)
7815 */
7816 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
7817 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
7818 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
7819 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
7820 sfree(banner);
7821 }
7822 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
7823 }
7824 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
7825 logevent("Access granted");
7826 s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = TRUE;
7827 break;
7828 }
7829
7830 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7831 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
7832 "type %d", pktin->type));
7833 crStopV;
7834 }
7835
7836 s->gotit = FALSE;
7837
7838 /*
7839 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
7840 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
7841 * helpfully try next.
7842 */
7843 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
7844 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
7845 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
7846 /*
7847 * We have received an unequivocal Access
7848 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
7849 * messages, or no message at all.
7850 *
7851 * For forms of authentication which are attempted
7852 * implicitly, by which I mean without printing
7853 * anything in the window indicating that we're
7854 * trying them, we should never print 'Access
7855 * denied'.
7856 *
7857 * If we do print a message saying that we're
7858 * attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
7859 * to print a followup message saying it failed -
7860 * but the message may sometimes be more specific
7861 * than simply 'Access denied'.
7862 *
7863 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
7864 * authentication, we should break out of this
7865 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
7866 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
7867 * username change attempts).
7868 */
7869 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
7870 /* do nothing */
7871 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
7872 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
7873 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
7874 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
7875 logevent("Server refused our key");
7876 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
7877 /* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
7878 * protocol bug causing client and server to
7879 * disagree on what is a correct signature. */
7880 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused public-key signature"
7881 " despite accepting key!\r\n");
7882 logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
7883 " despite accepting key!");
7884 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
7885 /* quiet, so no c_write */
7886 logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive authentication");
7887 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
7888 /* always quiet, so no c_write */
7889 /* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
7890 * already logged this in the Event Log */
7891 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
7892 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication failed");
7893 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7894 } else {
7895 assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
7896 logevent("Password authentication failed");
7897 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
7898
7899 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
7900 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
7901 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
7902 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
7903 break;
7904 }
7905 }
7906 } else {
7907 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
7908 logevent("Further authentication required");
7909 }
7910
7911 s->can_pubkey =
7912 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
7913 s->can_passwd =
7914 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
7915 s->can_keyb_inter = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_ki_auth) &&
7916 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
7917 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
7918 if (!ssh->gsslibs)
7919 ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(ssh->conf);
7920 s->can_gssapi = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_gssapi_auth) &&
7921 in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
7922 ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
7923 #endif
7924 }
7925
7926 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
7927
7928 if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
7929
7930 /*
7931 * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
7932 */
7933
7934 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
7935
7936 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
7937
7938 /* Unpack key from agent response */
7939 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7940 s->agentp += 4;
7941 s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
7942 s->agentp += s->pklen;
7943 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
7944 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
7945 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
7946 s->agentp += 4;
7947 s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
7948 s->agentp += s->commentlen;
7949 /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
7950
7951 /* See if server will accept it */
7952 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7953 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7954 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7955 /* service requested */
7956 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7957 /* method */
7958 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
7959 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7960 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7961 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7962 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7963 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7964 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
7965
7966 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7967 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
7968
7969 /* Offer of key refused. */
7970 s->gotit = TRUE;
7971
7972 } else {
7973
7974 void *vret;
7975
7976 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
7977 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
7978 "public key \"");
7979 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
7980 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
7981 }
7982
7983 /*
7984 * Server is willing to accept the key.
7985 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
7986 */
7987 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7988 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
7989 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
7990 /* service requested */
7991 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
7992 /* method */
7993 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
7994 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7995 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
7996 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7997 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
7998
7999 /* Ask agent for signature. */
8000 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
8001 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8002 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
8003 s->siglen -= 4;
8004 s->len = 1; /* message type */
8005 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
8006 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
8007 s->len += 4; /* flags */
8008 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
8009 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
8010 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
8011 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
8012 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
8013 s->q += 4;
8014 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
8015 s->q += s->pklen;
8016 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
8017 s->q += 4;
8018 /* Now the data to be signed... */
8019 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
8020 PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8021 s->q += 4;
8022 }
8023 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
8024 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8025 s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8026 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
8027 s->pktout->length - 5);
8028 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
8029 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
8030 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
8031 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
8032 &vret, &s->retlen,
8033 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
8034 do {
8035 crReturnV;
8036 if (pktin) {
8037 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
8038 " while waiting for agent"
8039 " response"));
8040 crStopV;
8041 }
8042 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
8043 vret = ssh->agent_response;
8044 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
8045 }
8046 s->ret = vret;
8047 sfree(s->agentreq);
8048 if (s->ret) {
8049 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
8050 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
8051 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
8052 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
8053 s->ret + 9,
8054 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
8055 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8056 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
8057 } else {
8058 /* FIXME: less drastic response */
8059 bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
8060 crStopV;
8061 }
8062 }
8063 }
8064
8065 /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
8066 if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
8067 s->done_agent = TRUE;
8068 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
8069 } else {
8070 s->keyi++;
8071 if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
8072 s->done_agent = TRUE;
8073 }
8074
8075 } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
8076 !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
8077
8078 struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
8079 char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
8080
8081 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
8082
8083 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
8084
8085 /*
8086 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
8087 *
8088 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
8089 * willing to accept it.
