| 1 | /* -*-c-*- |
| 2 | * |
| 3 | * $Id: keyset.c,v 1.5 2001/06/19 22:07:43 mdw Exp $ |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Handling of symmetric keysets |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * (c) 2001 Straylight/Edgeware |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | /*----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------* |
| 11 | * |
| 12 | * This file is part of Trivial IP Encryption (TrIPE). |
| 13 | * |
| 14 | * TrIPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| 15 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
| 16 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
| 17 | * (at your option) any later version. |
| 18 | * |
| 19 | * TrIPE is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| 20 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 21 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| 22 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
| 23 | * |
| 24 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
| 25 | * along with TrIPE; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
| 26 | * Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. |
| 27 | */ |
| 28 | |
| 29 | /*----- Revision history --------------------------------------------------* |
| 30 | * |
| 31 | * $Log: keyset.c,v $ |
| 32 | * Revision 1.5 2001/06/19 22:07:43 mdw |
| 33 | * Change the encrypted packet format to be non-malleable. |
| 34 | * |
| 35 | * Revision 1.4 2001/06/16 14:06:40 mdw |
| 36 | * Quantify collision probabilities for the stated data volume bounds. |
| 37 | * |
| 38 | * Revision 1.3 2001/02/16 21:39:55 mdw |
| 39 | * Major overhaul. Separate functions for manipulating keysets from |
| 40 | * functions for manipulating keyset lists. Introduce a concept of |
| 41 | * listening-only keys. |
| 42 | * |
| 43 | * Revision 1.2 2001/02/05 19:53:23 mdw |
| 44 | * Add sequence number protection. |
| 45 | * |
| 46 | * Revision 1.1 2001/02/03 20:26:37 mdw |
| 47 | * Initial checkin. |
| 48 | * |
| 49 | */ |
| 50 | |
| 51 | /*----- Header files ------------------------------------------------------*/ |
| 52 | |
| 53 | #include "tripe.h" |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /*----- Tunable parameters ------------------------------------------------*/ |
| 56 | |
| 57 | /* --- Note on size limits --- * |
| 58 | * |
| 59 | * For a 64-bit block cipher (e.g., Blowfish), the probability of a collision |
| 60 | * occurring after 32 MB is less than %$2^{-21}$%, and the probability of a |
| 61 | * collision occurring after 64 MB is less than %$2^{-19}$%. |
| 62 | */ |
| 63 | |
| 64 | #define T_EXP MIN(60) /* Expiry time for a key */ |
| 65 | #define T_REGEN MIN(45) /* Regeneration time for a key */ |
| 66 | #define SZ_EXP MEG(64) /* Expiry data size for a key */ |
| 67 | #define SZ_REGEN MEG(32) /* Data size threshold for regen */ |
| 68 | |
| 69 | /*----- Handy macros ------------------------------------------------------*/ |
| 70 | |
| 71 | #define KEYOK(ks, now) ((ks)->sz_exp > 0 && (ks)->t_exp > now) |
| 72 | |
| 73 | /*----- Low-level packet encryption and decryption ------------------------*/ |
| 74 | |
| 75 | /* --- Encrypted data format --- * |
| 76 | * |
| 77 | * Let %$p_i$% be the %$i$%-th plaintext message. We first compute |
| 78 | * |
| 79 | * %$c_i = \mathcal{E}\textrm{-CBC}_{K_{\text{E}}}(p_i)$% |
| 80 | * |
| 81 | * as the CBC-ciphertext of %$p_i$%, and then |
| 82 | * |
| 83 | * %$\sigma_i = \mathcal{T}_{K_{\text{M}}}(i, c_i)$% |
| 84 | * |
| 85 | * as a MAC on the %%\emph{ciphertext}%%. The message sent is then the pair |
| 86 | * %$(\sigma_i, c_i)$%. This construction is provably secure in the NM-CCA |
| 87 | * sense (assuming that the cipher is IND-CPA, and the MAC is SUF-CMA) |
| 88 | * [Bellare and Namprempre]. |
| 89 | * |
| 90 | * This also ensures that, assuming the key is good, we have a secure channel |
