X-Git-Url: https://git.distorted.org.uk/~mdw/tripe/blobdiff_plain/9a361a98e47bdade7bf107666441f41b4cb67dd9..c70a7c5cedab62209640b76f03d97c1876e38dc6:/server/bulkcrypto.c

diff --git a/server/bulkcrypto.c b/server/bulkcrypto.c
index 26ae9ede..288eed9d 100644
--- a/server/bulkcrypto.c
+++ b/server/bulkcrypto.c
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@
   trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: expected MAC", (pmac), (tagsz));	\
 }) } while (0)
 
+/*----- Common functionality for generic-composition transforms -----------*/
+
 #define CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz) do {					\
   ghash *_h = (h);							\
   const octet *_pmac = (pmac);						\
@@ -64,6 +66,172 @@
   }									\
 } while (0)
 
+typedef struct gencomp_algs {
+  const gccipher *c; size_t cksz;
+  const gcmac *m; size_t mksz; size_t tagsz;
+} gencomp_algs;
+
+typedef struct gencomp_chal {
+  bulkchal _b;
+  gmac *m; size_t tagsz;
+} gencomp_chal;
+
+static int gencomp_getalgs(gencomp_algs *a, const algswitch *asw,
+			   dstr *e, key_file *kf, key *k)
+{
+  const char *p;
+  char *q, *qq;
+  unsigned long n;
+  dstr d = DSTR_INIT;
+  int rc = -1;
+
+  /* --- Symmetric encryption --- */
+
+  if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "cipher")) == 0) p = "blowfish-cbc";
+  if ((a->c = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0) {
+    a_format(e, "unknown-cipher", "%s", p, A_END);
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  /* --- Message authentication --- */
+
+  if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "mac")) != 0) {
+    dstr_reset(&d);
+    dstr_puts(&d, p);
+    if ((q = strchr(d.buf, '/')) != 0)
+      *q++ = 0;
+    if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) {
+      a_format(e, "unknown-mac", "%s", d.buf, A_END);
+      goto done;
+    }
+    if (!q)
+      a->tagsz = a->m->hashsz;
+    else {
+      n = strtoul(q, &qq, 0);
+      if (*qq)  {
+	a_format(e, "bad-tag-length-string", "%s", q, A_END);
+	goto done;
+      }
+      if (n%8 || n/8 > a->m->hashsz) {
+	a_format(e, "bad-tag-length", "%lu", n, A_END);
+	goto done;
+      }
+      a->tagsz = n/8;
+    }
+  } else {
+    dstr_reset(&d);
+    dstr_putf(&d, "%s-hmac", asw->h->name);
+    if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) {
+      a_format(e, "no-hmac-for-hash", "%s", asw->h->name, A_END);
+      goto done;
+    }
+    a->tagsz = asw->h->hashsz/2;
+  }
+
+  rc = 0;
+done:
+  dstr_destroy(&d);
+  return (rc);
+}
+
+#ifndef NTRACE
+static void gencomp_tracealgs(const gencomp_algs *a)
+{
+  trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: cipher = %s", a->c->name);
+  trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: mac = %s/%lu",
+	a->m->name, (unsigned long)a->tagsz * 8);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int gencomp_checkalgs(gencomp_algs *a, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e)
+{
+  /* --- Derive the key sizes --- *
+   *
+   * Must ensure that we have non-empty keys.  This isn't ideal, but it
+   * provides a handy sanity check.  Also must be based on a 64- or 128-bit
+   * block cipher or we can't do the data expiry properly.
+   */
+
+  if ((a->cksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->c->keysz)) == 0) {
+    a_format(e, "cipher", "%s", a->c->name,
+	     "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz,
+	     A_END);
+    return (-1);
+  }
+  if ((a->mksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->m->keysz)) == 0) {
+    a_format(e, "mac", "%s", a->m->name,
+	     "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz,
+	     A_END);
+    return (-1);
+  }
+
+  return (0);
+}
+
+static void gencomp_alginfo(const gencomp_algs *a, admin *adm)
+{
+  a_info(adm,
+	 "cipher=%s", a->c->name,
+	 "cipher-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->cksz,
+	 "cipher-blksz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->c->blksz,
+	 A_END);
+  a_info(adm,
+	 "mac=%s", a->m->name,
+	 "mac-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->mksz,
+	 "mac-tagsz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->tagsz,
+	 A_END);
+}
+
+static int gencomp_samealgsp(const gencomp_algs *a, const gencomp_algs *aa)
+{
+  return (a->c == aa->c &&
+	  a->m == aa->m && a->tagsz == aa->tagsz);
+}
+
+static size_t gencomp_expsz(const gencomp_algs *a)
+  { return (a->c->blksz < 16 ? MEG(64) : MEG(2048)); }
+
+static bulkchal *gencomp_genchal(const gencomp_algs *a)
+{
+  gencomp_chal *gc = CREATE(gencomp_chal);
+
+  rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, buf_t, a->mksz);
+  gc->m = GM_KEY(a->m, buf_t, a->mksz);
+  gc->_b.tagsz = a->tagsz;
+  IF_TRACING(T_CHAL, {
+    trace(T_CHAL, "chal: generated new challenge key");
+    trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "chal: new key", buf_t, a->mksz);
+  })
+  return (&gc->_b);
+}
+
+static int gencomp_chaltag(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz, void *t)
+{
+  gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc;
+  ghash *h = GM_INIT(gc->m);
+
+  GH_HASH(h, m, msz);
+  memcpy(t, GH_DONE(h, 0), bc->tagsz);
+  GH_DESTROY(h);
+  return (0);
+}
+
+static int gencomp_chalvrf(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz,
+			   const void *t)
+{
+  gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc;
+  ghash *h = GM_INIT(gc->m);
+  int ok;
+
+  GH_HASH(h, m, msz);
+  ok = ct_memeq(GH_DONE(h, 0), t, gc->_b.tagsz);
+  GH_DESTROY(h);
+  return (ok ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+static void gencomp_freechal(bulkchal *bc)
+  { gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc; GM_DESTROY(gc->m); DESTROY(gc); }
+
 /*----- The original transform --------------------------------------------*
  *
  * We generate a random initialization vector (if the cipher needs one).  We
@@ -90,22 +258,110 @@
  * ciphertext and extracts the sequence number.
  */
 