8090 */
8091 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8092 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8093 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8094 /* service requested */
8095 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
8096 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8097 /* no signature included */
8098 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
8099 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8100 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
8101 (char *)s->publickey_blob,
8102 s->publickey_bloblen);
8103 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8104 logevent("Offered public key");
8105
8106 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8107 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
8108 /* Key refused. Give up. */
8109 s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
8110 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
8111 continue; /* process this new message */
8112 }
8113 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
8114
8115 /*
8116 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
8117 * the key.
8118 */
8119 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
8120 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
8121 c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
8122 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
8123 }
8124 key = NULL;
8125 while (!key) {
8126 const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
8127 if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
8128 /*
8129 * Get a passphrase from the user.
8130 */
8131 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
8132 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8133 s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
8134 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
8135 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8136 dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
8137 s->publickey_comment),
8138 FALSE);
8139 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8140 while (ret < 0) {
8141 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8142 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8143 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
8144 in, inlen);
8145 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8146 }
8147 if (!ret) {
8148 /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
8149 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8150 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
8151 "Unable to authenticate",
8152 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8153 TRUE);
8154 crStopV;
8155 }
8156 passphrase =
8157 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8158 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8159 } else {
8160 passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
8161 }
8162
8163 /*
8164 * Try decrypting the key.
8165 */
8166 s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
8167 key = ssh2_load_userkey(s->keyfile, passphrase, &error);
8168 if (passphrase) {
8169 /* burn the evidence */
8170 smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
8171 sfree(passphrase);
8172 }
8173 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
8174 if (passphrase &&
8175 (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
8176 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
8177 key = NULL;
8178 /* and loop again */
8179 } else {
8180 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
8181 c_write_str(ssh, error);
8182 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
8183 key = NULL;
8184 break; /* try something else */
8185 }
8186 }
8187 }
8188
8189 if (key) {
8190 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
8191 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
8192 int p;
8193
8194 /*
8195 * We have loaded the private key and the server
8196 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
8197 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
8198 */
8199 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8200 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8201 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8202 /* service requested */
8203 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
8204 /* method */
8205 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8206 /* signature follows */
8207 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
8208 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
8209 &pkblob_len);
8210 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8211 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
8212 pkblob_len);
8213
8214 /*
8215 * The data to be signed is:
8216 *
8217 * string session-id
8218 *
8219 * followed by everything so far placed in the
8220 * outgoing packet.
8221 */
8222 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
8223 ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8224 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
8225 sigdata_len -= 4;
8226 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
8227 p = 0;
8228 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
8229 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8230 p += 4;
8231 }
8232 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
8233 ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8234 p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
8235 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
8236 s->pktout->length - 5);
8237 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
8238 assert(p == sigdata_len);
8239 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
8240 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
8241 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
8242 sigblob, sigblob_len);
8243 sfree(pkblob);
8244 sfree(sigblob);
8245 sfree(sigdata);
8246
8247 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8248 logevent("Sent public key signature");
8249 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
8250 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
8251 }
8252
8253 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
8254 } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
8255
8256 /* GSSAPI Authentication */
8257
8258 int micoffset, len;
8259 char *data;
8260 Ssh_gss_buf mic;
8261 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
8262 s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
8263 s->gotit = TRUE;
8264 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
8265
8266 /*
8267 * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
8268 * list.
8269 */
8270 {
8271 int i, j;
8272 s->gsslib = NULL;
8273 for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
8274 int want_id = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
8275 CONF_ssh_gsslist, i);
8276 for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
8277 if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
8278 s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
8279 goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
8280 }
8281 }
8282 got_gsslib:
8283 /*
8284 * We always expect to have found something in
8285 * the above loop: we only came here if there
8286 * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
8287 * preference list should always mention
8288 * everything and only change the order.
