###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Configuration variables.
+## Automatically configured pathnames.
PACKAGE="@PACKAGE@" VERSION="@VERSION@"
-pkgconfdir="@pkgconfdir@" pkglibdir="@pkglibdir@"
bindir="@bindir@"
-case ":$PATH:" in *:"$bindir":*) ;; *) PATH=$bindir:$PATH ;; esac
-
-if [ -f $KEYS/keys.conf ]; then . $KEYS/keys.conf; fi
-: ${random=/dev/random}
+## Read user configuration.
+if [ -f $ETC/keys.conf ]; then . $ETC/keys.conf; fi
+## Maybe turn on debugging.
case "${KEYS_DEBUG+t}" in t) set -x ;; esac
+## Fake up caller credentials if not called via userv.
+case "${USERV_USER+t}" in
+ t) ;;
+ *) USERV_USER=${LOGNAME-${USER-$(id -un)}} USERV_UID=$(id -u) ;;
+esac
+case "${USERV_GROUP+t}" in
+ t) ;;
+ *) USERV_GROUP=$(id -Gn) USERV_GID=$(id -gn) ;;
+esac
+
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Cleanup handling.
cleanups=""
-cleanup () { cleanups="$cleanups $1"; }
-trap 'rc=$?; for i in $cleanups; do $i; done; exit $rc' EXIT
-trap 'exit 127' INT TERM
+cleanup () { cleanups=${cleanups+$cleanups }$1; }
+runcleanups () { for i in $cleanups; do $i; done; }
+trap 'rc=$?; runcleanups; exit $rc' EXIT
+trap 'trap "" EXIT; runcleanups; exit 127' INT TERM
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Utility functions.
+reqsafe () {
+ ## Fail unless a safe directory is set.
+
+ err="$quis: (CONFIGURATION ERROR)"
+ case ${SAFE+t} in
+ t) ;;
+ *) echo >&2 "$err: no SAFE directory"; exit 1 ;;
+ esac
+ if [ ! -d "$SAFE" ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$err: SAFE path \`$SAFE' isn't a directory"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ case "$SAFE" in
+ [!/]* | *[][[:space:]*?]*)
+ echo >&2 "$err: SAFE path \`$SAFE' contains bad characters"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ls -ld "$SAFE" | {
+ me=$(id -un)
+ read perm _ user stuff
+ case "$perm:$user" in
+ d???------:"$me") ;;
+ *)
+ echo >&2 "$err: SAFE path \`$SAFE' has bad owner or permissions"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ }
+}
+
## Temporary directory.
unset tmp
-rmtmp () { cd /; rm -rf $tmp; }
+rmtmp () { case ${tmp+t} in t) cd /; rm -rf $tmp ;; esac; }
+cleanup rmtmp
mktmp () {
- ## Make and return the name of a temporary directory.
+ ## Make a temporary directory and store its name in `tmp'.
- case "${tmp+t}" in t) echo "$tmp"; return ;; esac
- mem=$(userv root claim-mem-dir </dev/null)
- tmp="$mem/keys.tmp.$$"
+ case "${tmp+t}" in t) return ;; esac
+ reqsafe
+ tmp="$SAFE/keys.tmp.$$"
rm -rf "$tmp"
mkdir -m700 "$tmp"
- echo "$tmp"
}
-###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-### Input validation functions.
+reqtmp () {
+ ## Fail unless a temporary directory is set.
-checknumber () {
- what=$1 thing=$2
- case "$thing" in
- "" | [!1-9]* | *[!0-9]*)
- echo >&2 "$quis: bad $what \`$thing'"
- exit 1
- ;;
+ case ${tmp+t} in
+ t) ;;
+ *) echo >&2 "$quis (INTERNAL): no tmp directory set"; exit 127 ;;
esac
}
-checkword () {
- what=$1 thing=$2
- case "$thing" in
- "" | *[!-0-9a-zA-Z_!%@+=]*)
- echo >&2 "$quis: bad $what: \`$thing'"
- exit 1
- ;;
+parse_keylabel () {
+ key=$1
+ ## Parse the key label string KEY. Set `kdir' to the base path to use for
+ ## the key's storage, and `kowner' to the key owner's name.
