X-Git-Url: https://git.distorted.org.uk/~mdw/distorted-keys/blobdiff_plain/b65e1f934c6951c5943634f38ae4098573b94b0f..2235222bb9739a1e6713b49290906c5b4cf08f04:/keyfunc.sh.in

diff --git a/keyfunc.sh.in b/keyfunc.sh.in
index aae5598..a618e66 100644
--- a/keyfunc.sh.in
+++ b/keyfunc.sh.in
@@ -28,15 +28,26 @@ quis=${0##*/}
 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ### Configuration variables.
 
+## Automatically configured pathnames.
 PACKAGE="@PACKAGE@" VERSION="@VERSION@"
 bindir="@bindir@"
 
-case ":$PATH:" in *:"$bindir":*) ;; *) PATH=$bindir:$PATH ;; esac
-
+## Read user configuration.
 if [ -f $ETC/keys.conf ]; then . $ETC/keys.conf; fi
 
+## Maybe turn on debugging.
 case "${KEYS_DEBUG+t}" in t) set -x ;; esac
 
+## Fake up caller credentials if not called via userv.
+case "${USERV_USER+t}" in
+  t) ;;
+  *) USERV_USER=${LOGNAME-${USER-$(id -un)}} USERV_UID=$(id -u) ;;
+esac
+case "${USERV_GROUP+t}" in
+  t) ;;
+  *) USERV_GROUP=$(id -Gn) USERV_GID=$(id -gn) ;;
+esac
+
 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ### Cleanup handling.
 
@@ -118,6 +129,17 @@ parse_keylabel () {
   knub=$KEYS/nub/$kowner/$klabel
 }
 
+runas () {
+  user=$1 service=$2; shift 2
+  ## If the current (effective) user is not USER then reinvoke via `userv',
+  ## as the specified service, with the remaining arguments.
+
+  case $(id -un) in
+    "$user") ;;
+    *) exec userv "$user" "$service" "$@" ;;
+  esac
+}
+
 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ### Input validation functions.
 
@@ -133,7 +155,7 @@ check () {
   validp=t
   case "$thing" in
     *"$nl"*) validp=nil ;;
-    *) if ! expr >/dev/null "$thing" : "$ckpat\$"; then validp=nil; fi ;;
+    *) if ! expr >/dev/null "Q$thing" : "Q$ckpat\$"; then validp=nil; fi ;;
   esac
   case $validp in
     nil) echo >&2 "$quis: bad $ckwhat \`$thing'"; exit 1 ;;
@@ -142,10 +164,13 @@ check () {
 
 ## Regular expressions for validating input.
 R_IDENTCHARS="A-Za-z0-9_"
-R_WORDCHARS="-$R_IDENTCHARS!%@+="
+R_GOODPUNCT="!%@+="
+R_WORDCHARS="-$R_IDENTCHARS$R_GOODPUNCT"
 R_IDENT="[$R_IDENTCHARS][$R_IDENTCHARS]*"
 R_WORD="[$R_WORDCHARS][$R_WORDCHARS]*"
+R_ACLCHARS="][$R_IDENTCHARS$R_GOODPUNCT*?:.#"
 R_WORDSEQ="[$R_WORDCHARS[:space:]][$R_WORDCHARS[:space:]]*"
+R_ACL="[$R_ACLCHARS[:space:]-][$R_ACLCHARS[:space:]-]*"
 R_NUMERIC='\(\([1-9][0-9]*\)\{0,1\}0\{0,1\}\)'
 R_LABEL="\($R_WORD\(/$R_WORD\)*\)"
 R_LINE=".*"
@@ -227,9 +252,14 @@ defprops g_props <<EOF
 type			nil	$R_IDENT
 recovery		t	$R_WORDSEQ
 random			t	$R_WORD
-nubhash			t	$R_WORD
-nubidhash		t	$R_WORD
-nubsz			t	$R_NUMERIC
+nub_hash		t	$R_WORD
+nubid_hash		t	$R_WORD
+nub_random_bytes	t	$R_NUMERIC
+acl_encrypt		t	$R_ACL
+acl_decrypt		t	$R_ACL
+acl_sign		t	$R_ACL
+acl_verify		t	$R_ACL
+acl_info		t	$R_ACL
 EOF
 
 readprops () {
@@ -265,20 +295,24 @@ readmeta () {
 
 makenub () {
   ## Generate a key nub in the default way, and write it to standard output.
-  ## The properties `random', `nubsz' and `nubhash' are referred to.
+  ## The properties `random', `nub_random_bytes' and `nub_hash' are referred
+  ## to.
 
