unexpectedly or inconveniently, you can tell PuTTY not to respond to
those server commands.
-\S{config-features-qtitle} Disabling remote \i{window title} querying
+\S{config-features-qtitle} Response to remote \i{window title} querying
\cfg{winhelp-topic}{features.qtitle}
typed at the keyboard. This allows an attacker to fake keypresses
and potentially cause your server-side applications to do things you
didn't want. Therefore this feature is disabled by default, and we
-recommend you do not turn it on unless you \e{really} know what you
-are doing.
+recommend you do not set it to \q{Window title} unless you \e{really}
+know what you are doing.
+
+There are three settings for this option:
+
+\dt \q{None}
+
+\dd PuTTY makes no response whatsoever to the relevant escape
+sequence. This may upset server-side software that is expecting some
+sort of response.
+
+\dt \q{Empty string}
+
+\dd PuTTY makes a well-formed response, but leaves it blank. Thus,
+server-side software that expects a response is kept happy, but an
+attacker cannot influence the response string. This is probably the
+setting you want if you have no better ideas.
+
+\dt \q{Window title}
+
+\dd PuTTY responds with the actual window title. This is dangerous for
+the reasons described above.
\S{config-features-dbackspace} Disabling \i{destructive backspace}
get two warnings similar to the one above, possibly with different
encryptions.
-Single-DES is not recommended in the SSH-2 draft protocol
+Single-DES is not recommended in the SSH-2 protocol
standards, but one or two server implementations do support it.
PuTTY can use single-DES to interoperate with
these servers if you enable the \q{Enable legacy use of single-DES in
exchange (\q{rekey}). You can also force a key exchange at any time
from the Special Commands menu (see \k{using-specials}).
-\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 drafts' advice on
+\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 specs' advice on
these values? Do we want to enforce any limits?
\b \q{Max minutes before rekey} specifies the amount of time that is
to a remote destination (\q{Local}) or \I{remote port forwarding}forward
a remote port to a local destination (\q{Remote}). Alternatively,
select \q{Dynamic} if you want PuTTY to \I{dynamic port forwarding}provide
-a local SOCKS 4/4A/5 proxy on a local port.
+a local SOCKS 4/4A/5 proxy on a local port (note that this proxy only
+supports TCP connections; the SSH protocol does not support forwarding
+\i{UDP}).
\b Enter a source \i{port number} into the \q{Source port} box. For
local forwardings, PuTTY will listen on this port of your PC. For
An ignore message (SSH_MSG_IGNORE) is a message in the SSH protocol
which can be sent from the client to the server, or from the server
to the client, at any time. Either side is required to ignore the
-message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages to hide
-the password packet in SSH-1, so that a listener cannot tell the
-length of the user's password; it also uses ignore messages for
-connection keepalives (see \k{config-keepalive}).
+message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages to
+\I{password camouflage}hide the password packet in SSH-1, so that
+a listener cannot tell the length of the user's password; it also
+uses ignore messages for connection \i{keepalives} (see
+\k{config-keepalive}).
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will stop using ignore messages. This
means that keepalives will stop working, and PuTTY will have to fall
password packet is not really a bug, but it does make life
inconvenient if the server can also not handle ignore messages.
-If this \q{bug} is detected, PuTTY will have no choice but to send
-the user's password with no form of camouflage, so that an
-eavesdropping user will be easily able to find out the exact length
+If this \q{bug} is detected, PuTTY will assume that neither ignore
+messages nor padding are acceptable, and that it thus has no choice
+but to send the user's password with no form of camouflage, so that
+an eavesdropping user will be easily able to find out the exact length
of the password. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
server, the session will succeed, but will be more vulnerable to
eavesdroppers than it could be.
Versions below 3.3 of \i{OpenSSH} require SSH-2 RSA signatures to be
padded with zero bytes to the same length as the RSA key modulus.
-The SSH-2 draft specification says that an unpadded signature MUST be
+The SSH-2 specification says that an unpadded signature MUST be
accepted, so this is a bug. A typical symptom of this problem is
that PuTTY mysteriously fails RSA authentication once in every few
hundred attempts, and falls back to passwords.
projects / u / mdw / putty / blobdiff