-static int v0_check(const algswitch *a, dstr *e)
-  { return (0); }
+typedef struct v0_algs {
+  bulkalgs _b;
+  gencomp_algs ga;
+} v0_algs;
+
+typedef struct v0_ctx {
+  bulkctx _b;
+  size_t tagsz;
+  struct {
+    gcipher *c;
+    gmac *m;
+  } d[NDIR];
+} v0_ctx;
+
+static bulkalgs *v0_getalgs(const algswitch *asw, dstr *e,
+			    key_file *kf, key *k)
+{
+  v0_algs *a = CREATE(v0_algs);
+  if (gencomp_getalgs(&a->ga, asw, e, kf, k)) { DESTROY(a); return (0); }
+  return (&a->_b);
+}
+
+#ifndef NTRACE
+static void v0_tracealgs(const bulkalgs *aa)
+  { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; gencomp_tracealgs(&a->ga); }
+#endif
+
+static int v0_checkalgs(bulkalgs *aa, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e)
+{
+  v0_algs *a = (v0_algs *)aa;
+  if (gencomp_checkalgs(&a->ga, asw, e)) return (-1);
+  return (0);
+}
+
+static int v0_samealgsp(const bulkalgs *aa, const bulkalgs *bb)
+{
+  const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa, *b = (const v0_algs *)bb;
+  return (gencomp_samealgsp(&a->ga, &b->ga));
+}
+
+static void v0_alginfo(const bulkalgs *aa, admin *adm)
+  { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; gencomp_alginfo(&a->ga, adm); }
+
+static size_t v0_overhead(const bulkalgs *aa)
+{
+  const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa;
+  return (a->ga.tagsz + SEQSZ + a->ga.c->blksz);
+}
 
-static size_t v0_overhead(const algswitch *a)
-  { return a->tagsz + SEQSZ + a->c->blksz; }
+static size_t v0_expsz(const bulkalgs *aa)
+  { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; return (gencomp_expsz(&a->ga)); }
 
