#include <termios.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_NO_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
#define PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS /* actually _define_ globals */
#include "putty.h"
#define MAX_STDIN_BACKLOG 4096
+void *logctx;
+
void fatalbox(char *p, ...)
{
va_list ap;
vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
cleanup_exit(1);
}
void modalfatalbox(char *p, ...)
vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
cleanup_exit(1);
}
void connection_fatal(void *frontend, char *p, ...)
vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
cleanup_exit(1);
}
void cmdline_error(char *p, ...)
return dupstr(getenv("TERM"));
if (!strcmp(name, "UserName"))
return get_username();
+ if (!strcmp(name, "SerialLine"))
+ return dupstr("/dev/ttyS0");
return NULL;
}
mode.c_iflag &= ~IXON;
mode.c_iflag &= ~IXOFF;
}
+ /*
+ * Mark parity errors and (more important) BREAK on input. This
+ * is more complex than it need be because POSIX-2001 suggests
+ * that escaping of valid 0xff in the input stream is dependent on
+ * IGNPAR being clear even though marking of BREAK isn't. NetBSD
+ * 2.0 goes one worse and makes it dependent on INPCK too. We
+ * deal with this by forcing these flags into a useful state and
+ * then faking the state in which we found them in from_tty() if
+ * we get passed a parity or framing error.
+ */
+ mode.c_iflag = (mode.c_iflag | INPCK | PARMRK) & ~IGNPAR;
tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &mode);
}
#if defined(ONOCR)
GET_BOOL("ONOCR", ONOCR, c_oflag, );
#endif
-#if defined(ONLCR)
+#if defined(ONLRET)
GET_BOOL("ONLRET", ONLRET, c_oflag, );
#endif
return osize + esize;
}
+int from_backend_untrusted(void *frontend_handle, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ /*
+ * No "untrusted" output should get here (the way the code is
+ * currently, it's all diverted by FLAG_STDERR).
+ */
+ assert(!"Unexpected call to from_backend_untrusted()");
+ return 0; /* not reached */
+}
+
+int get_userpass_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = cmdline_get_passwd_input(p, in, inlen);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ ret = console_get_userpass_input(p, in, inlen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle data from a local tty in PARMRK format.
+ */
+static void from_tty(void *vbuf, unsigned len)
+{
+ char *p, *q, *end, *buf = vbuf;
+ static enum {NORMAL, FF, FF00} state = NORMAL;
+
+ p = buf; end = buf + len;
+ while (p < end) {
+ switch (state) {
+ case NORMAL:
+ if (*p == '\xff') {
+ p++;
+ state = FF;
+ } else {
+ q = memchr(p, '\xff', end - p);
+ if (q == NULL) q = end;
+ back->send(backhandle, p, q - p);
+ p = q;
+ }
+ break;
+ case FF:
+ if (*p == '\xff') {
+ back->send(backhandle, p, 1);
+ p++;
+ state = NORMAL;
+ } else if (*p == '\0') {
+ p++;
+ state = FF00;
+ } else abort();
+ break;
+ case FF00:
+ if (*p == '\0') {
+ back->special(backhandle, TS_BRK);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Pretend that PARMRK wasn't set. This involves
+ * faking what INPCK and IGNPAR would have done if
+ * we hadn't overridden them. Unfortunately, we
+ * can't do this entirely correctly because INPCK
+ * distinguishes between framing and parity
+ * errors, but PARMRK format represents both in
+ * the same way. We assume that parity errors are
+ * more common than framing errors, and hence
+ * treat all input errors as being subject to
+ * INPCK.
+ */
+ if (orig_termios.c_iflag & INPCK) {
+ /* If IGNPAR is set, we throw away the character. */
+ if (!(orig_termios.c_iflag & IGNPAR)) {
+ /* PE/FE get passed on as NUL. */
+ *p = 0;
+ back->send(backhandle, p, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* INPCK not set. Assume we got a parity error. */
+ back->send(backhandle, p, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ p++;
+ state = NORMAL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
int signalpipe[2];
void sigwinch(int signum)
printf(" -4 -6 force use of IPv4 or IPv6\n");
printf(" -C enable compression\n");
printf(" -i key private key file for authentication\n");
+ printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -m file read remote command(s) from file\n");
printf(" -s remote command is an SSH subsystem (SSH-2 only)\n");
printf(" -N don't start a shell/command (SSH-2 only)\n");
+ printf(" -nc host:port\n");
+ printf(" open tunnel in place of session (SSH-2 only)\n");
exit(1);
}
int exitcode;
int errors;
int use_subsystem = 0;
- void *ldisc, *logctx;
+ void *ldisc;
long now;
- ssh_get_line = console_get_line;
-
fdlist = NULL;
fdcount = fdsize = 0;
/*
* Override the default protocol if PLINK_PROTOCOL is set.