8289 */
8290 assert(s->gsslib);
8291 }
8292
8293 if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
8294 logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
8295
8296 /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
8297 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8298 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8299 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8300 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8301 logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
8302
8303 /* add mechanism info */
8304 s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
8305
8306 /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
8307 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
8308
8309 /* length of OID + 2 */
8310 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
8311 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
8312
8313 /* length of OID */
8314 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
8315
8316 ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
8317 s->gss_buf.length);
8318 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8319 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8320 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
8321 logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
8322 continue;
8323 }
8324
8325 /* check returned packet ... */
8326
8327 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8328 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8329 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8330 if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
8331 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
8332 ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
8333 memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
8334 s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
8335 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
8336 continue;
8337 }
8338
8339 /* now start running */
8340 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
8341 ssh->fullhostname,
8342 &s->gss_srv_name);
8343 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8344 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
8345 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
8346 else
8347 logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
8348 continue;
8349 }
8350
8351 /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
8352 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8353
8354 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8355 logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
8356 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8357 continue;
8358 }
8359
8360 /* initial tokens are empty */
8361 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
8362 SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
8363
8364 /* now enter the loop */
8365 do {
8366 s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
8367 (s->gsslib,
8368 &s->gss_ctx,
8369 s->gss_srv_name,
8370 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_gssapifwd),
8371 &s->gss_rcvtok,
8372 &s->gss_sndtok);
8373
8374 if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
8375 s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8376 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
8377
8378 if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
8379 &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
8380 logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
8381 sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
8382 }
8383
8384 break;
8385 }
8386 logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
8387
8388 /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
8389 * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
8390
8391 if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
8392 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
8393 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8394 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
8395 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8396 s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
8397 }
8398
8399 if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
8400 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8401 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
8402 logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
8403 s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
8404 break;
8405 }
8406 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
8407 s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
8408 s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
8409 }
8410 } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
8411
8412 if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
8413 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8414 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8415 continue;
8416 }
8417 logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
8418
8419 /* Now send the MIC */
8420
8421 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
8422 micoffset = s->pktout->length;
8423 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8424 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
8425 ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8426 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8427 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8428 ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
8429
8430 s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
8431 s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
8432
8433 s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
8434 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
8435 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
8436 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
8437 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8438 s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
8439
8440 s->gotit = FALSE;
8441
8442 s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
8443 s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
8444 continue;
8445 #endif
8446 } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
8447
8448 /*
8449 * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
8450 */
8451
8452 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
8453
8454 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
8455
8456 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8457 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8458 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8459 /* service requested */
8460 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
8461 /* method */
8462 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
8463 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
8464 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8465
8466 logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
8467
8468 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8469 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8470 /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
8471 * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
8472 * user without actually issuing any prompts).
8473 * Give up on it entirely. */
8474 s->gotit = TRUE;
8475 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
8476 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
8477 continue;
8478 }
8479
8480 /*
8481 * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
8482 */
8483 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
8484
8485 char *name, *inst, *lang;
8486 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
8487 int i;
8488
8489 /*
8490 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
8491 * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
8492 */
8493 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
8494 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
8495 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
8496 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8497 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8498
8499 /*
8500 * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
8501 */
8502 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8503 for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8504 char *prompt;
8505 int prompt_len;
8506 int echo;
8507 static char noprompt[] =
8508 "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
8509
8510 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8511 echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
8512 if (!prompt_len) {
8513 prompt = noprompt;
8514 prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
8515 }
8516 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8517 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
8518 echo);
8519 }
8520
8521 if (name_len) {
8522 /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
8523 * local prompts? */
8524 s->cur_prompt->name =
8525 dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
8526 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
8527 } else {
8528 s->cur_prompt->name =
8529 dupstr("SSH server authentication");
8530 s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
8531 }
8532 /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
8533 * has come from the server.
8534 * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
8535 * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
8536 /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
8537 * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
8538 * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
8539 if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
8540 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8541 dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
8542 inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
8543 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8544 } else {
8545 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
8546 }
8547
8548 /*
8549 * Display any instructions, and get the user's
8550 * response(s).
8551 */
8552 {
8553 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8554 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8555 while (ret < 0) {
8556 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8557 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8558 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8559 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8560 }
8561 if (!ret) {
8562 /*
8563 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8564 */
8565 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8566 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8567 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8568 TRUE);
8569 crStopV;
8570 }
8571 }
8572
8573 /*
8574 * Send the response(s) to the server.
8575 */
8576 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
8577 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
8578 for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
8579 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8580 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8581 s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
8582 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8583 }
8584 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8585
8586 /*
8587 * Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
8588 * If there's another, a new one will be allocated
8589 * when we return to the top of this while loop.
8590 */
8591 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8592
8593 /*
8594 * Get the next packet in case it's another
8595 * INFO_REQUEST.
8596 */
8597 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8598
8599 }
8600
8601 /*
8602 * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
8603 */
8604 s->gotit = TRUE;
8605
8606 } else if (s->can_passwd) {
8607
8608 /*
8609 * Plain old password authentication.
8610 */
8611 int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
8612 int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
8613
8614 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
8615
8616 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8617 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8618 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
8619 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
8620 ssh->username,
8621 ssh->savedhost),
8622 FALSE);
8623
8624 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8625 while (ret < 0) {
8626 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8627 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8628 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8629 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8630 }
8631 if (!ret) {
8632 /*
8633 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8634 */
8635 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8636 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8637 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8638 TRUE);
8639 crStopV;
8640 }
8641 /*
8642 * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
8643 * asked to change it.)
8644 */
8645 s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8646 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8647
8648 /*
8649 * Send the password packet.
8650 *
8651 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
8652 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
8653 * user's password.
8654 *
8655 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
8656 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
8657 * people who find out how long their password is!
8658 */
8659 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8660 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8661 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8662 /* service requested */
8663 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8664 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
8665 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8666 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8667 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8668 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8669 logevent("Sent password");
8670 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
8671
8672 /*
8673 * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
8674 * request.
8675 */
8676 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8677 changereq_first_time = TRUE;
8678
8679 while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
8680
8681 /*
8682 * We're being asked for a new password
8683 * (perhaps not for the first time).
8684 * Loop until the server accepts it.