| 91 | * [Krawczyk]. Actually, [Krawczyk] shows that, if the cipher is either a |
| 92 | * simple stream cipher or a block cipher in CBC mode, we can use the MAC- |
| 93 | * then-encrypt scheme and still have a secure channel. However, I like the |
| 94 | * NM-CCA guarantee from [Bellare and Namprempre]. I'm less worried about |
| 95 | * the Horton Principle [Wagner and Schneier]. |
| 96 | */ |
| 97 | |
| 98 | /* --- @doencrypt@ --- * |
| 99 | * |
| 100 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use |
| 101 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
| 102 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer |
| 103 | * |
| 104 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if a new key is required. |
| 105 | * |
| 106 | * Use: Encrypts a message with the given key. We assume that the |
| 107 | * keyset is OK to use. |
| 108 | */ |
| 109 | |
| 110 | static int doencrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb) |
| 111 | { |
| 112 | ghash *h; |
| 113 | gcipher *c; |
| 114 | const octet *p = BCUR(b); |
| 115 | size_t sz = BLEFT(b); |
| 116 | octet *qmac, *qseq, *qiv, *qpk; |
| 117 | uint32 oseq; |
| 118 | size_t osz, nsz; |
| 119 | int rc = 0; |
| 120 | |
| 121 | /* --- Allocate the required buffer space --- */ |
| 122 | |
| 123 | c = ks->cout; |
| 124 | if (buf_ensure(bb, MACSZ + SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz)) |
| 125 | return (0); /* Caution! */ |
| 126 | qmac = BCUR(bb); qseq = qmac + MACSZ; qiv = qseq + SEQSZ; qpk = qiv + IVSZ; |
| 127 | BSTEP(bb, MACSZ + SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz); |
| 128 | |
| 129 | /* --- Encrypt the packet --- */ |
| 130 | |
| 131 | oseq = ks->oseq++; STORE32(qseq, oseq); |
| 132 | rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, qiv, IVSZ); |
| 133 | c->ops->setiv(c, qiv); |
| 134 | c->ops->encrypt(c, p, qpk, sz); |
| 135 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
| 136 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: encrypting packet %lu using keyset %u", |
| 137 | (unsigned long)oseq, ks->seq); |
| 138 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: encrypted packet", qpk, sz); |
| 139 | }) |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /* --- Now compute the MAC --- */ |
| 142 | |
| 143 | h = ks->mout->ops->init(ks->mout); |
| 144 | h->ops->hash(h, qseq, SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz); |
| 145 | memcpy(qmac, h->ops->done(h, 0), MACSZ); |
| 146 | h->ops->destroy(h); |
| 147 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
| 148 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed MAC", qmac, MACSZ); |
| 149 | }) |
| 150 | |
| 151 | /* --- Deduct the packet size from the key's data life --- */ |
| 152 | |
| 153 | osz = ks->sz_exp; |
| 154 | if (osz > sz) |
| 155 | nsz = osz - sz; |
| 156 | else |
| 157 | nsz = 0; |
| 158 | if (osz >= SZ_REGEN && nsz < SZ_REGEN) { |
| 159 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: keyset %u data regen limit exceeded -- " |
| 160 | "forcing exchange", ks->seq); ) |
| 161 | rc = -1; |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | ks->sz_exp = nsz; |
| 164 | return (rc); |
| 165 | } |
| 166 | |
| 167 | /* --- @dodecrypt@ --- * |
| 168 | * |
| 169 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to keyset to use |
| 170 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
| 171 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer |
| 172 | * @uint32 *seq@ = where to store the sequence number |
| 173 | * |
| 174 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if it failed. |
| 175 | * |
| 176 | * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message with the given key. No other |
| 177 | * checking (e.g., sequence number checks) is performed. We |
| 178 | * assume that the keyset is OK to use, and that there is |