+
+ case "$key" in
+ *:*) kowner=${key%%:*} klabel=${key#*:} ;;
+ *) kowner=$USERV_USER klabel=$key ;;
esac
+ checkword "key owner name" "$kowner"
+ checklabel "key" "$klabel"
+ kdir=$KEYS/store/$kowner/$klabel
+ knub=$KEYS/nub/$kowner/$klabel
}
-checklabel () {
- what=$1 thing=$2
+runas () {
+ user=$1 service=$2; shift 2
+ ## If the current (effective) user is not USER then reinvoke via `userv',
+ ## as the specified service, with the remaining arguments.
+
+ case $(id -un) in
+ "$user") ;;
+ *) exec userv "$user" "$service" "$@" ;;
+ esac
+}
+
+###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### Input validation functions.
+
+nl="
+"
+check () {
+ ckwhat=$1 ckpat=$2 thing=$3
+ ## Verify that THING matches the (anchored, basic) regular expression
+ ## CKPAT. Since matching newlines is hard to do portably, also check that
+ ## THING doesn't contain any. If the checks fail, report an error and
+ ## exit.
+
+ validp=t
case "$thing" in
- *[!-0-9a-zA-Z_!%@+=/#]* | *//* | /* | */)
- echo >&2 "$quis: bad $what label \`$thing'"
- exit 1
- ;;
+ *"$nl"*) validp=nil ;;
+ *) if ! expr >/dev/null "Q$thing" : "Q$ckpat\$"; then validp=nil; fi ;;
+ esac
+ case $validp in
+ nil) echo >&2 "$quis: bad $ckwhat \`$thing'"; exit 1 ;;
esac
}
+## Regular expressions for validating input.
+R_IDENTCHARS="A-Za-z0-9_"
+R_GOODPUNCT="!%@+="
+R_WORDCHARS="-$R_IDENTCHARS$R_GOODPUNCT"
+R_IDENT="[$R_IDENTCHARS][$R_IDENTCHARS]*"
+R_WORD="[$R_WORDCHARS][$R_WORDCHARS]*"
+R_ACLCHARS="][$R_IDENTCHARS$R_GOODPUNCT*?:.#"
+R_WORDSEQ="[$R_WORDCHARS[:space:]][$R_WORDCHARS[:space:]]*"
+R_ACL="[$R_ACLCHARS[:space:]-][$R_ACLCHARS[:space:]-]*"
+R_NUMERIC='\(\([1-9][0-9]*\)\{0,1\}0\{0,1\}\)'
+R_LABEL="\($R_WORD\(/$R_WORD\)*\)"
+R_LINE=".*"
+
+## Various validation functions.
+checknumber () { check "$1" "$R_NUMERIC" "$2"; }
+checkident () { check "$1" "$R_IDENT" "$2"; }
+checkword () { check "$1" "$R_WORD" "$2"; }
+checklabel () { check "$1 label" "$R_LABEL" "$2"; }
+
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-### Crypto operations.
-###
-### We use Seccure for this, but it's interface is Very Annoying.
+### Key storage and properties.
+
+getsysprofile () {
+ profile=$1
+ ## Write the named system PROFILE to standard output.
-run_seccure () {
- op=$1; shift
- ## run_seccure OP ARG ...
+ $bindir/extract-profile "$profile" $ETC/profile.d/
+}
+
+setprops () {
+ what=$1 prefix=$2; shift 2
+ ## Set variables based on the NAME=VALUE assignments in the arguments. The
+ ## value for property NAME is stored in the shell variable PREFIX_NAME.
+
+ for assg in "$@"; do
+ goodp=t
+ case "$assg" in
+ *\=*) name=${assg%%=*} value=${assg#*=} ;;
+ *) goodp=nil ;;
+ esac
+ case "$goodp,$name" in t,*[!0-9A-Za-z_]*=*) goodp=nil ;; esac
+ case "$goodp" in
+ nil) echo >&2 "$quis: bad $what assignment \`$assg'"; exit 1 ;;
+ esac
+ eval "$prefix$name=\$value"
+ done
+}
+
+checkprops () {
+ whatprop=$1 prefix=$2; shift 2
+ ## Check that property variables are set in accordance with the remaining
+ ## TABLE arguments. Each row of TABLE has the form
##
- ## Run a Seccure program, ensuring that its stderr is reported if it had
- ## anything very interesting to say, but suppressed if it was boring.