8685 */
8686
8687 int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
8688 char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
8689 int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
8690
8691 {
8692 char *msg;
8693 if (changereq_first_time)
8694 msg = "Server requested password change";
8695 else
8696 msg = "Server rejected new password";
8697 logevent(msg);
8698 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
8699 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
8700 }
8701
8702 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
8703
8704 s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
8705 s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
8706 s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
8707 s->cur_prompt->instruction =
8708 dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
8709 s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
8710 /*
8711 * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
8712 * for the "old" passwords in the original and
8713 * password-change messages to be the same, and
8714 * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
8715 * by the user entering a blank password originally
8716 * and the real password subsequently, so,
8717 * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
8718 *
8719 * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
8720 * to check this field.)
8721 */
8722 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
8723 dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
8724 FALSE);
8725 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
8726 FALSE);
8727 add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
8728 FALSE);
8729
8730 /*
8731 * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
8732 * password twice.
8733 */
8734 while (!got_new) {
8735
8736 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
8737 while (ret < 0) {
8738 ssh->send_ok = 1;
8739 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
8740 ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
8741 ssh->send_ok = 0;
8742 }
8743 if (!ret) {
8744 /*
8745 * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
8746 */
8747 /* burn the evidence */
8748 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8749 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8750 sfree(s->password);
8751 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
8752 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
8753 TRUE);
8754 crStopV;
8755 }
8756
8757 /*
8758 * If the user specified a new original password
8759 * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
8760 * one.
8761 * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
8762 * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
8763 */
8764 if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
8765 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8766 /* burn the evidence */
8767 sfree(s->password);
8768 s->password =
8769 dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
8770 }
8771
8772 /*
8773 * Check the two new passwords match.
8774 */
8775 got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
8776 s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
8777 == 0);
8778 if (!got_new)
8779 /* They don't. Silly user. */
8780 c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
8781
8782 }
8783
8784 /*
8785 * Send the new password (along with the old one).
8786 * (see above for padding rationale)
8787 */
8788 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
8789 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
8790 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
8791 /* service requested */
8792 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
8793 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
8794 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
8795 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
8796 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
8797 s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
8798 free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
8799 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
8800 ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
8801 logevent("Sent new password");
8802
8803 /*
8804 * Now see what the server has to say about it.
8805 * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
8806 * new password.)
8807 */
8808 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8809 changereq_first_time = FALSE;
8810
8811 }
8812
8813 /*
8814 * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
8815 * of the loop. Either:
8816 * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
8817 * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
8818 * usual meaning
8819 * - we sent a new password, and the server was
8820 * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
8821 * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
8822 * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
8823 * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
8824 * the loop and start again.
8825 */
8826 s->gotit = TRUE;
8827
8828 /*
8829 * We don't need the old password any more, in any
8830 * case. Burn the evidence.
8831 */
8832 smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
8833 sfree(s->password);
8834
8835 } else {
8836 char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
8837 " (server sent: %.*s)",
8838 methlen, methods);
8839
8840 ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
8841 "No supported authentication methods available",
8842 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
8843 FALSE);
8844 sfree(str);
8845
8846 crStopV;
8847
8848 }
8849
8850 }
8851 }
8852 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
8853
8854 /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
8855 if (s->publickey_blob) {
8856 sfree(s->publickey_blob);
8857 sfree(s->publickey_comment);
8858 }
8859 if (s->agent_response)
8860 sfree(s->agent_response);
8861
8862 if (s->userauth_success) {
8863 /*
8864 * We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
8865 * packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
8866 * delayed compression.
8867 *
8868 * (Relying on we_are_in is not sufficient, as
8869 * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed is quite clear that it
8870 * triggers on USERAUTH_SUCCESS specifically, and we_are_in can
8871 * become set for other reasons.)
8872 */
8873 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
8874 }
8875
8876 /*
8877 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
8878 */
8879
8880 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
8881
8882 /*
8883 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
8884 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
8885 */
8886 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
8887 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
8888 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
8889 ssh2_msg_global_request;
8890
8891 /*
8892 * Create the main session channel.
8893 */
8894 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell)) {
8895 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
8896 } else if (*conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host)) {
8897 /*
8898 * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
8899 * channel.
8900 */
8901 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8902 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8903 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8904 logeventf(ssh,
8905 "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
8906 conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host),
8907 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
8908 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8909 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8910 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8911 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8912 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8913 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host));
8914 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
8915 /*
8916 * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
8917 * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
8918 * information.
8919 */
8920 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
8921 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
8922 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8923
8924 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8925 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8926 bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
8927 crStopV;
8928 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8929 }
8930 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8931 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8932 crStopV;
8933 }
8934 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8935 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8936 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8937 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8938 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8939 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8940 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8941 logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
8942 ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
8943 } else {
8944 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8945 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
8946 ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
8947 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8948 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
8949 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
8950 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8951 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8952 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
8953 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
8954 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
8955 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
8956 crStopV;
8957 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
8958 }
8959 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
8960 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
8961 crStopV;
8962 }
8963 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8964 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
8965 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
8966 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8967 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
8968 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
8969 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
8970 logevent("Opened channel for session");
8971 ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
8972 }
8973
8974 /*
8975 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
8976 * general channel-based messages.
