X-Git-Url: https://git.distorted.org.uk/u/mdw/putty/blobdiff_plain/dda87a288bfdd67b3572a8f219c66382b1045782..0ec4b50ff9d82409f851ea04b6587c42f97f1bdb:/ssh.c

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index ba2e0753..5bea36b9 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1167,8 +1167,18 @@ static void s_wrpkt_start(Ssh ssh, int type, int len)
 
 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh)
 {
-    int pad, len, biglen, i;
+    int pad, biglen, i;
     unsigned long crc;
+#ifdef __SC__
+    /*
+     * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
+     * register allocation in this function and use the same register
+     * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results.  The
+     * following sledgehammer prevents this.
+     */
+    volatile
+#endif
+    int len;
 
     ssh->pktout.body[-1] = ssh->pktout.type;
 
@@ -1772,7 +1782,7 @@ static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
 
     if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
 	(ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
-	 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.1[01]*", imp) ))) {
+	 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
 	/*
 	 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
 	 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
@@ -2193,7 +2203,13 @@ static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
 	    return -1;
 	    break;
 	  default:
-	    if (((c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
+	    /*
+	     * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
+	     * when we're doing password input, because some people
+	     * have control characters in their passwords.o
+	     */
+	    if ((!ssh->userpass_input_echo ||
+		 (c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
 		 ((unsigned char) c >= 160))
 		&& ssh->userpass_input_bufpos < ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1) {
 		ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos++] = c;