+ ## NAME OMIT PAT
+ ##
+ ## A table row is satisfied if there is a variable PREFIXNAME whose value
+ ## matces the (basic) regular expression PAT, or if the variable is unset
+ ## and OMIT is `t'.
+
+ for table in "$@"; do
+ case "$table" in ?*) ;; *) continue ;; esac
+ while read -r name omit pat; do
+ eval foundp=\${$prefix$name+t}
+ case "$foundp,$omit" in
+ ,t) continue ;;
+ ,nil)
+ echo >&2 "$quis: missing $whatprop \`$name' required"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ eval value=\$$prefix$name
+ check "value for $whatprop \`$name'" "$pat" "$value"
+ done <<EOF
+$table
+EOF
+ done
+}
- ## We need a temporary place for the error output.
- case ${tmp+t} in
- t) ;;
+defprops () {
+ name=$1
+ ## Define a properties table NAME.
+
+ table=$(cat)
+ eval $name=\$table
+}
+
+defprops g_props <<EOF
+type nil $R_IDENT
+recovery t $R_WORDSEQ
+random t $R_WORD
+nub_hash t $R_WORD
+nubid_hash t $R_WORD
+nub_random_bytes t $R_NUMERIC
+acl_encrypt t $R_ACL
+acl_decrypt t $R_ACL
+acl_sign t $R_ACL
+acl_verify t $R_ACL
+acl_info t $R_ACL
+EOF
+
+readprops () {
+ file=$1
+ ## Read a profile from a file. This doesn't check the form of the
+ ## filename, so it's not suitable for unchecked input. Properties are set
+ ## using `setprops' with prefix `kprop_'.
+
+ ## Parse the settings from the file.
+ exec 3<"$file"
+ while read line; do
+ case "$line" in "" | \#*) continue ;; esac
+ setprops "property" kprop_ "$line"
+ done <&3
+ exec 3>&-
+ checkprops "property" kprop_ "$g_props"
+
+ ## Fetch the key-type handling library.
+ if [ ! -f $KEYSLIB/ktype.$kprop_type ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: unknown key type \`$kprop_type'"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ . $KEYSLIB/ktype.$kprop_type
+ checkprops "property" kprop_ "$k_props"
+}
+
+readmeta () {
+ kdir=$1
+ ## Read key metadata from KDIR.
+
+ { read profile; } <"$kdir"/meta
+}
+
+makenub () {
+ ## Generate a key nub in the default way, and write it to standard output.
+ ## The properties `random', `nub_random_bytes' and `nub_hash' are referred
+ ## to.
+
+ dd 2>/dev/null \
+ if=/dev/${kprop_random-random} bs=1 count=${kprop_nub_random_bytes-64} |
+ openssl dgst -${kprop_nub_hash-sha256} -binary |
+ openssl base64
+}
+
+nubid () {
+ ## Compute a hash of the key nub in stdin, and write it to stdout in hex.
+ ## The property `nubid_hash' is used.
+
+ ## Stupid dance because the output incompatibly grew a filename, in order
+ ## to demonstrate the same idiocy as GNU mumblesum.
+ set _ $({ echo "distorted-keys nubid"; cat -; } |
+ openssl dgst -${kprop_nubid_hash-sha256})
+ echo $2
+}
+
+subst () {
+ what=$1 templ=$2 prefix=$3 pat=$4
+ ## Substitute option values into the template TEMPL. Each occurrence of
+ ## %{VAR} is replaced by the value of the variable PREFIXVAR. Finally, an
+ ## error is reported unless the final value matches the regular expression
+ ## PAT.
+
+ out=""
+ rest=$templ
+ while :; do
+
+ ## If there are no more markers to substitute, then finish.
+ case "$rest" in *"%{"*"}"*) ;; *) out=$out$rest; break ;; esac
+
+ ## Split the template into three parts.
+ left=${rest%%\%\{*} right=${rest#*\%\{}
+ var=${right%%\}*} rest=${right#*\}}
+ case "$var" in
+ *-*) default=${var#*-} var=${var%%-*} defaultp=t ;;
+ *) defaultp=nil ;;
+ esac
+
+ ## Find the variable value.