8977 */
8978 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
8979 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
8980 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
8981 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
8982 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
8983 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
8984 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
8985 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
8986 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
8987 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
8988 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
8989 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
8990 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
8991
8992 if (ssh->mainchan && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple)) {
8993 /*
8994 * This message indicates to the server that we promise
8995 * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
8996 * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
8997 * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
8998 */
8999 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9000 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9001 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
9002 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
9003 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9004 }
9005
9006 /*
9007 * Enable port forwardings.
9008 */
9009 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
9010
9011 /*
9012 * Send the CHANNEL_REQUESTS for the main channel. We send them all
9013 * and then start looking for responses, so it's important that the
9014 * sending and receiving code below it is kept in sync.
9015 */
9016
9017 /*
9018 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
9019 */
9020 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
9021 (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
9022 conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
9023 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
9024 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9025 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9026 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
9027 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9028 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
9029 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
9030 /*
9031 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
9032 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
9033 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
9034 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
9035 * cookie into the log.
9036 */
9037 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
9038 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
9039 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
9040 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
9041 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9042 s->requested_x11 = TRUE;
9043 } else
9044 s->requested_x11 = FALSE;
9045
9046 /*
9047 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
9048 */
9049 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
9050 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
9051 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9052 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9053 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
9054 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9055 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9056 s->requested_agent = TRUE;
9057 } else
9058 s->requested_agent = FALSE;
9059
9060 /*
9061 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
9062 */
9063 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
9064 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
9065 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
9066 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
9067 sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
9068 /* Build the pty request. */
9069 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9070 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
9071 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
9072 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9073 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
9074 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
9075 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
9076 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
9077 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
9078 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
9079 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
9080 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
9081 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
9082 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
9083 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
9084 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
9085 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9086 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
9087 s->requested_tty = TRUE;
9088 } else
9089 s->requested_tty = FALSE;
9090
9091 /*
9092 * Send environment variables.
9093 *
9094 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
9095 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
9096 */
9097 s->num_env = 0;
9098 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) {
9099 char *key, *val;
9100
9101 for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, NULL, &key);
9102 val != NULL;
9103 val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, key, &key)) {
9104 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9105 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9106 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
9107 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9108 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key);
9109 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
9110 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9111
9112 s->num_env++;
9113 }
9114 if (s->num_env)
9115 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
9116 }
9117
9118 /*
9119 * All CHANNEL_REQUESTs sent. Now collect up the replies. These
9120 * must be in precisely the same order as the requests.
9121 */
9122
9123 if (s->requested_x11) {
9124 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9125
9126 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9127 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9128 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
9129 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9130 crStopV;
9131 }
9132 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
9133 } else {
9134 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
9135 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
9136 }
9137 }
9138
9139 if (s->requested_agent) {
9140 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9141
9142 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9143 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9144 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
9145 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9146 crStopV;
9147 }
9148 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
9149 } else {
9150 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
9151 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
9152 }
9153 }
9154
9155 if (s->requested_tty) {
9156 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9157
9158 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9159 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9160 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
9161 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9162 crStopV;
9163 }
9164 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
9165 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
9166 } else {
9167 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
9168 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
9169 ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
9170 }
9171 } else {
9172 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
9173 }
9174
9175 if (s->num_env) {
9176 s->env_ok = 0;
9177 s->env_left = s->num_env;
9178
9179 while (s->env_left > 0) {
9180 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9181
9182 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9183 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9184 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
9185 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9186 crStopV;
9187 }
9188 } else {
9189 s->env_ok++;
9190 }
9191
9192 s->env_left--;
9193 }
9194
9195 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
9196 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
9197 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
9198 logevent("All environment variables refused");
9199 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
9200 } else {
9201 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
9202 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
9203 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
9204 }
9205 }
9206
9207 /*
9208 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
9209 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
9210 * of command.
9211 */
9212 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
9213 int subsys;
9214 char *cmd;
9215
9216 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
9217 subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys2);
9218 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
9219 } else {
9220 subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys);
9221 cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
9222 }
9223
9224 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9225 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
9226 if (subsys) {
9227 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
9228 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9229 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
9230 } else if (*cmd) {
9231 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
9232 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9233 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
9234 } else {
9235 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
9236 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
9237 }
9238 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
9239
9240 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
9241
9242 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
9243 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
9244 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
9245 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
9246 crStopV;
9247 }
9248 /*
9249 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
9250 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
9251 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
9252 * back to it before complaining.
9253 */
9254 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd &&
9255 *conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
9256 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
9257 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
9258 continue;
9259 }
9260 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
9261 crStopV;
9262 } else {
9263 logevent("Started a shell/command");
9264 }
9265 break;
9266 }
9267
9268 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
9269 if (ssh->size_needed)
9270 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
9271 if (ssh->eof_needed)
9272 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
9273
9274 /*
9275 * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
9276 * failure handler.
9277 */
9278 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
9279 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
9280
9281 /*
9282 * Transfer data!