*/
char *p = getenv("PLINK_PROTOCOL");
- int i;
if (p) {
- for (i = 0; backends[i].backend != NULL; i++) {
- if (!strcmp(backends[i].name, p)) {
- default_protocol = cfg.protocol = backends[i].protocol;
- default_port = cfg.port =
- backends[i].backend->default_port;
- break;
- }
+ const Backend *b = backend_from_name(p);
+ if (b) {
+ default_protocol = cfg.protocol = b->protocol;
+ default_port = cfg.port = b->default_port;
}
}
}
errors = 1;
}
} else if (*p) {
- if (!*cfg.host) {
+ if (!cfg_launchable(&cfg)) {
char *q = p;
- do_defaults(NULL, &cfg);
-
/*
* If the hostname starts with "telnet:", set the
* protocol to Telnet and process the string as a
*/
r = strchr(p, ',');
if (r) {
- int i, j;
- for (i = 0; backends[i].backend != NULL; i++) {
- j = strlen(backends[i].name);
- if (j == r - p &&
- !memcmp(backends[i].name, p, j)) {
- default_protocol = cfg.protocol =
- backends[i].protocol;
- portnumber =
- backends[i].backend->default_port;
- p = r + 1;
- break;
- }
+ const Backend *b;
+ *r = '\0';
+ b = backend_from_name(p);
+ if (b) {
+ default_protocol = cfg.protocol = b->protocol;
+ portnumber = b->default_port;
}
+ p = r + 1;
}
/*
{
Config cfg2;
do_defaults(host, &cfg2);
- if (loaded_session || cfg2.host[0] == '\0') {
+ if (loaded_session || !cfg_launchable(&cfg2)) {
/* No settings for this host; use defaults */
/* (or session was already loaded with -load) */
strncpy(cfg.host, host, sizeof(cfg.host) - 1);
if (errors)
return 1;
- if (!*cfg.host) {
+ if (!cfg_launchable(&cfg)) {
usage();
}
cfg.host[p1] = '\0';
}
- if (!cfg.remote_cmd_ptr && !*cfg.remote_cmd)
+ if (!cfg.remote_cmd_ptr && !*cfg.remote_cmd && !*cfg.ssh_nc_host)
flags |= FLAG_INTERACTIVE;
/*
* Select protocol. This is farmed out into a table in a
* separate file to enable an ssh-free variant.
*/
- {
- int i;
- back = NULL;
- for (i = 0; backends[i].backend != NULL; i++)
- if (backends[i].protocol == cfg.protocol) {
- back = backends[i].backend;
- break;
- }
- if (back == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Internal fault: Unsupported protocol found\n");
- return 1;
- }
+ back = backend_from_proto(cfg.protocol);
+ if (back == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Internal fault: Unsupported protocol found\n");
+ return 1;
}
/*
FD_SET_MAX(signalpipe[0], maxfd, rset);
if (connopen && !sending &&
- back->socket(backhandle) != NULL &&
+ back->connected(backhandle) &&
back->sendok(backhandle) &&
back->sendbuffer(backhandle) < MAX_STDIN_BACKLOG) {
/* If we're OK to send, then try to read from stdin. */
char buf[4096];
int ret;
- if (connopen && back->socket(backhandle) != NULL) {
+ if (connopen && back->connected(backhandle)) {
ret = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret < 0) {
perror("stdin: read");
back->special(backhandle, TS_EOF);
sending = FALSE; /* send nothing further after this */
} else {
- back->send(backhandle, buf, ret);
+ if (local_tty)
+ from_tty(buf, ret);
+ else
+ back->send(backhandle, buf, ret);
}
}
}
try_output(1);
}
- if ((!connopen || back->socket(backhandle) == NULL) &&
+ if ((!connopen || !back->connected(backhandle)) &&
bufchain_size(&stdout_data) == 0 &&
bufchain_size(&stderr_data) == 0)
break; /* we closed the connection */
projects / u / mdw / putty / blobdiff