| 179 | * sufficient output buffer space reserved. If the decryption |
| 180 | * is successful, the buffer pointer is moved past the decrypted |
| 181 | * packet, and the packet's sequence number is stored in @*seq@. |
| 182 | */ |
| 183 | |
| 184 | static int dodecrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq) |
| 185 | { |
| 186 | const octet *pmac, *piv, *pseq, *ppk; |
| 187 | size_t psz = BLEFT(b); |
| 188 | size_t sz; |
| 189 | octet *q = BCUR(bb); |
| 190 | ghash *h; |
| 191 | gcipher *c = ks->cin; |
| 192 | size_t ivsz = c->ops->c->blksz; |
| 193 | octet *mac; |
| 194 | int eq; |
| 195 | |
| 196 | /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */ |
| 197 | |
| 198 | if (psz < ivsz + 4) { |
| 199 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset %u", ks->seq); ) |
| 200 | return (-1); |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | sz = psz - IVSZ - SEQSZ - MACSZ; |
| 203 | pmac = BCUR(b); pseq = pmac + MACSZ; piv = pseq + SEQSZ; ppk = piv + IVSZ; |
| 204 | |
| 205 | /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */ |
| 206 | |
| 207 | h = ks->min->ops->init(ks->min); |
| 208 | h->ops->hash(h, pseq, SEQSZ + IVSZ + sz); |
| 209 | mac = h->ops->done(h, 0); |
| 210 | eq = !memcmp(mac, pmac, MACSZ); |
| 211 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
| 212 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decrypting using keyset %u", ks->seq); |
| 213 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed MAC", mac, MACSZ); |
| 214 | }) |
| 215 | h->ops->destroy(h); |
| 216 | if (!eq) { |
| 217 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
| 218 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decryption failed"); |
| 219 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: expected MAC", pmac, MACSZ); |
| 220 | }) |
| 221 | return (-1); |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | |
| 224 | /* --- Decrypt the packet --- */ |
| 225 | |
| 226 | c->ops->setiv(c, piv); |
| 227 | c->ops->decrypt(c, ppk, q, sz); |
| 228 | if (seq) |
| 229 | *seq = LOAD32(pseq); |
| 230 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { |
| 231 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: decrypted OK (sequence = %lu)", |
| 232 | (unsigned long)LOAD32(pseq)); |
| 233 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: decrypted packet", q, sz); |
| 234 | }) |
| 235 | BSTEP(bb, sz); |
| 236 | return (0); |
| 237 | } |
| 238 | |
| 239 | /* --- @dosequence@ --- * |
| 240 | * |
| 241 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 242 | * @uint32 seq@ = a sequence number from a packet |
| 243 | * |
| 244 | * Returns: Zero if the sequence number is OK, nonzero if it's not. |
| 245 | * |
| 246 | * Use: Checks a sequence number. The data in the keyset which keeps |
| 247 | * track of valid sequence numbers is updated if the sequence |
| 248 | * number given is good. It's assumed that the sequence number |
| 249 | * has already been checked for authenticity. |
| 250 | */ |
| 251 | |
| 252 | static int dosequence(keyset *ks, uint32 seq) |
| 253 | { |
| 254 | uint32 seqbit; |
| 255 | uint32 n; |
| 256 | |
| 257 | if (seq < ks->iseq) { |
| 258 | a_warn("received packet has old sequence number (possible replay)"); |
| 259 | return (-1); |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | if (seq >= ks->iseq + KS_SEQWINSZ) { |
| 262 | n = seq - (ks->iseq + KS_SEQWINSZ - 1); |
| 263 | if (n < KS_SEQWINSZ) |
| 264 | ks->iwin >>= n; |
| 265 | else |
| 266 | ks->iwin = 0; |
| 267 | ks->iseq += n; |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | seqbit = 1 << (seq - ks->iseq); |
| 270 | if (ks->iwin & seqbit) { |
| 271 | a_warn("received packet repeats old sequence number"); |
| 272 | return (-1); |
| 273 | } |
| 274 | ks->iwin |= seqbit; |
| 275 | return (0); |
| 276 | } |
| 277 | |
