[exim-config] / base.m4

### -*-m4-*-
###
### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
###
### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
###

###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
###
### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
### (at your option) any later version.
###
### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
### GNU General Public License for more details.
###
### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.

###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Global settings.

SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
prod_requires_admin = false

SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
log_file_path = : syslog
log_selector = \
	+smtp_confirmation \
	+tls_peerdn
log_timezone = true
syslog_duplication = false
syslog_timestamp = false

SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::

SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
deliver_queue_load_max = 8
queue_only_load = 12
smtp_accept_max = 16
smtp_accept_queue = 32
smtp_accept_reserve = 4
smtp_load_reserve = 10
smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted

SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
host_lookup = *

SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
gecos_name = $1
gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)

SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
received_header_text = Received: \
	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
	     {from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
	     {${if def:sender_ident \
		   {from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
	by $primary_hostname \
	(Exim $version_number)\
	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
	${if def:received_protocol \
	     {with $received_protocol \
	      ${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
	${if def:sender_address \
	     {(envelope-from $sender_address\
	      ${if def:authenticated_id \
		   {; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	id $message_exim_id\
	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}

SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
smtp_return_error_details = true
accept_8bitmime = true

SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
headers_charset = utf-8
qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain

SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d

SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.cert
tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
			       {match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
			   {CONF_good_ciphers} \
			   {CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Access control lists.

SECTION(global, acl-after)
SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_helo = helo
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
helo:
	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	## it's too blunt a tool.  Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	warn	 set acl_c_helo_warning = false
		!condition = \
			${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
					    {<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
				  {match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
						{localhost : +thishost}}}}
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
				       partial0-lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
				       {${if match_ip \
					     {$sender_host_address} \
					     {$value}}}}}}
		!verify = helo
		 set acl_c_helo_warning = true

	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
not_smtp_start:
	## Record the user's name.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_mail = mail
SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
mail:

	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	## add it now.
	warn	 condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
		 add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
			BADHELO \
			Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
			helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
			address=$sender_host_address

	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	accept	 senders = :

	## Ensure that the sender is routable.  This is important to prevent
	## undeliverable bounces.
	require	 message = Invalid sender; \
			($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = sender

	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	warn	 condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 control = submission

	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	deny	 message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
		!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 hosts = +allnets
		!encrypted = *

	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	require	 acl = mail_check_auth

SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	## And we're done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_connect = connect
SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
connect:
SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
	warn	 acl = check_submission

	## Done.
	accept

check_submission:
	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
	accept	!hosts = +thishost
		!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
		 set acl_c_mode = relay

	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	warn	 set acl_c_mode = submission

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
rcpt:

	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	## isn't in one of our known domains.
	deny	 message = Relaying not permitted
		!hosts = CONF_relay_clients
		!authenticated = *
		!domains = +known

	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	require	 message = Invalid recipient \
			($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = recipient

SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_data = data
SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
data:

SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
SECTION(acl)m4_dnl
expn_vrfy:
	accept	 hosts = +trusted
	deny	 message = Suck it and see

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Verification of sender address.

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
mail_check_auth:

	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	accept	 condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}

	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	## answer.  So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
		 hosts = +thishost
		!authenticated = *
		 condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
		 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## User must be authenticated by now.
	deny	 message = Sender not authenticated
		 condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}

	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	## is allowed to claim.
	deny	 message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
				       lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
				       {${if match_address \
					     {$sender_address} \
					     {+value}}} \
				       {false}}}}
		!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$acl_c_user} \
					    {+dom_users}} \
					  {match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+dom_locals}}}}},
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+user_extaddr}} \
					  {or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
						   {}} \
					       {match_domain \
						 {$sender_address_domain} \
						 {+public}}}}}}})}

	## All done.
	accept

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Common options for forwarding routers.

