From b675c0960bcd94d3893173065e1ddae1a68ac9bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Wooding Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2006 13:52:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mdw-crypto.bib: Add a pile of entries for Wrestlers paper. --- mdw-crypto.bib | 487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 484 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mdw-crypto.bib b/mdw-crypto.bib index 3fb1e98..4e79135 100644 --- a/mdw-crypto.bib +++ b/mdw-crypto.bib @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ title = {The CWC Authenticated Encryption (Associated Data) Mode}, howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/106}, year = {2003}, - url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/", + url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/106", } @inproceedings{Lim:1997:KRA, @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Secure Channels", month = may, year = 2001, - url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/040.ps.gz", + url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/040", note = "An extended abstract appears in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001." } @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ communications (Or: how secure is {SSL}?)", month = jun, year = 2001, - url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/045.ps.gz", + url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/045", note = "An abridged version appears in the proceedings of {CRYPTO} 2001." } @@ -207,6 +207,82 @@ url = "http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/goldwasser96lecture.html" } + +@InProceedings{Rogaway:2002:AEA, + author = "Phillip Rogaway", + title = "Authenticated-encryption with associated-data", + added-by = "msteiner", + URL = "http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ad.html", + pages = "98--107", + added-at = "Sun Nov 16 12:50:24 2003", + abstract = "When a message is transformed into a ciphertext in a + way designed to protect both its privacy and + authenticity, there may be additional information, such + as a packet header, that travels alongside the + ciphertext (at least conceptually) and must get + authenticated with it. We formalize and investigate + this authenticated-encryption with associated-data + (AEAD) problem. Though the problem has long been + addressed in cryptographic practice, it was never + provided a definition or even a name. We do this, and + go on to look at efficient solutions for AEAD, both in + general and for the authenticated-encryption scheme + OCB. For the general setting we study two simple ways + to turn an authenticated-encryption scheme that does + not support associated-data into one that does: nonce + stealing and ciphertext translation. For the case of + OCB we construct an AEAD-scheme by combining OCB and + the pseudorandom function PMAC, using the same key for + both algorithms. We prove that, despite + {"}interaction{"} between the two schemes when using a + common key, the combination is sound. We also consider + achieving AEAD by the generic composition of a + nonce-based, privacy-only encryption scheme and a + pseudorandom function.", + booktitle = "Proceedings of the 9th {ACM} Conference on Computer + and Communications Security", + year = "2002", + editor = "Ravi Sandhu", + month = nov, + publisher = "ACM Press", + address = "Washington, DC, USA", +} + +@Article{Rogaway:2003:OCB, + author = "Phillip Rogaway and Mihir Bellare and John Black", + title = "{OCB}: a block-cipher mode of operation for efficient + authenticated encryptiona", + added-by = "msteiner", + URL = "http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~jrblack/papers/ocb.pdf", + journal = "ACM Transactions on Information and System Security", + volume = "6", + year = "2003", + pages = "365--403", + number = "3", + added-at = "Sun Sep 28 21:27:38 2003", +} + +@InProceedings{McGrew:2004:SPG, + title = "The Security and Performance of the Galois/Counter + Mode ({GCM}) of Operation", + author = "David A. McGrew and John Viega", + bibdate = "2004-12-13", + bibsource = "DBLP, + http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/indocrypt/indocrypt2004.html#McGrewV04", + booktitle = "INDOCRYPT", + booktitle = "Progress in Cryptology - {INDOCRYPT} 2004, 5th + International Conference on Cryptology in India, + Chennai, India, December 20-22, 2004, Proceedings", + publisher = "Springer", + year = "2004", + volume = "3348", + editor = "Anne Canteaut and Kapalee Viswanathan", + ISBN = "3-540-24130-2", + pages = "343--355", + series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + URL = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193" +} + @techreport{Abdalla:1999:DHAES, author = "Michel Abdalla and Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway", title = "{DHAES}: An Encryption Scheme Based on the {Diffie-Hellman} Problem", @@ -264,6 +340,411 @@ url = "http://www.shoup.net/papers/" } +@inproceedings{Shoup:1997:LBD, + author = "Victor Shoup", + title = "Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems", + year = 1997, + url = "http://www.shoup.net/papers/", + crossref = "Fumy:1997:ACE" +} + +@InProceedings{Bellare:2004:EAX, + title = "The {EAX} Mode of