9283 */
9284 if (ssh->ldisc)
9285 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
9286 if (ssh->mainchan)
9287 ssh->send_ok = 1;
9288 while (1) {
9289 crReturnV;
9290 s->try_send = FALSE;
9291 if (pktin) {
9292
9293 /*
9294 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
9295 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
9296 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
9297 */
9298
9299 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
9300 crStopV;
9301 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9302 /*
9303 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
9304 */
9305 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
9306 s->try_send = TRUE;
9307 }
9308 if (s->try_send) {
9309 int i;
9310 struct ssh_channel *c;
9311 /*
9312 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
9313 */
9314 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
9315 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
9316 }
9317 }
9318
9319 crFinishV;
9320 }
9321
9322 /*
9323 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
9324 */
9325 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9326 {
9327 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
9328 char *buf, *msg;
9329 int reason, msglen;
9330
9331 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
9332 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9333
9334 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
9335 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
9336 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
9337 } else {
9338 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
9339 " type %d)", reason);
9340 }
9341 logevent(buf);
9342 sfree(buf);
9343 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
9344 msglen, msg);
9345 logevent(buf);
9346 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
9347 reason,
9348 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
9349 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
9350 msglen, msg));
9351 sfree(buf);
9352 }
9353
9354 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9355 {
9356 /* log the debug message */
9357 char *msg;
9358 int msglen;
9359
9360 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of the return value */
9361 ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
9362 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
9363
9364 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
9365 }
9366
9367 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
9368 {
9369 struct Packet *pktout;
9370 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
9371 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
9372 /*
9373 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
9374 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
9375 */
9376 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9377 }
9378
9379 /*
9380 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
9381 */
9382 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
9383 {
9384 int i;
9385
9386 /*
9387 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
9388 */
9389 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
9390 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
9391
9392 /*
9393 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
9394 * the coroutines will get it.
9395 */
9396 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
9397 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
9398 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
9399 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
9400 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
9401 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
9402 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
9403 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9404 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9405 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
9406 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
9407 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
9408 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
9409 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9410 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
9411 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
9412 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9413 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
9414 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
9415 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9416 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9417 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
9418 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
9419 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
9420 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
9421 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
9422 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
9423 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
9424 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
9425 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
9426 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
9427 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
9428 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
9429
9430 /*
9431 * These special message types we install handlers for.
9432 */
9433 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
9434 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
9435 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
9436 }
9437
9438 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
9439 {
9440 Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
9441
9442 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9443 return;
9444
9445 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
9446 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
9447 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
9448 }
9449 }
9450
9451 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
9452 struct Packet *pktin)
9453 {
9454 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
9455 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
9456 return;
9457
9458 if (pktin) {
9459 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
9460 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
9461 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
9462 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9463 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
9464 }
9465
9466 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
9467 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
9468 return;
9469 }
9470
9471 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
9472 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
9473 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
9474 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
9475 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
9476 /*
9477 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
9478 */
9479 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
9480 }
9481 } else {
9482 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
9483 }
9484 }
9485
9486 static void ssh_cache_conf_values(Ssh ssh)
9487 {
9488 ssh->logomitdata = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitdata);
9489 }
9490
9491 /*
9492 * Called to set up the connection.
9493 *
9494 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
9495 */
9496 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
9497 Conf *conf, char *host, int port, char **realhost,
9498 int nodelay, int keepalive)
9499 {
9500 const char *p;
9501 Ssh ssh;
9502
9503 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
9504 ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
9505 ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
9506 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
9507 ssh->s = NULL;
9508 ssh->cipher = NULL;
9509 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9510 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9511 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
9512 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9513 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
9514 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
9515 ssh->csmac = NULL;
9516 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
9517 ssh->scmac = NULL;
9518 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
9519 ssh->cscomp = NULL;
9520 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
9521 ssh->sccomp = NULL;
9522 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
9523 ssh->kex = NULL;
9524 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
9525 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
9526 ssh->exitcode = -1;
9527 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
9528 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
9529 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
9530 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
9531 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
9532 ssh->ldisc = NULL;
9533 ssh->logctx = NULL;
9534 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
9535 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
9536 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
9537 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9538 ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
9539 ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
9540 ssh->x11disp = NULL;
9541 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
9542 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
9543 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9544 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
9545 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
9546 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
9547 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
9548 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
9549 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
9550 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
9551 ssh->v_c = NULL;
9552 ssh->v_s = NULL;
9553 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
9554 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
9555 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
9556 ssh->queue = NULL;
9557 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
9558 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
9559 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9560 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
9561 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9562 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
9563 ssh->username = NULL;
9564 ssh->sent_console_eof = FALSE;
9565 ssh->got_pty = FALSE;
9566
9567 *backend_handle = ssh;
9568
9569 #ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
9570 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
9571 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
9572 #endif
9573
9574 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
9575 ssh->term_width = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_width);
9576 ssh->term_height = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_height);
9577
9578 ssh->channels = NULL;
9579 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9580 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
9581
9582 ssh->send_ok = 0;
9583 ssh->editing = 0;
9584 ssh->echoing = 0;
9585 ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
9586 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
9587 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
9588
9589 ssh->protocol = NULL;
9590
9591 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
9592
9593 ssh->pinger = NULL;
9594
9595 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
9596 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
9597 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
9598 CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
9599 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
9600
9601 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9602 ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
9603 #endif
9604
9605 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
9606 if (p != NULL)
9607 return p;
9608
9609 random_ref();
9610
9611 return NULL;
9612 }
9613
9614 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
9615 {
9616 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9617 struct ssh_channel *c;
9618 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