+ checkident "template variable name" "$var"
+ eval foundp=\${$prefix$var+t}
+ case $foundp,$defaultp in
+ t,*) eval value=\$$prefix$var ;;
+ ,t) value=$default ;;
+ *)
+ echo >&2 "$quis: option \`$var' unset, used in template \`$templ'"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ ## Do the substitution.
+ out=$out$left$value
+ done
+
+ ## Check the final result.
+ check "$what" "$pat" "$out"
+
+ ## Done.
+ echo "$out"
+}
+
+read_profile () {
+ owner=$1 profile=$2
+ ## Read property settings from a profile. The PROFILE name has the form
+ ## [USER:]LABEL; USER defaults to OWNER. Properties are set using
+ ## `setprops' with prefix `kprop_'.
+
+ reqtmp
+ case "$profile" in
+ :*)
+ label=${profile#:} uservp=nil
+ ;;
*)
- echo >&2 "$quis (INTERNAL): run_seccure called without tmpdir"
- exit 127
+ user=$kowner label=$profile uservp=t
+ ;;
+ *:*)
+ user=${profile%%:*} label=${profile#*:} uservp=t
+ ;;
+ esac
+ checkword "profile label" "$label"
+
+ ## Fetch the profile settings from the user.
+ reqtmp
+ case $uservp in
+ t)
+ checkword "profile user" "$user"
+ userv "$user" cryptop-profile "$label" >$tmp/profile </dev/null
+ ;;
+ nil)
+ $bindir/extract-profile "$label" $ETC/profile.d/ >$tmp/profile
;;
esac
- ## Run the program.
- set +e; seccure-$op "$@" 2>$tmp/seccure.out; rc=$?; set -e
- grep -v '^WARNING: Cannot obtain memory lock' $tmp/seccure.out >&2 || :
- return $rc
+ ## Read the file.
+ readprops $tmp/profile
}
-ec_public () {
- private=$1
- ## Write the public key corresponding to PRIVATE to stdout.
+###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### General crypto operations.
+
+c_genkey () {
+ profile=$1 kdir=$2 knub=$3 hook=$4; shift 4
+ ## Generate a key, and associate it with the named PROFILE (which is
+ ## assumed already to have been read!); store the main data in KDIR, and
+ ## the nub separately in the file KNUB; run HOOK after generation, passing
+ ## it the working key directory and nub file. Remaining arguments are
+ ## options to the key type.
+
+ ## Set options and check them.
+ setprops "option" kopt_ "$@"
+ checkprops "option" kopt_ "$k_genopts"
+
+ ## Create directory structure and start writing metadata.
+ rm -rf "$kdir.new"
+ mkdir -m755 -p "$kdir.new"
+ case "$knub" in */*) mkdir -m700 -p "${knub%/*}" ;; esac
+ cat >"$kdir.new/meta" <<EOF
+$profile
+EOF
- run_seccure key -q -cp256 -F"$private"
+ ## Generate the key.
+ umask=$(umask); umask 077; >"$knub.new"; umask $umask
+ k_generate "$kdir.new" "$knub.new"
+ $hook "$kdir.new" "$knub.new"
+
+ ## Hash the nub.
+ nubid <"$knub.new" >"$kdir.new/nubid"
+
+ ## Juggle everything into place. Doing this atomically is very difficult,
+ ## and requires more machinery than I can really justify here. If
+ ## something goes wrong halfway, it should always be possible to fix it,
+ ## either by backing out (if $kdir.new still exists) or pressing on
+ ## forwards (if not).
+ rm -rf "$kdir.old"
+ if [ -e "$kdir" ]; then mv "$kdir" "$kdir.old"; fi
+ mv "$kdir.new" "$kdir"
+ mv "$knub.new" "$knub"
+ rm -rf "$kdir.old"
}
-ec_keygen () {
- private=$1 public=$2
- ## Make a new key, write private key to PRIVATE and public key to PUBLIC.
+c_encrypt () { k_encrypt "$@"; }
+c_decrypt () {
+ if k_decrypt "$@" >$tmp/plain; then cat $tmp/plain
+ else return $?
+ fi
+}
+c_sign () { k_sign "$@"; }
+c_verify () { k_verify "$@"; }
+
+## Stub implementations.
