unexpectedly or inconveniently, you can tell PuTTY not to respond to
those server commands.
-\S{config-features-qtitle} Disabling remote \i{window title} querying
+\S{config-features-qtitle} Response to remote \i{window title} querying
\cfg{winhelp-topic}{features.qtitle}
typed at the keyboard. This allows an attacker to fake keypresses
and potentially cause your server-side applications to do things you
didn't want. Therefore this feature is disabled by default, and we
-recommend you do not turn it on unless you \e{really} know what you
-are doing.
+recommend you do not set it to \q{Window title} unless you \e{really}
+know what you are doing.
+
+There are three settings for this option:
+
+\dt \q{None}
+
+\dd PuTTY makes no response whatsoever to the relevant escape
+sequence. This may upset server-side software that is expecting some
+sort of response.
+
+\dt \q{Empty string}
+
+\dd PuTTY makes a well-formed response, but leaves it blank. Thus,
+server-side software that expects a response is kept happy, but an
+attacker cannot influence the response string. This is probably the
+setting you want if you have no better ideas.
+
+\dt \q{Window title}
+
+\dd PuTTY responds with the actual window title. This is dangerous for
+the reasons described above.
\S{config-features-dbackspace} Disabling \i{destructive backspace}
get two warnings similar to the one above, possibly with different
encryptions.
-Single-DES is not recommended in the SSH-2 draft protocol
+Single-DES is not recommended in the SSH-2 protocol
standards, but one or two server implementations do support it.
PuTTY can use single-DES to interoperate with
these servers if you enable the \q{Enable legacy use of single-DES in
exchange (\q{rekey}). You can also force a key exchange at any time
from the Special Commands menu (see \k{using-specials}).
-\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 drafts' advice on
+\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 specs' advice on
these values? Do we want to enforce any limits?
\b \q{Max minutes before rekey} specifies the amount of time that is
Versions below 3.3 of \i{OpenSSH} require SSH-2 RSA signatures to be
padded with zero bytes to the same length as the RSA key modulus.
-The SSH-2 draft specification says that an unpadded signature MUST be
+The SSH-2 specification says that an unpadded signature MUST be
accepted, so this is a bug. A typical symptom of this problem is
that PuTTY mysteriously fails RSA authentication once in every few
hundred attempts, and falls back to passwords.