| 278 | /*----- Operations on a single keyset -------------------------------------*/ |
| 279 | |
| 280 | /* --- @ks_drop@ --- * |
| 281 | * |
| 282 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 283 | * |
| 284 | * Returns: --- |
| 285 | * |
| 286 | * Use: Decrements a keyset's reference counter. If the counter hits |
| 287 | * zero, the keyset is freed. |
| 288 | */ |
| 289 | |
| 290 | void ks_drop(keyset *ks) |
| 291 | { |
| 292 | if (--ks->ref) |
| 293 | return; |
| 294 | ks->cin->ops->destroy(ks->cin); |
| 295 | ks->cout->ops->destroy(ks->cout); |
| 296 | ks->min->ops->destroy(ks->min); |
| 297 | ks->mout->ops->destroy(ks->mout); |
| 298 | DESTROY(ks); |
| 299 | } |
| 300 | |
| 301 | /* --- @ks_gen@ --- * |
| 302 | * |
| 303 | * Arguments: @const void *k@ = pointer to key material |
| 304 | * @size_t x, y, z@ = offsets into key material (see below) |
| 305 | * |
| 306 | * Returns: A pointer to the new keyset. |
| 307 | * |
| 308 | * Use: Derives a new keyset from the given key material. The |
| 309 | * offsets @x@, @y@ and @z@ separate the key material into three |
| 310 | * parts. Between the @k@ and @k + x@ is `my' contribution to |
| 311 | * the key material; between @k + x@ and @k + y@ is `your' |
| 312 | * contribution; and between @k + y@ and @k + z@ is a shared |
| 313 | * value we made together. These are used to construct two |
| 314 | * pairs of symmetric keys. Each pair consists of an encryption |
| 315 | * key and a message authentication key. One pair is used for |
| 316 | * outgoing messages, the other for incoming messages. |
| 317 | * |
| 318 | * The new key is marked so that it won't be selected for output |
| 319 | * by @ksl_encrypt@. You can still encrypt data with it by |
| 320 | * calling @ks_encrypt@ directly. |
| 321 | */ |
| 322 | |
| 323 | keyset *ks_gen(const void *k, size_t x, size_t y, size_t z) |
| 324 | { |
| 325 | HASH_CTX h; |
| 326 | octet buf[HASHSZ]; |
| 327 | keyset *ks = CREATE(keyset); |
| 328 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 329 | const octet *p = k; |
| 330 | T( static unsigned seq = 0; ) |
| 331 | |
| 332 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: adding new keyset %u", seq); ) |
| 333 | |
| 334 | /* --- Construct the various keys --- * |
| 335 | * |
| 336 | * This is done with macros, because it's quite tedious. |
| 337 | */ |
| 338 | |
| 339 | #define MINE HASH(&h, p, x) |
| 340 | #define YOURS HASH(&h, p + x, y - x) |
| 341 | #define OURS HASH(&h, p + y, z - y) |
| 342 | |
| 343 | #define IN MINE; YOURS; OURS |
| 344 | #define OUT YOURS; MINE; OURS |
| 345 | #define STR_IN "incoming" |
| 346 | #define STR_OUT "outgoing" |
| 347 | |
| 348 | #define GETHASH(str, dir) do { \ |
| 349 | HASH_INIT(&h); \ |
| 350 | HASH_STRING(&h, "tripe-" str); \ |
| 351 | dir; \ |
| 352 | HASH_DONE(&h, buf); \ |
| 353 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ |
| 354 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: " STR_##dir " key " str, \ |
| 355 | buf, sizeof(buf)); \ |
| 356 | }) \ |
| 357 | } while (0) |
| 358 | |
| 359 | GETHASH("encryption", IN); ks->cin = CIPHER->init(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 360 | GETHASH("integrity", IN); ks->min = MAC->key(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 361 | GETHASH("encryption", OUT); ks->cout = CIPHER->init(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 362 | GETHASH("integrity", OUT); ks->mout = MAC->key(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 363 | |
| 364 | #undef MINE |
| 365 | #undef YOURS |
| 366 | #undef OURS |
| 367 | #undef IN |
| 368 | #undef OUT |
| 369 | #undef STR_IN |
| 370 | #undef STR_OUT |
| 371 | #undef GETHASH |
| 372 | |
| 373 | T( ks->seq = seq++; ) |
| 374 | ks->t_exp = now + T_EXP; |
| 375 | ks->sz_exp = SZ_EXP; |
| 376 | ks->oseq = ks->iseq = 0; |
| 377 | ks->iwin = 0; |
| 378 | ks->next = 0; |
