X-Git-Url: https://git.distorted.org.uk/u/mdw/catacomb/blobdiff_plain/990dafb1c3a66076a1b3d66b901395ebc24de277..f9e5133271af9c7a63be8584e4c2705adb241bc2:/catcrypt.c diff --git a/catcrypt.c b/catcrypt.c index fdb8473..8468552 100644 --- a/catcrypt.c +++ b/catcrypt.c @@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ #include "ectab.h" #include "ptab.h" -/*----- Utilities ---------------------------------------------------------*/ - /*----- Static variables --------------------------------------------------*/ static const char *keyring = "keyring"; @@ -75,12 +73,13 @@ static const char *keyring = "keyring"; * MGF (or similar) to make a symmetric encryption and MAC key. * * If the message is signed, there comes a signature chunk. The signature is - * on the further output of the MGF. This means that the recipient can - * modify the message and still have a valid signature, so it's not useful - * for proving things to other people; but it also means that the recipient - * knows that the message is from someone who knows the hash, which limits - * the possiblities to (a) whoever encrypted the message (good!) and (b) - * whoever knows the recipient's private key. + * on the header and key-encapsulation chunks, and further output of the MGF. + * This means that the recipient can modify the message and still have a + * valid signature, so it's not useful for proving things to other people; + * but it also means that the recipient knows that the message is from + * someone who knows the hash, which limits the possiblities to (a) whoever + * encrypted the message (good!) and (b) whoever knows the recipient's + * private key. * * Then come message chunks. Each one begins with a MAC over an implicit * sequence number and the ciphertext. The final chunk's ciphertext is @@ -231,6 +230,7 @@ static int encrypt(int argc, char *argv[]) buf_putu32(&b, k->id); if (sk) buf_putu32(&b, sk->id); assert(BOK(&b)); + if (s) GH_HASHBUF16(s->h, BBASE(&b), BLEN(&b)); chunk_write(e, &b); /* --- Build the KEM chunk --- */ @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ static int encrypt(int argc, char *argv[]) die(EXIT_FAILURE, "failed to encapsulate key"); buf_init(&b, d.buf, d.len); BSTEP(&b, d.len); + if (s) GH_HASHBUF16(s->h, BBASE(&b), BLEN(&b)); chunk_write(e, &b); /* --- Write the signature chunk --- */ @@ -415,6 +416,15 @@ static int decrypt(int argc, char *argv[]) if (verb) printf("FAIL malformed header: junk at end\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } + if (sk) { + s = getsig(sk, "ccsig", 0); + if (!(f & f_nocheck) && verb && (err = s->ops->check(s)) != 0) { + dstr_reset(&d); + key_fulltag(sk, &d); + printf("WARN verification key %s fails check: %s\n", d.buf, err); + } + GH_HASHBUF16(s->h, BBASE(&b), BSZ(&b)); + } /* --- Find the key --- */ @@ -427,15 +437,11 @@ static int decrypt(int argc, char *argv[]) if (verb) printf("FAIL failed to decapsulate key\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } + if (s) GH_HASHBUF16(s->h, d.buf, d.len); /* --- Verify the signature, if there is one --- */ if (sk) { - s = getsig(sk, "ccsig", 0); - dstr_reset(&d); - key_fulltag(sk, &d); - if (!(f & f_nocheck) && verb && (err = s->ops->check(s)) != 0) - printf("WARN verification key %s fails check: %s\n", d.buf, err); dstr_reset(&d); dstr_ensure(&d, 1024); GC_ENCRYPT(cx, 0, d.buf, 1024);