While I'm adding explanatory comments by the coroutine macros, it

[u/mdw/putty] / ssh.c

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index ba2e075..662d521 100644 (file)
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -269,7 +269,26 @@ static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx, int type)
 
 enum { PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM };
 
-/* Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code */
+/*
+ * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
+ * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
+ * read
+ * 
+ *   http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
+ * 
+ * which explains the theory behind these macros.
+ * 
+ * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
+ * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
+ * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
+ * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
+ * 
+ *  - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
+ *  - click Settings
+ *  - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
+ *  - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
+ *    Database for Edit and Continue'.
+ */
 #define crBegin(v)     { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
 #define crState(t) \
     struct t *s; \
@@ -1167,8 +1186,18 @@ static void s_wrpkt_start(Ssh ssh, int type, int len)
 
 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh)
 {
-    int pad, len, biglen, i;
+    int pad, biglen, i;
     unsigned long crc;
+#ifdef __SC__
+    /*
+     * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
+     * register allocation in this function and use the same register
+     * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results.  The
+     * following sledgehammer prevents this.
+     */
+    volatile
+#endif
+    int len;
 
     ssh->pktout.body[-1] = ssh->pktout.type;
 
@@ -1772,7 +1801,7 @@ static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
 
     if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
        (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
-        (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.1[01]*", imp) ))) {
+        (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
        /*
         * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
         * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
@@ -2193,7 +2222,13 @@ static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
            return -1;
            break;
          default:
-           if (((c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
+           /*
+            * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
+            * when we're doing password input, because some people
+            * have control characters in their passwords.o
+            */
+           if ((!ssh->userpass_input_echo ||
+                (c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
                 ((unsigned char) c >= 160))
                && ssh->userpass_input_bufpos < ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1) {
                ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos++] = c;