math/mpreduce.h: Missing include files.

[u/mdw/catacomb] / README

diff --git a/README b/README
index ccc4987..9cd5a65 100644 (file)
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Catacomb
 
 Catacomb
 

-       
+

        Catacomb is a cryptographic library.  It covers quite a lot of
        Catacomb is a cryptographic library.  It covers quite a lot of

-       the `standard' cryptgraphic primitives, although there's plenty
+       the `standard' cryptographic primitives, although there's plenty

        of scope for improvement, implementing more block ciphers and
        hash functions for example.  It contains a relatively extensive
        multiprecision arithmetic library suitable for implementing a
        of scope for improvement, implementing more block ciphers and
        hash functions for example.  It contains a relatively extensive
        multiprecision arithmetic library suitable for implementing a


@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ Objectives
            interested in covering different sorts of cryptographic
            primitives and operations than in implementing standard
            protocols.  I'm more likely to add support for elliptic
            interested in covering different sorts of cryptographic
            primitives and operations than in implementing standard
            protocols.  I'm more likely to add support for elliptic

-           curve-based public-key cryptography and secret-sharing
-           systems than supporting something like SSL or the PKCS suite
-           of standards.
+           curve-based public-key cryptography and threshold
+           cryptography systems than supporting something like SSL or
+           the PKCS suite of standards.

 
          * Portability.  Almost all of Catacomb assumes nothing more
            than plain old ANSI C, and should therefore work on any
 
          * Portability.  Almost all of Catacomb assumes nothing more
            than plain old ANSI C, and should therefore work on any


@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Licensing, and trust
        hostile implementation can, undetectably, leak bits of your
        private key in each signed message.  This works by carefully
        choosing a supposedly random parameter to the signature
        hostile implementation can, undetectably, leak bits of your
        private key in each signed message.  This works by carefully
        choosing a supposedly random parameter to the signature

-       function. 
+       function.

 
        Once your adversary has acquired a few signed messages, which
        shouldn't be too hard, he can recover either your entire key, or
 
        Once your adversary has acquired a few signed messages, which
        shouldn't be too hard, he can recover either your entire key, or


@@ -186,10 +186,6 @@ Future directions
            management for public-key systems.  This needs a lot of
            thought, however.
 
            management for public-key systems.  This needs a lot of
            thought, however.
 

-         * Secret-sharing systems.  Take a secret, and give n people a
-           `share' in it, so that any k <= n of them can recover the
-           secret, but fewer than k have no hope.
-

          * Arithmetic in finite fields other than the prime-order
            fields constructed by integer multiplication with a prime
            modulus.  Interesting variants of Diffie-Hellman and other
          * Arithmetic in finite fields other than the prime-order
            fields constructed by integer multiplication with a prime
            modulus.  Interesting variants of Diffie-Hellman and other


@@ -202,8 +198,7 @@ Future directions
        people have suggestions then I'll consider them fairly, although
        they shouldn't conflict with my main objectives.
 
        people have suggestions then I'll consider them fairly, although
        they shouldn't conflict with my main objectives.
 

---
-[mdw]
+-- [mdw]

 
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