## We're pretty permissive here.
m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	<:driver = redirect
	modemask = 002
	check_owner = false
	check_group = false
	allow_filter = true
	allow_defer = true
	allow_fail = true
	forbid_blackhole = false
	check_ancestor = true:>)

## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	<:verify_only = true
	user = CONF_filter_user
	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	forbid_filter_perl = true
	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	forbid_filter_run = true
	file_transport = dummy
	directory_transport = dummy
	pipe_transport = dummy
	reply_transport = dummy:>)

## Transports for redirection filters.
m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
	<:file_transport = mailbox
	directory_transport = maildir
	pipe_transport = pipe
	reply_transport = reply:>)

m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
<:$1_vrf:
	$2
	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
$1:
	$2
	verify = no
	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Some standard transports.

m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	<:delivery_date_add = true
	envelope_to_add = true
	return_path_add = true:>)

SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
## A standard transport for remote delivery.  By default, try to do TLS, and
## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
## in plaintext anyway.  But all of this can be overridden from the
## `domains.conf' file.  Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way.  Instead, encode
## it into the transport name.  This is very unpleasant, of course.
smtp:
	driver = smtp
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true

m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
	<:driver = smtp
	hosts_try_auth = *
	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
	hosts_require_auth = \
		${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_require_ciphers = \
		DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
		      {${extract {${expand:$value}} \
				 { good = CONF_good_ciphers \
				   any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
				 {$value} \
				 {${expand:$value}}}} \
		      {CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
smtp_dhbits_1024:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
smtp_dhbits_2048:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)

## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
## authentication.
smtp_local:
	driver = smtp
	hosts_require_tls = *
	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.cert
	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
				    {$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
				    fail}

## A standard transport for local delivery.
deliver:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /var/mail/$local_part
	group = mail
	mode = 0600
	mode_fail_narrower = false
	USER_DELIVERY

## Transports for user filters.
mailbox:
	driver = appendfile
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

maildir:
	driver = appendfile
	maildir_format = true
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

pipe:
	driver = pipe
	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
		/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
		/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	initgroups = true
	umask = 002
	return_fail_output = true
	log_output = true

## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
dummy:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /dev/null

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Retry configuration.

SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
## Default.
*					* \
	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h