   dd 2>/dev/null \
-    if=/dev/${kprop_random-random} bs=1 count=${kprop_nubsz-512} |
-  openssl dgst -${kprop_nubhash-sha384} -binary |
+    if=/dev/${kprop_random-random} bs=1 count=${kprop_nub_random_bytes-64} |
+  openssl dgst -${kprop_nub_hash-sha256} -binary |
   openssl base64
 }
 
 nubid () {
   ## Compute a hash of the key nub in stdin, and write it to stdout in hex.
-  ## The property `nubidhash' is used.
+  ## The property `nubid_hash' is used.
 
-  { echo "distorted-keys nubid"; cat -; } |
-  openssl dgst -${kprop_nubidhash-sha256}
+  ## Stupid dance because the output incompatibly grew a filename, in order
+  ## to demonstrate the same idiocy as GNU mumblesum.
+  set _ $({ echo "distorted-keys nubid"; cat -; } |
+    openssl dgst -${kprop_nubid_hash-sha256})
+  echo $2
 }
 
 subst () {
@@ -327,9 +361,10 @@ subst () {
 }
 
 read_profile () {
-  profile=$1
+  owner=$1 profile=$2
   ## Read property settings from a profile.  The PROFILE name has the form
-  ## [USER:]LABEL.  Properties are set using `setprops' with prefix `kprop_'.
+  ## [USER:]LABEL; USER defaults to OWNER.  Properties are set using
+  ## `setprops' with prefix `kprop_'.
 
   reqtmp
   case "$profile" in
@@ -337,7 +372,7 @@ read_profile () {
       label=${profile#:} uservp=nil
       ;;
     *)
-      user=$USERV_USER label=$profile uservp=t
+      user=$kowner label=$profile uservp=t
       ;;
     *:*)
       user=${profile%%:*} label=${profile#*:} uservp=t
@@ -350,7 +385,7 @@ read_profile () {
   case $uservp in
     t)
       checkword "profile user" "$user"
-      userv "$user" cryptop-profile "$label" >$tmp/profile
+      userv "$user" cryptop-profile "$label" >$tmp/profile </dev/null
       ;;
     nil)
       $bindir/extract-profile "$label" $ETC/profile.d/ >$tmp/profile
@@ -424,16 +459,18 @@ k_verify () { notsupp verify; }
 prepare () {
   key=$1 op=$2
   ## Prepare for a crypto operation OP, using the KEY.  This validates the
-  ## key label, reads the profile, and checks the access-control list.
+  ## key label, reads the profile, and checks the access-control list.  If OP
+  ## is `-' then allow the operation unconditionally.
 
   ## Find the key properties.
   parse_keylabel "$key"
   if [ ! -d $kdir ]; then echo >&2 "$quis: unknown key \`$key'"; exit 1; fi
   readmeta $kdir
-  read_profile "$profile"
+  read_profile $kowner "$profile"
 
   ## Check whether we're allowed to do this thing.  This is annoyingly
   ## fiddly.
+  case $op in -) return ;; esac
   eval acl=\${kprop_acl_$op-!owner}
   verdict=forbid
   while :; do
@@ -474,7 +511,7 @@ prepare () {
   done
 
   case $verdict in
-    forbid) echo >&2 "$quis: $op access to key \`$key' forbidden"; exit ;;
+    forbid) echo >&2 "$quis: $op access to key \`$key' forbidden"; exit 1 ;;
   esac
 }
 
@@ -520,6 +557,31 @@ c_sysverify () { c_sysop verify "$1" /dev/null; }
 ###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ### Recovery operations.
 
+sharethresh () {
+  pf=$1
+  ## Return the sharing threshold from the parameter file PARAM.
+
+  read param <"$pf"
+  case "$param" in
+    shamir-params:*) ;;
+    *)
+      echo >&2 "$quis: secret sharing parameter file damaged (wrong header)"
+      exit 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+  t=";${param#*:}"
+  case "$t" in
+    *";t="*) ;;
+    *)
+      echo >&2 "$quis: secret sharing parameter file damaged (missing t)"
+      exit 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+  t=${t#*;t=}
+  t=${t%%;*}
+  echo "$t"
+}
+
 stash () {
   recov=$1 label=$2
   ## Stash a copy of stdin encrypted under the recovery key RECOV, with a