| 379 | ks->f = KSF_LISTEN; |
| 380 | BURN(buf); |
| 381 | return (ks); |
| 382 | } |
| 383 | |
| 384 | /* --- @ks_tregen@ --- * |
| 385 | * |
| 386 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 387 | * |
| 388 | * Returns: The time at which moves ought to be made to replace this key. |
| 389 | */ |
| 390 | |
| 391 | time_t ks_tregen(keyset *ks) { return (ks->t_exp - T_EXP + T_REGEN); } |
| 392 | |
| 393 | /* --- @ks_activate@ --- * |
| 394 | * |
| 395 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 396 | * |
| 397 | * Returns: --- |
| 398 | * |
| 399 | * Use: Activates a keyset, so that it can be used for encrypting |
| 400 | * outgoing messages. |
| 401 | */ |
| 402 | |
| 403 | void ks_activate(keyset *ks) |
| 404 | { |
| 405 | if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) { |
| 406 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: activating keyset %u", ks->seq); ) |
| 407 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN; |
| 408 | } |
| 409 | } |
| 410 | |
| 411 | /* --- @ks_encrypt@ --- * |
| 412 | * |
| 413 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 414 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
| 415 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer |
| 416 | * |
| 417 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the key needs replacing. If the |
| 418 | * encryption failed, the output buffer is broken and zero is |
| 419 | * returned. |
| 420 | * |
| 421 | * Use: Encrypts a block of data using the key. Note that the `key |
| 422 | * ought to be replaced' notification is only ever given once |
| 423 | * for each key. Also note that this call forces a keyset to be |
| 424 | * used even if it's marked as not for data output. |
| 425 | */ |
| 426 | |
| 427 | int ks_encrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb) |
| 428 | { |
| 429 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 430 | |
| 431 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) { |
| 432 | buf_break(bb); |
| 433 | return (0); |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | return (doencrypt(ks, b, bb)); |
| 436 | } |
| 437 | |
| 438 | /* --- @ks_decrypt@ --- * |
| 439 | * |
| 440 | * Arguments: @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 441 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to an input buffer |
| 442 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to an output buffer |
| 443 | * |
| 444 | * Returns: Zero on success, or nonzero if there was some problem. |
| 445 | * |
| 446 | * Use: Attempts to decrypt a message using a given key. Note that |
| 447 | * requesting decryption with a key directly won't clear a |
| 448 | * marking that it's not for encryption. |
| 449 | */ |
| 450 | |
| 451 | int ks_decrypt(keyset *ks, buf *b, buf *bb) |
| 452 | { |
| 453 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 454 | uint32 seq; |
| 455 | |
| 456 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now) || |
| 457 | buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b)) || |
| 458 | dodecrypt(ks, b, bb, &seq) || |
| 459 | dosequence(ks, seq)) |
| 460 | return (-1); |
| 461 | return (0); |
| 462 | } |
| 463 | |
| 464 | /*----- Keyset list handling ----------------------------------------------*/ |
| 465 | |
| 466 | /* --- @ksl_free@ --- * |
| 467 | * |
| 468 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
| 469 | * |
| 470 | * Returns: --- |
| 471 | * |
| 472 | * Use: Frees (releases references to) all of the keys in a keyset. |
| 473 | */ |
| 474 | |
| 475 | void ksl_free(keyset **ksroot) |
| 476 | { |
| 477 | keyset *ks, *ksn; |
| 478 | for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ksn) { |
| 479 | ksn = ks->next; |
| 480 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK; |
| 481 | ks_drop(ks); |
| 482 | } |
| 483 | } |
| 484 | |
| 485 | /* --- @ksl_link@ --- * |