DIVERT(null)
###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------
Commit	Line	Data
185b5456 MW	1	### --m4--
	2	###
	3	### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
	4	###
	5	### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
	6	###
	7
	8	###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
	9	###
	10	### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	11	### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	12	### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
	13	### (at your option) any later version.
	14	###
	15	### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	16	### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	17	### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	18	### GNU General Public License for more details.
	19	###
	20	### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	21	### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
	22	### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
	23
	24	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	25	### Global settings.
	26
	27	SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
b1d083dd	28	admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
185b5456 MW	29	prod_requires_admin = false
	30
	31	SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
	32	log_file_path = : syslog
	33	log_selector = \
	34	+smtp_confirmation \
	35	+tls_peerdn
	36	log_timezone = true
	37	syslog_duplication = false
	38	syslog_timestamp = false
	39
	40	SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
	41	local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
	42	extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::
	43
	44	SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
	45	deliver_queue_load_max = 8
	46	queue_only_load = 12
	47	smtp_accept_max = 16
	48	smtp_accept_queue = 32
	49	smtp_accept_reserve = 4
	50	smtp_load_reserve = 10
	51	smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted
	52
	53	SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
	54	host_lookup = *
	55
	56	SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
	57	gecos_name = $1
	58	gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)
	59
	60	SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
	61	received_header_text = Received: \
2cf9db84	62	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
9384ef4f	63	{from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
2cf9db84 MW	64	{${if def:sender_ident \
2cf9db84 MW	65	{from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
185b5456	66	by $primary_hostname \
b92689d6 MW	67	(Exim $version_number)\
b92689d6 MW	68	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
185b5456 MW	69	${if def:received_protocol \
185b5456 MW	70	{with $received_protocol \
b92689d6	71	${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
185b5456	72	${if def:sender_address \
43e6fc69	73	{(envelope-from $sender_address\
185b5456 MW	74	${if def:authenticated_id \
	75	{; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	76	id $message_exim_id\
	77	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}
	78
	79	SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
	80	smtp_return_error_details = true
	81	accept_8bitmime = true
	82
	83	SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
	84	extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
	85	headers_charset = utf-8
	86	qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain
	87
	88	SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
	89	delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d
	90
6aae076f MW	91	SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
	92	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.cert
	93	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
	94	tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
	95	tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
	96	tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
	97	{match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
	98	{CONF_good_ciphers} \
	99	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
	100	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	101	tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}
	102
185b5456 MW	103	DIVERT(null)
	104	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	105	### Access control lists.
	106
	107	SECTION(global, acl-after)
	108	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	109	acl_smtp_helo = helo
	110	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	111	helo:
fe8f2338 MW	112	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	113	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	114	## it's too blunt a tool. Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	115	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	116	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	117	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	118	warn set acl_c_helo_warning = false
	119	!condition = \
4ff4ad42 MW	120	${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
	121	{<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
	122	{match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
	123	{localhost : +thishost}}}}
	124	!condition = \
fe8f2338 MW	125	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	126	{${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
	127	partial0-lsearch \
	128	{CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	129	{${if match_ip \
	130	{$sender_host_address} \
	131	{$value}}}}}}
	132	!verify = helo
	133	set acl_c_helo_warning = true
185b5456 MW	134
	135	accept
	136
	137	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
284c9d7e MW	138	acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
	139	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	140	not_smtp_start:
	141	## Record the user's name.
	142	warn set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
	143
	144	## Done.
	145	accept
	146
	147	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
185b5456 MW	148	acl_smtp_mail = mail
	149	SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
	150	mail:
	151
fe8f2338 MW	152	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	153	## add it now.
	154	warn condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
	155	add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
	156	BADHELO \
	157	Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
60c96a7c	158	helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
d70f6d53	159	address=$sender_host_address
fe8f2338	160
185b5456 MW	161	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	162	accept senders = :
	163
	164	## Ensure that the sender is routable. This is important to prevent
	165	## undeliverable bounces.
	166	require message = Invalid sender; \
	167	($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	168	verify = sender
	169
	170	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	171	warn condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	172	control = submission
	173
284c9d7e MW	174	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	175	deny message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
	176	!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	177	hosts = +allnets
	178	!encrypted = *
	179
	180	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	181	require acl = mail_check_auth
	182
185b5456 MW	183	SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	184	## And we're done.
	185	accept
	186
	187	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	188	acl_smtp_connect = connect
	189	SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
	190	connect:
	191	SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
e12c9586	192	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
185b5456	193	warn acl = check_submission
e12c9586 MW	194
e12c9586 MW	195	## Done.
185b5456 MW	196	accept
	197
	198	check_submission:
	199	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
4ff4ad42	200	accept !hosts = +thishost
185b5456 MW	201	!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
	202	set acl_c_mode = relay
	203
	204	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	205	warn set acl_c_mode = submission
	206
	207	## Done.
	208	accept
	209
	210	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	211	acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
	212	SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
	213	rcpt:
	214
	215	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	216	## isn't in one of our known domains.
	217	deny message = Relaying not permitted
	218	!hosts = CONF_relay_clients
	219	!authenticated = *
	220	!domains = +known
	221