-static int v0_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
+static bulkctx *v0_genkeys(const bulkalgs *aa, const struct rawkey *rk)
 {
+  const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa;
+  v0_ctx *bc = CREATE(v0_ctx);
+  octet k[MAXHASHSZ];
+  int i;
+
+  bc->tagsz = a->ga.tagsz;
+  for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) {
+    ks_derivekey(k, a->ga.cksz, rk, i, "encryption");
+    bc->d[i].c = GC_INIT(a->ga.c, k, a->ga.cksz);
+    ks_derivekey(k, a->ga.mksz, rk, i, "integrity");
+    bc->d[i].m = GM_KEY(a->ga.m, k, a->ga.mksz);
+  }
+  return (&bc->_b);
+}
+
+static bulkchal *v0_genchal(const bulkalgs *aa)
+{
+  const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa;
+  return (gencomp_genchal(&a->ga));
+}
+#define v0_chaltag gencomp_chaltag
+#define v0_chalvrf gencomp_chalvrf
+#define v0_freechal gencomp_freechal
+
+static void v0_freealgs(bulkalgs *aa)
+  { v0_algs *a = (v0_algs *)aa; DESTROY(a); }
+
+static void v0_freectx(bulkctx *bbc)
+{
+  v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) {
+    GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].c);
+    GM_DESTROY(bc->d[i].m);
+  }
+  DESTROY(bc);
+}
+
+static int v0_encrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty,
+		      buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 seq)
+{
+  v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc;
   ghash *h;
-  gcipher *c = ks->out.c;
+  gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_OUT].c;
   const octet *p = BCUR(b);
   size_t sz = BLEFT(b);
   octet *qmac, *qseq, *qiv, *qpk;
-  uint32 oseq;
   size_t ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz;
-  size_t tagsz = ks->tagsz;
+  size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz;
   octet t[4];
 
   /* --- Determine the ciphertext layout --- */
@@ -123,8 +379,7 @@ static int v0_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
 
   /* --- Store the sequence number --- */
 
-  oseq = ks->oseq++;
-  STORE32(qseq, oseq);
+  STORE32(qseq, seq);
 
   /* --- Establish an initialization vector if necessary --- */
 
@@ -142,7 +397,7 @@ static int v0_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
   /* --- Compute a MAC over type, sequence number, IV, and ciphertext --- */
 
   if (tagsz) {
-    h = GM_INIT(ks->out.m);
+    h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_OUT].m);
     GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t));
     GH_HASH(h, qseq, SEQSZ + ivsz + sz);
     memcpy(qmac, GH_DONE(h, 0), tagsz);
@@ -155,22 +410,24 @@ static int v0_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
   return (0);
 }
 
-static int v0_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
+static int v0_decrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty,
+		      buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
 {
+  v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc;
   const octet *pmac, *piv, *pseq, *ppk;
   size_t psz = BLEFT(b);
   size_t sz;
   octet *q = BCUR(bb);
   ghash *h;
-  gcipher *c = ks->in.c;
+  gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_IN].c;
   size_t ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz;
-  size_t tagsz = ks->tagsz;
+  size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz;
   octet t[4];
 
   /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */
 
   if (psz < ivsz + SEQSZ + tagsz) {
-    T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset %u", ks->seq); )
+    T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset"); )
     return (KSERR_MALFORMED);
   }
   sz = psz - ivsz - SEQSZ - tagsz;
@@ -180,7 +437,7 @@ static int v0_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
   /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */
 
   if (tagsz) {
-    h = GM_INIT(ks->in.m);
+    h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_IN].m);
     GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t));
     GH_HASH(h, pseq, SEQSZ + ivsz + sz);
     CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz);
@@ -229,9 +486,74 @@ static int v0_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
  *		   tagsz     32		sz
  */
 