+notsupp () { op=$1; echo >&2 "$quis: operation \`$op' not supported"; }
+k_info () { :; }
+k_encrypt () { notsupp encrypt; }
+k_decrypt () { notsupp decrypt; }
+k_sign () { notsupp sign; }
+k_verify () { notsupp verify; }
+
+prepare () {
+ key=$1 op=$2
+ ## Prepare for a crypto operation OP, using the KEY. This validates the
+ ## key label, reads the profile, and checks the access-control list. If OP
+ ## is `-' then allow the operation unconditionally.
+
+ ## Find the key properties.
+ parse_keylabel "$key"
+ if [ ! -d $kdir ]; then echo >&2 "$quis: unknown key \`$key'"; exit 1; fi
+ readmeta $kdir
+ read_profile $kowner "$profile"
+
+ ## Check whether we're allowed to do this thing. This is annoyingly
+ ## fiddly.
+ case $op in -) return ;; esac
+ eval acl=\${kprop_acl_$op-!owner}
+ verdict=forbid
+ while :; do
+
+ ## Remove leading whitespace.
+ while :; do
+ case "$acl" in
+ [[:space:]]*) acl=${acl#?} ;;
+ *) break ;;
+ esac
+ done
+
+ ## If there's nothing left, leave.
+ case "$acl" in ?*) ;; *) break ;; esac
+
+ ## Split off the leading word.
+ case "$acl" in
+ *[[:space:]]*) word=${acl%%[[:space:]]*} acl=${acl#*[[:space:]]} ;;
+ *) word=$acl acl="" ;;
+ esac
+
+ ## See what sense it has if it matches.
+ case "$word" in
+ -*) sense=forbid rest=${word#-} ;;
+ *) sense=allow rest=$word ;;
+ esac
+
+ ## See whether the calling user matches.
+ case "$rest" in
+ !owner) pat=$kowner list=$USERV_USER ;;
+ !*) echo >&2 "$quis: unknown ACL token \`$word'" ;;
+ %*) pat=${rest#%} list="$USERV_GROUP $USERV_GID" ;;
+ *) pat=$rest list="$USERV_USER $USERV_UID" ;;
+ esac
+ matchp=nil
+ for i in $list; do case "$i" in $pat) matchp=t; break ;; esac; done
+ case $matchp in t) verdict=$sense; break ;; esac
+ done
+
+ case $verdict in
+ forbid) echo >&2 "$quis: $op access to key \`$key' forbidden"; exit 1 ;;
+ esac
+}
+
+###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### Crypto operations for infrastructure purposes.
- dd if=$random bs=1 count=512 2>/dev/null |
- openssl dgst -sha384 -binary |
- (umask 077 && openssl base64 >"$private")
- ec_public "$private" >"$public"
+c_sysprofile () {
+ profile=$1
+ ## Select the profile in FILE for future crypto operations.
+
+ unset $(set | sed -n '/^kprop_/s/=.*$//p')
+ reqtmp
+ getsysprofile "$profile" >$tmp/profile
+ readprops $tmp/profile
}
-ec_encrypt () {
- public=$1; shift
- ## Encrypt stuff using the PUBLIC key. Use -i/-o or redirection.
+c_gensyskey () {
+ profile=$1 kdir=$2 knub=$3; shift 3
+ ## Generate a system key using PROFILE; store the data in KDIR and the nub
+ ## in KNUB. Remaining arguments are options.
- run_seccure encrypt -q -cp256 -m128 "$@" -- $(cat "$public")
+ c_sysprofile "$profile"
+ c_genkey "$profile" "$kdir" "$knub" : "$@"
}
-ec_decrypt () {
- private=$1; shift
- ## Decrypt stuff using the PRIVATE key. Use -i/-o or redirection.
+c_sysprepare () {
+ kdir=$1
+ readmeta "$kdir"
+ c_sysprofile "$profile"
+}
- run_seccure decrypt -q -cp256 -m128 -F"$private" "$@"
+c_sysop () {
+ op=$1 kdir=$2; shift 1
+ c_sysprepare "$kdir"
+ c_$op "$@"
}
-ec_sign () {
- private=$1; shift
- ## Sign stuff using the PRIVATE key. Use -i/-o or redirection.
+c_sysencrypt () { c_sysop encrypt "$1" /dev/null; }
+c_sysdecrypt () { c_sysop decrypt "$1" "$2"; }
+c_syssign () { c_sysop sign "$1" "$2"; }
+c_sysverify () { c_sysop verify "$1" /dev/null; }
+
+###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### Recovery operations.