9619
9620 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
9621 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
9622 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
9623 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
9624 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
9625 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
9626 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
9627 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
9628 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
9629 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
9630 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
9631 if (ssh->cscomp)
9632 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9633 else
9634 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
9635 }
9636 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
9637 if (ssh->sccomp)
9638 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9639 else
9640 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
9641 }
9642 if (ssh->kex_ctx)
9643 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
9644 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
9645
9646 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
9647 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
9648 sfree(ssh->queue);
9649
9650 while (ssh->qhead) {
9651 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
9652 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
9653 sfree(ssh->qhead);
9654 }
9655 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
9656
9657 if (ssh->channels) {
9658 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
9659 switch (c->type) {
9660 case CHAN_X11:
9661 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
9662 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
9663 break;
9664 case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
9665 case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
9666 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
9667 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
9668 break;
9669 }
9670 sfree(c);
9671 }
9672 freetree234(ssh->channels);
9673 ssh->channels = NULL;
9674 }
9675
9676 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
9677 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
9678 free_rportfwd(pf);
9679 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
9680 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
9681 }
9682 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
9683 if (ssh->x11disp)
9684 x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
9685 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
9686 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
9687 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
9688 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
9689 sfree(ssh->v_c);
9690 sfree(ssh->v_s);
9691 sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
9692 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
9693 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
9694 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
9695 }
9696 if (ssh->s)
9697 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
9698 expire_timer_context(ssh);
9699 if (ssh->pinger)
9700 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
9701 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
9702 sfree(ssh->username);
9703 conf_free(ssh->conf);
9704 #ifndef NO_GSSAPI
9705 if (ssh->gsslibs)
9706 ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
9707 #endif
9708 sfree(ssh);
9709
9710 random_unref();
9711 }
9712
9713 /*
9714 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
9715 */
9716 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Conf *conf)
9717 {
9718 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9719 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
9720 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
9721 int i, rekey_time;
9722
9723 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, ssh->conf, conf);
9724 if (ssh->portfwds)
9725 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, conf);
9726
9727 rekey_time = conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time);
9728 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != rekey_time &&
9729 rekey_time != 0) {
9730 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
9731 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
9732
9733 if (new_next - now < 0) {
9734 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
9735 } else {
9736 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
9737 }
9738 }
9739
9740 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
9741 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
9742 CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
9743 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
9744 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
9745 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
9746 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
9747 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
9748 }
9749
9750 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression) !=
9751 conf_get_int(conf, CONF_compression)) {
9752 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
9753 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9754 }
9755
9756 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++)
9757 if (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i) !=
9758 conf_get_int_int(conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
9759 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9760 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9761 }
9762 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc) !=
9763 conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
9764 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
9765 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
9766 }
9767
9768 conf_free(ssh->conf);
9769 ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
9770 ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
9771
9772 if (rekeying) {
9773 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
9774 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
9775 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
9776 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
9777 }
9778 }
9779 }
9780
9781 /*
9782 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
9783 */
9784 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
9785 {
9786 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9787
9788 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9789 return 0;
9790
9791 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
9792
9793 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
9794 }
9795
9796 /*
9797 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
9798 */
9799 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
9800 {
9801 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9802 int override_value;
9803
9804 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
9805 return 0;
9806
9807 /*
9808 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
9809 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
9810 */
9811 override_value = 0;
9812 if (ssh->throttled_all)
9813 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
9814
9815 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9816 return override_value;
9817 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9818 if (!ssh->mainchan)
9819 return override_value;
9820 else
9821 return (override_value +
9822 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
9823 }
9824
9825 return 0;
9826 }
9827
9828 /*
9829 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
9830 */
9831 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
9832 {
9833 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9834 struct Packet *pktout;
9835
9836 ssh->term_width = width;
9837 ssh->term_height = height;
9838
9839 switch (ssh->state) {
9840 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
9841 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
9842 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
9843 break; /* do nothing */
9844 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
9845 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
9846 break;
9847 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
9848 if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
9849 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9850 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
9851 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
9852 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
9853 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
9854 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9855 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9856 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9857 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
9858 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9859 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
9860 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
9861 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9862 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
9863 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
9864 }
9865 }
9866 break;
9867 }
9868 }
9869
9870 /*
9871 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
9872 * protocol.
9873 */
9874 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
9875 {
9876 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
9877 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
9878 };
9879 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
9880 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
9881 };
9882 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
9883 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
9884 };
9885 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
9886 {NULL, TS_SEP},
9887 {"Break", TS_BRK},
9888 /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
9889 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
9890 * required signals. */
9891 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
9892 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
9893 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
9894 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
9895 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
9896 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
9897 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
9898 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
9899 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
9900 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
9901 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9902 };
9903 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
9904 {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
9905 };
9906 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
9907 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
9908 lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
9909 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
9910 lenof(specials_end)];
9911 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9912 int i = 0;
9913 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
9914 do { \
9915 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
9916 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
9917 i += lenof(name); \
9918 } while(0)
9919
9920 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9921 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
9922 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
9923 * asked anyway. */
9924 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9925 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
9926 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
9927 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
9928 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
9929 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
9930 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
9931 if (ssh->mainchan)
9932 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
9933 } /* else we're not ready yet */
9934
9935 if (i) {
9936 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
9937 return ssh_specials;
9938 } else {
9939 return NULL;
9940 }
9941 #undef ADD_SPECIALS
9942 }
9943
9944 /*
9945 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
9946 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
9947 * hostname sort').
