{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] & 0x60))
+ if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
fputc(buf[i], stderr);
}
while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
unsigned char *argp, argchar;
+ char *sargp;
unsigned long argint;
int arglen;
switch (argtype) {
ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
break;
case PKT_STR:
- argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
- ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, argp);
+ sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
break;
case PKT_BIGNUM:
bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
{
int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
- unsigned char *data = snewn(len, char);
+ unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
(void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
sfree(data);
ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
+ /*
+ * General notes on server version strings:
+ * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
+ * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
+ * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
+ * so we can't distinguish them.
+ */
if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
(ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
(!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
* magnitude of the password length, but it will
* introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
*
- * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
- * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
- * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
- * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
- * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
- * random data.
+ * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
+ * least in this context. For these servers, we need
+ * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
+ * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
+ * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
*
- * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
- * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
- * For this server we are left with no defences
+ * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * here _nor_ a padded password string.
+ * For these servers we are left with no defences
* against password length sniffing.
*/
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE)) {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
/*
* The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
* we can use the primary defence.
PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
} else {
/*
- * The server has _both_
- * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
- * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
- * therefore nothing we can do.
+ * The server is believed unable to cope with
+ * any of our password camouflage methods.
*/
int len;
len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
s->cur_prompt->instruction =
dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
+ * for the "old" passwords in the original and
+ * password-change messages to be the same, and
+ * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
+ * by the user entering a blank password originally
+ * and the real password subsequently, so,
+ * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
+ *
+ * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
+ * to check this field.)
+ */
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
}
/*
- * Check the two passwords match.
+ * If the user specified a new original password
+ * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
+ * one.
+ * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
+ * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
+ */
+ if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
+ memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ sfree(s->password);
+ s->password =
+ dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the two new passwords match.
*/
- got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result)
+ got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
== 0);
if (!got_new)
/* They don't. Silly user. */
dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
projects / u / mdw / putty / blobdiff