-static int iiv_check(const algswitch *a, dstr *e)
+typedef struct iiv_algs {
+  bulkalgs _b;
+  gencomp_algs ga;
+  const gccipher *b; size_t bksz;
+} iiv_algs;
+
+typedef struct iiv_ctx {
+  bulkctx _b;
+  size_t tagsz;
+  struct {
+    gcipher *c, *b;
+    gmac *m;
+  } d[NDIR];
+} iiv_ctx;
+
+
+static bulkalgs *iiv_getalgs(const algswitch *asw, dstr *e,
+			    key_file *kf, key *k)
+{
+  iiv_algs *a = CREATE(iiv_algs);
+  dstr d = DSTR_INIT, dd = DSTR_INIT;
+  const char *p;
+  char *q;
+
+  if (gencomp_getalgs(&a->ga, asw, e, kf, k)) goto fail;
+
+  if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "blkc")) == 0) {
+    dstr_puts(&dd, a->ga.c->name);
+    if ((q = strrchr(dd.buf, '-')) != 0) *q = 0;
+    p = dd.buf;
+  }
+  dstr_putf(&d, "%s-ecb", p);
+  if ((a->b = gcipher_byname(d.buf)) == 0) {
+    a_format(e, "unknown-blkc", "%s", p, A_END);
+    goto fail;
+  }
+
+  dstr_destroy(&d); dstr_destroy(&dd);
+  return (&a->_b);
+fail:
+  dstr_destroy(&d); dstr_destroy(&dd);
+  DESTROY(a);
+  return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef NTRACE
+static void iiv_tracealgs(const bulkalgs *aa)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa;
+
+  gencomp_tracealgs(&a->ga);
+  trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: blkc = %.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int iiv_checkalgs(bulkalgs *aa, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e)
 {
-  if (a->b->blksz < a->c->blksz) {
+  iiv_algs *a = (iiv_algs *)aa;
+
+  if (gencomp_checkalgs(&a->ga, asw, e)) return (-1);
+
+  if ((a->bksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->b->keysz)) == 0) {
+    a_format(e, "blkc", "%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name,
+	     "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz,
+	     A_END);
+    return (-1);
+  }
+  if (a->b->blksz < a->ga.c->blksz) {
     a_format(e, "blkc", "%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name,
 	     "blksz-insufficient", A_END);
     return (-1);
@@ -239,23 +561,91 @@ static int iiv_check(const algswitch *a, dstr *e)
   return (0);
 }
 
-static size_t iiv_overhead(const algswitch *a)
-  { return a->tagsz + SEQSZ; }
+static int iiv_samealgsp(const bulkalgs *aa, const bulkalgs *bb)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa, *b = (const iiv_algs *)bb;
+  return (gencomp_samealgsp(&a->ga, &b->ga) && a->b == b->b);
+}
+
+static void iiv_alginfo(const bulkalgs *aa, admin *adm)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa;
+  gencomp_alginfo(&a->ga, adm);
+  a_info(adm,
+	 "blkc=%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name,
+	 "blkc-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->bksz,
+	 "blkc-blksz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->b->blksz,
+	 A_END);
+}
+
+static size_t iiv_overhead(const bulkalgs *aa)
+  { const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; return (a->ga.tagsz + SEQSZ); }
+
+static size_t iiv_expsz(const bulkalgs *aa)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa;
+  return (gencomp_expsz(&a->ga));
+}
+
+static bulkctx *iiv_genkeys(const bulkalgs *aa, const struct rawkey *rk)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa;
+  iiv_ctx *bc = CREATE(iiv_ctx);
+  octet k[MAXHASHSZ];
+  int i;
+
+  bc->tagsz = a->ga.tagsz;
+  for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) {
+    ks_derivekey(k, a->ga.cksz, rk, i, "encryption");
+    bc->d[i].c = GC_INIT(a->ga.c, k, a->ga.cksz);
+    ks_derivekey(k, a->bksz, rk, i, "blkc");
+    bc->d[i].b = GC_INIT(a->b, k, a->bksz);
+    ks_derivekey(k, a->ga.mksz, rk, i, "integrity");
+    bc->d[i].m = GM_KEY(a->ga.m, k, a->ga.mksz);
+  }
+  return (&bc->_b);
+}
+
+static bulkchal *iiv_genchal(const bulkalgs *aa)
+{
+  const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa;
+  return (gencomp_genchal(&a->ga));
+}
+#define iiv_chaltag gencomp_chaltag
+#define iiv_chalvrf gencomp_chalvrf
+#define iiv_freechal gencomp_freechal
+
+static void iiv_freealgs(bulkalgs *aa)
+  { iiv_algs *a = (iiv_algs *)aa; DESTROY(a); }
+
+static void iiv_freectx(bulkctx *bbc)
+{
+  iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) {
+    GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].c);
+    GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].b);
+    GM_DESTROY(bc->d[i].m);
+  }
+  DESTROY(bc);
+}
 