Operation", + author = "Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway and David Wagner", + bibdate = "2004-07-29", + bibsource = "DBLP, + http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/fse/fse2004.html#BellareRW04", + booktitle = "FSE", + booktitle = "Fast Software Encryption, 11th International Workshop, + {FSE} 2004, Delhi, India, February 5-7, 2004, Revised + Papers", + publisher = "Springer", + year = "2004", + volume = "3017", + editor = "Bimal K. Roy and Willi Meier", + ISBN = "3-540-22171-9", + pages = "389--407", + series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + URL = "http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/eax-fse04.ps" +} + +@Misc{Shoup:1999:OFM, + title = "On Formal Models for Secure Key Exchange", + author = "Victor Shoup", + year = "1999", + month = apr # "~21", + abstract = "A new formal security model for session key exchange + protocols in the public key setting is proposed, and + several efficient protocols are analyzed in this model. + The relationship between this new model and previously + proposed models is explored, and several interesting, + subtle distinctions between static and adaptive + adversaries are explored. We also give a brief account + of anonymous users.", + citeseer-references = "oai:CiteSeerPSU:100248; oai:CiteSeerPSU:159141; + oai:CiteSeerPSU:587558; oai:CiteSeerPSU:70784; + oai:CiteSeerPSU:459391; oai:CiteSeerPSU:340126; + oai:CiteSeerPSU:343528; oai:CiteSeerPSU:451555; + oai:CiteSeerPSU:432396", + annote = "Victor Shoup (IBM Zurich Research Lab , Saumerstr; 4 , + 8803 Ruschlikon , Switzerland);", + bibsource = "OAI-PMH server at cs1.ist.psu.edu", + oai = "oai:CiteSeerPSU:190779", + rights = "unrestricted", + URL = "http://www.shoup.net/papers/skey.ps.Z", +} + +@misc{Koblitz:2006:ALP, + author = {Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes}, + title = {Another Look at ``Provable Security''. {II}}, + howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/229}, + year = {2006}, + url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/229}, +} + +@Article{Blake-Wilson:1998:EAA, + author = "S. Blake-Wilson and A. Menezes", + title = "Entity Authentication and Authenticated Key Transport + Protocols Employing Asymmetric Techniques", + journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + volume = "1361", + pages = "137--??", + year = "1998", + CODEN = "LNCSD9", + ISSN = "0302-9743", + bibdate = "Tue Apr 28 08:51:33 MDT 1998", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, Center for Scientific + Computing, University of Utah, Department of + Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org|, + \path|beebe@ieee.org| (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", + url = "http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/transport.ps" +} + +@Article{Blake-Wilson:1997:KAP, + author = "S. Blake-Wilson and D. Johnson and A. Menezes", + title = "Key Agreement Protocols and Their Security Analysis", + journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + volume = "1355", + pages = "30--??", + year = "1997", + CODEN = "LNCSD9", + ISSN = "0302-9743", + bibdate = "Tue Apr 28 08:51:33 MDT 1998", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, University of Utah, Department + of Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org| + (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", + url = "http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/agreement.ps" +} + +@InProceedings{Bellare:1998:MAD, + author = "Mihir Bellare and Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk", + title = "A Modular Approach to the Design and Analysis of Key + Exchange Protocols", + pages = "419--428", + ISBN = "0-89791-962-9", + booktitle = "Proceedings of the 30th Annual {ACM} Symposium on + Theory of Computing ({STOC}-98)", + month = may # "~23--26", + publisher = "ACM Press", + address = "New York", + year = "1998", + url = "http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/key-distribution.html" +} + +@TechReport{Canetti:2001:UCS, + author = "Ran Canetti", + title = "Universally Composable Security: {A} New Paradigm for + Cryptographic Protocols", + added-by = "sti", + URL = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067", + number = "2000/067", + month = oct, + abstract = "We propose a new paradigm for defining security of + cryptographic protocols, called {\sf universally + composable security.} The salient property of + universally composable definitions of security is that + they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is + composed with an arbitrary set of protocols, or more + generally when the protocol is used as a component of + an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for + maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in + complex and unpredictable environments such as the + Internet. In particular, universally composable + definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded + number of protocol instances are executed concurrently + in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee + non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, + and more. We show how to formulate universally + composable definitions of security for practically any + cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that + practically any such definition can be realized using + known general techniques, as long as only a minority of + the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to + formulate universally composable definitions of a wide + array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated + and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key + encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, + zero-knowledge, and more. We also make initial steps + towards studying the realizability of the proposed + definitions in other natural settings.", + keywords = "foundations / cryptographic protocols, security + analysis of protocols, concurrent composition", + type = "Report", + annote = "Revised version of \cite{Canett2000a}.", + year = "2001", + institution = "Cryptology {ePrint} Archive", + added-at = "Wed Oct 17 16:02:37 2001", + note = "Extended Abstract appeared in proceedings of the 42nd + Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), + 2001", +} + +@Article{Canett2000a, + author = "Ran Canetti", + title = "Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic + Protocols", + added-by = "sti", + URL = "http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/journals/00145/papers/0013001/00130143.pdf", + journal = "Journal of Cryptology", + number = "1", + month = "Winter", + abstract = "We present general definitions of security for + multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the + task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the + parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these + definitions, security is preserved under a natural + composition operation. The definitions follow the + general paradigm of known definitions; yet some + substantial modifications and simplifications are + introduced. The composition operation is the natural + ``subroutine substitution'' operation, formalized by + Micali and Rogaway. We consider several standard + settings for multiparty protocols, including the cases + of eavesdropping, Byzantine, nonadaptive and adaptive + adversaries, as well as the information-theoretic and + the computational models. In particular, in the + computational model we provide the first definition of + security of protocols that is shown to be preserved + under composition.", + volume = "13", + annote = "Discusses general formalization of Secure Multiparty + Computation in synchronous model with passive vs active + (=> compute function t-privately vs t-securely) and + static vs adaptive adversaries as well as perfect + (e.g., with secure channel) and cryptographic settings. + Contrary to previous definitions doesn't restrict to + black-box simulations (though probably that restriction + was not that important) and allows rewinds (more + important, e.g., ZKP). Probably most precise and + complete to date. Proves composition theorems for + 'sequential subroutine composition'. To model adaptive + adversaries he defines an additional TM Z to model the + environment which feeds the context as auxiliary input + on corruptions as well models post-execution effects in + a non-erasing model by allowing Z (on input \emph{all} + outputs of the protocol) to further corrupt parties + (via adversary) after the termination of the protocol. + The simulation has to hold now for all Z and all A (but + note that contrary to A, Z is the same in the ideal + model!). However, if we consider erasing models where + all internal states are deleted after protocol + terminatin then Z can be simplified to apriori fixed + auxilliary strings for each corruption. Appeared also + as Theory of Cryptography Library Record 98-18.", + year = "2000", + pages = "143--202", + publisher = "Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany", + added-at = "Thu Jul 20 11:01:42 2000", +} + + +@Article{Canetti:2002:UCN, + author = "Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk", + title = "Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and + Secure Channels", + journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + volume = "2332", + pages = "337--??", + year = "2002", + CODEN = "LNCSD9", + ISSN = "0302-9743", + bibdate = "Tue Sep 10 19:09:37 MDT 2002", + bibsource = "http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/series/0558/tocs/t2332.htm", + url = "http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/059", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, Center for Scientific + Computing, University of Utah, Department of + Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org|, + \path|beebe@ieee.org| (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", +} + +@misc{Shoup:2004:SGT, + author = {Victor Shoup}, + title = {Sequences of games: a tool for taming complexity in security proofs}, + howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/332}, + year = {2004}, + url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/332}, +} + +@InProceedings{Bellare:2006:STE, + title = "The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for + Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs", + author = "Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway", + bibdate = "2006-07-05", + bibsource = "DBLP, + http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/eurocrypt/eurocrypt2006.html#BellareR06", + booktitle = "Advances in Cryptology - {EUROCRYPT} 2006, 25th Annual + International Conference on the Theory and Applications + of Cryptographic Techniques, St. Petersburg, Russia, + May 28 - June 1, 2006, Proceedings", + publisher = "Springer", + year = "2006", + volume = "4004", + editor = "Serge Vaudenay", + ISBN = "3-540-34546-9", + pages = "409--426", + series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + note = "Proceedings version of \cite{Bellare:2004:CBG}" +} + +@misc{Bellare:2004:CBG, + author = {Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway}, + title = {Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption}, + howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/331}, + year = {2004}, + url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}, + note = "Full version of \cite{Bellare:2006:STE}" +} + +@Article{Shoup:2001:OR, + author = "Victor Shoup", + title = "{OAEP} Reconsidered", + journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + volume = "2139", + pages = "239--??", + year = "2001", + CODEN = "LNCSD9", + ISSN = "0302-9743", + bibdate = "Sat Feb 2 13:05:41 MST 2002", + bibsource = "http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/series/0558/tocs/t2139.htm", + URL = "http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2139/21390239.htm; + http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/series/0558/papers/2139/21390239.pdf", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, Center for Scientific + Computing, University of Utah, Department of + Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org|, + \path|beebe@ieee.org| (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", +} + +@Article{Canetti:2004:ROM, + author = "Ran Canetti and Oded Goldreich and Shai Halevi", + title = "The random oracle methodology, revisited", + journal = "Journal of the ACM", + volume = "51", + number = "4", + pages = "557--594", + month = jul, + year = "2004", + CODEN = "JACOAH", + ISSN = "0004-5411", + bibdate = "Sat Jul 10 09:49:01 MDT 2004", + bibsource = "http://portal.acm.org/", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, University of Utah, Department + of Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org| + (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", +} + +@Article{Boneh:2003:IBE, + author = "Dan Boneh and Matthew Franklin", + title = "Identity-Based Encryption from the {Weil} Pairing", + journal = "SIAM Journal on Computing", + volume = "32", + number = "3", + pages = "586--615", + month = jun, + year = "2003", + CODEN = "SMJCAT", + doi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/S0097539701398521", + ISSN = "0097-5397 (print), 1095-7111 (electronic)", + bibdate = "Wed Aug 20 06:43:35 MDT 2003", + bibsource = "http://epubs.siam.org/sam-bin/dbq/toclist/SICOMP/32/3", + URL = "http://epubs.siam.org/sam-bin/dbq/article/39852", + acknowledgement = "Nelson H. F. Beebe, University of Utah, Department + of Mathematics, 110 LCB, 155 S 1400 E RM 233, Salt Lake + City, UT 84112-0090, USA, Tel: +1 801 581 5254, FAX: +1 + 801 581 4148, e-mail: \path|beebe@math.utah.edu|, + \path|beebe@acm.org|, \path|beebe@computer.org| + (Internet), URL: + \path|http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/|", + doi-url = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/S0097539701398521", +} + + +@Article{ElGamal:1985:PKC, + author = "Taher ElGamal", + booktitle = "Advances in cryptology (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1984)", + title = "A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based + on discrete logarithms", + journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science", + volume = "196", + pages = "10--18", + year = "1985", + CODEN = "LNCSD9", + ISSN = "0302-9743", + MRclass = "94A60 (11T71 68P25)", + MRnumber = "87b:94037", + mrnumber-url = "http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=87b%3a94037", +} + +@misc{Menezes:2005:IPB, + author = "Alfred Menezes", + title = "An Introduction to Pairing-Based Cryptography", + url = "http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/pairings.pdf", + note = "Notes from lectures given in Santander, Spain", + year = "2005" +} + +@misc{Stinson:2006:EST, + author = {D.R. Stinson and J. Wu}, + title = {An Efficient and Secure Two-flow Zero-Knowledge Identification Protocol}, + howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/337}, + year = {2006}, + url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/337}, +} + +@misc{DiRaimondo:2006:DAK, + author = {Mario Di Raimondo and Rosario Gennaro and Hugo Krawczyk}, + title = {Deniable Authentication and Key Exchange}, + howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/280}, + year = {2006}, + url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/280}, +} + +@misc{SEC1, + author = "{Certicom Research}", + title = "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, {SEC} 1: {E}lliptic curve cryptography, Version 1.0", + year = "2000", + url = "http://www.secg.org/download/aid-385/sec1_final.pdf" +} + @proceedings{DBLP:conf/fse/2001, editor = {Mitsuru Matsui}, title = {Fast Software Encryption, 8th International Workshop, FSE 2001 -- 2.11.0