| 486 | * |
| 487 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
| 488 | * @keyset *ks@ = pointer to a keyset |
| 489 | * |
| 490 | * Returns: --- |
| 491 | * |
| 492 | * Use: Links a keyset into a list. A keyset can only be on one list |
| 493 | * at a time. Bad things happen otherwise. |
| 494 | */ |
| 495 | |
| 496 | void ksl_link(keyset **ksroot, keyset *ks) |
| 497 | { |
| 498 | assert(!(ks->f & KSF_LINK)); |
| 499 | ks->next = *ksroot; |
| 500 | *ksroot = ks; |
| 501 | ks->f |= KSF_LINK; |
| 502 | ks->ref++; |
| 503 | } |
| 504 | |
| 505 | /* --- @ksl_prune@ --- * |
| 506 | * |
| 507 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
| 508 | * |
| 509 | * Returns: --- |
| 510 | * |
| 511 | * Use: Prunes the keyset list by removing keys which mustn't be used |
| 512 | * any more. |
| 513 | */ |
| 514 | |
| 515 | void ksl_prune(keyset **ksroot) |
| 516 | { |
| 517 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 518 | |
| 519 | while (*ksroot) { |
| 520 | keyset *ks = *ksroot; |
| 521 | |
| 522 | if (ks->t_exp <= now) { |
| 523 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (time limit reached)", |
| 524 | ks->seq); ) |
| 525 | goto kill; |
| 526 | } else if (ks->sz_exp == 0) { |
| 527 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: expiring keyset %u (data limit reached)", |
| 528 | ks->seq); ) |
| 529 | goto kill; |
| 530 | } else { |
| 531 | ksroot = &ks->next; |
| 532 | continue; |
| 533 | } |
| 534 | |
| 535 | kill: |
| 536 | *ksroot = ks->next; |
| 537 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LINK; |
| 538 | ks_drop(ks); |
| 539 | } |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | |
| 542 | /* --- @ksl_encrypt@ --- * |
| 543 | * |
| 544 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
| 545 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
| 546 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer |
| 547 | * |
| 548 | * Returns: Nonzero if a new key is needed. |
| 549 | * |
| 550 | * Use: Encrypts a packet. |
| 551 | */ |
| 552 | |
| 553 | int ksl_encrypt(keyset **ksroot, buf *b, buf *bb) |
| 554 | { |
| 555 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 556 | keyset *ks = *ksroot; |
| 557 | |
| 558 | for (;;) { |
| 559 | if (!ks) { |
| 560 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no suitable keysets found"); ) |
| 561 | buf_break(bb); |
| 562 | return (-1); |
| 563 | } |
| 564 | if (KEYOK(ks, now) && !(ks->f & KSF_LISTEN)) |
| 565 | break; |
| 566 | ks = ks->next; |
| 567 | } |
| 568 | |
| 569 | return (doencrypt(ks, b, bb)); |
| 570 | } |
| 571 | |
| 572 | /* --- @ksl_decrypt@ --- * |
| 573 | * |
| 574 | * Arguments: @keyset **ksroot@ = pointer to keyset list head |
| 575 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to input buffer |
| 576 | * @buf *bb@ = pointer to output buffer |
| 577 | * |
| 578 | * Returns: Nonzero if the packet couldn't be decrypted. |
| 579 | * |
| 580 | * Use: Decrypts a packet. |
| 581 | */ |
| 582 | |
| 583 | int ksl_decrypt(keyset **ksroot, buf *b, buf *bb) |
| 584 | { |
| 585 | time_t now = time(0); |
| 586 | keyset *ks; |
| 587 | uint32 seq; |
| 588 | |
| 589 | if (buf_ensure(bb, BLEN(b))) |
| 590 | return (-1); |
| 591 | |
| 592 | for (ks = *ksroot; ks; ks = ks->next) { |
| 593 | if (!KEYOK(ks, now)) |
| 594 | continue; |
| 595 | if (!dodecrypt(ks, b, bb, &seq)) { |
| 596 | if (ks->f & KSF_LISTEN) { |
| 597 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: implicitly activating keyset %u", |
| 598 | ks->seq); ) |
| 599 | ks->f &= ~KSF_LISTEN; |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | return (dosequence(ks, seq)); |
| 602 | } |
| 603 | } |
| 604 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: no matching keys"); ) |
| 605 | return (-1); |
| 606 | } |
| 607 | |
| 608 | /*----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------*/ |