9948 */
9949 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
9950 {
9951 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
9952 struct Packet *pktout;
9953
9954 if (code == TS_EOF) {
9955 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
9956 /*
9957 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
9958 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
9959 */
9960 if (code == TS_EOF)
9961 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
9962 return;
9963 }
9964 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9965 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
9966 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9967 sshfwd_write_eof(ssh->mainchan);
9968 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
9969 }
9970 logevent("Sent EOF message");
9971 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
9972 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9973 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9974 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9975 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
9976 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
9977 } else {
9978 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
9979 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
9980 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
9981 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
9982 }
9983 }
9984 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
9985 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
9986 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
9987 }
9988 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
9989 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
9990 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
9991 if (ssh->version == 1) {
9992 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
9993 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
9994 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
9995 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
9996 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
9997 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
9998 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
9999 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10000 }
10001 } else {
10002 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
10003 char *signame = NULL;
10004 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
10005 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
10006 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
10007 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
10008 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
10009 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
10010 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
10011 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
10012 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
10013 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
10014 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
10015 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
10016 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
10017 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
10018 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
10019 if (signame) {
10020 /* It's a signal. */
10021 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
10022 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
10023 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
10024 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
10025 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
10026 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
10027 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10028 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
10029 }
10030 } else {
10031 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
10032 }
10033 }
10034 }
10035
10036 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
10037 {
10038 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10039 struct ssh_channel *c;
10040 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
10041
10042 c->ssh = ssh;
10043 ssh2_channel_init(c);
10044 c->halfopen = TRUE;
10045 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
10046 c->u.pfd.s = s;
10047 add234(ssh->channels, c);
10048 return c;
10049 }
10050
10051 /*
10052 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
10053 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
10054 */
10055 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
10056 {
10057 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10058 int buflimit;
10059
10060 if (ssh->version == 1) {
10061 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
10062 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
10063 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
10064 }
10065 } else {
10066 if (ssh->mainchan) {
10067 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
10068 bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
10069 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
10070 if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple))
10071 buflimit = 0;
10072 else
10073 buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
10074 if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
10075 ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
10076 ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
10077 }
10078 }
10079 }
10080
10081 /*
10082 * Now process any SSH connection data that was stashed in our
10083 * queue while we were frozen.
10084 */
10085 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
10086 }
10087
10088 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
10089 {
10090 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
10091 Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
10092 struct Packet *pktout;
10093
10094 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
10095
10096 if (ssh->version == 1) {
10097 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
10098 PKT_INT, c->localid,
10099 PKT_STR, hostname,
10100 PKT_INT, port,
10101 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
10102 PKT_END);
10103 } else {
10104 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
10105 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
10106 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
10107 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
10108 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
10109 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
10110 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
10111 /*
10112 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
10113 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
10114 * convinced the server should be told details like that
10115 * about my local network configuration.
10116 * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
10117 * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
10118 * if it doesn't match this syntax.
10119 */
10120 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
10121 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
10122 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
10123 }
10124 }
10125
10126 static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
10127 {
10128 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10129 return ssh->s != NULL;
10130 }
10131
10132 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
10133 {
10134 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10135 return ssh->send_ok;
10136 }
10137
10138 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
10139 {
10140 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10141 if (option == LD_ECHO)
10142 return ssh->echoing;
10143 if (option == LD_EDIT)
10144 return ssh->editing;
10145 return FALSE;
10146 }
10147
10148 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
10149 {
10150 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10151 ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
10152 }
10153
10154 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
10155 {
10156 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10157 ssh->logctx = logctx;
10158 }
10159
10160 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
10161 {
10162 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10163 if (ssh->s != NULL)
10164 return -1;
10165 else
10166 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
10167 }
10168
10169 /*
10170 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
10171 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
10172 */
10173 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
10174 {
10175 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10176 return ssh->version;
10177 }
10178
10179 /*
10180 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
10181 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
10182 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
10183 */
10184 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
10185 {
10186 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
10187 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
10188 }
10189
10190 Backend ssh_backend = {
10191 ssh_init,
10192 ssh_free,
10193 ssh_reconfig,
10194 ssh_send,
10195 ssh_sendbuffer,
10196 ssh_size,
10197 ssh_special,
10198 ssh_get_specials,
10199 ssh_connected,
10200 ssh_return_exitcode,
10201 ssh_sendok,
10202 ssh_ldisc,
10203 ssh_provide_ldisc,
10204 ssh_provide_logctx,
10205 ssh_unthrottle,
10206 ssh_cfg_info,
10207 "ssh",
10208 PROT_SSH,
10209 22
10210 };