 #define TRACE_PRESEQ(qseq, ivsz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, {		\
   trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: IV derivation input", (qseq), (ivsz));	\
 }) } while (0)
 
-static int iiv_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
+static int iiv_encrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty,
+		       buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 seq)
 {
+  iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc;
   ghash *h;
-  gcipher *c = ks->out.c, *blkc = ks->out.b;
+  gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_OUT].c, *blkc = bc->d[DIR_OUT].b;
   const octet *p = BCUR(b);
   size_t sz = BLEFT(b);
   octet *qmac, *qseq, *qpk;
-  uint32 oseq;
   size_t ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz, blkcsz = GC_CLASS(blkc)->blksz;
-  size_t tagsz = ks->tagsz;
+  size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz;
   octet t[4];
 
   /* --- Determine the ciphertext layout --- */
@@ -273,8 +663,7 @@ static int iiv_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
 
   /* --- Store the sequence number --- */
 
-  oseq = ks->oseq++;
-  STORE32(qseq, oseq);
+  STORE32(qseq, seq);
 
   /* --- Establish an initialization vector if necessary --- */
 
@@ -295,7 +684,7 @@ static int iiv_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
   /* --- Compute a MAC over type, sequence number, and ciphertext --- */
 
   if (tagsz) {
-    h = GM_INIT(ks->out.m);
+    h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_OUT].m);
     GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t));
     GH_HASH(h, qseq, SEQSZ + sz);
     memcpy(qmac, GH_DONE(h, 0), tagsz);
@@ -308,22 +697,24 @@ static int iiv_encrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb)
   return (0);
 }
 
-static int iiv_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
+static int iiv_decrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty,
+		       buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
 {
+  iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc;
   const octet *pmac, *pseq, *ppk;
   size_t psz = BLEFT(b);
   size_t sz;
   octet *q = BCUR(bb);
   ghash *h;
-  gcipher *c = ks->in.c, *blkc = ks->in.b;
+  gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_IN].c, *blkc = bc->d[DIR_IN].b;
   size_t ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz, blkcsz = GC_CLASS(blkc)->blksz;
-  size_t tagsz = ks->tagsz;
+  size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz;
   octet t[4];
 
   /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */
 
   if (psz < SEQSZ + tagsz) {
-    T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset %u", ks->seq); )
+    T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset"); )
     return (KSERR_MALFORMED);
   }
   sz = psz - SEQSZ - tagsz;
@@ -333,7 +724,7 @@ static int iiv_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
   /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */
 
   if (tagsz) {
-    h = GM_INIT(ks->in.m);
+    h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_IN].m);
     GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t));
     GH_HASH(h, pseq, SEQSZ + sz);
     CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz);
@@ -362,11 +753,18 @@ static int iiv_decrypt(keyset *ks, unsigned ty, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq)
 
 const bulkops bulktab[] = {
 
-#define BULK(name, pre, prim)						\
-  { name, prim, pre##_check, pre##_overhead, pre##_encrypt, pre##_decrypt }
+#define COMMA ,
+
+#define BULK(name, pre)							\
+  { name, pre##_getalgs, T( pre##_tracealgs COMMA )			\
+    pre##_checkalgs, pre##_samealgsp,					\
+    pre##_alginfo, pre##_overhead, pre##_expsz,				\
+    pre##_genkeys, pre##_genchal, pre##_freealgs,			\
+    pre##_encrypt, pre##_decrypt, pre##_freectx,			\
+    pre##_chaltag, pre##_chalvrf, pre##_freechal }
 
-  BULK("v0", v0, BCP_CIPHER | BCP_MAC),
-  BULK("iiv", iiv, BCP_CIPHER | BCP_MAC | BCP_BLKC),
+  BULK("v0", v0),
+  BULK("iiv", iiv),
 
 #undef BULK
   { 0 }