	222	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	223	require message = Invalid recipient \
	224	($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	225	verify = recipient
	226
	227	SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	228	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	229	accept
	230
	231	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	232	acl_smtp_data = data
	233	SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
	234	data:
	235
	236	SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	237	accept
	238
	239	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	240	acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
	241	acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
	242	SECTION(acl)m4_dnl
	243	expn_vrfy:
	244	accept hosts = +trusted
	245	deny message = Suck it and see
	246
	247	DIVERT(null)
	248	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
284c9d7e MW	249	### Verification of sender address.
	250
	251	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	252	mail_check_auth:
	253
	254	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	255	accept condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	256
	257	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	258	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	259	## answer. So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	260	warn set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
4ff4ad42	261	hosts = +thishost
284c9d7e	262	!authenticated = *
ff4c943d	263	condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
284c9d7e MW	264	set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
284c9d7e MW	265
ff4c943d	266	## User must be authenticated by now.
284c9d7e	267	deny message = Sender not authenticated
ff4c943d	268	condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}
284c9d7e MW	269
	270	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	271	## is allowed to claim.
	272	deny message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
459abd49 MW	273	!condition = \
	274	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	275	{${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
	276	lsearch \
	277	{CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	278	{${if match_address \
	279	{$sender_address} \
	280	{+value}}} \
	281	{false}}}}
284c9d7e MW	282	!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
	283	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	284	{$acl_c_user} \
	285	{+dom_users}} \
	286	{match_local_part \
	287	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	288	{+dom_locals}}}}},
	289	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	290	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	291	{+user_extaddr}} \
	292	{or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
	293	{}} \
	294	{match_domain \
	295	{$sender_address_domain} \
	296	{+public}}}}}}})}
	297
	298	## All done.
	299	accept
	300
	301	DIVERT(null)
	302	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
185b5456 MW	303	### Common options for forwarding routers.
	304
	305	## We're pretty permissive here.
	306	m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	307	<:driver = redirect
	308	modemask = 002
	309	check_owner = false
	310	check_group = false
	311	allow_filter = true
	312	allow_defer = true
	313	allow_fail = true
	314	forbid_blackhole = false
	315	check_ancestor = true:>)
	316
	317	## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
	318	m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	319	<:verify_only = true
	320	user = CONF_filter_user
	321	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	322	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	323	forbid_filter_perl = true
	324	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	325	forbid_filter_run = true
	326	file_transport = dummy
	327	directory_transport = dummy
	328	pipe_transport = dummy
	329	reply_transport = dummy:>)
	330
	331	## Transports for redirection filters.
	332	m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
7ab75d6f	333	<:file_transport = mailbox
185b5456 MW	334	directory_transport = maildir
	335	pipe_transport = pipe
	336	reply_transport = reply:>)
	337
7ab75d6f MW	338	m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
	339	<:$1_vrf:
	340	$2
	341	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
	342	$1:
	343	$2
	344	verify = no
	345	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)
	346
185b5456 MW	347	DIVERT(null)
	348	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	349	### Some standard transports.
	350
	351	m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	352	<:delivery_date_add = true
	353	envelope_to_add = true
	354	return_path_add = true:>)
	355
	356	SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
fa5a92c6 MW	357	## A standard transport for remote delivery. By default, try to do TLS, and
	358	## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
	359	## in plaintext anyway. But all of this can be overridden from the
beb15dae MW	360	## `domains.conf' file. Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
	361	## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way. Instead, encode
	362	## it into the transport name. This is very unpleasant, of course.
534d411b MW	363	smtp:
	364	driver = smtp
	365	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	366	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	367	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true
	368
beb15dae MW	369	m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
beb15dae MW	370	<:driver = smtp
ae9744ce	371	hosts_try_auth = *
fa5a92c6	372	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
ae9744ce MW	373	hosts_require_auth = \
ae9744ce MW	374	${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
fa5a92c6 MW	375	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	376	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	377	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	378	tls_require_ciphers = \
	379	DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
	380	{${extract {${expand:$value}} \
	381	{ good = CONF_good_ciphers \
	382	any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
	383	{$value} \
	384	{${expand:$value}}}} \
	385	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
beb15dae MW	386	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
beb15dae MW	387	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
beb15dae MW	388	smtp_dhbits_1024:
	389	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
	390	smtp_dhbits_2048:
	391	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)
185b5456 MW	392
	393	## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
	394	## authentication.
	395	smtp_local:
	396	driver = smtp
	397	hosts_require_tls = *
	398	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.cert
	399	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	400	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	401	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
b6d74252	402	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
185b5456 MW	403	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
185b5456 MW	404	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
0bed9b7f	405	{$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
185b5456 MW	406	fail}
	407
	408	## A standard transport for local delivery.
	409	deliver:
	410	driver = appendfile
	411	file = /var/mail/$local_part
8f6af4ae MW	412	group = mail
	413	mode = 0600
	414	mode_fail_narrower = false
185b5456 MW	415	USER_DELIVERY
	416
	417	## Transports for user filters.
	418	mailbox:
	419	driver = appendfile
8f6af4ae	420	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	421	USER_DELIVERY
	422
	423	maildir:
	424	driver = appendfile
	425	maildir_format = true
8f6af4ae	426	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	427	USER_DELIVERY
	428
	429	pipe:
	430	driver = pipe
8f6af4ae MW	431	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
	432	/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
	433	/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	434	initgroups = true
	435	umask = 002
	436	return_fail_output = true
	437	log_output = true
185b5456 MW	438
	439	## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
	440	dummy:
	441	driver = appendfile
	442	file = /dev/null
	443
	444	DIVERT(null)
	445	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	446	### Retry configuration.
	447
	448	SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
	449	## Default.
	450	* * \
	451	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h
	452
	453	DIVERT(null)
	454	###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------