+
+sharethresh () {
+ pf=$1
+ ## Return the sharing threshold from the parameter file PARAM.
- run_seccure sign -q -cp256 -F"$private" "$@"
+ read param <"$pf"
+ case "$param" in
+ shamir-params:*) ;;
+ *)
+ echo >&2 "$quis: secret sharing parameter file damaged (wrong header)"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ t=";${param#*:}"
+ case "$t" in
+ *";t="*) ;;
+ *)
+ echo >&2 "$quis: secret sharing parameter file damaged (missing t)"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ t=${t#*;t=}
+ t=${t%%;*}
+ echo "$t"
}
-ec_verify () {
- public=$1 signature=$2; shift
- ## Verify a SIGNATURE using the PUBLIC key; use -i or redirection for the
- ## input.
+stash () {
+ recov=$1 label=$2
+ ## Stash a copy of stdin encrypted under the recovery key RECOV, with a
+ ## given LABEL.
+ checkword "recovery key label" "$recov"
+ checklabel "secret" "$label"
+
+ rdir=$KEYS/recov/$recov/current
+ if [ ! -d $rdir/store ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: unknown recovery key \`$recov'"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ case $label in */*) mkdir -m755 -p $rdir/${label%/*} ;; esac
+ (c_sysencrypt $rdir/store >$rdir/$label.new)
+ mv $rdir/$label.new $rdir/$label.recov
+}
- run_seccure verify -q -cp256 "$@" -- $(cat "$public") "$signature"
+recover () {
+ recov=$1 label=$2
+ ## Recover a stashed secret, protected by RECOV and stored as LABEL, and
+ ## write it to stdout.
+ checkword "recovery key label" "$recov"
+ checklabel "secret" "$label"
+
+ rdir=$KEYS/recov/$recov/current
+ if [ ! -f $rdir/$label.recov ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: no blob for \`$label' under recovery key \`$recov'"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ reqsafe
+ nub=$SAFE/keys.reveal/$recov.current/nub
+ if [ ! -f $nub ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: current recovery key \`$recov' not revealed"
+ exit 1;
+ fi
+ mktmp
+ c_sysdecrypt $rdir/store $nub <$rdir/$label.recov
}
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Help text.
-dohelp () {
- case "$KEYS_HELP" in t) ;; *) return ;; esac
- help; exit
+defhelp () {
+ read umsg
+ usage="usage: $quis${umsg+ }$umsg"
+ help=$(cat)
+ case "$KEYS_HELP" in t) help; exit ;; esac
}
-defhelp () { read umsg; usage="usage: $quis${umsg+ }$umsg"; help=$(cat); }
help () { showhelp; }
showhelp () {
cat <<EOF
EOF
}
+usage_err () { echo >&2 "$usage"; exit 1; }
+
+###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### Subcommand handling.
+
+version () {
+ echo "$PACKAGE version $VERSION"
+}
+
+cmd_help () {
+ rc=0
+ version
+ case $# in
+ 0)
+ cat <<EOF
+
+$usage
+
+Options:
+ -h Show this help text.
+ -v Show the program version number.
+
+Commands installed:
+EOF
+ cd "$KEYSLIB"
+ for i in $prefix.*; do
+ if [ ! -x "$i" ]; then continue; fi
+ sed -n "/<<HELP/{n;s/^/ ${i#$prefix.} /;p;q;}" "$i"
+ done
+ ;;
+ *)
+ for i in "$@"; do
+ echo
+ if [ ! -x "$KEYSLIB/$prefix.$i" ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: unrecognized command \`$i'"
+ rc=1
+ continue
+ elif ! KEYS_HELP=t "$KEYSLIB/$prefix.$i"; then
+ rc=1
+ fi
+ done
+ ;;
+ esac
+ return $rc
+}
+
+dispatch () {
+ case $# in 0) echo >&2 "$usage"; exit 1 ;; esac
+ cmd=$1; shift
+ case "$cmd" in help) cmd_help "$@"; exit ;; esac
+ if [ ! -x "$KEYSLIB/$prefix.$cmd" ]; then
+ echo >&2 "$quis: unrecognized command \`$cmd'"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+
+ unset KEYS_HELP
+ exec "$KEYSLIB/$prefix.$cmd" "$@"
+}
+
###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------