RSA key generation routines, and the bignum enhancements required to
[u/mdw/putty] / sshrsag.c
CommitLineData
9400cf6f 1/*
2 * RSA key generation.
3 */
4
5#include "ssh.h"
6
7#define RSA_EXPONENT 37 /* we like this prime */
8
9static void diagbn(char *prefix, Bignum md) {
10 int i, nibbles, morenibbles;
11 static const char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
12
13 printf("%s0x", prefix ? prefix : "");
14
15 nibbles = (3 + ssh1_bignum_bitcount(md))/4; if (nibbles<1) nibbles=1;
16 morenibbles = 4*md[0] - nibbles;
17 for (i=0; i<morenibbles; i++) putchar('-');
18 for (i=nibbles; i-- ;)
19 putchar(hex[(bignum_byte(md, i/2) >> (4*(i%2))) & 0xF]);
20
21 if (prefix) putchar('\n');
22}
23
24int rsa_generate(struct RSAKey *key, struct RSAAux *aux, int bits,
25 progfn_t pfn, void *pfnparam) {
26 Bignum pm1, qm1, phi_n;
27
28 /*
29 * Set up the phase limits for the progress report. We do this
30 * by passing minus the phase number.
31 *
32 * For prime generation: our initial filter finds things
33 * coprime to everything below 2^16. Computing the product of
34 * (p-1)/p for all prime p below 2^16 gives about 20.33; so
35 * among B-bit integers, one in every 20.33 will get through
36 * the initial filter to be a candidate prime.
37 *
38 * Meanwhile, we are searching for primes in the region of 2^B;
39 * since pi(x) ~ x/log(x), when x is in the region of 2^B, the
40 * prime density will be d/dx pi(x) ~ 1/log(B), i.e. about
41 * 1/0.6931B. So the chance of any given candidate being prime
42 * is 20.33/0.6931B, which is roughly 29.34 divided by B.
43 *
44 * So now we have this probability P, we're looking at an
45 * exponential distribution with parameter P: we will manage in
46 * one attempt with probability P, in two with probability
47 * P(1-P), in three with probability P(1-P)^2, etc. The
48 * probability that we have still not managed to find a prime
49 * after N attempts is (1-P)^N.
50 *
51 * We therefore inform the progress indicator of the number B
52 * (29.34/B), so that it knows how much to increment by each
53 * time. We do this in 16-bit fixed point, so 29.34 becomes
54 * 0x1D.57C4.
55 */
56 pfn(pfnparam, -1, -0x1D57C4/(bits/2));
57 pfn(pfnparam, -2, -0x1D57C4/(bits-bits/2));
58 pfn(pfnparam, -3, 5);
59
60 /*
61 * We don't generate e; we just use a standard one always.
62 */
63 key->exponent = bignum_from_short(RSA_EXPONENT);
64 diagbn("e = ",key->exponent);
65
66 /*
67 * Generate p and q: primes with combined length `bits', not
68 * congruent to 1 modulo e. (Strictly speaking, we wanted (p-1)
69 * and e to be coprime, and (q-1) and e to be coprime, but in
70 * general that's slightly more fiddly to arrange. By choosing
71 * a prime e, we can simplify the criterion.)
72 */
73 aux->p = primegen(bits/2, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, 1, pfn, pfnparam);
74 aux->q = primegen(bits - bits/2, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, 2, pfn, pfnparam);
75
76 /*
77 * Ensure p > q, by swapping them if not.
78 */
79 if (bignum_cmp(aux->p, aux->q) < 0) {
80 Bignum t = aux->p;
81 aux->p = aux->q;
82 aux->q = t;
83 }
84
85 /*
86 * Now we have p, q and e. All we need to do now is work out
87 * the other helpful quantities: n=pq, d=e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1),
88 * and (q^-1 mod p).
89 */
90 pfn(pfnparam, 3, 1);
91 key->modulus = bigmul(aux->p, aux->q);
92 pfn(pfnparam, 3, 2);
93 pm1 = copybn(aux->p);
94 decbn(pm1);
95 qm1 = copybn(aux->q);
96 decbn(qm1);
97 phi_n = bigmul(pm1, qm1);
98 pfn(pfnparam, 3, 3);
99 freebn(pm1);
100 freebn(qm1);
101 diagbn("p = ", aux->p);
102 diagbn("q = ", aux->q);
103 diagbn("e = ", key->exponent);
104 diagbn("n = ", key->modulus);
105 diagbn("phi(n) = ", phi_n);
106 key->private_exponent = modinv(key->exponent, phi_n);
107 pfn(pfnparam, 3, 4);
108 diagbn("d = ", key->private_exponent);
109 aux->iqmp = modinv(aux->q, aux->p);
110 pfn(pfnparam, 3, 5);
111 diagbn("iqmp = ", aux->iqmp);
112
113 /*
114 * Clean up temporary numbers.
115 */
116 freebn(phi_n);
117
118 return 1;
119}